Republic of the Philippines their official functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and claimed

asked for the dismissal of the case and claimed moral

SUPREME COURT damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P165,000.00 (Answer with
Manila Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).
SECOND DIVISION
For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of
G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992 the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals,
ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses. He also
vs. demanded actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees (Answer, pp.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS 77-78).
REYES, respondents.
During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza of the case in the
NOCON, J.:
lower court, Mendoza was in possession of the subject lots and had cultivated the
same. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent the harvesting of the palay crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to deposit the
Court's decision promulgated on November 22, 1990, 1 which affirmed with modification the net harvest (after deducting from the expenses incurred), in a bonded warehouse
agrarian court's decision promulgated January 10, 1990, 2 which ordered them and the other of the locality subject to the disposition of the court. 3
defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to
private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Said respondent court's decision is now final
The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's decision
and executory as to Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the
with the modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it.
respondent court, since they did not appeal the same.

The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which was modified, states as follows:
Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of the respondent Court, the same shall
be quoted verbatim and are as follows:
It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio
Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the
Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000
square meters and 19,000 square meters, respectively. Devoted to the production
of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of
plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded
him as bona fidetenant of the subject lots; that between July 7 to July 15, 1984,
Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her
daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth,
from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the
instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus
violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery
of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the
meantime.
Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or
appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied
interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant
Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. Claiming that they
have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge of
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants:
On the Mandatory Injunction:
1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the landholding subject of the
action to the plaintiff and enjoining said defendants and any person claiming under
them to desist from molesting them or interfering with the possession and
cultivation of the landholding descriptive in paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare
Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969
square meters, more or less, owned by a certain Juan Mendoza, and
devoted principally to the production of palay, as evidenced by a
Certification from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued on July 30,
1984.
2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of the two landholding in
question and to respect the tenancy rights of plaintiff with respect to the same;
b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto plaintiff 220 cavans of
palay or its equivalent in cash of P33,000.00 from the principal crop year of 1984,
 and every harvest time until defendants finally vacate and surrender possession
and cultivation of the landholding in question to plaintiff.
c) the prayer for moral damages, not having been sufficiently proved, the same is
denied.
d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
The awards herein provided should first be satisfied from the deposits of the
harvests ordered by the Court from which the planting and harvesting expenses
have been paid to defendant Olympio Mendoza; and if said net deposits with the
Court or the warehouses as ordered by the Court are insufficient, then the balance
should be paid by defendants, jointly and severally. 4
Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
present for the consideration of the Court:
[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held liable, jointly and severally, with
the other defendants, for the harvests of the litigated property, Lot No. 46, or the
money equivalent thereof starting from the principal crop years of 1984 and every
harvest time thereafter until the possession and cultivation of the aforestated
landholding are finally surrendered to the private respondent. 5
It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio
Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block
2, Psd-38453 of the bahay Pare Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No.
106 of the estate, which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio
Mendoza's father, Juan, and which he later donated to the barangay Bahay Pare of
Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction of the Bahay Pare Barangay High School. 6 As to
their supposed participation in the dispossession of private respondent from the disputed
landholding, petitioners present the September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal
Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S.
No. 8576, 7 wherein private respondent's complaint against petitioners and the other
defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D. 5838 was dismissed, to show that private
respondent's "point is already settled and considered closed." 9 lastly, petitioners claim that
they were included in the present controversy so that their political career would be
destroyed.10
Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and contend that it was petitioners who
conspired with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only from Lot
No. 46 but also from Lot No. 106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot No. 46 from where
they were ejected and dispossessed, so much so that even if Farmlot No. 106 was removed
by the Court of Appeals from the judgment, as Farmlot No. 46 was harvesting palay worth
at least P33,000.00 per year since 1989, private respondents, who are entitled to the
possession and peaceful enjoyment of the farmlot as provided for in Section 23 of the
Agrarian Reform Law, should be compensated for the lost income by the petitioners who are
solidarily liable with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo. 11
We find for the private respondents.
It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already presented
and evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent appellate court.
Said evidence served as basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate court's findings of
fact. We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead put finis to the factual
findings in this case. Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 12 absent the exceptions which
do not obtain in the instant case. 13
We agree with the appellate court in its retiocination, which We adopt, on why it has to
dismiss the appeal. Said the Court:
In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she "is the tenant of Farm Lots Nos.
46 and 106 Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square meters, more or less . . ." (Complaint,
Record, vol. 1, p.1). However, during Violeta's testimony, she clarified that actually
only Lot No. 106, which contains an area of P19,000 square meters, is not included
in this controversy (T.S.N., August 10, 1989, p. 5; May 8, 1989, p. 12). This
statement was corroborated by plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Arturo Rivera, who
informed the court that the 19,000 square meter lot is subject of a pending case
before the MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga (Ibid., p. 15). The inconsistency between
the averment of the complaint and the testimony of the witness should not only
because there was no showing that she intended to mislead defendants and even
the trial court on the subject matter of the suit. It would in the complaint since
together with Lot 106 had been include in the complaint since together with Lot 46,
it is owned by Olympio's father.
We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other
appellants in the dispossession of appellee. They not only knew Olympio
personally, some of them were even asked by Olympio to help him cultivate the
land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olympio, together with
his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from entering the land
through "strong arm methods". (Decision of RTC, records, vol. II p. 564).
Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the
affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C") although the
affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D.
No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases
even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and
counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".
 Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than
substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section
18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No.
34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226,
the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant
evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to
be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by
stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or
circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment
or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight
of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief. 14
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
November 22, 1990 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137757. August 14, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODEGELIO TURCO, JR.,
aka TOTONG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of
rape in Criminal Case No. 2349-272, Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the
9th Judicial Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan, under the following Information:
That on or about the 8th day of July, 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
viz., at Km. 6, Begang Barangay, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, Philippines,
the above-named accused, by the use of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab the undersigned complainant by her neck, cover her
mouth and forcibly make her lie down, after which the said accused mounted on top of her
and removed her short pant and panty. Thereafter, the said accused, by the use of force,
threat and intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of the undersigned complainant
and finally succeeded to have carnal knowledge of her, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
( 17-19, id). Escelea tried to resist by moving her body but to no avail. Appellant succeeded
p. 6, Rollo.)
At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty, after which trial ensued.
The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of
its witnesses - Alejandra Tabada, mother of the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the
police officer who investigated the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brother-in-law of the victim;
Escelea Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos Santos Timorata, the medical
record clerk who used to be the medical officer under Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang, the
physician who physically examined the victim after the incident - is abstracted in the
Appellee's Brief in this wise:
Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower Begang, Isabela,
Basilan, their houses being only about sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n.; August
19, 1996). Escelea was then staying with her father, Alejandro and her deaf grandmother,
Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve (12) years and six (6) months old at the time of
incident, having been born on December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id).
The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven o'clock (7:00
p.m.) in the evening, Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She was accompanied by a certain
Cory Macapili, the granddaughter of her neighbor, Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).
Cory left upon reaching Escelea's home. Escelea went upstairs to join her grandmother who
was already sleeping in the room. About to enter the said room, Escelea heard a call from
outside. She recognized the voice and when she asked who was it, the party introduced
himself as the appellant, viz:
Q. After you heard your named was mentioned, what did you say if any?
A. I answered: "Who is that?"
Q. Did the person calling your name answer you?
A. I heard, sir, "me Totong".
Q. When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong" you are referring
to whom?
A. Rodegelio, sir.
(p. 15, id; Underscoring supplied)
She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for four (4) years and
appellant is her second cousin (p. 34, id). Unaware of the danger that was about to befall
her, Escelea forthwith opened the door. Appellant Turco, with the use of towel, covered
Escelea's face. Appellant, aside from covering the victim's mouth, even placed his right hand
on the latter's neck.
Appellant bid Eseelea to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which
was about twelve (12) meters away from the victim's house, appellant lost no time in laying
the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her shortpants and panty (pp.
in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea's private part. The
victim felt terrible pain (p. 20, id). Still dissatisfied, after consummating the act, appellant
kissed and held the victim's breast. Thereafter, appellant threatened her that he will kill her
if she reports the incident to anybody, thus:
"He threatened me, that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you.
(p. 21, id; Underscoring supplied)
Finally, after having satisfied his lust, appellant hurriedly went home. Escelea, on the other
hand, upon reaching home, discovered that her shortpants and panty were filled with blood
(p. 23, id). For almost ten (10) days, she just kept to herself the harrowing experience until
July 18, 1995 when she was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law,
Orlando Pioquinto, about the said incident. Orlando in turn informed Alejandro, the victim's
father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked
Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination (p. 27, id).
Escelea was accompanied by her sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the Provincial Hospital. She
was examined by Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang. After the issuance of the medical certificate,
they went to Isabela Municipal Station and filed Escelea's complaint against appellant (pp.
30-33, id).
(pp. 97-100, Rollo.)
The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her
granddaughter Corazon Macapili, and accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied
the charge. The defense that the victim and him were sweethearts was also advanced.
Leonora Cabase mentioned this in her direct testimony.
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held:
While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora Cabase was trying
to project that the complainant Escelea Tabada and the accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. are
sweethearts. In the case of People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA 285, the Supreme Court agrees
with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of appellant in order to
exculpate himself from criminal liability. The claim of voluntary love affair is an affirmative
defense, the allegation of a love affair needed proof. Nowhere in the record of the case that
the same was substantiated, though mentioned by Mrs. Leonora Cabase. The accused
and/or his witnesses must present any token of the alleged relationship like love notes,
mementos or pictures and the like. Such bare allegation of the defense, not to mention its
utter lack of proof, is incredulous. It is hard to understand how such a relationship could
exculpate a person from the rape of a terrified young child barely a little over the age of
twelve (12) years old. Indeed, a love relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule out
force (People vs. Sergio Betonio, G.R. No. 119165, September 26, 1997, Case Digests of
Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 1-29, 1997, pp. 695-697).
There are guiding principles in rape cases as cited in People vs. Victor Abrecinoz, G.R. No.
122474, October 17, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1,
October 2-31, 1997, pp. 157-160, and they are: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the
credibility of the complainant is a paramount importance, and if her testimony proves
credible, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
It should be noted that the complainant and the accused are second degree cousin or they
are sixth civil degree relatives. The mother of the accused is a first degree cousin of the
father of the complainant. In the culture of the Filipino family on extended family, the
relationship between the complainant and the accused being only second degree cousin, it
becomes the duty of an older relative (the accused) to protect and care for a younger relative
(the complainant). It is very hard to understand or comprehend why a cousin files a case of
rape against her cousin, unless it is true. There is no showing that there was compelling
motive why the case be filed against the accused, except that the rape really happened.
xxx xxx xxx
It is noted that there was no underlying reason why the complainant and/or her father would
bring an action against the accused, except that the accused had raped Escelea Tabada on
July 8, 1995, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. If it were not true that she was raped by
the accused, why would she expose herself to an embarrassment and traumatic experience
connected with the litigation of this rape case. We are aware of the Filipino culture especially
on virginity. We likened it as a mirror, once dropped and broken, it can no longer be pieced
together ... not ever. This is true among the Filipino folks that the complainant belonged,
poor and helpless and everything is entrusted to God. The complainant is a young girl, a
little over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III
only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go
to a house of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show ... and expose herself
to the danger of the dark night. All said, it is very difficult to be poor. Going to the court is a
shout for help ... let us try to hear it.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation, this court finds the accused
"GUILTY" of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral
damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 33-37, Rollo.)
In accused-appellant's brief, he assigns the following alleged errors:
 I Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 [1998]; People vs. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75 [1998]; People vs. Sta.
Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]).
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE
Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of
ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
rape is the credibility of complainant's testimony.
COMPLAINANT ESCELEA TABADA AND HER WITNESS.
The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years
II old and almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family
cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of a neighbor for
the meager joy of seeing a television show ... and exposes herself to the danger of the dark
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
night." But verily, age, youth, and poverty are not guarantees of credibility. Hence, thorough
THE PROSECUTION, BASED ON THE AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL TESTIMONIES OF
scrutiny must be made by the Court.
THE COMPLAINANT AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO PROVED [sic] BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE Complainant narrated the incident in this wise:
AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT.
Q While you went upstairs and about to enter the room of your grandmother, did you hear anything?
A Yes, sir.
III Q What was that?
A I heard a call, sir.
Q How was the call made?
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING A It is just by saying: "Lea".
THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO Q After you heard your name was mentioned, what did you say if any?
INDEMNIFY THE COMPLAINANT THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00 REPRESENTING A I answered: "Who is that?"
MORAL DAMAGES BASED ON THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE Q Did the person calling your name answer you?
A I heard, sir, "me Totong".
PROSECUTION.
Q When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong", you are referring to whom?
A Rodegelio, sir.
(p. 101, Rollo.) Q When you say "Rodegelio", you are referring to Rodegelio Turco, Jr., the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q After the person calling your name "Lea" identified himself as "Totong", what did you do?
He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable A I opened the door, sir.
doubt considering that other than the written statement of the complainant before the Police Q And when you opened the door, what happened next?
Station of Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, and her A Totong with the use of towel covered my face, sir.
Q Aside from covering your face with a towel, what else did he do?
testimony during direct examination, no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove A He covered my mouth, sir.
that there was ever rape at all; that she only presumed that it was accused-appellant who Q Aside from covering your mouth, what else did he do?
attacked her since she admitted that immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator A He placed his right hand on my neck, sir.
hastily covered her face with a towel; that nothing in her testimony clearly and convincingly Q Aside from placing his right hand ... when he placed his right hand on your neck, where was he? Was he
infront or behind?
shows that she was able to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator; that complainant
A He was at my back, sir.
implicated accused-appellant only because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that no Q After placing his right hand on your neck behind you, what did "Totong" do next with that position?
actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering A He covered my mouth, sir.
that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the Q After covering your mouth and face, what did he do next?
same was not presented in court to explain the same. A He told me to walk, sir.
Q Where did he bring you?
We agree with the trial court. A I don't know exactly where he brought me, sir.
Q But you know very well that he brought you to a certain place?
As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding principles in the review of A I don't know exactly the place where he brought me, sir.
Q Is it far from your house where you were forcibly taken?
rape cases, to wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove
A Yes, sir.
but more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the Q Do you have a copra kiln?
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:
testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for The witness already answered that she does not know where she was brought, leading, Your Honor.
the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q According to you, from your house you were brought by the accused to a place which you do not know?
from the weakness of the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590 [1998]; People vs.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What place? Q After the accused had raised your shortpants and panty, embraced you, kissed you and hold your breast,
A Pig pen, Your Honor. did he tell you anything?
Q Do you know the owner, of that pig pen? A He threatened me, "that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you."
A Our pig pen, Your Honor. Q In what dialect? In Chavacano, sir.
Q Who owned that pig pen? A After the accused embraced you, kissed you and hold your nipple and threatened you in Chavacano
A My father, Your Honor. dialect, what happened next after that?
Q How far is that pig pen to your house? No more, sir.
A (From this witness stand to that road outside of this building).
COURT:
It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue. (tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.)
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: (Continuing)
Q You stated in answer to the question of the Honorable Court that you were brought to the pig pen or the On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent confusion when the
place where you were sexually abused, were you place inside or outside?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:
defense counsel asked her about the events that transpired before the ill-fated July 8, 1995.
Leading, Your Honor. The query prompted her to narrate the incident prior to said date when she also watched
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: television at the home of Leonora Cabase, and that when she arrived home, accused-
I will withdraw. appellant came and called her "Lea" and when she asked who was it, he answered "so
Q Will you please explain to the Court what particular place of the pig pen that you were brought by the
Totong". When she asked what he wanted, he said he wanted to borrow a guitar. She said
accused?
A Inside the grasses, sir. that she could not lend him the guitar since her father was not yet around. He insisted but to
Q When you were already inside the grasses near this pig pen, what did the accused do to you? no avail, and hence he just went home. She went to sleep afterwards. On re-direct
A He put me down, sir. examination, she clarified that when accused-appellant came to borrow the guitar on July 8,
Q When you were already down on the ground, what did the accused do next? 1995, it was about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Lastly, she said that the incident of the
A He mounted on me, sir.
borrowing of the guitar and the incident that transpired at 7 o'clock in the evening on July 8,
Q And when the accused was already on top of you, what did he do next?
A He molested me, sir. 1995 were separate incidents.
Q Before he molested you, did he remove anything from your body?
A Yes, sir. Significantly, three things could be perceived: complainant's youth, her apparent
Q What? confusion concerning the events that transpired, and her fear of both accused-appellant and
A My shortpants and panty, sir. her father.
Q You stated that the accused while on top of you removed your pants and panty, did he totally remove it
from your body? At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of
A Yes, sir. rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294
Q After removing your shortpants and panty, what else did the accused do?
A He abused me, sir.
SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature girls from
Q You said that he abused you, how did he abuse your? the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what
A He put his private part inside my private part, sir. transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
Q When the accused was on top of you and he forcibly abused you, what did you do? embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they
A I tried to move my body, sir.
testified were not true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In addition, we take
Q While you were trying to move your body and while the accused was on top of you, what did the accused
do? cognizance of the trial court's observation on the segment of the Filipino society to which the
A He tried to insert his private part to my private part, sir. victim belongs - almost illiterate, having attended school up to the third grade only, and so
Q And was he able to insert his private part? poor that she had to go to a neighbor's house to watch television, yet one who values her
A Yes, sir. virginity which like a "mirror, once dropped and broken ... can no longer be pieced together
Q What did you feel when his private part was already inside your private part?
... not ever," this being "true among the Filipino folks [to which] complainant belonged, poor
A I felt pain, sir.
Q Will you please explain why you felt when the private part of the accused was already inside your private and helpless everything is entrusted to God" (p. 35, Rollo).
part?
A I felt pain when he already finished, sir. The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony,
Q By the way, before July 8, 1995, were you had been raped? Will you please tell us whether you have having intermingled two incidents. Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the record
already experienced or you have already your menstruation at that time? that the defense counsel may have contributed to this confusion when he asked the victim
A No, sir. what transpired "before" the incident (tsn, August 19, 1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a witness'
Q Now you stated to the Honorable Court ... after the accused had sexually abused you and you said you
felt pains after he consumated the sexual act, after that what did he do next after consumating the
testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so
act? humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478
A After consumating his desire, he raised my panty and shortpants then he kissed me and hold my nipple, [1998]).Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an
sir. offense is not something which enhances one's life experience as to be worth recalling or
reliving but, rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma
upon the victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or subconscious mind would
prefer to forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). These lapses do not detract from
the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the
malefactor (People vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Further, the testimony of a witness
must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or
isolated passages therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).
The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-
appellant. Her testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court (People
vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman, especially one of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter
pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251
[1998]).
Another point to consider is the blood relationship between accused-appellant and the
victim. At this juncture, we reiterate the trial court's observation thereon - the mother of
accused-appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father, that makes the victim
and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree relatives. Filipino culture,
particularly in the provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit and recognizes the
obligation of an older relative to protect and take care of a younger one. On the contrary, in
the instant case, the victim initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If the charge were not
true, it is indeed difficult to understand why the victim would charge her own cousin as the
malefactor. Too, she having no compelling motive to file said case against accused-
appellant, the conclusion that the rape really happened is logically reinforced.
As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state
that the delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue
is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the victim's fear of her father
who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She testified that she did not disclose the
incident to her father because of fear both of her father as well as of accused-appellant (tsn,
August 19, 1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction is typical of a twelve-year-old girl and only
strengthens her credibility.
The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are a few points
presented by the defense that must be passed upon:
1. Other than their blood relationship, was there an intimate relationship between
accused-appellant and the victim? The theory initially advanced by the defense in the
proceedings before the court a quo is the "sweetheart theory". In this regard, .we agree with
the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of accused-appellant in
order to exculpate himself from criminal liability. In People vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15
[1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and self-serving
where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous
affair with the victim. Hence, the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support
of the theory that he and the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such
as tokens, mementos, and photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of
the bankruptcy of this theory that accused-appellant has not insisted on this defense in his
brief, seemingly abandoning this line.
We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was
between accused-appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate relationship but
by their blood relationship. Hence, it is noticeable that on the day of the incident, when
accused-appellant called upon the victim and the latter asked who he was, the victim knew
right away that her caller was accused-appellant when the latter replied "Si Totong".
Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any blood relation with the
victim Escelea Tabada and touched on the apparent friendship between them, as follows:
Q You mentioned earlier that you know the complainant, why do you know the complainant Escelea
Tabada?
A I only know her when I was already in jail, sir.
Q You mean to say that you never knew the complainant before you were arrested?
A I do not know her, sir.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q Why, are you not related to the Tabadas?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III: (Continuing)
Q Have you ever seen the complainant in Begang?
A The complainant is at Begang, sir.
Q And you mentioned that you were not related with the complainant, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q So, in other words, Mr. Witness, you and the complainant Escelea Tabada were already friends?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43.)
However, on cross-examination, he notably crumbled:
Q Now, you stated in your direct examination that you are not related to the Tabadas in San Antonio
Begang, Isabela, Basilan, is that right?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that your mother is the first cousin of the father of Escelea Tabada?
A They are cousins, sir.
Q So, indeed you are related to the Tabadas?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, when you said that you are not related to the Tabadas, you were not telling the truth?
A Yes, sir.
(ibid, p. 51.)
2. Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented that the rape actually
happened since the medico-legal officer who prepared the medical certificate was not
presented in court to explain the same.
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical
certificate issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While
the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official
records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert
witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in
court to show his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility
of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court)
or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and
competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the
weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus,
while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely,
evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule
forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p. 550).
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining
physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical
certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion" as well as
"foul-smelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen secondary to rape" [p. 68,
Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing
alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369
SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the
prosecution of rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs.
Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The absence of medical
findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs.
Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is
proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is
credible and sufficient to convict.
As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by the trial court in
favor of Escelea Tabada as indemnification (P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the rape is
incomplete based on established jurisprudence and must be modified. In People vs.
Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we held that the award of P50,000.00 to the victim as
indemnity for rape not committed or qualified by any of the circumstances under the Death
Penalty Law, needs no proof other than the conviction of the accused for the raped proved.
This is different from the P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages which also needs no
pleading or proof as basis thereof (People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
that accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. aka "Totong" is ordered to indemnify the
offended party, Escelea Tabada, in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in
addition to the sum of P50,000.00 already awarded by the trial court as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
COMPETENCE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone
is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two
parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not
disputed by the petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with
the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to
his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his
regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the
request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the
problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally
the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant
enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been
increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together
with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case
for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco
Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don
Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed
against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's
affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed
later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical
School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the
mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10,
1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife
at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier
alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion
which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both
Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were
each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the
petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private
in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the
extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided
in Rep. Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and
raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension
telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c)
whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation
and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed
in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record,
wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in
any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of
evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a
telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone
and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison
sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged
attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and
accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between
one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is
also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and
overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously,
complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged
demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault
charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another
lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal
conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the
listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would
be the word of the caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and
the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone
users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to
pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police
authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own
telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely
the law was never intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of
the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a
device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months
to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public
officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses'
telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business
conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded
message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party
line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the
same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in
1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate,
telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the
most popularly known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on
the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made
of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described."
The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted
from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the
term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion
of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a
movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a
main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from
one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the
desired communication corning from the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must
be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office
use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern,
Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms
of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to
agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful
ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in
paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the
Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of
the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will
ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience that
usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and
that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood
alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are
 centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW
383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the
same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping
the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot
be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are
not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a
telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be
moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely
presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a
telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v.
United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may
cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a
telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension
telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes
place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain.
Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way
if instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out
of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to
use an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension
telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be
construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of
the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
(United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin
Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v.
Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The
purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro,
20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp.
183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a
legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of
the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our
lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device
or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the
act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which
is certainly objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment
which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less
possible with the amendment than without it, because with the
amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of
government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With
this amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials
and the person in fact would have the right to tape record their
conversation.
Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party
could record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay,
who is more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these
cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace
offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions,
with an agent outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there
is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to record or make a recording
in any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the
evidence is not very much.
Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the
presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we
could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be wonderful.
 But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other
electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will
be used in court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12,
1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment,
persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from
installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or
gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of
listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices
in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone
is not among such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Efren A. Santos for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the
decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of
the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to
Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits
"A" to "M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence
on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered
evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the present
petition, which in part reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof
can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are
presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of
truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error
in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is
interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling
should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not
through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it
exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and
not by certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry spectacle of a case being
subject of a counterproductive "ping-pong" to and from the appellate court as often
as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its rulings with respect
to evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This we cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby
DISMISSED. 1
From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition
10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor previous
decision of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court as the question of admissibility in evidence of tape
recordings has not, thus far, been addressed and decided squarely by
the Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals
has likewise rendered a decision in a way not in accord with law and with applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in nature, the same
can still be [the] subject of a petition for certiorari. 2
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory
order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence
offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of
petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such
tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are
as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections
of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same,
the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2
thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6)
years for violation of said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability
of American jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes
are inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood"
and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording
of the confrontation made by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na
kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang
gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik
sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin
ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00
p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your
own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply
alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo
ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano
ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo
ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede
ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil
tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas
ka na. Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October
6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation
of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A.
4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2)
the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the
instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision
of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the
unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her
act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said
act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy
to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge
of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or
special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties
but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the
act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would
you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill
or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair,
it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board
of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the
 parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are
being made should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please
be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness
and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you
are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill
as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized
under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is
the communication between one person and another person not between a
speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which
are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to
rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably
used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversationsare
often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured
by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must
have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must
have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in
the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals free
from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of
telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of
overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because
a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly
in favor of the accused."20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and
the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous
and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
JUDICIAL NOTICE Area Monthly
Amt. due from
NAME date of delinquency
in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT 1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97
Manila
EN BANC 2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, 3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36
vs.
GERARDO GARCIA CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO 4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24
NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA SIMEON DILIMAN,
5. Aquilino Barrios
AQUILINO BARRIOS LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA 54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz)
LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE
BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA,
6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40
MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIO
SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, 7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34
ANA DEQUIZ (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO,
FELICIDAD MIRANDA EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants. 8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38
Mauricio Z. Alunan for defendants-appellants.
City Fiscal's Office for plaintiff-appellee. 9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18

10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to

SANCHEZ, J.: lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering 11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26
Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles
Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants 12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34
entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses
13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88
of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the
necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present. 14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, 15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44
defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz,
Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, 16. Honorio Berio 24.00 1.92 188.16
Honorio Berio, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of
17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98
defendant Carandang) were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each
labeled "lease contract" to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein 18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68
set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A.
Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on January 29 and March Paid up to
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants exhibited none. March 1962.

20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84

For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1wph1.t
21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40
Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:
22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60

23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48
P7,580.69
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property.
Came the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On September 14, 1961,
plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city
property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or
improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each
defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason
of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to
recover possession.2
The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts
heretofore indicated opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals from
March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises, and the costs. Defendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court
properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that
the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963
Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de
los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at
the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision
under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that
there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he
cited the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within
its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. 3 Such was done here.
Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory
stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this
purpose.4
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken
because the was duty bound to take judicial notice5 of Ordinance 4566. The
reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take
judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. 6 And,
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of
P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction.
Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that
they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are
recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to
heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the
premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot
be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there
was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not
justify reversal of the judgment below.7
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They
are wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the
knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are
squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has
become a widespread vice. It was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose problems
of health, sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that
respect for the law and the rights of others, even those of the government, are
being flouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the pernicious act of
occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to their interests without
as much as leave, and even against the will, of the owner. They are emboldened
seemingly because of their belief that they could violate the law with impunity. The
pugnaciousness of some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The
latter are thus prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means.
Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, of course, that
intrusion into property, government or private, is wrong. But, then, the mills of
justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who, by means, fair or foul, are quite
often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible
entry into government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of some public
officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these squatters is difficult
to explain unless it is spawned by official tolerance, if not outright encouragement
or protection. Said squatters have become insensible to the difference between
right and wrong. To them, violation of law means nothing. With the result that
squatting still exists, much to the detriment of public interest. It is high time that, in
this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It is in this environment that we
look into the validity of the permits granted defendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors
in 1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these
defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now
elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located
permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred
to remain on city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal,
without permits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of
the City of Manila.9
Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question.
It is our considered view that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible
entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that
matter, executing leases.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials
will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official
permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of conduct.
Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It
does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in
vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore,
be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits,
written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.
3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the
premises. They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school
purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school
children in the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the
city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good.
The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount. 10
In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute
public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use
of the property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education
of the youth of the land.11 They shackle the hands of the government and thus
obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and
maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to
"provide at least free public primary instruction".12
Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public
nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities
themselves, even without the aid of the courts.13
4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
They say that the case should have been started in the municipal court. They prop
up their position by the averment that notice for them to vacate was only served in
September, 1961, and suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. We have reached the conclusion that their forcible
entry dates back to the period from 1945 to 1947. That entry was not legalized by
the permits. Their possession continued to remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was
filed long after the one-year limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the
Manila Court of First Instance has jurisdiction. 14
Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against defendants-
appellants. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971
GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation of her minor
children, DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA
JALAGAT and EMMANUEL JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.
Bonifacio P. Legaspi for plaintiff-appellant.
Cecilio P. Luminarias for defendants-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which
has not as yet been the subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not on a motion to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower
court may take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in the prior
judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance
is thus called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff,
now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion
to dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or
case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil
Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now
deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the very defendants in the
instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7,
1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel
Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the
same property and practically the same parties as defendants are the widow and the
children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That
the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one, has
already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable
Court [dated December 6, 1965]."1 There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on
March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for
dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was
nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on September
26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to dismiss filed
by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that
plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds to be well-
founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against
Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they
have derived their rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule
17 of the new Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the
instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The
Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent
action against the same parties over the same issues and the same subject-matter by the
same plaintiff. [So ordered]"2 Hence, this appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in accordance with
law.
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised in a motion to
dismiss when such ground does not appear on the face of the complaint. What immediately
calls attention in the rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of
applicant is that there was no denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe
that there was a previous dismissal the same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-
in-interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased
husband of one of them and father of the rest. There was no denial either of the property
involved being the same and of the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would
show that appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore futile for
the court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior judgment certainly binding
on appellant. What then was there for the lower court to do? Was there any sense in its
being engaged in what was essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was predictible?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would
sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even
to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice
of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by
it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such
an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran
is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine
whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or whether or not a previous ruling is
applicable in the case under consideration."3
2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse
to a remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the
cause of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and
the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter.
Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless find
hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor,4 a 1910
decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is
not to dispense justice according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should
ever keep such an imperative of our legal system in mind. 5
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With costs
against plaintiff.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case No.
C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said
petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy
Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate
Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased
[Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who
alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931
in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee;
and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to
become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p.
107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-
64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of
Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI
decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp.
105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao
Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to
Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese
People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor
of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue
Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should
be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36-
37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however
denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida
Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao
Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of
the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however
resolved to deny the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982
entry of judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the
Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a resolution
dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to this
petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING
THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN
VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO
SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition,
p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law
and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following
testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien,
China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during
that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her
case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement
with the parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Mat
would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that
the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but
two of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and
Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that
Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat,
have been living in FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several
occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a written document
[is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom,
or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between,
a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents
of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-
to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on
 engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring some pieces of jewelry to
the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after that, a date would be set
for the wedding, which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January
19, 1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic)
where the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would
give the dowry for her daughter and then the document would be signed by the
parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during
the wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as
well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the
document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage where she would be
brought to the town of the bridegroom and before departure the bride would be
covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the
bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to
said Chinese custom), there were many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened
the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the carriage and
brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the
eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as to the
whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already
and the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be
found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she
does not know the whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many
years and because they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the
termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as
husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the
Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year they were married; that
she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she
went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she
begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to
China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was
among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no
marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents
or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to
the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy
Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to Chinese
custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3,
1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital statusMarried"; "If married give name
of spousesYao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage1931"; and "Place of
marriageChina" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where
the following entries are likewise found: "Civil statusMarried"; and, 'If married, state name
and address of spouseYao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at the
Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were
married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance
with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and
Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law,
Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according
to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to
state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact"
[Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher
degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage
two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact;
and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed
and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25,
thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a
witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher
110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471
(1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and
custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered
as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to
testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently,
the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to
prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in
the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved
as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v.
Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage
presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged
by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered
duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly
corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided
was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was
duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial
notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not
shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc
Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being
applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion
case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent evidence to show the
fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not
concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a
spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed
that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965,
13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing
officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged
marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that
her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo
Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered:
"Children if any: give number of childrenFour"; and, "NameAll living in China"
[Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children
with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu
and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage
license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has three
daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whomSook Wah and Sze Kai Choshe knows,
and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according
to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that
of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the
time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the
deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension
to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil
Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years
without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment,
evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and
approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only
acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their
support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and
that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and
finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy,
born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on
January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and
Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the
parties mutually agree and covenant that
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ...,
shall be divided into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy
Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall
transfer the same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita
Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat.
However, it shall be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an
amount of One Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental
of the two doors of the same building now occupied by Everett
Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real
estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion
Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates and
properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion
Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a
child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao Kee
and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled "An
Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan',
with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption,
paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of
spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters
one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324]
reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished.
Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See Section
19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143
SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised
by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No.
5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in
any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the
main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA
307]:
 xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case
involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the
intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13,
1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration
proceeding is pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same
issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda.
de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more
importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error
committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17885 June 30, 1965
GABRIEL P. PRIETO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MEDEN ARROYO, JACK ARROYO, NONITO ARROYO and ZEFERINO ARROYO,
JR., defendants-appellees.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for plaintiff-appellant.
Quijano and Azores and J. P. Arroyo for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Gabriel P. Prieto appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 4280. Since only
questions of law are involved the appeal has been certified to this Court.
In 1948 Zeferino Arroyo, Sr. filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a petition
for registration of several parcels of land, including Lot No. 2, Plan Psu-106730 (L.R.C. No.
144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025). After the proper proceedings Original Certificate of Title No. 39
covering said lot was issued in his name. The same year and in the same Court Gabriel P.
Prieto filed a petition for registration of an adjoining parcel of land, described as Lot No. 3,
Plan Psu-117522 (L.R.C. No. 173; G.L.R.O. No. 1474). As a result Original Certificate of
Title No. 11 was issued in his name.
After the death of Zeferino Arroyo, Sr., Original Certificate of Title No. 39 was cancelled and
in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 was issued in the names of his heirs, the
defendants in this case, namely Meden Jack, Joker, Nonito and Zeferino, Jr., all surnamed
Arroyo.
On March 6, 1956 said heirs filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a petition
(L.R.C. No. 144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025; Special Proceedings No. 900) in which they claimed
that the technical description set forth in their transfer certificate of title and in the original
certificate of their predecessor did not conform with that embodied in the decision of the land
registration court, and was less in area by some 157 square meters. They therefore prayed
that said description be corrected pursuant to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act; that
their certificate of title be cancelled and another one issued to them containing the correct
technical description. The petition was filed in the registration record but was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 900.
On May 23, 1956 the court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Sur to "change, upon payment of his fees, the description in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
227 of Lot 2 in Plan Psu-106730 so as to make it conform to that embodied in the decision
of the Court on March 8, 1950, and to correct therein the spelling of the name of one of the
petitioners from 'Miden Arroyo' to 'Meden Arroyo'.
On November 29, 1956 Prieto filed against the defendants in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur (in the original registration records of the two lots) a petition to annul the
order of May 23 in Special Proceedings No. 900. At the hearing of the petition on July 12,
1957 neither he nor his counsel appeared. Consequently, the trial court on the same day
issued an order dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute. A motion for reconsideration
of that order was denied on September 5, 1957.
On September 2, 1958 Prieto filed against the same defendants the present action for
annulment of Special Proceedings No. 900 and the order therein entered on May 23, 1956.
He also prayed that the 157 square meters allegedly taken from his lot by virtue of said order
be reconveyed to him.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff opposed,
and on January 15, 1959 the court granted the motion. It is from the order of dismissal,
plaintiff having failed to secure its reconsideration, that the appeal has been taken.
Appellant maintains that the institution of Special Proceedings No. 900 was irregular and
illegal mainly because he was not notified thereof and the same was instituted almost six
years after the issuance of the decree and title sought to be corrected, and hence the order
of the court dated May 23, 1956 for the correction of the technical description in appellees'
title is void ab initio.
The issue here, however, is not the validity of said Special Proceedings No. 900 but the
propriety of the dismissal of appellant's complaint on the ground of res adjudicata. The
validity of the said proceedings was the issue in the first case he filed. But because of his
failure and that of his counsel to attend the hearing the court dismissed the case for failure
to prosecute. Since no appeal was taken from the order of dismissal it had the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, the court not having provided otherwise (Rule 30, Section 3).
Appellant contends that said order could not have the effect of a judgment because the Court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents therein, defendants-
appellees here, as they did not file any opposition or responsive pleading in that case.
Appellees, on the other hand, allege that they had voluntarily submitted to the court's
jurisdiction after they were served copies of the petition. This allegation finds support in the
record, particularly in the following statement of appellant in his brief:
This petition was originally set for hearing on December 8, 1956, but was
postponed to January 14, 1957, due to lack of notice to the respondents. Upon
motion for postponements of respondents, now defendants-appellees, the hearing
of January 14, 1957 was postponed to May 16, 1957. The hearing set for May 16,
1957 was again postponed upon motion of the respondents to July 12, 1957.
Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his first petition for
annulment because no "parole" evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein
alleged being parts of the records of L.R.C. No. 144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025, and L.R.C. 173,
G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well within the judicial notice and cognizance of the said
court.
In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that
both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge (Municipal
Council of San Pedro, Laguna, et al. v. Colegio de San Jose, et al., 65 Phil. 318). Secondly,
if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should
have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by
counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied.
Finally, the point raised by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order
dismissing his first petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the
present action was filed.
The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is untenable.
Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings No. 900; in both appellant seeks
that the order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside. Of no material significance
is the fact that in the complaint in the instant case there is an express prayer for
reconveyance of some 157 square meters of land, taken from appellant as a result of such
correction of title. For that area would necessarily have reverted to appellant had his first
petition prospered, the relief asked for by him being that "the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Sur be ordered to amend Certificate of Title No. 332 by incorporating therein only and solely
the description of Lot No. 2, plan Psu-106730 as appearing in the Decree No. 5165 and
maintaining consequently the description limits and area of the adjoining land of the herein
petitioner, Lot No. 3, plan Psu-117522, in accordance with Decree No. 2301 of Land
Registration No. 173." The claim for damages as well as for other additional and alternative
reliefs in the present case are not materially different from his prayer for "such other
remedies, just and equitable in the premises" contained in the former one.
There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the two cases,
the order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to the institution of the second.
The appealed order is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
Ramon Dimen for petitioner.
Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for
lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence
not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square
meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of
ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo
Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo
Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in
1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject
land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as
she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on
the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her
death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took
possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to
surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he
inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living
thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject
of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut
trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual
findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had
been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also
erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in
another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4,
1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter
indicating that the amount of P600.00the first P300.00 and then another P300.00
as interest since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B",
a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and
Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the
appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the
transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. 2 The challenged decision also
upheld the use by the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings
in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-
described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which were the last
will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that
the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court
categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those
documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a
clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems to have confused
Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the quoted
transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A,"
"B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose
of identifying them at that time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits.
As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles,3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may
decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again
it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered
evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of
facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at
the trial.4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may
still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we
do not find that these requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court
said the said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not been formally
offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial
and was even cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although she
did testify, all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a
recital of the contents of the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to
Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed.6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking
judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely
connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending
in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending b before the same judge.7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a
court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its
archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name
and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when
the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from
the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the
parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection,"
"with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the
parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then
pending." These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner
was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by
the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was
never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to
counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial
notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's
cause because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted
by the plaintiff." What "other evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits
it intends to corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally
submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the
complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to
substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of
land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner
contends. Even assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by
Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court,
"there is no question that before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman."
Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to property that did not belong to him
unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been
presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in
many cases.1wphi1 However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the accepted and
well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the disputed property since even before World
War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact, the tax declarations in their name become weighty
and compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become
strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof
of actual possession of the property.9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land
covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in
supporting a claim of ownership.10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject
parcels of land by the respondents and their parents before them for more than 30
years qualify them to register title to the said subject parcels of land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and
magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require her
to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that
he was not much concerned with the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three
dogs he had bought from America. That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture.
If he were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the property in
the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded another form of payment
if he did not have the intention at all of living on the land. On the other hand, if he were really
interested in the property, we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when
the realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the
payments were made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were
the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in
possession thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she
died.12 She paid the realty taxes thereon in her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of
strong materials on the lot.14 He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the owner. 15 These acts
denote ownership and are not consistent with the private respondent's claim that the
petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts
below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been
reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on
record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had
not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded,
conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence
submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or
knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been
sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove
his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under
our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's
contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss
the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude
of legal protection accorded to the offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards
designed to minimally reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed,
there is no critique on the plethora of rights enjoyed by the accused regardless of how
ruthlessly he committed the crime. Any margin of judicial error is further addressed by the
grace of executive clemency. But, even before that, all convictions imposing the penalty of
death are automatically reviewed by this Court. The cases at bar, involving two death
sentences, apostrophize for the condemned the role of this ultimate judicial intervention.
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the
Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and 267
of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:
That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot
Center, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force, threat
and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mia Taha to her
damage and prejudice.1
In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality
of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, a private individual, and being a teacher
of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of 17 years
old (sic), for a period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her
liberty against her will and consent and without legal justification, to the damage
and prejudice of said Mia Taha.2
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges
and, after the pre-trial was terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the
trial court.3
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to
the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point
which is near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying.
When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the
back because she knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door,
somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and
told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark,
complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and
through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding
the knife with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private
organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first
experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very
frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor
plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him.
She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be
killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with
blood. Appellant walked with her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to
the boarding house where she lived. She did not see where appellant went after she left him
at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not
mention anything about the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at
Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that
appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant
arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could
accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When
her parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want her
parents to get into trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following
behind appellant, towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was
empty except for the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because
appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the
Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d
for three days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant
was not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously
guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious.
Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always
carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at
Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained
and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January
27, 1994, they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been
reported and indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain
Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only
after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point
where she was examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical
findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent
Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and
minora, hymenal opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial,
longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2 cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal
opening admits 2 fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix
closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance,
presence of laceration, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm.
length. Hymenal opening can admit an average size penis in erection with
laceration.4
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that
there was a laceration, which shows that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse.
On the basis of the inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could
not say that there was force applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a
week-old laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or
injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.
During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as
Exhibits "1" and "2"; that she never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him
because of what he did to her; and that she did not notice if there were people near the
boarding house of her cousin. She narrated that when appellant started to remove her panty,
she was already lying down, and that even as appellant was doing this she could not shout
because she was afraid. She could not remember with which hand appellant held the knife.
She was completely silent from the time she was made to lie down, while her panty was
being removed, and even until appellant was able to rape her.
When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but
there was no threat made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously
asked permission from them in her behalf and so they left the house with appellant walking
ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because
she was afraid. However, she admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife
at her. She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were
other people inside. She likewise did not ask the appellant why he brought her there.
Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the
door of the courtroom which, even if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she
added that there was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they stayed at Sunset
Garden for three days and three nights but she never noticed if appellant ever slept because
everytime she woke up, appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes.
Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house
in the morning of January 22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were
swollen. When she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter merely kept
silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant because she knew he was her
teacher. However, when Mia and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she
and her husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan. When they could not find them
there, she went to the house of appellant because she was already suspecting that
something was wrong, but appellant's wife told her that he did not come home.
Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The
following day, they went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto
Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing
the Radyo ng Bayan program where she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter.
When she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her that Mia
was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so
he could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she
wanted to see her daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to
fetch complainant. She testified that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that
she was raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did not return
within an hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter
was examined and then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and
kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements before the PNP
at Brooke's Point.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the
settlement of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all
three of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
where they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen
Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for
kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito
S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was
what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to
graduate. Her father died two months later, supposedly because of what happened.
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan
National School (PNS). Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she
often told him "Sir, I love you." What started as a joke later developed into a serious
relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on December 20, 1993
when they first had sexual intercourse as lovers. Appellant was then assigned at the Narra
Pilot Elementary School at the poblacion because he was the coach of the Palawan
delegation for chess. At around 5:00 P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at his quarters
allegedly because she missed him, and she then decided to spend the night there with him.
Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero,
a teacher at the PNS, was looking inside the school building for her husband, who was a
security guard of PNS, when she heard voices apparently coming from the Orchids Room.
She went closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir,
iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately opened
the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy holding hands. She asked
them what they were doing there at such an unholy hour but the two, who were obviously
caught by surprise, could not answer. She then hurriedly closed the door and left. According
to this witness, complainant admitted to her that she was having an affair with appellant.
Desirous that such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed appellant's
wife about it when the latter arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.
Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with
the present case, but the same was not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance
which was executed and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn statement,
later marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994,
she confronted Mia Taha about the latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a
married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that she loves
appellant very much.
Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office
asking for help with the monologue that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest.
He agreed to meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However, when he
reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly,
they just sat on a bench near the road where there was a lighted electric post and they talked
about the matter she had earlier asked him about. They stayed there for fifteen minutes,
after which complainant returned to her boarding house just across the street while appellant
headed for home some fifteen meters away.
It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former
teacher of Mia at PNS and who was then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a
bench and asked what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant merely replied
that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store and, along the way,
she saw Inday Zapanta watering the plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena
Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant and she noticed that they were
quite intimate because they were holding hands. This made her suspect that the two could
be having a relationship. She, therefore, told appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics
class and was already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go home.
Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench.
Filomena further testified that she had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because
his wife had a heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had likewise
told complainant's grandmother about her activities. At the trial, she identified the handwriting
of complainant appearing on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is
familiar with the same because Mia was her former student. On cross-examination, Filomena
clarified that when she saw the couple on the night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking
naturally, she did not see Mia crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was pleading with her.
In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the
road near their house and she invited him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he
accepted. Thirty minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission from her mother
for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before they left, he noticed
that Mia was carrying a plastic bag and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained
her things which she was bringing to her cousin's house. Appellant and Mia went to the
poblacion where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan
Store.
Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more
available transportation, so she suggested that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced
that there was nothing wrong in that because they already had intimate relations, aside from
the fact that Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should he leave her,
appellant was prevailed upon to stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who
arranged their registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the funds they
had solicited. That evening, however, appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that
he was going out to see a certain Bert Dalojo at the latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed
a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to Pulot. He did not bring complainant
along because she had refused to go home.
The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's
parents and informed them that Mia spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said
that they would just fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and waited for them
outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani
Virey, whom he saw while waiting near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's
friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to Sunset Garden where they proceeded
to Mia's room. Since the room was locked from the inside, Virey had to knock on the door
until it was opened by her.
Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely
answered that what she was doing was of her own free will and that at that moment her
father was not supposed to know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant
did not know, however, was that appellant had already reported the matter to her parents,
although he opted not to tell her because he did not want to add to her apprehensions.
Isagani Virey further testified that when he saw appellant and complainant on January 23
and 24, 1994, the couple looked very happy.
Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden,
that is, from January 22 to 24, 1994, because he did not have any idea as to what she really
wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew that what they were doing was wrong but he
allegedly could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would commit suicide if he left
her. Thus, according to appellant, on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany
him to the house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the matter.
Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask
for assistance in procuring transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of
Mia were already looking for them and so they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City. Virey
accompanied them to the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a co-teacher of appellant's
wife, but the latter refused to help because of the complicated situation appellant was in.
Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed
against appellant and after finding out that there was none, he told appellant to just consult
a certain Naem who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house that
same day and bared everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry
complainant in Muslim rites but appellant refused because he was already married. It was
eventually agreed that Naem would just mediate in behalf of appellant and make
arrangements for a settlement with Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the
parents of complainant at the latter's house.
The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford
to pay their hotel bills, the couple were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's
friend, Fernando Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two days. They just
walked along the national highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was
only five hundred to seven hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio,
as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the couple were very happy, they were
intimate and sweet to each other, they always ate together, and it was very obvious that they
were having a relationship.
In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they
were there, she would buy food at the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and
sometimes watch television. When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose to go
with appellant despite the fact the he was a married man, Mia told him that she really loved
appellant. She never told him, and Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that
she was supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later claimed. He also testified that
several police officers lived within their neighborhood and if complainant had really been
kidnapped and detained, she could have easily reported that fact to them. Mia was free to
come and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never locked because
the lock had been destroyed.
On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance
of his; that it was Naem who went to the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that
complainant's mother never went to his house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo
who fetched appellant from the lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall.
Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's
Subdivision and informed him that complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's
house the next day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994, appellant was not able
to talk to complainant's parents because they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's
Subdivision and to tell her that her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her.
Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told her that within one hour he was be going
to the police station at the municipal hall so that they could settle everything there.
After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was
met by Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited
at the police station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents and relatives
arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That
afternoon of January 27, 1994, appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was
detained at the police station after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for rape and
kidnapping against him.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different
occasions two letters from complainant dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994,
respectively. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify
the handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through
his mother, that an affidavit of desistance was reportedly executed by complainants.
However, he claims that he never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day
he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he
did not dissuade them, neither did he request his mother to talk to complainants in order to
settle the case.
Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on
January 21, 1994. However, he admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but
that was already on January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they never
had sexual relations. Appellant was told, when complainant visited him in jail, that her father
would kill her if she refused to testify against him, although by the time she testified in court,
her father had already died.
Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding
house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However,
he decided to have a relationship with her because he wanted to change her and that was
what they had agreed upon. Appellant denied that, during the time when they were staying
together, Mia had allegedly asked permission to leave several times but that he refused. On
the contrary, he claimed that on January 27, 1994 when she told him that her parents wanted
to see her, he readily gave her permission to go.
He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on
January 22, 1994, but which she left behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to
return on January 27, 1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the provincial jail by
Benedicto Rubio.
Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January
27, 1994 but the warrant for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did
not submit a counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes, it was
no longer necessary since the complainants had already executed an affidavit of desistance.
He admits having signed a "Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with
these cases.
On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter
to appellant when the latter was still detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-
examination, that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she clarified
that she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant.
Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero
regarding the incident at the Orchids Room because, according to her, the truth was that
she was at the boarding house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise negated
the claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on January 21, 1994 about her alleged
relationship with appellant contending that she did not see her former teacher on that day.
Similarly, she disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night of January
21, 1994. She vehemently disavowed that she and appellant were lovers, much less with
intimate relations, since there never was a time that they became sweethearts.
She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense
witnesses: that she told appellant "iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she
answered "wala kang pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about her relationship
with appellant; that she was the one who registered them at Sunset Garden and paid for
their bill; that appellant left her at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that
Isagani Virey came to their room and stayed there for five minutes, because the only other
person who went there was the room boy who served their food; that they went to the house
of Virey's aunt requesting help for transportation; and that she was free to roam around or
to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.
Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra,
Palawan to have sex with him and claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she
was still in Grade VI; that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo" when she
allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him, since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and
"2" are not hers; that she threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since
she never brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset Garden and at Edward's Subdivison,
she was not being guarded by appellant.
However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper
marked as Exhibit "4" and admitted that the signature thereon is exactly the same as that
appearing on Exhibits "1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also
admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to her.
On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who
volunteered to testify in these cases, identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited
appellant in jail on February 27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that time,
he asked her what she wanted and she said she would just visit appellant. Pasion then called
appellant and told him he had a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the visiting
area which is around ten meters away from his post, and then he saw her hand over to
appellant a letter which the latter immediately read. This witness declared that appellant
never requested him to testify.
Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon
of January 22, 1994, he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when
he passed by Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already
several passengers inside his jeepney. The two got off at the poblacion market. He denied
that he brought them to the Sunset Garden.
On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and
sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both cases.6 By reason of the nature of
the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review.
The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape7 and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention8 filed by Mia Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court
of Brooke's Point issued a resolution9 on February 4, 1994 finding the existence of a prima
facie case against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen
Taha executed an affidavit of desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention.10 However, pursuant to a joint resolution11 issued on March 11, 1994 by
Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate
informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were nevertheless filed
against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges.
Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the
following assignment of errors:
 I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape
despite the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in reviewing the
evidence adduced in a prosecution for the crime of rape as cited in its decision
reiterating the case of People vs. Calixto (193 SCRA 303).
III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had consummated
the crime of rape against private complainant.
IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2"
as evidence of the defense.
V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and completely ignoring the testimonies of the defense
witnesses.
VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt on
the part of the accused-appellant in view of the offer to compromise.
VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified in the sum
of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes
committed.
IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each of the
crimes charged on the accused-appellant despite the fact that the crimes were
allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659. 12
A. The Rape Case
A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the
accused and the accuser to humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of
shame that both have to bear for the rest of their
lives.13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only
the participants can testify as to its occurrence. 14This notwithstanding, the basic rule
remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which
the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to
any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the
prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted. 15
The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused
is accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds
against him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of
his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 16 In other words, the accused
may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman,
provided such testimony is clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence
presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most
detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in
mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended
by the party accused, though innocent;17 (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution;18 and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.19
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably
convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and
that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint
for redress of an actual wrong.
I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of
the crime of rape under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that
the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same was
accomplished through force or intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant
had sexual congress with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night
of January 21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her
cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious
imputation and contends that on said date and time, he merely talked with complainant
outside that house. We find appellant's version more credible and sustained by the evidence
presented and of record.
According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant
was already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could
have known that she was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering that
she does not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful
desires on anybody who happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the
imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim
was never established nor even intimated by the prosecution.
Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility
that plagues it as regards the setting of the supposed sexual assault. 20 It will be noted that
the place where the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence but a boarding
house where several persons live and where people are expected to come and go. The
prosecution did not even bother to elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that
the boarding house had remained closed for some time, in order that it could be safely
assumed that nobody was expected to arrive at any given time.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house
upon the invitation of complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her
monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go inside the house
because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house
and talked. This testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness
Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both
appellant and complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding house, and that she even
advised them to go home because it was already late and appellant's wife, who was the
head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school building. On rebuttal,
complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.21
It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty
and then appellant openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they
eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man to
remain for long by the side of the woman he had raped, 22and in public in a highly populated
area at that. Given the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure
at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his
victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be
expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to dissociate himself from the person
of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other things and circumstances related to
the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as
to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth.
It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at
the scene of the crime are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be
appreciated as a circumstance tending to identify the appellant. 23 Consequently, it is not in
accord with human experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the complainant
immediately after he had allegedly raped her. 24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the
notion that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany complainant up to the gate of
the house, considering its strategic location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is
just across the street,25 and the PNS schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters
away.26
Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her
boarding house where she saw her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a
witness to corroborate the story of complainant, despite the fact that the former was the very
first person she came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of
the Casantosan boarding house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they
supposedly did not talk, the landlady could at least have testified on complainant's physical
appearance and to attest to the theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date
and hour, possibly with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all.
We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who
invited him to the boarding house to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the
school contest. This is even consonant with her testimony that appellant fetched her the
following day in order to solicit funds for her candidacy in that same school affair.
In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and
tenuous. At first, she asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and
then, later, she said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she
was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994
at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding house conversing with her cousin. Then in the
course of her narration, she gave another version and said that when she reached the
boarding house it was dark and there was nobody inside.
The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or
realign the same with her prior inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her
testimony even on this single episode, thus:
Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
do you remember where you were?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why were you there?
A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.
COURT:
Q Conversing with whom?
A With my cousin, Your Honor.
Q Your cousin's name?
A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will you please
relate to this Honorable Court how that rape happened?
A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
COURT:
Q Of what date?
A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.
 xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Then what happened?
A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I
passed (through) the kitchen and then when I opened the door somebody
grabbed me suddenly.
xxx xxx xxx
Q During that time were there other people present in that boarding
house where you said Danny Godoy raped you?
A None, Sir.
COURT:
Q So, the house was empty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing?
A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor.27 (Corrections and
emphasis supplied.)
2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation,
specifically by holding a knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently
established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the
prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr.
Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither
support nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by
appellant against complainant on January 21, 1994.
The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and
already healed, and the conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with
a man on the date which she alleged, do not establish the supposed rape since the same
findings and conclusion are likewise consistent with appellant's admission that coitus took
place with the consent of complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994. 28 Further,
rather than substantiating the prosecution's aforesaid theory and the supposed date of
commission of rape, the finding that there were no evident signs of extra-genital injuries
tends, instead, to lend more credence to appellant's claim of voluntary coition on a later date
and the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of physical force. 29In rape of the
nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be
corroborated by physical evidence showing use of force.30
Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the
aforesaid medico-legal expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was
force involved. On further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force was not
applied.31 He also added that when he examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign
of bruises.32 The absence of any sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an
indication of complainant's consent to the act.33 While the absence in the medical certificate
of external signs of physical injuries on the victim does not necessarily negate the
commission of rape,34 the instant case is clearly an exception to this rule since appellant has
successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated
complainant's assertion that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be
said as to the alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative evidence is not
considered sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal element of the crime is
not corroborative proof of facts necessary to constitute another equally important element of
the crime.35
Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was
afraid of appellant. Again assuming that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we
nevertheless strongly believe that her supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is evident
that complainant did not use the manifest resistance expected of a woman defending her
honor and chastity.36 She failed to make any outcry when appellant allegedly grabbed her
and dragged her inside the house. There is likewise no evidence on record that she put up
a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper
of his trousers, and inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that
appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her to any force of whatever nature or
form.
Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and
ruefully unconvincing to make this Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged
sexual attack on her by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or objected at all
to the involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of resistance expected
of a woman defending her virtue and honor.37 Her failure to do anything while allegedly being
raped renders doubtful her charge of rape,38 especially when we consider the actual mise-
en-scene in the context of her asseverations.
There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and
need not be presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape.39 We incline
to the view, however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist other corroborative
evidence sufficiently and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt.
The rule should go the other way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant
is inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been presented to bolster the charge
of sexual abuse except for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the
existence of one of the essential elements of the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the
irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of complainant's blood-stained
skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.
II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the
utmost importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be
doubted whether a conviction for the offense of rape should even be sustained from the
uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her
conduct at the time when the alleged rape was committed and immediately thereafter was
such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of the
case. 40
Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents'
house and asked permission from them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her
candidacy. Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply that appellant
was armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to leave with him. In brief, she was
neither threatened nor intimidated by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the
supposed threat previously made by appellant does not inspire belief since appellant was
alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no showing of any opportunity for him
to make good his threat, even assuming that he had really voiced any. On the contrary,
complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from her parents for
her to accompany him.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as
paradoxical: it was so strangely normal as to be abnormal. 41 It seems odd, if not incredible,
that upon seeing the person who had allegedly raped her only the day before, she did not
accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and disgust. 42Instead, she meekly
went with appellant despite the presence of her parents and the proximity of neighbors
which, if only for such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil
design. From her deportment, it does not appear that the alleged threat made by appellant
had instilled any fear in the mind of complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude
is totally at odds with the demeanor that would naturally be expected of a person who had
just suffered the ultimate invasion of her womanhood. 43
III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical:
admiration and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her
outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law
and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and
deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the
natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually
abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the
anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should
equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. 44
The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses 45 will not apply where the evidence of record fails to
support or substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or where the lower
court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would affect the
outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of
facts.46
The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding
the January 21, 1994 incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All
that the victim had to testify to was that appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill her
if she shouted and under these threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her.
The question then that confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's testimony is
credible.47 The technique in deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated
parts of that testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only
upon a perusal of the entire testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be considered
in relation to what else has been stated.48
In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court
below made no serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the
evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the
testimony of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. 49 In finding
that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of
the testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident and conveniently
deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped.
But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events which
transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or
declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.
There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh
against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered
independently of any other, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment
of conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert
a powerful compulsion towards reversal of said judgment. 50 Thus:
1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset
Garden and around three times at Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made
the same allegations. If this were true, it is inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor
could have overlooked these facts with their obvious legal implications and, instead, filed an
information charging appellant with only one count of rape. The incredibility of complainant's
representations is further magnified by the fact that even the trial court did not believe it, as
may be inferred from its failure to consider this aspect of her testimony, unless we were to
uncharitably assume that it was similarly befuddled.
2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was
threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving
in to his innumerable sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape cases, this claim
that complainant now advances appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-
saving subterfuge.
3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that
she never noticed if appellant slept because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when
asked if she slept side by side with appellant, complainant admitted that everytime she woke
up, appellant was invariably in bed beside her. 51
4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it
could not be opened from the inside. But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony,
as follows:
Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside?
A No, Sir, it was locked.
 Q Can you describe the lock of that room?
A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.
ATTY. EBOL:
Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask that the door be locked
and opened from the inside.
COURT:
Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for yourself if you can open
that door from the inside.
CLERK OF COURT:
Witness holding the doorknob.
COURT:
The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're were (sic) inside you can
open it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you held?
A There was, Your Honor.
Q What is that?
A The one that slides, Your Honor.
Q And that is used when you are already inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.52 (Emphases ours.)
5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond
supposedly offering token or futile resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no
outcry, no attempt to flee or attract attention to her plight. 53 In her own declaration,
complainant mentioned that when they checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier
at the information counter where appellant registered. She did not do anything, despite the
fact that appellant at that time was admittedly not armed. She likewise stated that a room
boy usually went to their room and brought them food. If indeed she was bent on fleeing
from appellant, she could have grabbed every possible opportunity to escape. Inexplicably,
she did not. What likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's failure to present these two
people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or corroborated
complainant's story.
6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the
house together and walked in going to the highway. In her own testimony, complainant
stated that appellant went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if appellant really had evil
motives, that he would be that careless. It is likewise beyond comprehension that appellant
was capable of instilling such fear in complainant that she could not dare take advantage of
the situation, in spite of the laxity of appellant, and run as far away from him as possible
despite all the chances therefor.
7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case,
complainant was dropped from school and was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd.
Rather than support and commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear that
the school authorities were heartless people who turned their backs on her and considered
her an outcast. That would be adding insult to injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant
is that Mia and her parents were never heard to complain about this apparent injustice. Such
complacency cannot but make one think and conclude that there must necessarily have
been a valid justification for the drastic action taken by the school and the docile submission
thereto by the Taha family.
On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete
with sweeping statements and generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of
appellant's testimony, declared them to be preposterous and abnormal, and then hastened
to conclude that appellant is indeed guilty. The court in effect rendered a judgment of
conviction based, not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of
that of the defense, which is totally repugnant to the elementary and time-honored rule that
conviction should be made on the basis of strong, clear and compelling evidence of the
prosecution.54
IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts.
While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always
the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately
related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's
parents are against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is
uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of
instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than
for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is
precisely what happened to appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible
testimonies of several witnesses for the defense, viz.:
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and
complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took
place, and the couple were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit
affair with appellant.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's
Subdivision, testified that he asked Mia why she decided to have an affair with appellant who
is a married man. Mia answered that she really loves him. 55 He heard her call appellant
"Papa".56 The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other.57
3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that
he asked Mia if she knew what she getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her
if she really loved Sir Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative. When he was trying
to give counsel to appellant, complainant announced that if appellant left her, she would
commit suicide.58 He could see that the couple were happy together. 59
4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he
worked was located within the premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the
couple and that when he was advising appellant that what he was doing is wrong because
he is married and Mia is his student, complainant reacted by saying that no matter what
happened she would not leave Godoy, and that if she went home her father would kill
her.60 He also observed that they were happy.61
5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape
incident, inside one of the classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell
appellant, "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." 62 She tried
to dissuade complainant from continuing with her relationship with appellant. 63
The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with
complainant, which were substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never
successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare,
unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed assertions of
appellant.64 Mere denials are self-serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary
weight greater than the declarations of credible disinterested witnesses.65
Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were
replete with details which could have been known only to him, thereby lending credence and
reliability thereto.66 His assertions are more logical, probable and bear the earmarks of truth.
This is not to say that the testimony of appellant should be accorded full credence. His self-
interest must have colored his account, even on the assumption that he could be trusted to
stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless, there is much in his version that does not strain the
limits of credulity. More to the point, there is enough to raise doubts that do appear to have
some basis in reality.67
Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous,
nonsensical and incredible is highly uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus is not mandatory. It is not a positive rule of law and is not an inflexible one. 68 It does
not apply where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony and the
supposed inconsistencies arise merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself
although not completely.69
Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented
by the defense, the most telling of which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2",
which she sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. For analysis and
emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:
27 Feb. 94
Dane,
Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.
Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong
mahal mo ako gagawa kang paraan na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng
nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one week. pinapainom nila ako ng
pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot
sinasaktan nila ako.
Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong
maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong
kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon. ang mga gamit ko
ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay ang
bihisan kong luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na gagamitin sa
pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay
dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna kong saan ang
Veta nila Navoor Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na
ako at huwag kang tatapat ng bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang
disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna.
alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko
hahaluan nila.
Please sir . . . (Sgd.) Mia Taha70
Dane,
I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag
usap na tayo nagawa ko lang naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa
pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil
sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong
superentende sa Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa
DECS para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong
lumayas ng wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko
sinabi sa kanila na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya mismo
binigyan ako ng gamot samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman dahil
gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil
nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong iniisip mong minahal lang kita
dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi
ganon ang hangarin ko sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam
mo. kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na
gusto kang makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang magagawa ko kong ang paglabas
ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa may guardiya pa. tanungin mo si
Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong puganti. hindi ito
ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba
akong hindi makakain maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may
masama akong hangarin sa iyo.
Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay
na sinasabi mo. hindi ko matiyak kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo
na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang pati ang kapatid kong si Rowena ay
 inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya lang ang
kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng bahay sa
tulong niya. Love you (Sgd.) Mia Taha71
There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for
themselves. It was complainant's handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside
from appellant, two other defense witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as
belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were admittedly
the former teachers of complainant and highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest
blunder committed by the trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these qualified
witnesses and refusing to give any probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on
the dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert was presented to analyze and
evaluate the same.
Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more
familiarly called handwriting experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably
useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. 72 This is so since under
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by
any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said
section further provides that evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine
by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge.73
The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the
examination papers submitted to them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has
likewise carefully examined and compared the handwriting on the letters with the standard
writing appearing on the test papers as specimens for comparison and, contrary to the
observations and conclusions of the lower court, we are convinced beyond doubt that they
were written by one and the same person. More importantly, complainant herself
categorically admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to her.
It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to
turn a deaf ear to this conclusive portion of complainant's testimony:
ATTY. EBOL:
Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero and Filomena Pielago were your teachers?
A Yes, sir.
Q And they have been your teachers for several months before this incident of January 21, 1994,
am I not correct?
A That is true, sir.
Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they have been your teachers you took
examinations in their classes in their particular subject(s)?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of your teachers, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit "4", it appears to be your test paper and
with your signature and the alphabet appears in this exhibit appears to be that of Mia Taha, please
examine this and tell the Honorable Court if that is your test paper?
A Yes, sir.
Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this Exhibit "4-A" and tell this Honorable
Court if you are familiar with that.
A What subject is that?
Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.
A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.
Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar with that signature?
A That is min(e), sir.
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in Math, are you familiar with that signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own handwriting?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?
xxx xxx xxx
Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?
A That is my handwriting, sir.
Q Also Exhibit "2"?
A Yes, sir.74
While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of
complainant to herein appellant, the witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal,
Armando Pasion, who was the guard on duty at the provincial jail at that time, testified of his
own accord because he knew that what Casantosan said was a blatant lie. Appellant never
talked to Amando Pasion nor requested him to testify for the defense, as related by the
witness himself. Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony of
witness Pasion to the effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit appellant in jail and
in truth handed to him what turned out to be the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for
the defense.
V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be
an admission of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an
offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a
legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the
matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever
may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such
cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness
of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason
which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.75
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves
appellant's innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did
not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or
Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim
so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to
appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of these,
appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for
the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present
during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant
himself was never present in any of said meetings.76
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the
prosecution.77 In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from
the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in
any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the
established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent
further deterioration of the relations between the parties. 78
VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It
may, however, create serious doubts as to the liability of appellant, especially if it
corroborates appellant's explanation about the filing of criminal charges. 79
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most
probably written out of desperation and exasperation with the way she was being treated by
her parents, complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko
nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila
ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to
her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore,
be safely presumed that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her
parents of the intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order to avoid retribution
from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was
forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young
ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is
observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings
dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. 80 It could precisely be that
complainant's mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows
everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the
wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape
drama.
Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a
story of defloration, that is not always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The
books disclose too many instances of false charges of rape. 81 While this Court has, in
numerous cases, affirmed the judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape
charges, especially where the offended parties were very young and presumptively had no
ill motives to concoct a story just to secure indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the
Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction and acquitted the accused when there
are strong indications pointing to the possibility that the rape charges were merely motivated
by some factors except the truth as to their commission.82 This is a case in point. The Court,
therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet the
exacting test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took
advantage of complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As
her teacher, he should have acted as adviser and counselor to complainant and helped her
develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting her. 83Hence, even as he is freed from
physical detention in a prison as an instrument of human justice, he remains in the spiritual
confinement of his conscience as a measure of divine retribution. Additionally, these
ruminations do not rule out such other legal options against him as may be available in the
arsenal of statutory law.
VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young
Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally
disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed
innocent until proven otherwise.
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved.
Sometimes the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused
and the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each
presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and
then determine which should be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over
the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating
guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is
sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of
innocence continues.84
The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:
In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the
complaining witness, on the theory that she will not choose to accuse her attacker
at all and subject herself to the stigma and indignities her accusation will entail
unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to speak up exposes
herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also irreparably
sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened
woman, never mind that she did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact
denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be the object of lascivious curiosity.
People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her violation. She will
squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor was defiled, relating
every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of her
body. Most frequently, the defense will argue that she was not forced to submit but
 freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity will
be challenged and maligned. Whatever the outcome of the case, she will remain a
tainted woman, a pariah because her purity has been lost, albeit through no fault
of hers. This is why many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing
her helpless indignation rather than denouncing her attacker. This is also the
reason why, if a woman decides instead to come out openly and point to her
assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . .
.85
The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of
justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere
suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact
that he had the opportunity to do so.86 Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would
otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and
all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and
influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot
be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.87 This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts
in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt
when it is possible to do so.88
On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the
overwhelming evidence in favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in
concluding that the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must prevail
in this particular indictment.
B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent
of the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. 89 In the present charge for
that crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from
the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves
instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's
evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant, as hereunder explained:
To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents'
house the day after the alleged rape incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked
her parents to permit her to help him solicit contributions for her candidacy. When they left
the house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors
witnessing their departure. It is difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from these
normal and innocuous arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive complainant
of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed under such
inauspicious circumstances as described by complainant.
Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was
bringing with her a plastic bag which later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was
left behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered
to appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where
the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely
leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and consent of
her parents who passively looked on without comment.
Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they
occupied, whether at Sunset Garden or at Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not
unlock the door from the inside. We must, however, recall that when she was asked on
cross-examination about the kind of lock that was used, she pointed to the doorknob of the
courtroom. The court then ordered that the door of the courtroom be locked and then asked
complainant to open it from the inside. She was easily able to do so and, in fact, she admitted
that the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could also be opened from the inside in the
same manner. This demonstrably undeniable fact was never assailed by the prosecution. It
also failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that the room which was occupied by
the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the lock thereof was
broken.
When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national
highway in broad daylight. Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek
the help of other people and free herself from appellant if it were true that she was forcibly
kidnapped and abused by the latter.90 In fact, several opportunities to do so had presented
themselves from the time they left complainant's home and during their extended stay in the
hotel and in the lodging house.
According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to
Sunset Garden to inform them that Mia spent the night in said place. This was neither denied
nor impugned by Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On the other hand, the
allegation of Helen Taha that she made a report to the police about her missing daughter
was not supported by any corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was the
police officer to whom she allegedly reported the incident ever identified or presented in
court.
We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his
part for the commission of the crime charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping
charge where there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime. 91 It is true that, as a
rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and, not being an element of
a crime, it does not have to be proved.92 Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any
motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of the accused becomes open to a
reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in order.93 Nowhere in the testimony of either
the complainant or her mother can any ill motive of a criminal nature be reasonably drawn.
What actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst, immoral though it may be.
As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag
of clothes belonging to complainant which was presented and duly identified by the defense,
on its announced supposition that the clothes could have easily been bought from a
department store. Such preposterous reasoning founded on a mere surmise or speculation,
aside from the fact that on rebuttal the prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation
or clarification from complainant about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces our
impression of an apparently whimsical exercise of discretion by the court below. Matters
which could have been easily verified were thus cavalierly dismissed and supplanted by a
conjecture, and on such inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn by said court.
We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of
this Court against the practice of excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by
the trial court:
It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered
where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical
objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy
it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development
of the proof, to know with any certainty whether the testimony is relevant or not;
and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the
evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement
of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be
remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides, a judge of first
instance may possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a fair
and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the
proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without
returning the case for a new trial, a step which this court is always very loath to
take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if
the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in
much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law
and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant
and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the
cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the
materials before it necessary to make a correct judgment. 94
At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient
and substantial evidence which warrant and demand the acquittal of
appellant. Apropos thereto, we take this opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and
experience of mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital punishment: If it is
justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.
Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed
the death penalty on certain heinous crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen
days after its publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine
Star, Malaya and Philippine Times Journal, 95 and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes
misinterpreted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
accused-appellant Danny Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641
of the Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby
ORDERED that he be released forthwith, unless he is otherwise detained for any other valid
cause.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000]
BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF
TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so
must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments. When it is
undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke technicalities
to keep money not belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the
expense of another.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed the December 24, 1993
Decision[2] of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit."[3]
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by the CA reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioners claim for refund is hereby
DENIED and this Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of merit." [4]
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution[5] denying reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
"This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00
representing petitioners tax withheld for the year 1989.
In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following items
are reflected:
Income.............................P1,017,931,831.00
Deductions........................P1,026,218,791.00
Net Income (Loss).................(P8,286,960.00)
Taxable Income (Loss).............P8,286,960.00
Less:
1988 Tax Credit...............P185,001.00
1989 Tax Credit...............P112,491.00
TOTAL AMOUNT......................P297,492.00
REFUNDABLE
"It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total
refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax
refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income
Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied
as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.
"On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of
P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that
it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including
P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to
the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.
"Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the
claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Tax
Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00.
"The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioners petition on the ground
that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual Income Tax
Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount
of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the subject of the
present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability.
"Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was
denied by respondent court in its Resolution dated May 6, 1994." [6]
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition. [7]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
"It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to its 1990
Annual income Tax Return, the amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00),
so as to refute its previous declaration in the 1989 Income Tax Return that the said
amount will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding year of 1990. Having failed
to submit such requirement, there is no basis to grant the claim for refund. x x x
"Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded as in
derogation of sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi juris against the
person or entity claiming the exemption. In other words, the burden of proof rests
upon the taxpayer to establish by sufficient and competent evidence its entitlement
to the claim for refund."[8]
Issue
In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:
"The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the refund
of P112,491.00, representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable
year 1989."[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue: Petitioner Entitled to Refund
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1989 and was thus
entitled to a refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69[10] of the 1986 Tax Code
which states that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1) to obtain such refund
or (2) to credit said amount for the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated in its 1989
Income Tax Return that it would apply the said amount as a tax credit for the succeeding
taxable year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
that it would claim the amount as a tax refund, instead of applying it as a tax credit. When
no action from the BIR was forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim with the Court of Tax
Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner declared in
its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax credit for
the following year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to have done so. The
CTA and the CA ruled that petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because it did not
present its 1990 Return, which would have shown that the amount in dispute was not applied
as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate court
are binding on this Court. This rule, however, does not apply where, inter alia, the judgment
is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court failed to notice
certain relevant facts which if considered would justify a different conclusion. [11] This case is
one such exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply the
amount as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the manager
of petitioners accounting department, testified to this fact. It likewise presented its claim for
refund and a certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioners vice-president, stating that the
amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be automatically credited/offset against
any succeeding quarters income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year ending
December 31, 1990." Also presented were the quarterly returns for the first two quarters of
1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioners claim. In fact, it
presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers, the
CIR could have easily disproved petitioners claim. To repeat, it did not do so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CTA.[12] A final adjustment return shows whether
a corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable year. In this case, that
Return clearly showed that petitioner incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it
could not have applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an
opposition to petitioners Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. In
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said Return. In the
same vein, the CA did not pass upon that significant document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the trial.
The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically provides that proceedings
before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence." [13] The paramount
consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation
of issues is not an absolute. It should not bar courts from considering undisputed facts to
arrive at a just determination of a controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly showed
that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA,
petitioner could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said
Return, as well as the other documentary evidence presented during the trial, the appellate
court committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just
determination of every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice.[14] But there can be no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on
grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted before the CTA and even before this
Court.[15] To repeat, the undisputed fact is that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990;
accordingly, it incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied. Consequently,
there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to withhold the tax refund which rightfully
belongs to the petitioner.
Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was not the final adjustment Return, but petitioners first two quarterly
returns for 1990.[16] This allegation is wrong. An examination of the records shows that the
1990 Final Adjustment Return was attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. On the other
hand, the two quarterly returns for 1990 mentioned by respondent were in fact attached to
the Petition for Review filed before the CTA. Indeed, to rebut respondents specific
contention, petitioner submitted before us its Surrejoinder, to which was attached the Motion
for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, the Final Adjustment Return for 1990. [17]
CTA Case No. 4897
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision
rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year
1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year
1990 x x x."[18] Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said
case.[19]
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before
the same judge."[20]
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes
that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review
filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision
was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said
Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof.
To our mind, respondents reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had
really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily proved
that it did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to
assail the fact appearing therein -- that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 in the same way
that it refused to controvert the same factestablished by petitioners other documentary document was executed and signed by all of the above parties and the defendant, Gelasio
exhibits. Calupitan, wherein it was stated that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido, sold
all their rights had obligation pertaining to the property in question to Calupitan for the amount
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioners case. It of the purchase price together with 1 per cent per month interest thereon up to the time of
is merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 redemption, or 1,687 Mexican dollars, plus 33.74 Mexican dollars, the amount of the interest.
refund to pay its taxes for 1990. It will be observed that the computation of the transfer price is in accordance with section
465 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the same day Lucido and Calupitan executed the
following document:
Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to
be construed strictissimi juris against the claimant. Under the facts of this case, we hold that
petitioner has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply with the I, Gelasio Calupitan y Agarao, married, certify that I have delivered this statement
rules of procedure; it may have even been negligent. These circumstances, however, should to Leonardo Lucido y Vidal to witness that his lands, which appear in the instrument
not compel the Court to disregard this cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a net I hold from the deputy sheriff and for which he has accepted money from me, I
loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied the amount claimed as tax credits. have ceded to him all the irrigated lands until such time as he may repurchase all
said lands from me (not only he irrigated ones), as also the Vienna chairs, the five-
lamp chandelier, a lamp stand, two wall tables, and a marble table; no coconut tree
Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner. Technicalities and
on said irrigated land is included. Apart from this, our real agreement is to permit
legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not
three (3) whole year to elapse, reckoned from the date of this instrument, which
belonging to it and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the State
has been drawn up n duplicate, before he may redeem or repurchase them from
expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply
me.
the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments of such taxes. Indeed, the
State must lead by its own example of honor, dignity and uprightness.
The lower court held that this document constituted a sale with the right to conventional
redemption set forth in articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code. The present action not having
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
been instituted until February 17, 1910, the fur the question arose as to whether the
of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of Internal
redemption period had expired, which the lower court decided in the negative. The lower
Revenue is ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess creditable
court further found as a fact that Lucido had prior to the institution of the action offered the
taxes paid in 1989. No costs.
redemption price to the defendant, who refused it, and that this offer was a sufficient
compliance with article 1518 of the Civil Code. The decision of the lower court was that the
SO ORDERED. property in question should be returned to the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant
appealed, and all three of the above rulings of the court are assigned as errors.
JUDICIAL ADMISSION
1. Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of the lower court upon
the first question, if the document executed by the execution purchasers and the parties to
Republic of the Philippines this action stood alone. In that document it appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and
SUPREME COURT obligations of the execution purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights
Manila and obligations are defined in the Code of Civil Procedure to be the ownership of the property
EN BANC sold, subject only to the right of redemption on the part of the judgment debtor or a
G.R. No. L-8200 March 17, 1914 redemptioner, within one year from the date of the sale. (Secs. 463-465, Code Civ. Proc.)
LEONARD LUCIDO, plaintiff-appellee, Were this the nature of the transaction between the parties, however, the intervention of
vs. Lucido in the transfer would be wholly unnecessary. Hence, the fact that he intervened as
GELASIO CALUPITAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants. an interested party is at least some indication that the parties intended something more or
Pedro Guevara for appellants. different by the document in question than a simple assignment of the rights and obligations
Ramon Diokno for appellee. of the execution purchasers to a third person.
TRENT, J.:

Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by the agreement
In this case it appears that some chattels and real estate belonging to the plaintiff, Lucido, entered into between Lucido and calupitan on the same day. In this document it is distinctly
were regularly sold at an execution sale on February 10, 1903, to one Rosales, who the text stipulated that the right to redeem the property is preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after
day transferred a one-half interest in the property of Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, a public
the expiration of three years. The right to repurchase must necessary imply a former
ownership of the property.
Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale with the right
to conventional redemption is to be found in his original answer to the complaint. This original
answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. Its
admission was proper, especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself,
who was the time acting as his own attorney.
Jones on evidence (secs. 272, 273), after remarking that the earlier cases were not in
harmony on the point, says:
Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as admissions were based
on the theory that most of the allegations were merely pleader's matter -- fiction
stated by counsel and sanctioned by the courts. The whole modern tendency is to
reject this view and to treat pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause
and hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to the
circumstances of each case. But some of the authorities still hold that if the
pleading is not signed by the party there should be some proof that he has
authorized it.
On the same principles where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in
the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings
can have no effect, unless formally offered in evidence.
In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of sale with the
right to repurchase governed by the provisions of articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.
It further appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that he furnished $20
Mexican of the account necessary to redeem the property from the execution purchasers. It
therefore appears beyond dispute that the redemption of the property from the execution
purchasers was made by the plaintiff himself by means of a loan furnished by the defendant
Calupitan, who took possession of the major portion of the land as his security for its
redemption. The ruling of the lower court the transaction between Lucido and Calupitan was
one of purchase and sale with the right to redeem was therefore correct.
2. By the terms of his agreement with Calupitan the plaintiff could not exercise his right to
redeem the property within three years from March 30, 1903; and the lower court arrived at
the date upon which the right to redeem expired by computing five years from March 30,
1906, on the ground that there was no express agreement as to how long the right to
repurchase, once available, should continue. Counsel for the appellant admits in his brief
that the complaint was filed forty-three days before the expiration of this period. In
accordance with our decision in Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza (25 Phil. Rep., 495), we
hold that this ruling of the court was correct.
3. The court held that the plaintiff had actually tendered the redemption price to the defendant
Calupitan. After an examination of the evidence of record as to this finding of fact, we concur
therein. We discussed the legal sufficiency of such tender in the above-cited case of Rosales
vs. Reyes and Ordoveza, and held that it was sufficient. This assignment of error must
therefore be held to be unfounded.
4. The defendants Oreta and Bueno have no interest in the subject matter of this action. it
appears that the defendant Dorado purchased the land from his codefendant Calupitan
subsequent to the tender of the redemption price to the latter by the plaintiff. It does not
appear that the property was ever registered by any one, nor was the document of sale with
the right to repurchase registered by either Calupitan or Lucido. No evidence of the purchase
of the land from Calupitan by Dorado is of record with the exception of the oral testimony
although it may be taken as established that such a sale actually took place, since all the
parties interested agree on this point. Dorado himself testified that he purchased the property
with the knowledge that Calupitan had purchased the property from Lucido subject to the
right of redemption and insists that he purchased with the knowledge and consent of Lucido.
Lucido denies that he was aware of the sale of Dorado until after it had taken place. Upon
this state on facts, it is clear that the following provisions of article 1510 of the Civil Code are
applicable:
The vendor may bring his action against every possessor whose right arises that
of the vendee, even though in the second contract no mention should have been
made of the conventional redemption; without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage Law with regard to third persons.
The provisions of the Mortgage Law with regard to third persons are clearly not applicable
to Dorado. (Manresa, vol., 10, p. 317.)
5. The lower court ordered the redelivery of the land to the plaintiff upon his payment to
Calupitan of P1,600, plus the costs entailed in the execution of the document of repurchase.
The amount paid to the purchaser at the execution sale for the redemption of the property
was $1,720.74 Mexican. Of this amount the plaintiff furnished $120 Mexican, and Calupitan
the balance of $1,600.74 Mexican. No amount is fixed in the document of purchase and sale
above set forth, but the amount borrowed from Calupitan to redeem the land from the
execution sale being thus clearly established no objection can be or is made to the plaintiff's
paying this amount. In ordering the payment of this amount to the defendant the lower court
failed to reduce it to Philippine currency. On this appeal plaintiff alleges that this amount in
Mexican currency exceeds the amount he actually owes to the defendant by about P100,
but that rather than spend the time and incur the expense attendant to new trial for the
purpose of determining the equivalent of his amount in Philippine currency he is agreeable
to pay the defendant P1,600.74 Philippine currency, as the redemption price of the property.
In view of this offer and in case it is accepted by the defendant it will be unnecessary to go
through formality of a new trial for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the fact that it
is claimed that Calupitan has sold the land in question to his codefendant, Macario Dorado,
and it not clearly appearing to whom the plaintiff should pay the P1.600.74, we think this
amount should be turned over to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Laguna to be held by him until it is determined in the proper manner who is the owner of this
amount, Calupitan for Dorado.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered directing the defendants Calupitan and
Dorado to deliver the possession of the land in question to the plaintiff upon the plaintiff's
depositing with the clerk of the court the sum of P1,600.74, to be disposed of in the manner
above set forth. In all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs
against the appellants Calupitan and Dorado.
Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS
NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA
NARCISO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD
NARCISO, BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA NARCISO, LEONARDO
QUINTO, ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN, TOMAS NARCISO and AMADO
NARCISO, respondents.
Juan R. Liwag for petitioner.
Cesar Nocon for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil action. 1 prays that the
judgment rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases, CA-G.R. NO.
34998-R entitled "Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente Santillan, et al.,
defendants-appellants", and CA-G.R. No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al.,
plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et al., defendants-appellees and the Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New Trial, be set aside; and that,
instead, The Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7, 1963 be affirmed, or, in the
alternative, that the case be remanded to it for new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private respondents
over Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite,
with an area of approximately 1,622 square meters. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-6804 issued in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita Torres, during the
Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this
union. Claro died leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely:
Alfredo, Salud (married to Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo
Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso,
who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the private respondents. Antonina died before the
institution of the cases while Vicente died on June 4, 1957, 2 during the pendency of the
cases in the Trial Courts, without progeny .
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without
benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to
Francisco Bautista) was born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26, 1898. In a
Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and
Margarita Torres were named as father and mother of petitioner whose name was listed as
Macaria Arvisu", (Exhibit "C" Another Baptismal Certificate, however, listed her name as
Macaria Torres, while her father's name was left blank (Exhibit "4"). Subsequently, or on
June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married (Exhibit "A"). Petitioner lived
with and was reared by her parents. Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931
(Exhibit "D"), while Leon, the father, passed away on September 14, 1933 (Exhibit " E ").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been leased
temporarily by the Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual
occupant of the lot. The date of the lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the
records. On December 13, 1910, the Government, through the Director of Lands, issued to
Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222 (Exhibit "B") over the said lot at the price of
P428.80, payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s previously paid of
P17.40 was credited to the purchase price. Testimonial evidence is to the effect that Leon
Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of Lands,
Tanza, Cavite. The last installment, however, was paid on December 17, 1936, or three (3)
years after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred in
a notarial deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor
of petitioner, for the sum of P300.00.3
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. 551
and asking for the issuance of title in his name, which he filed with the Bureau of Lands.
Based thereon, the Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the
legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued
by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 7, 1957, also in the name of said heirs.
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry,
with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that petitioner had entered a
portion of Lot No. 551 without their consent, constructed a house. and refused to vacate
upon demand. For her part, petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in question,
being one of the daughters of Margarita Torres. The ejectment case was decided against
petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551 before the then
Court of First Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 5505 (Partition Case), alleging
that said lot was conjugal property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and
that she is their legitimated child. Private respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot
belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are her only heirs, and that the complaint
for partition should be dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on November 20,
1958 with a finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and
adjudicating to private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares, and to
petitioner a one-third (1/3) portion. 4 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private
respondents opposed. Pending its resolution, the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned,
resulting in the complete destruction of the records of the two cases, which, however, were
later partially reconstituted.
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, issued an Order
granting reconsideration and amending the Decision of November 20, 1958. The positive
portion thereof reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. .5505:
(1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole
and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to
Macaria Torres, and two-sixths (2/6th) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado,
Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs
of the deceased Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The
parties may make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the
parties, each party should be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her house
has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners to make the
partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 5
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:
It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20, 1898, her
parents, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, had the capacity to marry each other.
There was no legal impediment for them to marry It has also been established that
Macaria A. Torres had been taken care of, brought up and reared by her parents
until they died. The certificate of baptism (Exh. "G") also shows that Macaria Torres
was given the family name of Arvisu, which is also the family name of her father,
Leon Arbole, and that her father is Leon Arvisu and her mother is Margarita Torres.
Such being the case, Macaria A. Torres possessed the status of an acknowledged
natural child. And when her parents were married on June 7, 1909, she became
the legitimated daughter of on Arbole and Margarita Torres. 6
Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals 7 rendered the
judgment sought to be set aside herein, the decretal part of which states:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:
(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria
Torres, and the other half (1/2) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud,
Demetria and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of
Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The parties may make
the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to
confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should
be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as
far as this is possible. In case the parties are unable to agree upon the partition,
the Court shall appoint three commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu Arbole and
Margarita Torres, the former not having been legally acknowledged before or after
the marriage of her parents. As correctly pointed out by the appellants in their brief,
the fact that she was taken cared of, brought up and reared by her parents until
they died, and that the certificate of baptism (Exhibit "C") shows that she was given
 the family name of Arvisu did not bestow upon her the status of an acknowledged (Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
natural child. LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES

Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the matter, children Signed in the prsence of:
shall be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof, and Article (Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria Bautista
131 of the same code provides that the acknowledgement of a natural child must
be in the record of birth, in a will or in some public document. Article 131 then
x----------------------------------------------------x
prescribed the form in which the acknowledgment of a natural child should be
made. The certificate of baptism of Macaria A. Torres (Exhibit "C") is not the record
of birth referred to in Article 131. This article of the old Civil Code 'requires that UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
unless the acknowledgement is made in a will or other public document, it must be PHILIPPINE ISLANDS )
made in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register (Samson vs. MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA ) ss
Corrales Tan, 48 PhiL 406). 9 PROVINCE OF CAVITE )

A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was filed by petitioner. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant Leon
In support thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930, Arvisu exhibited to me no cedula certificate being exempt on account of going over
of spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres, 10 reading in full as follows: 60 years of age and Margarita Torres having exhibited no cedula certificate being
exempt on account of her sex.

SWORN STATEMENT
Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid.
We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife respectively, of majority
age, and residents of the Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I., after being CONSTANCIO T. VELASCO
duly sworn to according to law depose and say Notary Public, Cavite Province
Until Dec. 31, 1930.

That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being born out of wedlock
on the 26 th of June 1898 all Tanza, Cavite, but as stated she was legitimized by
our subsequent marriage.
That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could have married
without dispensation had we desired.
That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de Torres after that of
her mother's at the time she was baptized as per record on file in the Church.
That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed Arvisu after her
father's family name.
Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned that proper remedy
be made for the change of the surname of said Macaria de Torres as desired.
In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza, Cavite, this 5th day
of March 1930.
Not. Reg. No. 56
P. No. 2
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11
The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial was that the
same was only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A. Bautista, among the personal
belongings of private respondent, Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and
who may have attempted to suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against
new trial, and contended that it is not newly discovered evidence which could not have been
produced during the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three, composed of
Justices Jesus Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for
Reconsideration and New Trial was considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to
whether or not new trial should be granted in respect of the sworn statement of March 5,
1930. A Special Division of five was then formed, composed of Justices Antonio Lucero
Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes (Justice
Perez having retired or having disqualified himself). In a minute resolution of August 24,
1973, the Division of five, by a vote of three or two, denied both reconsideration and new
trial.
To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her submission based on two assignments
of error. The first was expressed as follows:
Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not
the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has
overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente
Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that Macaria A.
Torres and Vicente Santillan and Antonina Santillan are brother and sisters with a
common mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal heirs and nearest of
relatives of Margarita Torres, and as a consequence thereof, the Court of Appeals
had drawn an incorrect conclusion in adjudicating the entire share of Margarita
Torres in the conjugal property solely to Vicente Santillan and the heirs of Antonina
Santillan. (emphasis supplied)
As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that, without taking
account of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be considered a legitimated
child of her parents. Continuous possession of the status of a natural child, fact of delivery
by the mother, etc. will not amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory
recognition is still necessary, which action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the
putative parents, subject to certain exceptions. 12
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original complaint
in the Ejectment Case reading:
the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest
of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931.
(Emphasis supplied).
The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling
in the determination of her participation in the disputed property.
We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same
Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read:
That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who
died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, 1931.
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is
regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The
original complaint no longer forms part of the record. 13
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in
evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial
admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial
admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to
petitioner's submission, therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made
in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. 14
It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer (parag. 4),
denied the legitimacy of petitioner.
The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as follows:
Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
petition for new trial, knowing as it does that the judgment is clearly erroneous in
view of the evidence which is offered and no amount of diligence on the part of the
petitioner could it be produced in court at any time before it was offered as it was
found from the personal belongings of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after
his death.
It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible miscarriage
of justice. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the Sworn Statement of
March 5, 1930 is established in accordance with procedural due process, a new trial would
resolve such vital considerations as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as
the public document prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil Code; 15 (2) whether or not it
conforms to an act of acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration of their marriage
as required by Article 121 of the same code; 16 and (3) whether or not petitioner's signature
as a witness to said document was the equivalent of the consent necessary for
acknowledgment of an adult person under Article 133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative answers
would confer upon petitioner the status of a legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle
her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.
Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the document she
should be chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and, therefore, the Sworn Statement
was not newly discovered evidence. In our view, the document can reasonably qualify as
newly discovered evidence, which could not have been produced during the trial even with
the exercise of due diligence; specially if it really had been in the possession of Vicente
Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged, suppressed the document.
In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by respondent Appellate
Court, now empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate Appellate Court for
new trial, and depending on its outcome, said Court shall also resolve the respective
participation of the parties in the disputed property, inclusive of the estate of the deceased
Vicente Santillan. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123553. July 13, 1998]
NORA A. BITONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION), EUGENIA
D. APOSTOL, JOSE A. APOSTOL, MR. & MS. PUBLISHING CO., LETTY J.
MAGSANOC, AND ADORACION G. NUYDA, respondents. NORA A.
BITONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) and
EDGARDO B. ESPIRITU, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
These twin cases originated from a derivative suit [1] filed by petitioner Nora A. Bitong
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC hereafter) allegedly for the benefit of
private respondent Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc. (Mr. & Ms. hereafter), among others, to
hold respondent spouses Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose A. Apostol[2] liable for fraud,
misrepresentation, disloyalty, evident bad faith, conflict of interest and mismanagement in
directing the affairs of Mr. & Ms. to the damage and prejudice of Mr. & Ms. and its
stockholders, including petitioner.
Alleging before the SEC that she had been the Treasurer and a Member of the Board
of Directors of Mr. & Ms. from the time it was incorporated on 29 October 1976 to 11 April
1989, and was the registered owner of 1,000 shares of stock out of the 4,088 total
outstanding shares, petitioner complained of irregularities committed from 1983 to 1987 by
Eugenia D. Apostol, President and Chairperson of the Board of Directors. Petitioner claimed
that except for the sale of the name Philippine Inquirer to Philippine Daily
Inquirer (PDI hereafter) all other transactions and agreements entered into by Mr. &
Ms. with PDI were not supported by any bond and/or stockholders resolution. And, upon
instructions of Eugenia D. Apostol, Mr. & Ms. made several cash advances to PDI on various
occasions amounting to P3.276 million. On some of these borrowings PDI paid no interest
whatsoever. Despite the fact that the advances made by Mr. & Ms. to PDI were booked as
advances to an affiliate, there existed no board or stockholders resolution, contract nor any
other document which could legally authorize the creation of and support to an affiliate.
Petitioner further alleged that respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol were
stockholders, directors and officers in both Mr. & Ms.and PDI. In fact on 2 May 1986
respondents Eugenia D. Apostol, Leticia J. Magsanoc and Adoracion G. Nuyda subscribed
to PDI shares of stock at P50,000.00 each or a total of P150,000.00. The stock subscriptions
were paid for by Mr. & Ms. and initially treated as receivables from officers and
employees. But, no payments were ever received from respondents, Magsanoc and Nuyda.
The petition principally sought to (a) enjoin respondents Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose
A. Apostol from further acting as president-director and director, respectively, of Mr. &
Ms. and disbursing any money or funds except for the payment of salaries and similar
expenses in the ordinary course of business, and from disposing of their Mr. & Ms. shares;
(b) enjoin respondents Apostol spouses, Magsanoc and Nuyda from disposing of
the PDI shares of stock registered in their names; (c) compel respondents Eugenia and Jose
Apostol to account for and reconvey all profits and benefits accruing to them as a result of
their improper and fraudulent acts; (d) compel respondents Magsanoc and Nuyda to account
for and reconvey to Mr. & Ms. all shares of stock paid from cash advances from it and all
accessions or fruits thereof; (e) hold respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol liable for
damages suffered by Mr. & Ms. and the other stockholders, including petitioner, by reason
of their improper and fraudulent acts; (f) appoint a management committee for Mr. &
Ms. during the pendency of the suit to prevent further dissipation and loss of its assets and
funds as well as paralyzation of business operations; and, (g) direct the management
committee for Mr. & Ms. to file the necessary action to enforce its rights against PDI and
other third parties.
Private respondents Apostol spouses, Magsanoc, Nuyda, and Mr. & Ms., on the other
hand, refuted the allegations of petitioner by starting with a narration of the beginnings of Mr.
& Ms. They recounted that on 9 March 1976 Ex Libris Publishing Co., Inc. (Ex
Libris hereafter) was incorporated for the purpose of publishing a weekly magazine. Its
original principal stockholders were spouses Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (then Minister of
National Defense) and Cristina Ponce Enrile through Jaka Investments
Corporation (JAKA hereafter), and respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol. When Ex
Libris suffered financial difficulties, JAKA and the Apostols, together with new investors Luis
Villafuerte and Ramon Siy, restructured Ex Libris by organizing a new corporation known
as Mr. & Ms.
The original stockholders of Mr. & Ms., i.e., JAKA, Luis Villafuerte, Ramon Siy, the
Apostols and Ex Libris continued to be virtually the same up to 1989. Thereafter it was
agreed among them that, they being close friends, Mr. & Ms. would be operated as a
partnership or a close corporation; respondent Eugenia D. Apostol would manage the affairs
of Mr. & Ms.; and, no shares of stock would be sold to third parties without first offering the
shares to the other stockholders so that transfers would be limited to and only among the
original stockholders.
Private respondents also asserted that respondent Eugenia D. Apostol had been
informing her business partners of her actions as manager, and obtaining their advice and
consent. Consequently the other stockholders consented, either expressly or impliedly, to
her management. They offered no objections. As a result, the business prospered. Thus, as
shown in a statement prepared by the accounting firm Punongbayan and Araullo, there were
increases from 1976 to 1988 in the total assets of Mr. & Ms. from P457,569.00 to
P10,143,046.00; in the total stockholders equity from P203,378.00 to P2,324,954.00; and,
in the net sales, from P301,489.00 to P16,325,610.00. Likewise, cash dividends were
distributed and received by the stockholders.
Private respondents further contended that petitioner, being merely a holder-in-trust
of JAKA shares, only represented and continued to represent JAKA in the board. In the
beginning, petitioner cooperated with and assisted the management until mid-1986 when
relations between her and her principals on one hand, and respondent Eugenia D. Apostol
on the other, became strained due to political differences.Hence from mid-1986 to mid-1988
petitioner refused to speak with respondent Eugenia D. Apostol, and in 1988 the former
became openly critical of the management of the latter. Nevertheless, respondent Eugenia
D. Apostol always made available to petitioner and her representatives all the books of the
corporation.
Private respondents averred that all the PDI shares owned by respondents Eugenia
and Jose Apostol were acquired through their own private funds and that the loan of
P750,000.00 by PDI from Mr. & Ms.had been fully paid with 20% interest per annum. And, it
was PDI, not Mr. & Ms., which loaned off P250,000.00 each to respondents Magsanoc and
Nuyda. Private respondents further argued that petitioner was not the true party to this case,
the real party being JAKA which continued to be the true stockholder of Mr. &
Ms.; hence, petitioner did not have the personality to initiate and prosecute the derivative
suit which, consequently, must be dismissed.
On 6 December 1990, the SEC Hearing Panel[3] issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining private respondents from disbursing any money except for the payment of salaries
and other similar expenses in the regular course of business. The Hearing Panel also
enjoined respondent Apostol spouses, Nuyda and Magsanoc from disposing of
their PDI shares, and further ruled -
x x x respondents contention that petitioner is not entitled to the provisional reliefs prayed
for because she is not the real party in interest x x x x is bereft of any merit. No less than
respondents Amended Answer, specifically paragraph V, No. 8 on Affirmative
Allegations/Defenses states that `The petitioner being herself a minor stockholder and
holder-in-trust of JAKA shares represented and continues to represent JAKA in the
Board. This statement refers to petitioner sitting in the board of directors of Mr. & Ms. in two
capacities, one as a minor stockholder and the other as the holder in trust of the shares
of JAKA in Mr. & Ms. Such reference alluded to by the respondents indicates an admission
on respondents part of the petitioners legal personality to file a derivative suit for the benefit
of the respondent Mr. & Ms.Publishing Co., Inc.
The Hearing Panel however denied petitioners prayer for the constitution of a management
committee.
On 25 March 1991 private respondents filed a Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform
to Evidence alleging that the issue of whether petitioner is the real party-in-interest had been
tried by express or implied consent of the parties through the admission of documentary
exhibits presented by private respondents proving that the real party-in-interest was JAKA,
not petitioner Bitong. As such, No. 8, par. V (Affirmative Allegations/Defenses), Answer to
the Amended Petition, was stipulated due to inadvertence and excusable mistake and
should be amended. On 10 October 1991 the Hearing Panel denied the motion for
amendment.
Petitioner testified at the trial that she became the registered and beneficial owner of
997 shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. out of the 4,088 total outstanding shares after she acquired
them from JAKA through a deed of sale executed on 25 July 1983 and recorded in the Stock
and Transfer Book of Mr. & Ms. under Certificate of Shares of Stock No. 008. She pointed
out that Senator Enrile decided that JAKA should completely divest itself of its holdings
in Mr. & Ms. and this resulted in the sale to her of JAKAs interest and holdings in that
publishing firm.
Private respondents refuted the statement of petitioner that she was a stockholder
of Mr. & Ms. since 25 July 1983 as respondent Eugenia D. Apostol signed Certificate of
Stock No. 008 only on 17 March 1989, and not on 25 July 1983. Respondent Eugenia D.
Apostol explained that she stopped using her long signature (Eugenia D. Apostol) in 1987
and changed it to E.D. Apostol, the signature which appeared on the face of Certificate of
Stock No. 008 bearing the date 25 July 1983. And, since the Stock and Transfer Book which
petitioner presented in evidence was not registered with the SEC, the entries therein
including Certificate of Stock No. 008 were fraudulent. Respondent Eugenia D. Apostol
claimed that she had not seen the Stock and Transfer Book at any time until 21 March 1989
when it was delivered by petitioner herself to the office of Mr. & Ms., and that petitioner
repeatedly referred to Senator Enrile as "my principal" during the Mr. & Ms. board meeting
of 22 September 1988, seven (7) times no less.
On 3 August 1993, after trial on the merits, the SEC Hearing Panel dismissed the
derivative suit filed by petitioner and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction barring
private respondents from disposing of their PDI shares and any of Mr. & Ms. assets. The
Hearing Panel ruled that there was no serious mismanagement of Mr. & Ms. which would
warrant drastic corrective measures. It gave credence to the assertion of respondent
Eugenia D. Apostol that Mr. & Ms. was operated like a close corporation where important
matters were discussed and approved through informal consultations at breakfast
conferences.The Hearing Panel also concluded that while the evidence presented tended to
show that the real party-in-interest indeed was JAKA and/or Senator Enrile, it viewed the
real issue to be the alleged mismanagement, fraud and conflict of interest on the part of
respondent Eugenia D. Apostol, and allowed petitioner to prosecute the derivative suit if only
to resolve the real issues. Hence, for this purpose, the Hearing Panel considered petitioner
to be the real party-in-interest.
On 19 August 1993 respondent Apostol spouses sold the PDI shares registered in the
name of their holding company, JAED Management Corporation, to Edgardo B. Espiritu. On
25 August 1993 petitioner Bitong appealed to the SEC En Banc.
On 24 January 1994 the SEC En Banc[4] reversed the decision of the Hearing Panel
and, among others, ordered private respondents to account for, return and deliver to Mr. &
Ms. any and all funds and assets that they disbursed from the coffers of the corporation
including shares of stock, profits, dividends and/or fruits that they might have received as a
result of their investment in PDI, including those arising from the P150,000.00 advanced to
respondents Eugenia D. Apostol, Leticia J. Magsanoc and Adoracion G. Nuyda; account for
and return any profits and fruits of all amounts irregularly or unlawfully advanced to PDI and
other third persons; and, cease and desist from managing the affairs of Mr. & Ms. for reasons
of fraud, mismanagement, disloyalty and conflict of interest.
The SEC En Banc also declared the 19 August 1993 sale of the PDI shares of JAED
Management Corporation to Edgardo B. Espiritu to be tainted with fraud, hence, null and
void, and considered Mr. & Ms.as the true and lawful owner of all the PDI shares acquired
by respondents Eugenia D. Apostol, Magsanoc and Nuyda. It also declared all subsequent
transferees of such shares as trustees for the benefit of Mr. & Ms. and ordered them to
forthwith deliver said shares to Mr. & Ms.
Consequently, respondent Apostol spouses, Magsanoc, Nuyda, and Mr. & Ms. filed a
petition for review before respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-GR No. SP 33291,
while respondent Edgardo B. Espiritu filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition also before
respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-GR No. SP 33873. On 8 December 1994 the
two (2) petitions were consolidated.
 On 31 August 1995 respondent appellate court rendered a decision reversing the SEC
En Banc and held that from the evidence on record petitioner was not the owner of any share
of stock in Mr. & Ms. and therefore not the real party-in-interest to prosecute the complaint
she had instituted against private respondents. Accordingly, petitioner alone and by
herself as an agent could not file a derivative suit in behalf of her principal. For not being the
real party-in-interest, petitioners complaint did not state a cause of action, a defense which
was never waived; hence, her petition should have been dismissed. Respondent appellate
court ruled that the assailed orders of the SEC were issued in excess of jurisdiction, or want
of it, and thus were null and void.[5] On 18 January 1996, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Before this Court, petitioner submits that in paragraph 1 under the caption "I. The
Parties" of her Amended Petition before the SEC, she stated that she was a stockholder and
director of Mr. & Ms. In par. 1 under the caption "II. The Facts" she declared that she "is the
registered owner of 1,000 shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. out of the latters 4,088 total
outstanding shares" and that she was a member of the Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms. and
treasurer from its inception until 11 April 1989. Petitioner contends that private respondents
did not deny the above allegations in their answer and therefore they are conclusively bound
by this judicial admission. Consequently, private respondents admission that petitioner has
1,000 shares of stock registered in her name in the books of Mr. & Ms. forecloses any
question on her status and right to bring a derivative suit on behalf of Mr. & Ms.
Not necessarily. A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission against interest
is entitled to overcome by evidence the apparent inconsistency, and it is competent for the
party against whom the pleading is offered to show that the statements were inadvertently
made or were made under a mistake of fact. In addition, a party against whom a single
clause or paragraph of a pleading is offered may have the right to introduce other paragraphs
which tend to destroy the admission in the paragraph offered by the adversary. [6]
The Amended Petition before the SEC alleges -
I. THE PARTIES
1. Petitioner is a stockholder and director of Mr. & Ms. x x x x
II. THE FACTS
1. Petitioner is the registered owner of 1,000 shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. out of the latters
4,088 total outstanding shares. Petitioner, at all times material to this petition, is a member
of the Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms. and from the inception of Mr. & Ms. until 11 April 1989
was its treasurer x x x x
On the other hand, the Amended Answer to the Amended Petition states -
I. PARTIES
1. Respondents admit the allegations contained in Caption I, pars. 1 to 4 of the Petition
referring to the personality, addresses and capacity of the parties to the petition except x x
x x but qualify said admission insofar as they are limited, qualified and/or expanded by
allegations in the Affirmative Allegations/Defenses x x x x
II. THE FACTS
1. Respondents admit paragraph 1 of the Petition, but qualify said admission as to the
beneficial ownership of the shares of stock registered in the name of the petitioner, the truth
being as stated in the Affirmative Allegations/Defenses of this Answer x x x x
V. AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS/DEFENSES
Respondents respectfully allege by way of Affirmative Allegations/Defenses, that x x x x
3. Fortunately, respondent Apostol was able to convince Mr. Luis Villafuerte to take interest
in the business and he, together with the original investors, restructured the Ex
Libris Publishing Company by organizing a new corporation known as Mr. & Ms. Publishing
Co., Inc.x x x x Mr. Luis Villafuerte contributed his own P100,000.00. JAKA and respondent
Jose Z. Apostol, original investors of Ex Libris contributed P100,000.00 each; Ex
Libris Publishing Company was paid 800 shares for the name of Mr. & Ms. magazine and
goodwill. Thus, the original stockholders of respondent Mr. & Ms. were:
Cert./No./Date Name of Stockholder No. of Shares %
001-9-15-76 JAKA Investments Corp. 1,000 21%
002-9-15-76 Luis Villafuerte 1,000 21%
003-9-15-76 Ramon L. Siy 1,000 21%
004-9-15-76 Jose Z. Apostol 1,000 21%
005-9-15-76 Ex Libris Publishing Co. 800 16%
4,800 96%
4. The above-named original stockholders of respondent Mr. & Ms. continue to be virtually
the same stockholders up to this date x x x x
8. The petitioner being herself a minor stockholder and holder-in-trust of JAKA shares,
represented and continues to represent JAKA in the Board x x x x
21. Petitioner Nora A. Bitong is not the true party to this case, the true party being JAKA
Investments Corporation which continues to be the true stockholder of respondent Mr. &
Ms. Publishing Co., Inc., consequently, she does not have the personality to initiate and
prosecute this derivative suit, and should therefore be dismissed x x x x
The answer of private respondents shows that there was no judicial admission that
petitioner was a stockholder of Mr. & Ms. to entitle her to file a derivative suit on behalf of
the corporation. Where the statements of the private respondents were qualified with
phrases such as, "insofar as they are limited, qualified and/or expanded by," "the truth being
as stated in the Affirmative Allegations/Defenses of this Answer" they cannot be considered
definite and certain enough, cannot be construed as judicial admissions. [7]
More so, the affirmative defenses of private respondents directly refute the
representation of petitioner that she is a true and genuine stockholder of Mr. & Ms. by stating
unequivocally that petitioner is not the true party to the case but JAKA which continues to be
the true stockholder of Mr. & Ms. In fact, one of the reliefs which private respondents prayed
for was the dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal
interest to initiate and prosecute the same.
When taken in its totality, the Amended Answer to the Amended Petition, or even
the Answer to the Amended Petition alone, clearly raises an issue as to the legal personality
of petitioner to file the complaint. Every alleged admission is taken as an entirety of the fact
which makes for the one side with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect
on the other side. The reason for this is, where part of a statement of a party is used against
him as an admission, the court should weigh any other portion connected with the statement,
which tends to neutralize or explain the portion which is against interest.
In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to
be determined from the whole statement and others intimately related or connected
therewith as an integrated unit.Although acts or facts admitted do not require proof and
cannot be contradicted, however, evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the
admission was made through palpable mistake. [8] The rule is always in favor of liberality in
construction of pleadings so that the real matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment
of the court.[9]
Petitioner also argues that since private respondents failed to appeal the 6 December 1990
Order and the 3 August 1993 Decision of the SEC Hearing Panel declaring that she was the
real party-in-interest and had legal personality to sue, they are now estopped from
questioning her personality.
Not quite. The 6 December 1990 Order is clearly an interlocutory order which cannot
be considered as having finally resolved on the merits the issue of legal capacity of
petitioner. The SEC Hearing Panel discussed the issue of legal capacity solely for the
purpose of ruling on the application for writ of preliminary injunction as an incident to the
main issues raised in the complaint. Being a mere interlocutory order, it is not appealable.
For, an interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement and end
of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole
controversy.[10] Thus, even though the 6 December 1990 Order was adverse to private
respondents, they had the legal right and option not to elevate the same to the SEC En
Banc but rather to await the decision which resolves all the issues raised by the parties and
to appeal therefrom by assigning all errors that might have been committed by the Hearing
Panel.
On the other hand, the 3 August 1993 Decision of the Hearing Panel dismissing the
derivative suit for failure to prove the charges of mismanagement, fraud, disloyalty and
conflict of interest and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction, was favorable to private
respondents. Hence, they were not expected to appeal therefrom.
In fact, in the 3 August 1993 Decision, the Hearing Panel categorically stated that the
evidence presented showed that the real party-in-interest was not petitioner Bitong
but JAKA and/or Senator Enrile.Petitioner was merely allowed to prosecute her complaint
so as not to sidetrack "the real issue to be resolved (which) was the allegation of
mismanagement, fraud and conflict of interest allegedly committed by respondent Eugenia
D. Apostol." It was only for this reason that petitioner was considered to be capacitated and
competent to file the petition.
Accordingly, with the dismissal of the complaint of petitioner against private
respondents, there was no compelling reason for the latter to appeal to the SEC En Banc. It
was in fact petitioners turn as the aggrieved party to exercise her right to appeal from the
decision. It is worthy to note that even during the appeal of petitioner before the SEC En
Banc private respondents maintained their vigorous objection to the appeal and reiterated
petitioners lack of legal capacity to sue before the SEC.
Petitioner then contends that she was a holder of the proper certificates of shares of
stock and that the transfer was recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book of Mr. & Ms. She
invokes Sec. 63 of The Corporation Code which provides that no transfer shall be valid
except as between the parties until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation,
and upon its recording the corporation is bound by it and is estopped to deny the fact of
transfer of said shares. Petitioner alleges that even in the absence of a stock certificate, a
stockholder solely on the strength of the recording in the stock and transfer book can
exercise all the rights as stockholder, including the right to file a derivative suit in the name
of the corporation. And, she need not present a separate deed of sale or transfer in her favor
to prove ownership of stock.
Section 63 of The Corporation Code expressly provides -
Sec. 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. - The capital stock of stock corporations
shall be divided into shares for which certificates signed by the president or vice president,
countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the
corporation shall be issued in accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are
personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed
by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the
transfer. No transfer however shall be valid except as between the parties until the transfer
is recorded in the books of the corporation showing the names of the parties to the
transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates and the
number of shares transferred x x x x
This provision above quoted envisions a formal certificate of stock which can be issued
only upon compliance with certain requisites. First, the certificates must be signed by the
president or vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and
sealed with the seal of the corporation. A mere typewritten statement advising a stockholder
of the extent of his ownership in a corporation without qualification and/or authentication
cannot be considered as a formal certificate of stock. [11] Second, delivery of the certificate is
an essential element of its issuance. Hence, there is no issuance of a stock certificate where
it is never detached from the stock books although blanks therein are properly filled up if the
person whose name is inserted therein has no control over the books of the
company.[12] Third, the par value, as to par value shares, or the full subscription as to no par
value shares, must first be fully paid. Fourth, the original certificate must be surrendered
where the person requesting the issuance of a certificate is a transferee from a stockholder.
The certificate of stock itself once issued is a continuing affirmation or representation
that the stock described therein is valid and genuine and is at least prima facie evidence that
it was legally issued in the absence of evidence to the contrary. However, this presumption
may be rebutted.[13] Similarly, books and records of a corporation which include even the
stock and transfer book are generally admissible in evidence in favor of or against the
corporation and its members to prove the corporate acts, its financial status and other
matters including ones status as a stockholder. They are ordinarily the best evidence of
corporate acts and proceedings.
However, the books and records of a corporation are not conclusive even against the
corporation but are prima facie evidence only. Parol evidence may be admitted to supply
omissions in the records, explain ambiguities, or show what transpired where no records
were kept, or in some cases where such records were contradicted. [14] The effect of entries
in the books of the corporation which purport to be regular records of the proceedings of its
board of directors or stockholders can be destroyed by testimony of a more conclusive
character than mere suspicion that there was an irregularity in the manner in which the books
were kept.[15]
The foregoing considerations are founded on the basic principle that stock issued
without authority and in violation of law is void and confers no rights on the person to whom
it is issued and subjects him to no liabilities.[16] Where there is an inherent lack of power in
the corporation to issue the stock, neither the corporation nor the person to whom the stock
is issued is estopped to question its validity since an estoppel cannot operate to create stock
which under the law cannot have existence.[17]
As found by the Hearing Panel and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, there is
overwhelming evidence that despite what appears on the certificate of stock and stock and
transfer book, petitioner was not a bona fide stockholder of Mr. & Ms. before March 1989 or
at the time the complained acts were committed to qualify her to institute a stockholders
derivative suit against private respondents. Aside from petitioners own admissions, several
corporate documents disclose that the true party-in-interest is not petitioner but JAKA.
Thus, while petitioner asserts in her petition that Certificate of Stock No. 008 dated 25
July 1983 was issued in her name, private respondents argue that this certificate was signed
by respondent Eugenia D. Apostol as President only in 1989 and was fraudulently antedated
by petitioner who had possession of the Certificate Book and the Stock and Transfer
Book. Private respondents stress that petitioners counsel entered into a stipulation on record
before the Hearing Panel that the certificate was indeed signed by respondent Apostol only
in 1989 and not in 1983.
In her reply, petitioner admits that while respondent Eugenia D. Apostol signed the
Certificate of Stock No. 008 in petitioners name only in 1989, it was issued by the corporate
secretary in 1983 and that the other certificates covering shares in Mr. & Ms. had not yet
been signed by respondent Eugenia D. Apostol at the time of the filing of the complaint with
the SEC although they were issued years before.
Based on the foregoing admission of petitioner, there is no truth to the statement
written in Certificate of Stock No. 008 that the same was issued and signed on 25 July 1983
by its duly authorized officers specifically the President and Corporate Secretary because
the actual date of signing thereof was 17 March 1989. Verily, a formal certificate of stock
could not be considered issued in contemplation of law unless signed by the president or
vice-president and countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary.
In this case, contrary to petitioners submission, the Certificate of Stock No. 008 was
only legally issued on 17 March 1989 when it was actually signed by the President of the
corporation, and not before that date. While a certificate of stock is not necessary to make
one a stockholder, e.g., where he is an incorporator and listed as stockholder in the articles
of incorporation although no certificate of stock has yet been issued, it is supposed to serve
as paper representative of the stock itself and of the owners interest therein. Hence, when
Certificate of Stock No. 008 was admittedly signed and issued only on 17 March 1989 and
not on 25 July 1983, even as it indicates that petitioner owns 997 shares of stock of Mr. &
Ms., the certificate has no evidentiary value for the purpose of proving that petitioner was a
stockholder since 1983 up to 1989.
And even the factual antecedents of the alleged ownership by petitioner in 1983 of
shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. are indistinctive if not enshrouded in inconsistencies. In her
testimony before the Hearing Panel, petitioner said that early in 1983, to relieve Mr. &
Ms. from political pressure, Senator Enrile decided to divest the family holdings in Mr. &
Ms. as he was then part of the government and Mr. & Ms. was evolving to be an opposition
newspaper. The JAKA shares numbering 1,000 covered by Certificate of Stock No. 001
were thus transferred to respondent Eugenia D. Apostol in trust or in blank.[18]
Petitioner now claims that a few days after JAKAs shares were transferred to
respondent Eugenia D. Apostol, Senator Enrile sold to petitioner 997 shares of JAKA. For
this purpose, a deed of sale was executed and antedated to 10 May 1983. [19] This
submission of petitioner is however contradicted by the records which show that a deed of
sale was executed by JAKA transferring 1,000 shares of Mr. & Ms. to respondent Apostol
on 10 May 1983 and not to petitioner.[20]
Then Senator Enrile testified that in May or June 1983 he was asked at a media
interview if his family owned shares of stock in Mr. & Ms. Although he and his family were
stockholders at that time he denied it so as not to embarrass the magazine. He called up
petitioner and instructed her to work out the documentation of the transfer of shares
from JAKA to respondent Apostol to be covered by a declaration of trust. His instruction was
to transfer the shares of JAKA in Mr. & Ms. and Ex Libris to respondent Apostol as a nominal
holder. He then finally decided to transfer the shareholdings to petitioner. [21]
When asked if there was any document or any written evidence of that divestment in
favor of petitioner, Senator Enrile answered that there was an endorsement of the shares of
stock. He said that there was no other document evidencing the assignment to petitioner
because the stocks were personal property that could be transferred even orally. [22] Contrary
to Senator Enriles testimony, however, petitioner maintains that Senator Enrile executed a
deed of sale in her favor.
A careful perusal of the records shows that neither the alleged endorsement of
Certificate of Stock No. 001 in the name of JAKA nor the alleged deed of sale executed by
Senator Enrile directly in favor ofpetitioner could have legally transferred or assigned on 25
July 1983 the shares of stock in favor of petitioner because as of 10 May 1983 Certificate of
Stock No. 001 in the name of JAKA was already cancelled and a new one, Certificate
of Stock No. 007, issued in favor of respondent Apostol by virtue of a Declaration of Trust
and Deed of Sale.[23]
It should be emphasized that on 10 May 1983 JAKA executed a deed of sale over
1,000 Mr. & Ms. shares in favor of respondent Eugenio D. Apostol. On the same day,
respondent Apostol signed a declaration of trust stating that she was the registered owner
of 1,000 Mr. & Ms. shares covered by Certificate of Stock No. 007.
The declaration of trust further showed that although respondent Apostol was the
registered owner, she held the shares of stock and dividends which might be paid in
connection therewith solely in trust for the benefit of JAKA, her principal. It was also stated
therein that being a trustee, respondent Apostol agreed, on written request of the principal,
to assign and transfer the shares of stock and any and all such distributions or dividends
unto the principal or such other person as the principal would nominate or appoint.
Petitioner was well aware of this trust, being the person in charge of this documentation
and being one of the witnesses to the execution of this document. [24] Hence, the mere
alleged endorsement of Certificate of Stock No. 001 by Senator Enrile or by a duly
authorized officer of JAKA to effect the transfer of shares of JAKA to petitioner could not
have been legally feasible because Certificate of Stock No. 001 was already canceled by
virtue of the deed of sale to respondent Apostol.
And, there is nothing in the records which shows that JAKA had revoked the trust it
reposed on respondent Eugenia D. Apostol. Neither was there any evidence that the
principal had requested her to assign and transfer the shares of stock to petitioner. If it was
true that the shares of stock covered by Certificate of Stock No. 007 had been transferred to
petitioner, the person who could legally endorse the certificate was private respondent
Eugenia D. Apostol, she being the registered owner and trustee of the shares of stock
covered by Certificate of Stock No. 007. It is a settled rule that the trustee should endorse
the stock certificate to validate the cancellation of her share and to have the transfer recorded
in the books of the corporation.[25]
In fine, the records are unclear on how petitioner allegedly acquired the shares of stock
of JAKA. Petitioner being the chief executive officer of JAKA and the sole person in charge
of all business and financial transactions and affairs of JAKA[26] was supposed to be in the
best position to show convincing evidence on the alleged transfer of shares to her, if indeed
there was a transfer. Considering thatpetitioners status is being questioned and several
factual circumstances have been presented by private respondents disproving petitioners
claim, it was incumbent upon her to submit rebuttal evidence on the manner by which she
allegedly became a stockholder. Her failure to do so taken in the light of several substantial
inconsistencies in her evidence is fatal to her case.
The rule is that the endorsement of the certificate of stock by the owner or his attorney-
in-fact or any other person legally authorized to make the transfer shall be sufficient to effect
the transfer of shares only if the same is coupled with delivery. The delivery of the stock
certificate duly endorsed by the owner is the operative act of transfer of shares from the
lawful owner to the new transferee.
Thus, for a valid transfer of stocks, the requirements are as follows: (a) There must be
delivery of the stock certificate; (b) The certificate must be endorsed by the owner or his
attorney-in-fact or other persons legally authorized to make the transfer; and, (c) to be valid
against third parties, the transfer must be recorded in the books of the corporation. [27] At
most, in the instant case, petitioner has satisfied only the third requirement. Compliance with
the first two requisites has not been clearly and sufficiently shown.
Considering that the requirements provided under Sec. 63 of The Corporation
Code should be mandatorily complied with, the rule on presumption of regularity cannot
apply. The regularity and validity of the transfer must be proved. As it is, even the credibility
of the stock and transfer book and the entries thereon relied upon by petitioner to show
compliance with the third requisite to prove that she was a stockholder since 1983 is highly
doubtful.
The records show that the original stock and transfer book and the stock certificate
book of Mr. & Ms. were in the possession of petitioner before their custody was transferred
to the Corporate Secretary, Atty. Augusto San Pedro.[28] On 25 May 1988, Assistant
Corporate Secretary Renato Jose Unson wrote Mr. & Ms. about the lost stock and transfer
book which was also noted by the corporations external auditors, Punongbayan and Araullo,
in their audit. Atty. Unson even informed respondent Eugenia D. Apostol as President of Mr.
& Ms. that steps would be undertaken to prepare and register a new Stock and Transfer
Book with the SEC. Incidentally, perhaps strangely, upon verification with the SEC, it was
discovered that the general file of the corporation with the SEC was missing. Hence, it was
even possible that the original Stock and Transfer Book might not have been registered at
all.
On 20 October 1988 respondent Eugenia D. Apostol wrote Atty. Augusto San Pedro
noting the changes he had made in the Stock and Transfer Book without prior notice to the
corporate officers.[29] In the 27 October 1988 directors' meeting, respondent Eugenia D.
Apostol asked about the documentation to support the changes in the Stock and Transfer
Book with regard to the JAKA shares. Petitioner answered that Atty. San Pedro made the
changes upon her instructions conformably with established practice. [30]
This simply shows that as of 1988 there still existed certain issues affecting the
ownership of the JAKA shares, thus raising doubts whether the alleged transactions
recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book were proper, regular and authorized. Then, as if to
magnify and compound the uncertainties in the ownership of the shares of stock in question,
when the corporate secretary resigned, the Stock and Transfer Book was delivered not to
the corporate office where the book should be kept but to petitioner. [31]
That JAKA retained its ownership of its Mr. & Ms. shares was clearly shown by its
receipt of the dividends issued in December 1986. [32] This only means, very obviously,
that Mr. & Ms. shares in question still belonged to JAKA and not to petitioner. For, dividends
are distributed to stockholders pursuant to their right to share in corporate profits. When a
dividend is declared, it belongs to the person who is the substantial and beneficial owner of
the stock at the time regardless of when the distribution profit was earned. [33]
Finally, this Court takes notice of the glaring and open admissions of petitioner made,
not just seven (7) but nine (9) times, during the 22 September 1988 meeting of the board of
directors that the Enriles were her principals or shareholders, as shown by the minutes is impliedly recognized when the law makes corporate directors or officers liable for damages
thereof which she duly signed[34] - suffered by the corporation and its stockholders for violation of their fiduciary duties.

Hence, a stockholder may sue for mismanagement, waste or dissipation of corporate

5. Mrs. E. Apostol explained to the Directors that through her efforts, the asset base of the
Company has improved and profits were realized. It is for this reason that the Company has
declared a 100% cash dividend in 1986. She said that it is up for the Board to decide based
on this performance whether she should continue to act as Board Chairman or not. In this
regard, Ms. N.A. Bitong expressed her recollection of how Ex-Libris/Mr. & Ms. were
organized and her participation for and on behalf of her principals, as follows: She recalled
that her principals were invited by Mrs. E. Apostol to invest in Ex-Libris and eventually Mr. &
Ms. The relationship between her principals and Mrs. E. Apostol made it possible for the
latter to have access to several information concerning certain political events and issues. In
many instances, her principals supplied first hand and newsworthy information that
made Mr. & Ms. a popular paper x x x x
assets because of a special injury to him for which he is otherwise without redress. [39] In
effect, the suit is an action for specific performance of an obligation owed by the corporation
to the stockholders to assist its rights of action when the corporation has been put in default
by the wrongful refusal of the directors or management to make suitable measures for its
protection.[40]
The basis of a stockholders suit is always one in equity. However, it cannot prosper
without first complying with the legal requisites for its institution. The most important of these
is the bona fide ownership by a stockholder of a stock in his own right at the time of the
transaction complained of which invests him with standing to institute a derivative action for
the benefit of the corporation.[41]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 31 August 1995 Decision of the Court of
6. According to Ms. Bitong, her principals were instrumental in helping Mr. & Ms. survive
Appeals dismissing the complaint of petitioner Nora A. Bitong in CA-G.R. No. SP 33291, and
during those years that it was cash strapped x x x x Ms. N.A. Bitong pointed out that the
granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Edgardo B. Espiritu as
practice of using the former Ministers influence and stature in the government is one thing
well as annulling the 5 November 1993, 24 January 1994 and 18 February 1994 Orders of
which her principals themselves are strongly against x x x x
the SEC En Banc in CA-G.R. No. SP 33873, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

7. x x x x At this point, Ms. N. Bitong again expressed her recollection of the subject matter SO ORDERED.
as follows: (a) Mrs. E. Apostol, she remembers, brought up the concept of a cooperative-ran
newspaper company in one of her breakfast session with her principals sometime during the
end of 1985. Her principals when asked for an opinion, said that they recognized the concept
as something very noble and visible x x x xThen Ms. Bitong asked a very specific question -
"When you conceptualized Ex-Libris and Mr. & Ms., did you not think of my shareholders the
Ponce Enriles as liabilities? How come you associated yourself with them then and not
now? What is the difference?" Mrs. Apostol did not answer the question.

The admissions of a party against his interest inscribed upon the record books of a
corporation are competent and persuasive evidence against him. [35] These admissions
render nugatory any argument that petitioner is a bona fide stockholder of Mr. & Ms. at any
time before 1988 or at the time the acts complained of were committed. There is no doubt
that petitioner was an employee of JAKA as its managing officer, as testified to by Senator
Enrile himself.[36] However, in the absence of a special authority from the board of directors
of JAKA to institute a derivative suit for and in its behalf, petitioner is disqualified by law to
sue in her own name. The power to sue and be sued in any court by a corporation even as
a stockholder is lodged in the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers and not
in the president or officer thereof.[37]

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that where corporate directors are guilty of a breach
of trust, not of mere error of judgment or abuse of discretion, and intracorporate remedy is
futile or useless, a stockholder may institute a suit in behalf of himself and other stockholders
and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong inflicted directly
upon the corporation and indirectly upon the stockholders. [38] The stockholders right to
institute a derivative suit is not based on any express provision of The Corporation Code but