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Giap’s lust Win?


Colonel John C. Bell, United States Armg

v O NGUYEN GIAP, the North Vietnamese Min-


ister of Defense and guiding spirit behind the
Vietminh, Viet Cong, and People’s Army of North Viet-
nam, earned the nickname “’Tiger of Dien Bien Phu”
with his decisive victory over the French in 1954.
Today, General Giap desperately needs another Dien
Bien Phu. His methods won in the past, but can they
now bring him Dien Bien Phu II?

Military ReviDw
DIEN BIEN PHU

He has fought the Japrmeae, the of forces employed. His three stages
French, the South Vietnamese, and derive from Mao Tae-tung through
the Americans in Vietnam. He hae Truong Chinh, onetime Secretary of
borrowed from and improvised upon the Indochinese Communist Party and
the techniques of earlier and contem- preeent North Vietnamese official.
porary commander from Tzu Fan Truong’a nomenclature and the pre-
(6’76B.C.) to Mao Tse-tung. HIS doc- dominant activities seen in each stage
trine for revolutionary war is violent, by Giap are shown in the accompany-
brutal, and callous. ing chart.
There is little evidence that Giap The conditions for a revolutionary
has personally engaged in much ac- war, stage I, exist when a people are
tivecombat—he was probably not even oppressed by an alien irmader or by

Truong Giap

Stage I Strategic defensive Concealed mobilization and


guerrilla operations
Stage II Equilibrium Larger but still mobile oper-
ations
Stage III Victorious counter- Classic conventional military
offensive operations

present at Dien Bien Phu. Rather, he a native but non-Communist govern-


bas organized, planned, and directed. ment. When a foreign power is in-
Thie absence from the battlefield may volved, Communiet calls for liberation
lie at the root of some of hie apparent of the country have a powerful appeal
misconceptions today. to patriotic natives, Communist or not.
Giap summarizes and greatly ilhrmi- When the “enemy” is a led govern-
nateehis theories with this sentence: ment, the appeal ie based on promiees
“The essential is to have a workable of land reform, tax reform, self-rule,
politico-military doctrine.” He has me- and democratic government. In either
thodically set forth three sets of event, the non-Communiete who coop-
tbree’e—three etages of war, three erate later find tbemeelves hopelessly
types of operation, and three types entangled in the Communist conspir-
acy, or, just as bad, find they have
Colonel John C. Bell is with the 1st
assisted the Communiet to climb to
Field Force, Vietnam. He received his
M.S. in Civil Engineering from the power. The non-Communiete do not
University of Iowa, Iowa City, and is ehare this power, but eomrbecome the
a 1967 graduate of the US Army War victims of it.
College, Carliale Barracks, Penn@- The Communist insurgents immedi-
varria. His eervice also includes a.ssign- ately begin to establish a political base
mentewith the 7th Division in Korea; among the peopl+the peasant-s and
Joint US Military Advizory Group,
workere~uring which every feasible
Greece; w“th the .jth Armored Divi-
m“onand 7th US Army in Germany; tool is used. Subversion, political edu-
and with the facmlty of the US Army cation and indoctrination, organiza-
Command and General Staff College. tion, terror tactics to intimidate the

Mmmy 1968 85
DIEM BIEN PHU

population in general and eliminate meticulously planned and sought out


opposition 1eaders,compromises of ex- by him.
pediency with other dissatisfied ele- The most important task of stage
ments, even though non-Communist, I is to “sell” the revolution to the
are all used as appropriate. maeses and secure their political co.
A grassroots, clandestine organiza- operation. Tax and other reforms ars
tion begins to foti and gathers weap- promised. At times, if the insurgents
one for the struggle. Attacks on small J gain de fodo control of sufficient
areas, these reforms actually may be
implemented as indicators of events
to come.
Giap’s forces uee any available sanc-
tuary during all stages. The Vietminh
based some of their activities in China
during the Japanese occupation of
Vietnam. They mingled their forces
freely with Laotian forces and on Lae.
tian soil against the French. As a
result, the Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese are obviously making the max-
imum use today of Laos, Cambodia,
and the demilitarized zone, disregard-
ing entirely the legal, moral, and eth-
ical implications of such acts.
6iap’s fiusrrilla War
Guerrilla war as defined by Giap is
much the same aa guerrilla war else-
where, but, perhaps, even more lim-
ited. Forces are small and ill-equipped,
Vo Nguyen Giap sdvoeates a tenacious composed of nonuniformed irregulars
military doctrine which will be difficult who continue work and are, full-time
to defeat combatants in only a small percentage
of cases. Pitched battles are virtually
military or internal security forces
unknown, and engagements are short
are carried out hy guerrilla bands. in order to avoid overwhelming enemy
Through these attacks they secure reinforcements. Insurgent forces con-
weapons, ammunition, explosives, com- duct operations to minimize their
munications equipment, and other us- losses while inflicting steadily mount-
able hardware which are concealed and ing caeualtiee on the enemy. Virtually
used for later attacks. Material assist- all have the aim of securing military
ance from abroad ie sought. hardware from the enemy but not of
The insurgent is careful n@ to over- holding ground. If not suppressed,
commit bis resources. He goes to great these forces are enlarged and ex-
Iengthe to avoid open conflict unless panded so as to be capable of escalat-
the odds are greatly in his favor. This ing guerrilla war into mobile war after
usually means that any encounter ie a period of time-possibly years.

aa’ Military ROVi@W

. ...—s. ..-
,
DIEM BIEN PHU

In stage II, guerrilla war diminishes guerrilla war and predominate. Guer-
as mobile war and entrenched camp rilla war persists on a lees important,
warfare increase in importance. The more selective basis such as terror
insurgentsbegin to aeeert domination attacks on enemy headquarters and
over specific territories large enough assassinatione.
so that enemy forces can enter briefly Whereaa the passage from stage I
and only in force. The supPort pro- to stage II is almost a growth process,
vided by the people on a piecemeal, the shift from stage II to stage III
small-scale baaia heretofore is now is more dramatic and its timing is
regularized through insurgent tax, most crucial. To delay unnecessarily
tribute, and toll ayatems. means useless prolongation of the war
Rebel institutions such aa schools, with attendant loss of morale and
military campa, training centers, re- added costs, but to move too quickly
cruiting systems, hospitals, supply in- is much worse, for this could mean
stallations, and propaganda facilities total defeat. Giap’s nearly fatal mis-
are operated on an organized baaia. take in the anti-French war was the
Dominationover the populations with- too-early challenge of French forces
in these areaa through the systematic in opsn battles during the first half
elimination and intimidation of oppo- of 1951. In three battles, the Viet-
sition leaders becomes complete and minh were defeated each time and
effective. Despite the fact that the Giap almost lost his position as Viet-
enemy can defeat any single force minh commander in chief. The Vlet-
concentrated against him, he is now minh immediately went back to stage
on the strategic defensive. II—smaller battles on their own terms
in ecattered areas.
Major Conditions
Giap requires three major condi- Final Victory
tions for the third, final stage of the Final victory is the objective of
war. stage III; either the overthrow of
● Superiority of forces, meaning a native government or the ejection
numericalsuperiority of armed troops of the foreign force must be accom-
and, to some extent, superiority of plished. Recognizing reality, the con-
some key weapons. ditions for victory are met when mat-
● A favorable international situa- ters are made unpleasant enough for
tion, meaning military assistance from the foreign nation to agree at the con-
Communist nations abroad and their ference table to withdraw.
political support at the conference The Asian conferee at the peace ta-
table. ble feels that the best credential he
● A situation within Vietnam, in can bring is a spectacular, late-vintage
general, and the enemy camp, in par- victory on the battlefield. For West-
ticular, favorable to his forces, mean- erners, this is a difficult point to con-
ing demoralization among the native test, particularly if the Asian is will-
government and political dissension ing to pay a high price in casualties
within the homeland of the foreign for this victory, as he usually is. The
aggressor. violent attacks launched by the Chi-
Given these conditions, mobile war nese and North Koreans while the con-
and “entrenched camp war” overtake ferees were at the Korean peace table

febnmy 1986 01
DIEN BIEN PHU

are one example of thie philosophy; In late 1953, their free zone was
the Battle of Dien Bien Phu wae an- threatened by French concentrations
other. in the Red River Delta and at Dien
Completing Giap’s triad of trios are Bien Phu. The Central Committee,
the three types of forces employed: after lengthy debate, ordered diver-
guerrilla units, regional troops, and sionary attacks at four points in Laos
regular unite. Guerrilla units are the and Vietnam, drawing French forces
claseical part-time resistance fighters to these points and weakening French
who farm by day and fight by night, posture over-all. When the Vietminh
poorly equipped, but numerous. Re- main effort then fell on Dien Bien
gional forces, although full time, bet- Phu, French reservee were lacklng.
ter equippid, and relatively more mo- A secondary direct benefit of the
bile, confine their operations to their prolonged war concept is the freedom
own province. At the top of the heap to choose between “strike swiftly, win
are the regulars—hard core, full time, swiftly” and “strike surely, advance
well trained and disciplined, and surely” tactics. It is probable that the
armed with modern weapons. The slow, blnody, Dien Bien Phu victory,
three forces coordinate closely, and ground out using the “cure” concept,
the “people’s army” concept is SUS- had a greater impact on French and
tained through almost total involve- world public opinion than a quicker
ment of the population in one of the victory would have had. The world
three forces. audience was able to see a seemingly
unstoppable Communist war machine
Prolonged War Concept
power its way closer to victory daily,
While Giap owed much of his doc-
despite the most vigorous French ef-
trine to Mao Tse-tung and Truong
forte to reinforce and defend, whereas
Chinh, Bernard B. Fall rated Giap’s
a quick victory might well have been
best contribution to revolutionary war
written off as just another successful
as “his estimate of the political-psy-
Communist sneak attack.
chological shortcomings of a demo-
cratic system when faced with an in- An Interim Step
conclusive military operation,” which But the Vietnamese Communists’
concludes essentially that the democ- victory over the French and gains at
racy seeks a short war and is not the Geneva Conference table were only
psychologically able to stand a pro- an interim step toward their aim of
longed indecisive war. ruling all of Vietnam. In 1957-60 they
One major advantage of the pro- launched another war of liberation
longed war concept is the absence of against the established government of
the need to make momentoue decisions South Vietnam. In this conflict, G]ap
rapidly. Instead, lengthy periods may must win his second Dien Bien Phu
be devoted to gathering facte and eval- if the Communist aim ie to be fulfilled.
uating them; the decision-making In late 1964, the Viet Cong moved
process may be deferred and drawn into etage III and ultimate victory
out to the satisfaction of all parties was near when the United States com-
participating. The strategic decisions mitted large numbers of troope using
leading up to the Battle of Dien Bien weapons and tactics new to Glap. But
Phu offer an excellent example. despite some spectacular although lim-

88 MilitlryRstisw

.. —.’-
DIEN BIEN PNU

ited successes against small US ele- tion between 1954 and 1966 wbieh Giap
ments and installations, the Viet Cong does not seem to realiae, although it
havenot succeeded in obtaining a vic- bears on the politico-psychological
tory approaching the magnitude of area in which he deems himself expert.
Dien Bien Phu, nor is it likely to. Cer- This one of his key three conditions
tain major factors explain why, for etage III does not now exist.
Between 1945 and 1954, the Viet- A second Giap condition, that of
minhcould plausibly claim their strug- having euperior forces, was reversed
gle was a patriotic nationalist one by the US entry of US troops. Roughly

and maximize popular support. Tbe half of Vietnam opposes him, PIUSthe
French, on the other hand, were di- United States. Numerically, he does
vided in their support of the conflict. not have the manpower superiority
Giap’s third condition for stage III necessary to win a ‘conventional war,
was thus present. But the United and his materiel inferiority is even
States is not France, she is not in greater. Condition I, then, does not
Vietnam for the same motives, and obtain for Giap.
shecannot be conveniently substituted Condition II, bloc military assist-
for France on a one-for-one basis as ance and support at the conference
the current enemy. “ table, is also in need of repair. Al-
The United States wiil not accept though he receives military aid from
a defeat or disgraceful compromise. the USSR and the People’s Repnblic
This is one highly significant distinc- of China, their widening rift has hin-

hbreaty1968 89
DIEN’ BIEN! PHU
-
...
dered this program since he moved Vietnam has rejected US peace feelers
into stage 111. may well be this: In the manner of
Therefore, it can be concluded that, Asiatic Communists, Giap is not corn.
although Giap has formally moved into ing to the conference table until he
stage 111-and it must be considered has a recent speetamdar military vie.
that this was carefully done-the sit- tory or Dien Bien Phu II which would
uation has now reverted to that which provide a position of strength from
he visualizes as better befitting stage which to negotiate. But Dien Bien

Vo Nguyen Giap was faced with new weapons and tactics when US troops arrivsdin
force

11. His dilemma must be painful. Does ‘ rnu


‘. 11
‘- 1s
“ omamame
. “ “ - only ‘ m“ a stage
he deescalate; does he continue to seek III, the conditions for which no longer
a military decision, one which is daily exist.
more hopeless for him to achieve; or However, Giap may have shifted his
does he move for the conference table aim to a political and psychological
and settle for much less than he as- Dien Bien Phu rather than military.
pired to? Events in Vietnam so far In January 1966 articles in a Hanoi
indicate that he seeks a second Dien newspaper, he recognized US mate-
Bien Phu. rial strength, but described its weak
The fundamental reason why North pointe as:

90 Milifsry Review

I&----- . .
DIEN BIEN PHU

● The United States cannot send that Giap believes it and will convince
unlimited resources to Vietnam, but a substantial number of his audience.
must consider her commitment else- Isolated as he is today from the battle-
where. field, he may conceivably be efficiently
● The more US troops sent to Viet- uninformed or misinformed by subor-
nam, the more clearly tbe United dinates to believe that he can defeat
States labels hereelf aggressor and US forces militarily.
her lackeys as countryeellers. Giap is faced with the choice of ret.
● The US invaeion of Vietnam ‘regressing to stage H for an extended
comes when the patriotic war, libera- period or of moving for peace talks.
tion forces, and liberated areas are all The former would be costly in terms
growing so the United States muet of Viet Cong morale and of his own
scatter her forces and lose the initia- pereonal prestige. Should he opt for
tive. the latter with an eye toward achiev-
● In this politically and militarily I ing his end in South Vietnam at an-
passive posture, witbout an ideal, US other time, it would indicate that
forces cannot uee their full combat pragmatism has overcome his avowed
power nor escape defeat. determination to fight to ultimate vic-
● Although the United States came
tory.
to bolster the South Vietnamese Gov- Of the two, peace talks would seem
ernment, tbe latter is decaying and to be leee damaging internally since
will collapse when US troops are de- no matter what the true result of any
feated. truce, the Politburo could dietribute
● Peace-loving people worldwide
its own vereion to ite people. However,
strongly oppose US imperialists. anything less than total victory would
have a resounding impact on other fu~
In contrast, the people of Vietnam,
ture wars of liberation, of which the
according to Giap, have these strong
Democratic Republic of Vietnam has
points:
ao loudIy proclaimed itself the leader.
● They have the party’s correct
The stakes are high.
revolutionary line.
Giap’e military doctrine is a tena.
● Tbe people of the north and south
cious one, one that will be difficult to
are united against the United States defeat. A continuation of the war can
and her lackeys. lead only to many more casualties and
● To lead the struggle, they have the further impoverishment of his own
the experience and the concept of the already backward country. From a
invincible people’s war. Western viewpoint, it ie clear that his
● They are eupport~d by brother best course of action is to go to the
Socialist countries a d progressive peace table soon and obtidn the best
peoplesof the world. ? terms possible in hopes of achieving
Fallacious as this type of reasoning his objectives later in other ways. But
maysound, there is no reason to doubt Giap is not a Westerner.
1.

hhnmy1968 91

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