thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are

People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
FACTS
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and
for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is
apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance
excuse to free a person validly in prison.
at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of the
sovereign will.

RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of laws., this simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
Central Bank Employees Association vs BSP GR 148208 15
December 2004 operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c). Legal history shows that

GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class,

separate from other governmental entities. There is no substantial

Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and
distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other
created the new BSP on 1993 through RA No 7653. Central Bank
rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. The equal protection clause does not
Employees Association assailed the provision of RA No 7653, Art II Sec
demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be
15(c). They contend that it makes an unconstitutional cut between two
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers as exempt
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Those that fall within a
class of Salary Standardization Law (RA 6758) and (2) the rank-and-
class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast
file non-exempt class. BSP contends that the exemption of officers (SG
on some in the group is equally binding on the rest. It is clear that the
20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and
continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal
executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-
protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.
file.

Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c) violates equal protection right of

the BSP r&f employees?

Decision: Sec 15(c) unconstitutional. Judicial notice that other Govt

Financial Institution undertook amendment of their charters from 1995

to 2004 a blanket provision for all employees to be covered by SSL.

The said subsequent enactments constitute significant changes in

circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued

 SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. v.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
AND PEDRO BALUBAL
519 SCRA 432 (2007), SECOND DIVISION
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in
the business of providing public transportation. One of its buses,
while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit
lane, crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National
Construction Company (PNCC). PNCCs Sofronio Salvanera,
and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic control and security
department of the South Luzon tollway, investigated the incident.
The bus was turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own
investigation. Because of lack of adequate space,
traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera requested that the bus be
towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound. Superlines made several
requests for the release of the bus but Balubal refused. Instead,
Balubal demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a collateral with the
same value for the reconstruction of the damaged radio room.
Superlines filed a replevin suit with damages against PNCC and
Balubal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The trial court
dismissed the complaint and ordered Superlines to pay PNCC an
amount of P40, 320.00, representing actual damages to the radio
room. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and
concluded that the case should have been brought against the
police authorities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper
HELD:
Contrary to PNCCs contention, the petition raises questions of law
foremost of which is whether the owner of a personal property may
initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and recover
damages for illegal distraint. In a complaint for replevin,
the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or
clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal
possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
In the case at bar, Superlines ownership of the bus being admitted
by PNCC, consideration of whether PNCC has been wrongfully
detaining it is in order. The bus was towed by the PNCC on the
request of Lopera in violation of constitutional right against
unreasonable seizures. The seizure and impounding of Superliness
bus, on Loperas request, were unquestionably violative of the
right to be let alone by the authorities as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it cannot pass
upon the same without impleading Lopera and any other police
officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus.
The police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus
to PNCC for safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected
between them and PNCC. Superlines or the trial court motu proprio
may implead as defendants the indispensable parties Lopera and
any other responsible police officers.
ALIH v. CASTRO probable cause to search the petitioners premises. It
151 SCRA 279 follows that as the search of the petitioners
premises was violative of the Constitution, all the
FACTS: firearms and the ammunitions taken form the raided
The respondents raided the compound occupied by compound are inadmissible as evidence in any of the
the petitioners in Zamboanga City in search of loose proceedings against the petitioners.
firearms, ammunitions and other explosives.
Petitioners pray to recover the articles seized from
them and respondents be enjoind from using the
same against them since they did not have a warrant
to search the compound when they seized said
articles, thus constituting an illegal search.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts done by the respondents are
violative of the Bill of Rights and thus the evidence
obtained therein inadmissible in court

HELD:
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga at
the time in question did not excuse the non-
observance of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time of
the zona the petitioners were merely suspected of
the mayors slaying and had not been in fact
investigated. Every person is entitled due process.
The respondents defied the precept that civilian
authority is at all times supreme over the military
so clearly proclaimed in the Constitution. The
respondents simply by-passed civil courts which had
the authority to determine whether or not there was
David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006
FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of
national emergency. This case covers the seven
consolidated petitions for cetiorari assailing the
constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5
implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing
so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed
grave abuse of discretion and that respondent
officials of the Government, in their professed efforts
to defend and preserve democratic institutions are
actually trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the constitution.
power by issuing decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.
With respect to "laws", she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws such as customs
laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She
can only order the military under PP1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are
constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "the legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives". To be sure, neither martial law nor
a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative
Mata v Bayona
G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984
FACTS:
Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as
amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano
Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by selling
illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case,
he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be
found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding
Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the court. The Judge
then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.
This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and
for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was
denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles
and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd
PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to
that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant
were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no
moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents
are to be attached to the records. Matas motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with
the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the
search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the
requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the
articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the
case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?
HELD:YES. Under the Constitution no search warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional
injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid.
Kho vs Makalintal
G.R. No. 94902-06. April 21, 1999
Facts:
Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent NBI from using the
objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or
to be filed against them and to return immediately the said items,
including the firearms, ammunition and explosives, radio
communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers, two units of
vehicles and motorcycle.
Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing
upon the absence of any probable cause therefor. They contend that
the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the
premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under
controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the
commission of a crime by them (petitioners).
Issue: Whether petitioners contention of the absence of probable cause
in the given situation is tenable.
Held: Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI
agents who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified
unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the
two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored
therein. In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he personally
attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May 15,
1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally saw the weapons
being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises
referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the
firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the
aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there
inside the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15,
1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the
questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of
the applicants and their witnesses.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that
the question of whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must
be determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations. In Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of
a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion
of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicants
and the witnesses.
After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the
findings and conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge after
examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the
singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a
probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the
applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis
the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and
determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave
accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted
at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that
respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the
personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there
is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings
and impressions.
People vs Olaes GR No 11166 105 Phil 502 17 April 1959
Fact: Bus No 64 of Laguna Transportation Company was on the
road when at about 4:00 am in the morning of 9 November 1954
when an armed man later identified as Cosme Isip hailed the bus to
stop. Driver Feliciano Limosnero slowed down and seven other
armed men emerged from the left side. Convinced that the eight
are not passengers but robbers Limosnero sped away and the eight
started firing at the bus. A shot grazed Limosneros heaf, another
struck the shoulder of passenger Elena Loyola who would have died
if she had not been given medical attention and another hit the
back of passenger Maria Argame who was pronounced dead on
arrival in the hospital. Passenger Mariano Inobio identified and
testified against Eugenio Olaes his barriomate as one of the men
who apperead after Isip. Cour of First Instance rendered Olaes guity
of attempted robbery with homicide and attempted homicide.
Issue: Whether or not CFI rendered correct indictment against
Olaes.
Olaes contened that he was sleeping at his house at the time the
incident happened and that Inobio has a grudge against him and
just trying to implicate him. He also contended that Inobio failed to
identify him when he led the team of Lt Ver to Inobios house
during investigation. This was disputed by Lt Ver as he learned later
that Inobio revealed already to PC detachment commander the
involvement of Olaes.

Decision: Decision modified. The aggravating circumstance of

nocturnity and in band will qualify the act of killing Maria Argame as
murder and wounding of Elena Loyola as frustrated murder. The
voluntary surrender of Olaes upon learning that he is wanted by the
constabulary is a mitigating circumstance that will compensate the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. The penalty for murder
which is reclusion temporal in its maximum degree death should be
imposed its medium period, reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND
ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As
part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints,
the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their
safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of
the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant
and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality
of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway
at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in
the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had
gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected
to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not the installation of checkpoints violates the right of
the people against unreasonable searches and seizures?
Ruling:
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers
and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow
units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the
alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of
which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly consider,
at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.

Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections
Facts:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial
law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for
the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days
after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031,
amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes
in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec
4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued
PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites
in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to
the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire
to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will
be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree
Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it
directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16,
1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen
contended that the question is political in nature hence the court
cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to
the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and
ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases
where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process
by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and
the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather
than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a
constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the
proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments
thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are
assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to
pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides:
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in
the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power,
so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose
amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those
proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time
also sits as the legislature.
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu
GR 95770, 29 December 1995; En Banc Resolution, Kapunan
[J]
FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue
whether school children who are members or a religious sect
known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school
(both public and private), for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which
includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic
pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were
expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in
Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No.
1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department
Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag
Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing
these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against
their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends
constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where
the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides
that we are a system of separation of the church and state
and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt
involve any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovahs
Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag
ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption.
Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school
discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population
which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of
religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and
cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with
reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations
promulgated by competent authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated
their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from
the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights,
for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The
right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare. The only
limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave
and present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external
acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who
believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for
the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior,
there is no warrant for their expulsion.
ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651, contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could
August 4, 2003 allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided
it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to
be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state
FACTS:
has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes,
compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent,
Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent
thus the case is remanded to the RTC.
Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her
husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise
old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her
Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling
partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he
state interest. It is the respondents stance that the
believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes
respondents conjugal arrangement is not immoral and
the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain
punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise
employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her
protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct
act.
where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary
action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to
in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in
religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a
1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano
passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom, but
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years
must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The
and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect
government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given
known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the
Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity
states compelling interest which can override respondents
with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living
religious belief and practice.
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned,
there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good
standing in the congregation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct."

HELD:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue
its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality

Iglesia ni Cristo v CA 259 SCRA 529 (1996)
Facts:
This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming
action of respondent Board of Review For Moving Pictures and
Television that x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"
classifying it not for public viewing on grounds that they offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law. Respondent contends the Board acted without
jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion by requiring them to
submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and suppression of freedom of
expression. Trial court rendered judgment ordering the Board to
give petitioner the permit for their TV program while ordering
petitioners to refrain from attacking and offending other religious
sectors from their program. In their motion for reconsideration the
petitioner prays for the deletion of the order of the court to make
them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes of
their programs for review prior to showing on television. Such
motion was granted. Respondent board appealed before the CA
which reversed the decision of the lower court affirming the
jurisdiction and power of the board to review the TV program. In
their petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the
jurisdiction of the Board over reviewing of their TV program and its
grave abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeed
vested with such.
petitioners freedom of speech and free exercise of religion.
Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni
Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is
unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever
of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity
and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. Thus
the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the
petitioners TV program while it reversed and set aside the decision
of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating
the TV program of the petitioner.
2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely:
1. Freedom to believe (absolute)
1. Freedom to act on ones belief where an individual
externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions affecting the
public, this freedom to do so becomes subject to the
regulation authority of the state.

Issue: whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at
bar and whether or not it has acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held: The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV

programs by virtue of the powers vested upon it by PD 1986. On
the account of suppression of religious freedom, the court ruled that
any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of
invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this
presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppression of the