CASES ON EMINENT DOMAIN
pecuniary estimation. As discussed:
DEVORAH E.
BARDILLON vs. BARANGAY MASILI of
Calamba, Laguna,
Res Judicata
Expropriation not capable of pecuniary
estimation
Facts:
Two lots measuring 144 square
meters was to be expropriated by
Bargy Masili for the purpose of
constructing a barangay hall.
However, the barangay and the lot
owners could not agree with the
purchase price of Php 200,000.
The first complaint was filed before
the MTC. Whereas, the second
complaint was filed before the RTC.
The MTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of interest of the petitioner lot
owners.
The RTC stated that the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case. It also ruled
in favor of Brgy Masili.
Issue/s:
1. WON the MTC has jurisdiction
over the case of expropriation;
2. WON the State is barred from
expropriating the property by
reason of res judicata; and
3. Legality of entry into the premises
subject of expropriation.
Ruling:
The SC held that the expropriation
proceedings is within the jurisdiction
of the RTC because it is incapable of
xx An expropriation suit does not
involve the recovery of a sum of
money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its
authority and right to take property for
public use. As such, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and should be
filed with the regional trial courts. xx
As regards to the second issue, the
principle of res judicata does not apply
against the inherent powers of the
State. The SC has this to say:
xx Res judicata literally
means a matter adjudged,
judicially acted upon or decided,
or settled by judgment. It
provides that a final judgment on
the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies; and
constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the
same claim, demand or cause of
action.
The following are the
requisites of res judicata: (1) the
former judgment must be final;
(2) the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment on the merits; and (4)
there is -- between the first and
the second actions -- an identity
of parties, subject matter and
cause of action.
Since the MTC had no
jurisdiction over expropriation
proceedings, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application
 even if the Order of dismissal
may have been an adjudication
on the merits. xx
The entry in the premises of the
expropriated property was held to be
justified by the SC. It ruled that:
xx The requirements for
the issuance of a writ of
possession in an expropriation
case are expressly and
specifically governed by Section
2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. On the part of
local government units,
expropriation is also governed
by Section 19 of the Local
Government Code. Accordingly,
in expropriation proceedings,
the requisites for authorizing
immediate entry are as follows:
(1) the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form
and substance; and (2) the
deposit of the amount
equivalent to 15 percent of the
fair market value of the
property to be expropriated
based on its current tax
declaration.
In the instant case, the
issuance of the Writ of
Possession in favor of
respondent after it had filed the
Complaint for expropriation and
deposited the amount required
was proper, because it had
complied with the foregoing
requisites.
The issue of the necessity
of the expropriation is a matter
properly addressed to the RTC
in the course of the
expropriation proceedings. If
petitioner objects to the
necessity of the takeover of her
property, she should say so in
her Answer to the
Complaint. The RTC has the
power to inquire into the
legality of the exercise of the
right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a
genuine necessity for it. xx
PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY
(deceased) and LEONORA MODAY
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE
EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL
SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF
BUNAWAN
Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan passed a
resolution authorizing the municipal
mayor to expropriate 1 hectare
portion of the property owned by
Percival Moday. The mayor approved
the said resolution and submitted the
same to Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The latter denied the resolution
stating that there are other properties
which may be expropriated.
Notwithstanding the denial of the
resiolution by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, the Municipality of
Bunawan filed a complaint for the
expropriation of the property of
Moday. The RTC granted the
municipalitys motion to take
possession of the parcel of lot.
The Court of Appeals, upon petition
for certiorari, stated that the public
purpose for the expropriation is clear
from Resolution No. 43-89 and that
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Agusan del Sur did not declare
Resolution No. 43-89 invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property
could proceed.
Issue: whether a municipality may
expropriate private property by virtue
of a municipal resolution which was
disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
Ruling:
The SC upheld the decision of the
Court of Appeals. It stated that the
only ground by which the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan may deny a resolution or
an ordinance is the lack of authority.
Thus:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's
disapproval of Municipal Resolution
No. 43-89 is an infirm action which
does not render said resolution null
and void. The law, as expressed in
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power
to declare a municipal resolution
invalid on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although
pertaining to a similar provision of law
but different factual milieu then
obtaining, the Court's pronouncements
in Velazco v. Blas, where we cited
significant early jurisprudence, are
applicable to the case at bar.
The only ground upon which
a provincial board may
declare any municipal
resolution, ordinance, or
order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or
order is "beyond the powers
conferred upon the council
or president making the
same." Absolutely no other
ground is recognized by the
law. A strictly legal question
is before the provincial
board in its consideration of
a municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order. The
provincial (board's)
disapproval of any
resolution, ordinance, or
order must be premised
specifically upon the fact
that such resolution,
ordinance, or order is
outside the scope of the
legal powers conferred by
law. If a provincial board
passes these limits, it usurps
the legislative function of
the municipal council or
president. Such has been
the consistent course of
executive authority.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was
without the authority to disapprove
Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the
Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the
power to exercise the right of eminent
domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution,
pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of
B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that
Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding
and could be used as lawful authority to
petition for the condemnation of
petitioners' property.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
Sec. 153. Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Review. (1)
Within thirty days after
receiving copies of
approved ordinances,
resolutions and executive
orders promulgated by the
municipal mayor, the
sangguniang panlalawigan
shall examine the
documents or transmit
them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be
none, to the provincial
fiscal, who shall examine
them promptly and inform
the sangguniang
panlalawigan in writing of
any defect or impropriety
which he may discover
therein and make such
comments or
recommendations as shall
appear to him proper.
(2) If the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall find that
any municipal ordinance,
resolution or executive
order is beyond the power
conferred upon the
sangguniang bayan or the
mayor, it shall declare such
ordinance, resolution or
executive order invalid in
whole or in part, entering
its actions upon the minutes
and advising the proper
municipal authorities
thereof. The effect of such
an action shall be to annul
the ordinance, resolution or
executive order in question
in whole or in part. The
action of the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall be final.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis
supplied.)
Diosdado Lagcao vs Hon Judge
Generosa Labra
Facts:
The Province of Cebu donated 210
lots to the City of Cebu. Included in
the said donation is Lot 1029. In
1965, petitioners Lagcao purchased Lot
1029 in installment basis from the City
of Cebu.
The same lots, however, reverted
back to the province and the sale f Lot
1029 to Lagcao was being annulled by
the province. The appellate court
ordered the issuance of Deed of Sale in
favor of Lagcao.
Lagcao initiated demolition
proceedings against the squatters
occupying Lot 1029. This was enjoined
by the MTC granting the motion filed
by the Province of Cebu.
The Province of Cebu filed
expropriation proceedings against
Lagcao. The purpose of which is to
construct in the lots socialized housing.
Issue: WON the private property may
be expropriated for the purpose of
socialized housing thereon
Ruling:
The SC granted the petition of
Lagcao and declared that the purpose
was not public use but is only
beneficial to few a handful few. It
explained:
xx We have found
nothing in the records
indicating that the City of Cebu
complied strictly with Sections 9
and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance
No. 1843 sought to expropriate
petitioners property without
any attempt to first acquire the
lands listed in (a) to (e) of
Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise,
Cebu City failed to establish
that the other modes of
acquisition in Section 10 of RA
7279 were first exhausted.
Moreover, prior to the passage
of Ordinance No. 1843, there
was no evidence of a valid and
definite offer to buy petitioners
property as required by Section
19 of RA 7160.[20] We therefore
find Ordinance No. 1843 to be
constitutionally infirm for being
violative of the petitioners right
to due process.
It should also be noted
that, as early as 1998,
petitioners had already
obtained a favorable judgment
of eviction against the illegal
occupants of their
property. The judgment in this
ejectment case had, in fact,
already attained finality, with a
writ of execution and an order
of demolition. But Mayor Garcia
requested the trial court to
suspend the demolition on the
pretext that the City was still
searching for a relocation site
for the squatters. However,
instead of looking for a
relocation site during the
suspension period, the city
council suddenly enacted
Ordinance No. 1843 for the
expropriation of petitioners lot.
It was trickery and bad faith,
pure and simple. The
unconscionable manner in
which the questioned ordinance
was passed clearly indicated
that respondent City
transgressed the Constitution,
RA 7160 and RA 7279.
For an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the city
or municipality to enact but
must also be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by
law. It must be in accordance
with certain well-established
basic principles of a substantive
nature. These principles require
that an ordinance (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or
any statute (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with
public policy, and (6) must not
be unreasonable.[21]
Ordinance No. 1843
failed to comply with the
foregoing substantive
requirements. A clear case of
constitutional infirmity having
been thus established, this
Court is constrained to nullify
the subject ordinance. We
recapitulate:
first, as earlier discussed, the
questioned ordinance is
repugnant to the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution,
RA 7279 and RA 7160;
second, the precipitate manner
in which it was enacted was
plain oppression masquerading
as a pro-poor ordinance;
third, the fact that petitioners
small property was singled out
for expropriation for the
purpose of awarding it to no
more than a few squatters
indicated manifest partiality
against petitioners, and
fourth, the ordinance failed to
show that there was a
reasonable relation between
the end sought and the means
adopted. While the objective of
the City of Cebu was to provide
adequate housing to slum
dwellers, the means it employed
in pursuit of such objective fell
short of what was legal,
sensible and called for by the
circumstances.
Indeed, experience has
shown that the disregard of
basic liberties and the use of
short-sighted methods in
expropriation proceedings have
not achieved the desired results.
Over the years, the government
has tried to remedy the
worsening squatter problem.
Far from solving it, however,
governments kid-glove
approach has only resulted in
the multiplication and
proliferation of squatter
colonies and blighted areas. A
pro-poor program that is well-
studied, adequately funded,
genuinely sincere and truly
respectful of everyones basic
rights is what this problem calls
for, not the improvident
enactment of politics-based
ordinances targeting small
private lots in no rational
fashion. xx
Jesus Is Lord Church School
Foundation (JILCSF) vs Municipality of
Pasig
Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig
approved the ordinance submitted
thereto by the Municipality of Pasig,
the purpose of which is to expropriate
private lots to be used as public roads.
Stated in the complaint was averment
that the private owners were informed
of the expropriation.
A complaint was filed against
owners Ching Cuancos to expropriate
their property pursuant to the Local
Govt Code. The complaint included a
photocopy of a letter to intent sent to
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
The Municipality of Pasig caused
the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens with the complaint under the
name of Jesus is Lord Christian School
Foundation (JILCSF). The latter was
alleged to have bought the private lots
from the Ching Cuancos.
JILCSF averred that there was no
valid and definite offer to acquire the
property and that the property in
dispute was already being used by the
public.
Issue: WON there was a valid and
definite offer
Ruling:

The SC held that there was no
definite and valid offer. The letter sent
to the Lorenzo Ching Cuanco was
merely a letter of intent stating that
the property was to be expropriated.
An extensive discussion on the
matter was as follows:
xx An offer is a unilateral
proposition which one party makes to
the other for the celebration of a
contract. It creates a power of
acceptance permitting the offeree, by
accepting the offer, to transform the
offerors promise into a contractual
obligation. Corollarily, the offer must
be complete, indicating with sufficient
clearness the kind of contract intended
and definitely stating the essential
conditions of the proposed contract.
An offer would require, among other
things, a clear certainty on both the
object and the cause or consideration
of the envisioned contract.
The purpose of the requirement of
a valid and definite offer to be first
made to the owner is to encourage
settlements and voluntary acquisition
of property needed for public purposes
in order to avoid the expense and delay
of a court action. The law is designed
to give to the owner the opportunity to
sell his land without the expense and
inconvenience of a protracted and
expensive litigation. This is a
substantial right which should be
protected in every instance. It
encourages acquisition without
litigation and spares not only the
landowner but also the condemnor,
the expenses and delays of litigation.
It permits the landowner to receive full
compensation, and the entity acquiring
the property, immediate use and
enjoyment of the property. A
reasonable offer in good faith, not
merely perfunctory or pro forma offer,
to acquire the property for a
reasonable price must be made to the
owner or his privy. A single bona
fide offer that is rejected by the owner
will suffice.
The expropriating authority is
burdened to make known its definite
and valid offer to all the owners of the
property. However, it has a right to
rely on what appears in the certificate
of title covering the land to be
expropriated. Hence, it is required to
make its offer only to the registered
owners of the property. After all, it is
well-settled that persons dealing with
property covered by a Torrens
certificate of title are not required to
go beyond what appears on its face.
xx
As regards to the second contention of
Public Necessity, the SC held:
The subject property is expropriated
for the purpose of constructing a road.
The respondent is not mandated to
comply with the essential requisites for
an easement of right-of-way under the
New Civil Code. Case law has it that in
the absence of legislative restriction,
the grantee of the power of eminent
domain may determine the location
and route of the land to be
taken unless such determination is
capricious and wantonly injurious.
Expropriation is justified so long as it is
for the public good and there is
genuine necessity of public
character. Government may not
capriciously choose what private
property should be taken.
The respondent has demonstrated the
necessity for constructing a road from
E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas
Bukid. The witnesses, who were
residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified
that although there were other ways
through which one can enter the
vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially
fire trucks, could enter the area except
through the newly constructed
Damayan Street. This is more than
sufficient to establish that there is a
genuine necessity for the construction
of a road in the area. After all,
absolute necessity is not required, only
reasonable and practical necessity will
suffice.
Nonetheless, the respondent failed to
show the necessity for constructing the
road particularly in the petitioners
property and not elsewhere. We note
that the whereas clause of the
ordinance states that the 51-square
meter lot is the shortest and most
suitable access road to connect Sto.
Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street.
The respondents complaint also
alleged that the said portion of the
petitioners lot has been surveyed as
the best possible ingress and egress.
However, the respondent failed to
adduce a preponderance of evidence to
prove its claims.
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE FELIPE S.
TONGCO and THE CITY OF MANILA
Facts:
Petitioner, Filstream International
Inc., is the registered owner of the
properties subject of this dispute
consisting of adjacent parcels of land
located in Manila.
Petitioner filed an ejectment suit
against occupants of the
abovementioned parcels of land on
the grounds of termination of the
lease contract and non-payment of
rentals.
During the pendency of the
ejectment proceedings, the City of
Manila government approved
Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing
Mayor Lim to expropriate the parcels
of land which form part of the
properties of Filstream then occupied
by private respondents. The said
properties were to be sold and
distributed to qualified tenants of the
area pursuant to the Land Use
Development Program of the City of
Manila.
Judgment was rendered by the MTC
ordering private respondents to vacate
the premises and pay back rentals to
petitioner.
Filstream filed a motion to dismiss
the expropriation proceedings on the
grounds that there was no valid cause,
no public necessity, and that there was
no just compensation because the
price offered was too low.
Issue: WON the private property
which was adjudged in an ejectment
case be the subject of expropriation
proceedings for socialized housing
Ruling:
The SC held that the City
Government of Manila has the right to
expropriate private properties for its
public use. Thus:
 xx the City of Manila has an
undeniable right to exercise its power
of eminent domain within its
jurisdiction. The right to expropriate
private property for public use is
expressly granted to it under Section
19 of the 1991 Local Government
Code, to wit:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain A
local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to
an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, that the
power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite
offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not
accepted; Provided, further, That the
local government unit may
immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based
on the fair market value at the time of
the taking of the property. (Italics
supplied)
More specifically, the City of
Manila has the power to expropriate
private property in the pursuit of its
urban land reform and housing
program as explicitly laid out in the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila
(R.A. No. 409) as follows:
General powers The city may
have a common seal and alter the
same at pleasure, and may take,
purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey,
and dispose of real and personal
property for the general interest of the
city, condemn private property for
public use, contract and be contracted
with, sue and be sued, and prosecute
and defend to final judgment and
execution, and exercise all the powers
hereinafter conferred. (R.A. 409, Sec.
3; Italics supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 100. The City of Manila is
authorized to acquire private lands in
the city and to subdivide the same into
home lots for sale on easy terms to city
residents, giving first priority to
the bona fide tenants or occupants of
said lands, and second priority to
laborers and low-salaried
employees. For the purpose of this
section, the city may raise necessary
funds by appropriations of general
funds, by securing loans or by issuing
bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire
the lands through expropriation
proceedings in accordance with law,
with the approval of the President x x
x. (Italics supplied).
In fact, the City of Manilas right
to exercise these prerogatives
notwithstanding the existence of a
final and executory judgment over the
property to be expropriated has been
upheld by this Court in the case of
Philippine Columbian Association vs.
Panis, G.R. No. 106528, December 21,
1993.[32] Relying on the
aforementioned provisions of the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila,
the Court declared that:
 The City of Manila, acting
through its legislative branch, has the
express power to acquire private lands
in the city and subdivide these lands
into home lots for sale to bona-fide
tenants or occupants thereof, and to
laborers and low-salaried employees of
the city.
That only a few could actually
benefit from the expropriation of the
property does not diminish its public
use character. It is simply not possible
to provide all at once land and shelter
for all who need them (Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).
Corollary to the expanded notion
of public use, expropriation is not
anymore confined to vast tracts of land
and landed estates (Province of
Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nol 103125, May 17, 1993; J. M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413
[1970]). It is therefore of no moment
that the land sought to be
expropriated in this case is less than
the half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court
of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
Through the years, the public use
requirement in eminent domain has
evolved into a flexible concept,
influenced by changing conditions
(Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra;
Manotok v. National Housing
Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of
Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA
220 [1983]). Public use now includes
the broader notion of indirect public
benefit or advantage, including a
particular, urban land reform and
housing. xx
THE CITY OF MANILA
vs.
CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET
AL
Facts:
The City of Manila filed a petition
for expropriation or private properties
for the purpose of constructing public
improvement. Included in the private
properties to be expropriated is the
parcel of lot covered by the Chinese
Cemetery.
The Chinese Community refused
the offer on the ground that
expropriation is not necessary, there
will be more expenses to be incurred
and that parcels of lots to be
expropriated were already devoted for
public use.
Issue: WON the parcel of lot forming
part of Chinese Cemetery and owned
by the Chinese Community be
expropriated
Ruling:
The SC ruled in the negative. Thus,
it stated:
xx Where a cemetery is open to
public, it is a public use and no part of
the ground can be taken for other
public uses under a general authority.
And this immunity extends to the
unimproved and unoccupied parts
which are held in good faith for future
use It is alleged, and not denied, that
the cemetery in question may be used
by the general community of Chinese,
which fact, in the general acceptation
of the definition of a public cemetery,
would make the cemetery in question
public property. If that is true, then, of
course, the petition of the plaintiff
must be denied, for the reason that the
city of Manila has no authority or right
under the law to expropriate public
property. xx
The Supreme Court also added
xx But, whether or not the
cemetery is public or private property,
its appropriation for the uses of a
public street, especially during the
lifetime of those specially interested in
its maintenance as a cemetery, should
be a question of great concern, and its
appropriation should not be made for
such purposes until it is fully
established that the greatest necessity
exists therefor. xx
On the issue on whether the
eminent domain may be exercised by a
municipality, the Supreme Court ruled
in the wise:
xx It can scarcely be contended that a
municipality would be permitted to
take property for some public use
unless some public necessity existed
therefor. The right to take private
property for public use originates in the
necessity, and the taking must be
limited by such necessity. The
appellant contends that inasmuch as
the legislature has given it general
authority to take private property for
public use, that the legislature has,
therefore, settled the question of the
necessity in every case and that the
courts are closed to the owners of the
property upon that question. Can it be
imagined, when the legislature
adopted section 2429 of Act No. 2711,
that it thereby declared that it was
necessary to appropriate the property
of Juan de la Cruz, whose property,
perhaps, was not within the city limits
at the time the law was adopted? The
legislature, then, not having declared
the necessity, can it be contemplated
that it intended that a municipality
should be the sole judge of the
necessity in every case, and that the
courts, in the face of the provision that
"if upon trial they shall find that a right
exists," cannot in that trial inquire into
and hear proof upon the necessity for
the appropriation in a particular case?
The Charter of the city of Manila
authorizes the taking
of private property for public use.
Suppose the owner of the property
denies and successfully proves that the
taking of his property serves no public
use: Would the courts not be justified
in inquiring into that question and in
finally denying the petition if no public
purpose was proved? Can it be denied
that the courts have a right to inquire
into that question? If the courts can
ask questions and decide, upon an
issue properly presented, whether the
use is public or not, is not that
tantamount to permitting the courts to
inquire into the necessity of the
appropriation? If there is no public use,
then there is no necessity, and if there
is no necessity, it is difficult to
understand how a public use can
necessarily exist. If the courts can
inquire into the question whether a
public use exists or not, then it seems
that it must follow that they can
examine into the question of the
necessity.
The very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be
of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany, and not follow,
the taking of the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc.
Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511;
Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281;
Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry.
etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right
of eminent domain must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in
a particular case. The power of the
legislature to confer, upon municipal
corporations and other entities within
the State, general authority to exercise
the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts, but that
general authority of municipalities or
entities must not be confused with the
right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation
to exercise the right of eminent
domain is admittedly within the power
of the legislature. But whether or not
the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case
under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question which
the courts have the right to inquire
into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the
question whether the necessity for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain
is purely legislative and not
judicial, arises generally in the wisdom
and propriety of the legislature in
authorizing the exercise of the right of
eminent domain instead of in the
question of the right to exercise it in a
particular case. (Creston Waterworks
Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts
have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the
actual reasonable necessities of the
case and for the purposes designated
by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St.
Paul. 48 Minn., 540.) xx
CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO)
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LUIS L.
DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte,
EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL.
RUFINO CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO
BORJA, CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES
REALTY CORPORATION
Facts:
Conrad Leviste filed a complaint for
the foreclosure of mortgage against
Philippines Smelter Co. Judgment was
made in favor of Leviste. Two parcels
of lot were levied upon and were sold
at public auction. The lots were sold
to Vines Realty Co.
Owner Vines Realty Co. filed a
petition for the removal of the
improvements on the lot. Included in
such improvements are the power
lines owned by petitioner CANORECO.
Issue: WON the installed power lines
and posts constitute expropriation of
property that would required
CANORECO to pay just compensation
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that the
simple right-of-way easement do not
require the owner to be compensated.
However, due to the nature of the
power lines, the private owner is
constricted in its use of the lot. The
Supreme Court stated:
xx Electric cooperatives, like
CANORECO, are vested with the power of
eminent domain.
The acquisition of an easement of a
right-of-way falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. Such conclusion
finds support in easements of right-of-way
where the Supreme Court sustained the
award of just compensation for private
property condemned for public use. The
Supreme Court, in Republic vs. PLDT thus
held that:
"Normally, of course, the power of eminent
domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the
owner of condemned property, without loss
of title and possession. It is unquestionable
that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement
of right-of-way."
However, a simple right-of-way
easement transmits no rights, except the
easement. Vines Realty retains full
ownership and it is not totally deprived of
the use of the land. It can continue doing
what it wants to do with the land, except
those that would result in contact with the
wires.
The acquisition of this easement,
nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the
nature and effect of the installation power
lines, the limitations on the use of the land
for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. For these
reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment
of just compensation, which must be neither
more nor less than the money equivalent of
the property.
Just compensation has been
understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss, which the owner of
the res expropriated has to suffer by reason
of the expropriation. The value of the land
and its character at the time it was taken by
the Government are the criteria for
determining just compensation. No matter
how commendable petitioners purpose is, it
is just and equitable that Vines Realty be
compensated the fair and full equivalent for
the taking of its property, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever
gain would accrue to the expropriating
entity.
Moreover, CANORECO only sought the
continuation of the exercise of its right-of-
way easement and not ownership over the
land. Public utilities power of eminent
domain may be exercised although title is
not transferred to the expropriator.
Consequently, we rule that a courts
writ of demolition cannot prevail over the
easement of a right-of-way which falls
within the power of eminent domain. xx
ESTATE OF SALUD
JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
EXPORT PROCESSING
ZONE, respondent.
Facts:
In 1981, Private respondent PEZA
filed a complaint before the RTC to
expropriate three parcels of lot owned
by Salud Jimenez.
 Ten years thereafter, the trial court
decide in favor of PEZA. However, the
petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the
properties will only be transferred to
Philippine Vinyl, Co.
PEZA and the petitioner executed a
compromise agreement. One of the
provisions therein is that the disputed
property of Salud Jimenez will be
swapped with one of the lots owned
by PEZA. Thus:
Estate of Salud Jimenez
shall transfer lot 1406-B
with an area of 13,118
square meters which forms
part of the lot registered
under TCT No. 113498 of
the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite to the name of the
plaintiff and the same shall
be swapped and exchanged
with lot 434 with an area of
14,167 square meters and
covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No.
14772 of the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite which lot
will be transferred to the
name of Estate of Salud
Jimenez.
However, PEZA failed to transfer
the parcel of lot to
petitioner because the same was not
registered under the name of PEZA but
under Progressive Realty, Inc.
The trial court annulled the
compromise agreement and ordered
PEZA to return the property.
The Court of Appeals decided in
favor of Salud Jimenez.
Issue: WON the disputed property
may be returned to the estate of Salud
Jimenez
Ruling:
The SC held that the property
cannot be remanded back to
petitioner Salud Jimenez despite the
nonpayment of just compensation for
11 years. the SC has this to say:
xx In the case at bar, the
trial court approved the
compromise
agreement. Petitioner insists
that Articles 2038, 2039 and
1330 of the New Civil Code
should apply. Said articles
provide that:
Article 2038. A compromise in
which there is mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or falsity of
documents, is subject to the
provisions of Article 1330 of this
Code.
However, one of the parties
cannot set up a mistake of fact
as against the other if the latter,
by virtue of the compromise, has
withdrawn from a litigation
already commenced.
Article 2039. When the parties
compromise generally on all
differences which they might
have with each other, the
discovery of documents referring
to one or more but not to all of
the questions settled shall not
itself be a cause for annulment
or rescission of the compromise,
unless said documents have been
concealed by one of the parties.
But the compromise may be
annulled or rescinded if it refers
only to one thing to which one of
the parties has no right, as
shown by the newly discovered
documents.(n)
Article 1330. A contract where
consent is given through
mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence, or fraud is
voidable.[40]
The applicability of the
above-quoted legal provisions
will not change the outcome of
the subject of the
rescission. Since the compromise
agreement was only about the
mode of payment by swapping
of lots and not about the right
and purpose to expropriate the
subject Lot 1406-B, only the
originally agreed form of
compensation that is by cash
payment, was rescinded.
This Court holds that
respondent has the legal
authority to expropriate the
subject Lot 1406-B and that the
same was for a valid public
purpose. In Sumulong v.
[41]
Guerrero , this Court has ruled
that,
the public use requirement for
a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. In this
jurisdiction, the statutory and
judicial trend has been
summarized as follows:
this Court has ruled that the
taking to be valid must be for
public use. There was a time
when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to
such a requirement. Whatever
project is undertaken must be for
the public to enjoy, as in the case
of streets or parks. Otherwise
expropriation is not allowable. It
is not anymore. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent
domain comes into play It is
accurate to state then that at
present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. [Heirs
of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125
SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-235
quoting E. Fernando, the
Constitution of the Philippines
523-4 (2nd Ed. 1977)
The term public use has
acquired a more comprehensive
coverage. To the literal import
of the term signifying strict use
or employment by the public has
been added the broader notion
of indirect public benefit or
advantage.
In Manosca v. Court of
Appeals, this Court has also held
that what ultimately emerged is
a concept of public use which is
just as broad as public
welfare.[42]
Respondent PEZA
expropriated the subject parcel
of land pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1980 dated May 30, 1980
issued by former President banks while the rest was made a
Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, transportation terminal. Said
the power of eminent domain of public purposes were even
respondent is contained in its reaffirmed by Republic Act No.
original charter, Presidential 7916, a law amending
Decree No. 66, which provides respondent PEZAs original
that: charter, which provides that:

Section 23. Eminent Domain. Sec. 7. ECOZONE to be a

For the acquisition of rights of Decentralized Agro-Industrial,
way, or of any property for the Industrial, Commercial/Trading,
establishment of export Tourist, Investment and Financial
processing zones, or of low-cost Community. Within the
housing projects for the framework of the Constitution,
employees working in such the interest of national
zones, or for the protection of sovereignty and territorial
watershed areas, or for the integrity of the Republic,
construction of dams, reservoirs, ECOZONE shall be developed, as
wharves, piers, docks, quays, much as possible, into a
warehouses and other terminal decentralized, self-reliant and
facilities, structures and self-sustaining industrial,
approaches thereto, the commercial/trading, agro-
Authority shall have the right industrial, tourist, banking,
and power to acquire the same financial and investment center
by purchase, by negotiation, or with minimum government
by condemnation intervention. Each ECOZONE
proceedings. Should the shall be provided with
authority elect to exercise the transportation,
right of eminent domain, telecommunications and other
condemnation proceedings shall facilities needed to generate
be maintained by and in the linkage with industries and
name of the Authority and it may employment opportunities for its
proceed in the manner provided own habitants and those of
for by law. (italics supplied) nearby towns and cities.

Accordingly, subject Lot The ECOZONE shall administer

1406-B was expropriated for itself on economic, financial,
the construction of terminal industrial, tourism development
facilities, structures and and such other matters within
approaches thereto. The the exclusive competence of the
authority is broad enough to give national government. (italics
the respondent substantial supplied)
leeway in deciding for what
public use the expropriated Among the powers of PEZA
property would be enumerated by the same law
utilized. Pursuant to this broad are:
authority, respondent leased a
portion of the lot to commercial
Sec. 12. Functions and Powers of
PEZA Board. ---- The Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)
Board shall have the following
function and powers:
(a) Set the general policies on
the establishment and
operations of the ECOZONE,
Industrial estate, exports
processing zones, free trade
zones, and the like;
x x x
(c) Regulate and undertake
the establishment, operation and
maintenance of utilities, other
services and infrastructure in the
ECOZONE, such as heat, light and
power, water supply,
telecommunications, transport,
toll roads and bridges, port
services, etc. and to fix just,
reasonable and competitive
rates, fares, charges and fees
thereof.[43]
In Manila Railroad Co. v.
Mitchel[44], this Court has ruled
that in the exercise of eminent
domain, only as much land can
be taken as is necessary for the
legitimate purpose of the
condemnation. The term
necessary, in this connection,
does not mean absolutely
indispensable but requires only a
reasonable necessity of the
taking for the stated purpose,
growth and future needs of the
enterprise. The respondent
cannot attain a self-sustaining
and viable ECOZONE if inevitable
needs in the expansion in the
surrounding areas are hampered
by the mere refusal of the
private landowners to part with
their properties. The purpose of
creating an ECOZONE and other
facilities is better served if
respondent directly owns the
areas subject of the expansion
program.
The contention of petitioner
that the leasing of the subject lot
to banks and building terminals
was not expressly mentioned in
the original charter of
respondent PEZA and that it was
only after PEZA devoted the lot
to said purpose that Republic Act
No. 7916 took effect, is not
impressed with merit. It should
be pointed out that Presidential
Decree No. 66 created the
respondent PEZA to be a viable
commercial, industrial and
investment area. According to
the comprehensive wording of
Presidential Decree No. 66, the
said decree did not intend to
limit respondent PEZA to the
establishment of an export
processing zone but it was also
bestowed with authority to
expropriate parcels of land for
the construction of terminal
facilities, structures and
approaches thereto. Republic
Act No. 7916 simply
particularized the broad
language employed by
Presidential Decree No. 66 by
specifying the purposes for which
PEZA shall devote the
condemned lots, that is, for the
construction and operation of an
industrial estate, an export
processing zone, free trade
zones, and the like. The
expropriation of Lot 1406-B for
the purpose of being leased to
banks and for the construction of
a terminal has the purpose of
making banking and
transportation facilities easily
accessible to the persons
working at the industries located
in PEZA. The expropriation of
adjacent areas therefore comes
as a matter of necessity to bring
life to the purpose of the law. In
such a manner, PEZAs goal of
being a major force in the
economic development of the
country would be
realized. Furthermore, this Court
has already ruled that:
(T)he Legislature may directly
determine the necessity for
appropriating private property
for a particular improvement for
public use, and it may select the
exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it
is well-settled that the utility of
the proposed improvement, the
existence of the public necessity
for its construction, the
expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location
selected, are all questions
exclusively for the legislature to
determine, and the courts have
no power to interfere or to
substitute their own views for
those of the representatives of
the people.
In the absence of some
constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of
exercising the right of eminent
domain are questions essentially
political and not judicial in their
character.[45]
Inasmuch as both Presidential
Decree No. 66 and Republic Act
No. 7916, bestow respondent
with authority to develop
terminal facilities and banking
centers, this Court will not
question the respondents lease
of certain portions of the
expropriated lot to banks, as well
as the construction of terminal
facilities.
Petitioner contends that
respondent is bound by the
representations of its Chief Civil
Engineer when the latter
testified before the trial court
that the lot was to be devoted
for the construction of
government offices. Anent this
issue, suffice it to say that PEZA
can vary the purpose for which a
condemned lot will be devoted
to, provided that the same is for
public use. Petitioner cannot
impose or dictate on the
respondent what facilities to
establish for as long as the same
are for public purpose.
Lastly, petitioner appeals to
the sense of justice and equity to
this Court in restoring the said
lot to its possession. From the
time of the filing of the
expropriation case in 1981 up to
the present, respondent has not
yet remunerated the petitioner
although respondent has already
received earnings from the rental
payments by lessees of the
subject property.
We have ruled that the
concept of just compensation
embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to
be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment of the
land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot
be considered just inasmuch as
the property owner is made to
suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary
to cope with his loss.[46] Payment
of just compensation should
follow as a matter of right
immediately after the order of
expropriation is issued. Any
delay in payment must be
counted from said
order. However, the delay to
constitute a violation of due
process must be unreasonable
and inexcusable; it must be
deliberately done by a party in
order to defeat the ends of
justice.
We find that respondent
capriciously evaded its duty of
giving what is due to
petitioner. In the case at bar, the
expropriation order was issued
by the trial court in 1991. The
compromise agreement between
the parties was approved by the
trial court in 1993. However,
from 1993 up to the present,
respondent has failed in its
obligation to pay petitioner to
the prejudice of the
latter. Respondent caused
damage to petitioner in making
the latter to expect that it had a
good title to the property to be
swapped with Lot 1406-B; and
meanwhile, respondent has been
reaping benefits from the lease
or rental income of the said
expropriated lot. We cannot
tolerate this oppressive exercise
of the power of eminent domain
by respondent. As we have ruled
in Cosculluela vs. Court of
Appeals:[47]
In the present case, the irrigation
project was completed and has
been in operation since 1976.
The project is benefiting the
farmers specifically and the
community in
general. Obviously, the
petitioners land cannot be
returned to him. However, it is
high time that the petitioner be
paid what was due him eleven
years ago. It is arbitrary and
capricious for a government
agency to initiate expropriation
proceedings, seize a persons
property, allow the judgment of
the court to become final and
executory and then refuse to pay
on the ground that there are no
appropriations for the property
earlier taken and profitably
used. We condemn in the
strongest possible terms the
cavalier attitude of government
officials who adopt such a
despotic and irresponsible
stance.
Though the respondent has
committed a misdeed to
petitioner, we cannot, however,
grant the petitioners prayer for
the return of the expropriated
Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of
expropriation dated July 11,
1991, has long become final and
executory. Petitioner
cited Provincial Government of
Sorsogon v. Rosa E. Vda. De
Villaroya[48] to support its
contention that it is entitled to a
return of the lot where this Court
ruled that under ordinary
circumstances, immediate return
to the owners of the unpaid
property is the obvious remedy.
However, the said statement
was not the ruling in that
case. As in other cases where
there was no prompt payment by
the government, this Court
declared in Sorsogon that the
Provincial Government
of Sorsogon is expected to
immediately pay as
directed. Should any further
delay be encountered, the trial
court is directed to seize any
patrimonial property or cash
savings of the province in the
amount necessary to implement
this decision. However, this
Court also stressed and declared
in that case that In cases where
land is taken for public use,
public interest, however, must be
considered. xx
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. SALEM INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, MARIA DEL CARMEN
ROXAS DE ELIZALDE, CONCEPCION
CABARRUS VDA. DE SANTOS
MILAGROS AND INOCENTES DE LA
RAMA
Facts:
Expropriation proceedings was filed
against the properties owned by
Milagros and Inocentes dela Rama in
1983.
In 1988, a contract to sell was
executed by Milagros and Inocentes
dela Rama in favor of Alfredo Guerrero
wherein the former received a partial
payment of Php 2,200,000. Gerrero
filed an action for specific performance
to enforce the contract to sell.
While the case for specific
performance was pending. The
Republic of the Philippines filed a case
for expropriation and deposited an
amount of Php 12,970,350
representing the 10% of the
approximate fair market value of the
property. Guerrero filed a motion for
intervention alleging that the de
Ramas agreed to sell the disputed
property to him.
In 1991, the petition for specific
performance was granted by the RTC.
In 1995, the RTC declared that
Guerrero was the rightful owner of the
property in dispute and that just
compensation should be paid to him.
Issue: WON Guerrero is the rightful
owner of the property to be
expropriated and in effect, just
compensation whould be paid to him
Ruling:
The SC held that Guerrero has the
rightful title. It was explained thus:
xx It is true that the contract
to sell did not convey to
Guerrero the subject parcel of
land described therein.
However, it created an
obligation on the part of the
De la Ramas to convey the
land, subject to the fulfillment
of the suspensive conditions
therein stated. The
declaration of this contracts
validity, which paved the way
for the subsequent execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale
on March 8, 1994, following
the order of the Regional Trial
 Court for its execution, by the
Clerk of Court, Branch 113,
Pasay City, effectively
conveyed ownership of said
parcel of lot xx
As regards to the amount to be paid
by Guerrero to the de Ramas, the SC
stated that the RTC has already ruled
on the matter and the purchase price
with legal interest was fixed by said
court at Php 1,383,000. Thus:
xx Petitioners can no longer
question a judgment which
has already become final and
executory. The order of the
Regional Trial Court on the
payment of legal interest was
issued on September 18, 1991
in the case for specific
performance against the De
la Ramas (Civil Case No. 6974-
P). Hence, they are already
barred from questioning it
now in this proceeding.
Finally, we take note of the
fact that the De la Ramas
have withdrawn and
appropriated for themselves
the amount paid by Guerrero.
This amount represented the
purchase price of the entire
4,075 square meters of land,
including the expropriated
portion, which was the
subject of their agreement.
The payment, therefore, to
them of the value of the
expropriated portion would
unjustly enrich them. xx
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
vs.
SPS. MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and
RICARDO MALIT and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
In order for NAPOCOR to construct
230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission
lines, the power lines will have to pass
though several parcels of lots owned
by private respondents. A commission
was created to determine the amount
of just compensation to be awarded to
the private owners.
However, the private respondents
contested the findings of the
commission that the award was only
Php 10.00. The contention was that
the amunt should be the market value
of the parcel of lot which is Php 50.00
pr square meter.
Issue: WON the amount to be awarded
to the private owners should be the
full market value considering the
nature of the installation of power
lines
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the
just compensation should be
equivalent to the amount of loss which
the owner shall suffer by reason of
such expropriation. Thus the High
Court has promptly observed:
". . . While it is true that plaintiff are
(sic) only after a right-of-way
easement, it nevertheless perpetually
deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the
imposition by the plaintiff upon
defendants that below said
transmission lines no plant higher than
three (3) meters is allowed.
Furthermore, because of the high-
tension current conveyed through said
transmission lines, danger to life and
limbs that may be caused beneath said
wires cannot altogether be discounted,
and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the
fee to defendants once, while the latter
shall continually pay the taxes due on
said affected portion of their property."
The foregoing facts considered, the
acquisition of the right-of-way
easement falls within the purview of
the power of eminent domain. Such
conclusion finds support in similar
cases of easement of right-of-way
where the Supreme Court sustained
the award of just compensation for
private property condemned for public
use (See National Power Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665,
1984; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 102
SCRA 597,1981). The Supreme Court, in
Republic of the Philippines
vs. PLDT, * thus held that:
Normally, of course, the power of
eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated
property; but no cogent reason
appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way.
In the case at bar, the easement of
right-of-way is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of
the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-
Limay transmission lines, the limitation
imposed by NPC against the use of the
land for an indefinite period deprives
private respondents of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the
property expropriated is entitled to a
just compensation, which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is
possible to make the assessment, than
the money equivalent of said
property. Just compensation has
always been understood to be the just
and complete equivalent of the loss
which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of
the expropriation (Province of Tayabas
vs. Perez, 66 Phil. 467 [1938]; Assoc. of
Small Land Owners of the Phils., Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
78742; Acuna vs. Arroyo, G.R. No.
79310; Pabrico vs. Juico, G.R. No.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No.
79777,14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343
[1989]). The price or value of the land
and its character at the time it was
taken by the Government are the
criteria for determining just
compensation (National Power Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665,
[1984]). The above price refers to the
market value of the land which may be
the full market value thereof.
According to private respondents, the
market value of their lot is P50.00 per
square meter because the said lot is
adjacent to the National and super
highways of Gapan, Nueva Ecija and
Olongapo City.
Private respondents recognize the
inherent power of eminent domain
being exercised by NPC when it finally
consented to the expropriation of the
said portion of their land, subject
however to payment of just
compensation. No matter how
laudable NPC's purpose is, for which
expropriation was sought, it is just and
equitable that they be compensated
the fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the
indemnity, not whatever gain would
accrue to the expropriating entity
(EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987];
Mun. of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93
SCRA 503 (1979]).
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE
vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION
Facts:
Sangguniang Bayan of Paranaque
passed a resolution to expropriate two
parcels of lots with a total of 10,000
square meters belonging to VM Realty
Co. A complaint for expropriation was
filed against the private owner and the
trial court gave tit due course.
The private corporation in its
answer argued that the expropriation
proceedings was not valid because
there was no ordinance authorizing
such proceedings. mere resolution
was not tantamount to an ordinance.
Issue: WON the resolution of the
SAngguniang Bayan of Paranaque is a
substantial compliance of the staturoy
requirement of R.A. 7160 on
expropriation proceedings.
Ruling:
The SC held that there was no cause
of action. Thus, it was stated:
xx The fact that there is no cause of
action is evident from the face of the
Complaint for expropriation which was
based on a mere resolution. The
absence of an ordinance authorizing
the same is equivalent to lack of cause
of action. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error
in affirming the trial courts Decision
which dismissed the expropriation
suit. xx
Another issue raised in this case is
whether the State may expropriate the
same property once all the legally
requirements were meant. As the SC
discussed:
xx The scope of eminent domain is
plenary and, like police power, can
reach every form of property which
the State might need for public use.
All separate interests of individuals in
property are held of the government
under this tacit agreement or implied
reservation. Notwithstanding the
grant to individuals, the eminent
domain, the highest and most exact
idea of property, remains in the
government, or in the aggregate body
of the people in their sovereign
capacity; and they have the right to
resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest requires
it. Thus, the State or its authorized
agent cannot be forever barred from
exercising said right by reason alone of
previous non-compliance with any
legal requirement.
While the principle of res
judicata does not denigrate the right of
the State to exercise eminent domain,
it does apply to specific issues decided
in a previous case. For example, a final
judgment dismissing an expropriation
suit on the ground that there was no
prior offer precludes another suit
raising the same issue; it cannot,
however, bar the State or its agent
from thereafter complying with this
requirement, as prescribed by law, and
subsequently exercising its power of
eminent domain over the same
property. By the same token, our
ruling that petitioner cannot exercise
its delegated power of eminent domain
through a mere resolution will not bar
it from reinstituting similar
proceedings, once the said legal
requirement and, for that
matter, all others are properly
complied with. Parenthetically and by
parity of reasoning, the same is also
true of the principle of law of the
case. In Republic vs De Knecht, the
Court ruled that the power of the State
or its agent to exercise eminent
domain is not diminished by the mere
fact that a prior final judgment over
the property to be expropriated has
become the law of the case as to the
parties. The State or its authorized
agent may still subsequently exercise
its right to expropriate the same
property, once all legal requirements
are complied with. To rule otherwise
will not only improperly diminish the
power of eminent domain, but also
clearly defeat social justice. xx
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA,
COMMODORE EDGARDO GALEOS,
ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO
MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS
vs. VICENTE G. LIM
Facts:
In 1938, Republic of the Philippines
expropriated two lots owned by
Gervasia Denzon and Eulalia Denzon.
A deposit amounting to Php 9,500 was
made with PNB pursuant to the order
of the CFI. The Republic took
possession of the lot thereafter but the
just compensation held by the same
court amounting to Php 4.062 was
never made to the Denzons.
Jose Galeos, heir of the Denzons
filed a claims for rentals on the lots
from National Airports Commission.
The claim was rejected.
In 1961, there being no payment of
just compensation from the
government, successors-in-interests,
Valdehueza and Panerio, filed a
complaint for recovery in possession of
the properties. The CFI decided in
their favor, stating that they retain
ownership over the properties.
However, they were ordered to sell
the same to the Republic.
In 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio
executed a mortgage over the
disputed properties in favor of Vicente
Lim.
In 1992, there still being no
payment of just compensation, Lim
filed a complaint for quieting of title
over the properties.
Issue: whether the Republic has
retained ownership of Lot 932 despite
its failure to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation therefor pursuant to the
judgment of the CFI rendered as early
as May 14, 1940
Ruling:
 The SC held that the two parcels of It bears emphasis that
lots are still owned by the Valdehueza when Valdehueza and Panerio
and Panerio. The rights of Vicente Lim mortgaged Lot 932 to
respondent in 1964, they were
as a mortgagee is still protected. Thus,
still the owners thereof and
it is held: their title had not yet passed to
the petitioner Republic. In fact,
it never did. Such title or
xx Here, the annotation ownership was rendered
merely served as a caveat that conclusive when we
the Republic had categorically ruled
a preferential right to acquire in Valdehueza that: It is true
Lot 932 upon its payment of a that plaintiffs are still the
reasonable market value. It registered owners of the land,
did not proscribe Valdehueza there not having been a
and Panerio from exercising transfer of said lots in favor of
their rights of ownership the Government.
including their right to
mortgage or even to dispose of For respondents part, it is
their property. In Republic vs. reasonable to conclude that he
Salem Investment entered into the contract of
Corporation we recognized the mortgage with Valdehueza and
owners absolute right over his Panerio fully aware of the
property pending completion of extent of his right as a
the expropriation proceeding, mortgagee. A mortgage is
thus: merely an accessory contract
intended to secure the
It is only upon the completion performance of the principal
of these two stages that obligation. One of its
expropriation is said to have characteristics is that it
been completed. Moreover, it is is inseparable from the
only upon payment of just property. It adheres to the
compensation that title over the property regardless of who its
property passes to the owner may subsequently
[25]
government. Therefore, until be. Respondent must have
the action for expropriation has known that even if Lot 932 is
been completed and ultimately expropriated by the
terminated, ownership over the Republic, still, his right as a
property being expropriated mortgagee is protected. In this
remains with the registered regard, Article 2127 of the Civil
owner. Consequently, the latter Code provides:
can exercise all
rightspertaining to an Art. 2127. The mortgage
owner, including the right to extends to the natural
dispose of his property subject accessions, to the
to the power of the State improvements, growing fruits,
ultimately to acquire it through and the rents or income not yet
expropriation. received when the obligation
becomes due, and to the
amount of the indemnity
granted or owing to the
proprietor from the insurers of
the property mortgaged, or in
virtue of expropriation for
public use, with the
declarations, amplifications,
and limitations established by
law, whether the estate
remains in the possession of
the mortgagor or it passes in
the hands of a third person.
In summation, while the
prevailing doctrine is that the
non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle
the private landowner to
recover possession of the
expropriated lots, however, in
cases where the government
failed to pay just
compensation within five
(5) years from the finality of
the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession
of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle
that the government cannot
keep the property and dishonor
the judgment. To be sure, the
five-year period limitation will
encourage the government to
pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping
with justice and equity. After
all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes
property from private persons
against their will, to facilitate
the payment of just
compensation. In Cosculluela v.
Court of Appeals, we defined
just compensation as not only
the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the
payment of the property within
a reasonable time. Without
prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered just. xx
It was also held that Vicente Lim did
not act in bad faith.
xx 932 by its failure to pay just
compensation. The issue of bad
faith would have assumed
relevance if the Republic
actually acquired title over Lot
932. In such a case, even if
respondents title was
registered first, it would be the
Republics title or right of
ownership that shall be
upheld. But now, assuming
that respondent was in bad
faith, can such fact vest upon
the Republic a better title over
Lot 932? We believe not. This
is because in the first place, the
Republic has no title to speak
of. xx
CASES ON EMINENT DOMAIN
CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Conrad L. Leviste filed with the
Regional Trial Court a complaint for
collection of a sum of money and After the petition filed before the
foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Court of Appeals was dismissed, the
Smelter Corporation (PSC). The trial court petitioner re-constructed its power lines
rendered decision in favor of Leviste for along the provincial road upon the
failure of PSC to file an answer to the authority of the District Engineer of the
complaint. DPWH due to public need. Vines Realty
however sent a letter prohibiting the said
When the decision was final and
construction without its permission.
executory, the trial court issued a writ of
Petitioner replied that the power lines were
execution and the respondent sheriff levied
constructed within the right of way of the
upon two parcels of land which were sold at
provincial road.
a public auction in favor of Vines Realty
Corporation (Vines Realty). Hence, this petition.

After the writ of possession was

granted to Vines Realty, it filed an amended
Issue/s:
motion for an order of demolition and
removal of improvements on the subject 1. Whether the petitioner is entitled
land, included were the power lines and to retain possession of the power
electric posts belonging to the petitioner. lines located in the land sold at
public auction as a result of extra-
Petitioner opposed the motion on the
judicial foreclosure of mortgage.
ground that petitioner was not the party to
the case and therefore not bound by the Ruling:
judgment of the trial court and that it had
The Court finds that the trial court
subsisting right-of-way agreements over
gravely abused its discretion in hastily
said property.
ordering the removal of the electric posts.
The trial court, however, directed to
The trial court failed to appreciate the
shut off the power lines energizing several
nature of electric cooperatives as public
business establishments in the area. Vines
utilities.
Realty cut down petitioners electric posts
professedly using a chainsaw. Among the powers granted to electric
cooperatives by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 269 are:
Section 16 Powers- Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO,
are vested with the power of eminent
(j) To construct, maintain
domain.
and operate electric
The acquisition of an easement of a
transmission and
right-of-way falls within the purview of the
distribution lines along,
power of eminent domain. Such conclusion
upon, under and across
finds support in easements of right-of-way
publicly owned lands and
where the Supreme Court sustained the
public thoroughfares,
award of just compensation for private
including, without
property condemned for public use. The
limitation, all roads,
Supreme Court, in Republic vs. PLDT thus
highways, streets, alleys,
held that:
bridges and causeways;
Provided, that such shall
"Normally, of course, the
not prevent or unduly
power of eminent domain
impair the primary public
results in the taking or
uses to which such lands
appropriation of title to,
and thoroughfares are
and possession of, the
otherwise devoted;
expropriated property; but
no cogent reason appears
(k) To exercise the power
why said power may not be
of eminent domain in the
availed of to impose only a
manner provided by law for
burden upon the owner of
the exercise of such power
condemned property,
by other corporations
without loss of title and
constructing or operating
possession. It is
electric generating plants
unquestionable that real
and electric transmission
property may, through
and distribution lines or
expropriation, be subjected
systems.
to an easement of right-of-
way."
 However, a simple right-of-way gain would accrue to the expropriating
easement transmits no rights, except the entity.
easement. Vines Realty retains full
Moreover, CANORECO only sought the
ownership and it is not totally deprived of
continuation of the exercise of its right-of-
the use of the land. It can continue doing
way easement and not ownership over the
what it wants to do with the land, except
land. Public utilities power of eminent
those that would result in contact with the
domain may be exercised although title is
wires.
not transferred to the expropriator.
The acquisition of this easement,
Consequently, the Supreme Court
nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the
ruled that a courts writ of demolition
nature and effect of the installation power
cannot prevail over the easement of a
lines, the limitations on the use of the land
right-of-way which falls within the power
for an indefinite period deprives private
of eminent domain.
respondents of its ordinary use. For these
Private respondents are ordered to
reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment
restore or restitute petitioners electric
of just compensation, which must be
posts and power lines or otherwise
neither more nor less than the money
indemnify petitioner for the cost of the
equivalent of the property.
restoration thereof. Finally, private
Just compensation has been
respondents are permanently enjoined or
understood to be the just and complete
prohibited from disturbing or interfering
equivalent of the loss, which the owner of
with the operation and maintenance of the
the res expropriated has to suffer by reason
business of petitioner.
of the expropriation. The value of the land
and its character at the time it was taken by
the Government are the criteria for PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE v.
determining just compensation. No matter COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
how commendable petitioners purpose is,
Facts:
it is just and equitable that Vines Realty be
compensated the fair and full equivalent for The Philippine Press Institute, Inc.

the taking of its property, which is the (PPI), a non-stock, non-profit organization

measure of the indemnity, not whatever of newspaper and magazine publishers, is

assailing the constitutional validity of
Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent
COMELEC and its corresponding COMELEC
directive dated 22 March 1995, through a
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Resolution No. 2772 asks the
allocation of free print space of not less
than one half (1/2) page in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as "Comelec Space."
PPI asks the Court to declare
COMELEC Resolution No.
unconstitutional and void on the ground
that it violates the prohibition imposed by
the Constitution upon the government, and
any of its agencies, against the taking of
private property for public use without just
compensation.
The Solicitor General argued that
the questioned Resolution and
implementing letter directives do not
provide any criminal or administrative
sanction for non-compliance. Moreover,
even if they are viewed as mandatory, the
same would be valid as an exercise of the
police power of the State.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Section 2 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 can
be classified as taking of private
property for public use without
just compensation.
2. Whether or not Section 2 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is a
valid exercise of the police power
of the State.
Ruling:
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is
clearly susceptible of the reading that
petitioner PPI has given it.
2772
That Resolution No. 2772 does not,
in express terms, threaten publishers who
would disregard it or its implementing
letters with some criminal or other
sanction, does not by itself demonstrate
that the Comelec's original intention was
simply to solicit or request voluntary
donations of print space from publishers. A
its
written communication officially directing a
print media company to supply free print
space, dispatched by a government (here a
constitutional) agency and signed by a
member of the Commission presumably
legally authorized to do so, is bound to
produce a coercive effect upon the
company so addressed. That the agency
may not be legally authorized to impose, or
cause the imposition of, criminal or other
sanctions for disregard of such directions,
only aggravates the constitutional
difficulties inhearing in the present
situation. The enactment or addition of private property for public use need to be
such sanctions by the legislative authority examined here:
itself would be open to serious
one is the necessity for the
constitutional objection.
taking; another is the legal
To compel print media authority to effect the
companies to donate " COMELEC -space" of taking.
the dimensions specified in Section 2 of
The element of necessity
Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half
for the taking has not been
page), amounts to "taking" of private
shown by respondent
personal property for public use or
COMELEC.
purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the
intended frequency of such compulsory
It has not been suggested that the
"donation:" only once during the period
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print
from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until
space at their normal rates to COMELEC for
12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week?
election purposes. Indeed, the
or as often as COMELEC may direct during
unwillingness or reluctance of COMELEC to
the same period? The extent of the taking
buy print space lies at the heart of the
or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is
problem.
not a case of a de minimis temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of Similarly, it has not been
private property. The monetary value of the suggested, let alone demonstrated, that
compulsory "donation," measured by the COMELEC has been granted the power of
advertising rates ordinarily charged by eminent domain either by the Constitution
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in or by the legislative authority. A
non-urban areas, may be very substantial reasonable relationship between that
indeed. power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by
The taking of print space here
COMELEC must be shown; it is not casually
sought to be effected may first be appraised
to be assumed.
under the rubric of expropriation of private
personal property for public use. The That the taking is designed to
threshold requisites for a lawful taking of subserve "public use" is not contested by
petitioner PPI. We note only that, under as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to
Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free publishers to donate free print space, as
"COMELEC space" sought by the Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A
respondent Commission would be used not attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all
only for informing the public about the to prevent newspaper and magazine
identities, qualifications and programs of publishers from voluntarily giving free print
government of candidates for elective office space to COMELEC for the purposes
but also for "dissemination of vital election contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.
information" (including, presumably,
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
circulars, regulations, notices, directives,
does not, however, provide a constitutional
etc. issued by COMELEC). It seems to the
basis for compelling publishers, against
Court a matter of judicial notice that
their will, in the kind of factual context here
government offices and agencies (including
present, to provide free print space for
the Supreme Court) simply purchase print
COMELEC purposes. Section 2 does not
space, in the ordinary course of events,
constitute a valid exercise of the power of
when their rules and regulations, circulars,
eminent domain.
notices and so forth need officially to be
brought to the attention of the general
As earlier noted, the Solicitor
public.
General also contended that Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772, even if read as
The taking of private property for
compelling publishers to "donate"
public use is, of course, authorized by the
"COMELEC space, " may be sustained as a
Constitution, but not without payment of
valid exercise of the police power of the
"just compensation" (Article III, Section 9).
state. This argument was, however, made
And apparently the necessity of paying
too casually to require prolonged
compensation for "COMELEC space" is
consideration on our part.
precisely what is sought to be avoided by
respondent Commission, whether Section 2
Firstly, there was no effort (and
of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner
apparently no inclination on the part of
PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to
COMELEC) to show that the police power
require newspaper publishers to "donate"
essentially a power of legislation has
free print space for COMELEC purposes, or
been constitutionally delegated to
respondent Commission. Secondly, while
private property may indeed be validly
taken in the legitimate exercise of the
police power of the state, there was no
attempt to show compliance in the instant
case with the requisites of a lawful taking
under the police power.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is
a blunt and heavy instrument that purports,
without a showing of existence of a national
emergency or other imperious public
necessity, indiscriminately and without
regard to the individual business condition
of particular newspapers or magazines
located in differing parts of the country, to
take private property of newspaper or
magazine publishers. No attempt was made
to demonstrate that a real and palpable or
urgent necessity for the taking of print
space confronted the COMELEC and that
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself
the only reasonable and calibrated
response to such necessity available to the
COMELEC. Section 2 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the
State.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in
its present form and as interpreted by
COMELEC in its 22 March 1995 letter
directives, purports to require print media
enterprises to "donate" free print space to
COMELEC. As such, Section 2 suffers from a
fatal constitutional vice and must be set
aside and nullified.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMELEC
Facts:
In the present case, the Court
considers the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. No.
881 against claims that the requirement
that radio and television time be given free
takes property without due process of law;
that it violates the eminent domain clause
of the Constitution which provides for the
payment of just compensation; that it
denies broadcast media the equal
protection of the laws; and that, in any
event, it violates the terms of the franchise
of petitioner GMA Network, Inc.
Petitioner Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. They
are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and
registered voters. The other petitioner,
GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and
television broadcasting stations throughout
the Philippines under a franchise granted by candidates within the area
Congress. of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this
Petitioner claims that it suffered
purpose, the franchise of all
losses running to several million pesos in
radio broadcasting and
providing COMELEC Time in connection
television stations are
with the 1992 presidential election and the
hereby amended so as to
1995 senatorial election and that it stands
provide radio or television
to suffer even more should it be required to
time, free of charge, during
do so again this year. Petitioner's allegation
the period of the campaign.
that it will suffer losses again because it is
(Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
required to provide free air time is
sufficient to give it standing to question the Thus, the law prohibits mass media
validity of 92. from selling or donating print space and air
time to the candidates and requires the
. Petitioners claim that the primary
COMELEC instead to procure print space
source of revenue of the radio and
and air time for allocation to the
television stations is the sale of air time to
candidates. It will be noted that while 90
advertisers and that to require these
of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the COMELEC to
stations to provide free air time is to
procure print space which, as we have held,
authorize a taking which is not "a de
should be paid for, 92 states that air time
minimis temporary limitation or restraint
shall be procured by the COMELEC free of
upon the use of private property.
charge.

B.P. Blg. 881, (Omnibus

Petitioners challenge the validity of
Election Code)
92 on the ground (1) that it takes property
Sec. 92. Comelec time.
without due process of law and without just
The commission shall
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and
procure radio and television
television broadcast companies the equal
time to be known as
protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in
"Comelec Time" which shall
excess of the power given to the COMELEC
be allocated equally and
to supervise or regulate the operation of
impartially among the
media of communication or information
during the period of election.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not 92 of B.P. Blg. No.
881 violates the eminent domain
clause of the Constitution which
provides for the payment of just
compensation.
Ruling:
Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do
not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast
signals and images. They are merely given
the temporary privilege of using them.
Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service.
In the granting of the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and thereafter
supervising radio and television stations,
the state spends considerable public funds
in licensing and supervising such
stations. 18 It would be strange if it cannot
even require the licensees to render public
service by giving free air time.
The claim that petitioner would be
losing P52,380,000 in unrealized revenue
from advertising is based on the assumption
that air time is "finished product" which, it
is said, become the property of the
company, like oil produced from refining or
similar natural resources after undergoing a
process for their production. But air time is
not owned by broadcast companies.
As held in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. F.C.C., 19 which upheld the right of a
party personally attacked to reply, "licenses
to broadcast do not confer ownership of
designated frequencies, but only the
temporary privilege of using them."
Consequently, "a license permits
broadcasting, but the license has no
constitutional right to be the one who holds
the license or to monopolize a radio
frequency to the exclusion of his fellow
citizens. There is nothing in the First
Amendment which prevents the
Government from requiring a licensee to
share his frequency with others and to
conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with
obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by
necessity, be barred from the airwaves." As
radio and television broadcast stations do
not own the airwaves, no private property
is taken by the requirement that they account COMELEC Resolution No. 2983-A,
provide air time to the COMELEC. 2 of which states:

The basic flaw in petitioner's Sec. 2. Grant of "Comelec

argument is that it assumes that the Time." Every radio
provision for COMELEC Time constitutes the broadcasting and television
use and operation of the stations of the station operating under
GMA Network, Inc., This is not so. Under franchise shall grant the
92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not Commission, upon payment
take over the operation of radio and of just compensation, at
television stations but only the allocation of least thirty (30) minutes of
air time to the candidates for the purpose prime time daily, to be
of ensuring, among other things, equal known as "Comelec Time",
opportunity, time, and the right to reply as effective February 10, 1998
mandated by the Constitution. 23 for candidates for
President, Vice-President
For the fact is that the duty
and Senators, and effective
imposed on the GMA Network, Inc. by its
March 27, 1998, for
franchise to render "adequate public
candidates for local elective
service time" implements 92 of B.P. Blg.
offices, until May 9, 1998.
881. Undoubtedly, its purpose is to enable
(Emphasis added).
the government to communicate with the
people on matters of public interest. This is because the amendment
providing for the payment of "just
In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is not an
compensation" is invalid, being in
invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise
contravention of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 that
but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily
radio and television time given during the
assumed by petitioner in accepting a public
period of the campaign shall be "free of
grant of privilege.
charge." Indeed, Resolution No. 2983
originally provided that the time allocated
Thus far, we have confined the
shall be "free of charge," just as 92
discussion to the provision of 92 of B.P.
requires such time to be given "free of
Blg. 881 for free air time without taking into
charge." The amendment appears to be a
reaction to petitioner's claim in this case
that the original provision was
unconstitutional because it allegedly
authorized the taking of property without
just compensation. Hence, the amendment
cannot be invoked by the parties.
Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg.
881, 92 singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time. They
contend that newspapers and magazines
are not similarly required as, in fact,
in Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, the
Court upheld their right to the payment of
just compensation for the print space they
may provide under 90.
The argument will not bear analysis.
It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media
are entitled to the same treatment under
the free speech guarantee of the
Constitution as the print media. There are
important differences in the characteristics
of the two media, however, which justify
their differential treatment for free speech
purposes. Because of the physical
limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the
government must, of necessity, allocate
broadcast frequencies to those wishing to
use them. There is no similar justification
for government allocation and regulation of
the print media.
In the allocation of limited
resources, relevant conditions may validly
be imposed on the grantees or licensees.
The reason for this is that, as already noted,
the government spends public funds for the
allocation and regulation of the broadcast
industry, which it does not do in the case of
the print media. To require the radio and
television broadcast industry to provide
free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair
exchange for what the industry gets.
From another point of view, this
Court has also held that because of the
unique and pervasive influence of the
broadcast media, "[n]ecessarily . . . the
freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspaper
and print media."
Petitioners' assertion therefore that
92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal
protection of the law has no basis. In
addition, their plea that 92 (free air time)
and 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid
political ads) should be invalidated would
pave the way for a return to the old regime
where moneyed candidates could
monopolize media advertising to the
disadvantage of candidates with less
resources. That is what Congress tried to
reform in 1987 with the enactment of R.A.
No. 6646. We are not free to set aside the election is maintained. For while broadcast
judgment of Congress, especially in light of media are not mere common carriers but
the recent failure of interested parties to entities with free speech rights, they are
have the law repealed or at least modified. also public trustees charged with the duty
of ensuring that the people have access to
With the prohibition on media
the diversity of views on political issues.
advertising by candidates themselves, the
This right of the people is paramount to the
COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are
autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm
about the only means through which
the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to
candidates can advertise their qualifications
uphold the people's right to information on
and programs of government. More than
matters of public concern. The use of
merely depriving their qualifications and
property bears a social function and is
programs of government. More than
subject to the state's duty to intervene for
merely depriving candidates of time for
the common good. Broadcast media can
their ads, the failure of broadcast stations
find their just and highest reward in the fact
to provide air time unless paid by the
that whatever altruistic service they may
government would clearly deprive the
render in connection with the holding of
people of their right to know. Art III, 7 of
elections is for that common good.
the Constitution provides that "the right of
the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized," while
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PLDT
Art. XII, 6 states that "the use of property
bears a social function [and] the right to
Facts:
own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the This case arose from a complaint
State to promote distributive justice and to filed on May 17, 1972 by the Republic
intervene when the common good so Telephone Company [RETELCO] (now PLDT),
demands." seeking to enjoin the respondents Director
or Acting Director of the Bureau of
To affirm the validity of 92 of B.P.
Telecommunications (now DOTC); its
Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to
Regional Superintendent; the Exchange
their obligation to see to it that the variety
Manager and Chief Operator of the Bureau
and vigor of public debate on issues in an
of Telecommunications at Malolos, Bulacan, Republic Telephone Company, Inc.,
and the agents and representatives acting or RETELCO, is a domestic corporation
in their behalf, from operating and engaged in the business of installing,
maintaining their local telephone system in operating and maintaining nationwide local
Malolos, Bulacan and from soliciting telephone services. On December 1959, it
subscribers in that municipality and its had acquired a municipal franchise from the
environs, alleging inter alia that such Municipal Council of Malolos, Bulacan per
operations and maintenance of the Resolution No. 190, Series of 1959 to install,
telephone system and solicitation of maintain and operate a local telephone
subscribers by respondents constituted an system within the municipality of Malolos
unfair and ruinous competition to the for a period of thirty-five years x x x. The
detriment of petitioner [RETELCO] who is a municipal franchise was approved by the
grantee of both municipal and legislative Provincial Board of Bulacan thus certificate
franchises for the purpose. of public convenience and necessity was
secured from the Public Service Commission
Order was issued on June 30, 1972,
which the President of the Philippines
restraining respondents [BUTELCO] from
approved x x x. RETELCO accepted the
operating and maintaining the local
commission certificate and filed the
telephone system in Malolos and from
required deposit with the Treasurer of
soliciting customers.
the Philippines x x x. RETELCO obtained a
legislative franchise under Republic Act No.
The Republic of the Philippines, on
3662 of the then Congress of the Philippines
behalf of the Bureau of
for the construction, operation and
Telecommunications, begged leave of court
maintenance of a nationwide telephone
to intervene in the proceedings on the
service with exchanges in various areas
ground that the suit affected state property
including the municipality of Malolos. It
and accordingly the state has a legal
was approved by the President of the
interest involved. There being no essential
Philippines for a period of fifty years x x x
dispute between the parties over the fact
and the correspondent certificate of public
that the suit indeed involved property of
convenience and necessity was granted
the state, the Answer in Intervention was
under Public Service Commission case No.
admitted and the case proceeded to trial.
67-4023 x x x.
 Way back in February, 1969 of telephone subscribers to the difference
RETELCO learned through public in rates individually charged by them x x x.
announcements of government projects to
The lower court, finding after trial
be launched that the Bureau of
that BUTELCO and intervenors-appellants
Telecommunications would establish and
were duplicating the functions of RETELCO
operate telephone system in Malolos to
in contravention of Executive Order No. 94,
serve government offices and the private
Series of 1947, rendered a judgment
[sector] as well thus exposing x x x
making the preliminary injunction
appellees *RETELCOs+ telephone business
PERMANENT.
operation to the risk of undue
competition. Immediately, they filed Respondent appellate court
protests, and sought for administrative sustained the court a quos finding that
remedies and reliefs from the Section 79 of Executive Order No. 94, Series
Telecommunications Board, the President of 1947 prohibited any other entity, besides
of the Philippines, the Secretary of the the present operator, from maintaining and
Department of Public Works and selling telephone services in Malolos,
Communication, the then Speaker Jose B. Bulacan, unless there was first executed a
Laurel, Jr. of the House of Representatives, mutually acceptable arrangement or
and the Philippine National Bank which was agreement between such other entity and
financing the project x x x but all were to no the present operator as regards the
avail. In May, 1969, the Bureau of utilization of the latters existing
Telecommunications commenced its facilities. Respondent court found
operation of the telephone exchange in respondent RETELCO to be the present
Malolos and, incidentally, number of the operator of telephone services in Malolos,
telephone subscribers of RETELCO dropped. Bulacan, and BUTELCO having failed to first
make arrangements with the former before
The Bureau of Telecommunications
establishing its own telephone system,
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
respondent appellate court upheld the
Public Service Commission on matters of
propriety of the permanent injunction
fixing the rates of fees to be charged to
issued by the court a quo.
telephone subscribers, thus RETELCO
attributed the sharp decline in the number
 In rendering judgment in favor of
respondent RETELCO, the appellate court
rejected BUTELCOs main argument that
Section 79 of Executive Order No. 94, Series
of 1947, has been repealed by Presidential
Decree No. 1 promulgated by
President Marcos in the exercise of his
martial law powers, by virtue of which
decree the Integrated Reorganization Plan
was made part of the law of the
land. Under such plan, in turn, BUTELCOs
functions had been expanded to include the
operation of telephone systems
government offices for purposes
augmenting inadequate
communications services. However, this
was rebuffed by the appellate court.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not RETELCO have the
exclusive right to operate and
maintain a telephone system in
Malolos, Bulacan.
Ruling:
There is no clear showing by
RETELCO, however, that its franchises are of
an exclusive character. At any rate, it may
very well be pointed out as well that neither
did the franchise of PLDT at the time of the
controversy confer exclusive rights upon
PLDT in the operation of a telephone
system.
In fact, we have made it a matter of
judicial notice that all legislative franchises
for the operation of a telephone system
then
contain the following provision:
It is expressly provided
that in the event the
Philippine Government
should desire to maintain
and operate for itself the
for
system and enterprise
of
herein authorized, the
private
grantee shall surrender his
franchise and will turn over
to the Government said
system and all serviceable
equipment therein, at cost,
less reasonable
depreciation.
BUTELCOs initiative to operate and
maintain a telephone system in Malolos,
Bulacan, was undertaken pursuant to
Section 79 (b) of Executive Order No. 94,
Series of 1947.
While we affirmed that *t+he Bureau
of Telecommunications, under section 79
(b) of Executive Order No. 94, may operate
and maintain wire telephone or radio
telephone communications throughout the
Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in Now in the subsequent case of Director
cities, towns, and provinces under such of the Bureau of Telecommunications v.
terms and conditions or arrangement with Aligaen, we emphasized the relevance of
present owners or operators as may be the latter portion of Section 79 (b) of
agreed upon to the satisfaction of all Executive Order No. 94 as providing a
concerned, we also at the same time caveat to any initiative on the part of the
clarified that nothing in these provisions government to operate and maintain a
limits the Bureau to non-commercial telephone system in an area where there is
activities or prevents it from serving the an existing franchise holder. In the said
general public. case of Aligaen, we foregrounded the need
for BUTELCO to first enter into negotiation
x x x It may be that in its
or arrangement with the operator or owner
original prospectuses the
of the existing telephone system. We had
Bureau officials had stated
stated, thus:
that the service would be
limited to government x x x The Bureau of
offices; but such limitations Telecommunications may
could not block future take steps to improve the
expansion of the system, as telephone service in any
authorized by the terms of locality in the Philippines,
the Executive Order, nor but in so doing it must first
could the officials of the enter into negotiation or
Bureau bind the arrangement with the
Government not to engage operator or owner of the
in services that are existing telephone system.
authorized by law. x x x When a private person
or entity is granted a
In other words, BUTELCO cannot be
legislative franchise to
said to be prohibited under the aforecited
operate a telephone
legal provision from operating and
system, or any public utility
maintaining its own telephone system in
for that matter the
Malolos, Bulacan.
government has the
correlative obligation to
 afford the grantee of the satisfaction of all
franchise all the chances or concerned *emphasis
opportunity to operate supplied].
profitably, as long as public
The right of the prior operator under
convenience is properly
the aforecited provision is to be unfailingly
served rather than promote
and seriously considered in case it chooses
a competition with the
to propose arrangements or such terms and
grantee. x x x
conditions whereby BUTELCO is to
This is not to say, however, that the lack of coordinate its efforts to set up and operate
prior negotiation with the existing a telephone system with the existing
telephone system operator renders illegal operator. BUTELCO, in that case, would be
the operation by BUTELCO of a telephone obligated to exercise good faith and exert
system. After all, the very provision in optimal cooperative efforts so that it may
question phrases the prior negotiation save government some money and prevent
requirement in less than mandatory competition by utilizing existing facilities in
terms. Section 79 (b) of Executive Order cities, towns and provinces x x x [of] the
No. 94, Series of 1947 provides: present owners or operators, as mandated
by Section 79 (b) of Executive Order No. 94.
(b) To x x x negotiate for,
operate and maintain wire- In the case at bench, BUTELCO
telephone or radio admittedly did not fulfill this
telecommunications service obligation. Such failure, however, is not
throughout the Philippines violative of any mandatory provision of
by utilizing such existing law. There was no violation of Section 79
facilities in cities, towns, (b) of Executive Order No. 94 but only an
and provinces as may irregularity in the procedure by which
be found feasible and BUTELCO undertook the operation of a
under such terms and telephone system in Malolos, Bulacan.
conditions or arrangements
It cannot be denied that, even if
with the present owners or
prior negotiations were undertaken by
operators thereof as may
BUTELCO with RETELCO, and they both
be agreed upon to the
could not agree on mutually acceptable
terms and conditions, nothing in Section 79 dissatisfaction. After all,
(b) of Executive Order No. 94 prohibits neither PLDT nor any other
BUTELCO from proceeding with the setting public utility has a
up and operation of a telephone system in constitutional right to a
Malolos, Bulacan, despite the presence of a monopoly position in view
prior operator in the person of of the Constitutional
RETELCO. Thus, any injunction prohibiting proscription that no
BUTELCO from operating its telephone franchise certificate or
system finds no sufficiently legal and just authorization shall be
basis under Section 79 (b) of Executive exclusive in character or
Order No. 94. shall last longer than fifty
(50) years (ibid., Section 11;
To read from Section 79 (b) of
Article XIV, Section 5, 1973
Executive Order No. 94 an ultra-
Constitution; Article XIV,
protectionist policy in favor of telephone
Section 8, 1935
franchise holders, smacks of a promotion of
Constitution).
the monopolization of the countrys
telephone industry which, undeniably, has
contributed to the slackened pace of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
national development.
CASTELLVI
As we have pointed out in the case
Facts:
of PLDT v. National Telecommunications
The Republic of the Philippines,
Commission[16]:
(hereinafter referred to as the Republic)
Free competition in the
filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for
industry may also provide
eminent domain against defendant-
the answer to a much-
appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi,
desired improvement in the
judicial administratrix of the estate of the
quality and delivery of this
late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter
type of public utility, to
referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of
improved technology, fast
land situated in the barrio of San Jose,
and handly mobil service,
Floridablanca, Pampanga and against
and reduced user
defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo
Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Toledo- be expropriated were residential lands, they
Gozun) over two parcels of land. recommended unanimously that the lowest
price that should be paid was P10.00 per
In its complaint, the Republic
square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi
alleged, among other things, that the fair
and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional
market value of the above-mentioned
P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for
lands, according to the Committee on
improvements found on her land; that legal
Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga,
interest on the compensation, computed
was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a
from August 10, 1959, be paid after
total market value of P259,669.10; and
deducting the amounts already paid to the
prayed, that the provisional value of the
owners, and that no consequential damages
lands be fixed at P259.669.10 which the
be awarded.
court granted.
The Commissioners' report was
In her "motion to dismiss" filed on
objected to by all the parties in the case
July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among
by defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun,
other things, that the land under her
who insisted that the fair market value of
administration (occupied by the Philippine
their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per
Air Force since 1947 under a contract of
square meter; and by the Republic, which
lease), being a residential land, had a fair
insisted that the price to be paid for the
market value of P15.00 per square meter,
lands should be fixed at P0.20 per square
so it had a total market value of
meter.
P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through
the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
The trial court finds:
particularly the Philippine Air Force, had
been, despite repeated demands, illegally That the unanimous
occupying her property since July 1, 1956, recommendation of the
thereby preventing her from using and commissioners of ten
disposing of it, thus causing her damages by (P10.00) pesos per square
way of unrealized profits. meter for the three lots of
the defendants subject of
The Commissioners submitted their
this action is fair and just.
report and recommendation, wherein, after
The plaintiff will pay 6%
having determined that the lands sought to
 interest per annum on the
total value of the lands of
defendant Toledo-Gozun
since (sic) the amount
deposited as provisional
value from August 10, 1959
until full payment is made
to said defendant or deposit
therefor is made in court.
In respect to the defendant
Castellvi, interest at 6% per
annum will also be paid by
the plaintiff to defendant
Castellvi from July 1, 1956
when plaintiff commenced
its illegal possession of the
Castellvi land when the
instant action had not yet
been commenced to July 10,
1959 when the provisional
value thereof was actually
deposited in court, on the
total value of the said
(Castellvi) land as herein
adjudged.xxx
Issue/s:
2. Whether the taking of
the properties commenced
with the filing of this
action.
3. Whether the plaintiff-
appellant shall pay 6%
interest on the adjudged
value of the Castellvi
property starting from July
1956.
Ruling:
1. A number of circumstances must
be present in the "taking" of property for
purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a
private property.
This circumstance is present in the
instant case, when by virtue of the
lease agreement the Republic,
through the AFP, took possession of
the property of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private
property must be for more than a
momentary period.

1. Whether the price of P10 "Momentary" means, "lasting but a

per square meter of the moment; of but a moment's
subject lands is a just duration"
compensation. The aforecited lease contract was for
a period of one year, renewable the intention was, but what is
from year to year. The entry on the expressed in the language used. (City
property, under the lease, is of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53
temporary, and considered Phil. 515, 525)
transitory. The fact that the
Moreover, in order to judge the
Republic, through the AFP,
intention of the contracting parties,
constructed some installations of a
their contemporaneous and
permanent nature does not alter the
subsequent acts shall be principally
fact that the entry into the land was
considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If
transitory, or intended to last a year,
the intention of the lessee (Republic)
although renewable from year to
in 1947 was really to occupy
year by consent of 'The owner of the
permanently Castellvi's property,
land. By express provision of the
why was the contract of lease
lease agreement the Republic, as
entered into on year to year basis?
lessee, undertook to return the
Why was the lease agreement
premises in substantially the same
renewed from year to year? Why did
condition as at the time the property
not the Republic expropriate this
was first occupied by the AFP. It is
land of Castellvi in 1949 when,
claimed that the intention of the
according to the Republic itself, it
lessee was to occupy the land
expropriated the other parcels of
permanently, as may be inferred
land that it occupied at the same
from the construction of permanent
time as the Castellvi land, for the
improvements. But this "intention"
purpose of converting them into a
cannot prevail over the clear and
jet air base? 14 It might really have
express terms of the lease contract.
been the intention of the Republic to
Intent is to be deduced from the
expropriate the lands in question at
language employed by the parties,
some future time, but certainly mere
and the terms 'of the contract, when
notice - much less an implied notice
unambiguous, as in the instant case,
of such intention on the part of
are conclusive in the absence of
the Republic to expropriate the lands
averment and proof of mistake or
in the future did not, and could not,
fraud the question being not what
bind the landowner, nor bind the In the instant case, the entry of the
land itself. The expropriation must Republic into the property and its
be actually commenced in court utilization of the same for public use
(Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. did not oust Castellvi and deprive
461, 484). her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Castellvi remained as
Third, the entry into the property
owner, and was continuously
should be under warrant or color of
recognized as owner by the
legal authority.
Republic, as shown by the renewal of
the lease contract from year to year,
This circumstance in the "taking"
and by the provision in the lease
may be considered as present in the
contract whereby the Republic
instant case, because the Republic
undertook to return the property to
entered the Castellvi property as
Castellvi when the lease was
lessee.
terminated. Neither was Castellvi
Fourth, the property must be deprived of all the beneficial
devoted to a public use or otherwise enjoyment of the property, because
informally appropriated or the Republic was bound to pay, and
injuriously affected. had been paying, Castellvi the
agreed monthly rentals until the
It may be conceded that the time when it filed the complaint for
circumstance of the property being eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
devoted to public use is present
because the property was used by It is clear, therefore, that the
the air force of the AFP. "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes
of eminent domain cannot be considered to
Fifth, the utilization of the property have taken place in 1947 when the Republic
for public use must be in such a way commenced to occupy the property as
as to oust the owner and deprive lessee thereof. We find merit in the
him of all beneficial enjoyment of contention of Castellvi that two essential
the property. elements in the "taking" of property under
the power of eminent domain, namely: (1)
that the entrance and occupation by the in the instant case, ceases
condemnor must be for a permanent, or upon the day fixed, without
indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting need of a demand (Article
the property to public use the owner was 1669, Civil Code). Neither
ousted from the property and deprived of can it be said that the right
its beneficial use, were not present when of eminent domain may be
the Republic entered and occupied the exercised by simply leasing
Castellvi property in 1947. the premises to be
expropriated (Rule 67,
Untenable also is the Republic's
Section 1, Rules of Court).
contention that although the contract
Nor can it be accepted that
between the parties was one of lease on a
the Republic would enter
year to year basis, it was "in reality a more
into a contract of lease
or less permanent right to occupy the
where its real intention was
premises under the guise of lease with the
to buy, or why the Republic
'right and privilege' to buy the property
should enter into a
should the lessor wish to terminate the
simulated contract of lease
lease," and "the right to buy the property is
("under the guise of lease",
merged as an integral part of the lease
as expressed by counsel for
relationship ... so much so that the fair
the Republic) when all the
market value has been agreed upon, not, as
time the Republic had the
of the time of purchase, but as of the time
right of eminent domain,
of occupancy."
and could expropriate
Castellvi's land if it wanted
We cannot accept the
to without resorting to any
Republic's contention that a
guise whatsoever. Neither
lease on a year to year basis
can we see how a right to
can give rise to a
buy could be merged in a
permanent right to occupy,
contract of lease in the
since by express legal
absence of any agreement
provision a lease made for a
between the parties to that
determinate time, as was
effect. To sustain the
the lease of Castellvi's land
contention of the Republic
is to sanction a practice
whereby in order to secure
a low price for a land which
the government intends to
expropriate (or would
eventually expropriate) it
would first negotiate with
the owner of the land to
lease the land (for say ten
or twenty years) then
expropriate the same when
the lease is about to
terminate, then claim that
the "taking" of the property
for the purposes of the
expropriation be reckoned
as of the date when the
Government started to
occupy the property under
the lease, and then assert
that the value of the
property being expropriated
be reckoned as of the start
of the lease, in spite of the
fact that the value of the
property, for many good
reasons, had in the
meantime increased during
the period of the lease. This
would be sanctioning what
obviously is a deceptive
scheme, which would have
the effect of depriving the
owner of the property of its
true and fair market value
at the time when the
expropriation proceedings
were actually instituted in
court. The Republic's claim
that it had the "right and
privilege" to buy the
property at the value that it
had at the time when it first
occupied the property as
lessee nowhere appears in
the lease contract. What
was agreed expressly in
paragraph No. 5 of the
lease agreement was that,
should the lessor require
the lessee to return the
premises in the same
condition as at the time the
same was first occupied by
the AFP, the lessee would
have the "right and
privilege" (or option) of
paying the lessor what it
would fairly cost to put the
premises in the same
condition as it was at the
commencement of the
lease, in lieu of the lessee's
 performance of
undertaking to put the land
in said condition. The "fair
value" at the time
occupancy, mentioned in
the lease agreement, does
not refer to the value of the
property if bought by the
lessee, but refers to the cost
of restoring the property in
the same condition as of
the time when the lessee
took possession of
property. Such fair value
cannot refer to
purchase price, for purchase
was never intended by the
parties to the
contract. It is a rule in the
interpretation of contracts
that "However general the
terms of a contract may be,
they shall not
understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and
cases that are different
from those upon which the
parties intended to agree"
(Art. 1372, Civil Code).
We hold, therefore,
"taking" of the Castellvi property should not
the be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the
Republic first occupied the same pursuant
to the contract of lease, and that the just
of compensation to be paid for the Castellvi
property should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property as of that
year. The lower court did not commit an
error when it held that the "taking" of the
property under expropriation commenced
with the filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is
the
to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. This Court has ruled that
the
when the taking of the property sought to
be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation
lease
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to
the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine
be
National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1
SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is
undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castellvi property, by
authority of the court, on August 10, 1959.
The "taking" of the Castellvi property for
the purposes of determining the just
that the compensation to be paid must, therefore,
be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the in the present case, as of August 10, 1959
complaint for eminent domain was filed. when the same were taken possession of by
the Republic, were residential lands and
2. In determining the value of land
were adaptable for use as residential
appropriated for public
subdivisions. Indeed, the owners of these
purposes, the same consideration
lands have the right to their value for the
are to be regarded as in a sale of
use for which they would bring the most in
property between private parties.
the market at the time the same were taken
The inquiry, in such cases, must be
from them. The most important issue to be
what is the property worth in the
resolved in the present case relates to the
market, viewed not merely with
question of what is the just compensation
reference to the uses to which it is
that should be paid to the appellees.
at the time applied, but with
reference to the uses to which it is The Court arrived at the conclusion
plainly adapted, that is to say, What that the price of P10.00 per square meter,
is it worth from its availability for as recommended by the commissioners and
valuable uses? adopted by the lower court, is quite high. It
is Our considered view that the price of
In expropriation proceedings,
P5.00 per square meter would be a fair
therefore, the owner of the land has the
valuation of the lands in question and
right to its value for the use for which it
would constitute a just compensation to the
would bring the most in the market. The
owners thereof. In arriving at this
owner may thus show every advantage that
conclusion We have particularly taken into
his property possesses, present and
consideration the resolution of the
prospective, in order that the price it could
Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the
be sold for in the market may be
province of Pampanga informing, among
satisfactorily determined. The owner may
others, that in the year 1959 the land of
also show that the property is suitable for
Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to
division into village or town lots.
P4.00 per square meter, while the land of
Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50
We agree with the findings, and the
to P3.00 per square meter. The Court has
conclusions, of the lower court that the
weighed all the circumstances relating to
lands that are the subject of expropriation
this expropriations proceedings, and in
fixing the price of the lands that are being
expropriated the Court arrived at a happy
medium between the price as
recommended by the commissioners and
approved by the court, and the price
advocated by the Republic. This Court has
also taken judicial notice of the fact that the
value of the Philippine peso has
considerably gone down since the year
1959. 30Considering that the lands of
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are adjoining
each other, and are of the same nature, the
Court has deemed it proper to fix the same
price for all these lands.
3. If Castellvi had agreed to receive
the rentals from June 30, 1956 to
August 10, 1959, she should be
considered as having allowed her
land to be leased to the Republic
until August 10, 1959, and she
could not at the same time be
entitled to the payment of interest
during the same period on the
amount awarded her as the just
compensation of her land. The
Republic, therefore, should pay
Castellvi interest at the rate of 6%
per annum on the value of her land,
minus the provisional value that
was deposited, only from July 10,
1959 when it deposited in court the
provisional value of the land.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
modified, as follows:
(a) the lands of appellees Carmen Vda. de
Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, as
described in the complaint, are declared
expropriated for public use;
(b) the fair market value of the lands of the
appellees is fixed at P5.00 per square
meter;
(c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi
the sum of P3,796,495.00 as just
compensation for her one parcel of land
that has an area of 759,299 square meters,
minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she
withdrew out of the amount that was
deposited in court as the provisional value
of the land, with interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day
full payment is made or deposited in court;
(d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-
Gozun the sum of P2,695,225.00 as the just
compensation for her two parcels of land
that have a total area of 539,045 square
meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00 that
she withdrew out of the amount that was
deposited in court as the provisional value
of her lands, with interest at the rate of 6%,
per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day
full payment is made or deposited in court;
(e) the attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto
Cacnio is enforced; and

(f) the costs should be paid by appellant

Republic of the Philippines, as provided in
Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13, Rule
141, of the Rules of Court.
 1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Both Republic and respondents
Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo
claim ownership over the same lots i.e.,
Nos. 817 and 2509 of the Sagay-Escalante
Cadastre, Negros Occidental, subject matter
of this litigation. The basis of the Republics
claim is that the said lots were bequeathed
to the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of
Public Schools) by the late Esteban
Jalandoni through his will.
Respondent de Ocampo, on the
other hand, predicates his claim on an
application for registration of the same lots.
He averred that the lots were unregistered
lands belonging to and possessed by him,
by virtue of a donation from Luis Mosquera.
Respondent Anglo intervened in the
case having allegedly bought the same lots
from de Ocampo
De Ocampo averred in his answer
that the properties alleged to have been
donated by Esteban Jalandoni to the the
then Bureau of Education were different
from the properties involved in this case.
The lots applied for by de Ocampo and
which the Republic sought to recover were
unregistered lands, and that granting,
without admitting, that they are the same
lands, the court no longer had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action since
the issue of possession over said lots was
already decided by the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. The subject
two lots were registered in the name of the
then applicant Ocampo.
The Republic contend that actual
fraud had been perpetrated by Respondent
de Ocampo in securing the lower courts
decision ordering the registration of the lots
in his name, as well as the issuance of the
decree of registration and the
corresponding certificate of title, on the
grounds which, briefly restated. advert to
respondent de Ocampo's alleged
misrepresentations that the two parcels of
land applied for by him in the land
registration case were "different from the
two parcels of land of the same lot
numbers, technical descriptions and areas
belonging to the Government, knowing
such allegations to be false, the truth of the
matter being that said parcels of land are
the same property owned by the
Government"; that there was previous
registration of the same parcels of land,
Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, under the Torrens
System in favor of Meerkamp and Company
which later sold the same to Jalandoni who,
in turn, gave the lots to the Bureau of
Education as a legacy and that the Court of
First Instance no longer had jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of Lots Nos.
817 and 2509, in favor of respondent de
Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration
of the same lands in favor of Meerkamp
and Company.
The trial court concluded that the
evidence adduced by the petitioner in this
incident does not establish actual and
constructive fraud which is the only kind of
fraud that is considered a legal ground to
review, reopen or set aside the decree
which has already been issued in the name
of Alfredo V. de Ocampo.
The Republic appealed but was
dismissed.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the dismissal by the Court
of Appeals of Republic's appeal
from the decision of the trial court
denying its Amended Petition, is
not proper and should be set aside
as contended by Republic, or
correct and should be maintained,
as argued by respondents.
Ruling:
A consideration in depth of the
unique and peculiar facts attendant to this
case and the procedural and substantive
implications of the dismissal of the appeal
now sought to be reviewed and
reconsidered; and a due and proper regard
to the merits of the case rather than a
fascile reliance on procedural rules, compel
this Court to reverse and set aside the
dismissal of Republic's appeal by
respondent Court of Appeals.
1. The documentary exhibits
adduced by Republic in the hearing of the
Amended Petition below signed by the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental,
stating that there was registered a sale
executed by Meerkamp and Company in
favor of Esteban Jalandoni and as a result
the name of the Company was cancelled
and the title was issued to Jalandoni; that
the title was later cancelled by virtue of the
will of Jalandoni leaving the parcel of land
to the then Bureau of Education.
The trial court also made the
express finding that the alleged deed of
donation by Luis Mosquera in favor of
respondent de Ocampo does not appear in
his notarial book which is on file in the
Bureau of Record Management, Manila.
 The Provincial Assessor of Negros
Occidental likewise issued a certification
stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were
never declared in the name of Mosquera.
His later certification states that the said
lots were assessed in the name of the
Bureau of Education, and that the technical
descriptions in the Bureau of Lands records
show that the same lots were in the name
of Meerkamp and Company.
Authorities are in agreement that a
land registration court is without
jurisdiction to decree again the registration
of land already registered in an earlier
registration case, and that the second
decree entered for the same land is null and
void.
2. There is a serious charge, which
is also crucial to the issue between the
parties, that respondent de Ocampo used
fraudulent misrepresentations
machinations in securing his title. If the
charge is true, there is the element of wilfull
intent to deprive Republic of just rights
which constitutes the essential
characteristics of actual as distinguished
from legal fraud.
3. The foregoing overriding
considerations then the alleged lack of
jurisdiction and the alleged fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations,
which, buttressed by strong evidence, can
nullify the second registration and/or set
aside OCT No. 576 issued to respondent de
Ocampo taken in relation with the
procedural and substantive implications
which could and would arise if the appeal
were dismissed, namely, the risk that the
holdings may be transacted to third parties
and the fact that Republic's action to
recover tile holdings would give rise to
multiplicity of suits compel Us to
conclude that the only recourse in the
interest of just and expeditious proceedings
considering that these have been pending
for close to twenty (20) years now is to
suspend Our rules and/or to except this
case from their operation. For when the
operation of the Rules of will lead to an
injustice we have, in justifiable instances,
resorted to this extraordinary remedy to
prevent it.
and
While the above exceptions are
predicated on different grounds, they
nevertheless support the view that the rigid
adherence to the rules on perfection of
appeals may and should be relaxed where
compelling reasons so warrant. The grounds
invoked in this case not only lack of
jurisdiction but gross injustice itself more
than justify the exception considering
further that the delay in the perfection of
the appeal involved six (6) days only.

4. Finally, enshrined in our legal and

judicial annals is the maxim that no person
should enrich himself at the expense or
prejudice of others. The commendable and
determined efforts on the part of the
citizenry to fashion a New Society rid of
graft, corruption and the persistent malaise
of land grabbing, will be set back, if the
subject lots consisting of close to 300
hectares which are devoted to educational
purposes have indeed been wrongfully
titled to respondent de Ocampo.

The Court set aside the dismissal of

the Republics appeal and according to the
parties the opportunity in this proceeding,
and without further need to re-litigate, to
terminate this litigation, which has been
pending for close to twenty years in
fairness to both parties.