Psychology

of
future orientation
 Scientific Society
of the Catholic University of Lublin

Department of Psychology of Motivation and Emotion

Publications of the Faculty of Social Sciences

N 32

LUBLIN 1994
 PSYCHOLOGY
OF
FUTURE ORIENTATION

Zbigniew Zaleski
Editor

86BJ
c.
Lublin 1994
Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
 " COPYRIGHT BY TOWARZYSTWO NAUKOWE KUL 1994

ISBN 83-85291-73_3

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 Contents
Foreword Philip ZIMBARDO 7
Towards a psychology of the personal future Zbigniew ZALESKI 10

PART 1. Concept, development, and social aspects

of Future Time Perspective
Future time perspective: individual and societal approach
>l Willy LENS and Marie-Anne MOREAS 23
Future time perspective and control orientation:
!' social conditions and consequences Gisela TROMMSOORFF 39
I' The development of future orientation in life-span context
Jari-Erik NURMI 63
The personal future in old age
Leandre BOUFFARD, Etienne BASTIN and Sylvie LAPIERRE 75

PART 2. Dynamic aspects of Future Time Perspective

On living tomorrow today: .the quality of inner life as a function
of goal. expectations Eric KLINGER 97
Constructing the future with present behavior: an individual
difference approach Alan STRATHMAN, David BONINGER,
Faith GLEICHER, and Sara BAKER 107
,,'1 Structure and purpose in the use of time
Norman FEATHER and Malcolm BOND 121
Goals and plans: the perspective of cognitive orientation
Shnlamith KREITLER and Hans KREITLER 141
Goal setting and productivity under capitalism and socialism
Edwin LOCKE 157

PART 3. Attitudes toward and predicting the Future

Personal future in hope and anxiety perspective
Zbigniew ZALESKI 173.
Cognitive dimensions used in the prediction of future events:
assessment instrument and indications for cognitive functioning
Jerome TOBACYK and Ed NAGOT 195
Importance of and optimism-pessimism in predicting solution
to world problems: an ijIterculturai study ,
Zbigniew ZALESKI, ZdzislawCHLEWINSKI, and Willy LENS 207
,
The pragmatics of future time perspective: concluding
remarks Zbigniew ZALESKI 229
Contributors

SaraBAKER University of Oklahoma, USA

Etienne BASTIN University of Sherbrooke, Canada
Malcolm BOND Flinders University, Australia
David BONINGER University of California, USA
Leandre BOUFFARD College of Sherbrooke, Canada
Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI University of Lublin, Poland
Nonnan FEATHER Flinders University, Australia
Faith GLEICHER University of California, USA
Eric KLINGER University of Minnesota, USA
Hans KREITLER Tel Aviv University, Israel
Shu1arnith KREITLER Tel Aviv University, Israel
Sylvie LAPIERRE University of Quebec, Canada
Willy LENS University of Leuven, Belgium
Edwin LOCKE University of Maryland, USA
Marie-Anne MOREAS University of Leuven, Belgium
EdNAGOT Louisiana Tech University, USA
Jari-Erik NURMI University of Helsinki, Finland
Alan STRATHMAN University of Missouri, USA
Jerome TOBACYK Louisiana Tech University, USA
Gisela TROMMSDORFF University of Konstanz, Gennany
Zbigniew ZALESKI University of Lublin, Poland
Philip ZIMBARDO Stanford University, USA
FOREWORD

Philip G. ZIMBARDO
Department of Psychology
Stanford University,
Stanford, CA, USA

Allow me to. begin my introduction to this important volume with a critical

thinking exercise. Assume two pair of twinS are each separated at birth and
placed in adopted homes in different communities. One pair of twins is Identical,
the other Fraternal. Now assume further, that one of the Identical twins was
raised in a family and culture, that is primarily future-oriented, the otb,er being
raised by a family within a community that is heavily oriented towards
present-time perspective. Th" Fraternal twins both are raised in very different
family/community environments, but with the same time perspective, either
future- or present-oriented. As young adults which pair would be more similar
in attitudes, values, motivation, cognitive functioning, as well as, academic and
financial success? Or, put somewhat differently, when we pit the powerful genetic
determinants of human functioning against this environmental, learning
experience, which wins?
My own research on aspects of psychological time, bolstered by the ample,
broadly-based evidence presented by this array of experts, leads me to the
prediction that learned differences in time perspective would have more profound
effects than genetic differences on each of these aspects of human functioning.
The natural tendency of humans to parcel the flow of their personal experienc~
into time-bound categories of future, present, past (or a subset of them) is one of
the most fundamental aspects of the human condition.
The strong form of my argument is that there is no psychological variable or
process that exerts a greater influence across a wider range of human thoughts,
feelings, and actions than does psychological time orientation. If this can be
shown to be true, then we are faced with a dual paradox: most people are
unaware of this enormous influence of time orientation in their own lives; and
few psychologists or social scientists have recognized the significance of time
orientation as a grounding fur much of human motivation, cognitive functioning,
social behavior, and the economic well-being of families and cultures.
8 Philip G. ZIMBARDO

The dozen essays in this volume, ably edited by Professor Zbigniew Zaleski
of Poland, all focus on different aspects of one dimension of time orientation,
future-time perspective, or FrP. But the implicit comparison they all make is
with the other time zones of present-orientation or past-orientation. We can
operationalize these alternative orientations in the following way; if a decision has
to be made at a given moment, what influences exert the greatest force in
determining what it will be? If the person focuses primarily on anticipated
conseg\Iences of possible actions, visualizes alternative scenarios associated with
different courses of action, considers liabilities and costs against expected gains,
she 01: he would be categorized as behaving in a future-oriented manner.
In cl'ntrast, when those cognitive plans about if ... then connections are not
made! and the determining feature of the decision is the sensory, sensual,
empirical nature of the stimulus and its context factors, we are dealing with a
present-orientation.
Ignoring both future considerations and the press of the present stimulation
leads one to emphasize memories of previous actions and their effects, be mindful
of obligations, commitments, responsibilities, and thus be past-oriented.
When a person habitually over-utilizes one of these modes of decision making
to the exclusion or minimization of the others, we can posit a cognitive bias
toward being either past-, present-, or future-oriented. At that point, the bias acts
like a personality dispositional variable which subtly but powerfully exerts a
non-conscious direction on thoughts, feelings, and actions. Individuals are always
part of a social community which itself manifests the same kina of temporal bias
at a group level of either emphasizing one or several of these time zones, or
de-emphasizing one or more of them. Although, as hedonically- focused infants
and children, we are all initially heir only to the present-time orientation, cultures
reshape that "monochronicity" to accommodate each society'S needs. They
encourage becomiog more past-oriented when the objective is'to have children
take the place of the elders in the same community, taking over their same roles,
in a sense "to have roots." But they encourage more future-orientation when the
objective is for children to "go where the action is," to leave home and go to
wherever work and career demands take them, in this sense, "to have wings."
However, to develop into a future-oriented person requires a learned sense of
trust in others along with a set of beliefs about the predictability and
controllability of people and nature. That usually requires growing up in a family
and a community that are marked by some degree of stability; economic, social,
political, and psychological. Those attributes are alien to the poor, the transient,
the migrants, the abused and neglected. Future-time perspectives are shaped
largely through education, certain religious ideologies, family values and models,
and the historical accident of being born into a middle-class, urban culture. The
present-orientation of the lower class mixes both the hedonistic living for the
moment within an "expanded present" and the fatalistic pessimism of never being
able to influence the agents and agencies that control one's life.
 FOREWORD 9

Our twins living a present-oriented life style would exhibit low levels of
achievement motivation, be likely to engage in high-risk activities, be
unconcerned about health-maintenance behaviors, seek impulse gratification that
encourages addictions of all sorts, drop out of school early, be delinquent,
unemployed, and "at risk" for permanent failure - if they lived in a largely
future-oriented culture that penalizes and stigmatizes those who do not share that
value frame. The twin who embodies the future-oriented life style would differ
in virtually every way imaginable from its kin. But his or her success would
depend on functioning in an environment that prizes and reinforces "living for
tomorrow," and "saving for a rainy day." The trade-off is play versus work,
surrender of immediate behavioral freedom for long-term financial freedom, and
exchanging a more social, sexual life for more asocial, business-before-pleasure
life style.
With this simplified menu for time perspective differences in mind, the table
is set for the reader to enjoy a veritable feast laid out by these twenty
international scholars and researchers. This collection of original essays comes
to us from many different parts of the world by keen observers and sensitive
social scientific investigators. They offer rich fare for our intellectual enjoyment
of the complexities involved in FrP, with courses that range from developmental
life span issues to personality, social psychology, and cognitive psychology. And
that is just for starters, because others then add -basic motivational issues,
especially those that arise with achievement, goal setting, and task involvement
in the broader context of organizational behavior and structure. Some of our hosts
treat us to assessment problems and their resolution, while others show how time
perspective can be studied with multiple methodologies. But this invaluable new
addition to our rather limited literature on the psychological exploration of future
perspectives also ranges from fine-grained analysis of individual behavior to
macro-analysis of cultural, environmental, political, and economic issues. What
one relishes in reading these essays is the hreadth of the scholarship they reveal
and the intensity of the authors' commitment to using this knowledge to deal
more effectively with a host of vital world problems as well as to cope more
creatively with the everyday problems of individuals. I can't recall having ever
enjoyed a feast of knowledge as much as I have from reading the Psychology of
Future Orientation. I am saddened ouly by the fact that if I had an identical twin
who was present-oriented, he would be unlikely to ever read such a book nor
benefit from its wisdom. But setting aside such hypotheticals, I can be optimistic
about the pleasure and knowledge that so many readers will derive from this
timely volume. Hurry up, please, it's time to begin the show.

San Francisco, California

June, 1992
TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PERSONAL FUTURE

Zbigniew ZALESKI'
Department of Psychology
Catholic University of Lublin
Lublin, Poland

"Who lives in wealth - fears to lose it,

who does not have - hopes to attain it" .

THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

Human history as registered in cerlificates, diplomas, and memoirs, in museums

and geological discoveries, demonstrates our placement in the temporal
dimension. The vision of the past is not only ordered chronologically but is also
evaluated on the criteria of importance and emotional judgement. This temporal
perspective, filled with events and personal experiences, is a basis of our
reflection on life in time categories. We benefit from this storage in our present
endeavors which, apart from the routinized actions of everyday life, are often
directed towards future states.
Similarly, humans have the capability and tendency to organize their future, to
create an image of what may come. This sphere, however, ltas a psychological
character different from that of the past. Whereas no real changes can be made
in the past, the future perspective is open, nondetermined. Thus, it offers an
opportunity to create something new. Humans, with their ability for cognitive
representation, can project their thoughts and realistic goals into the future
(Nuttin, 1985). This cognitive shaping of one's future is a Significant part of our
actual inner life, from pure fantasy at first to more realistic later planning based
on clues from past and present experiences.
Because these clues need not be causall determining factors for the events to
come (as psychoanalysis has claimed), our attitude towards the future is
accompanied by emotions, of which those deserving the most attention are hope
and anxiety/fear. Uncertainty and the unknown evoke these commonly
experienced states, though to a different extent from one individual to another.
These emotions are vivid due to our eagerness to know what will happen to us,
to those clOse to us, and to our environment.
 TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PERSONAL FUTURE 11

Since the beginning of humanity, people wanted to know more about their own
future than they could predict by themselves. This is why the fortune-tellers such
as palm-readers have always had employment and clients to live from. People
will pay for this "future information" regarding their family, marriage, health,
financial successes, .etc. The "knowers" of the future have always commanded
high respect. To Cassandra in Delphes came kings and simple citizens to hear
what their future was fated to be. Since then, astrology has developed the art of
prediction, relating human fate to something real - that is, to the constellation of
the planets. Individual life events were believed to be determined by cosmic
factors. The belief was that the line of life was already decided. The only
problem was that only exceptionally gifted persons were thought to be able to
discover it.
The search for causation should not surprise psychologists. Research shows that
people have a strong tendency to think in a deterministic way, which has been
confirmed in sophisticated experiments done by decision-theory psychologists (cf.
Janis and Mann, 1977; Kozielecki, 1975). Faced with lack of obvious causes or
common-sense cues for prediction in a probabilistic situation, we use different
heuristics and tricks, e.g., magic dates such as New Year midnight, which may
change our life for the next year, a 40th anniversary, the 21st century, etc., as
if they were the beginning of a new desired course of our life. Naive, common
predictions have one significant advantage - they enable us to live the future right
now. It is no wonder that they can be erroneous. Even advanced computerized
prognostic systems utilizing large data sets are often not much more valid for real
life problems than is intuition.
Future time perspective should be approached from at least two viewpoints. One
regards future perspective as a basis for goal setting and goal realization from the
present moment on. Under this perspective the future is a space for human
cognitive and behavioral activity; it is a field to cultivate with life projects.
Second, the future can be treated as an unknown sphere that humans would like
to make more visible, readable. In this view the future is a big puzzle, and people
lire mostly interested in discovering what the future may hold for them. It is
!lSsociated with predictions of all kinds based mostly on indicators believed to be
'ither ancient or very modem.
Within the framework of a cognitive psychology of motivation, the first
Ipproach is far more important and interestiJ;tg; but within the broader scope of
I general psychology of future orientation, both aspects should be considered as
he psychological reality, and that is what this book does.
Psychology has much to say about this matter: first of all, how people
,xperience and live their future on the level of thought and emotion; second and
nost important, what impact the subjectively conceived future has on actual
,ehavior. This question opens up a broad field of speculations and empirical
Inalyses of how different characteristics of future perspective are related to
>ehavior. Long vs. short, structured vs. unstructured, positive vs. negative - these
uture dimens,ions may influence behavior in various ways.
12 Zbigniew ZALESKI ';

However,' We are still very much at the natural history phase of appreciating
value of Future Time Perspective, a phase during which personal experience is
more prominent than theory.
'The desire to know what will come is a force pushing us to invest in an
exploration of the future. More interesting, though, is another way of coping with
the future: looking into the future as an arena of possibilities to achieve and as
a land which can be cultivated according to our desires and values. Realizing our
goals will change our present state. Sometimes these plans cover only a short
time perspective, in other cases they may occupy our whole life.
The past is immutable - we are locked into it and no real change can be
introduced - whereas in the future we expect changes for the better. No one
desires a loss, even while one can expect some negative events to occur (cf.
unrealistic optimism; Weinstein, 1980). Hope for the better andthreat of worse
are complementary states of mind concerned with the future. The prospect of
changes for the better is probably the central feature and virtue of our spending
so much time and energy for the future's sake.
This takes place when we talk over plans with our spouses of where we are
going to spend the next summer holidays or how to orient our children to a
career, when we listen to the elderly who draw conclusions from their life
experiences or to those who are believed to have abilities of foretelling the future,
and when we read horoscopes and wait for our lucky star. This potentiality, on
the other hand, is fertile soil for our cognitive freedom to create our image of
ourselves and our immediate environment. Contemporary ideas, which are often
unpopular, bring glory for their authors from future generations. Because of a
certain natural freedom in thinking, we cannot avoid returning to the past but,
even more, we cannot escape from living the future (cf. Klinger, this volume).
It goes without saying that only ho/tW sapiens can do this, but it would be no
exaggeration to mention once again the relationship between the ability to look
into the future and the cultural achievements of humanity, attained in a relatively
short space of a few thousand years.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FUTURE PERSPECTIVE

Humans, contrary to animals, wish not only to preserve their genetic type, as
the sociobiology claims, but are also constantly trying to improve life conditions
and create things which would never have appeared on earth without the human
mind and its striving for higher standards. Before creating a new object there was
its cognitive representation, launched by the mind into the future: first in
cognition, then for real. Without anticipation (see Kelly, 1958), we would not
have witnessed the revolutionary changes which have happened from the
Neanderthal age up to the 20th century A.D. Step by step, anticipated images
were the seed, the motor, of what we have now, both in material and spiritual
treasure. These global reflections on humanity in general do not minimize the
 TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PERSONAL FUTURE

important role of an individual future orientation in one's life. On the contrary,

the numerous personal future perspectives are elements of the global effect.
A human cannot develop into a mature personality without having an image of
him/herself some time in the future. People create their future self-image as a
model or ideal to strive for. Sometimes it begins at an earlier developmental age,
but from adolescence on this phenomenon is a common feature in our psychical
reality. How far one looks forward differs from person to person, but, apart from
some clinically disordered personaIities, a future time perspective characterizes
a large majority of people (Nuttin, 1985; Bouffard et al., this volume; Lens,
1988).
Self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) is stressed heavily by many authors in the
Sorrentino & Higgins' (1986) manual on motivation and cognition. I would like
to extend this model by placing SE in the more distant future. Future self is a
target to attain through coordinated past, present and future efforts. As Tesser
(1986, p. 435) states: "The SEM model has at its heart the assumption that people
are motivated to evaluate themselves positively." If we extend this model in a
broad sense along the future time dimension, we can say that people not only
desire to see themselves positively, but having a future time perspective of
themselves gives them a chance to attain this desire.
The personal future time perspective is an important personality characteristic.
It reveals an individual's ability to deal with not-yet-existing facts and "designs"
of what one will become in the future (cf. Allport, 1961). I refer to
characteristics that can be reformed or reshaped, such as knowledge, prestige,
moral sensitivity, professional skills, etc. The anticipation of who we will become
cannot be overestimated as a premise of motivational psychology. The image of
self in the future as a motive force for behavior may stem from different sources,
including vicarious learning (Bandura, 1986) from observing others who have
attained standards desired by us. Whereas many authors speak of how people
perceive, misinterpret, or predict objects and events (cf. attribution theory;
Weiner, 1986), I want to stress here what people make of themselves, who they
intend to become, what their existence will be like, and what they will make of
their lives. Thus, I do not have in mind the oft-cited examples of performing well
on exams, quizzes etc., but rather becoming someone in society, e.g., a good
father, manager, wealthy man, respected priest, and the like. These are the
real-life goals worthy of our commitment, which is lacking in Srull and Wyer's
(1986) conclusion that "Goals often determine what we attend to, how we perceive
objects and events, how we use reasoning processes to make inferences about causal
connections, how these events are organized and represented in memory, how they both
affect long-term storage and retrieve relevant information, how they influence the
integrations of information (or lack thereof) to make higher-order judgments, and how
they enter into possible affective reactions" (p.542).
The term goal-orientation often means a particular direction of attention evoked
by an experimental procedure involving perception or solving a particular task.
Such a definition slights the role of the future, except, perhaps, by bare
14 Zbigniew ZALESKI

implication. In contrast, by "goal" in the present approach I mean an end state

in the future towards which an individm;1 is striving (cf. Zaleski, 1987). In line
with this argument are Zuckier's (1986) concluding remarks underlining the
insufficient consideration of future behavior in social-psychological research. He
particularly has in mind information processing in present behavior, with
reference to which he writes that this "Information and integration clearly is
preceded (underline Z.Z.) by future-oriented decision-making processes, which
guide data selection and the choice of an appropriate strategy from among the
several that are available" (p.495). There is extensive evidence that such goals
guide our covert and overt behavior. The same role should apply to important
personal goals placed in the future; otherwise much of our behavior would remain
unexplained.

PIONEERS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FUTURE

This approach and inspiration can be traced back to the pioneering analyses of
time and intentionality by the psychologically oriented French philosopher Guyau
(1890). He reformulated the philosophical problem of time as a psychological
issue. His conceptualization of time, intentionality, future, goal realization, and
terminology can be applied to the present, more experimentallY and cognitively
oriented psychology of motivation.
Guyau wrote, "The future, initially, is what is to be, it is what I do not have but
wish or need to have, it is what I attempt to possess. Just as the present can be reduced
to a conscious and intrinsically gratifYing activity, the future can be reduced to the
activity-directed outward search for what is missing ... " (pp. 32/33; after Michon et
al., 1988). Time in Guyau's conception is "a strategy of coping with the world; our
consciousness of time is a side effect of goal~oriented behavior; time is a product of
consciousness. Whereas the present is perceived, the past and future are represented
< cognitively - Z.Z. >. The changes do not cause the flow of time (duration). The
duration arises from action and inaction and appears in a conscious gap between a need
and its satisfaction, the distance between a cup and lips," He emphasized the
significance of effort; effort exerted (engaged) in goal realization is a source of
internal perspective that is launched into the future. These statements and
propositions of Guyau are not outdated in present thinking.
When speaking of SUbjective perception of time, we cannot avoid giving credit
to Fraisse's work on the "psychology of time" (1957), where we acknowledge
how people experience time psychologically (see also Fraser, 1987). We owe a
considerable advance in that domain to Nuttin's (1980, 1985) and LenS's (1988)
works, which employed a very advanced methodology of research, measurement,
and to structural and functional analyses of Raynor and Entin (1982). The elusive
phenomenon became a more tangible dimension and, brick by brick, we are
slowly building a more general psychology of the future. A similar desire was
clearly expressed in Atkinson's (1983) hope for a general psychology of
motivation.
 TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PERSONAL FUTURE

SCOPE OF THE BOOK

The aim of the present collaborative work from many continents is to make the
reader more familiar with psychological views of the personal future. At the
starting point of this endeavor I had a different title in mind, "The individual and
his personal future," but I changed it. The present title better covers the included
papers and is better justified by the limits of psychological knowledge. This can
be perceived in the authors' respect for the unknown potential of what will be
uncovered in the future. The authors analyze various aspects of the future time
perspective (thereofFrP): development, structure, length, social bases, contents,
goals and their motivational properties, and more general attitudes expressed in
hopeS and fears when thinking about and predicting the future. The issues of the
personal future are roughly grouped into three parts:
1) Concept, developmental and social aspects of FrP
2) Dynamic aspects of FrP: living the future, considering future consequences
of present actions, using time, and goal setting
3) Attitudes toward and predicting the future: hope and anxiety, processes
involved in predicting events, optimism/pessimism about future solutions
to world problems.
The articles of the first part are both theoretical analyses and empirical reports
of recent research, with ambitious formulations and conclusions regarding the
origin and conditions of future orientation.
As the FrP refers to both temporal length and specific content, the latter aspect
is the focus of the paper by Lens and Mareas, "Future Time Perspective: an
Individual and Societal Approach." Lens and Mareas deal with the concept of
FrP and its motivational implications. In many instances they present us the ideas
of the Leuven school of FrP research. FrP in their conception is a temporal
space enabling an individual and groups to plan and act beyond their actual time
limits. Moreover, they consider FrP together with other personality and task
characteristics and in relationship to achievement motivation. The authors
introduce (and stress the need of) discussion of the social consequences of
individuals' short and long FrP with respect to common resources and
environmental protection. These consequences, and individual and social
preoccupation with preserving the Earth from destructive human expansion,
should be included in the broader concept of future perspective.
Trommsdorff in her paper "Future TIme Perspective and Control Orientation:
Social Conditions and Consequences" continues the theoretical analysis of future
orientation but more in a relationship to personal control and socioeconomic
conditions and consequences. She deals with FrP in reference to the need of
security and stresses also its affective aspects. A distinction between socially
influenced "primary" control (a belief of changing environment to one's own
goals) and "secondary" control (changing own goals to environmental demands)
and the role of control in behavior are widely elaborated.
16 Zbigniew ZALESKI

She concentrates on development, on social origins and significance of FI'P,

showing how this perspective is subjects to social, cultural and political
influences. By the same token, the level of elaboration of FI'P affects the quality
of an individual's functioning within a society. Among other observations, the
relationship between FI'P and adaptation to political changes, expectancy
attributions, and delinquency is worthy of consideration in youth sopialization.
Presumably, youths with better developed,FI'P will lead more effective lives later
on.
Nurmi in his article, "The Development of Future Orientation in a Life- Span
Context," introduces his own model. of FI'P, which is then used to characterize
adolescents' and adults' future orientation. The model includes temporal
extension, goals, and attributions of their realization., Among various
relationships, the finding that boys become more optimistic and girls more
pessimistic with age poses the place, of sex and social role in the development of
FI'P. This suggestion is reinforced by statements in the paper by Bouffard et a!.,
regarding FI'P in old age.
Bouffard, Bastin and Lapierre in their report, "The Personal Future in Older
Age," refer to data showing that older people elaborate their FI'P no less than
younger generations. The biological limits on the human life-span do not
necessarily hinder these processes to the extent one might assume. Did these
people also have an elaborated FI'P when they were adolescents and then in
middle age? And what role did this perspective play in their life? These questions
and also the fact that women plan for longer future than men (see also Zaleski,
1987) open a new area of studies on individual differences.
However, the FI'P matter is itself an important issue at present life stage.
Klinger, in his paper, "On Living Tomorrow Today: the Quality of Inner Life as
a Function of Goal Expectancies," reverses the story and tells us how the goals
set in the future and not yet attained really occupy our minds, the phenomenon
called "current concerns." We live our future now, and many of our emotional
reactions are related to the cues to our goals. They are "partial constituents of our
inner life," says the author; He makes the reader aware that the future we think
of is not an aspect separated from present actual life. It is interwoven within
present thinking, feeling, and acting. In other words, our psychological future
occupies and hence co determines our present mental processes.
In a similar vein to these conclusions that the future has an impact on our
present activities, Strathman, Boninger, Gleicher and Baker in their paper
"Constructing the future with present behavior" show that the consideration for
the future consequences has an impact on the present activities of which the
results will be known only after some time. Referring to their empirical evidence,
the authors argue that this consideration is crucial for investing in an activity that
pays off only aftersome period of time (delayed gratification). It is also important
in actions (responsible decisions) leading in the long run to negative
consequences, e.g., leaving the school too early, using drugs in early age, killing
the rare animals, or exploitation of limited natural resources.
 TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PERSONAL FUTURE

The next paper, Feather and Bond's "Structure and Purpose in the Use of
Time" is the most present-oriented, although only outwardly. The ability to use
time wisely (optimal scheduling of activities) is of great relevance to future
achievement. The authors demonstrate that appropriate structure and purpose in
the use of time in present daily life are important predictors of later psychological
well-being, and their implications bear on future perspective. Depending on their
ability to structure and meaningfully use time, people will organize their future
better or worse on private and professional levels. The reported data collected by
means of the Time Structure Questionnaire strongly support the relevance of time
use for professional activity, personality functioning, and adjustment. Thus, the
indirect conclusion emerges that time-planning pays off in benefitting the
direction and sense of an individual's life.
The next two papers by Kreitler and Kreitler, and Locke provide more general
statements on goal-setting and offer conclusions based on their own long-term
research programs in their respective fields.
Kreitler and Kreitler, in their chapter, "Goals and Plans: the Perspective of
Cognitive Orientation," first give a historical overview of the concept of goal and
then present in an elaborated form their theory of cognitive orientation, which
consists of four beliefs, one of them incorporating goals and plans for the future.
Their position is that goals do not per ipso determine behavior but contribute to
its determination. They are incorporated into more complex clusters that initiate
behavioral acts.
Locke, on the other hand, in his paper, "Goal Setting and Productivity under
Capitalism and Socialism," presents the role of goals as the main factor of human
activity, particularly in various kinds of production, from cutting wood to writing
scientific papers. In many instances he refers to goals in industrial settings, which
reflects the author's own interests and wide research achievements in this demain.
Each of his conceptual propositions is then viewed in the framework of the
capitalist and socialist systems as juxtaposed bases for the realization of personal
and industrial goals. This author argues that literally personal goals can be set
under the democratic, free market system but not in the communist,
state-controlled society. In my personal knowledge of and experience with
so-called "real socialism," these statements are supported by strong evidence,
with the major exception of those cases where the personal goal was a defense
of the reward system (nomenclature members) or when the goal was to fight it
with all available energy (dissidents). Locke also considers other personal and
situational co-variants in the GOAL - - - > PERFORMANCE model.
These empirically founded thoughts and assumptions about goal realization in
different political and social settings are of particular value at this time in history.
The present changes in the political map of the world, in Europe in particnlar,
stimulate the search for a social model that would be optimal for effective
goal-oriented activity in industry, society, and private life.
 Zbigniew ZALESKI

The last three chapters have more to do with hope and anxiety in looking into
the personal future, with predicting coming events, and with elaborating more
positive (optimistic) or more negative (pessimistic) attitudes towards the future
of the humanity at large. The present awareness of world events, of history, and
of the progress of technology with its creative and negative ecological side-effects
make us ,ask broader questions about our personal future and that of the world.
Such hopes and fears constitute the issue of the chapter by Zaleski "Personal
Future in Hope and Anxiety Perspective". On the one hand, the author deals with
hope, a phenomenon to which little attention has been paid in the psychology of
motivation. The concept itself has ilOt even been included in the subject index of
Psychological Abstracts. Therefore it is treated by the author with an appropriate
accentuation in reference to literature and some empirical analyses. On the other
hand, stress is placed on the negative side of future attitude - that is, future
anxiety. The conceptualization of future anxiety and some preliminary empirical
data on its dynamic aspects are discussed.
Tobacyk and Nagot in their article, "Cognitive Dimensions Used in the
Prediction of Future Events," analyze the clues used by people in this cognitive
activity. They state that humans have a need to predict the future. Characterize
seven cognitive dimensions of processes involved in prediction and present a scale
constructed to measure them. Also they make a clear distinction between
prediction and other similar processes, e.g., superstition, but also indicate their
common aspects, e.g., illusion of control. Then they discuss links (or lack
thereof) of future prediction with other processes related to behavior in uncertain
situations, such as intuition, superstition, preference for games of chance, and
attributional complexity.
Zaleski, Chlewinski and Lens, in "Optimism-Pessimism in Predicting Future
Soluti()ns to World Problems: Intercultural Study," present data from seven
countries on pessimistic/optimistic predictions of future solutions to present world
problems ill the broad meaning of this term. Humans face many dangerous
problems (political, ecological, health, social, psychological, and moral) and look
forward to their solution. Their optimism/pessimism is related to national
differences, to the nature of the problems, to subjective importance, and to
religious faith. In general, samples from India, East 'I11d West Germany, and
Belgium are rather pessimistic in imagining the future world, Poles and
Americans are rather neutral, and Ukrainians reveal some optimism. Further
investigations of this topic will follow in order to find clearer interpretations of
these phenomena.
In sum, the papers cover most part of the relevant literature on the psychology
of the future and contribute to recent publications by Bandura (1986), Frese and
Sabini (1985), Locke & Latham (1990), Nuttin (1985), Pervin (1989). Not all the
issues have been tackled and treated proportionally to their importance; future
research will have to fill the gaps, of which there are many. For example we
know little about the cost of time, as in the famous saying "time is money." How
much does it really mean for us to lose hours, days, months, or years in our
 TOWARDS A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PERSONAL FUTURE

trajectory of realizing an important far-distant goal? This and other such questions
await answers. May this book be a stimulus for psychologists to engage more in
the psychology of the future perspective.

THE SOCIOPOLITICAL SITUATION

The psychology of future orientation as a tentative title can refer to good
exal)lples in real life. Faith in the victory of justice and hope of installing
democracy helped political dissidents in the "SOLIDARITY" movement in Poland
to survive oppression and imprisonment, to withstand the slanders and large
'personal losses that they risked when undertaking actions aimed at giving society
a better future. The effect of their persistence is one of the biggest revolutions in
human history - nonviolent victory of freedom over the violent communist
'system. In Siberia, in the concentration camps of World War n, and in
totalitarian manipulation, the hope to win and destroy evil systems helped many
pecple fight and witness the attainment of the freedom they desired. Without hope
we would probably not have already participated in the global changes in Europe
and Soviet Union in years 1989-90.
Wbile I am writing these lines, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the military
conflicts in Yugoslavia pose a question of the future security of many nations in
the world and probably enhances one's anxiety when thinking of the possible
development of this conflict. But the bombing of the military targets in Iraq by
allied pilots also shows how vulnerable and defenseless a person becomes. This
precise, computerized slaughter is a threat in itself, no ':'latter against whom it is
directed. Thus, many such global events, as well as individual experiences, may
evoke long-lasting preoccupation, worry, anxiety, and fears of what may come.
The military decisions and war developments raise either hope or fear, depending
on what happens from day to day. We look althe development of the Persian
Gulf conflict with positive and negative expectations. Simi1arly, the steps
LUldertaken towards a United Europe on the one hand and the Russian military
reaction to the Baltic nations' liberation movement make us look with hope and
fear toward the future of a peacefully collaborating, multinational Europe.
However, the present developments in world events, the Persian Gulf, ethnic
lorror in Yugoslavia, and ecological pollution, do not allow us to be so neutral
Ind calm. Hopes and fears alternately occupy our minds, reflecting like a mirror
nat which happens and may happen.in reality. Humanity sets two types of goals:
'ne is to extend its power and possessions, its knowledge and art; and the second,
) limit the negative consequences of its own expansion. If there is a reasonable
alance between them, the future may yet unfuld more interestiogly than the
ratus quo that we witness today.

Acknowledll"'ents: Author wools to thank Eric K1inller for improving the English
nguage of thIS paper, and J as editor, expresses his gratitude to Rayna Carlsen for the
:oofreading of most of the manuscripts.
MAIL: ZZAI,.ESKI@PLUMCSll.BITNET
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 PART 1

Concept, development,
and social aspects of Future
Time Perspective
FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE: AN INDIVIDUAL
AND A SOCIETAL APPROACH

Willy LENS* & Marie-Anne MOREAS

Department of Psychology
Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

INTRODUCTION
Man lives in a spatio-temporal world. From a rather early age on, we are
aware of space and of chronological time: I know that America is at the west side
of the Atlantic, that Paris is about 300 km. south of Brussels and that Australia
is at the other side of the globe. I know that there was a world thousands of years
ago and that it will be Sunday four days from now. I know that, most probably,
there will be another summer next year and in a hundred years from now.
Being conscious of distances and places in space and of moments or intervals
in time is necessary but not sufficient for them to have much psychological
impact. There are large individual differences in the extensiveness of our
psychological spatio-temporal environment. For many Belgians, Paris is much too
far away to be part of their life space. For others, however, it takes only a short
three hours drive to go there. Paris is almost in their backyard.
Analogously, the same holds for our individual temporal life spaces. We all
know about the past, the present and the future. But our temporal orientations can
be very different (De VoIder, 1979). Some people are predominantly
past-oriented. They live in their very traumatic or very rewarding past. Other
people are present-oriented and completely absorbed by the present. Their past
and future do not belong to their psychological world.' They did not learn from
previous experiences and they do not take into account the future consequences
of present behavior. StilI others are almost exclusively future oriented. They
forget to enjoy the present because everything they are doing now is in the
service of their future. Psychologically, it is most often much healthier to see and
experience continuity between one's past, present and future. That gives temporal
integration or time competence (Nuttin & Lens, 1985; Shostrom, 1968). The past
and the future are integrated in the present that evolved from the past (as a
positive or negative example) and that is directed towards the future.
Time perspective refers to the past, present and future time that is part of an
individual psychological life space. Future time perspective (FTP) is the degree
to which and the way in which the chronological future is integrated in the
24 Willy LENS & Marie-Anne MOREAS

present life space (Lewin, 1942, 1943). This future dimension can be short or
very long, it may even extend beyond .the individual life time.
Our main goal is to show how this future time perspective has a double
motivational significance: it originates in motivational processes and it affects
goal oriented striving. In the first part we will approach the motivational meaning
of future time perspective from an individual standpoint. In the second part we
discuss it from a societal perspective, confronting individual future time
perspectives with the future time perspective of mankind and their impact on
present individual or collective actions.

MOTNATION AND FUTURE TIME PERSPECTNE

FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE AS A PERSONALITY TRAIT

Motivational processes in human behavior are very different from motivation

in lower animals. The capacity of higher cognitive functioning by human beings
is the main reason for this difference. Covert cognitive functioning is much more
developed and important in human than in animal behavior. We are able to
elaborate complex thinking. Due to long term memory the past can be integrated
in the present. But we can also anticipate what will come or what we would like
or not like to happen in the near and distant future. The anticipated future
becomes part of the psychological present. Human beings do not only act on the
overt, manifest level, but to an important extent also on acovert, representational
level. Covert behavior may be very important in its own right (e.g., negative
thoughts in depression), but it often functions as a preliminary behavioral stage,
as a preparation for overt behavior. The functional relationship between covert
and overt behavior, or between cognition and action, is an important theoretical
problem in motivational psychology (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Birch, 1985;
d'Ydewalle & Lens, 1981; Halisch & Kuhl, .1987; Nuttin, 1984). Due to this
cognitive ability of anticipation, incentive motivation as being pulled by goals,
is often a more important cause of human behavior than the instincts or drives
that push him (Ryan, 1970).
For Nuttin (1984) needs or motives are types of required behavioral
interactions between individuals and their environment. From a psychological
point of view,these interactions constitute the individual personality and the
psychological environment. But.needs and motives express themselves originally
as rather vagoe, unspecified cravings and states of tension. They have their first
behavioral impact on the covert, representational level. Through more Dr less
complex thinking, needs and cravings are cognitively elaborated into more
specific motivational goals and further into behavioral plans and projects. At the
same representational or covert level, these plans or projects can be tested for
their feasibility, resulting .eventually in behavioral intentions and overt actions
(Heclchausen & Kuhl, 1985). This cognitive-dynamic process of motivational goal
 F\JTURB TIME PERSPEC1'IVE: .. ; 2S

setting creates a future time perspective, defined as the present anticipation of

future goals (Frank; 1939; Lewin, 1935, 1942).
This conceptualization of future time perspective as a cognitive-motivational
variable has a long history in European psychology: "The setting of goals is
closely related to time perspective. The goal of the individual includes his
expectations for the future ... " (Lewin, 1948, p. 113); "the future only unfolds in
so far as we imagine a future which seems to be realizable... There is no future
without at the same time a desire for something else and awareness of the
possibility of reaIizing it ... " (Fraisse,1963, p. 172 & 174); "the psychological
future is not just a learning effect of the. past, it is essentially related to
motivation ... the future is the time quality of the goal object; the future is our
primary 'motivational space'" (Nuttin, 1964, p. 63).
By definition, human motivation is future-oriented. People strive for goals that
are not present yet but already anticipated. Motivated behavior is goal-oriented.
The present anticipation. rather than the future goal motivates behavior. This type
of motivational explanation is certainly not in contradiction with Lewin's
principle of contemporaneity (Lewin, 1936). Future time perspective is even
present in what Raynor (1982) calls the "maintaining type of striving". One can
be highly motivated to maintain a presently satisfying situation. Even then the
goal. to be reached is situated in the future (e.g., to stay healthy; to preserve my
happy family life). Contrary to what is usually assumed in motiVatiOnal]
psychology (Miller, Galanter, & Prlbram, 1960; Nuttin, 1984), goals need not ?
be discrepant from the actual situation to be highly motivating.
Motivatioual goals and behavioral projects can hence be analyzed not only for
their content, but also for their spatio-temporallocaIization. The content refers
to more or less specific motivational domains (e.g., hunger, affiliation, power,
achievement, curiosity) or a combination of several domains. Secondly,
motivational goals can be situated on a temporal scale. Some goals are set for a
very immediate future, while other goals are set fur an intermediate or a very
distant future. For Nuttin, future time perspective evolves from motivational goal
setting. Itis formed by the more or less distant goal objects that are processed by
an individual (Nuttin & Lens, 1985, p.22). However, a long future time
perspective is for Nuttin also a person's prerequisite to be able to elaborate long
term motivational projects. He assumes reciprocal influences between the
development of a long FrP and long term motivational planning.
In this coguitive-motivational conceptuaIization, future time perspective is a
personality characteristic that originates in motivational striving and in the
deVelopment of motivational goals and aspirations on the representational level.
People with a long future time perspective have set for themselves a relatively
high number of goals that can only be reached in the distant future. People with
a short future time perspective have relatively more goals in the very near or near
future than in the distant future. We refer to Nuttin, Lens, Van Calster and De
VoIder (1979) fur a review of the literature on determinants and correlates of
individual differences in the extension or length of FrP.
26 WIlly LENS &Marie-Anne MOREAS

Contrary to the theoretical definitions, there is much less agreement in the

operational measures of FfP. A large number of very heterogeneous techniques
were developed to measure future time perspective. Unlike most of these
measures, Nuttin's Motivational Induction Method or (MIM) is a faithful
operationalization of the theoretical conceptualization of FfP as a
cognitive-motivational variable (Nuttin & Lens, 1985). The MIM is a direct, first
person sentence completion technique to collect a representative sample of
individual, conscious goals, aspirations or motivational plans and projects.
Subjects are asked to complete 40 (30 or Win the shortened versions) positively
and 20 (15 or 10 in the shortened versions) negatively formulated first person
sentence beginnings (e.g., I strive for ... ; I work for ... ; I would like it if...; I fear
that ... ; I would not like it if...). They are instructed to do so by expressing the
personal goal or desire that comes to their mind when reading each sentence
beginning. The sentence beginnings direct the subjects toward the future by
inducing a motivational orientation, but not towards a particular moment or
interval in the future. The expressed goal objects may apply to the present
moment or to a still distant future time. A scoring technique was developed to
localize those individual motivational goals on a temporal scale in order to
measure the extension of the individual FfP (Nuttin & Lens, 1985). A first index
of the extension is the median or mean of the temporal distances (in years)
betWeen the present moment and the temporal localizations of the goal objects in
the future. The proportion of the number of motivational goals in the near future
(within a two-year period) to the number of goals in the more distant future
(more than two years from now) is often used as an alternative and much easier
to calculate index of the extension of the future time perspective. The smaller this
proportion, the longer the FTP.
Our theoretical and operational definition of future time perspective is strongly
related to Mischel's (1981) concept of delayed gratification. In Mischel's first
type of studies, children must choose between an immediate smaller reward and
a delayed but larger reward (e.g ., one pencil now or two pencils. tomorrow).
Some children have a more or less systematic preference for the delayed larger
reward, while other children systematically choose the immediate reward.
Children's preferences correlate with age, intelligence, need for achievement,
socio-economic status etc. In Mischel's second type of studies children must
choose between two rewards. Then they are told that they must sit down and wait
for the experimenter to return spontaneously in order to receive the preferred
reward, but they are also told that they can ring a bell at each moment during the
waiting time to call back the experimenter. If they do this, they will not get the
preferred but the nonpreferred reward. In both types of studies the children
receive the larger or preferred reward after waiting long enough. The delay-time
is a waiting period during which nothing else can be done to achieve the reward. '
This is what Hull (1952) called the non-chaining type of delayed reinforcement.
Shorter or longer time intervals are inserted between performing a task and
receiving the reward.
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECTNE, ..

,., As stated earlier, people with a long future time perspective are striving
toWards relatively more goals in the distant future than in the near future. By
definition, such people will achieve fewer goals in the near future than people
with a short future time perspective who have most of their goals in the near
future. Hence, they will experience less immediate satisfaction and more delayed
satisfaction due to goal a!tainment (e.g., to become a nurse in two years vs. a
medical doctor in seven years). However, the self-imposed delayed gratification
that is inherent in long term goal-setting can not be reached by waiting. One
usually has to perform a longer or shorter series of instrumental actions in order
tu achieve one's goals. Hull (1952) called this the "within-chain type of delayed
gratification". The number of S-R associations or the number of reactions
between the startbox and the goalbox is different (for example a simple T-maze
versus a complex maze). The reinforcement or reward follows immediately upon
the last instrumental action, but the time interval between the first goal oriented
action and the reinforcement differs for behavioral chains of different length. To
become a nurse requires for a 12th grade pupil less successful semesters than the
goal of becoming a neurosurgeon.

FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE AS A TASK CHARACTERISTIC

Until now we defined future time perspective as a personality characteristic that

results from motivational goal setting. Behavioral goals, intentions, plans and
projects are situated in time. They have certain temporal characteristics such as
their temporal extension and degree of structuralization. FrP as a characteristic
of motivational plans and projects is not very different from Raynor's original
conceptualization ofF.T.P. as a task characteristic. In his doctoral dissertation
under the supervision of Atkinson, Raynor elaborated Atkinson's theory of
achievement motivation (Atkinson & Feather, 1966) in such a way that it could
account for empirical findings showing that success-oriented students perform
better in a course exam when that course has a high instrumental value for
reaching important future goals than when it has a low instrumental value. The
opposite is true for failure-threatened individuals. They perform better when the
exam has low instrumental value for reaching important professional goals in the
future (Raynor, 1970, study 1). This interaction between future importance and
motive disposition could not be accounted for by Atkinson's original theory of
achievement motivation. Atkinson only discussed the motivational effects of the
immediate behavioral consequences: success or failure in the achievement task at
hand. Raynor's cognitive elaboration of the theory of achievement motivation is
the first mathematical formalization of the motivational effects of the future in
present achievement oriented behavior.
Future time perspective is for Raynor (1969) however not a personality trait
but a perceived task characteristic. Future time perspective is identified with the
length of, or the number of steps (tasks) in a contingent path. In a contingent path
of achievement tasks, success in a previous task is a necessary and sufficient
condition to be allOWed to perform the next achievement task in the series. A
28 Willy LENS & MariC'Annc MORBAS

non-contingent path is a series of achievement tasks where success in a previous

task is not required to tackle the next task. Based on Nuttin's (1953) distinction
between open and closed tasks, Raynor makes a distinction between open and
closed paths. A closed path has a fixed number of tasks, so that after a task is
finished the length of the path 'or the number of tasks left decreases with one unit.
In an open task there is no definite end taSk. After success in a task, the length
of the path stays the same or becomes longer because one or more new
achievement tasks are added at the end of the series. The future orientation that
is present in an non-contingent path has no motivational effects for Raynor. In a
contingent path, however, the length or number of tasks is positively related to
the strength of the resultant achievement motivation for the first task .. The .longer
the path; the stronger the positive resultant achievement motivation of
success-oriented individuals (their need for achievement is stronger.than their fear
of failure), and the stronger the negative, inhibitory resultant achievement
motivation of failure-threatened individuals (their fear of failure is stronger than
their need for achievement).
To operationalize the degree of future orientation or the extension of future
time perspective as the number of steps or tasks in a contingent path is however
very particular. It is true that within a given path the chronological duration
decreases with the number of tasks left. But a path with two steps may cover a
much longer time interval than a path with four steps (Gjesme, 1974). Therefore,
Raynor, (1981 i Raynor & Entin, 1982) distinguished more recently between two
aspects of the future time perspective that is involved in contingent paths and
which he calls the 'task hierarchy" and the "time hierarchy". Task hierarchy is
the number of tasks in the path. Time hierarchy refers to the chronological length
of a contingent path. The motivational effects of the time hierarchy are opposite
to the already explained effects of task hierarchy. The closer in time one comes
to the goal (the shorter the time hierarchy) the stronger the motivation for the
goal. See also Miller's (1944) goal gradient hypothesis. This implies that
success-oriented individuals will be more motivated for an immediate achievement
task if it constitutes the next step in a contingent path of many steps that can be
finished in a relative short time interval. Failure-threatened individuals will be
more anxious, more inhibited and hence less motivated, to the extent that the
contingent path has more steps and can be finished in a shorter time interval.
However, psychologically it is not the chronological time but the subjectively
perceived temporal length or duration that is motivationally relevant (Gjesme,
1975, 1981,1983; De Voider & Lens, 1982). Individuals with a long future time
perspective experience a ,given time interval into the future as much shorter than
people with a short future time perspective (Gjesme, 1975; 1982). The
motivational effect of Raynor's time hierarchy is affected by individual
differences in the extension of future time perspective, as shown by Gjesme
(1975). Future time perspective defined by RAynor as the time hierarchy of
contingent paths of achievement tasks does affect the strength of achievement
motivation, but not independently of the future time perspective as an individual
personality characteristic. Success-oriented people with a long FTP will be more
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE, ..

motivated to strive for distant achievement goals than people with a short
FTP (everything else assumed to be constant). .

MOTIVATIONAL EFFECTS OF FTP

Most empirical research on future time perspective is correlational or
differential in nature and searching for the relationship between individual
differences in the extension of future time perspective or in the degree of future
orientation and a number of other personality characteristics such as age, sex,
socio-economic level, need for achievement, psychopathology, delinquency,
frustration or situational circumstances such as being employed or not,
hospitalized, imprisoned, etc ..
In more recent research we try to understand the motivational effects or
consequences of individual differences in the extension of future time perspective.
As said 'before, FTP does not only result from motivational processes such as
goal setting, it also affects goal oriented striving.
We (Lens, 1986, 1987) conceptualize this second motivational meaningofFTP
in terms of the well known and validated "expectancy-instrumentality-value"
models (VIE) of human motivation (Feather, 1982). Analogous to the distinction
made by Bergius (1957), De Voider and Lens (1982) distingoish a cognitive and
a dynamic aspect in FTP as a personality characteristic. The cognitive aspect can
be understood as a disposition to anticipate in the present not ouly the immediate
effects of a potential action but also its long-term consequences. People with a
long FTP can more easily foresee the implications of their present actions for the
distant future (instrumentality), and thus develop much longer behavioral
means-end structures. This of course increases the instrumental motivation for
iminediate actions. The dynamic aspect of FIP is conceived of as a disposition
to ascribe a high valence (anticipated value) tu goals, even if they caD. only be
reached in the distant future. Everything else being constant, the valence of a
given goal object decreases with increasing temporal distance of that object.
De Voider and Lens (1982) gave people a list of motivational objects. Subjects
had to tell which value they attach to each of these given motivational objects. In
this case, they found indeed that subjects attached less value to the distant
motivational objects (2 years and more) than tu short range objects (less than 2
years). We are aware of the fact that in daily life everything else is not constant.
More important goals in life usually require a longer time tu be achieved than
less important goals, even if they belong to the same motivational category (e.g.,
to work and save money to buy a bike versus a car; to become a nurse versus a
neurosurgeon). Furthermore, we can assume that people are ouly willing to work
for distant goals so far as they are more important than th~ goals they can reach
in the near future (e.g., Ifone can choose to get the same pret'eged object now
or in a week's time, everyone will choose for the immediate gratification).
Zaleski (1987) asked his subjects which"goals they set for themselves in a given
period in the future. In that caSe, he found indeed that subjects attached
sigoificantly more value to distant goals (10 years and more) than to short range
 g9~S(q!l~\V~)' But,. as said earlier, i!ldividu~s with a IQng FTP experil'nce a
~ven delay-interval, say five or ten years, psychologically shorter thllDpeople
with. a short FI'P. Therefore, the decrease of the valence of a potential goal
object with increasing temporal distance will be less steep for subjects with a long
FTP. And we know from the VIE-models that the strength of motivation is a
multiplicative function of the perceived instromentality of an . action and the
valences. of its ()utcomes . Thus, it is evident that. the tWo aspects of FTP - the
cognitive and the dYJlllmic - are motivationally relevant. So we c?n explain, .the
often found positive correlation between the extensio!l of FI'P and school results.
l)e Voider and Lens (1982) did find thathigband low achieving boys in 11th
and 12th grade do not differ for the value that they attach. to goals tbat can be
reached in the near future (within 2 years) nor ror the perceived instromentality
of doing their best in school now for achieving these goais in the rather near
filture. But, in comparison with low achievers,. the high achievers give

-- I
significantly more value to goals that can only be reach<;d in the .distant future.
For them, present school work is also significantly, more instromental fortlw~,e
distant future g()als. Zaleski (.1987.) found thoat self-reponed e.ffi.ort, persistence and
present satisfaction with goal-oriented striving increase with temporal distance of
the .goal. Lqng-term goals reql!ire more work and are. achieved by first reaching
subgoals: " ... if proximal goalS. are intermediate, instrumental subgoals necessary
for attaimn.entof the final end stales, then those who .have.. distal goals work
harder on the proximal Qnes" (p. 34). Zaleski found also that subjects with a long
FI'P - in comparison with subjects with a short FI'P - are more persistent in
working fM a gQai, and ,have mpresatisfaction from such present goal-oriented
acpvity. In sum,they wQrK. harder for more pro~imal. goals. In, addition,
""rsistent striving to'.V?fdIQng,termgqals will beJacilltated by formulating a
seriesofsh()rt~termsubg~als,I<ng to the provisional final goal in the more
distant future (Bandura& Sch1l1lk,.1981; Bandl\fa,& Simon, 1977). . .
In the precedings~tionswe. <liscussed the double ,motivational significance of
foture timeperspeclive,more specifically 'If its length or extension. Another
motivationally relevant concept of psychological time perspective is the affective
attitude toward thefo.ture. Individuals have more orless p()sitive. or negative
attitudes toward. their Personal past, present or futui:e life period. The affective
attitude toward tb~ perso,nal future results from the anticipated positive, neutral
ornegative characteristics offuture.life events (see also Zaleski, this volume). It
is an individual's affective Qutlook:on his or her personal future in general.
Nuttin and Lens (1985) .developed the Time Attitude Scale (TAS) to measure the'
affective attitude toward the' individual past, . present and future. The scaie is
b;ised on Osg()od's seniailtic,differential ratiJIg techllique. Subjects are asked to
indicate for ni,nete<'h bipolar'pairs of adjectives, such as "pleasant - u,!pleasant",
how they spol1f\ln~,usly experience their personal futUre. For each pair they do
this on a 7 poilit scale ranging from very positive (e.g., very pleasant) io very
negative (e.g., very unpleasant). . '.'
As we did for the extension of fUture'time 'perspective, we also try to
conceptualize the motivational significance' of the affective attitude toward the
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE: ..

in terms of the expectancy-instrumentality-value model of human

tuc.tivati,on. Van Calster, Lens and Nuttin (1987) use the TAS-measure of the
iIfj'ective attitude toward the future as a substitute for the algebraic sum of the
>lI11Lticipated valences of all more or less important and personally relevant goals
future. They predicted and found an interaction effect of the .affective
at1:itude toward the future and the perceived instrumental value of doing one's
in high school for success in future life, on the motivation to study and on
scores of 12th grade-boys. Students with a high perceived instrumentality
significantly more motivated and obtain significantly higher grades in school
people with a low perceived instrumentality, but only if their affective
at1:itude toward the future is positive. In the low attitude group - which means
here a negative at1:itude toward the future - the differences are not significant.
Scores for motivation and school grades are low in these groups (negative attitude
high or low perceived instrumentality). The combination of a high perceived
instrumentality of doing your best in school for the personal future and a high
positive affective attitude toward the personal future increases the motivation to
study and the exam scores. A very blea1c outlook on the future may be an
important de-motivating variable for young people.

MOTIVATION AND VOLITION

A difficult but fundamental problem for cognitive theories of motivation such

as Nuttin's theory on motivation, planning and action (Nuttin, 1984) is to bridge
the gap between behavioral plans or intended behavior (at the covert,
representational level) and actual behavior at the overt, manifest level (Birch,
1985). Very often we do what we planned to do, but also quite often we forget
to do what we intended, we change our plans or we postpone an action. The
rather recently developed action-control theory (Frese & Sabini, 1985;
Heckhausen & Kuhl, 1985; Kuhl & Beckman, 1985; Kuhl & Kazen-Saad, 1988)
gives us a useful conceptual framework to linlc intended and actual behavior or
to bridge the cognition-behavior gap. Heckhausen and Kuhl (1985) make a
distinction between motivation and volition as two processes in the development
of wishes into action. Motivation is now limited to predecisional processes in
which values and expectancies are elaborated and integrated. In this motivational
process wishes are transfurmed into wants, which are understood as "incitations
tu action" (Heckhausen & Kuhl, 1985, p. 151). From then on processes of
volition take over. Self-commitment to a want changes it into an intention. Self-
commitment separates motivation from volition. Volition refers to postdecisional
processes of self-regnlation through which intentions are enacted or not.
Future time perspective as a personality characteristic has a role in the
motivational and the volitional phase. The extension of an individual futore time
perspective affects the motivational process because - as said before - the longer
the future time perspective the higher the presently anticipated value of distant
goals and the higher the perceived instrumentality of immediate instrumental
actions. ~e probability that long term wants are elaborated into behavioral
 WtllyLBNS & Marie-Anne MOREAS

intentions is higher for people with a long F.T.P. than for people with a short
F.T.P. Secondly, future time perspec!ive as the temporal characteristics or
temporal signs of what we traditionally still call motivational means-end
structures will influence the volitional process. It is hypothesized that the
probability of enactment of a behavioral intention correlates positively with the
specificity of the temporal localization of that intention. For example, I may have
the intention "to read a book" or "tu read that book next Saturday evening and
Sunday afternoon". Everything else assumed constant, the probability that I'll
read that book is higher if I have the second behavioral intention. Attaching a
temporal sign to a behavioral plan or intention enhances the probability of its
execution at the planned moment.
A change from behavior A to behavior B in the continuous stream of behavior
is not only affected by the waxing and waning in the strength of the underlying
motivational tendencies as assumed by Atkinson and Birch (1970). For Nuttin
(1987, p. 319) "Most behavioral change is regulated and planned in advance by
a kind of 'master plan' that is constructed on a temporal canvas ... behavioral
change is not only the resnlt of inner developments within dynamic structures, it
is inbuilt in our behavioral planning ... ". I'll stop writing this chapter at 11
o'clock and I'll start to talk with a student, because last week I planned it that
way when the student and I made the appointment for Monday 11 0' clock. At the
phenomenological level I feel more motivated to continue my writing but I'll stop
anyway, only because of what I planned.
Decock (1988) elaborated several alternative theoretical models to explain a
change in behavior at a certain moment in time that resnlts from temporal
planning. Some .of these explanations fit in the DynamiCS of Actions (Atkinson
& Birch, 1970). The motivational significance of the temporal sign of an action
plan is then understood in terms of instigating and inhibiting forces. Other hypo-
thetical explanations are not in line with that theory because they assume that one
can start doing something at a certain moment, not because the tendency fur that
action becomes dominant but because we planned to do it at that moment in time,
whatever the relative strength of the underlying behavioral tendencies. Computer
simulations of the competing hypothetical models still need empirical validation.

FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE: A SOCIETAL PERSPECTIVE

In the preceding sections, we discussed the motivational significance of future
time perspective from an individual point of view. The extension of the individual
FTP affects the anticipated value of motivational goals in the future, and as such
it will influence the choice between conflicting goals. The examples of motiva-
tional goal setting we have given are of the approach-approach type of conflict.
Motivational goal setting very often means to choose between an objectively
less valuable but immediate goal and a more important but delayed goal.
Motivational goal setting or behavioral planning may, however, also imply
approach-avoidance conflicts. The conflict results from the fact that a potential
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE: ...

action has positive and negative consequences that are separated in time. Messick
and Brewer (1983) make a distinction between two types of such individual
conflicts or dilemmas: individual traps and individual fences. An individual trap
is created when a potential action has immediate positive consequences and
delayed negative consequences (e.g.,_ smoking behavior). Not to perform that
action prevents the desired immediate and the undesired delayed consequences.
An individual fence involves an action that has immediate negative consequences
and delayed positive consequences (e.g., saving rather than spending money).
The alternative action has negative consequences in the future. In such situations,
the long run consequences have more important implications for the person than
the immediate consequences. Thus, if both kinds of consequences could be
reached at the same time, everyone would go for the more favorable (or less
negative) long-term consequences. InreaIity, however, many people neglect those
long-term consequences in their behavior. How can we explain this?
Our cognitive-motivational theory of future time perspective explains it by two
processes. People don't anticipate the long-term consequences of their present
behavior (the cognitive aspect), and the positive or negative valence of the
consequences in the long run are underestimated because of that temporal delay
(the dynamic aspect). So, we can expect that people with a long future time
perspective will be less easily trapped in individual dilemmas than people with
a short future time perspective.
The same type of motivational conflicts exists at the social.level, involving also
the behavior and behavioral outcomes of others. In a social dilemma a group of
individuals is involved. Each member of the group has to choose between two
action alternatives. One action-alternative guarantees immediately a more
favorable situation for the person than the other action-alternative, and that
regardless of what the others do. If, however, a lot of members choose that
alternative action, then the group as a whole (and so its members) will confront
a less favorable situation in the long run than if most of the people would have
chosen the other action-alternative. The group consequences in social dilemmas
can be more or less immediate or delayed (Messick & Brewer, 1983). In our
discussion we are ouly interested in social dilemmas with delayed group
consequences .
Also at the social level we distinguish between social traps and- social fences.
A social trap is a situation in which an individual act has immediate positive
consequences for the actor. If, however, many individuals act in that way,
negative consequences are for all the group members will follow in the future.
This is called the tragedy of the commons (Crowe, 1969; Hardin, 1968). If I
overconsume a limited common resource (e.g., hunting deers as many as I can),
I'll gain immediately from doing so. If many members of the group overconsume
(e.g., all the hunters kill as many deers as they can) the negative effects of
depletion (no deers, no money) will be shared by all the group members. So there
is a chance to become a sucker in this situation: if I am the ouly persopP1~)31~!1!!...
sparing the resource, then I do not enjoy the immediate mo _gds eJ:) ~
consequences and I will share the negative long-run consequences. t>;er'e i~dJme! ~
~, It PSWIl8SIA d< '"
~4 .. Willy LENS & M.rie-Al1ne MOREAS

a chance to be a free-rider. if I am the only person who is overconsuming the

resource,. I will immediately enjoy a more favorable situation and my share of the
negative group consequences will be relatively small. Social fences are situations
in which a certain act (e.g,. installing filters in a Chemical plant) has immediate
negative consequences for the actor (costs of the filters) but positive long term
consequences for the group (preservation of a healthy environment), if many
others do the same (see Strathman et a1., this volume) ..
Abstaining from the act gives an immediate more positive situation for the
individual (no additional costs) but will result in a more negative group situation
in the future (environmental pollution). Also here you have a chance to be a
sucker or a free-rider. Resource depletion and the creation of common resources
(e.g., paying our taxes) are important problems in our society. Many of our daily
actions have positive (negative) individual and negative (positive) social
consequences. Many of our daily actions have immediate rewarding effects but
pernicious social consequences in the long run. And we know it. Driving big
individual cars to and from work is one good example. It is fast and comfortable.
But those cars bum a lot of limited fuel and they pollute the air. Using public
transportation is much less comfortable but it helps to keep the environment
clean. "The consideration of individual advantage prevents us from doing
something. that might nevertheless be of great benefit to the group as a whole"
(platt, 1973, p. 641).
An important problem is then to know how to change this type of behavior
patterns or !J.abits which bring people in the most favorable short-term situation,
but which have negative implications for the group and its members in the long
run (Nuttin & Lens, 1988). To find a solution, we will have to search for the
causes of social dilemmas. The type of social dilemmas we discuss here and
individual dilemmas, have immediate and delayed consequences. So we can
assume that the causes of individual dilemmas also play a role in social dilemmas.
Thus, there could be at least a cognitive cause and a dynamic cause. The
cognitive cause has to do with the fact that people do not always know the
long-term group consequences of their individual behavior.
In social dilemmas, the instrumenta1ity-relation between ones own behavior and
the group consequences can be unclear because of two factors (platt, 1973). The
first factor is that the social consequences socially determined. The group result
is not contingent upon the behavior of each of the group members individually
but upon the combination of the responses of all the group members. The second
factor is the temporal lag between ones own behavior here and now and the
future time at which the group consequences will become perceivable. Dawes
(1980, p. 173) gives us an idea of the importance of this last factor in social
dilemmas "many observers have noted that many modem technological advances
may be traps; e.g., the good effects of DDT usage were immediately evident,
while the disastrous effects took years to ascertain".
The importance of this cognitive aspect is evident. As far as people do not
know the delayed social consequences of their own behavior, only the immediate
individual consequences can determine their behavior. So, ignorance of the social
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECrNB: ...

consequences will surely lead to the undesired group consequences.

Regarding the dynamic cause, we know from previous research (Lens,1986;
Mischel, 1981) that the incentive value and motivating power of goal objects
decrease with increasing temporal delay. This implies for the problem discussed
here that the negative (versus the positive) value of the state of the world in the
very distant future may objectively be very high but subjectively much lower,
because of the perceiVed temporal distance. This temporal distance should
psychologically be shortened via the development of very deep individual future
time perspectives.
Here we refer to some of the research questions formulated by Boniecki (1977,
p. 59) . "Is man interested in his own future? How far does his concern go? Does
it cover his own anticipated life-time? Does it extend over the life-time of his
children? ... Is he prepared to forego some short-term benefits for long-term
rewards? And how much is he ready to sacrifice?" There is no doubt that human
beings are cognitively able to foresee a very distant future, extending much
beyond their individual life time and that of their children. Even motivationally
they are sometimes able to anticipate and take into consideration goals in a very
distant future (Nuttin & Grommen, 1975; Lens & GaiIly, 1980), as is evident
from religious attitudes and behaviors. Many people suffer(ed) and forego
immediate gratifications for the sake of 'eternal' happiness in heaven. So, it is
important that also the .negative value of the state of the world in the future must
be seen as more extreme and valuable by developing a deep future time
perspective. This also requires that individnals of the present generation identify
themselves with mankind in general in order to feel responsible for future
generations. An altruistic or pro-social attitude towards future generations
resulting from an identification with the human race is a first prerequisite.
To know the group consequences of ones 6wn behavior (cognitive aspect) and
to attach a high negative (versus positive) value to these consequences, are
necessary but insufficient conditions for solving social dilemmas. They are
necessary because there can ouly exist a motivational conflict between striving for
the immediate more rewarding situation and avoiding the much delayed more
negative consequences for the group when these conditions are fulfilled.
Otherwise, there is no conflict and people will behave themselves to maximize
their own immediate gain (Linder, 1982).
But even when people do know the effects of their own present behavior in the
long run and that the negative value of the group consequences is high, the social
dilemma is not yet solved. Each individual knows also that his or her behavior
has a rather small impact on the group consequences. The avoidance of the highly
negative consequences in the distant future is contingent upon the combined
action of all participants. In order to change individnal actions, people must be
convinced that this will have the desired effect. Given the fact that the common
goal can ouly be realized through collective actions, individuals must be sure that
many others will give up undesirable habits in order to avoid their future negative
consequences (Boniecki, 1978; McKnight, 1978; Stem, 1978). This is an utmost
important but also very difficult social-psychological problem. People are ouly
36 Willy LENS &:Marie-Anne MOREAS

motivated for actions when they see a reasonable chance to be effectual (Bandura,
1986). The goal of saving a healthy and rich environment is a collective goal. It
can only be reached via collective actions. But collective actions are nothing more
than the sum of individual action.
Understanding this interdependence, people can behave themselves following
one or more cognitive schemata (Kelley & Thibaut,. 1978). They can still use a
"maximizing own gains" schema, or they can adopt an altruistic (maximizing the
other person's outcome), a social (maximizing the group's outcome), an equity
(minimize the difference in outcomes across the group of participants: Adams,
1965) or a competitive schema (maximizing the relative difference between own
outcomes and the outcomes of others). Which factors facilitate the adoption of
socially desirable schemes, or inhibit socially undesirable schemes is of utmost
importance as a social-psychological research question.

* Note. EMAIL WLENS@CC3.KULEUVEN.AC.BE

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Ryan T. (1970). Intentional behavior: An approach to human motivation. New York: The
Ronald Press Company.
Shostrom E. (1968). Time as an integrating factor. In Ch. Biihler & F. MaSsarik (Eds),
The course of human life. A study of goals in the humanistic perspective (pp.
351-359). New York: Springer.
Stem P. (1978). When do people act to maintain common resources? A reformulated
question for our times. International Journal of Psychology, 13, 149-158.
Van Calster K., Lens W., & Nuttin J. (1987). Affective attitude toward the personal
future. Impact on motivation in high school boys. American Journal of
Psychology, 100, 1-13.
Zaleski Z. (1987). Behavioral effects of self-set goals for different time ranges.
International Journal of Psychology, 22, 17-38.
FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE AND CONTROL
ORIENTATION: SOCIAL CONDmONS
AND CONSEQUENCES

Gisela TROMMSDORFF*
Department of Psychology
University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany

INTRODUCTION
Reducing \mcertainty is a central human need. This universal need (cf. Kagan,
1981) structures the basic motive system in early childhood and organizes each
individual's behavior and development throughout the life span. The need for
security seems to be related to attachment and curiosity, and possibly lays the
foundation for further development of self-other relations, e.g., the person's
working model (Bowlby, 1988). The need for security induces the person to gain
"knowledge" about the self and the environment, about the relation between both,
and about their development in the future. Related individual differences are called
"uncertainty orientation" by Sorrentino and Short (1986). The researchers reasoned
that situations include information about the extent to which uncertainty about the
self, the environment or the outcome of an act is resolved, and that individuals
differ with respect to uncertainty orientation. In order to resolve uncertainty,
people want to "know" what the future will be like and to possibly control the
future. Expectations, evaluations, and beliefs about the future and about ways of
controlling outcomes include beliefs about the self and about the relation between
the self and the environment in the future. These are parts of future time
perspective (FfP) and control orientation.
FfP and control orientation organize individual behavior. They serve as
guidelines, especially in uncertain situations by cognitively structuring the future
and by evaluating possible means (strategies) and outcomes. The behavioral
relev~nce of FfP and control orientation become especially obvious in decision-
making and other uncertain situations.
Since individual behavior is embedded in a social and cultural context, it may
be assumed that individual differences in FTP and control orientation depend, on
the one hand, on the sociocultural experiences of the person; and on the other
hand, these experiences influence individual behavior and also have an impact on
the wider social environment. This in tum should influence the development of
FfP and control orientation during socialization and life-span development.
Accordingly, mutually interdependent relationships are assumed to exist between
40 Gisela TROMMSDORFF

the person's future orientation and control beliefs and the sociocultural context.
Thus, FTP and control orientation may serve as mediating concepts explaining
some of the interrelations between individual and society. Inthe following, some
conceptual clarifications are presented first, and second, some social conditions
and consequences of FTP and control orientation will be discussed.

FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE (FfP)

Conceptual remarks. Future time perspective (or future orientation - FO)

comprises global and domain-specific subjective expectations and evaluations of
the future. Future orientation is a complex way of subjectively organizing one's
cognitions, evaluations, and behavior with respect to the future. Future events,
including the consequences of one's own behavior, can be anticipated as more or
less causally interrelated, following a certain systematic logic, or they are believed
to occur accidentally. Furthermore, the future can be evaluated as fulfilling one's
wishes or as being fearful and threatening. Accordingly, one's future orientation
can be more or less optimistic or pessimistic (see Zaleski, this volume).
The study of future orientation should, thus, take into account its cognitive
structure (density; extension) and also its affective quality. Furthermore, FO can
be studied with respect to specific domains of life and also as a' certain genera1ized
tendency of the person to anticipate and evaluate future developments. For a
differentiated understanding of FO it seems necessary to look at both, (a) the
cognitive and affective-evaluative orientation and (b) the domain- specific and the
global orientation towards the future.
Future orientation and behavior. Besides these structural, evaluative and
affective aspects of the subjective future, the behavioral aspect, which becomes
relevant in specific situations, is of special interest. It can be assumed that people
organize their behavior according to their beliefs about the future. This can be
observed in strategies for dealing with uncertainty, e.g., planning behavior,
preference for the delay of gratification, readiness to invest and to take risks.
The behavioral relevance of FO has rarely been taken into account in the
literature. A large amount of research has been carried out to analyze the cognitive
structure of FO, disregarding its motivational and affective qualities, and
neglecting its relevance for individual and social action. Generally, structural
aspects such as the extension of time perspective into the future, the duration of
anticipated events, or the differentiation of expectations have been studied in
relation to certain personality variables. Much of this research has focused on
individual and group differences in FO (see Trommsdorff, 1983; Nurmi, 1991).
So far, the research on specific aspects of FO with respect to behavior, e.g.,
research on expectations, has been much more fruitful regarding the prediction of
human behavior. This research took a cognitive-motivational approach quite early
on. Atkinson (1964) intruduced this aspect of FO as a basis for decision-making
theories. In other motivation theories, future orientation is also implicitly taken
into account by studying the role of expectations, goal setting, and volition for
behavior (Heckbausen, 1989).
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE AND CONTROL ORIENTATION: ...

This is in line with Lewin's conception that a pe~on's FO is related to the goals
which are selected and striven for. Therefore, a person's FO should depend on the
person's motive system.
Future orientation and motivation. One of the basic motives for human
behavior has already been mentioned - the need for security. Of course, there are
many other motives that organize the person's FO during hislher development.
Hopes and wishes, fears and concerns, the person's belief that helshe has control,
and the affective evaluation of the future in terms of optimism and pessimism are
motivational elements of future orientation.
However, only a few researchers follow a motivational approach to FO. Nuttin
(1984) and his coworkers, especially Lens (e.g., De Voider & Lens, 1982), have
studied FO in a motivational framework; Nuttin' s special measurement technique
has proven useful for the prediction of planning and achievement. In the same
line, Gjesme (1981) has demonstrated the behavioral relevance of FO for
achievement proceeding from Heckbausen's motivation theory. A motivational
view also underlies studies on the delay of gratification (fronimsdorff& Schmidt-
Rinke, 1980), and on delinquency (Landau, 1976; Trommsdorff & Lamm, 1980).
In summary, the focus on cognitive elements is obviously too narrow to study
the behavioral function of FO. Therefore, the evaluative, affective, and especially
the motivational components of FO have to be taken into account in order to
predict behavior in uncertain situations. .

CONTROL ORIENTATION (CO)

The study of future time perspective or future orientation not only requires a
differentiated approach, it also teaches us to follow an integrative approach which
does not simply isolate cognitive and affective aspects but searches for their
interrelations. This is best demonstrated by the concept of control orientation - CO
which has just entered the study of future orientation in the last few decades.
Control orientation can be seen as closely related to future orientation - both based
on the need for certainty. In our studies on the concept and function of future
orientation for behavior, we were clearly able to demonstrate that beliefs about the
future are related to certain beliefs about causal relations between future events
(frommsdorff, 1983, 1986).
CO constitutes a belief system about interrelations and possible causes of future
events. In most research following this conceptualization of CO, the traditional
differentiation between internal and external control (cf. Rotter, 1966) was
studied. The question was, thus, to what extent do people differ with respect to
the belief that they can influence certain desired or undesired future events as
compared to the belief that external factors organize the occurrence of these future
events. Attribution research made it clear that further differentiation (between
stable and variable factors) was necessary to predict achievement behavior, for
example. This line of research, however, did not really influence studies on future
orientation. Furthermore, recent research on coping has produced very promising
results on the relations between certain aspects of control beliefs, such as self
efficacy (Bandura, 1986, 1990), problem solving, and coping.
42 Gisela TROMMSOORFF

Furthermore, for an understanding of CO which goes beyond the notion about

"who" causes future events, it seems necessary to analyze "how l' future events
may be achieved. This question focuses on anticipated person-environment
relations with respect to the belief in "prirhary" and "secondary" control
(Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984). The
idea behind this concept is that people may differ with respect to their beliefs
about how goals can be attained. Such beliefs are based on different ways of
structuring one's relation to the environment: one may believe in control by means
of changing the environment according to one's own goals ("primary" control);
this is in contrast to believing in control by means of changing one's own goals
in accordance with environmental conditions ("secondary" control). In a similar
way, Brandtstiitter and Renner (1990) differentiate between tenacious and flexible
strategies of goal attainment; their concept is clearly based on the study by
Rothbaum et al. (1982).
The concept of "primary" and "secondary" control orientation and its function
for behavior is not yet clear. Some authors only believe in individual differences
with respect to the preference of "primary" or "secondary" control. Accordingly,
it is assumed that people structure their (problem-solving) behavior in such a way
that first "primary" control beliefs are dominant; only after their actiVity remains
unsuccessful do people shift towards "secondary" control. This "two-step" process
of control beliefs has indeed been empirically supported by Flammer et al.(1988).
One may also argue that the preference for "primary" as compared to "secondary"
control depends on one's developmental stage in the life span. In adolescence, it
may seem more realistic to believe in "primary control and individual "agency"
II

while in adulthood and old age, "secondary" control and accommodation to given
constraints may become more appropriate. Proceeding from a life-span theoretical
approach, one may assume that in old age one's past investments in resources and
increasing age-related constraints reduce the attractiveness for new investments
(Baltes & Baltes, 1989, 1990). Accordingly, more "s.elective" investment. to
compensate for lost chances and more "secondary" control would be expected for
older age groups.
Beyond individual and developmental differences, cultural specifics in CO have
been observed (Weisz et al., 1984). Recent studies demonstrate clear cultural
differences in the preference for "primary" or "secondary" contr'li (Essau, 1992;
Essau & Trommsdorff, 1993). According to these studies, it seems that people
from individualistic cultures as compared to collectivistic or group-oriented
cultures prefer "primary" to "secondary:' control beliefs (Trommsdorff, 1989a;
Kornadt & Trommsdorff, 1990; Essau, 1992; Essau & Trommsdorff, 1993;
Seginer, Trommsdorff, & Essau, 1993). Though the concepts of "primary" and
"secondary" control are not very clear yet, some promising approaches to the
operationalization of this concept have been developed in these studies.
Interestingly, most of the operationalizations proceed from the assumption that
control orientation is a concept which. should be studied with respect to certain
situations. Essau and Trommsdorff (1993) used both, a glebal and a domain-
specific conceptua}ization. The two measures did not produce the same results. It
is obvious that further conceptual refinement and validation of CO is necessary.
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE AND CONTROL ORIENTATION: ... 43

FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE AND CONTROL ORIENTATION

Future time perspective and control orientation seem to be related to each other
at the same time being part of a general orientation of the self to the
enlvil,onm,out. Future time perspective can thus be conceived of as perceiving the
with respect to control over the environment. Or control orientation can be
conceived of as part of anticipating the future self in relation to the environment .
. p.cccirdiing to Pulkkinen and Riinkii (1992), orientation to the future, self percepts
personal control over development, and identity formation are empirically
re.lat,O(! in personal development. This hypothesis is based on the theoretical notion
adaptive psychological functioning is the common underlying construct which
modulates these three towards internal consistency.
In the same line, on the basis of several empirical findings, Waterman (1992)
has discussed how adaptive capacities are related to a sense of identity and to the
belief in autonomous control over one's (future) development. In a similar vein,
Brandtstiitter (1989) points out the relation between a person's self percepts of
personal control over one's development and optilnistic expectations of his/her
personal development. Referring to the literature on self efficacy and aspects of
well-being (Bandura, 1986, 1990), it has been shown that a positive outlook on
the future and on control capacity is related to satisfaction and coping ability.
However, so far, the theoretical and empirical relations between FTP and CO
are not clear. This is a result of theoretical and methodological shortcomings in
the study of both concepts and their possible relations.
As for the conceptualization of future orientation, the various approaches and
their restricted meaning have led to specific, rather restricted, operationa1izations.
As regards the concept of control orientation, control could be conceived of as the
belief in internal or external control (source of causation or goal attailnnent) or as
the belief in "primary" or "secondary" control (means for goal attailnnent).
Accordingly, CO was measured differently. So far, most studies on control belief
in relation to FTP hl\ve measured the belief in internal vs. external control (cf.
Pulkkinen & Riinkii, 1992; Seginer & Halabi, 1991; Trommsdorff, 1983).
Significant individual differences occur for thematic areas of FTP and of CO as
has been shown in several studies comparing culture, age, gender, or education
(cf. Seginer & Halabi, 1991; Trommsdorff, 1983, 1986). From a motivational
point of view, the thematic content of the FTP and CO should be taken into
account, at least when predicting behavior. Some future events are more relevant
than others and thus have a differential ilnpact on an individual's behavior.
Even though the relations between FTP and CO are not yet clear, we can
assume that both concepts are related to the basic need for security and to the
structuring of' person-environment relations. As for future time perspective,
expectations and evaluations of the future (or future events) serve to subjectivelY
control the future by making the future cognitively available and by inducing the
person to experience the future emotionally in the present. As for control
.....
'
orientation, the person believes in certain ways of matching personal goals (and
possible ways of attaining them in the near or far future) and the given situation
either by assimilative or accommodative control orientation.
44 Gisela TROMMSDORFF

In summary, future orientation is understood here as a complex cognitive-

motivational conceptualization of the 'self in the future in relation to the social
world. Related to future orientation is the person's control orientation - the belief
concerning how desired and undesired future events and developments can be
achieved or avoided. Both - FrP and CO - include expectations and evaluations
of the self in interaction with the environment. Accordingly, subjective predictions
and expectations are based on cognitive-motivational schemata (or subjective
theories) about the self, the relation between the self and the (physical and social)
environment, and the way these will develop and change in the future.
In order to gain a better theoretical understanding of the concept of future time
perspective, control orientation, and its social preconditions and consequences, we
will first deal with the question concerning how individual differences develop and
then we will discuss how future orientation functions for individual behavior in a
given cultural and social context.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE ORIENTATION

AND CONTROL BELIEFS
DEVELOPMENT THROUGHOUT THE LIFE SPAN

The following factors are relevant in the development of FO: (a) processes of
cognitive maturation, especially in childhood and early adolescence, (b) social
learning, (c) social interaction processes, and (d) the impact of situational
demands. These processes are influential throughout the life span. However,
systematic s~dies on the development of future orientation from a life-span
perspective are very rare. Expectations and beliefs about the future are established
according to socialization experienCes starting in the early childhood. Child-rearing
affects the child and his/her experience on the basis of the given developmental
(e.g., physical, cOgnitive, etc.) conditions of the child. In the beginning of the
child's development, the primary caretakers are of great influence. Their
responsiveness and warmth allow the child to develop a more or less secure
attachment and a related workiilg model about the relation between the self and
the world around him/her (Bowlby, 1988). Accordingly, one main influential
factor can be seen in early attachment and the related development of a working
model as being established in early mother'child interactions (Bowlby, 1969). On
this basis, the consequences of one's own behavior are interpreted and early
expectations of person-environment relations develop. Thus, further expectations
about the self, the environment, and their future relations are reinforced. From
this point of view, one may assume that securely attached children develop a more
extended and quite optimistic future orientation which enables them to cope with
a certain amount of uncertainty about the future.
Accordingly, certain affective and cognitive aspects of future orientation
(e.g., optimism, differentiation, and strncturedness) sho)lld be influenced by child-
rearing and social conditions. Some empirical evidence supports this theorizing,
pointing out that a warm and responsive child-rearing background is related to. a
child's optimistic future orientation and beliefs in internal control of the future.
Parental support was related to a more positive future outlook (Trommsdorff,
 ,~/~ '~%~-.~
TIME PERSPECTIVE AND CONTROL ORIENTAT/ON: ... 45

emma.t, 1978). Of course, these .results on child-rearing should not

forget: tllte impact of maturation, cognitive development, and formal
fUltul,e orientation and control beliefs.
have produced empirical evidence supporting the notion that
alionlS related to FO (e.g., Pulkkinen & Riinkii, 1992). 1n our own
high-education groups of adolescents were compared with
i02nitive and evaluative aspects of FO. Less as compared to more
lQIe,;celnts had a less differentiated and a less extended FO, and they
the external control of their future (Trommsdorff, 1983).
the co,rnithre aspect of future orientation but also its motivational and
related to education. There is evidence for more general
el!a~,~~.one's own future in high- than in low-education groups
However, cognitive structuring of the future is not
rellat<:d to a positive outlook on the future. Other variables probably
diators. Better educated people may realistically expect to at least be
regarding the achievement of material success in our social
~mlploymlent is still more probable for less educated than better
(Feather & Bond, this volume). Thus, high education allows a
more positive outlook on the future at least with respect to the
'd()m,.m or the domain of material well-being.
(e.g., Pulkkinen & Riinkii, 1992) report clear gender differences
studies, female adolescents were less optimistic about the
to males, they concentrated less on occupational and more on
of the future, even though equal socialization for German
has been widely accepted (Trommsdorff, 1983). Interestingly,
, we have found the same kinds of gender differences in FO
adults (Trommsdorff, unpublished data).
~ol)m;ent of future orientation is presumably closely related to the
identity (Nurmi, 1991; Pulkkinen & Ronkii, 1992) and is, thus,
iellev:ant for adolescents. However, the process of identity formation
:pninalte during adolescence, but rather continues throughout the life
a life-span perspective should be taltell into account.
certain relations between personality development, subjective chances
., ....... orientation, one may expect that an individual's past experiences
gains and losses during the life span), the present social context, and
affect his/her future orientation. This view is supported by a study
(64 to 90 years of age) by Lapierre, Bouffard, and Bastin
l3()uffilfd, Bastin & Lapierre, this volume). .
the most part, correlational studies have been carried out
~~~:~!:; for example, why adolescents are more optimistic than
W are less optimistic and oriented more towards social aspects
males. Also, these studies have not been able to disentangle the
sources of influence. Longitudinal studies are necessary
and processes of the development of FO and control
adolescents, and adults. As yet, only very few longitudinal
been carried out (Lamm, Schmidt, & Trommsdorff, 1976;
aI., 1978; Pulkkinen & Riinkii, 1992). These studies support the
46 Gisela TROMMSDORFF

notion that - besides normal cognitive development (see Piaget, 1966) -

socialization experiences and life events provide subjectively evaluated resources
and constraints which contribute to individual differences in the development of
FO, control beliefs, and related behavior.
From a life-span perspective, the possible relations between a person's FO,
planning behavior, pursuit of goals, life events, and coping may give insight into
the process of development of and change in a person's future orientation as a
process of the person's adaptation to present and future chances. For adolescents,
the future offers a variety of chances as regards self development. Identity
formation is not yet completed. For adults, the future may be seen more with
respect to past investments and present constraints (Baltes & Baltes, 1989).
For both age groups, life events can bring about a possible turning point for FO.
In order to investigate the effects of life events on an individual's FO, we carried
out longitudinal studies of adolescents from different educational backgrounds
(Trommsdorff et al., 1978). The results showed strong effects of life events such
as leaving school and starting to work. Adolescents who started to work, as
compared to those of the same age group who continued their school education,
changed with respect to several aspects of future orientation, e.g., they learned to
take into account specific causes for anticipated future events and their FO became
more realistic. The effects of occupational experiences were more pronounced than
those of age-graded sociocultural enviromnents.
In another longitudinal study, we looked for possible effects of current concerns
and life events on adult women's FO. One group of women (between 20 and 25
years of age) was about to marry. Another group of women (between 40 and 50
years of age) anticipated that their last child would leave home in the near future.
These two groups of women were facing different life events. The women were
interviewed, before and after the respective life event, about their FO and control
beliefs. Objectively equal life events had different effects on the women's FO and
their evaluation of these life events. Women preferred different coping styles
depending on their FO and control beliefs. Accordingly, similar situations may not
have the same meaning for different people.
The effects of life events on future orientation and subsequent behavior are
presumably mediated by other variables including the activity of the person such
as his or her planning behavior. Given a well-structured, extended, positive future
orientation, one may expect more adequate coping and satisfaction with life.
Therefore, we need to ask whether and how future orientation is affected by social
experiences and certain life events during development in the life course and also
whether and how one's future orientation has certain functions, for example, in
dealing with such life events. LaJer, we will discuss whether a person's future
time perspective and control orientation affect decision making and behavior, and
thus influence the person's social enviromnent.

THE CULTURAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT

FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE ORIENTATION

Studies on the development of and change in future orientation cannot ignore the
effects of the sociocultural context in which the person's development and
situational changes in his/her life are embedded. It is assumed here that a person's
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE AND CONTROL ORIENTATION: ... 47

perspective and control orientation are part of a wider sociocultural

On ihe one hand, it is assumed that cultural values and social norms
individual goal setting and the kind of subjective experiences of the
and obstacles for attaining these goals. These again should affect a
future time perspective and control orientation.
le(,ultural context influences the soCialization process and thereby the social,
and motivational development of the person. However, on the other
person actively structures his or her environment by selecting certain
and certain behaviorS to attain these goals. The person assimilates and
to new constraints and resources by actively changing his or her
and control orientation. Through the interactions between
and the cultural context, the individual's future time perspective
orientation are co-constructed. .
context. Cultural differences in future orientation have been reported,
by Bouffard (1981) and Seginer (1988). Seginer and Halabi (1991) have
strong intercultural differences between Israeli' Druze, Arab Druze, and
adolescents with respect to hopes and fears, the extension of future
ililt;'tiOl~, and also with respect to their control beliefs. The salience (number of
or fears) of future life domains were more s~i1ar for Druze and Jewish
.jij<Olescents than for Druze as compared to Arab adolescents. This partly replicated
(diJ'feflonclos which Seginer (1988) found between Jewish and Arab adolescents.
compared to Jewish adolescents named more future-related events (hopes,
J~~~~;;;~~, which were related to other persons and to the collective.
~':l Arab adolescents have obviously internalized the more collectivistic
~~~~~;~"~~:~~ their culture while Jewish adolescents are soCialized in a more
.~ belief system and adopt a corresponding future oriilUtation. Here,
br cultUral values, culture-specific soCialization, and related
tasks can be observed. .. . . ..
and possibly historical effects were demonstrated by Morsbach (1990).
as compared to Scottish adolescents showrrl less realism in future
in 1976; 11 years later these differences disappeared. The unrealistic
(dreams) of Japanese youth were i;elated to social-oriented goals while
:$C:Qttiish youth were oriented more to individualistic goals. This difference in
"~~~d~:~e::ii~:, clearly reflects the different cultural values with respect to
'Ii and social orientation which have often been shown in cross-cultural
(Trommsdorff, 1989a, 1993a) .
...~~:~:~~ context. Auweele (1975) was even able to demonstrate differences
Il\ who share the same culture, history, and language, but whose
~9~)ializalion experiences are embedded in very different social systems: East and
German adolescents. Auweele used the Motivational Induction Method
by Nuttin (1984) to demonstrate that collectivistic ideas dominate the future
~4~&:!:~~~of East German adolescents while West German adolescents
~ .. . their fumre orientation more on. themselves and on personal goals .
.. ,German in contrast to West German adolescents pursued more social goals
establishing social contacts; they focused less on hopes for their own m~terial
In contrast to West German youth, East Germans had fewer expectations for
whole,jife span. Instead, their future orientation focused more on events and
48 Gisela TRO:MMSDORFF

concrete tasks in the near future. Their future-oriented control orientation was
more biased with respect to external" control: they focused less on future events
which could be achieved by their own efforts.
As is known, in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), children were
socialized in a collectivistic society in which individual achievement and control
were discouraged while the society took responsibility for planning and
programming the individual's future. In this context, East as compared to West
Germans developed a less elaborated and less extended future orientation, focusing
less on individual goal attainment.
Regrettably, we cannot compare the FO of the two samples of adoles.cents
studied by Auweele (1975) with their FO now, after the two Germani<)S have been
nnited and the sociopolitical situation in East Germany has radically changed. The
question therefore cannot really be answered as to whether the East Germans'
(adolescents) FO has changed and become more similar to the West Germans' FO
on account of the historical events, or whether the basic differences which were
observed in the eighties have remained stable.
Since the life situ.ation of East Germans has changed drastically and the East
German people are having to deal with a great many challenges and threats, new
options and obstacles, it may well be assumed that these changes affect their future
(and control) orientation, including their goals, hopes, fears, and expectations
about whether and how these goals can be attained.
Comparisons of East Germans' future time perspective and control orientation
before and after the collapse of the former GDR may, therefore, demonstrate
significant changes. For example, more interpersonal variance with respect to. the
kinds of hopes and fears, optimism, pessimism, and the structuredness of FO
should have occurred. Also, one may expect a certain decrease in optimistic FO
since it has become apparent that the economic and social problems cannot be
resolved in a short period of time and more problems are expected to arise.
However, data to compare East Germans' future orientation before and after the
collapse of the GDR are not really available. There are some data collected by the
Research Institute on Youth in Leipzig which demonstrate that at least 90 % of the
apprentices interviewed in 1984 described their future orientation as being very
optimistic, whereas only 15 - 31 % of the apprentices interviewed in 1990 did so.
That the data from 1984 are valid is questionable as they may reflect a strong
social desirability bias due to the strict political control in the GDR. The results
of the data from 1990 may be partially due to the apprentices' having experienced
an insecure job market, and the socioeconomic problems in East Germany.
Interestingly, a study using unobtrusive methods demonstrated a higher degree
of pessimistic orientation in East Germany before the German unification. Ottingen
(1993) (a) carried out content analyses of media reports with respect to
attributional styles I\Ild (b) did observations of the facial expressions of people
from East and West Berlin in bars. Both approaches demonstrate clear differences:
East as compared to West Germans were more depressive before the unification.
After the collapse of the former GDR, however, these differences disappeared.
However, in this study, future orientation was not measured directly. Still, the
data may illustrate the general emotional mood in both parts of Germany, before
and after the wall fell.
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECl'NE AND CONTROL ORIENTATION, ...

are more direct studies at hand which compare the verbally measured
.~~~'~::~~~~: of adolescents in East and West Germany after the unification.
:~ representative studies of the, value orientations of these two groups
4::::~ticv0,ery similar orientations with respect .to post-materialistic
.( values (cf. Schnabel, Baumert, & Roeder, 1993) and similar life
with respect to job and education (cf. Behnken et al., 1991).
Seve~a1 rep=entative studies compare the degree of optimism of East and West
adolescents after the collapse of the GDR. Behnken et al. (1991)
the same degree of optimism for East and West German youth.
differences showed. that boys, especially in East Germany, followed more
goals than girls (Gille, 1992). Furthermore, similar differences in
orientation for adolescents from different educational backgrounds occurred
in ....., ' and West Germany. These differences are roughly comparable to results
previous studies (e.g., Trommsdorff, 1983; 1986). Education and gender
affect adolescents' future orientation while the effect of past socialization W
4if'ferent political contexts is fairly negligible.
careful study of the future orientation ofGerman adolescents from East and
Berlin after the unification, Jiilisch, Sydow, and Wagner (1993) showed that
were no significant differences with =pect to various structu~ aspects of
their FO. The authors conceive of future orientation as sUbjective theories about
life which serve to help adolescents to accommodate to sociaJ and developmental
problems. The authors assume that changes induced by the unification are relevant
for the East Germans' identity and th,!s should influence their FO. They compared
adolescents from East and West Berlin with different social and educational
backgrounds and used an open-end instrument according to Trommsdor/'f (1983,
1986) to study future orientation as a complex phenomenon consisting of different
aspects. Subjects named hopes and fears and evaluated these according to different
aspects of the future (extension, control orientation, etc.).
. The results showed that students from East as compared to West Berlin had a
less extended time perspective with respect to hopes andfears. This result is
similar to Auweele's (1975) findings. Furthermore, East German students named
more politically relevant future events. With respect to the content of the future
orientation, no differences occurred betWeen students from East and West Berlin.
The a!1ticipated future events were mostly reIatedJo basic human needs. However,
significant differences between gender and education occurred in both samples.
Again, these differences were comparable to those found in other studies on
adolescents from various cultures.
In her study on adults from East and West Berlin, Heckhausen (1993) also found
a less extended future orientation for those from East Berlin (anticipated time of
goal attainment). However, it is unclear whether the shorter future time
perspective indicates positive expectations that one's goals will be fulfilled in the
near future, or impatience, or a "tenacious" pursuit of goals. Also, in this study,
adults from East as compared to West Berlin demonstrated less belief in internal
control of successful outcomes.
These studies are in line with our previous assumption that a person's future
()rientation develops and changes throughout one's life span according to one's
experiences of self-environment relations in the given sociocultural context. These
studies 4emonstrate significant effects of SUbjective experiences and chances in life
50 Gisela TROM:M:SDORFF

as mediated by socioeconomic and political conditions. In a process of basic

transitions in chances in life, as presently is the case in East Germany, one should
thus expect significant changes in individual's FTP and control orientation. The
possible process of change should, however, be analyzed in longitudinal studies.
In summary, a person's future orientation develops and may change throughout
his/her life span according to the subjective experience of person-environment
relations. Future orientation is not only related to one's individual hopes and fears,
but comprises concerns beyond self-orientation which focus on the relation
between the self and the social environment. This kind of thematic focus on both -
expectations with respect to self and to interpersonal relations - may indicate the
conceptual connection between future time perspective, on the one hand, and
control orientation, on the other.
A more fruitful use of the concept of future orientation is believed to be possible
when not only the cognitive and affective structure of future orientation are taken
into account, but also those thematic aspects related to the motivational quality of
future time perspective and control orientation. Such conceptualization may also
allow us to find out more about the psychological function of FO for individual
behavior as well as for the social context in which this behavior takes place.

FUTURE ORIENTATION, CONTROL BELIEFS,

AND BEHAVIOR
The study of future orientation increases in theoretical value when one focuses
on the question ofits functional relevance for individual behavior. However, only
a few studies on future orientation have to do with the behavioral relevance.
Furthermore, most of these studies are more correlational in nature and do not
investigate the usefulness of future orientation for predicting behavior.
So far, studies of the effects of a global or domain-specific future orientation on
behavior are very scarce. Considering the difficulties of attitude research in
predicting behavior, this wea1rness in the study of future orientation is no surprise.
Presumably, FO represents a construct which, as a whole, is too complex to be
very useful for predicting specific behaviors. For the time being, it may be more
advantageous to focus on specific aspects of future orientation and to define such
theoretically relevant aspeotswith precision before carrying out empirical studies.
Therefore, in the following, we will focus on traditional concepts of future
orientation first and then on aspects of anticipatory processes which include
cognitive but also motivational components of future orientation and control beliefs
such as expectations and optimism/pessimism. These variables cannot substitute
for future orientation, but they are important aspects thereof.

RELATIONS BETWEEN COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE ASPECTS

OF FUTURE ORIENTATION AND BEHAVIOR

Individuals differ with respect to global and domain-specific expectations and

evaluations of the future. The elaboration and content of such expectations of the
future and an overall evaluation of the future as being positive or negative are not
only related to personality variables but also to differences in behavior.
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECfIVE AND C.oNTR.oL .oRIENTATI.oN: .. ' 51

:Several studies have shown that certain qualities of future orientation (extension,
and evaluation) and delinquent behavior are closely related
~::d~I,~9~75, 1976; Stein, Sarbin, & Kulik, 1968; Tr.ommsd.orff et aI., 1979;
I:! & Lamm, 1980; Trommsd.orff, 1986). Instituti.onalized delinquents
less structured future .orientati.on and were more pessimistic than n.on-
:\t~lin(IUents. H.owever, Pulkkinen and R6nkii (1992) c.ould n.ot replicate these

i
ll~~~~~~Al~s~.o, it is unclear whether certain aspects .of future .orientati.on are a
f.or.or a result .of delinquent behavi.or.
betwee,n future .orientati.on and delay .of gratificati.on (Tr.ommsd.orff &
~ll]lunidtRink", 1980) p.oint .out the effect .of intermediate variables. This is in line
.our recent unpublished data sh.owing p.ositive relati.ons between aggression
ilJlribJiti.on and the differentiati.on and extension .of delinquents' future orientation.
elaborated anticipati.on .ofthec.onsequences.of .one's behavi.or for .other people
f.or .oneself may have an inhibit.ory effect .on aggressi.on. Thus, certain
.:~~::!~~)aspects .of future .orientati.on can be activated t.o regulate s.ocial (.or
'a behavi.or (K.ornadt, 1981).
,F,.rtiitermo,re, certain cognitive and affective aspects .of future .orientati.on are
reilaulO t.o coping in vari.ous s.ocial situati.ons. Our l.ongitudinal data .on the functi.on
future .orientati.on f.or the planning behavi.or .of y.oung married women clearly
that w.omen were m.ost active with respect t.o g.oal .oriented behavi.or when
strongly believed in the .occurrence .of the desired event and when they
belie"ed in their .own control. Overall, .optimism and internal c.ontrol belief
predicted w.omen's planning behavi.or and .overall high life satisfacti.on
(Trommsd.orff, 1989b). When people are .optimistic t.o the extent that they
anticipate Duly a few,negative c.onsequences while alternative g.oals are represented
in their future .orientati.on, .overall goal-directed activities increase. This is in line
with Scheier and Carver (1992) wh.o dem.onstrated the p.ositive functi.ons of an
optimistic future orientati.on f.or c.oping behavi.or.
H.owever, it is unclear whether an .optimistic future .orientati.on and belief in
internal contr.ol stimulate plamring behavi.or and c.oping; .or whether planning
behavi.or supports a positive .outl.o.ok.on the future. There is reason t.o believe that
an individual's evaluati.on.of the present and the future is related t.o the setting of
and striving f.or g.oals. Thus, "current c.oncerns" (Klinger, 1977, this v.oIUlne) may
mediate between the individual's acti.on and future .orientation.
This fits int.o an acti.on theoretical m.odel which assumes that .optimism and
planning behavi.or are mutually supportive elements. Recent action theoretical
'. ,"
studies have indicated that certain situati.onal experiences can significantly affect
:.... aspects .of future orientati.on. Acc.ording t.o G.ollwitzer (1990), the planning stage
,:.". (as compared t.o the preliminary stage .of "weighing") .of an acti.on sequence is
:.:-: characterized by a great deal .of .optimism. If people are stimulaied t.o engage in
planning behavi.or, their general .optimism is significantly increased. They believe
m.ore in the successful attainment .of certain g.oals, and they als.o believe m.ore in
their .own ability t.o achieve these g.oals.

EXPECTATIONS AS ANTICIPATORY PROCESSES AND BEHAVIOR

Expectati.ons functi.on t.o reduce uncertainty by estimating the probability .of the
.occurrence .of future events. As such they are part .of future .orientati.on. They may
52 Gisela TROMMSDORFF

focus on single events or on global developments. Expectations ,are of special

interest for research on decision making and behavior. Using. his cognitive-
motivational approach, Atkinson (1964) has studied decision making as a rational
process. Expectations enter into the cost"reward calculations of alternatives and
thus into strategies and decision making.
Subjective biasof expectations. Our need for security does not prevent us from
often underestimating the probability of risks. Since people more often believe that
misfortune strikes other people and not themselves, false expectations of risk
occur. Oftentimes, optimistic expectations are preferred. This is even the case
when individual jUdgements are validated with respect to their "objective" basis.
Social comparisons often serve to validate individual expectations.
Expectations and behavior. From other social-psychological studies we do not
only know about the subjective bias but also about the behavioral relevance of
expectations. Subjective expectations influence individual behavior even when
these expectations turn out to be wrong and create strong intrapersonal conflict
(e. g., "when prophecy fails": Festinger, Riecken,& Schachter, 1956). Even when
people try to refrain from biased expectations, they still organize their perceptions
according to pre-existing expectations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This
cognitive-motivational bias in perception reinforces the respective expectations and
behavior. Subjective expectations can also turn into social reality.
That expectations can function as self-fulfilling prophecies was recognized rather
early. Subjective expectations about oneself (and also about other people) influence
one's behavior; this then influences the perception and expectations and, finally,
also the behavior of other people. Longitudinal studies on teacher-pupil
interactions have clearly demonstrated that experimentally induced positive of
negative teachers' expectations influence their pupils' behavior accordingly.
Expectations become especially relevant for behavior when certain hopes and
fears or individual goals are at stake. On the other hand, behavior can change
goals and related expectations. For example, having achieved certain goals may
induce an individualto raise hislher subjective expectations and strive for more
demanding goals. This can be seen in achievement situations when achievement
goals are raised after successes.
In summary, people create social realities according to their expectations. Once
established, expectations are quite resistant to change even if contradicting
evidence is at hand. Therefore, all kinds of stereotypes are supported by biased
perceptions and expectations.

EXPECTATIONS, CONTROL BELIEFS, AND BEHAVIOR

EXpectations become relevant for behavior when they are connected to certain
control beliefs. For example, in achievement situations, people with high
expectations of success and a belief in internal rather than external control attribute
their success to themselves rather than to external factors; this increases their
positive self concept with respect to achievement, related goal setting, and
behavior (Heckhausen, 1989; Weiner, 1992). Such control beliefs are basic to goal
setting. They reinforce existing expectations and induce behavior; this in turn is
interpreted in a way that supports existing control beliefs. Accordingly, people's
experience of encouraging or discouraging events depends on their expectations
 ~i;,,*~1
FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE AND CONTROL ORIENTATION: ... 53

beliefs, thus reinforcingexisiting expectations. Therefore, a

~eIali:red optimistic or pessimistic futore orientation develops over time.
:~Ixpectati,ons in connection with control beliefs can create social realities which
more self-enhancing or more self-handicapping (cf. Higgings, 1990). When
i(;)lf'ch~'ndicapping, people expect failure and focus on task-irrelevant aspects; later
""ne,v refer to this maladaptive behavior as attributional excuse (Berglas &
, 1978). In contrast, pessimistic expectations may induce behavior which
not buffer negative self evaluation; here, a self-enhancing attributional bias
as is the case for learned helplessness. For the latter, pessimistic
are related to refraining from formulating goals and plans and
in active goal attainment (Seligman, 1975). Pessimistic expectations may,
be instrumental in protecting oneself against disappointments ("defensive
cf. Norem & Cantor, 1986) and thus in achieving control. These
do not develop into self-fulfilling prophecies but rather serve as
attributional "excuses" and stabilize achievement motivation.
Several stodies (e.g., Skinner, 1991) have shown that children who believe they
control are more successful while children who believe they do not have
~;~!:~~m;ore often fail. Thus, it seems that children tend to confirm their belief
V whether or not they are in control. These connections between control
and performance imply self-perpetoatingcycles (Seligman, 1975). One may
assume that believing that they are in control has an impact on the children's
behavior, especially on their efforts to plan and carry out tasks.
Usually action sequences rather than one single act produce success or failure.
Therefore, the question arises a~ to what induces people to continue doing a
certain kind of behavior, i.e., to invest sustained effort in accomplishing a
particular task. It can be assumed that, first of all, behavior is activated on the
basis of control beliefs - i.e., the generalized expectations about the extent to
which one is able to reach desired goals and to avoid undesired outcomes. One's
own behavioral outcomes are interpreted in a way that affects subsequent behavior.
-:.'.
,
:-:. According to present control theories, such interpretations are based, first of all,
, ..... on subjective expectations about one's success and, secondly, on beliefs about the
likely causes of perceived failure or success ("means-ends beliefs ") and one's own
,
,
.::.:
-::::
role in having an impact on those causes ("agency beliefs": cf. Skinner, Chapman,
& Baltes, 1988) or "strategy" and "capacity" beliefs (Schmitz & Skinner, 1993) .
. Preconditions for successful and adaptive behavior may combine sitoation-
specific and generalized beliefs about oneself in relation to the environment.
Presumably, these preconditions are, on the one hand, sitoation- specific optimistic
expectations about one's success (including a belief in one's own ability) and the
setting of specific goals and plans and, on the other hand, a generalized belief in
one's own competence and ability to control futore outcomes - either by
assimilative or by accommodative behavior ("primary" or "secondary" control) -
including a preference for a self-serving attributional bias (in the event of failure
or success). Generalized beliefs such as these may stabilize one's behavior over
time even in the event of an occasional failure.
Even carefully conducted experimental stodies on the relation between
expectations, control beliefs, and performance cannot really support a simple
explanation of this seemingly self-perpetoating cyclical process. In order to,
disentangle the possible interrelations, it seems necessary to focus on further
54 Gisela TROMMSDORFF

mediating factors which stem from the cumulative experience of success and
failure and their subjective interpretations. Therefore, both, situation-specific
expectations and control beliefs, but also a global positive or negative future
orientation and control belief should be taken into account.

OPTIMISM, CONTROL ORIENTATION, AND BEHAVIOR

Relations between optimism and control orientation. Biased expectations

should be especially interesting when related to positive or negative evaluations of
expected future developments. A case of such biased expectations is a person's
optimism or pessimism. Optimism is understood here as the expectation of
predominantly positive events and pessimism as the expectation of predominantly
negative events.
One may assume that optimistic and pessimistic expectations and control beliefs
are related. As a matter of fact, research on future-oriented affective states like
optimism and pessimism clearly demonstrate relations with control beliefs.
Research on learned helplessness by Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy (1989) shows
a positive relation between pessimism (or hopelessness) and negative attributions.
People with a negative attribution style attribute positive outcomes more to
variable and specific factors and negative outcomes to stable and global factors.
Those with a pessimistic attribution style expect that in many situations in the
future many negative events but only very few positive events will occur. The
belief that one causes negative events oneself indicates a negative self concept.
According to empirical results, a depressive person's control beliefs about
positive and negative outcomes do not differ while, in a control group, loop-sided
optimistic attributions prevail. Thus, a non-depressive person's future orientation
is more optimistic insofar as not only are more positive future outcomes expected
but they are also expected to depend on personal abilities. This control belief
indicates a positive self concept and a belief in self efficacy (Bandura, 1990).
Relations between optimism, control orientation and behavior. Optimism,
even in the event of non-realistic expectations, is not only related to psychological
well-being but also to active and successful coping. Optimistic people are more
successful in actively structuring their future; they are more satisfied, more
socially integrated, more creative and risk taking; they master difficult decisions
more easily, do not give up easily, are more willing to overcome difficulties in the
pursuit of their goals (Taylor, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988), and cope with
critical life events (Scheier & Carver, 1992). There is considerable evidence that
optimism is related to both psychological (Scheier & Carver, 1985; 1992) and
physical (Scheier & Carver, 1987) well-being. Accordingly, one may expect
successful coping and adjustment given positive thinking and optimism. Whether
expectations are optimistic or pessimistic, they seem to have a self-fulfilling
function. This is reflected in success and failure, respectively. The expectation of
success allows us to organize our behavior in a way that enables us to really
achieve success which in tum reinforces our optimistic beliefs; the opposite holds
true for pessimistic beliefs.
Quasi-circular intrapersonal processes can be expected which relate an optimistic
evaluation of the future with planning activity. This is in line with studies on the
illusion of control (Langer, 1983). Though an overestimation of one's own
 ,~~;:::F
FUTURE TIME PERSPECTNE AND CONTROL ORIENTATION: ... 55

may be an illusion, it is still functional in the process of actively coping

problems. Depressed people who are more realistic in their pessimistic
\~~~:~:::~~re::fra~~in more from active coping. On the one hand, optimism may be
:] of a positive outcome of the given situation and of one's own
::qo'ntrc)1 and ability; on the other hand, optimism functions as a motivating factor
action process allowing coping to occur. Optimism hereby activates goal
.::~:~~~~g:oal attainment increases one's life satisfaction and positively affects health
.-.1 job satisfaction, achievement, and success.
Op'tinlisln has also been widely conceived of as a personality construct (e.g.,
et aI., 1974; Scheier & Carver, 1987; Marshall et al., 1992) which is related
personality variables like extraversion and mood.
O'Ptimism activates volitional resources for doing something. The same tendency
one believes in control (or one's abilities) even when optimistic
~~~~~;:r; do not reflect the actual difficulties. This is in line with action
. analysis. "Realistic" optimism is functional in the preliminary action
of weighing alternatives; however, in the subsequent action sequence,
planning is necessary, which is related to optimism. People perceive more control
than they actually have when they are implementing a decision (as compared to
weighing alternatives) even if this is illusionary (Gollwitzer, 1990). Belief in
control may also be illusionary in this stage, but it is quite effective for achieving
success. Thus, the illusion of control has a volitional fimction that enables an
individual to plan, take the initiative, maintain his/her goals and intentions.
In summary, optimistic future orientation and a self-enhancing control
orientation are a useful basis for coping with problems and achieving one's goals.
However, more research is needed to specify the functional relations between
future time perspective and control orientation by taking into account different
aspects and the thematic context of both.
It can be assumed - and empirical data are at hand - that, in general, people
' ../ actively select situations and behavioral styles which are more or less conducive
to optimism. According to this line of reasoning, we assume interactive relations
,.:.""
:.::-: between the social context and the individual's future orientation depending on the
given situation. The person may act upon the situation which in tum will influence
aspects of his or her future orientation and behavior. Thus, individuals' future
orientation and control belief may function as a process of accommodation and
assimilation in different social contexts; social contexts change according to the
way people anticipate and evaluate their future. Thus, future-oriented action may
not only affect the present situation but could also be the basis for social change.

FUTURE ORIENTATION AND CONTROL BELIEFS

IN PROCESSES OF SOCIAL CHANGE
This brings us back to our question about possible interrelations between
individual future time perspective and control orientation, on the one hand, and
societal conditions, on the other hand. In the following, we will deal with the
question concerning how such future and control orientation function in situations
of social change which are accompanied by stress, risk, and coping demands.
56 Gisela TROMMSDORFF

If future time perspective and control orientation are relevant for individual and
social action, the question arises as to how the individual deals with social change.
Future time perspective and control orientation may allow the individual person
to cope with certain problems arising from social change; on the other hand, such
behavior may have an impact on the further process of social change. Empirical
studies on this process are not yet available; however, a number of empiriCl)l
studies on various aspects of future time perspective and control orientation may
allow us to formulate hypotheses on these interrelations.

SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE AND FUTURE ORIENTATION

Certain relations betweeu expectations, decision making, and global

socioeconomic change have been demonstrated in studies on consumer behavior.
It is well known that declines in consumers' expectations and confidence in the
economy precede recessions (Katona, 1975). Surveys on consumer attitudes show
that consumers' expectations prove to be quite accurate, seemingly creating a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Economic optimism increases the consumers' confidence and
their willingness to engage in large expenditures and debts. In contrast, economic
pessimism increases their readiness to postpone expenditures. The individuals'
optimism or pessimism thereby influences the economy in the direction of growth
or recession. However, it is unclear why consumers shift in their optimistic and
pessimistic orientations and how this really influences their behavior.
Several contradicting explanations have been proposed. One causal link may be
that consumer pessimism causes cutbacks in spending; or pessimism may increase
as economic conditions worsen; or consumers may just respond to media reports
about the economic decline. The causal links between economic conditions,
consumer expectations, and consumer behavior are difficult to disentangle and
should be studied on a longitudinal basis. Empirical studies on the relation
between individual expectations and performance may allow us to analyze in more
detail the specific prOcesses for the seemingly reciprocal influences between
control beliefs and performance.

SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE: THE CASE

OF BAST-GERMANY

Possible relations between future orientation, control beliefs, and social change
shOUld become obvious during the transformation process in East Germany. After
the collapse of the former GDR, dramatic transformations occurred there which
have caused fundamental changes not only in social, economic, and political
institutions, but also in people's everyday life circumstances. These changes were
not expected. In contrast, most East German's future orientation with respect tc
the unification with West Germany was highly optimistic. Present realities are
causing more disappointments and frustrations. Questions thus arise concerninE
how people in East Germany will deal and cope with these dramatic sociopolitica
changes and to what extent future orientation and control beliefs may be relevan!
in this process of dramatic socioeconomic and political change.
Socioeconomic and political change. On the one hand, the drastic chang'"
should affect the people's future time perspective and control orientation. On the
 ';~?".~
FUTURE TIME PERSPEcrIVE AND CONTROL ORIENTATION: ... 57

hand, coping processes should depend on the kind of future time perspective
control beliefs. Coping styles, in tum, should affect the way sociopolitical
ftjullSfolrmati()lls continue. Data on life satisfaction of the East as compared to the
German population demonstrate a much lower degree of satisfaction. The

~
~i;~~~~sco~res of East Germans are similar to those of West German
groups. In the same line, East as compared to West Germans
more political and economic difficulties arising from synchronizing the
Germanies, e.g., with respect to the labor market. At the same time, East
<3erm,ms are much more optimistic than West Germans (Landua & Zapf, 1991).
is even true for people who had to undergo economic and other difficulties
the unification.
:': Though these are aggregated data which do not really allow us to analyze
'.r::~~~~~on an individual level, they help us to formulate hypotheses about such
.~ processes being a result of social comparisons with West Germans. The

:
::~~~: future orientation may be a result of comparisons with one's own past
in the former GDR and may strengthen the willingness to cope with the
difficulties East Germans are facing. According to the recent literature
optimism,one may expect a high motivation for active problem solving and
:::.~~:.~~~Th::e tolerance for frustration should be higher for highly optimistic people.
I it is unclear how long the optimistic outlook on the future can be
.Dlres,erv'ed in spite of everyday disappointments and stress. .
Here, the kind of control orientation that is preferred becomes relevant. With
rel;pect to the dimension of attributional beliefs, one may assume that blaming the
unsatisfying (e.g., economic) situation on oneself would rather have derogating
consequences for one's self concept. Thus, external attribution to the disappointing
present situation should be preferred. As Bauer-Kaase (1993) has shown, West and
East Germans attribute responsibility for the problem to each other . West Germans
are more likely to attribute some responsibility to themselves. West German
ll
lIinternalizers and East German lIexternalizers" seem to view the present political
.... system of Germany rather negatively and sympathize with the concepts of
socialism. For East Germans, however, such externaIization does not seem to be
:> very helpful for coping. As a matter of fact, Bauer-Kaase (1993) observes anomic
tendencies for East German "externalizers." With respect to the dimension of
strategies for goal attainment, two kinds of control orientation are differentiated,
"primary" or assimilative vs. "secondary" or accommodative control (cf. Weisz
et aI., 1984), to predict successful coping and problem solving.
In dramatic situations of drastic changes in life conditions, as is the case for the
East Germans, a flexible strategy for reaching one's goals should be more
preferable than simply orienting oneself to either assimilative or accommodative
control. Assimilative control is necessary to actively influence one's own
environment, e.g., by political participation or by starting a new enterprise.
Accommodative control should be necessary when re-evaluating one's selfidentity,
one's value system, or more concretely when deciding to start a vocational
retraining program in order to be better prepared for the new job market.
Accommodative control allows an individual to give up certain goals which are
beyond one's reach without experiencing a loss of control and an anomic situation.
Accommodative control is useful in order to overcome frustrations and to switch
58 Gisela TROMMSDORFF

to alternative goals which can then be actively pursued. Such active goal
attainment calls for assimilative conirol and actively changing the environment.
This line of reasoning is different from Rothbaum et al. (1982) and Flammer's
(1990) theoretical approach. These authors assume that people follow a two-step
process of control, starting with "primary" control and shifting to "secondary"
control; in the event of failure, they finally experience a loss of control. This
model does not take into account the possibility of people starting with
"secondary" control and then shifting to "primary" control. In contrast to the two-
step model, it is assumed here that in a difficult situation, e.g., during the process
of a drastic socioeconomic change, a flexible shifting in priorities between both
kinds of control are not only possible but very adaptive. This again raises the
question posed by psychological data from cross-cultural studies in which
adolescents in Malaysia and Arab Druze in Israel who are facing significant
socioeconomic changes in their immediate environment show a preference for both
- "primary" and "secondary" control (see Seginer, Trommsdorff, & Essau, 1993).
Presently, East Germans are encountering a sociocultural context in which
assimilative control is highly valued. In an individualistic society and a free market
economy in which individual initiative and active influence are positively
rewarded, assimilative-control is prevalent. For East Germans, these values may
be in conflict with values of solidarity, obedience, and group orientation which
were socialized and highly reinforced in the former GDR and which are conducive
to accommodativtl control orientation (Trommsdorff, 1989, 1993b). However,
from what we know about the socialization conditions of East Germans before the
unification, we should assume that besides accommodative ("secondary") control,
assimilative ("primary") control was also partly adopted by the East German
people. So far, no systematic data on the East Germans' control preference or
possible changes during the process of socioeconomic change are available.

OUTLOOK ON FUTURE RESEARCH

In summary, present studies show that future orientation is strongly affected by

the ongoing sociopolitical changes. There is reason tu assume that people's control
orientation will also be affected. More should be known about the kinds and
processes of such effects since both, the kind of future time perspective and the
quality of control orientation as well as their specific relation to each other,
influence behaviors such as planning, problem solving, and coping. Therefore, we
may assume that direct and indirect effects on the processes of socioeconomic and
political changes exist and should be studied in more detail.
In conclusion, it seems necessary to analyze the relations between future time
perspective and control orientation, on the one hand, and the two concepts and
social change, on the other. So far, it seems promising to define future time
perspective and control orientation as distinct concepts. Both belief systems are
presumably based on the same general process of relating the self to the
environment. However, both belief systems should be studied separately by
employing different concepts and methods for operationalization.
The reason is that both belief systems presumably develop, differently, being
affected by certain socialization experiences in different ways. Both belief systems
 FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE AND CONTROL ORIENTATION: ..

to different psychological processes and have different functions for

behavior. Thus, from an ontogenetic and also from an actual-genetic
, both belief systems should be studied separately. However, both
closely related to each other and may contribute to adaptive as well
~i~:~J~~beh:::a~v!i'Or which are sometimes constructed in self-perpetuating
i,i cycles.
mUIlUiU relations between these belief systems which are mediated by
and social behavior are a promising topic of future research. Such
should specify the relations between individual and society.
E-MAIL: SYTROMOl@NYX.UN!-KONSTANZ.DE

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 DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE-ORIENTATION
A LIFE-SPAN CONTEXT

::J~ri-t;rik NURMI*
:~~:::~:~ of Psychology
t of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

A major feature of human thinking and acting is orientation towards future

and outcomes. This feature has recently assumed increasing importance in
ps:ych.olo,gic:al theories. Bandura (1986) stressed forethought capability as one of
basic features of humau thinking. Neisser (1976) discussed anticipation as one
the main functions of schemata and Oppenheimer (1987) underlined future
o;':::;~s,:as a major characteristic of goal-directed behavior. In these
f future-orientation refers to how people see their future in terms of

:::~::~~:~' goals, standards, concerns, plans and strategies. By setting goals,

plans and making causal attributions about influencing factors,
.r--r ..- work out different normative life-tasks (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987) which
characterize the contextual changes and challenges which occur as they develop.
However, future-time perspective, or future-orientation, has been under
.. investigation for decades. Lewin (1948) was one of the first to emphasize the role
::: of goals, plans and aspirations in this research field. The different aspects of
..... future-orientation, such as content (Frank, 1939), temporal extension and
.:::: coherence (Wallace & Rabin, 1960), and realism (Lewin, 1948), were conceptua-
Iized in the early studies. Although the first series of studies was published by
Israeli (1932, 1932-1933) in the 1930s, the majority of research has been carried
out during the last three decades. Following Gillispie and Allport's (1955) work
comparing adolescents' thinking about the future, covering IO countries, dozens
of studies have been published on the topic (for review, Nurmi, 1989d). On the
other hand, only a few investigations have concerned adults' future-orientation
(Rakowski, 1979; de Voider 1979, Bouffard et al., this volume).
In this paper, a theoretical model of future-orientation is first introduced. This
framework has similarities with some others presented recently in the field of
motivation, such as those concerning current concerns (Klinger, 1977), personal
projects (Little, 1983), strivings (Emmons, 1986) and life-tasks (Cantor &
Kihlstrom, 1987). Then, the results of two studies, one concerning adolescents'
 64 Jari-Erik NURMI

(Nurmi, 1987, 1989c, 198ge) and the other adults' future-orientation (Nurmi,
1989b), are summarized. Bringing together the results of these two studies
provides the opportunity to investigate the development of orientation to the
future over a fifty-year period of life. Although both studies are based on the
model presented, they are also closely related to traditional research into future-
orientation and time-perspective (Nuttin, 1984; Trommsdorff, Burger & Fiichsle,
1982).

FUTURE-ORIENTATION IN TERMS OF THREE PROCESSES

Orientation to the future is a complex, multidimensional and multistage

phenomenon. According to basic theories of cognitive psychology (Bandura,
1986; Neisser, 1976; Weiner, 1985) and action theory (Leontiev, 1979; Nuttin,
1984), future orientation is described here in terms of three processes,
motivation, planning, and evaluation. It is furthermore suggested that these three
processes interact with schemata concerning the future and self-development. This
model is presented on the right-hand side of Figure 1 (see also Nurmi, 1989a).

SOCIaL
.........
-
COlC'I'DT FtmJIlK-OaIIJft'A'rION

-,-
_orIn'
LIn-nan ... LU&-AM
......., .....
..... ICI ...'I'1m
VA'l'IOM
,/
..... Figure 1. Orientation to the
future. schemata concerning
anticipated life-span deve-
AC'I'IOif
OPPOItI\IIflTlP lopment and social context.

~:ILlft' ... =
Ia.r-
KVALU-
..'nOlI
v/'

.,..."...

According to the model, motivation refers to what interest people have in the
future. It is suggested that they set their future-oriented goals on the basis of
comparisons between their general motives and values and the knowledge they
have about their anticipated life-span development. Planning activity, on the other
hand, refers to how people plan the realization of their goals in a future context
(Nuttin, 1984). Knowledge about the expected 'context of future activities is
expected to provide a basis for this planning. Finally, evaluation concerns the
extent to which the interests are expected to be realized. Following Weiner's
(1985) ideas, it is suggested that causal attributions and affects concerning the
future constitute this evaluation process. Moreover, people evaluate their chances
of realizing their goals and plans according to their present view of their skills
and competence, i.e their self-concept, as well as their beliefs concerning the
controllability of different domains of life. The processes involved in orientation
to the future are considered in detail in the following sections.
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE-ORlENTATION .. , 65

Motives, Interests and Goals. Most of the' motives, interests and goals people
have are future-oriented, i.e. they refer to anticipated futore events and objectives
(Nuttin, 1984) . .since futore events and objectives are represented as expectations
concerning the futore. the knowledge on which these expectations are based plays
an important role in the development of futore-oriented motivation. In order to
set realistic goals, general motives and values have to be compared with
knowledge concerning the futore. By exploring knowledge related to motives and
values, people are able to make their interests more specific.
The development of futore-oriented motivation can also be described as a more
complex process involving a number of substages. In addition to asking what
people are interested in, it is possible to investigate what stage in the development
of this interest they have reached. Theories of identity (Marcia, 1980) and
goal-setting (Markns & Wurf, 1987) suggest that the development of motivation
can be outlined as a multistage process. :first, the emergence of new knowledge
which is relevant to people's general motives or values may provoke interest in
this specific topic. Then, people may begin to explore their knowledge about the
new interest. Third comes the setting of specific goals. Finally, people decide
whether they are ready to make commitments concerning their goal.
People's motives, interests, strivings and goals have also recently been
characterized as a motivational system consisting of a complex hierarchy, the
levels of which are assumed to differ according to the generality and abstractoess
of the intentions involved (Emmons, 1986; Lazarus & Folkman, 1987; Leontiev,
1979). The major principle behind this framework is that the higher-level
motives, values or strivings are realized via lower-level goals, which are further
worked out through a number of subgoals. On the other hand, higher-level
personal motives organize and integrate the lower-level goals into hierarchical
structores. It is also typical of the goal hierarchy that higher-level goals are less
related to specific knowledge concerning the futore than lower level goals.
Planning. The second major process involved in orientation to the futore
concerns how people plan the realization of their aims, interests and goals.
Although they may already have realization strategies or procedural knowledge
related to their goals, planning and problem solving are normally required
(Nuttin, 1984; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). According to the major ideas behind
cognitive psychology and action theory (Hacker, 1985; Nuttin, 1984; Pea &
Hawkins, 1987), planning for the futore falls into three phases.
First, individuals have to construct arepresentation of both the goal and the
futore context in which the goal is expected to be realized. Both of these
anticipatory representations are based on the knowledge people have about the
context of futore activities and they provide a basis for the next two phases of
planning. Next, people have to construct a plan. or strategy for achieving the goal
within the chosen context. The individual must invent the paths which lead to
goal achievement and then decide which of them is the most efficient. The third
phase of planning activity is the execution of the plans and strategies constructed.
As with general planning, this is also controlled by comparing the representation
of the goal and the actoal context (Miller, Galanter & Prlbram, 1960).
Evaluation. Finally, people also have to evaluate the realizability of the goals
they set and the plans they construct. It is suggested here that causal attributions
66 Jaci-Erik NURMI

and affects concerning future events constitute this third process of orientation to
the future, since they are both included in evaluating the possibilities of realizing
future-oriented goals and plans. According to Weiner's (1985) attribution-emotion
model, the attribution of success and failure to specific causes is followed by
specific emotions. For example, the attribution of success to internal and
controllable causes is followed by feelings of hopefulness and optimism (Weiner,
1986; Zaleski,1988).
It is also suggested that pecple evaluate their chances of realizing their goals
according to their present view of their own capabilities and the controllability
of.the domain of life their goals concern. Therefore, self-concept (Marsh, et al.,
1984) and control beliefs concerning different domains of life can be expected to
play an important role in the evaluation process.
Future-Orientation as a System. Orientation to the future is depicted in
Figore 1 as a three-stage process consisting of setting goals, planning their
actualization and, finally, evaluating iheir realizability. However, it must be
remembered that these three stages are related in a variety of ways. First, as
suggested by Bandura (1986), goals and personal standards provide a basis upon
which pecple evaluate their own performance: goal attainments build up a
positive self-concept and internal attributional beliefs. Secondly, the effectiveness
of the plans constructed influences the attainment outcome and also, therefore,
self-evaluation. Thirdly, as the arrow in Figure 1 indicates, how people evaluate
the causes of their success and failure in. turn affects the goals and aspirations
they set later.
Orientation to the future has been described so far.in terms of future-oriented
motives, goals, plans, causal attributions and affects. However, it was also
emphasized that (1) motives refer to future events and objectives, (2) planning for
the future is based on anticipation of the context of future activities and (3)
evaluation concerns the extent tu which people expect to ha'le control over
different domain~ of their life. Anticipation of normative life-events, planning
context and their 'controllability provides a contextual basis for the development
of orientation to the future. These contextual factors are described on the
left-hand side of Figore 1.
First, developmental differences in cultural norms, expectations, rules and
activity patterns have been characterized as developmental tasks (Havighurst,
1948/1974) or normative life-tasks (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Dittman-Kohli,
1986). The contextual model suggests that these tasks and their sodal timetable
provide a context in which pecple's future- oriented goals and interests develop.
Secondly, life-span~related changes in action opportunities provide a basis for the
development of future-oriented plans and strategies. These may include
age-related changes in social groups, institutional structures or even legal norms.
For example, it has been shown that students make decisions concerning
schooling at times imposed on them by the structure of the educational system
(Osipow, 1983, p. 180). Similarly, action opportunities to build up an intimate
relationship with a member of the opposite sex change with age during young
adulthood, as the percentage ofnnmarried people in a cohort decreases. Finally,
it is suggested that pecple's causal attributions vary across different domains of
life, reflecting differences in the objective controllability of theSe life-domains.
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURB-QRlENTATION ... 67

people's opportunities to control a certain domain of their life may also

age. For example, the ability to control health and physical fitness
as people grow older. It is suggested here that knowledge about
life-span development, the context of future activities and the
of different domains of life mediates the influence of social context
s orientation to the future.

A~~~~g FUTURE-ORIENTATION: PERSONAL GOALS,

fJi AND CONCERNS
on this framework, two ways of assessing future-orientation have been
e~:I~~:~~~H~~o,P~;es~an~d Fears Interview and Hopes and Fears Questionnaire (see
Is Burger, & Fiichsle, 1982). These methods will now be
4esc,ibe:d in some (for more information see Nurmi, 1989b; 1989c).

HOPES AND FEARS INTERVIEW

The generation of a list of hopes, goals and fears. In the Hopes and Fears
lnltenl;e,,,. people are asked "Would you like to tell me what kind of goals and
you have? What kind of hopes and dreams?" Their fears are investigated
asking them: "Would you like to tell me what kind of fears you have? Ate
any matters you feel bad about?" (The goals, plans, hopes, fears and
c()]lcerns mentioned by the subjects are then written down).
AsseSsment of the different dimensions. Whenever a specific hope, aim or
fear is mentioned, the subject is also asked:
(1) "Could you please estimate how old you will be at the time '* will be actualized?" This
question measures temporal extension related to hopes and fears.
(2) "Have you done something in order to realize * 1" (for hopes) "Have you done something in
order to make sure that * will not come true? (for fears)" This question is used to measure the level
of realization.
(3) "Could you please teU me how you intend to realize *1" (for 4opes) "Could you please tell me
how you intend to prevent * from coming true? (for fears)" This question is used to measure the
complexity of the plans constructed.
(4) "What do you think are the major factors that influence the actualization of * ?" This question
is used for analyzing the amount of knowledge.
(5) "Could you please indicate, using the following alternatives, the extent to which you think you
are able to influence the realization of *. " Participants are asked to indicate this on a 4-point bipolar
rating scale measuring internality-externality.
(6) "How likely do you think it is that * will come true?" ParticipWltsare asked to indicate this on
a 5-point bipolar rating scale measuring the probability that the hope or fear will be actualized.
(7) Before being questioned about their hopes, participants are asked: "How do you feel when you
think: about the future?'" The subjects are asked to indicate their feelings on a 4-point bipolar scale.
Scoring. Hopes and fears are classified and placed in one of ten categories on
the basis of their content. The following content categories have been used in
analyses of adolescents' hopes, goals and fears: future profession! occupation,
education!schooling, family/marriage, leisure activities, property, human
relations/home, their own health and death, the health and death of others,
war/nuclear armament, others.
Secondly, (a) hopes are classified in four categories, on the basis of content
analysis, according to how far advanced the subject's plans for realizing each of
68 Jari-Erik NURMI

them are. An identical analysis is carried out for fears. (b) Moreover, hopes are
classified similarly in three categories according to the level of realization, i.e.
the extent to which the plans have already been carried out. Again, an identical
analysis is carried out for fears. (c) The amount of knowledge about the factors
influencing the realization of the hopes or fears is also analyzed according to how
many pieces of pertinent information are mentioned in the interview. The
following summary of two studies does not, however, include results concerning
levels of planning, realization and pertinent knowledge (see Nurmi, 1989c).
The content analysis reliability of these variables, measured according to the
percentage rate of agreement between the two raters, ranges from. 77 to .96.

THE HOPES AND FEARS QUESTIONNAIRE

In the Hopes and Fears Questionnaire, a list of goals, hopes and fears is
generated using identical questions to those in the Hopes and Fears Interview.
Similarly, questions concerning temporal extension and internality are identical
on both measures. However, the questionnaire procedure does not include other
dimensions of future-orientation. Moreover, the scoring of the different
dimensions is identical on both measures.
The Interview method was used with an adolescent sample, whereas Hopes and
Fears Questionnaires were filled out by adults. Therefore, slightly different
categories were used when the content of goals was analyzed. The major
difference was that the following content categorieli were added in adults' goals
analysis: travelling. self. their own children. retiring, friends and global issues.
The content analysis reliabilitv of this variable for the adult sample was .90.

EMPIRICAL WORK ON ADOLESCENTS' AND ADULTS'

ORIENTATION TO THE FUTURE

A summary of the two studies gives an overall view of the development of

future-orientation over a fifty-year period of life. In the first study, 114 eleven-,
104 fifteen- and 49 eighteen-year-old adolescents (149 boys, 118 girls) were
investigated in 1982 and 1987 using the Hopes and Fears Interview. All the 11-
and 15-year-old subjects attended secondary school. Of the groups of 18-year old,
23 subjects attended high school and 26 attended commercial school.
In the second study, using the Hopes and Fears Ouestionnaire, a total of 371
adults (107 men, 264 women) aged between 20 and 64 were studied in 1988. The
subjects consisted of 114 college students, 233 public servants and 24 elderly
students at a local community college.
In the following analyses, the groups of 11-, 15- and 18- year-old adolescents
in Study 1 and the groups of about twenty- (19-24), thirty- (25-34), forty-
(35-44), fifty- (45-54) and sixty-year-old adults (55-64) in Study 2 are compared.
As my purpose is to give a general overview of the development, the emphasis
is on descriptive data. Furthermore, ouly the results concerning hopes and goals
are presented. (For the results concerning fears, see Nurmi, 1988). Consequently,
the differences in the methods used must be considered when the results of the
two studies are compared.
 li'~, }~,~~~;
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE-ORIENTATION ... 69

of Goals. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, the results showed that

orientation to the future reflected the major developmental tasks of
and early adulthood (Newman & Newman 1975), such as those
to future education, occupation, family and property. Furthermore,
in future education increased between the ages of 11 and 15, whereas an
interest in future occupation, family, and property-related issues was
between the ages of 15 and 18. Consequently, adolescents seem to
interested in the developmental tasks oflate adolescence before they start
about those of early adulthood. Although not included in Figures 2 and
young people's hopes concerning future leisure activities were found to
de<~rease during early adolescence, reflecting continuing changes of interest from
to work (Nurmi, 1989c).
'N

.."
.."
of
Subjects
..
"
H
"
30150.,

Figure 2. Percentage of subjects mentioning Figure 3. Mean temporal extension scores

goals related to future occupation, education for goals of different contents by
and family in different age groups. different age groups.

Moreover, Figures 2 and 3 show that, during early adulthood, people are most
interested in their future education, occupation and marriage. Thus, young adults'
future-orientation is similar to that of older adolescents. Later on, as thinking
about education and marriage-related issues decreases at about the age of 30,
people first become interested in property-related issues and, later on during
middle-age, in their children'S lifeand their own health. However, interest in
occupation does not decrease with age. These changes in people's interests again
fit to age-graded developmental tasks as characterized in the life-span approach
(e.g., Havighurst, 19481 1974; Newman & Newman, 1975).
The results were true both for males and females and ouly a few sex
differences were found. For example, girls were more interested in a future
family than boys (Nurmi, 1989a). Similarly, women were more frequently
interested in their children's future life than men. On the other hand, elderly
women mentioned goals relating to the occupational domain of their 1ife less
frequently than men.
 70 lari-Erik\NtJRMl'

Temporal extension. Next, temporal extension scores for the most freq\lently
mentioned content categories, Le., ..education, occupation, .family, property,
children's life and their own health, were analyzed. Since the content categories
in which people were interested varied to a large extent according to the age of
the subjects, temporal extension scores are not presented for each content in all
age-groups (Figure 4) .

.
.
o "
Figure 4. Mean temporal
o '0 extension scores for goals
of different contents by
E"=~";] different age groups.

" [-.:-:Q
u [ -~'::g
. "
o

au r,,~_.ti_
occ f .. tIOta _ U o n
.... f"t...ra fo.J.ly
f1lOlO ~r'J
"'n
_ .,.,Udr_
_ _lth

As shown in Figure 4, the results revealed that, irrespective of age,

adolescents' temporal extension reflected "the cultural prototype" .of expected
life-span development: young people expected to finish their education first, then
to get a job, thirdly to get married and to build up a material basis for their later
life. When this temporal extension was analyzed further, it was also found that
thinking about the future did not concern the fourth or later decades of life.
The results of the adult sample showed that young adults' temporal extension
was similar to that of older adolescents. Typical of both groups was that the
temporal extension of their interests relating to their future education, occupation
and family was only a few years. This was also true for older adults' interests
concerning these domains of life (Figure 4). On the other hand, older adults'
interests related to their children's future life and their own health extended
relatively far into the future. However, it has to be remembered that people
become interested in these topics particularly during middle-age.
In all, the resnlts indicate that an extended temporal time span is typical of the
stages of life during which people become interested in developmental tasks
different from those they have w.orked with earlier. For example, during
adolescence, when young people become interested in their future education,
work and family, they show relatively long temporal extension. Similarly, during
middle-age, when they become interested in their children's life and their own
health, they again show relatively long temporal extension related to these
 I~~,Z:~;:.~
TIlE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE-ORIENTATION ... 71

domains of life. On the other hand, it seems that the goals and plans with which
people have been working for a long time during adulthood, such as future work
and family, typically concern the relatively immediate future.
Causal attributions and affects. Analysis of the overall internality scores of
goals based on aggregate data showed that preadolescents' beliefs about future
goals became more internal with age. Similarly, the probability estimations of
goal realization, indicating optimism, increased during early adolescence. When
overall emotional evaluation of the future was analyzed, it was found that boys
became more optimistic with age, whereas girls tended to become more
pessimistic (Nurmi, 1989c). These results are similar to those reviewed by
Petersen (1988, p. 590) showing that girls, in contrast to boys, appear to increase
in depressive affect over the adolescent period.
The results of adults' goals and hopes based on aggregate data showed a high
negative correlation between the overall internality score and age (r = -.38,
.... p < .000). Brandtstlitter, Krampen and Heil (1986) also found that internality
decreased with age.
However, it is possible that the increase in overall inter-nality during early
adolescence and the decrease during adulthood is partly due to the changes in the
topics in which people are interested. As evident from Figures 2 and 3, young
people become particularly interested in their future education during early
adolescence. The fact that their control beliefs concerning this domain of life
were more internal compared with those concerning other domains of life (Figure
5), partly explains the increase in overall internality during early adolescence.
Similarly, younger adults were relatively more intere-sted in a future family and
education and older people in their children's life and their own health. Since
people felt that they had less personal control over their children's life and their
own health compared with their future education and family, this change in
interest partly explains the decrease in overall intema1ity during adulthood.
To investigate whether the decrease in internality with age is also true for
different domains of life, the internality scores for the different contents of goals
in the eight age grollps were analyzed separately (Figure 5). However, as the
content of goals varied to large extent according to the subject's age, the
internality scores are not presented for each content in all age groups.
The results showed first that young people's intema1ity concerning their future
occupation and education did' not increase with age during early adolescence,
whereas during late adolescence their beliefs about their future education become
slightly more internal (Figure 5).
Secondly, in adults' thinking, age differences in internality varied according to
the domain of life in several ways: Their beliefs about their own health and their
children's life became increasingly external with age. On the other hand, people
became slightly more internal about their future education and family before
middle age, after which intema1ity concerning these domains of life decreased
significantly. However, as oulya few middle-aged adults mentioned goals related
to these topics (Figure 2), a variety of reasons for this decrease Can be put
forward. Finally, internality related to occupational domain did not change with
age.
72 Jan-Erik NURMI"

In all, the results emphasize the

importance of taking into account the
age-related changes in (1) people's
interests and (2) related contextual
factors when cj1anges in overall
internality are analyzed. First, as
adults grow older, they seem to
become increasingly interested in
developmental tasks (their own
health, children) over which they
feel they have less personal control
than in those in which they were
u .. " .. .. interested in eariy adulthood
(education, family). Secondly,
people's opportunities to control
different domains of life decrease
Figure 5. Internality scores for goals of different with age. When children grow up
contents by different age groups. and become mo're independent,
parents' level of control over their
life decreases. Similarly, biological and physiological changes related to aging
decrease people's real possibilities of managing their health.

SUMMARY
Orientation to the future was described in terms ofthr"" processes, motivation,
planning and evaluation: People set goals based on a comparison between their
motives or values and their expectations concerning the future. Next, they work
out how to realize these goals, which is typically done by means of planning.
Finally, causal attributions and affects concerning the future were thought to play
an important part in evaluating the realizability of goals and plans.
It was also suggested from a contextual point of view that developmental tasks
and their timetable provide the context in which people's goals and interests
develop. The results of the two studies summarized fit this hypothesis, showing
that people's hopes and goals concerned the major developmental tasks of their
own age or the next life-stage. Moreover, it was found that temporal extension
of these goals reflected "the cultural prototype" of anticipated life-span
development. People also tend to think as far as the remote future in connection
with developmental tasks in which they have only recently become interested. On
the other hand, the goals and plans on which people have been working for a
long time typically concerned the relatively immediate future.
It was also suggested that life-span related changes in people's interest and the
life-context they concern are reflected in their evaluation of the future.
Adolescents were found to become increasingly interested inUfe-tasks over which
they felt they had more control. Similarly, adults seem to become increasingly
interested in life-tasks over which they feel they have less control than in those
in which they were interested in early adulthood. Moreover, as'adults grow older,
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE-ORIENTATION ...

their beliefs concerning their children's life and their own health apparently
become less internal, reflecting the objective changes in these domains of life.
Finally, it was suggested that the development of planning for the future may
reflect action opportunities in different domains of life, as well as the
development of individual planning skills. However, this issue was not
investigated in the two studies summarized .
Note: E-MAIL: NURMI@F1NUHA.Bitnet

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Marsh H., Cairs L., Relich J., Barnes J., & Debus R. (1984). The relati()nship between
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THE PERSONAL FUTURE IN OLD AGE

Uand", BOUFFARD' Etieooe BASTIN Sylvie LAPIERRE

College de Sherbrooke Universite de Sherbrooke Universite du Quebec
Sherbrooke. Qc, CWlada aTrois-Rivieres

INTRODUCTION
Elderly people are interested in their past and reminiscing about the past can be
adaptive and therapeutic (Butler, 1963, 1981). But also, the present has a larger
part in,their life space than the past (L'Ecuyer, 1980). The present is as important
for elderly ,as itis for other age groups (Cameron et al., 1977-78). Elderly people
are also equally interested in their future (Bouffard, Lapierre & Bastin, 1989;
Kastenbaum, 1982, Rakowski, 1979). They consider the future" ... as part of life
itself.. " and the time that remains "... as a valuable resource, to be used well for
as long as it lasts ... (Erikson et al., 1986, p. 64)." Before discussing empirical
research on FTP in old age, we will first define the notion of FrP, its dimensions
and correlates.
The personal future is defined here in terms of a future time perspective (FTP):
"The ability to foresee and anticipate, to make plans for and organize future
possibilities represents one of the most outstanding traits of man" (Gjesme, 1983,
p. 347). FTP is a cognitive-motivational variable. It is constituted by mental
representations of future events (Fraisse, 1983) which are invested with value and
affect (Nuttin, 1984). Fnture time perspective is considered to be a fundamentally
important variable in explaining human behavior (Bischof, 1976; Bouffard et aI.,
1987; Hazan, 1984; Lazarus & DeLongis, 1983; Liber, 1982; Nuttin & Lens,
1985; Schiinfield, 1973; Rakowski, 1986).
We will now define the basic concepts or dimensions of psychological time in
general and of future time perspective in particular (see also Nuttin & Lens,
1985). Time orientation refers to the temporal dimension (the past, the present
or the future) that is dominant for a given individual. In which temporal direction
are his preoccupations and interests predominantly oriented? Future time
perspective can be characterized by the density of the number of events
anticipated in different future time periods, by the degree of structure or relations
between elements (such as a means-end relation), by the' content of the
anticipations, and, finally, by the extension or length of the time interval between
the present and the future moments at which the already anticipated events are
expected to happen. Without distance, extension or length,' there is no
perspective. This conceptualization of FTP does not correspond to the capacity
to use the future as an abstract category (as studied by Piaget, 1946). The
individual FTP results from the motivational goals, aspirations and behavioral
 ~~.,'.\~~.'~
76 Uandre BOUFFARD, Etienne BASTIN & Sylvie LAPIERRE

projects that an individual has formulated for himself. It is not a chronological

but a motivational future time perspective (Nuttin & Lens, 1985).
A long and active FfP is created by elaborating long term goals and behavioral
plans on the covert, representational level, which must then be enacted on the
overt level in order to be achieved. FfP contributes to a higher positive self
esteem (Liber, 1982) and to stronger feelings of competence (Deci & Ryan,
1985). It enhances actions (Zaleski, 1987), and higher levels of aspiration
(Nuttin, 1984) and performance (De Voider & Lens, 1982; Nuttin, 1971; Raynor,
1969). Length of FfP is positively correlated with adaptation (Spence, 1968),
hope (Weinberg, 1976; Wolff, 1971), morale (Lewin, 1942), life satisf'!ction and
psychological health (Chown, 1977; Dickie et al., 1979; Steuer, 1977; Thomae,
1981), the perception of physical health (Rakowski, 1986; Thomae, 1981) and the
perception of internal control (Nuttin & Lens, 1985; Schulz & Hanusa, 1978).
A long FfP increases the meaning of life (Reker et al., 1987) and prevents
depression (Lazarus, 1971). Future time perspective is an important variable for
"human progress" (Nuttin & Lens, 1985).
Our research question,then, is to know what happens with this important
personality dimension and its functioning among older people for whom the
chronological future is becoming rather short. Do they still elaborate and strive
for motivational goals in the more or less distant future? To answer this question,
we will first review the literature on FTP in old age and how it is related to sex,
age, socio-economic and educational level, degree of functional autonomy and to
life circumstances. We will then discuss our own empirical research. Studies on
the correlation between FTP and other psychological variables (e.g., individual
perception of p,,"ysical health, locus of control, meaning of life, life satisfaction,
etc.) are extensively reviewed in Bouffard (1990).

FUTURE TIME PERSPECTIVE IN OLD AGE

FfP can change during the whole course of life (Buhler, 1968; Lens & Gailly,
1980). It has the plasticity (Kostin, 1979) to adapt to cultural, situational and
even experimentally induced influences (Nuttin & Lens, 1985). How does FfP
change or develop within old age as a function of other personality variables and
situational circumstances?
FfP and gender. Spence (1968) found that men have longer plans for the
future than women. However, the difference was small (one to two weeks).
Zibbell (1972) also reported less planning among older women than among males
of the same age. Chiriboga (1982) tested recently divorced men and women and
found longer planning periods among the women. At all age levels, but especially
in old age, men had a lower morale and were more helpless as a consequence of
their divorce. Staats and Stassen (1986) did not find a difference for their
measure of hope. The women did, however, score higher than the men on the
item that referred to the achievement of long term goals. In a series of
exploratory studies, Bouffard (1987) found that men in the 70-75 age group had
more short term than long term projects. He attributes this finding to the high
number of men from a lower socio-economic level in his sample. In all the
following studies no sex differences were found among elderly (Cameron et al.,
 THE pilRSONAL FUTUlU! IN OLD AGE

"0'77_'7)(' Dickie et al.; 1979; Gonzales & Zimbardo, 1985); Hansson, 1986;
lto,welll, 1977; Kastenbaum, 1963; Kostin, 1979; Kuhlen & Monge, 1968; Kulys
Tobin, 1980; Rakowski & Clark, 1985; Thumber, 1974). Also, the studies on
the Nuttin-group in Leuven and the Thomae-group in Bonn d() not report
differences. Although these findings are somewhat diverse, we can maintain
hypothesis of no difference in the extension of the FfP of older women and

. FI'P and age. In a more traditional approach based on physical and biological
niodels, chronological age is considered to be strongly correlated with
psychological age (see, for example, the earlier writings of Birren, 1959). Thus,
to be old means, almost by definition, to have several problems, reduced life
expectations and a loss of the future (Thompson & Streib, 1961). According to
this approach, it is as difficult to imagine old age with a future as it is to imagine
youth without a future. In a subjective, phenomenological approach, however, the
relation of man to time is considered to be very complex (Kastenbaum, 1977) and
characterized by many interindividual differences (Thomae, 1981). Chronological
age is no longer viewed as a good index of psychological age. It does not say
very much about how an individual perceives and feels about his or her age
(Hendricks & Hendricks, 1975). For Birren (1988, p. 1(j2) " ... there is a loose
coupling between biological time and psychological time". In this view, there
should not be a strong relationship between age and future time perspective. The
results of empirical research on the relationship between age and FfP are
inconclusive. Some studies show that old people have a shorter FfP than younger
people (Gonzales & Zimbardo, 1985; Krajcir & Sundberg, 1979; Kuhlen &
Monge, 1968; Lowenthal et al., 1975; Staats & Stassen, 1986). Other studies did
not find a difference (Boniecki, 1980; Carr, 1985; Cameron et a\., 1977-78;
Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Eson & Greenfeld, 1962). Lens and Gailly (1980) and
Nuttin and Grommen (1975) confirmed the hypothesis of a curvilinear (inverted
V-shaped) relationship between chronological age and extension ofFfP. It grows
to its maximum in adulthood and declines in old age to the level it more or less
had in adolescence and early adulthood.
Studies done exclusively with elderly subjects show that the amount of planning
(Hansson, 1986), the temporal extension of motivational goals (Bouffard, 1987;
Lapierre, 1990) and the temporal range of their concerns (Riverin-Simard, 1983)
stay rather stable during old age. The important longitudinal research of the
Bonn-group found relations between FTP and several other variables, but no
linear relationship between age and the extension of the FfP (Thomae, 1981,
1987a, b, c). So, we may conclude that the length of FTP is more or less
curvilinearly related (inverted V-shaped) to age when we look at all age
categories. However, it stays rather stable during old age, although there may be
some fluctuations due to a number of variables.
The decrease in the extension of FTP reported in some studies with the elderly
is not always an effect of age as such. Israeli (1936) mentioned that the sterile
and reduced amount of future projections that can sometimes be observed among
elderly age people, are also typical for other age groups living in difficult life
circumstances or with frustrations, stress etc. (see also Kenyon, 1988r After an
exhaustive review of the literature, Bouffard (1988) lists 13 variables that are
78 Uandre 'BOUFFARD, Etienne BASTIN &- Sylvie LAPIERRE l'lo\, i:~~~",~-

related to a reduced future time perspective in old age. He carefully avoids

attributing the shorteniug of FfP to age as such when it can be explained by
other variables. He concludes that the 33 studies on age and FTP do not allow
the conclusion that FTP decreases because of age as such. The results of
Rakowski (1979) and Kastenbaum (1982) were similar. Older people seem to
keep their habit of setting more or less long term goals, even in their final life
period (Birren, 1988; Biihler & Massarik, 1968).
FTP and socio-economic level. Empirical studies on the relationship between
socio-economic level and future time perspective show contradictory results.
Nevertheless, it seems that in all age groups people of a lower socio-economic
level are more present oriented and have a shorter future time perspective. Some
authors (e.g., Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Nisan, 1973; Nuttin et al., 1979;
Schneiderman, 1964) argue that it is more functional ,and realistic to be present
oriented than to elaborate long term projects, when living in conditions where the
future is uncertain and unpredictable because of social, political or economic
reasons.
There is little research relating FTP to socio-economic level in old age. A few
studies show that socio'economic level does affect some aspects of dimensions of
the psychological future, but not its extension (e.g., Cameron, 1977-78; Levy,
1978; Gonzales & Zimbardo, 1985; Shifflett & McIntosh, 1986-87). Thomae and
his collaborators found effects on the degree of adaptation and on cognitive
functioning, but not on FTP. However, most oflheir subjects belong to the low-
middle social class (Thomae, 1987a).
Lens and Gailly (1980) and Nuttin and Grommen (1975) measured FTP in a
representative sample of the, Belgian population. They reported a positive
relationship between socio-economic status and the extension of FTP. People of
a higher social class have a significantly more extended FTP. The differences
between the three socio-economic levels are most pronounced in older age
groups. In old age, people of a low socio-economic level have a significantly
shorter FfP than their peers of a middle or high socio"economic level. Their FTP
is also shorter than the FTP of young people of the same low socio-economic
level, which is not true at the middle or high socio-economic level.
FTP and level of education. We know of no direct studies on the relationship
between schooling or level of education and FTP among elderly. Schmidt et al.
(1978) found a more extended FfP for adults with a higher level of education
than for adults with a low level of education. Trommsdorff (1983) argues that the
level of education has an effect on a broad range of individual experiences. It is
not unreasonable to hypothesize a positive correlation between the level of
education or schooling and the length or extension of FfP among people in their
old age.
FTP and functional autonomy. A decline in.iunctional autonomy is defined
as a more or less permanent increase of social dependency that is caused by
objective facts such as sickness, reduced financial income, illiteracy, etc. At the
more SUbjective level it causes' feelings of helplessness (Ennuyer, 1987; Hobert,
1982). It is quite evident from daily observations and, from many studies that
functional autonomy or independence decreases, in old age (Dillard, 1983;
Neugarten, 1982). This has an effect on many life experiences and individual
characteristics such as the future time perspective.
 THE PERSONAL FUTURE IN OLD AGE

The links between health and FTP (Levy, 1978, 1978-79; Rakowski, 1979;
Thomae, 1981) supply relevant information about the relationship between FTP
and degree of functional autonomy. Health problems are indeed at the origin of
social handicaps and requests for help. Thomae (1987b) found that people with
a long and active FTP are more effective in coping with health problems.
Rakowski (1986) and Rakowski and Hickey, (1980, 1983) developed a model in
which FTP and health decisions are integrated. For Rakowski, there is no doubt
that FTP is related to the prevention and treatment of health problems ..
Rakowski and Clark (1985) studied the direct link between FTP and the loss of
functional autonomy. They measured "the extension of the personal future" with
direct questions concerning individual anticipations of the future, and correlated
',-:
this measure with an index of the amount of help received and the degree of
limitations in actions (scored in collaboration with the individual's physician).
They found that FTP decreases with increasing handicaps and need for assistance.
The hypothesis of a positive relationship between FTP and functional autonomy
is well founded in theoretical and empirical work.
FTP and living conditions. Entering a home or institution for elderly people
has, of course, many consequences. Fink (1957) found a shorter FfP among aged
people living in an institution than among their peers still living in their
community. Dickie et a!. (1979) report that more old people living at home plan
future activities. Rosenfeld et al. (1964) and Hughes (1979) found that the
extension of FTP is negatively correlated with the amount of time spent in an'
ins.titution. Kostin (1979) found that elderly people who recently entered an
institution (less than one year) benefited more from a program intended to
elaborate the future time perspective than those who had been institutionalized for
a longer period of time. These findings suggest that living in an institution and
length of stay here affect the extension of FTP in a negative way.

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
HYPOTHESES

Based on the literature that we reviewed and on our own previous research on
FTP in old age, we formulate the following hypotheses for the empirical study
to be reported in the remaining part of this chapter.
1. There are no sex differences in the extension of FTP.
2. The extension of FTP does not have to decrease because of old age.
3. People of lower socio-economic levels have a shorter FTP than people
with a higher socio-economic status.
4. The extension of FTP increases with increasing level of education.
5. The extension of FTP decreases with increasing loss of autonomy.
6. Elderly individuals living in an institution have a shorter FTP and the
longer they stay there, the shorter their FTP.
80

The empirical basis fQr these hypotheses, however, is not very conclusive or
strong. There are 'several reasons.fQr this. Very often the concept of FTP is not
well defined and its componentS or. dimensions not disentangled. Measures of
FTP may be unreliable (e.g., one single question; suggestive questions). 1;hey
certainly are very heterogeneous (e.g., questionnaires, drawil1gs, projective
techniques, events tests, story completion techniques) and hence their fiudings are
difficult to compare. Methodological shortcomings have to do with the lack of
control variables, an insufficient number of subjects and inappropriate statistical
analyses (for a discussion of these theoretical and methodological problems, see
Kastenbaum, 1982; Nuttin et al., 1979; Rakowski, 1982, 1984-85). Finally,
research on FrP in old age also suffers from what Butler (1969) called "age-
ism": the future is most often approached as limited, disappearing or fading away
(Bouffard, 1987) or measured in very inappropriate ways as indicated by Maehr
and Kleiber (1981) regarding the need for achievement. We took into account all
these types of errors in our empirical study.

METHODOLOGY
Subjects. In the research 708 subjects from.li5 to 90 year old were individually
intervieWed. They were asked for collaboration in a study on old age. They knew
in advance that they had to .answer questions for about 30 to 50 minutes and that
their responses were confidential. The number of refusals was very low. This
may be due to the fact that they were contacted via a local religious organizati,?n
for the elderly (The Golden Age Club) or via a friend of the subject. Table 1
shows the number of subjects as a function of age and gender.

Table 1. Distribution of men and women according to age categories.

Age Men Women Total

N. (%) N (%) N (%)

65-69
70-74
75-79
80 +
~ !~fl
52 29
38 21
130 69
102rl
126 71
143 79
162rl
187 26
178 25
181 26
Total 207 (29) 501 71 708

Note: For some analyses, there are fewer subjects because some of them did not answer to
all the questions. .

There were many more WOmen (N=501) than men (N=207) in our sample
(mean age = 75), and the ratio of women increased with age. The socio-
economic level was determined by the subject's profession during his or her
active life (blue collar = low level; white collar = high level). Women who did
not have a job outside the home were classified as a function of their husband's
 ~~i~, ;i~~"'~
THE PERsONAL FUTURE IN OLD AGE 81

profession: 65% of the subjects were, of lower socio-economic level. The level
of education was rather low: 57% of the subjects did not study beyond primary
education. Within the whole sample, 355 subjects were healthy and autonomous
(group A). They lived independently in their community (either in their own
house or in an apartment) and 351 subjects had lost their functional independence
or autonomy. The degree of functional autonomy or impairment was measured
with a detailed questionnaire (Hebert, 1982) that was administered by well-trained
research assistants. Specific or concrete questions and objective criteria for
scoring allowed for a high reliability (Hebert, 1984).
The impaired group was further subdivided into two subgroups: subgroup AI,
with 162 subjects, was less helpless or impaired than subgroup A2, with 189
subjects. Elderly people who could not take care of themselves at all were not
included in this study. A hundred ninety three subjects from subgroups Al and
A2 lived with host families who were part of a governmental social service
network or in private institutions for elderly people, whereas 148 of the Al and
A2 subjects still lived in their house or in an apartment. Our sample was not
representative of the elderly in Quebec (Canada). The detailed characteristics of
this sample will be taken into consideration in data analyses.
Data collection. We used the Motivational Induction Method, MIM (Nuttin &
Lens, 1985) to sample the motivational goals and projects of the subjects.
Subjects were presented with 23 sentence beginnings such as, "I would like ... ",
"I wish ... ". This method induces ouly a general motivational orientation but
permits the individual to freely express, in his or her own words, personal,
conscious and specific motives. The sentence beginnings do not suggest any
temporal distance, although they refer, of course, to the future. Subjects are
invited to be spontaneous and honest in their responses. The interviewer creates
a climate of collaboration that is necessary for this type of questionnaire. The
sentence completion technique is very sensitive to situational circumstances,
experimental manipulations and individual characteristics (cf. Lens & Nuttin,
1984). Based on 20 years of applications, Nuttin and Lens (1985) argue for the
face validity of the method. Palys and Little (1983) stress the ecological validity
of this type of questionnaire. Coding reliability for trained people is indicated by
an interscorer agreement on 90 to 95% of the responses. Bouffard, Lens and
Nuttin (1983) found a coefficient of concordance (cf. Tinsley & Weiss, 1975) of
.83, which is very high for this type of data. Stability of results is tested with
test-retest or split-half reliability (Nuttin & Lens, 1985, chapter 2). The MIM has
a validity and reliability that allows for sampling the motivational objects (goals,
aspirations, plans) of groups of subjects.
Data analysis. Our subjects expressed 15.020 aspirations in their MIM-sentence
completions. We aualyzed those answers for the extension of their future time
perspective. Taking into account that a detailed coding of the FTP is a very
complex procedure, we preferred a more simple technique. We coded only three
different temporal categories. The Near Future includes all goals that normally
can be reached within a one year period (e.g., to go to the movies; to visit my
daughter soon; to spend this winter in Florida; to be healthy again very soon).
82 Uandre BOUFFARD, Etienne BASTIN & Sylvie LAPIERRE

The Distant Future includes aspirations which can only be realized later than one
year from the present (e.g., to have my wife with me as long as I live; that my
children do not fight because of my last will). Responses that cannot be classified
in a specific time period because they apply to the present, but a present that is
extended into the future, belong to the Open Present category (e.g., to be happy,
to be honest, world pesce). The temporal classification was done by two trained
coders who discussed problems until total agreement on all codings was reached.
The relative number of goals within the near future and within the distant future
gives a global idea of the extension of the FrP in the different groups. This Index
of future extension is calculated by the proportion of the number of goals in the
near future to the number of goals in the distant future, multiplied by l(lO. The
higher this index is. the shorter the FIP. This index will be used to test the
hypotheses. Because the scores are not normally distributed we will use
nonparametric analyses such as chi square and gamma correlation.

RESULTS

Table 2 gives the relative frequency of the three temporal categories as a

function of the degree of functional autonomy. The category "distant future"
(more than one year from the present) has the highest frequency, certainly among
the individuals classified as functionally autonomous.
We will now analyze in detail the relationship between FrP and the other
variables discussed earlier.

Table 2. Distribution of answers in temporal categories as a function of the level

of functional autonomy.

In loss
Autonomous of autonomy Total
N=355 N=351 N=706

N % N % N %

Near future (1301) 16 (2158) 30 (3459) 23

Distant future (4127) 53 (2795) 39 (6922) 46
Open present (2406) 31 (2233) 31 (4639) 31
Total (7834) (7186) (15020)

FTP and gender. Figure 1 gives the number of men and women in each
quartile of the FIP-index distribution (quartile 1 = long FIP; quartile 4 = short
FIP). There are relatively more men than women with a temporal score below
the median (longer FIP). But the difference is not siguificant (x'- (3) = 3.62).
This result holds for each age group, for the two socio-economic levels, for the
 l*:. . (*~~f-
THI\ PERSONAL FUTURE IN OLD AGE 83

two types of living conditions

and for the three levels of oI_ w_

functional autonomy. Within 30

the subgroup of subjects with a
low level of education we do
25
find a significant' relationship
between gender and FTP-
extension, with relatively more %o'W","", 20
males having a longer FTP (~,..)
(x' (3) = 12.35, p < .01).
FrP and age. Table 3 15
gives the relative number of
subjects in each quartile of the
distribution for FTP-extension
as a function of age. There is a
rather low but significant 4 3 2
correlation between these two !!!" (OuDltiIeS)

measures. The gamma

correlation is .14 (p<.OOI)and Figure L Distribution of men and women when FrP
x' (9) = 27.42, p < .001. The is divided into quartiles (Quartile I ~ Extended FTP).
extension of the FTP decreases
with increasing age.
Table 4 lists, for each of the four age groups, the relative number of subjects
scoring below the median for FTP-extension as a function of the other variables.
A score below the median means a longer FTP. For the women, we notice a
significant decrease of FTP as a function of age ('Y = .20, p< .01). At the low
socio-economic level (-y = .15, p < .05) and at the)ow level of education ('Y =
.17, p < .05), the decrease of FTP with increasing age is less strong but
significant. The corresponding chi-squares are not significant. However, the
extension of FTP increases with age in the subgroup with the lowest level of
functional autonomy (subgroup A2: 'Y = -.39, P < .01) and in the group of
functionally handicapped people still living in their own home ('Y = -.26,
p < .05). In all other subgroups the relation between age and FTP is not
significant.
These results confirm the hypothesis of no relationship between extension of
FTP and age as such. FTP increases in some subgroups. It decreases in other
groups and it stays stable for the majority of the subjects. (For more details, see
Bouffard, Bastin & Lapierre, in press).

FrP after the age of 50. We live in an age in which chronological age as
such is becoming less important. Neugarten and Hagestad (1976) talk of an "age-
irrelevant society". More so than in the past, there are large differences in the
age at which people retire from professional life. For these reasons, the age of
65 as the beginning of old age is becoming more arbitrary. To broaden the scope
of research on FTP as a function of age, Lapierre (1990) studied 52 women and
36 men older than 50~(mean age = 61). They all lived a regular life in their
community. Twenty three subjects were professionally involved, while the other
 84

-'Table 3. Distribution of subjects according to age categories when FrP Index is divided
into quartiles (Quartile 1 = extended FrP).

QUARTILES

Age N 1 2 3 4

% % % %

65-69 (161) 37 20 19 25
70-74 (187) 25 30 22 22
75-79 (176) 22 21 32 24
80+ (179) 18 25 27 30
Total (703)

x'- = 27.42, df = 9, P < .001, 'Y = .14, P < .001

Table 4. FI'P and age. Relative frequencies of subjects below the median according to age
groups and to the indicated variables (Below the median ,= extended FTP).

Age 65-69 70-74 75-79 80 + x'-

% % % % (df=3) . 'Y
sex
Men (205) 53 61 48 50 2.23 .07
Women (498) 58 52 41 41 10.28* .20**
Socioeconomic status
Low (437) 50 51 36 40 7.31 .15*
High (233) 59 63 50 49 3.35 .14
Education.
Primary
school (377) 49 53 38 38 5.93 .17'
-High
school (280) 62 60 51 54 2.52 .12
Functional autonomy
A (355) 69 65 58 65 2.20 .10
A1 (161) 20 49 .41 33 4.62 .06
A2 (185) 9 24 21 39 9.59' .-.39**
Housing (for A1 & A2)
Own house (146) 16 35 36 42 5.03 -.26'
Seniors'
residence (193) 10 46 31 33 4.51 .002
Total (703) 56 55 43 43 11.32** .17**

* p<.05 ** p<.Ol
Note: A positive coefficient means that FI'P decreases with age.

65 were retired. Thirty eight of the retired people followed some type of
educational program. The data were collected with Nuttin's Motivational
Induction Method (Nuttin & Lens, 1985) and analyzed as explained above.
 THE PERSONAL FUTURE IN OLD AGE

Lapierre found that FfP was not related to age, gender," level of income, nor to
being retired or not. The subgroup of those who followed a study program had
a somewhat less extended FrP, but the difference was not significant. Subjects
with a higher level of education expressed significantly (p < .05) more goals for
the near future (75% of the subjects finished at least 11th grade). Fifty percent
of all the responses were situated in the distant future (more than one year from
the present). This corresponds to our data for the subgroup of people who are
still functionally independent.
FfP and soclo-economic level. As shown in Figure 2, individuals from a
higher socio-economic level have a more extended FrP than individuals from a
lower level <x' (3) = 13.37,p<.014; 'Y = -.20,p<.001).
This relationship is
strongest for men (x'=5.53,
'Y = -.26, P < .01), for younger
age groups (-.24 & -.27,
o I...
~

4.
P < .01) and for people with
high functional autonomy (-.24,
p< .01). It is less strong for
" oI8VOfeCt& 30
women (-.18, p< .01) and for ''"''')
more educated people (-.17,
P < .01). It is not significant in 20
the other groups.
" In the subgroups of more
functionally dependent people,
the association is very weak, 4 3 2

but in the same direction as in !!!'COwrtllee,

the other age-groups (see also,

Bouffard, 1980; Cottle & FIgure 2. Distribution of subjects of high and low
Kiineberg, 1974; Nuttin et al., socioeconomic status when FfP Index is' divided into
1979; Schmidt et al., 1978; Quartiles (Quartile 1 = Extended FTP).
Trommsdorff, 1983).
FfP and level of education. As shown in Figure 3, people with a high
school education have a longer FrP than those with a lower level of education
<x' (3) = 13.53, P < .01; 'Y = -.20, P < .001).
The gamma correlations for different subgroups are not very high, but in the
predicted direction and significant in the youngest (65-69 years, 'Y = - .20, P < .05)
and in the oldest age group, over 80, ('"(=-.24 p< .05), at the higher socio-
economic level (-.25 p< .01), for men (-.21p< .01), for women (~.19,p< .05),
for those who still live at home (-.18, p< .01) and for those who are functionally
autonomous (-.14, p< .05). The x' is only significant for the total group (13.53,
p< .01) and for the subgroup of women (15.08, p<: .01).
FTP and functional autonomy. We find a high and significant gamma
correlation between the extension of FfP and the degree of functional autonomy
('"( = .48, P < .001). The FfP decreases with increasing degree of impairment
(see Figure 4). '
 Uandre BOUFFARD, Etienne BASTIN" & Sylvie LAPIERRE

" 011
A AI U

40
40

......,
f subfects 30

2D

4 3 2 4 3 2

Figure 3. Distribution of subjects of high Figure 4. Distribution of subjects

and low educational level when FrP according to functional autonomy
Index is divided in quartiles when FI'P Index is divided into
(Quartile 1 = Extended FrP). quartiles (Quartile 1 =Extended FTP).

Table 5 shows that this correlation and the corresponding chi-square are
significant for men and women, at the two socio-economic levels and at the two
levels of education. It is .75 in the youngest age group (65-69 years) and it
decreases with increasing age. The relationship between FTJ,' and functional
autonomy as a function of living conditions can only be studied. for subjects with
functional impairment because subjects without functional impairment live in their
home. Table. 5 shows that the correlation is not significant (.16) for those who
still live at home. ancl significant .26 (p < .01) for those who live in an institution.
However, in both groups the chi-square is not significant. As such, the
relationship between FTP and functional autonomy is not strongly affected by
living conditions. The restilts at the bottom of table 5 show thai being
autonomous or not has a major impact on FTP. But the degree of impairment (AI
or A2) does not have much effect. The correlation is .22 for the total Al plus A2
group and increases to .48 when the functionally unimpaired subjects are added.
In general, we can conclude that there is a strong correlation between functional
impairment and FTP.

FrP and living conditions. The following analysis clarifies the importance of
functional impairment and living conditions. This comparison must be limited to
subjects with functional impairment (148 subjects living at home and 200 living
in an institution for the elderly). We did not fiud any difference between these
two groups. Also, within the ,different subgroups" we did not find a difference
between people living at home or in an institution. .
Moving from one's own house to the institution means the beginning of a
 THE PERSON~ FUTURE IN OLD AGE

Table 5. FfP (in quartiles) and functional autonomy (in three categories), Chi-quares
and gamma correlations for the studied sub-group~.

Variables N JC (df=6) -y

Sex
Men (210) 34.77*** .49***
Women (498) 81.05*** .49***
Age
65-69 (161) 45.32*** .75***
70-74 (186) . 28.09*** .49***
75-79 (175) 26.77*** .44***
80 + (179) 13.99* .25**
Socioeconomic status
Low (439) 54.15*** .42***
High (235) 42.23*** .49***
Education
.. Primary school (378) 58.33*** .46***
:::~: . High school + (383) 41.75*** .47***
Housing
Own house (AI +A2=147) 2.44(df=3) .16
Residence
for seniors (A1+ A2= 193) 6.29(df=3) .26**
Total
A+A1+A2 (708) 109.04*** .48***
A1+A2 (347) 8.0S*(df=3) .22**

* p<.05, ** p<.Ol, ***p<.OOl

Note: A positive coefficient means that FrP increases with autonomy.

somewhat different life with all its positive and negatjve consequences. The
adaptation process and finding one's own place within the institution community
may influence subjective attitudes towards the future.
Based on the number of years spent in an institution, we formed three
subgroups: one year (124 subjects), two years (48 subjects) and three or more
years (28 subjects). For the three groups, the number of subjects (%) scoring
below the general median (long FTP) was as follows: one years group - 30%,
two years group - 42%, and three or more year group - 35%. We see an inverted
U-shaped distribution, but the association is not significant (x'- (2) = 1.72). This
finding is repeated within Ihe different subgroups, based on age, sex, socio-
economic level, level of education and functional autonomy. The extension of
FTP is not related to the length of time spent in an institution for elderly people.

DISCUSSION

Elderly subjects expressed a broad variety of motivational goals and aspirations

with a direct technique that does not affect the content of the verbal responses.
These goals were classified according to their .temporal distance. Based. on this
classification we calculated an Index of FTP as a measure of its extension. We
gg Uandre BOUFFARD. Etienne BASTIN & Sylvie LAPIERRE ~",C).~<-,,

then analyzed the relationship, for elderly people, between this measure and
several other variables. We will now comment on some of our results.
As hypothesized, the FrP of women is not longer thim men's, although women
have longer life expectancy , at least in the western world. Why do women, who
may expect to live longer, not have a longer FrP than men? This result may
partly be due to the rather crude measure of the extension of the FrP. It is also
possible that the anticipation of a broad variety of problems and limitations does
not instigate long term projects. And finally, women may not live,
psychologically, with the idea of an objectively longer life. This hypothetical
explanation is part of a more general theory that holds that the SUbjective reality
(e.g., FrP) is not always correlated with the objective or chronological reality
(Bouffard, Bastin & Lapierre, in press; Hendricks & Hendricks, 1975;
Kastenbaum, 1979).
The results for the relationship. between age and FrP in different subgroups
confirm the hypothesis that the reduction in FrP during old age depends on a
number of variables but not on age as such. Subjects in the 65-69 years age group
with a loss of functional autonomy (AI and A2) have the shortest FrP. They
seem to experience their future as closed. Older subjects, however, experience
functional impairment as more "normal" for their age and they continue to set
goals for themselves. The way in which people perceive their life condition (their
limitations) seems to be - at least a posteriori - important for their personal
future. It is surprising to see that such a high percentage of people older than 80
and with functional impairment (A2), but still living at home, have a long FrP.
One can question the degree of realism of their aspirations. It is also possible that
their subjective perception of their life condition explains this result. Indeed,
many of them said during the interview, that they were proud of the fact that they
still live at home, notwithstanding their age and handicaps.
The relationships between FrP alld the other variables were not always stable.
For example, the relationship between ,FrP and socio-economic level decreases
for subjects without functional autonomy and it disappears in the very old age
group. The relationship between FrP and level of education is much lower for
less autonomous subjects (A2). It is difficult to generalize the relationship
between FrP and" those variables for elderly people, although the trend is the
same as for other age groups.
The strong association betweeu FrP and functional autonomy also decreases
with age because there is not much differeuce in functional impairment in the
very old and, accordingly, in their FrP. We do not find a difference in FrP
between those who live at home" and those who live in an institution. Others
found a shorter FrP among people in an institution, but that may be due to
variables uncontrolled for in their research (e.g., age, functional independence,
etc.). When we keep these variables constant, the difference disappears. The time
spent in an institution does not affect the FrP, but it may decrease the extension
if the elderly are held in a dependency position.
We will place our results in a broader context. Attributing much importance to
the future does not mean to ueglect the importance of the present and the past in
 THE PERSONAL FUTURE IN. OLD AGE

mental life nor their role in the explanation of behavior. To the contrary, FrP
contributes to a "temporal integration" (Markson, 1973). It gives a "perspective"
to older people (Erikson et al., 1986; Kastenbaum, 1966) and it enhances "time
competence" (Shostrom, 1968). People with time competence can use .their past
experiences, act in the present and take into account theirprojects for the future:
"These could be described as proactive older adults whose wisdom embraces far
more than just adaptation to the present" (Birren, 1988, p. 171).
The development of FrP starts in infancy (Lewin, 1935) and it changes during
the whole course of life (BUhler, 1968; Lens &.Gailly, 1980). The el.iboration
of new goals and the readaptation of old ones is a very important task in old age
(Atchley, 1985; Bischof, 1976; Schiinfield, 1981). The achievement of this task
makes it possible to continue one's personal development (Moody, 1988), which
does not stop in old age (Cohen 1984). Being involved in personal goals and
projects C8D.also give meaning to life (again) and to old age (Baird, 1985; Reker
& Wong, 1988), notwithstanding the unavoidable problems that come with older
age. To strive for goals, to develop new strategies and to continue self regulation
are very important, following Birren's "counterpart" theory (Birren, 1988). This
theory stresses that psychological growth is possible even in biological decay.
Programs to develop the FrP were successful with young delinquents (Ricks et
al., 1964), high school pupils (Leblanc, 1985; Sosnowski, 1976), unemployed
people (Lemaire, 1985) and the elderly (Koslin, 1979). We should, therefore,
create and evaluate prognims intended to develop the FrP or to reverse a
reduction of FTP in old age (cf. Bouffard, DuM, Lapierre & Bastin, 1990).
Developing the FrP of the elderly may have positive effects on mental health,
because FTP is related to many psychological variables, as discussed in the first
part of this chapter. Bouffard and Leclerc (1990) plan to study .the relationship
between FTP and self realization in order to develop a training program in this
field. This work is complementary to Butler's (1981) on the "life review".
Finally, we must mention that there is not much cross-cultural research on FrP
in old age. Bouffard (1980, 1982) reviewed research on the FTPofyoungpeople
in Africa. Cameronet al. (1977-1978) studied the dominant time orientation of
subjects in many countries, but they did not have many subjects older than 55 (3
in Ghana, 5 in India and 13 in Iran). Thus, there is really a need for cross-
cultural research on the extension of FTP in old age. Bouffard (1982) and
Cameron et al. (1977-78) warn against the danger of cultural stereotypes and
biases. They also discuss the more methodological problems of translations,
interpretations and understanding in cross-cultura1 research .

... Acknowledgments: This research was supported by a grant from "Les fonds pour la
Fonn.tion de Chercheurs et I' Aide a 1. Recherche du Quebec" (89-AR-0735) .nd from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant 492-86-0015);
The authors thank professor W. Lens for the translation of the French manuscript.
90

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 PART 2

Dynamic aspects of Future

Time Perspective
ON LIVING TOMORROW TODAY: THE QUALITY OF
INNER LIFE AS A FUNCTION OF GOAL EXPECTATIONS

Eric KLlNGER*
Division of Social Sciences
University of Minnesota, Morris, MN, USA

We all spend a substantial amount of time thinking about the future. In

thought samples.. of college students (Klinger & Cox, 1987-88), we found that
about a third of thoughts were rated as dealing with something other than the
present, and about. a third of those, or about one thought in eight (12%)
overall, were focused on something in the future. Given. the brief average
duration of thoughts, we estimate that people average about 4000 waking
thoughts a day, 12 % of which amount to 480 future-oriented thoughts daily.
The future makes up a substantial portion of our daydreaming throughout the
lifespan. Using the Imaginal Processes Inventory, Giambra (1974, 1977) found
that scores on scales assessing the present, past, and future in daydreaming
were overall at about the same level, suggesting that - at least from their
recollections of their daydreaming - people think about' present, past, and
future in about equal proportions.
Daydreaming about the futUre somewhat exceeded daydreaming about the
past in most groups in late adolescence, young-adulthood, and middle age and
gradually fell somewhat below daydreaming about the past only in old age.
Even then, the difference was not great. Similarly, a sample of mostly young
college students estimated that when they imagined a personal interaction with
another individual the interaction was set in the future more often than in the
past (Edwards, Honeycutt, & Zagacki, 1988).
The frequency with which humans are preoccupied with the future is no
accident. It is an inevitable outgrowth of the fact that humans organize their
lives around their goals, which lie by definition in the future. The goal-
orientedness of human life is receiving an upsurge of renewed attention (e.g.,
Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langston, & Brower, 1987; Emmons, 1989;
Halisch & Kuhl, 1987; Klinger, 1977, 1987; Little, 1989; Pervin, 1989;
Zaleski, 1987); but it is rooted in the most central imperatives of almost all
zoological life. There are in the universe broadly speaking two plans for the
survival of life forms. One of these we might call the sessile plan, which is to
sit in place and depend on the environment to provide nutrients, fertilization,
and hospitable conditions and to carry off toxic substances. It carries a high
price in the demise of individuals and places a heavy burden on procreation,
98 Eric KLINGER.

but it is an effective plan, as witness the success of plant species. The second
plan we might call the motile plan. Under this plan, organisms play a role in
seeking out the substances and conditions they need for survival. This plan
places a heavier burden on the flexibility and complexity of the individual, but
it places the individual less at the mercy of the immediate environment. It is
the plan followed by most members of the animal kingdom.
Life for the motile organism is a succession of searches and pursuits. These,
of course, are oriented toward things that foster species survival or away from
things that jeopardize it. To put this in current psychological terms, motile life
is organized around goal pursuits. This is the case whether we are speaking of
amoebas or flat worms or Nobel prize winners. To put this still another way,
zoological life and behavior are organized around goal striving, and such a life
form can succeed only insofar as it successfully attains its vital goals.
Therefore, in the course of evolution, it is goal striving that is most central,
and it is the requirements of goal striving that will have the most pronounced
effects on the direction that evolution will take. This, of course, puts motiva-
tional systems at the core of life and at the center of behavioral organization.
It follows that all 'behavioral systems, including cognition, must have evolved
according to their success in fostering goal striving. It is therefore no wonder
that human cognitions are often concerned with the future, with future paths
toward goals and with future goal consummations.

FROM REACTIVITY TO MENTAL REACTIVITY:

A MODEL FOR FUTURE-ORIENTED MENTATION
Simple organisms are programmed to react to conditions and stimuli, both
those within themselves and those outside themselves, that propel them toward
appropriate goals. More complex organisms, and certainly humans, commit
themselves to goal pursuits, during which they are sensitized to react to cues
relevant to successful goal-striving. By the time evolution led to humanity,
humans had become capable of sustaining extended interruptions of a given
goal pursuit without abandoning the pursuit. In the normal course of living,
most of our most important goals require that we interweave our instrumental
activities for one goal with those for other goals. We interrupt professional,
artistic, romantic, and spiritual goal pursnits to eat, sleep, take out the
garbage, and attend to various important goals, and yet we come back to the
interrupted goal pursuit, often without any loss of vigor or resolve. We
continue to react to the cues of interrupted goal pursuits even when there is
nothing constructive that we can do about them. The difference is that we
react on a purely mental level, inhibiting the overt activity that might other-
wise have been part of our reaction. These mental reactions take the form of
images and verbal thoughts that are related in one way or another to the goal
of which the cues reminded us. Sometimes, they take th" form of instrumental
thoughts about the goal pursuit, at other times the form of spontaneous daydre-
ams; but they are in most instances thoughts that bear a relation to our
I
Ii-
ON LIVING TOMORROW TODAY: THE QUALITY OF INNER LIFE __ _

personal future - a relation to anticipated goals or possible goals - even when

they are ostensibly about the past or when they depict a fanciful vision of the
future. This system of reacting to goal-related cues is part of a larger system
that underlies our capacity for distraction. Although we tend to think of
distraction as a nuisance to be avoided, it is fundamentally important to
survival, for it enables us to respond to cues of danger or opportunity whose
importance will sometimes supersede that of whatever we may be doing at the
time. Among humans, the cues to which we respond may be internal as well
as external, our own previous thoughts as well as environmental stimuli. To
that extent, our capacity for distraction is in part a capacity for self-distraction,
which, as we shall see, also contributes to effective functioning.
The mental reactions to these cues are real reactions in at least two senses.
First, they are reactions in parts qf. the same brain systems that would be
involved in an overt reaction. Second, they have the potential for affecting our
capacity for and tendency toward overt action in the future. Thus, they are far
from h\ling merely epiphenomenal. What distinguishes them from overt
reactions is neither their isolation from regular brain processes nor any lack of
influence on overt behavior, but largely their encapsulation from the outside
:~ : . world. That is, these mental reactions run their course without any necessary
further reference to the immediate stimulus environment, and they generally
do not spill over into overt motor activity. In other respects, they constitute a
kind of (to modify Piaget's term) interior action - and I include here under
action perceptual activity as well moving voluntary muscles.
The reasons for believing that mental images are interior action in this global
sense are that
1. healthy people can be fooled into confusing mental images with reality
(perky, 1910);
2. visual imagery makes it harder to see something real unless it happens to be
the same thing one is imagining (Segal& Fusella, 1970);
3. brain areas active in seeing are also-active in mental visualizing (Farah, 1988;
Farah et aI., 1988; Kunzendorf, in press);
4. brain damage that destroys one's ability to see certain kinds of things also
knocks out the ability to imagine them (Farah, 1988);
5. mental images of moving create electric81 activity in the muscles one imagines
moving (Jacobson, 1929-30, 1930, ~1932);
6. mental images, like overt acts, 'chn,' be shaped through conditioning and
training (Elison, 1941);
7. mentally practicing physical skills such as shooting baskets can improve the
level of the overt physical skill (Heuer, 1989);
8. working through mental images can help people to change their emotional
reactions (Leuner, 1980; Lipsky, Kassinove, & Miller, 1980); and
9. working through mental images can help to improve social skills (Kazdin,
1979) and other aspects of personal growth.
To the extent that mental reactions are (a) really aim-inhibited interior
action, (b) really governed by our goal pursuits, and (c) formed in reference to
our goals, they constitute a present-moment psychological representation of the
future - truly psychological living in a perceived future.
100 -Eric KLINGER .:,' ")"

DEPENDENCE OF MENTAL CONTENT ON SPECIFIC GOALS

If mental imagery is interior action, . it is easy to conclude that goals
determine mental content for exactly the same reasons they determine
behavior. In fact, one could conclude that when we are reminded of a goal and
can profitably take immediate action toward it, we act, and when we cannot
act we think. To put this another way, when something evokes a goal-related
reaction pattern, we react - completely if the circumstances are right, and
otherwise ouly mentally. In either case - action or thought - we are occupied
with one of our future goals.
We investigated this phenomenon in a series of studies. For example, a
golfer is sitting in our laboratory listening through a headset to two different
narrations, one to each ear. On one chalmel, in the middle of a long passage,
the narrator mentions insects. A fraction of a minute later, the tape sounds a
tone and stops - a signal to the listener to describe his thoughts. He reports
that his thoughts had been about golfing when the reference to insects drew his
attention, and "that's when I noticed how bad they really were when we went
golfing and how they just wouldn't leave you alone - they'd fly all around
your head ... The last thing I was thinking about was all the bugs and ticks up
north ... and I was just thinking about how bad the mosquitoes were. "
This was no simple word association to the tape. Out of all the things on the
tape that might have triggered a train of thought, this reference to insects sent
the listener into a stream of vivid images about being bothered by "bugs and
ticks up north" while gOlfing. The golfer's report exudes life and feeling. He
is obviously living through something in his mind that has some of the
properties of reality, including strong feelings. It is as if the insect reference
tied intu a scenario in his head that was primed to roll, a. concern (having a
particular unmet goal) about something he would have to' contend with if he
continued to go north to golf. This example illustrates the fairly transparent
relation of thoughts of all kinds to goals - a by-now frequent finding, not ouly
in the laboratory but also in field settings (Klinger, 1977, 1987). For example,
Roberson (1984) assessed subjects' work concerns and then sampled their
thoughts, using a beeper to signal them to report, during the subsequent work
week. Even though her method for assessing concerns was directed just at ,
work-related concerns, she found that two-thirds of her subjects' thoughts
were related to the concerns recorded before the start of thought-sampling.
Another participant in the same experiment as the golfer listened to
narrations that included the worlls "the powers of a man of learning." When,
shortly thereafter, the tape stopped, he reported: "And then I thought what it
would be like if I was the ouly person who knew that we were actually here
and had the true answer; I thought what a celebrity I'd be and how much
money I could make for selling the answer, and I pictured myself with a
mansion.", What a thrill that would be ... !" Again, out of all the phrases to
which this listener cOuld have reacted, he responded to something close to his
heart - something related to his concern of getting good grades and the future
they might bring. Just as with the golfer, the words on the tape that triggered
a daydream were words that bore on one of his most compelling goals.
 '~i,./.$:",Jt
ON LIVING TOMORROW TODAY: THE QUALITY OF INNER LIFE ... 101

In those experiments (Klinger, 1978), we did more than just look at coinci-
dences between what was on the tape and what listeners reported thinking
about. We also modified the narrations in certain ways. Before the day of the
experiment, each participant had given us interviews and filled out
questionnaires about their current concerns. We now doctored the scripts from
which our narrators taped their narrations: at varying intervals, we modified
one of the two scripts to allude to a current concern of the particular listener.
We then modified the second script - the one being played into the listener's
other ear - so that it simultaneously alluded to things that we thought were
probably not of concern to that listener. At each of these intervals, then, we
pitted two allusions against each other: into one ear, an allusion to a current
concern, and into the other ear an allusion to a nonconcern.
Nearly a third of the listeners' thoughts were related to the modified
passages that alluded to their current concerns about unmet goals, which was
twice as many thoughts as were related to the passages .\hat alluded to
nonconcerns (Klinger, 1978). This suggests that daydreams and other thoughts
arise when we run into something that reminds us, consciously or unconsci-
ously, of our unmet goals in situations that do not lend themselves to taking
overt action. We respond with the mental acts that our experience equips us to
direct at those goals - perceptual acts, such as the golfer's hearing and feeling
the mosquitoes, as well as thoughts and imaginary actions and outcomes, such
as the student's profiting from selling his exclusive knowledge.
Using this experimental paradigm, we have also demonstrated. effects of
concern-related cues on the dreams of sleeping subjects (Hoelscher, Klinger,
& Barta, 1981). Dream content was related to cues that bore on subjects'
current concerns three times as often as to other cues. This finding showed
that we are dealing with a process that is both automatic and pervasive. Taken
together with the othe~ findings, it is safe to say that. what people imagine and
when they imagine it both depend On their current concerns and hence on the
future goals to which they have committed themselves. It is not only the
identity of specific goals that determines what we think about. Where we are
in relation to them also makes a difference. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987)
divided goal pursuits into a number of phases, of which they have investigated
two most intensively: a predecisional phase and a postdecisional phase. By
sampling subjects' thoughts in an experimental setting, they found that subjects
who were trying to decide a choice of goals thO)lght more often about values
and expectancies than about implementing a course of action. Subjects who
had already chosen their goals thought more often about implementation.
When subjects were asked to complete incomplete stories (Gollwitzer,
Heckhausen, & Steller, 1989), the characters of predecisional subjects were
more reflective and the characters of postdecisional subjects were more
inclined to take action, even though the themes of the stories were unrelated to
the goals about which subjects were pre- or postdecisional. Remarkably,
subjects also differ in other ways between these two phases, such as in
memory span and realism (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989). Heckhausen and
Gollwitzer therefore labeled predecisional consciousness as a deliberative
mindset and postdecisional consciousness as an implemental mindset. They
102 Eric KLINGER

have thereby established a new dimension in the effects of goal pursuits on

mental content and cognition.

MECHANISMS WHEREBY CONCERNS ABOUT GOALS

STEER COGNITION
The precise mechanism by which concerns about goals influence mental
content or other cognitions is still unknown. However, there are growing
indications that the effect is mediated by emotional reactions. As an early
indication (Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980), the factors that determine how
much any particular concern engenders thought (as reported on retrospective
questionnaires) are things such as the value of the goal, expectancy of success,
time urgency, and frustration. All are related to emotion. In an experiment by
Young (1987), the peripheral, incidental cues that most distracted subjects
from a simple lexical task were related to goals high in value and expectancy.
Words that subjects have been instructed to process semantically are more
likely to be recalled the more that subjects rated them (1) as emotionally
arousing and (2) as related to their current concerns (Bock &' Klinger, 1986).
These two variables - arousal value and concern-relatedness - were themselves
strongly correlated; but the relatively few words that subjects rated as
emotionally more arousing than average but not closely related to a current
concern were recalled as well as words that were both; and words that were
strongly concern-related without being arousing were recalled no better than
words that were neither. It appeared that, insofar as emotional arousal value of
a semantically processed word can be separated from its concern-relatedness,
it is emotional arousal that plays the critical role. That makes it appear as if
emotion may mediate the influence of motivation on recall. If emotion plays
the critical role in recall, perhaps it also plays that role in thinking.
Since that time we have found two additional indications that emotions play a
critical mediatillg role. Schlleider (1987) gave participants in his research a
lexical task som\lwhat similar to Young's, with incidental distractor words that
subjects were instructed to ignore. Later the participants rated each word
according to how much emotion it made them feel. Emotionally evocative
words, such as "blaze" or "wreck" slowed reaction times in the lexical task
significantly more than emotionally neutral words, such as "vowel" or "cable."
The role of emotion in this investigation is corroborated by a further
measure. Those of Schneider's participants who scored high on an individual
differences Affective Intensity Measure (Larsen, 1987) had longer response
latencies and hence shOWed more interference from the emotionally charged
words than people who scored low. These participants had also taken Kuh!' s
(1985) Action Orientation Questionnaire, which produced a similar pattern of
results. If we take the Affective Intensity scores at face value, Schlleider's
results are consistent with the interpretation that emotional reactions play a
significant role in the flow of cognitive activity. In other words, we react with
part of our cognitive apparatus to cues that arouse emotions. The reaction is
automatic, and it may interfere with th'; ongoing activity.
 ON UVING TOMORROW TODAY: THE QUALITY OF INNER LIFE ...

Schneider's experiment used no measures of current concerns or other

motivational constructs. His work therefore does not link emotional reactions
to motivation, but other recent results by Nikula (Nikula, Klinger, &
Larson-Gutman, 1989) do. Nikula took electrodermal measures from subjects
during a period of rest. He also interrupted them periodically with a tone,
which signaled them to rate their thoughts and feelings. Half the tones occur-
red immediately following a spontaneous fluctuation in skin conductance. The
others occurred during electrodermally inactive times. The results show that
thoughts following spontaneous fluctuations were rated as significantly more
closely related to current concerns about future goals than thoughts duriog
inactive periods, which were more often related tu past ("dormant") concerns.
They were also rated as accompanied by significantly more emotional arousal.
Ratings of concern-relatedness and arousal were strongly correlated.
Two more aspects of these various results are worth noting. First, the
mechanism by which emotionally arousing stimuli elicit cognitive activity
seems to be automatic and inexorable. Hoelscher et ale (1981) showed the
effect on dream content while subjects were demonstrably asleep. Both Young
and Schneider found that their distractor stimuli slowed reaction time even
though subjects had been instructed tu ignore them. In Young's experiment,
the distractors were visually tu the left of the focal point for target stimuli, and
they were embedded in many other distractor words that were standard and
probably neutral. Young's subjects under later questioning showed no
awareness that the stimulus screens contained anything emotionally evocative.
Second, the fact that emotional reactions probably mediate the effects of
concerns about goals on cognition does not diminish the importance of those
concerns. The emotional reactivity of subjects to these cues is in most
instances instated as a consequence of the individual having been committed to
a goal pursuit. In other words, in speaking of this kind of emotioual reactivity,
we are really speaking of one aspect of harboring a concern about a goal.

FUNCTIONS OF CURRENT-CONCERN-DIRECTED
FUTURE MENTATION
I have described a system by which the cues of concerns about goals trigger
mental reactions, in the form of mental images and other thought components.
Although this system is responsible for most of the. distraction to which
humans are subject, it is, paradoxically, also a system that helps humans to
manage effectively an often complex life. Because it is driven by emotional
reactions to goal-related cues, it is a way of returning our consciousness to
those of our goals that are emotionally most compelling to us and,
presumably, therefore important. In this way, the system keeps ever before us
our personal agendas. It thereby functions as a kind of reminder system, which
helps us keep our lives organized and helps us keep track of our many affairs
that we are not working on at any given moment.
Those of our mental reactions that focus on the future explore our options for
future action, action in regard to goals important enough to engender
104 BricKUNGER

emotional reactivity. Most of these reactions will be relatively realistic

previews of our possible future situationS and responses. However, up to a
quarter on average will' contain fanciful or dream-like elements (Klinger &
Cox, 1987-88). These can be thought of as mental attempts to operate with
fewer of the reality constraints that we ordinarily impose on ourselves. They
therefore contain the seeds of creative solutions (Klinger, 1971, 1990).
The same mental reactions can serve as a form of mental rehearsal for the
tasks ahead of us. The value of covert rehearsal has by now been well
demonstrated in various clinical settings. Its value seems to be enhanced when
clients are encouraged to give their natural daydreaming tendencies during a
freer play (Kazdin, 1979), a condition that encourages the influence of current
C01lcerns and their attendant emotional reactivity. Also college students appear
to imagine interactions with others mqre often before thR1l after actual
inter,lctions with these same others (Edwards, Honeycutt, & Zagacki, 1988).
This, together with copious protocol evidence, suggests a spontaneous use of
imagined future interactions as rehearsals for the real thing. Finally, it appears
that mentally previewing the steps necessary to attain a possible goal can help
move one tuward a commitment to the goal (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, &
Ratajczak:, in press). The kinds of future-oriented mental reactions described
here may therefore playa significant role in decision-making.

GOAL ANTICIPATIONS AND THE QUALITY OF INNER LIFE

Because most of o~r thoughts and accompanying affects are determined by
our goals, the goals we ch,oose determine most of the contents of
consciQus1less. They thereby determine our inner decor and the experiential
tenor of our lives. For example, the number of important personal
relatiOnShips and other goals is strongly related to an individual's sense that
his or her life is meaningful, which is in tum related inversely to the use of
alcohol (Klinger, 1977). The person's subjective probability of succeeding in
those goal pursuits is correlated inversely with depressed mood (Klinger,
Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980). The proportion of an individual's goals that are
aversive is a relatively strong correlate of job satisfaction (Roberson, 1984).
In a saniple of alcoholics, 'goals and the alcoholics' attitudes toward them
were related to s!;veral variables of psychopathology and affect (unpublished
data collected with W. M. Cox). The subjective probability 'of reaching their
goals was correlated inversely with scores on the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Ii:tventory seales" for Depression, Hysteria, Psychopathic Deviate,
Paranoia, Psychasthenia, Schizophrenia, and Social Ii:ttroversion. The mean
amount of sorrow subjects expected to feel if they do not reach their goals was
correlated significantly and positively with all of those same variables except
the last, as well as with measures of guilt, worry, and anxiety associated with
drinking. The proportion of goals that are aversive is correlated with the
Alcohol Use Ii:tventory scales: Drinking to Help Manage Mood and the
Quantity of Daily Use When Drinking.
 .~i; .:~;..~
ON LIVING TOMORROW TODAY: THE QUALITY OF INNER LIFE... 105

It is therefore clear that what preoccupies us and the emotions we feel are
tied to the nature of our goals and our expectancies for reaching them.

.. Acknowledgments: Portions of this work were supported by Grant MH24804 from the
National Institute of Mental Hes1th.
E-MAIL: KLINGER@CAA.MRS.UMN.EDU

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CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE WITH PRESENT HERAVIOR:
AN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE APPROACH

Alan STRATHMAN* David S. BONINGER*

University of Missouri, University of California,
Columbia, MO, (USA) Los Angeles

Faith GLEICHER Sara M. BAKER

University of California, Santa Barbara University of Oklahoma

INTRODUCTION

In our modern time, we frequently face recommendations to plan far our fature
with our current actions. From the earliest age, we hear that we should "save for
a rainy day. " We listen to actors in television commercials warn us "You can pay
me now, or you can pay me later," implying that if we fail to perform regular
maintenance on our automobile, we will end up with large repair bills. And when
we become older we are inundated with insurance sellers attempting to persuade
us to buy insurance now to avoid financial disaster later.
Not only do such appeals make us aware ofthe relationship between our
present behavior and future events, they also imply that there is some benefit in
addressing potential future outcomes with our current behavior. In fact, an
individual who refused to save money, perform regular maintenance on his/her
automobile, and buy insurance would be viewed as foolhardy. The failure to
perform such actions may render an individulll unable to cope with future
negative events, and unable to achieve futore positive outcomes.
The importance of this relationship between present behavior and distant
outcomes also can be viewed within the domain of physical health. Research
indicates that good health in later life is a result of lifestyle-related choices, many
of which are made much earlier in life. A diet of foods high in fat and choleste-
rol, accompanied by significant alcohol use and cigarette smoking, has been
related to increased chances of heart disease or cancer at a later point in time.
A final domain in which current behavior can influence future outcomes is
considered by many to be one of the greatest challenges facing the world today:
the state of the natural environment. Environmental problems such as depletion
of the ozone layer, increased levels of "greenhouse" gases, and exhaustion of
landfill space are issues which will reach crisis level in 15-20 years, but which
must be addressed proactively with current behavior.
 If..);Jij.~~,1!
108 Alan STRATHMAN, David BONINGER, Faith GLEICHER & Sara BAKER

Even though consideration of the future consequences of our actions (or

inactions) seems tu have important benefits for individuals, and for collections of
individuals, not all people are influenced by the distant outcomes of their
behavior. In fact, there seem to be distinct differences in the extent to which
individuals actually consider the possible future consequences of their behavior,
and are influenced by that consideration.
One situation in which individuals may not be influenced by possible future
consequences is when immediate events are so pressing as to be lire threatening.
Such a situation occurs in many inner-city areas where poverty and violence are
everyday concerns. Taking actions to shape future outcomes may seem
unimportant tu individuals who do not expect to survive to experience the future.
In situations like this, the more adaptive strategy may be to consider only the
immediate consequences of behavior. Some evidence for this idea can be found
in previous research (Lamm, Schmidt, & Trommsdorff, 1976; Nurmi, 1987)
which has identified a positive correlation between socioeconomic status and
future orientation.
Previous research also has found a relationship between future orientation and
juvenile delinquency. Researchers studying this relationship have hypothesized
that individuals who have engaged in delinquent behavior wonld be less future
oriented either because their immediate circumstances are too pressing to allow
for consideration of the future, or because they lack the optimism that their
circumstances will improve. Barndt and Johnson (1955) found that delinquent
boys who had been committed to a state rehabilitation school completed a story
completion task by writing stories of events which occurred over a shorter time
span than did non-delinquent boys (see also Trommsdorff & Lamm, 1980).
Our research began with the notion that there are clear and reliable individual
differences in the extent to which individuals are likely to consider distant
outcomes in choosing their present behavior. At one end of the continuum are
those individuals who consider future outcomes as a matter of course. These
individuals believe certain behaviors are worthwhile because of future benefits,
even if immediate outcomes are relatively undesirable, or even if there are
immediate costs to a particular behavior. They are wilIing to sacrifice immediate
benefits like pleasure or convenience tll achieve more desirable future states.
At the other end of the continuum are individuals who are not interested in
considering possible future consequences. These individuals are more interested
in maximizing immediate benefits at the,expense of costs or benefits which will
not occur for some time, and they place a high priority on such immediate
benefits. In addition, they may be more strongly influenced by the relatively more
concrete and certain immediate consequences than they are by the uncertain,
probabilistic future outcomes. For example, people who do not typically consider
future consequences may be unconcerned about warnings of diminishing landfill
space because they are more attentive to the immediate goal of conveniently
disposing of their garbage. In addition, governmental calls to increase taxation
 CONsTRucrlNG THE FUTURE WITH PRESENT BERAVIOR, ..

to.. reduce national debt and to fund social programs may have less impact on
individuals at this end of the continuum because the immediate monetary concerns
for the individual are more important.
In this chapter, we describe a program of research in which we have developed
and examined the psychological consequences of an individual difference measure
of the extent to which individuals generally consider the future consequences of
their behavior. We begin with a brief overview of previous research which has
examined related individual difference measures, and then we describe the
Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Scale (Strathman, Gleicher,
Boninger, & Edwards, 1992; see Appendix). We provide evidence concerning the
relation of the CFC Scale to other related constructs and review evidence
regarding the role of CFC in moderating various psychological responses. We
conclude with a discussion of directions for future research.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

As indicated by this volume, a significant body of literature examines various

conceptions of future orientation and future time perspective. In this research,
future orientation has served as both a cause, or independent variable, and as an
effect, or dependent variable. Among the factors that influence future orientation
are age (Lessing, 1972; Nurmi, 1987), socioeconomic status (Lamm, Schmidt,
& Trommsdorff, 1976; Nurmi, 1987), gender (Lessing, 1968), delinquency
(Barndt & Johnson, 1955; Trommsdorff & Lamm, 1980), optimism (Teahan,
1957), and schizophrenia (Wallace, 1956).
There is also research examining the influence of future time perspective as an
independent variable. Within this tradition falls the large body of research on the
influence of future time perspective on motivation and goal setting (De. Voider
& Lens, 1982; Nuttin, 1964; Raynor, 1970). A second,smaller strain of research
within this paradigm has attempted to identify stable individual difference
constructs related to various aspects of future orientation (see Strathman et aI.,
1992 for a review of these constructs).

CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE CONSEQUENCES SCALE

The present research falls within this latter category of research, in which
future orientation is seen as an independent variable. The CFC Scale and the
other measures of future orientation are similar in that they are attempts to
measure a relatively stable construct related to some aspect of future orientation.
However, the CFC Scale differs from earlier methods in the aspect of future
orientation that it measures. Earlier measures (e.g., Stanford Time Perspective
 ~;,,~,,~
110 Alan STRATHMAN, David BONINGER, Faith GLEICHER & Sara BAKER

Inventory, Zimbardo, 1990) differ from our conceptoalization in that. they

typically measure a general preoccupation with the future (i.e., how much people
think about what might be in the future) or with specific future events (e.g.,
getting married, buying a car). Although it is both interesting and valuable to
investigate this general preoccupation with time and future events, this is not the
aspect of future thought that we pursue in our research. Rather, we are concerned
about the future only within the context of how possible events in the future
influence decisions about present behavior.
The Consideration of Future Consequences refers to the extent to which
individuals consider the potential distant outcomes of their current behaviors, and
the extent to which they are influenced by these imagined outcomes (Strathman
et al., 1992). It involves the intrapersonal struggle between present behavior with
one set of immediate outcomes and one set of future outcomes. Whether'
particular individuals resolve this dilemma in favor of the present or the future
is hypothesized to be a relatively stable dispositional characteristic. Individuals
low in CFC focus more on their immediate, versus distant, needs and concerns,
and thus act to satisfy these immediate influences. In contrast, people who are
high in CFC consider the future implications of their behavior and use their
distant goals as a guide for their current actions. (For details regarding the
validation of CFC, see Strathman et al., 1992).

RELATIONSHIP WITH RELATED MEASURES

Delay of Gratification. Given our conceptualization of future orientation, we

expected CFC to be related to delay of gratification (see Mischel, 1958).
Klineberg (1968) provided evidence for the existence of a relationship between
general orientation toward the future and willingness to delay gratification in a
study in which he found that preference for a larger, delayed reward over a
smaller, immediate reward was related to the degree of everyday preoccupation
with the future. In order to assess the relationship between the delay of
gratification and consideration of future consequences, respondents completed a
twelve-item instrument intended to assess a' general trait of deferment of
gratification (Ray and Najman, 1986). The correlation between the CFC Scale
and Ray and Najman's deferment of gratification scale was ! = .47 (p < .001),
indicating that there is a strong relationship between delay of gratification and
consideration of future consequences.

Locus of Control. We also expected orientation toward the future to be related

to locus of control (see Rotter, Chance, & Phares, 1972). To the extent that
individuals attempt to influence future outcomes with their own present behavior,
these individuals would be expected to have a more well-developed interuallocus
of contro!. Nurmi (1987) and Platt and Eisenman (1968) found evidence of a
relationship between general future orientation and locus of contro!. In order to
 CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE WITH .PRESENT BEHAVIOR: ...

examine the more specific relationship between CFC and locus of control,
individuals who completed the CFC Scale also completed the Intemal-External
Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966). The correlation between the I-E Scale and
the CFC Scale was r = .25 q,< .01). The magnitude of this correlation is
interesting because it indicates .that . there is a significant, albeit moderate,
relationship between CFC and locus of control. This moderate correlation
indicates that feeling a sense of control over outcomes perhaps represents only
one component of the tendency to consider future outcomes.

Time Perspective. Finally, individuals who completed the CFC Scale also
received the Stanford Time Perspective Inventory (Zimbardo, 1990). This
measure consists of 38 items tapping the dimensions of present and future
orientation. Gonzalez and Zimbardo (1985) describe seven factors, four of which
they consider future-oriented factors. Gonzalez and Zimbardo labeled these
factors work motivation, goal seeking, daily planning, and pragmatic action for
future gain. It is this last subscale that is most similar to the present measure.
Items loading on this factor included "It makes sense to invest a substantial part
of my income in insurance premiums," and "I believe it is important to save for
a rainy day. " Scores on the CFC Scale were correlated with the future orientation
items of the Stanford measure. This correlation was r = .43 (p< .001), indicating,
not surprisingly, that the CFC Scale is related to the more general preoccupation
with the future assessed by the Stanford Time Perspective Inventory.

EFFECTS OF CFC ON THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR

Correlational evidence. Given the nature of the CFC construct, we

hypothesized that the CFC Scale would be related to the extent to which
individuals engage in social activism; That is, people high in CFC wonld be more
likely to support, belong to, and be active meinbers in social movements. We
make this prediction because there are often no immediate positive outcomes of
such activities. Indeed, the accomplishments of social activism may not be
realized until long into the future, and may not ever be experienced by the
activist. For instance, individuals working to reduce the emissions leading to
global warming must realize that because of the slow rate at which regulations
are enacted, obvious signs of a reverse in warming may not be seen for many
years. If this is the case, then activists ought to be high .in the extent to which
their behavior is influenced by future outcomes, indicating a willingness to
disregard immediate outcomes (Le., time and effort expended to no immediate
avail) in favor of distant ones (Le., future success).
To test this possibility, a sample of respondents was recruited from University
of Missouri student organizations involved in social causes. This sample of
respondents was clrawn from four such organizations: College Democrats; Black
Students for Progressive Change, Committee Against Intervention, and National
 ~~.,~~=~*
112 Alan STRATHMAN, David BONINGER, Faith GLEICHER. & Sara BAKER

Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws. Scores on the CFC Scale from
four samples of non~activist respondents was compared with the CFC scores from
this activist sample. This comparison revealed that the activist sample did indeed
report being significantly more concerned with future rather than immediate
outcomes (M=52.3) than did each of the four non-activist samples M's = 43.8,
44.3,44.1,41.4).
The relevance of present and future outcomes of behavior can be seen in a
number of other domains as well. For instance, because academic behaviors like
studying for exams and arriving for class on time have both present and future
consequences, we hypothesized that these behaviors would be significantly
correlated with CFC. Thus, we asked a sample of respondents a variety of
questions pertaining to their scholastic habits. In addition to completing the CFC
Scale, these respondents reported how much they procrastinate, when they arrive
to class, and how many days before an exam they typically start to study.
Correlations between CFC and subjects' self-reports of their academic behaviors
supported our predictions: Subjects higher in CFC reported arriving to cIass
earlier, r = -.25 (p < .(01), procrastinating less, r = -.28 (p < .(01), and starting
to study earlier for exams, r = .12 (p=.05), than subjects scoring lower in CFC
scale.
We also examined the extent to which CFC might be related to various political
attitudes and behaviors. First; we asked respondents whether or not they had
voted in the recent national election and how much of a role the vice-presidential
candidates had played in determining their presidential votes. We expected high
CFC subjects to be more likely to vote, and to consider the vice-presidential
candidate to a greater extent than low CFC subjects. The latter prediction was
based on the fact that the vice-president's role in American politics is minor, but
it could change dramatically if the president became unable to continue in office.
Although level of CFC did not reliably predict whether subjects did or did not
vote, r = -.03, it did predict the nature of their voting decisions. Among subjects
who voted in the recent ,national election, subjects higher in CFC reported that
the vice-presidential candidates played a greater role in determining their voting
decisions, r = .13 (p= .(5).
We also assessed subjects' opinions on two political issues that do not
immediately affect subjects' lives, but that may lead to disastrous effects in the
future. Consistent with predictions, high CFC subjects reported greater concern
about the sale of American weapons and technology to foreign countries, r = .09
(p < .10), and about the state of the natural environment, r = .11 (p < .(6).

Consequences for Affective Responses to Counterfactual Thinking. The

extent to which people consider the future consequences of current behaviors is
likely to have an important impact on their affective and cognitive responses to
negative events. Boninger, Gleicher, & Strathman (1992) provided It direct test
of this impact in a study that examined the effects ofCFC on individuals'
 CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE WITH PRESENT BEHAVIOR:... 113

affective responses to counterfactual simulations of reality. Much research has

suggested that when people experience negative outcomes, they spontaneously
consider hypothetical alternative outcomes (Le., "what could have been") (e.g.,
Wells & Gavlinski, 1989). If the counterfactual alternatives that are considered
change the negative outcome to something neutral or even positive, the individual
feels worse about what actually happened to him or her than if slhe does not
consider the counterfactual at all, or if the counterfuctual does not change the
negative outcome (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986).
Boninger et al. (1992) suggested a qualification to this influence of
counterfuctual thought on affect, They noted that sometimes, counterfactuals can
prepare people to deal with future events (see also Markman, Gavanski, Sherman,
& McMullen, 1993). Whereas people who are concerned primarily with present
outcomes would be unlikely to be affected by this feature of counterfactuals,
those people who are concerned with future outcomes would be expected to be
reassured at knowing that they have learned something that will be of use to them
in the future. Boninger at al. thus predicted that subjects who were gnided to
dwell on a negative event that just happened, regardless of their level of CFC,
would feel particularly bad when there was a counterfactual that could have
changed the negative outcome. However, they expected that among subjects who
were guided to think about the future; only those low in CFC would feel bad.
The negative affect of subjects high in CFC, in contrast, was expected to be
alleviated by thoughts of future preparation.
In the experiment (Boninger et aI., 1992, Experiment 2), subjects imagined
they were an athlete who was preparing to compete in pre-Olympic national
competitions. Subjects read and imagined that just before their first national race,
they sustain a painful ankle injury. They 'are given a choice of two drugs to take
to alleviate the pain. Theychoose one of the drugs, which effectively reduces the
pain but also induces nausea and fatigue that cause them to lose the race. In this
situation, the available counterfactual that subjects consider is that they could
have taken the other drug. Some subjects read that other athletes who had taken
the other drug suffered the same side effects that they did (i.e., no change in
outcome). Other subjects read that the other athletes who took the other drug
suffered no side effects (L e., change in outcome: they could have won if they had
taken the other drug). At the end of the scenario, subjects were either instructed
to think about the race they just lost (present focus) or to.think about the next
race two weeks away (future focus).
Consistent with predictions, findings on three measures of affect showed that
subjects suffered more regret and blamed themselves more for the loss when they
knew that the other athletes did npt suffer the same side effects. More
importantiy, however, this negative affect was ameliorated for high CFC subjects
who were instructed to think about their next upcoming race. These high CFC
individuals, who tend to consider and try to influence future outcomes,
presumably felt better about their loss because they learned something useful from
 114 Alan,STRATHMAN, David BOMINGER, Faith GLEICHER. & Sara Bd~..f:~~'::;

their experience: next time, they would take. the better drug and possibly win.
Low CFC subjects, on the other hand, who were more focused .on immediate
outcomes, were not able to benefit from an induced fufure focus; their affect was
not influenced by thoughts of how their current loss might lead to future gain.
These data provide evidence that the considemtion of future consequences
construct has an important influence on individuals' affective responses to
negative outcomes.

Consequences in Persuasion. A number of individual difference constructs

have been shown to influence the extent to which individuals are motivated or
able to process persuasive communications (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1982;
Sorrentino et al., 1988). One implication of the present construct is that high and
low CFC individuals, when they consider the same current behavior, ought to be
differentially concerned about the immediate and long-term consequences of that
behavior. In other words, if high. and low CFC individuals encountered a
persuasive communication highlighting the immediate and distant consequences
of some behavior, we would expect low CFC individuals to be more influenced
by arguments related to the immediate consequences, and high CFC individuals
to be more influenced by arguments related to the distant consequences. hnplicit
in this prediction is the idea that low CFC individuals are likely to be
uninfluenced by distant consequences, regardless of their favorability,and high
CFC individuals are likely to be uninfluenced by immediate consequences,
regardless of their favombility.
. Stmthman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards (1992) examined these hypotheses.
In this study, high and low CFC subjects were presented with a message that
discussed both the advantages and disadvantages of increased oil drilling off the
California coast. Although we expected most subjects to be relatively opposed to
oil-drilling, we also expected that CFC would influence how subjects responded
to the message. Because off-shore drilling tends to be perceived as
environmentally unsafe, we expected high CFC subjects to weight long-term
environmental concerns relatively heavily in their evaluation of the advantages
and disadvantages of off-shore drilling; Thus, we expected high CFC subjects to
be more critical of the arguments in favor of off-shore drilling, and to be more
strongly opposed to it than low CFC subjects.
In addition, we expected that this main effect of CFC would be qualified by
whether the advantages ofincreased drilling Were framed as immediate or distant.
We expected that when the advantages were framed as immediate, low CFC
subjects would be more favomble toward drilling than they would be when the
advantages were framed as distant. Conversely, we expected that when the
advantages were framed as distant, high CFC subjects would be more favomble
toward drilling than when they were framed as immediate.
High and low CFC subjects read a two-sided message on the topic of
oil-drilling off the California coast. All versions of the message presented four
 CONSTRUCl'ING THE FUTURE WITH PRESENT BEHAVIOR:... 115

arguments describing the consequences of off-shore drilling: two in favor

of off-shore drilling (increased drilling would lead to a reduction in dependence
on nuclear power and to a reduction in gas and oil prices) and two against
off-shore drilling (increased drilling would lead to oil seepage and to a diversion
of research ,funds from alternative sources of energy).
Although the same advantages and disadvantages were presented in all
conditions, we manipulated the temporal framing of these consequences. In one
version of the message, the advantages were presented as immediate and the
disadvantages as distant. In this message, for example, off-shore drilling was
.. described as likely to lead directly to immediate reductions in gas prices, whereas
the pollution caused by the oil seepage would not be likely to be seen for many
years. In the other version of the essay, the timing of the advantages and
disadvantages was switched, such that the disadvantages were immediate and the
advantages distant. In this essay, then, gas prices were predicted to drop
eventually, but not for several years,' whereas oil seepage would lead to
immediate increases in pollution.
After subjects read the message they indicated their attitude toward off-shore
drilling. Analysis of these items revealed, as expected, that compared to high
CFC subjects, low CFC subjects reported that they were generally more in favor
of off-shore drilling. In addition, this main effect was qualified by an interaction
between Framing of Consequences and CFC. This interaction revealed that low
CFC subjects favored increased off-shore drilling to a greater extent when its
advantages, rather than its disadvantages, were portrayed as immediate. This
pattern reversed for high CFC subjects. High CFC subjects favored increased
drilling more when its advantages were portrayed as distant and its disadvantages
as immediate. Thus, CFC played a significant role in determining attitude change.

Summary of Evidence. A series of studies have now demonstrated the utility

and impact of the CFC construct. CFC has been shown to be related to behavior
within domains such as politics, participation in social movements, and
academics. In addition, CFC has been demonstrated to playa role in coping with
n"gative outcomes. Finally, individuals who vary in their responses to the CFC
Scale have also been found to vary systematically in their responses to a
persuasive communication. Although we believe that the research to date has
provided substantial evidence for the CFC construct, a great deal of research
remains to be done to further explore the psychological implications of CFC.

ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Development of CFC. Perhaps the most fundamental issue to be addressed by

future research concerns the factors that lead individuals to consider 'and be
influenced by the future consequences of their behavior. Our research to date has
 ", "'''
'i.;i:.,:i/:""",,,.'~
Alan STRATHMAN, David BONINGER, Faith GLEICHER, & Sara BAlCER

discovered that, at least by the time they attend a university, some individuals
have begun to consider future consequenceS. We suspect, that one factor that
might influence the extent of this consid.::ration is the degree to which an
individual has had occasion to experience a consequence of some' much earlier
behavior. Such experience may occur, for example, if,a parent or grandparent
had suffered a health problem caused by their much earlier behavior. This could
have the effect of forcing the individual to realize that behavior that one engages
in has two sets of consequences, those that are immediately experienced and those
that are not.
Implicit in this notion is the idea that level of CFC may vary across the
life-span (e.g., Nurmi, 1987). We Suspect that it is possible to go through the
early part of one's life focused mainly on the immediate,consequences of one's
actions. However,at some point an individual may experience an event that
causes him/her to, begin to consider future consequences. We imagine that having
children is the event that might have a dramatic impact on the extent to which
one considers the future. It is not uncommon for parents to contrast the state of
the world when they were children with how they expect it to be for their
children.
A second set of factors may be related to the socioeconomic conditions in
which an iridividuallives. Individuals who experience a change in socioeconomic
status such that they no longer need to consider only immediate, consequences
may become more able to consider future consequences. For example, an
individual who receives an increase'in salary which allows him/her to begin to
save money may begin to consider constructing a more promising, future. In
addition, changes in perceptions of safety and optimism that one has any future
at all may influence the extent to whkh an individual begins to consider possible
future consequences of their behavior
It 'also may be possible for an individual to change from considering future
consequences to no longer considering future consequences. It well may be that
the same types of factors which lead to the development of CFC also influence
people to 'no longer consider future consequences. This may occur, for instance,
if an individual has attempted to arrange the future with his/her current behavior,
only to find later that s/he was unsuccessful in creating the future s/he desired.

WEIGHTING OF FUTURE CONSEQUENC]'S

We have explained the motivation behind the actions of low CFC individuals
as a concern for immediate consequences.
However, this concern could resnlt from two processes. It may be that both high
and low CFC individuals consider immediate and distant consequences, but low
CFC individuals place more weight on immediate consequences and high CFC
individuals place more weight on distant consequences. Alternatively, high and
low CFC individuals may be engaging' in different processes. It is possible that
 CONSTRUCI1NGTHE FUTURE WITH PRESENT BEHAVIOR:... 117

low CFC individuals consider only theimmediate consequences of their behavior.

In the langUage of mathematical models, this alternative is analogous to placing
a zero weight on future consequences.
However, in this case, it may be misleading to consider the behavior of
individuals in mathematicalt.enns. According to a mathematical model, the
behavior of low CFC individuals would be the result of one process, in which
future consequences are always included in the equation (although sometimes they
are assigned a weight of zero). However, phenomenologically, two very different
processes may be at work. In one process, a low CFC individual considers future
consequences but decides that the immediate consequences are more important
(i.e., s/he actively weighs both immediate and distant .copsequences).
Alternatively, a low CFC individual may not consider future consequences atal!.
For instance, an individual living in a violent inner-city 'neighh9r\1ood may not
believe he/she has a future, and thus, does not consider future outcomes. Future
research may be profitably directed toward understanding these processes.

PERSONAL VERSUS PUBLIC FUTURES

A third issue is whether CFC is at all domain-specific. Lamm,' Schmidt, and

Trommsdorff (1976) provided evidence that people can vary in their degree of
future orientation toward personal events (i.e., those related to family and
occupation) and public events (i.e .. , those related to politics and the economy).
Within the current conceptualization, it seems possible that individuals may work
more actively to achieve future outcomes in one domain or another.
Some consequences, such as the. consequences of not studying for an exam, are
purely personal. If! put off studying for an eXam because I want to go toa party
tonight, only I will pay the consequences. On the. other hand"sollle consequences
are more public. If I fail to recycle paper and aluminum cans because.! do not
want to exert the effort it would take now to preserve the environment, my choice
may affect the larger population as well as myself. To this point, our
correlational evidence (Strathman et' al., 1992) suggests, that CFC may be more
strongly related to an issue with personal consequences (i.e., academic behavior)
than to an issue with more public consequenees (i.e., political behavior).

CONCLUSION

The research outlined in this chapter identifies an individual difference in the

extent to which individuals are influenced by the distant consequences of their
behavior. We have also provided empirical evidence that illustrates the
consequences that this individual difference has for social perception, social
influence, and behavior. We believe that this program of research has only begun
 . :"":.:~.'lf
~)."'- N
118 Alan STRATHMAN, David BONINGER" Faith GLEICHER & Sara BAKER

to uncover domains in which CFC may moderate or media\\> various

psychological processes and behaviors. CFC may well have aI\ impact in areas
such as altruism, aggression, aI\d in health-related contexts. We also believe that
understaI\ding the aI\tecedents aI\d consequences of people's tendency to consider
the future in the context of their present behavior has importaI\t practical
implications. This understanding may facilitate the attaimnent of goals to which
maI\y societies aI\d individuals aspire, such as public safety, health, and a
sustainable global environment.

* Note: Correspondence address: Alan Strathman, Department of Psychology, ,University of

Missouri, 210 McAlester Hall, Columbia, MO 65211, USA.
E-MAlL:PSY371@MIZZOU1.MISSOURI.EDU
David Boninger, Psychology Department, University of California, 405 Hilgard Ave., Los
Aogeles, CA 90024.
E-MAlL:BONINGER@PSYCH.SSCNET.UCLA.EDU

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120 Alan STRATHMAN, DavidBONlNGER,Faith GLmCHBR & Sara BAKERt;;J~~,lj

Appendix:
Consideration of Futl!te Consequences Scale
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is
characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharac.teristic of you (not at
all like you) please write a "1" to the left of the ,question; if the statement is
extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) please write a "5" next to
the question. And, of course, use the numbers in the middle if you fall between
the extremes. Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the
statements below.

1 2 3 4 5
extremely somewhat, uncertain somewhat extremely
IUlcbulracte~c uncharacteristic characteristic characteristic

_ 1. I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with
my day to day behavior.
2. Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not
result for many years.
3. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of
itself.
4. My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (Le., a matter of days or weeks)
outcomes of my actions.
5. My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take.
6. I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well~being in order to achieve
future -outcomes.
7. I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if
the negative outcome will non occur for many years.
8. I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant
consequences than 3: . 'behavior with less~important immediate consequences.
9. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the
problems will be resolved before they reach crisis level.
_10. I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be
dealt with at a later time.
_11. I only act to satisfY immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future
problems that may occur at a later date.
_12. Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me
than behavior that has distant outcomes.
STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE IN TIlE USE OF TIME

Norman FEATHER & Malcolm BOND

Department of Psychology
Flinders University of South Australia,
Adelaide, Australia

In this chapter we describe recent research that has been concerned with how
people use their time. Time use can be investigated in many different ways.
For example, people can be asked to keep diaries in which they report their
activities at different times of the day and from day to day; they can be paged
at various intervals during the day with an electronic pager and asked to report
what they are doing; their activities can be observed by others and recorded in
relation to ecological variables. All of these procedures have been used in the
study of time use (e.g;, Barker, 1963; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983;
Robinson, 1977). Our focus was different. We developed a questionnaire that
was designed to measure the degree to which people perceive their use of time
to be structured and purposive. We have now used this questionnaire in a
number of studies and the results provide encouraging evidence that supports
our hypothesis that the degree to which people percei'l"e their daily lives to
have structure and purpose is an important predictor of their psychological
well-being and adjustment. We will describe some of our studies in the
sections that follow.

UNEMPLOYMENT RESEARCH
One of the findings from the classic study of the unemployed in the
Austrian village of Marienthal -(Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, & Zeisel, 1933) was that
the unemployed suffered a disintegration in their use of time. Much later, in
theoretical discussions of the psychological impact of unemployment, Jahoda
(1979, 1981) included the imposition of a time structure as an important latent
consequence of having a job. This consequence, along with other latent
consequences that were assumed to follow paid employment (shared
experiences and contacts with people,collective goals and purposes, the
assignment of status and identity, and required regnlaractivity), were seen as
beneficial to psychological weIlcbeing. Jahoda proposed that the consequences
would be negative if a person were deprived of these categories of experience,
as might occur if the person was unemployed (see Feather, 1990, for Ii fuller
discussion) .
122 Norman FEATHER & Malcolm BOND

Feather and Bond (1983) investigated the role of time structure in a study
employed and unemployed university graduates. We predicted that the
unemployed graduates would report less structure and purpose in their use of
time when compared with the unemployed graduates. We also expected that
perceived difficulties in the use of time would covary with reported diminished
self-esteem and with a higher frequency of reported depressive symptoms.
Hepworth (1980) had found that unemployed men who could not fill their time
meaningfully reported poorer mental health on the General Health
Questionnaire (Goldberg, 1972). We expected that these kinds of effects would
generalize beyond unemployed samples and that they would occur in the
general population.
Our study was also designed to investigate the effects of employment and
unemployment on other variables (self-esteem, depressive symptoms) and the
mediating role of employment commitment (or the degree to which having a
job was seen to be important to the person) on. reactions to employment and
unemployment. The main focus, however, was on the perceived use of time
and how it might vary between the employed and unemployed groups and in
relation to psychological well-being.
The university graduates who were tested consisted of 43 who were
unemployed and 255 who were employed. The mean age for both samples was
approximately 26 years. The unemployed graduates had a mean reported
length of unemployment of 29.70 weeks and the mean length of employment
for the employed sample. was 19.60 months. The graduates were from Flinders
University in South Australia and they had completed their degrees in 1979
and 1989. Other details of the sampling can be found in Feather and Bond
(1983). fJ
Subjects completed a questionnaire that was mailed to them. It included an
early 17-item version of the Time Structure Questionnaire (TSQ). The most
recent version (Bond & Feather, 1988) is presented in Table L It is longer
then the earlier version and consists of 26 items that overlap with the items
used in the earlier version. The items in the TSQ cover such aspects of time
use as organization, purpose, routine, planfulness, inertia, daydreaming, and
so forth. Subjects used a 1 to 7 rating scale to answer each item so that, for
the 17-item version of the TSQ, their total scores could range from 17 to 119,
with higher scores indic!jting more structure and purpose in their use of time.
In addition to the total score we obtained scores on four subscales of the
TSQ. These subscales were determined by the results of a factor analyses. The
first subscale was called the Engagement Scale. It consisted of four items that
referred to engagement, purpose,. meaning, and interest in daily life. The
second subscale involved three items that referred to lack of direction, aimless
activity, and difficulty in initiating activity. We called it the Direction Scale.
The third subscale Was called the Structure Scale. It consisted of three items
that referred to lack of structure or organization in the uSe of time.
The fourth subscale was called the. Routine Scale. It comprised two items
that referred to routine and planning .. Higher scores on the four. subscales
indicated more engagement, more direction, more structure, and more routine
respectively.
 @'",fQ!;.:7f
STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE IN THI! US OF TIME 123

Table 1. Items in the Time Structure Questionnaire:

1. Do you ever have trouble organizing the things you have to do? (No)
2. Do you ever find that time just seems slip away? (No)
3. Do yoy have a daily routine which you follow? (Yes)
4. Do you often feel that your life is aimless, with no definite purpose?
(No)
5. Many of us tend to daydream about the future. Do you find this
happening to you? (No)
6. And what about the past? Do you find youself dwelling on the past?
(No)
7. Once you've started an activity do you persist at it until you've
completed it? (Yes)
8. Do you ever feel that the things you have to do during the day just
don't seem to matter? (No)
9. Do you plan yor activities from day to day? (Yes)
10. do you tend to leave things until the last minute? (No)
11. Do you find that duming the day you are often not sure what to do
next? (No)
12. Do you take a long time to "get going"? (No)
13. Do you tend to change rather aimlessly from one activity to another
during the day? (No)
14. Do you give up easily once you've started something? (No)
15. Do you plan your activities so that they fall into a particular pattern
during the day? (Yes)
16. Could you tell how many useful hours you put in last week? (Yes)
17. Do you thing you do enough with your time? (Yes)
18. Do you get bored with your day-to-day activities? (No)
19. Looking at a typical day in your life, do you think that most things you
do have some purpose? (Yes)
20. Do your main activities during the day fit together in a structured way?
(Yes)
21. Do the important interests/activities in your life tend to change
frequantly? (No)
22. Do your main interests/activities fulfill some purpose in your life? (Yes)
23. Do you have any difficulty in finishing activities once you've started
them? (No)
24. Do you spend time thinking about opportunities that you have missed?
(No)
25. Do you ever feel that the way fill your time has little use or value? (No)
26. Do you spend time thinking about what your future might be like? (No)

Note: The key for scoring each item is given in parentheses. For example, ratings in
the direction of the !!Q pole were scored as indicating more time structure for Items
1, 2, 4, and so forth, and ratings in the direction of the ~ pole were coded as
indicating more time structure for Items 3,7,9, and so forth.
124 Nonnan FEATHER & Malcolm BOND

/
Our subjects also answered a three-item of measure of employment value
first used by Feather and Davenport (1981). It consisted of items concerning
whether having a job meant more to the person than just money, whether most
of the satisfaction in a person's life comes from his/her work, and how much
should people be interested in' their work. Our subjects also completed a
modified version of the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale to measure global
self-esteem and the 13-item short form of the Beck Depression Inventory
(Beck & Beck, 1972) to measure depressive symptoms - for more detailed
information about these scales see Feather (1990) and Feather & Bond (1983).

Table 2. Mean scores and standard deviations for employed and unemployed samples
and results of analysis of variance.

Group

Employed Unemployed
(N=255) (N=43) F values
of main
effect
Variable Range Mean sd Mean sd of group
Use of time
Total score 7-119 79.30 14.85 74.49 16.56 4.17*
Engagement 4-28 20.31 4.67 17.74 5.19 9.60**
Direction 321 15.55 3.65 13.98 4.53 7.46**
Structure 3-21 11.81 3.71 12.84 4.05 2.00
Routine 2-14 9.62 2.44 8.72 2.78 7.59**
Self-estoem
Total 10-50 41.93 5.13 40.43 8.10 1.32
Positive items 6-30 25.04 3.17 24.86 5.07 0.02
Negative items 4-20 16.91 2.56 15.57 3:45 5.18'
BDI depression 0-39 2.57 3.35 5.44 5.55 16.05***
Employment importance 3-21 16.33 2.20 .16.16 3.29 1.75

*p<.05; **p<.Ol; *** p<.OOl

Note. There were minor variations from the Ns listed due to occasional missing cases.

The mean scores on these variables for the employed and unemployed
groups are presented in Table 2. The correlations between variables are
presented in Table 3. The differences between groups were as predicted for
the use of time scores (see Table.2). The unemployed graduates had lower
scores on most of the measures of time use when compared with the employed
graduates. They also had higher depression scores and lower global
self-esteem scores, when self-esteem was assessed by using the negative items
in the scale.
The correlations showed that more structured and purposeful use of time as
indexed by the total TSQ score and by the subscale sCOres was positively
related to global self-esteem and negatively related to depressive symptoms for
 ~i'J!i&~,."
STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE IN THE US OF TIME 125

both the employed and unemployed samples (with the exception of the routine
scores). Employment value acted as a moderator variable. The correlations
between the use of time scores and employment value were in opposite
directions for the employed and unemployed samples (see Table 3). They were
positive for the employed sample and negative for the unemployed sample.
Thus, the more the employed graduates valued having a job, the more they
saw their use of time as structured and purposeful. In contrast, the more the
unemployed graduates valued having a job, the less they saw their use of time
as structured and purposeful. Those unemployed graduates with higher
employment value scores were also more likely to report lower global
self-esteem and more depressive symptoms when compared with unemployed
graduates who valued employment less. Theseresu1ts resemble. those obtained
by Warr and. his colleagues in which measures of psychological well-being
were related to a measure of employment commitment for employed and
unemployed groups (see Warr, 1987, for a review of these studies).

Table 3. Correlations between use of time measures and other major variables
for employed and unemployed samples.

Employed group Unomployed group

VWblo T"",
POililivc
i-
Ncptivo BDl

--.- Positive
i - dcprcasiUl importaDcc T"'" U...
--
Nep.tivc BDl

.- - -
i_ ........... ..........

--
Ute oC time
T""'_

llhmion
S.......
_ _loon
R""'"
.~

.32-
.1.
..so-
.4'" .3.s-
.3~ .32*'1*
.-
.13*
.42-

~-
.~

...
.Zl""'
-.41-

..,.- .1'"
"1
.23-
......- .14*
2>"* .2S-

.1" .-
.""
.42'"

Jl2
.43~
.30
.41-
.4S'*
.03
.St-

.38*
.4Z-
Jl2
..-.51-
.41-

-
.30
.oJ
.50""*
..
-,44-
-.33*
_.14

T"'"
Poeilivc items
Negative items
.92- .s.,-
.61-
-.54-
.~
-.61-
.... ..,
.07

.02
.w- .93-
.so- ..-.61-
-.n-
-.31'"

..,..
. 24

BDI depreulon -.01 :n

p<.05; **p<.Ol; *** p<.OOl

Note: N =255 for employed group and N =43 for unemployed group, except for minor
variations. Tests of significance of correlations are two-tailed.

The results of our study with university graduates clearly indicated that how
people use their time is an important variable in the study of employment and
unemployment. The fact that unemployed people tend to show less
organization and less purpose in their use of time is not altogether surprising.
Boredom was often mentioned as a problem for the unemployed in the 1930s
studies of the psychological impact of the Great Depression (Eisenberg &
Lazarsfeld, 1938). Having a job brings with it goals, purposes, and routines
that are no longer present when a person is unemployed. The unemployed
126 Norman FEATHER& Malcolm BOND

have to fall back on their own resources and some may have difficulty in
generating new structure and purpose in their daily lives. Our results also
showed that the degree to which people perceived themselves to be using time
in a structured and purposeful way predicted to psychological well-being. Lack
of structure and lack of purpose was associated with poorer adjustment.
The Time Structure Scale has also been used in an abbreviated form in a
study concerned with young versus middle-aged unemployed groups (Rowley
& Feather, 1987). This study involved 107 unemployed men who were
contacted through centers for unemployed people located in metropolitan
Adelaide, South Australia. The mean age of the "young" group (15-24 years
old) was 20.8; the mean age of the "mature" age group (30-49 years old) was
38.9. The young group had been out of full-time employment for a mean of
75.9 weeks (median = 31 weeks); the matUre group had been unemployed for
a mean of 97.6 weeks (median = 59 weeks). Further details of the sampling
can be found in the published report (Rowley & Feather, 1987).
Among the variables used by Rowley and Feather (1987) in their study was
a five-item scale concerned with the use of time that was based on the Feather
and Bond (1983) questionnaire and subsequent modifications to it (Bond &
Feather, 1988). Subjects answered each item by using a 1 to 7 rating scale.
Total scores could therefore range from 5 to 35. Subjects also completed a
modified version of the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, a 12-item version
of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) to measure psychological
distress (Goldberg, 1972, 1978), and items concerned with job-seeking
activity, employment commitment, and financial strain (see Feather, 1990;
Rowley & Feather, 1987, for further details).
We will limit our description of the results to those involving the use of time
scores. Rowley and Feather (1987) reported no statistically significant
difference between the two age groups in regard to their use of time scores. In
both groups, however, significant positive correlations were found between the
structured and purposeful use of time and self-esteem, and significant negative
correlations were found between the use of time score and both psychological
distress and financial strain. Thus, as was the case in the earlier Feather and
Bond (1983) study with university graduates, there was evidence that reported
time use that involved structure and purpose was associated with psychological
well-being and adjustment.
The recent literature on unemployment contains other studies concerned with
time use (e.g., Bostyn & W)ght, 1987; Feather, 1989, 1990; Fryer &
McKenna, 1987; Kilpatrick & Trew, 1985; Miles, 1983; Ullah, 1990; Warr,
1984; Warr, Banks & Ullah, 1985; Warr & Payne, 1983). Some of these
studies have investigated reported changes in behavior after job loss (e.g.,
Feather, 1989; Warr, 1984); others have involved the use of time diaries
(e.g., Kilpatrick & Trew, 1985) or detailed interviews (e.g., Fryer &
McKenna, 1987). We do not have space to report the results of all of these
studies. A very brief summary of three of them will have to suffice.
 STRUCTlJRE AND PURPOSE IN THE US OF TIME 127

Kilpatrick and Trew (1985) asked a sample of unemployed men in Northern

lreland to keep diaries about how they spent their time. They were able to
cluster their subjects into four main groups in relation to the time they spent .at
various activities (Active, Social, Domestic, and Passive clusters). They found
that psychological well-being, assessed by the 12-item version of the GHQ
(Goldberg, 1972, 1978), progressively declined as one moved from the active
to the social to the domestic to thepassive cluster, i.e., more passive activities
were associated with more psychological distress.
Feather (1989, 1990) conducted a study of reported behavior change
following unemployment in a small group of unemployed men, using
procedures previously employed by Warr (1984) and Warr and Payne (1983)
with unemployed people in the United Kingdom. He was able to replicate most
of the previous findings with his Australian sample. In addition, he found that
increases in the time spent in passive activities were negatively correlated with
life satisfaction and quality of life scores assessed by specially designed items,
and positively correlated with reported psychological distress, assessed by the
GHQ-12 (Goldberg, 1972, 1978). Warr and Payne (1983) had previously
found that for both middle-class and working-class respondents, increases in
the more passive domestic and other past-times had the highest positive
correlations with both activity problems (i.e., problems with "Keeping myself
from being bored"; Finding enjoyable things to do"; and "Finding useful ways
to spend my time") and with psychological distress assessed by the 12-item
version of the GHQ (Goldberg, 1972, 1978).
Fryer and McKenna (1987) compared two groups of men from engineering
companies in an industrial town in a high unemployment area in the north of
England. One group comprised middle-aged men who had been made
redundant; the other group comprised middle-aged men who had been
temporarily laid off for a period of seven weeks. They conducted interviews
with these men in the fifth week after the end of employment and they also
used the GHQ (Goldberg, 1972) to obtain information about perceived
psychological distress. Fryer and McKenna (1987) found that the redundant
men suffered greater difficulties in their use of time when compared with the
temporarily laid-off men and showed more symptoms of psychological dis-
tress. They attributed these differences mainly to the fact that the redundant
men had a more uncertain future and suffered greater financial stress. They
found a lot of individual variation in how time was used and in the ways in
which the experience of unemployment was negative. Fryer and McKenna
(1987) used their findings to question Jaboda's (1982) explanatory claim that
deprivation of the .latent consequences of unemployment will 'have negative
effects. They argued that Jaboda's deprivation theory would lead one to expect
that the laid-off men who were without employment would suffer as much as
the redundant men because both were deprived of the latent functions of
employment. Fryer and McKenna (1987) emphasized the need to consider
orientation towards the future and the role of planning as important variables
affecting psychological reactions to unemployment.
 128 , Notlnan: FEATHER.' & Malcolm BOND"

The results _of "the three sets of studies that we have described can be
interpreted as reflecting the effects of a number of different variables. It is
likely, however, that perceived structure and purpose in the use of time is an
/ " important variable that underlies some of the differences that were obtained. In
the Fryer and McKenna (1987) study, for example, the redundant workers
probably had less sense of purpose and structure in regard to their filture when
compared with the laid-off workers. The temporary nature of their
unemployment would have less effect on the goal structures of the laid-off
workers but, for those made redundant, the change in situation would have
profound implications for the meaning and direction of their lives.
In his recent vitamin model Warr (1987) discussed the consequences of
unemployment for a person's sense and use .of time in terms of a reduction in
externally generated goals, one of the environmental features or "vitamins" in
his model. In unemployment, "fewer demands are made, objectives are
~ reduced, and purposeful activity. is less encouraged by the environment.
/ Routines and cycles of behavior are less often set in motion, and opportunities
for 'traction' and 'flow' .... may be limited" (p.213). Warr also observed that
"an absence of demands can produce an excess of time and remove the need to
choose between activities or to allocate fixed amounts of time to individual
tasks ... " (p.213).There may be a loss of temporal differentiation because
time-markers" ... which break up the day or week and indicate one's position
in it are no longer as frequent or as urgent" (p.213). So the unemployed
person may have a prolonged sense of waiting and a feeling that daily life
lacks structure, accompanied by reduced psychological well-being as evidenced
by feelings of boredom, negative affective states, and so forth.
In summary, there is consistent evidence that unemployment is associated
with objective and subjective changes in the use of time. These changes can be
related to reductions in some of the environmental features mentioned by Warr
(1987) and, more generally, to decreases in perceived structure and purpose in
relation to the present and the future. There is clear evidence that lack of
structure and purpose in the use of time is linked to negative consequences
over a wide range of variables. We tum to a further study that supports that
conclusion in the next section.

PERSONALITY AND ADJUSTMENT

The literature on time structure extends far beyond reports concerned with
the psychological impact of unemployment. There is a large and complex lite-
rature that deals with philosophical and scientific ideas about the nature of
time (~.g., Fraser, 1966; Gould, 1988; Hawking, 1988; McGrath & Kelly,
1986). In psychology a lot of research on time has been concerned with time
perception and time estimation (e.g., Fraisse, 1963; Ornstein, 1969), but there
is also Ii literature concerned with time perspective and future orientation
(e.g., De Voider & Lens, 1982; Gorman & Wessman, 1977; Lens, 1986;
 STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE IN THE US OF TIME 129

Nuttin, 1985; VanCalster, Lens, & Nuttin, 1987), with the psychopathology of
time (e.g., Melges, 1982), with the social psychology of time (McGrath &
Kelly, 1986), and with subjective time experience and personality
characteristics (see Orme, 1969; Wallace & Rabin, 1960, for early reviews).
Wessman (1973) suggested that the latter group of studies and the results from
his own reSearch " ... support the view that characteristic ways of experiencing
and utilizing time vary greatly among individuals along dimensions that can be
assessed and measured, and that these differences are meaningfully related to
personality characteristics" (p.103). .
Wessman (1973) used a Temporal Experience Questionnaire in his research
that sampled four factors: Immediate Time Pressure (harassed lack of control
vs. relaxed mastery and adaptive flexibility), Long-Term Personal Direction
(continuity and steady purpose vs. discontinuity and lack of direction), Time
Utilization (efficient scheduling vs. procrastination and inefficiency), and
Personal Inconsistency (inconsistency and changeability vs. consistency and
dependability). Scores on these facturs correlated reliably with a variety of
personality measures (e.g., variables from the 16PF, MMPI, and fantasy
productions). Calabresi and Cohen (1968) also developed a questionnaire
concerited with time experience and time attitudes. They found evidence for
four factors. Two of these factors, Time Anxiety (discomfort and anxiety
about time and the need to control it) and Time Submissiveness (a dutiful and
conforming attitude towards time, emphasizing appointments and schedules)
were respectively similar to the Immediate Time Pressure and Time Utilization
factors obtained by Wessman (1973).
As we indicated previously, our study with an earlier version of the Time
Structure Questionnaire (Feather & Bond, 1983) produced a set of factors that
we called Engagement, Direction, Structure, and Routine. These factors
resemble the Long-Term Personal Direction and Time Utilization facturs
described by Wessman (1973) because they are concerned with purpose and
organization in the way time is used. Wessman (1973), however, used a more
extensive set of items (80 items in all), whereas our item set was more limited
in cope. Despite that, as we indicated in the previous section, our use of time
scores were reliably associated with measures of global self-esteem and
depressive symptoms.
Following our earlier research we revised the Time Structure Questionnaire
(TSQ) by including ten new items and removing Item 1 from the previous
version (Feather & Bond, 1983). These new items were Items 7, 14, 15, and
20 through 26 in Table 1. A factor analysis of the 26 - item TSQ, using data
obtained from a large student sample (N =336), resulted in five interpretable
factors. The first factor was called Sense of Purpose, and Items 4, 8, 18, 19,
and 20 had high loadings on this factor. The second factor was called
Structured Routine and Items 3, 9, 15, 16, and 20 had high loadings on it.
The third factor was called Present Orientation, with Items 5, 24, and 26
having high loadings. The fourth factor was called Effective Organization and
Items 1, 11, 12, and 13 had high loadings. The fifth factor was called
130 Norman FEATHER. & Malcolm BOND

Persistence and it was identified by Items 7, 14, and 23 with high loadings
(see Bond & Feather, 1988, for further details).
Interitem reliability coefficients (alphas) obtained for the total scale were.
88, .92, and .91 from studies involving three student samples. The test-retest
reliability coefficient for the total scores was .76 after an interval of 15 weeks.
We have correlated scores on the revised version of the TSQ with a wide
range of personality and adjustment variables, using both the total TSQ score.
and scores on the five factors derived from the regression procedure (Bond &
Feather, 1988). The main variables that we used in these studies were as
follows: (1) Part A of the Purpose in' Life Test (Crumbaugh & Maholick,
1981), based on Frankl's (1984) concept of existential vacuum conceived of as
a state of emptiness manifested mainly by. boredom; (2) The modified 1O-item
version of the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale; (3) The short 13-item
form of the Beck Depression Inventury, used to measure general depressive
symptoms (Beck & Beck, 1972); (4) The 28-item version of the General
Health Questionnaire (Goldberg & Hillier, 1979), designed to measure
psychological distress; (5) State anxiety and trait anxiety, assessed by using the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983); (6) The Eysenck Personality
Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964), included to measure two personality
dimensions, neuroticism and extraversion; (7) Reported health based on a
question concerning general health; (8) A check-list of physical symptoms; (9)
The 20-item Hopelessness Scale (B<lck, Weissman; Lester, & Trexler, 1974)
used to measure hopelelisness or pessiJ)lism; (10) A modified 9-item version of
the Anomie Scale (Srole, 1956), used to measure anomie or the individUal's
generalized sense of self-to-others alienation; (11) Cantril's (1965)
Self-Anchoring Scale, used to measure the bound3rles of subjects' standing or
"l!pirations in the past, in the present, and for the future on a ladder containing
11 intervals. (0 - 10); (12) Type A behavior, assessed by using a 9-item scale
developed by Vickers (1973; see also Caplan, Cobb, & French, 1975); (13)
The 19-item Protestant Ethic Scale (Mirels & Garrett, 1971), used to assess
the extent to which subjects favored hard work, individual effort, and
asceticism; and (14) The Study Habits Survey devised by Brown and Holtzman
(1967) to provide measures that' reflected good study habits (study habits,
delay avoidance, work methods). Bond and Feather (1988) provide more detail
about each of these variables along with information about the three student
samples to whom the tests were administered.
The correlations obtained in the Bond and Feather (1988) study are
presented in Table 4. The results indicated positive relations between the total
TSQ score (perceived use of time), . and a sense of purpose in life, global
self-esteem, reported health, present standing and optimism about the future,
and more efficient study habits. Consistent with these findings, there were
negative relations between perceived use of time and depression, psychological
distress, anxiety, neuroticism, physical symptoms, hopelessness, and anomie.
There was a fair degree of overlap between the pattern of correlations that
involved the total use of time scores and those involving scores on the separate
i STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE IN THE US OF TIME 131

r Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, and Coqelations of Time Structure Questionnaire

(I'SQ) Scores With Other Variables.

Correlations with TSQ scores

Variable M . U~"
""'"
..... " .......
....... """""'" p""",
orientatim.
E"""'"
organizatiOll. PcrsislcDcc

Purpose .in life

Self-esteem
99.99 17.67 .65** .58 .25 .04 .34 .11
SampJc2
Sample 3
29.33
40.94
4.S6
5.S9
.59
.53"'
.43
.54 .00
.11
.09
.21"
.44
.16-
.20
.28
Depression
Sample 1
Sample 2
3.85
4.46
4.47
4.62
-.44
-.55
-.39
-.42
-.10
-.01
-.24
-.25
-.30"
-.45
-.OS
-.07
PJychological distn:as 4.86 5.48 -.37- -.30- -.05 -.08 -.35- .03
Smte anxiety 31.73 11.60 -.37- -.27-- -.13 -.26- -.25- -.04
Trait anxiety
Sample 1
Sample 2
42.64
41.89
.'"
10.56
-.56--
-.68--
-.52-
- ..ui-
-.17-
-.m
-.30**-
-.13
-,26-
-.50-
-.13
-.24-
Neuroticism 11.87 4.99 -.55- -.43- -.09 -.45- -.30" -.15"-'
Ex!ravertion
Reported health
1229
6.63
4.35
1.54
.05
.27-
.29-
.15'" .,.,..
-.14- -.08
.11
.06
.12 '."
.03
Phyaical I5)'ID.ptoms
"", -"
Past year
2.43
6.06
2.78
4.81
-.lD-
-.20*""
-.08
-.12*
-.06
-.04
-.27*-
-.11**
-.15-
-.21-
-.01
-.03
Hopeleuneu 3.11 2.87 -.49*"" -.45- -.24- -.09 -.23- -.09
Anomie 2'Tl 2.10 -.<to- -.35- -.14* -.21""* -.10 -.07
Past Slanding
Preaent standing
Future 'landing
5.40
6.53
8.37
2.38
1.63
1.31
.06
.34-
.31-
.06
.38-
.33-
.01
.12*
.11*
..,
-.04

-.00
.10
.11*
.15""
-.03
.07
.07
Type A behavior
Sample 2 42.46 7.59 .44- .17 .32- -.03 .23" .32-
Sample 3 43.45 8.12 .48- .14* .41*"" .09 .12 .38-

....53--
Proteatant ethic 77:12 14.56 .04 .01 .24- -.03 -.08 -.03
Study habit. 5254 16.44 .66"* .34- .31- .24""* .34- .38-
Delay avoidance 25.21 9.50 .31- .40- .23- .30- .34-
WoO;; methods 27.49 '.64 .:lO- .1" .21"" .33""* .36-

Note: There were minor variations from the Ns listed because of occasional missing cases.
All tests of significance were two-tailed. * p < .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001

factors, but some evidence for more differentiated patterns as well. For
example, higher self-esteem, lower depression, less psychological distress, and
fewer reported physical symptoms were all associated with \l higher perceived
sense of purpose, but not with the structured routine aspect of time use. Type
A behavior. and the Protestant work ethic were associated with the Structured
Routine factor, but not with the Sense of Purpose factor, except for one very
low correlation. Self-reported persistence in activities was associated with
lower anxiety, lower neuroticism,. Type A behavior, and more efficient study
habits but with none of the other variables in Table 4. These distinctive
patterns of relations justify the usefulness of conducting analyses that involve
scores on the separate factors as well as the total use of time score.
We also found statistically significant positive correlations between age .and
the total use of time scores for all three samples used in the investigation.
These positive correlations probably reflect the different role demands thllt::l\fe
placed on individuals as they get older and, for example, enter the workforce,
become married, have children, and so forth. These new roles intruduce.llw
sets of purposes and routines in the organization of daily life. Consistent.With
132 Nonnan FEATHER & Malcolm BOND

this interpretation, we found that the useof time score was significantly higher
for students who reported major employment or full-time employment when
compared with students who reported no major employment or either part-time
employment of no employment. We also found that single students had lower
use of time scores when compared with students who were married or in a de
facto relationship, or divorced, separated, or widowed. Part-time students at
the university (who also tended to be older, with major employment, and
married) reported higher use of time scores than full-time students (see Bond
& Feather, 1988, for further details). Note, however, that the positive
correlations that we found between the use of time and age may not hold
across the entire life span. Role demands change at key transition points (e.g.,
when children grow up and leave the home, or at retirement). One might
expect to find decreases in the perceived use of time at some of these
transition points where there is a removal of important concerns, although in
some cases there may be some replacement by new interests and activities.
In summary, the evidence from our studies consistently indicates that
perceived structure and purpose in the use of time is reliablY associated with
measures of personality and adjustment and varies according to role demands.
To what extent can a person's perceived use of time be modified by specially
designed, planned interventions? We tum to this question in the next section.

INTERVENTION RESEARCH
If symptoms of psychological distress such as anxiety, depression, anomie,
and boredom are associated with a diminished sense of purpose and structure
in the use of time (as our evidence shows), then relieving psychological
distress by planned interventions may be accompanied by reports that the use
9f time is now more purposeful and structured. A study by Bond and Feather
(1991) provides preliminary evidence that supports this hypothesis.
The study involved people who presented themselves with stress-related
problems to the Health Promotion Unit at the Flinders Medical Center in
Adelaide, South Australia. Commoni problems cited by participants in the
study included anxiety, panic attacks, and hypertension. The subjects in the
study attended stress management workshops at the Flinders Medical Center.
These workshops were group-based programs consisting of one session per
week for a total period of eight weeks. Each session lasted for about two and
half hours. The groups usually consisted of approximately seven or eight
participants. Each workshop session had a specific set of. topics for discussion
but the general aims of the workshop series were to provide: (1) information
on stress; (2) training in goal-setting and time management; (3) cognitive
restructuring (rational emotive therapy); (4) assertion training; and (5)
relaxation training.
There were 51 participants in the study with an age range froll). 30 to 73
years. Eight subjects were excluded from the analysis due to the absence of
post-test data. There remained 43 subjects (17 male, 26 female) who Were
 t
IIi
STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE IN THE US OF TIME
.:::

tested at the beginning of Session 1 (pre-test) and at the end of Session 8

wi (post-test).
We included the Time Structure Questionnaire (TSQ) in the scales that were

I:
[:
administered at both pre-test and post-test. Three other scales that we included
were: (1) The trait anxiety scale from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(Spielberger, 1983), to measure relatively stable differences in anxie-
w.:
~L
ty-proneness; (2) The 30--item assertiveness scale (Rathus, 1973), to measure
[:: social boldness as indicated by outspokenness, aggressiveness, and confidence;
h
[::, and (3) The Multidimensional Health Locus of Control scales developed by
Wallston, Wallston, and DeVellis (1978), to provide measures of how strongly
individuals believed that reinforcements for health-related behaviors were
primarily internal, a matter of chance, or under the control of powerful others.
Subjects received FormA of this locus of control scale at pre-test followed by
Form B at post-test, or vice versa determined by a random schedule. Further
information about the tests that were used is presented in Bond and Feather
(1991).
We obtained correlations between the TSQ scores and the other variables
both for the pre-test and for the post-test. Table 5 reports these correlations.
The main result of interest is that, for both the pre-test and post-test analyses,
trait anxiety was negatively related to the TSQ scores and assertiveness was
~t positively related to the TSQ scores. The respective correlations were
~~~ : statistically significant. However, time structure scores were not significantly
~~: : related to the locus of control scores, except in one case.

II Table 5. Intercorrelations for Time Structure Scores with Indices of Stress.

Pre-"", Post-test

Variable lIT SP SR PO EO PE lIT SP SR' PO EO PE

Trait anxiety -.66 -.58"' -.33 -.63*" -.35 -.27 -.63** -.66 -.32- -.66"' -.41"' -.36
Assertiveness .68*- -.56"'"! .49.... 1.47"' .37 .42"' .75 .69"' .56"' .55"' .68"' .46"'
Intcmal COlJlroi .21 .16 .14/ ' .38 1 -.16 .22 .15 -.03 .26 .05 .17 .2'
Powerful others -.24
Chance control -.01
-.19
-.03
-1
.19
-.14
-.19
-.15
.17
.0'
.14
-.12
-.36
-.06
-.29
-.22
-.16
.01
-.46-
-.09
-.20
.05
-.28

Note: All tests of significance were two-tailed. UT =

Use of Time. SP = Sense of Purpose.
SR = Structured Routine. PO = Present Orientation. EO = Effective Organisation. PE = Persistence.
'" p<.OS ...'" p<.Ol "' ...'" p<.OOl.

The mean scores for the time structure scores at pre-test ~nd post-test are
presented in Table 6. It can be seen that, following the stress management
workshops significant improvement occurred on all time structure scores
except Persistence. Further analyses indicated that trait anxiety decreased
significantly from pre-test to post-test' and that assertiveness increased
134 Norman FEATIlER & Malcolm BO~D

significantly. Locus of control measures were not modified by the workshops.

They showed no significant change from pre-test to post-test.

Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Time,Structure Spores at Pre-test and Post-test
and Results of Repeated Measures t Tests.

Pre-test Post-test

M sd M sd
Use of time 114.33 23.17 126.54 26.55 4.45***
Sense of purpose 21.65 8.06 24.42 7.64 3.32**
Structured routine 21.47 6.21 23.98 5.98 3.09**
Present orientation 15.37 5.14 17.58 5.06 3.24**
Effective organization 22.42 6.73 25.49 5.99 3.95***
Persistence 15.51 4.28 16.23 4.33 1.88

Note: All tests "of significance were two-tailed.

These results must be viewed cautiously because of the lack of a control

group of stressed individuals who did not receive treatment at the stress
management workshop. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the intervention
was successful in producing decreases in participants' level of anxiety,
increases in their confidence and assertiveness, and increases in the degree to
which they saw their use of time as structured and purposeful. Furthermore,
the results again indicated that time structure scores were linked to indicators
of psychological well-being (low anxiety, higher confidence and assertiveness).

SOME COl'fCLUDING COMMENTS

We will conblude with some general comments that relate to the research
that we have described and to future studies that could be conducted.
First, the corFflationai evidence that we have presented is not sufficient to
establish cause and effect relations. Does lack of structure and purpose in the
perceived use of time cause psychological distress, or is the causal chain in the
reverse direction with problems in time use" following the development of
symptoms of psychological ill-health? Are there other variables that
simultaneously affect both time structure and psychological adjustment? Are
these variables "SO closely linked that it is more appropriate to refer to an
individual's perception of time use as one among several indicators of
p~ychological adjustment rather than a cause or an effect of adjustment? We
need further research to answer these questions, involving controlled,
longitudinal studies; These studies should include behavioral measures of how
people use their time (e.g., time budgets) as well as subjective reports.
 STRUCruRE AND PURPOSE IN THE US OF TIME 135

These questions can be illustrated in relation to findings from research into

the psychological impact of unemployment. The results of the Feather and
Bond (1983) study showed that unemployment was associated with problems jn
the use of time and with a hlgher frequency of depressive symptoms and lower
self-esteem (at least in regard to the negative self-image). But were some of
our subjects unemployed because they had symptoms of psychological distress
to begin with? Did they report lack of structure and purpose in their use of
time because they were depressed or were their depressive symptoms an
outcome of boredom and lack of direction in their lives? Perhaps the lack of
time structure among the unemployed reflected their greater financial stress
and strain and the restrictions that relative poverty imposed on the daily acti-
vities were available to them and that they could afford (Feather, 1989;
Rowley & Feather, 1987; Ullah, 1990). These sorts of questions can only be
answered by moving beyond cross-sectional studies to research that examines
relations between variables using longitudinal designs.
Further research is also required. that investigates the interrelations between
the perceived use of time, role demands, and personality variables (Bond &
Feather, 1988). These studies might focus on changes in life circumstances
that are forced upon people (e.g., unemployment, chronk iliness, physical
handicaps) and those that are an important pari of most people's experience as
they grow older (e.g., marriage, having chlldren, retirement). For example,
Bond and Feather (1988) refer to research by Seleen (1982) that shows that
dissatisfaction with life among the elderly is related to a mismatch between
desired and actual activity patterns. This mismatch could be investigated
further by using the Time Structure Questionnaire (TSQ) to identify the key
aspects of time use in which the mismatch occurs (e.g., a sense of purpose,
structured routine). One might also develop intervention programs that are
specifically designed to increase an elderly person's sense of structure and
purpose in the use of time. It may be the case that the positive effects that
seem to occur when elderly people in nursing homes are given more control
over their daily activities (Langer & Rodin, 1976) reflect at least in part the
effects of introducing increased purpose and structure in their lives.
A further possible area of research concerns whether or not psychological
well-being is positively related to perceived structure and purpose in time use
over the entire range or whether too much structure and purpose can have
negative effects in relation to adjustment. Warr's (1987) vitamin model
specifies nine features of the environment that are assumed to relate to mental
health. These features are assumed to function in a manner analogous to the
way vitamins affect physical health: All of them are associated with poorer
mental health if they are in short supply. One feature refers to externally
generated goals, or the degree to whlch environments generate goals and task
demands, enabling individuals to have a sense of purpose and to be actively
motivated. This environmental feature and some of the other features (vanety,
 Norman FEATHER & Malcolm. BOND

environmental clarity, control, skill use,' and interpersonal contact) are

assumed to be associated with decrements in mental health if they are
over-abundant.Other environmental featores (money, physical security, valued
social position) are assumed to have a constant effect on mental health, with
increases in these features, being associated with better mental health over the
entire range.
Warr's (1987)anaIysis implies that too much structure and purpose in the
perceived use of time can have detrimental effects on mental health, just as
some vitamins when taken in large quantities can be harmful to physical
health. Thus, the relationship between mental health and perceived time use
may be curvilinear rather than linear, with increases in psychological
well-being associated with increases in perceived structure and purpose only
up to a certain point, beyond which decrements occur. People who are in this
decremental range may be those who are overloaded with goals and routines.
They have an excess of structure and purpose in their daily lives. They may
not be able to coordinate their activities in an efficient way in. the real time
that is available to them. Their goal structure is too complex and, despite
attempts to structure and organize the direction of their lives, they become the
victims of too many competing interests. They are .people who are at the
opposite pole from boredom and anomie. The effects of very high levels of
perceived structure and purpose in the use of time on psychological well-being
are worth investigating in future research.
Finally, at the theoretical level, we need to relate ideas about time strocture
to other psychological approaches. Two factors that emerged from the Bond
and Feather (1988) study deserve further conceptual analysis. These factors
are Sense of Purpose and Structured Routine. Sense of purpose can be linked
to theories that relate action to goal structures. Relev~t approaches are
theories from motivational psychology that relate behavior to goal-directed
action tendencies (e.g., expectancy,value theories; Feather, 1982, 1990) and
the volitional control. of actions (e.g., Kuhl, 1987; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985).
Some motivational theorists explicitly take the time dimension into account, as
in research on time perspective and future orientation (e.g., De Voider &
Lens, 1982; Gjseme, 1981; Lens, 1986; Nuttin, 1985; Van Calster et aI.,
1987; Raynor & Entin, 1982). Other related approaches from cognitive
psychology emphasize that actions are determined by goals, plans, and
feedback (e.g., Frese & Sabini, 1985; Locke & Latham, 1990; Miller,
Galanter & Pribram, 1960). The effects of goals, feedback, and other
cognitive variables such as perceived self-efficacy are also considered in
Bandura's (1986) recent social-cognitive analysis of thought and action.
Although sense of purpose is a subjectively defined variable, it may be
possible to relate it to a dominant action tendency or to a strong intention or to
the presence of goals and plans that are of current concern to the, individual.
We also need to conduct a conceptual analysis of the factor that we called
 STRUCI'URE AND PlJRPOSEINTHB US OF TIME 137

Structured Routine. Bond and Feather (1988) noted that this factor has
generally been 'neglected by psychologists. The itnpoSition of an orderly
structure on daily activities is an essential part of planning and, if not carried
to extremes, has healthy co!lsequenceso, Having a routine, however, is not the
same as having a plan. A plan can change froni thne to time depending on the
circumstances. It is responsive to the success or failure of goal-directed,actions
in relation to potential outcomes, i.e., whether the plan is successful or unsuc-
cessful in enabling the individual to achieve desired goals or to avoid aversive
outcomes. A routine can form part of a planned sequence of behavior and
pertains to a particular set of activities wi!bin a defined situation. A' routine
has a stability and constancy about it, though it can be replaced by a new
routine when Ulw plans are formed in the context of purposive behavior.
Recent research on action styles has provided evidence for factors concerned
with goal orientation and planfulness (Frese, Stewart, & Hannover, 1987).
These factors resemble the purpose and routine faCtors that we have described
but they are not identical to them.,
In summary, there is scope for further empirical research and for further
conceptual analysis in relation to perceived purpose and structure in the use of
time. There is converging evidence from a number of different areas that
shows that purpose and structure are iJnportant variables in the analysis of
action and pSYChological well-being, worthy of more attention in the future.

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GOALS AND PLANS: THE PERSPECTIVE
OF COGNITIVE ORIENTATION

Shulamith KREITLER & Hans KRElTLER

Department of Psychology
Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel

TWO UNNERSES OF CONTENT

Goals and' plans have traditionally belonged to different universes of
discourse. In their torturous history in the 'different schools of psychology,
goals have been mostly considered as a motivational concept. Sometimes they
did better, as for example at the hands of McDougall (1930), Adler (1930),
Lewin (1935, 1951), Tolman (1932) and F. H. Allport (1937) who positioned
goals at the center of the motivational scene and considered striving for goals
as the major characteristic of human behavior. At other times it did worse,
mainly at the hands of behaviorists who considered goals as dangerous mental
ghosts (Skinner, 1953). Yet it was one of the. greatest behaviorists, no less
thinker and researcher than Hull (1943) who conceded that in order to explain
the behavior of mice and humans it is necessary to consider goals and goal-
directedness.
With the decline of drive theory in the late fifties, goals emerged as one of
the major contenders for a central role in a theory of human motivation. Yet,
recognition was slow in coming. For one, for theoretical and traditIonal
reasons, many psychologists preferred to consider behavior as caused by
external incentive stimulation and reinforcements rather than internal deter-
minants like goals (e.g., Bindra, 1979; Young, 1961). External elicitors could
undoubtedly be accommodated with greater ease within the existing models.
Secondly, the clinical and depth-psychological orientations have rendered
psychologists suspicious in regard to goals that seemed to many of them hardly
better than rationalizations. Thirdly, to the many who worked with animals or
considered the applicability of a psychological theory to animals as a major
criterion for testing the theory's validity, it seemed difficult to espouse goals
as an explanatory concept because it seemed impossible to assess them at the
sub-human level. Fourthly, developmentally-oriented psychologists al~o were
wary of goals because they could not see how to apply them to children. But
142 Shulamith KREITLER & Hans KREITLER

the main difficulty was probably the absence of a theory which would enable
them to work with a cognitive-motivational construct like goals.
Not surprisingly, Pervin (1989a) noted that goals concepts have almost
always formed part of cognitive models. One of the most obvious
manifestations of the cognitive revolution has been the relative ease with
which psychologists could incorporate the goals, concept in their thinking.
Within the span of a few years, goals have been recognized as playing a
central role in regard to human motivation (e.g., Bandura, 1986), the self
(Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987), personality (Gedo, 1979), perception of others
(e.g., Bruner, 1981; Carbonell, 1981), impression management.(Schienker,
1985), social interaction (Schank & Abelson, 1977), and the organization of
social knowledge (TrzebiIiski, 1989).
However, there remained some persistent problems plaguing the construct
of goals that made it difficult to specify its motivational status. The major ones
are how do goals affect actions, what is the motivational impact of goals and
how does the organism proceed from goal to action (e.g., Frese & Sabini,
1985; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985;Pervin, 1989b). More specific problems focus
on the acquisition of goals, their consciousness and their relation to voluntary
and rational control of behavior .
. In sum, although. it is evident to many that a goal is a necessary construct
for a psychological theory of motivation, it is far from evident what it does
and how it functions in this context.
Plans have had a different history in psychology. They have burst into
psychology with Miller, Gallanter and Pribram's (1960) book. Initially
modelled on cybernetic principles as an.;analog to programs that guide a
computer, from the beginning they were designed to elCplain the how of
behavior, namely, to complement the cognition in the organism's mind with
the actual action. They were indeed perfect candidates for displacing the
outmoded concept of habit. In contrast to habit, plans were sufficiently
flexible, complex and dynamic to account for acnons and their ready
modifiability by' ever changing contexts. However, instead of gaining ground
in the domains of action and motivation, plans have been readily adopted in
the cognitive field as a construct allied to strategies and heuristics in
comprehension, memory and problem solving (e.g., Brown, Collins & Harris,
1978; Klahr, 1978; Newell & Simon, 1972).
With the advent of the cognitive'revolution and the awakening of interest in
cognitive approaches to motivation, the. concept of plan was resuscitated and
implanted in the new emerging conceptions of motivation. However, not
enough emphasis was placed on its specific characteristics and unique
contribution to the problems of behavior. When adopted, it became lumped
together with the construct of goals and has often been considered merely as a
means for goal attainment (Scholnick & Friedman, 1987). Hence, ,it became
clear that using the construct of plans for understanding action required a
 GOALS AND PLANS .. 143

clarification of its nature, dynamics, and functioning, and especially how it

related to goals, to everyday action, and to planning.
Thus, it is evident that hoth goals and plans are constructs related to the
domain of human motivation and action. In order to clarify their role,
dynamics and interrelations it is necessary to present, however briefly, a
comprehensive theory of human motivation that incorporates these two con-
structs. This is the theory of cognitive orientation (CO) (Kreitler & Kreitler,
1976, 1982). Its special characteristics are: (a) It is a cognitive theory of
motivation; (b) It is a comprehensive theory, namely, it deals with the whole
sequence from input identification to behavior elicitation; and (c) it is
empirically-grounded and validated through well over 60 studies of behavior
prediction and modification.

THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE ORIENTATION

The co theory is a cognitive-motivational general theory of behavior that

has been developed to enable understanding, predicting and modifying human
behavior. The main tenet of the theory is that cognitive contents - i.e.,
meanings, beliefs, attitudes - gnide human behavior. The processes intervening
between input and output may be grouped into four stages, each characterized
in terms of metaphoric questions and answers.
The first stage is initiated by an external or internal input,. and is focused, as
it were, on the question "What is it?'.'. It sets in operation a primary procedure
for input identification called Meaning Action which may result in Initial (or
Limited) Meaning and determineS to which of the four following alternatives
the input pertains: (a) The input is a signal for a defensive or an adaptive
reflex or for a conditioned response; (b) The input is a signal for molar action
and hence stands in need of a more elahorate clarification of its meaning; (c)
The input is known to be irrelevant to the present situation; and (d) The input
does not pertain to the ahove three alternatives because it is new or particu-
larly significant and hence it elicits the orienting reflex which may provide
sufficient meaning for identifying the input as the signal for one of the three
alternativeS ..
The second stage sets in if the defensive, adaptive or conditioned response
that has been elicited (see alternative a) turns out to be insufficient for coping
with the situation; or when the input has been identified from'the outset as a
signal for more complex behavior (alternative b, ahove); or when the elicited
orienting reflex (alternative c, ahove) has not provided information sufficient
for identifying the input. The second stage is focused as it were on the
questions IlWhat does "it mean to me and for me?" or "How am I involved?"
This stage involves eliciting and eiahorating more complex and more personal
meanings than in the first stage. The underlying procedure is called Meaning
144 Shulamilh KRBITLER & Ha.,. KRBITLER

Generation and results in Comprehensive (or Extended) Meaning. The elicited

meanings also include combinations of meaning called "beliefs", for example,
"I am iIi: a room", "The store is closed II, "My toes itch". The evoked beliefs
refer to the input directly or indirectly and are designed to clarify whether
action is required or not. If not, then the input is not further dealt with, and
may be stored intentionally or unintentionally, depending on its anticipated
importance. If at least one of the elicited beliefs indicates a goal directly or
indirectly, the elaboration of the input is carried further in the framework of
the third stage.
The extended meaning elaboration of the third stage is focused on the
metaphoric question "What will I do?" The answer is sought by means of the
elicitation of four belief types: (I) Beliefs about goals, which express actions;
states, or objects desired or undesired by the individual, e.g., "I want to be
leaner", "I wish peace reigned in the world"; (2) Beliefs about rules and
norms, which express ethical, social, aesthetic and other rules and standards,
that is, actions, states or objects considered by the individual as necessary,
permissible, required, ought to be or unnecessary, forbidden, undesirable,
e.g., "A person. should eat as little as possible", "One ought to care for one's
old age" ; (c) Beliefs about self which express information about oneself, such
as one's habits, actions, feelings, abilities, in the present, the past or the
future, as the.individual sees it, e.g., "I am a lazy person", "I like staying in
hotels", "When 1 was five years old I fell off a tree"; and (d) General beliefs,
which express information concerning others and the enviromnent, that is,
about states, events, objects, relations etc. assumed by the individual to exist
or to be true, e.g., "Being popular may help in your promotion", "People
cannot .control. most of the things that happen to them".
The different beliefs are usually elicited by means of a goal belief that can
be considered as a: focal belief in regard to the evocation of a specific action.
The task of the focal belief consists in triggering and gniding the evocation of
other beliefs that are related by meaning to its behavioral implications. The
elicited beliefs undergo interactions in line with the matching or mismatching
of their orientational support fora specific action. For example, if the action is
"eat this piece of cake" for a dieting person, the beliefs supporting it (e.g.,
"One should never miss an enjoyment") are pooled together, as well as those
that negate (e.g., "Even the smallest deviation from one's decision may have
catastrophic results "). The pooling occurs within each belief type. Beliefs of
each type.. (namely, beliefs about. goals or beliefs about self) act as one
vectorial unit, whose direction is determined in line with the majority of the
beliefs of that type.
If all four belief types support the behavior, or at least three support it
whereas the fourth is neutral, a cluster of beliefs - called the CO cluster - is
formed which fulfills a central role in the prediction and modification of
behavior. It is manifested in the form of "a behavioral intent" supporting the
 GOALS AND PLANS ...

performance of that behavior. The behavioral intent represents the

directionality of the CO cluster and in this sense constitutes an answer to the
question "What will I do?" Whereas the processes .of meaning assignment and
clustering are not conscious, the behavioral intent may become conscious. In
this case it may assume externally - but only externally - the form of a belief
about self (e.g., "Next winter I'll go to Florida") ora goal belief (e.g., "Next
winter I want to go to Florida").
Not all cases result in the formation ofa full-fledged CO cluster. If two
belief types point in one direction and two in another, there arises a stalemate,
which may spur attempts at resolution, like belief substitution. If these
attempts fail, a polarization may occur, resulting in the formation of two CO
clusters, each of which is anchored on a goal belief supported by beliefs of all
four belief types and with behavioral implications opposed to those of the
other goal belief. The outcomes of such two competing CO clusters would be
two competing behavioral intents, a constellation we call conflict or more
specifically "intent conflict" to distinguish between it and oilier types of
conflicts.
Sometimes it is not possible to form the four belief types because there may
not be enough beliefs of one or another type relevant in regard to the input.
The result is all incomplete CO cluster, as for example in the. case of window-
shopping (the missing belief type is often goal beliefs) or .when not all the
circumstances necessary, for a specific COllrse .of action are known (the. missing
belief type wonld be. general. beliefs or beliefs about norms). A different type
of an unoperational COcluster may bef0l1J1.edwhenaHeast one of the belief
types includes many beliefs known by the individual to be imaginative, as-if
beliefs. This is characteristic ofdaydreattls. TheuJlderlyillgCO cluster often
includes as-if beliefs in the beliefs~bollts~forgeneral beliefs, whereas goal
beliefs and norm beliefs are characterislicai!yieftuntratisformed.
Not all CO clusters; actually only a minority, ,ate produced ad hoc. CO
clusters that have occurred frequently orhavegnided successful performance
may be stored in long term. memory and 'hence 'maybe retrieved whenever
needed. Even then the CO cluster is checked and modified or completed in
view of the prevailing conditions,e)<ternally and internally. When the
deviation is marked, the retrieved CO cluster is abandoned in favor of
renewed CO clustering .. For.example;a stored CO cluster orienting toward
helping a stranger who feels ill in the street may be abandoned when the street
is dark and desolate or when one feels ill oneself. Thus, in no case does a CO
cluster give rise to a behavioral intent without a previous rechecking of
situation meanings. Stored CO clusters may however vary in their
completeness and specificity. Some relate to a partiCUlar course of action,
whereas others serve as guidelines for the acquisition or production of further
beliefs as well as for the formation of more specific CO clusters: Such
generalized CO clusters often interact with personality traits.
146 Shulamith KREITLER. & Hans KREITLER

Performance of an action requires however more than a behavioral intent.

Thus, the last stage is focused on the question "How will I do it?" The answer
is in the form of a behavioral program which is a hierarchical system of
instructions, mostly sequential, for regulating behavior. Behavioral programs
are the pure or mixed products of heredity and learning. Mostly they are
retrieved from memory and sometimes they are formed ad hoc (Kreitler & \t
Kreitler, 1987a, 1987b). In the fourth stage behavioral programs are elicited,
selected and adjusted for application in a given situation. If necessary,
conflicts are resolved between programs ready for application and those in the
process of application. Actual performance is the sequel of this stage.
In sum, the CO theory assumes that cognitive contents and processes
specific for particular behaviors guide those behaviors. The relevant cognitive
contents do not necessarily reflect a common interpersonal reality, and are not
necessarily rational or logical when considered as separate units, in pairs or in
sets. Most importantly, the processes involved in the guidance of behavior, its
elicitation and performance, are neither conscious nor voluntary.
The CO theory has been applied successfully to the prediction of over 60
different behaviors, such as being on time, achievement, pain tolerance
(Kreitler & Kreitler, 1976), curiosity (Kreitler & Kreitler, in press-l!; Kreitler,
Kreitler & Zigler, 1974), planning (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1987a, 1987b) ,
conformity, honesty, 'assertiveness (Lobel, 1982) , smoking (Tipton &
Riebsame, 1987), quitting smoking (Kreitler, Shahar, & Kreitler, 1976) ,
overeating (Kreitler & Chemerinski, 1988), undergoing examinations for the
early detection of breast cancer' (Kreitler, Chaitchik, & Kreitler, 1990;
Westhoff & Halbach-Suarez, 1989), in samples of normals of different ages,
schizophrenics (Kreitler, Schwartz, & Kreitler, 1987) or retarded individuals
(Kreitler & Kreitler, 1988). In recent years the procedures of prediction have
been applied successfully also in the new field of health psychology
(Drechsler, Kreitler, & Brunner, 1987; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1991a, 1991b).
The prediction is based on information about the subject's CO cluster and the
availability of behavioral programs in the studied domain of behavior.
The procedure for predicting behavior is based on constructing a CO
questionnaire in regard to the specific behavior. The questionnaire enables
assessing the particular course of behavior. Constructing a CO questionnaire
includes severiU stages (for detailed instructions see Kreitler & Kreitler, 1982).
The major ones are: (1) Determining by means of an analysis of meaning
(Kreitler & Kreitler, 1976, 1982, 1990b) the major aspects of the meaning of
the behavior and situation characteristic for the studied population. These
aspects are called "themes" and they represent: the meaning of the behavior. If
the behavior is, say, overeating, the themes include "avoidance of limitations"
and "avoidance of overt hostility expressions" (Kreitler & Chemerinski, 1988).
Accordingly, a theme is a specific content with an orientative directionality,
that is, supporting or not supporting a certain course of action. (2)
 GOALS AND PLANS ...

Formulating beliefs of four types relating to each of the themes, for example,
concerning "avoidance of limitations", some of the beliefs were "I want my
life to be without any duties" (belief ahout goals), "I feel really happy only
when there are no constraints" (belief ahout self), "Limitations and external
requirements spoil every pleasure in life" (general belief), "One should strive
to live without any obligations" (belief ahout norms). There can be more than
one belief per theme in each belief type, some formulated positively, some
negatively. This stage yields a draft of aCO questionnaire. (3) Administering
the first draft of the CO questionnaire to a pretest sample, whose members
vary in the behavior of interest, so as to examine the questionnaire's reliability
and validity, and to shorten it by excluding inappropriate questions (namely,
nondiscriminating, with restricted range of responses, unclear, etc.).
The final CO questionnaire includes four parts, each of which refers to one
belief type and is preceded by instructions emphasizing that belief type. Each
part includes brief statements (representing beliefs), to which the subjects
respond by selecting one of several response alternatives or by checking their
agreement on a 2- to 7-point scale. Notably, the statements do not refer
directly to the behavior in question but to the "themes" that reflect its
underlying meanings.
A CO questionnaire provides four separate scores, one for each belief type,
which enable a researcher to get an approximation of the behavioral intent.
The prediction of behavior is based on using the four belief types either as
separate predictors, or jointly in the form of a CO score (whose range is 0 to
4 and which represents the number of belief types in which the subject got a
score above the group's mean). As mentioned, if there are enough relevant
beliefs orienting toward the behavior in at least three of the belief types, the
person is likely to show the expected behavior, when it can be assumed that
the behavioral program is available in that person's repertory.
The CO theory has enabled also successful modifications of behavior, such
as curiosity, pain tolerance (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1976) or impulsivity (Zakay,
Bar-El, & Kreitler, 1984). The change has been effected by producing four or
at least three belief types orienting toward the desired behavior, and by training
an adequate behavioral program when necessary (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1990a).
The CO model seems to resemble other cognitive models of behavior,
especially Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) reasoned action model, the Health
Belief model (Becker, 1974; Becker & Maiman, 1975) and Leventhal's stress,
threat and emotion model (Leventhal & Everhart, 1979; Leventhal & Nerenz,
1983). It shares with tliese models the assumption that cognitions affect
behavior but differs from them mainly in five respects: (a) It is more
comprehensive than any of the models since it applies to the whole range of
behaviors, including reflexes, and constitutes an encompassing theory of
behavior providing a complete description of the processes starting with input
identification and culminating in performance; (b) Its principles apply tOllnY
148 Shulamith KREITLER..& Hans KREITLER

domain of behavior without the need to, construct theoretical extensions or

genel'lllizations; (c) It provides systematic prpcedures for determining in each
case the particular meanings ,and contents of the beliefs relevant for the
behavior in question, thus preserving theoretical tightness and strict
operationalization of its constructs in contrast to the other models which have
often to rely on selecting variables in line with shifting contextual conditions;
(d) It includes particular and separate sets of methods for predicting behaviors
and for modifying them; and (e) In contrast to the other models that tend to
confound cognition,with rationality and voluntarY control, the CO model does
not, assume that behavior is the product of rational decision or carefully
reasoned weighing of benefits and losses but shows how behavior proceeds
from specific clustered beliefs whose orientational directionalities are
manifested in the behavioral intent.

BELIEFS ABOUT GOALS

The framework of the CO theory enables us to present a closer analysis of

the concept of goals, and provides some clarifications about the nature and
functioning of goals.
The most important conclusion is that goals do not determine behavior but
they contribute to its determination. Goals are one of the four belief types that
together constitute a vector called the behavioral intent, directing toward a
specific course of action. Often however goals play a more central role than
the other three belief types (beliefs about self, beliefs about rules and norms,
and genera) beliefs) and constitute the core around which the CO cluster is
formed. This is likely to occur because the orientative aspect of goals (namely,
the clarity and salience with which they point toward behaviors) is usually
more prominent than, that of the other belief types.
Sometimes, when expressed verbally, a behavioral intent may seem to
resemhle a goal;'e.g., "In the summer I want to go to France". But there are
important differences in nature and function between these two constructs.'
GOI;1 beliefs are beliefs prior to clustering, that is, orientative units of content
competing with other units for co-determining the course of action which will
finally emerge. In contrll!!t, behavioral intents represent the joint orientative
directionalities ,of beliefs about goals, ,about rules and norms, about self, and
gen,eral beliefs. Thus, they reflect the goal only after it has been subjected to a
clustering process in which it has been checked and elaborated in view of
other beliefs. Theoretically, the clustering process may leave the original goal
unchanged but more often it leads to its transformation so that it becomes
operational in view of other beliefs and cognitive structures.
A, study about the meanings of behavioral intents, goals and plans (Kreitler
& Kreitler, 1976, chapter 11) showed that the meaning of gOlils consisted
primarily of the desired or undesired actions which they indicated, reasons for
 qOALS AND PLANS ... 14,9

upholding the goals, as well as the affect associated with them and their
attainment. In contrast, the meaning of behavioral intents consisted mainly of
specifying the function or purpose of the intents and the manner of
implementing them, accompanied by a few major details concerning the time
and place of the outlined actions. Finally, the meaning of plans consisted
primarily of stating the actions constituting the plan and various temporal,
locational and operational details associated with their actual performance.
Thus, it is evident that the emphasis on actions becomes clearer and more
prominent the closer the sequence gets to the stage of actual behavior. In this
sense, the behavioral intent serves as a bridge between the goals and the plans.
The presented view of goals also implies that there is no obvious
correspondence between goals and behaviors (see also the results of the study
by Pervin, 1983, about the low correlation between the ratings of goals and
behaviors). The reasons for this include the following. First, goals alone do
not guide behavior but only in conjunction with other beliefs that determine
the behavioral intent. It is only in children under the age Of 5 or 6 years
(Marom, 1978) or in adults under exceptional conditions, such as drunkenness,
that fewer than all four belief types' may cluster into a behavioral intent.
Second, more than one goal may enter into the determination of the behavioral
intent. In fact usually several goals participate in the shaping of each
behavioral intent. And third, for an action to be elicited the behavioral intent
has to be implemented by a behavioral program. Thus, it is obvious that the
same overt behavior may implement different goals and the same goal may be
implemented by different behaviors in different situations or under different
circumstances. Further, it is possible that the goals of an individual or group
are interpersonally-shared (as we found in regard to the goals preferred by
schizophrenics, Kreitler & Kreitler, 1976, chapter 10) while the overt
behaviors are abnormal. '.
Just as there is no perfect correspondence betwl""n behaviors and goals,
there is also no perfect correspondence between si~ations and goals (see
'again, the findings of Pervin, 1983). Goals are not elicited directly by
situations but depend on the meaning the individual assigns to the input. The
first stage of meaning assignment consists in input identification and is largely
interpersonally-shared (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1983). It is only in the second
stage of processing, when the foc~s is on "what does it mean to me and for
me?", that goals may be elicited ~ part of the meaning of the situation which
determines whether action is required or not. Thus, for example, if the input
has been identified as "an exam", further meaning assignment may include the
goal "I want to succeed in this exam". Often it is the elicitation of a goal that
leads to a positive answer. Mostly more than one goal is elicited.
The selection of one or more goals for the next stage of processing depends
on the nature of the goal and'its meaning in terms of the other elicited' beliefs.
Thus, we found that the chances for selection of a goal are higher if a goal is
150 Shulamith KREITLER. & HansJCREITLER.

related to several other goals, or is embedded within a goal hierarchy of

central importance for the individual, or is supported - or at least is not
contradicted - by other belief types (namely, beliefs about self, beliefs about
rules and norms, and general beliefs). Thus, for example, one stody (Kreitler
& KreitIer, 1976) showed that the estimated probability of attaining a goal in a
specific situation played a role in determining its selection in that situation, so
that a less preferred goal was selected if the probability of its realization in the
situation was higher than that of a more highly preferred goal. More
specifically, the product of multiplying the goal preference by the probability
estimation provided a good approximation to goal selection.
Our view of goals enables also specifying more clearly their different
functions. Participating in guiding action is one function, which may be called
the behavioral function. Further, goals also fulfil an emotional function for
they provide the individual with criteria for evaluating the success of an
action. Of the goal has been attained there is an experience or achievement,
success and a sense of control over events which may also contribute to
enhancing self-esteem. If it has not been attained there is a sense of failure and
disappointment. In addition, there i~ the orientative function of goals whereby
goals give the individual information about where he or she is proceeding in a
specific situation or .in a given period in life or more generally in time. The
orientative function thus enables the individual to impose a certain structure on
the flow of time. Finally, insofar as the individual's goals are part of the
interpersonally-shared meanings in a given culture, they also fulill a social
function, providing cultural continuity and enabling the sharing of experiences
and better interpersonal commuuication among the members of the culture.
Finally, there are some more general conclusions. In the first place, it is
evident that the whole process of behavior elicitation is not conscious and does
not have to be conscious, even if some aspects of it, like the behavioral intent
can sometimes become conscious. It should be emphasized also that the goals
that participate in determining the course of action are mostly not conscious
and are not identical to the goals that a person declares or assigns to his or her
behavior. Hence, it should not be surprising that an individual says that his or
her goal is, for example, to lose weight but does not behave accordingly. The
reason is that the goals that determine behavior are those that express the
meauings of eating, dieting or losing weight and these goals (e.g., to act in
complete freedom without any limitations) are very different from the
conscious goals the person knows about and assumes erroneously that they
guide his or her behavior. The CO theory has evolved procedures for
identifying the goills that actually direct behavior (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1990a;
see also above, The Theory of Coguitive Orientation).
Secondly, the process of behavior elicitation is not necessarily rational or
logical. The dynamics of the process is mainly that of meaning interactions,
some of whose constituents may conform to the rules of logic and ratiouality
but neither always no necessarily.
 GOALS AND PLANS ...

And thirdly, the process of behavior elicitation is not subject to voluntar:y

control. Though interventions are possible, for example, by systematic
modifying beliefs, the individual himself or herself cannot change behavior by
mere decision, if it is not supported by relevant beliefs of the four types.
Hence, goal-directed behavior is cognitively based but is neither conscious
nor necessarily logical, rational or subject to voluntary control.

PLANS AND PROGRAMS

We define programs as hierarchically ordered sequences of instructions

guiding the performance of actions. They may profitably be analyzed in terms
of two levels: (a) the level of the "program scheme" representing the relatively
more general instructions and responsible for the overall strategy and the
holistic or flexible aspects of actions; and (b) the level of the "operational
program" representing the relatively more detailed instructions and responsible
for the specific tactics and the more rigidly determined aspects of action
(Gallistel, 1980; Prjbram, 1971).
There are four kinds of behavioral programs. One kind consists of innately
determined programs, such as tho.se controlling reflexes or tropisms. A second
kind consists of programs determined both innately and through learning, such
as those controlling instinctive sequences (Dilger, 1962; Tinbergen, 1951),
linguistic behaviors and probably some of the defense mechanisms (Kreitler &
Kreitler, 1972, in press-.!1). The third kind includes programs that have been
acqnired only through learning, such as tho~e controlling all culturally-shaped
behaviors (e.g., greeting, conducting" a conversation, religious ceremonies; see
also Schank & Abelson, 1977) and personaiIy-formed hapits (e.g., modes of
relaxing, preparing an exam). The fourth kind - which we have called plans -
include programs that have been constructed by the individual and represent
products of the act of planning.
Programs are elicited by the behavioral intent. They are indeed a part of its
meaning. Their enactment requires programming, a process that may include
minor adjustments in the program, for example, checking operationability of
the program or modifying some parts of the program in view of situational
constraints. Sometimes however more basic processes may be involved, for
example, in order to resolve conflicts when there is more than one program
adequate for implementing a given behavioral intent or when a new program
clashes with one that is currently enacted.
Planning is a uniquely characterized complex cognitive behavior resorted to
when no behavioral program adequate for implementing the behavioral intent
can be retrieved (KreitIer & Kreitler, 1987c). It is of particular interest to note
that planning is itself a behavior that is subject to the processes specified by
the CO model. In a series of studies we succeeded to predict the behavior of
152 Shulamith KREITLER & Hans KREITLER.

planning in both adults as well as children in different age groups (about 5, 7,

9 and 11 years old) (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1986, 1987a,b). The behavior of
planning was assessed by observing the performance of planning in 10
planning situations, different for adults and children, e.g., planning a <!ay with
errands in town, planning a trip to an unfamiliar country or a picnic out-of-
town. The spoken, written or drawn responses of the subjects were coded in
terms of three sets of variables: (a) General aspects of planning, reflecting the
complexity and richness of the plans, e.g., number of. alternative plans
constructed or number of if-then eventualities considered in the plans, mean
number of steps included in the plans; (b) Global evaluations of the plans by
experts, focusing on the relevance, operationability and economy of the plan;
and (c) Specific contents considered in the plan, such as emotional, functional,
temporal or locational aspects.
The predictions were based on focusing separately on the motivation for
planning, conceptualized in terms of the behavioral intent, and on the
performance of planning, conceptualized in terms of the behavioral program.
In exploring the motivation we applied the procedures for identifying the
meanings of planning and set up a CO Questionnaire of Planning assessing the
four types of beliefs (goals, rules and norms, about self, and general), in
regard to the identified themes (e.g., maintaining spontaneity in one's life,
incr~ing control over events, wasting time), that differed for adults and
children. Concerning the performance of planning, we examined first, the
cognitive processes that were required for the act of planning, and secondly;
preferences for specific content categories that were used in the plans. Both
the cognitive processes (e.g., categorizing, drawing inferences, considering the
manner in which things operate) and the preferences for specific contents
(e.g., emotions, locations) were assessed by the Meaning Test (Kreitler &
Kreitler, 1990b).
In both adults and children the scores of CO (approximating the behavioral
intent for planning) together with those for the cognitive processes
(approximating the behavioral program for planning) provided - by means of
multiple stepwise regression analyses - significant predictions of the general
aspects of planning and the global evaluations of the plans, accounting on the
average for 83 % to 85 % of the variance. The content aspects were accounted
for by the preferences for specific contents.
These results may serve as a paradigm for predicting behaviors, cognitive or
noncognitive, on the basis of the CO theory.
 GOALS AND PLANS ...

MODIFYING BEHAVIOR

It is evident that in order to modify behavior it is necessary to. modify those

processes that are involved in the different stages of the eliCitation of behavior,
that is, meaning assignment to inputs, beliefs including goals, and behavioral
programs. We have attained behavior modifications by modifying meanings,
beliefs and behavioral programs, as required by the specific case. Due to
limited space it may suffice to emphasize that the procedures involved in
modifying meanings, beliefs and programs are different. For example, goals
may be modified by exposing inconsistent aspects in their meanings,
embedding them in contexts different from the habitual ones, or changing the
meaning of one of their constituents. Further, new goals may be acquired
through interactions with respected figures that represent specific goals. In
contrast, programs and plans are modified through means such as
psychodramatic enactment, imitation and modelling.
Similar principles apply in regard to modifying behaviors on a broader
basis, such as society or a culture. Here too, if we are to expect enduring
changes it is necessary that meanings, goals and other beliefs as well as
behavioral programs be changed. The process may seem slow but it is
cumulative, and when the necessary changes have occurred on the submolar
level, the new behaviors may burst on the scene as if unexpected.
This statement may seem frightening because of the possibility that the new
behaviors could be dangerous and detrimental for individuals and groups. But
if One considers the intense dynamics of interaction of meanings, values and
behavioral forms in a free, democratic and pluralistic society, it is more likely
to expett in the long run changes in behavior that are beneficial for individuals
and groups and allow for the flowering of the rich human potential for
creativity and cooperation.

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GOAL SETTING AND PRODUCTIVITY
UNDER CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM

Edwin A. LOCKE
School of Business and Administration
University of Maryland
College'Park, MA, USA

GOAL-DIRECTED ACTION AND HUMAN LIFE

A fundamental attribute of the actions of living organisms is their goal-
directedness. The goal to which such actions are directed is: the organism's life.
Examples of such actions inClude,: the assimilation of food by an amoeba, the root
growth of a plant, the hunting activities of a wild animal, and the activities of
humans in the pursuit of a career. '
At the vegetative level of life, characteristic of an amoeba or plant, goal-
directed action oCCUrs automatically. Such organisms are biologically
programmed to take actions which further their existence. Vegetative actions are
also present within the higher organisms. For example, activities such as
digestion, breathing, the beating of the heart, and the actions of many other
internal organs such as the liver and kidneys, automatically act in such a manner
as to preserve the animal's or human's life. These automatic activities, while
necessary, are not sufficient to preserve the existence and animal of man. The
latter also has to use consciousness (the faculty of awareness) to guide their
actions. For example, their stomach's will digest food but will not find the food
or produce the food. Actions guided towards goals by consciousness are called
purposeful.
Both vegetative and purposeful action share three features which justify
characterizing them as goal-directed (quoting from Locke & Latham, 1990, pp.
2-3, based on Binswanger, 1986):

(1) Self-generation. The actions of living organisms are fueled by energy sources
integral to the organism as a whole, i.e., the energy source is not "put into it" as
the motor into a torpedo but is integral to every cell. Furthermore, this energy
 158 Edwin LOCKE

is available for many different actions - depending on environmental

circumstances and the organism's needs.

(2) Value-significance. A living organism can go out of existence; its survival is

conditional. To maintain its existence, every living organism must take specific
actions to fulfill its needs. If it does not take such actions, it dies. Life
maintenance is the ultimate explicit or implicit end of such action and the
h standard of successful action. Thus, all goal-directed action has value significance
r for the organism. In contrast, the continued existence of inanimate objects does
not require them to take any action; they will remain "as is" unless changed or
destroyed by external forces. Their movements have no value significance.

(3) Goal-causation ... In purposeful action, it is the individual's idea of and desire
for the goal or end that causes action. The idea serves as the efficient cause, but
the action is aimed toward a future state.
In nonconsciously goal-directed action (e.g., the actions of the heart and
lungs), the principle is the same, but the explanation is more complex.
Binswanger (1986) observed that natural selection explains the adaptation of
actions to survival in the same way that it explains the adaptation of structural
features of the organism to s'!rvival:

For example, my heart will be able to beat tomorrow only if I am alive tomorrow.
Bot I will survive only if my blood is circulated today. The present blood circulation .
is thus an indirect cause of the future heartbeat. And since blood circulation is the
goal of the heartbeat, this means that subsequent heartbeats are caused by the survival
value of that action's goal, as attained in earlier instauces of that very action.... The
~ vegetative actions of living organisms are teleological - i.e., goal directed -
because these actions have been naturally selected for their efficacy in attaining ends
having survival value for the agent .... in vegetative action a past instance of the "final
cause" functions as the efficient cause. (pp. 4-5).

To summarize, the ultimate biological basis of goal-directed action is the

organism's need to sustain its life by taking the actions its nature requires (Locke
& Latham, 1990, pp 2-3).
The distinctive feature of purposeful action at the human level is that human
beings can and must select their own purposes. Man possesses senses just as
animals do but also possesses the faculty of reason. Unlike animals, people are
not programmed to automatically want things which are good for them and dislike
things that are bad for them. Further, they are not programmed to know how to
get things they want or avoid things they do not want. All this has to be
discovered by a process of thought, i.e., by reason. To quote philosopher Ayn
Rand (1964, p. 24):
 GOAL SEITING AND PRODUCTIVITY ...

Man cannot survive, like an animal, by acting on the range of the moment. An
animal's life consists of a series of separate cycles, repeated over and over again,
such as the cycle of breeding its young, or of storing food for the winter; an animal's
consciousness cannot integrate its entire lifespan; it can carry just so far, then the
animal has to begin the cycle all over again, with no connection to the past. Man's
life is a continuous whole: for good or evil, every day, year, and decade of his life
holds the sum of all the days behind him. He can alter his choices, he is free to
change the direction of hi$ course, he is even free, in many cases, to atone for the
consequences of his past - but he is not free to escape them, nor to live his life with
impunity on the range of the moment, like an animal, a playboy or a thug. If he is
to succeed at the task of survival, if his. actions are not to be aimed at his own
destruction, man has to choose his course, his goals, his values in the context and
terms of a lifetime. No sensations, percepts, urges or "instincts"' can do it; only a
mind can (Rand, 1964, p.24).
To choose goals which will further his survival and well-being, man needs a
code of values, a code of ethics to guide him. If a man wants to live, he has to
hold life as the ultimate standard of value and his own life as his highest ethical
purpose. "Man must choose his actions, values and goals by the standard of that
which is proper to man - in order to achieve, maintain, fulfill and enjoy that
ultimate value, that end in itself; which is his own life," (Rand, 1964, p.25). To
live successfully as a man, one must uphold, argues Rand, three cardinal virtues:
rationality, productiv.eness and pride. "Productive work is the central purpose of
a rational man's life, the central value that integrates and determines the
hierarchy of all his other values; Reason is the source, the precondition of his
productive work - pride is the. result" (1964, p.25)

GOAL SETTING, PRODUCtiVITY AND WQRKPERF~RM~CE

Goal setting theory, as developed my myself and Gary Latham over the past
25 years is concerned with how to enhance hJllllan.prol\uctiveness,especi.ally.in
work settings. (The theory is presented in fullin. Loc~e.~.Lath31l1., 1990 and
is summarized below.) We view goals, fundamentally, as the b~dge between
man's needs and values and his actions. For example,mlUl need!;. food to live but,
in order to get it, he has to set goals (e.g., the goal to earn. ",noughmoney to buy
it, the goal to go somewhere to get it, the goal to prepare it,etc.). Similarly, a
man who values ambition has to set goals to gain specific knowledge and skills
in his work, to undertake challenging tasks and projects and to perform well
when working on them.
Goal setting theory is based on the results of over 500 studies conducted by
ourselves and others. The studies were .conducted maiuly in the U.S. but also in
seven other countries. Over 40,000 subjects were used including students,
managers, children, retardates, factory workers, engineers, scientists and even
'160 EdwihLOCKE

college professors. The studies were conducted in both laboratory and field
(organizational) settings and utilized 88 different types of tasks. The time spans
of the studies ranged from one minute to three years; although we know of one
intervention that endured for 9 years. Criteria of performance have included:
quantity of output, quantity of quality-controlled output, quality, performance in
college courses, production efficiency, time spent on the task, behavior on the
job, profit and costs. Most of the research has been done at the individual level;
however, a number of studies reveal similar results at the group and
organizational levels.
The basic findings of goal setting theory are as follows:

1. Core Findings. Goals which are specific (usually quantitative) and difficult
or challenging lead to higher performance or productivity than vague goals such
as "do your best" or specific goals which are not challenging. Goals which are
specific (e.g.,.produce a 10% increase in sales) guide action more precisely than
goals which are vague (e.g., try to improve sales). Vague goals are compatible
with many different outcomes (e.g., a 0.5% increase, a 2%, 5%, or 10%
increase in sales). Goals whiCh are challenging lead to greater effort and
persistence than goals which are not challenging. Thus the combination of
specificity and difficulty is most effective.

2. Anticipated Satisfaction. Goals serve as standards for selfsatisfaction with

performance (Bandura, 1986). The higher or more challenging the goal, the better
one must perform in order to be satisfied .. Thus there is a negative association
between the difficulty or challenge level of one's goal and the degree of expected
satisfaction with any given performance attaimnent. For example, if a person's
goal in auniversity course ls an A, Jhatpefson will be s,atisfied with an A,
dissatisfied With a B and extremely dissatisfied with a C. The person with a goal
ofB, in contrast, will be very satisfied with an A, satisfied with a B, dissatisfied
with a C and extremely dissatisfied with aD. AsSuming that everyone wants self-
satisfaction,' the person With a Challenging or difficult goal has to work harder to
get it than the person with an easy goal. This is why challenging goals inspire
people to higher levels of performariee than easy goals,
It might be asked why, if hard goals require more effort for less satisfaction
than easy goals; all people do ll<it set easy goals. The answer is twofold. First,
the' goals people set are often tied to their self-image and they do not readily
change this image, especially as adults. Second, striving for high goals typically
leads to more and greater practical benefits, both internal' and external, than
striving for easy goals. Consider, for example, the student who tries for A's in
, his courses. If the student comes close to attaining this goal; he will feel prouder
of himself (academically) than the student who strives for C's and will be more
likely to gain the respect of fellow students, teachers and parents, obtain a good
job offer after graduation;" and have the opportunity to enter a graduate or
 GOAL SEITING AND PRODUCTIVITY ... 161

professional school and thereby enjoy the future benefits of working in a

profession. Similarly, the ambitious employee is more likely to be rewarded with
job security, pay raises and promotions than the unambitious employee (at least
under a capitalist system" see below).

3. Expectations of Success. Challenging goals are associated with high

expectations of success or confidence. There are several reasons for this. First,
when people choose their own goals, those who are more confident set higher
goals for themselves. Second, when people are assigned challenging goals by
others, those who are most confident are most likely to accept the assigned goals
as their own. Third, the assignment of high goals is, in itself, an expression of
confidence on the part of those assigning the goals and thus raises the
expectations of the recipient. High expectations of success, task specific
confidence, or what Bandura calls high "self-efficacy" (Bandura, 1986), not only
affect performance though their association with high goals, they also affect it
directly. Thejoint effect of high goals and high confidence is more powerful than
the effect of either one alone.

4. Goal Mechanisms. Goals affect performance by means of three direct

mechanisms and one indirect mechanism. The direct mechanisms are direction,
effort and persistence. Goals direct attention and action to goal-relevant activities
at the expense of goal-irrelevant activities. They also activate stored knowledge
and skills that are perceived as relevant to task performance and goal
accomplishment. Goals also regulate effort expenditure (if there is commitment
to the goal in proportion to the difficulty of the goal. Finally, goals affect
persistence; activity is continued (again,assuming cOmmitment) until the goal is
attained, with more challenging or difficult goals typically requiring more
persistence than easy goals.
Goals affect performance indirectly by motivating people to select, discover
andlor utilize relevant task or performance strategies. I am referring here to
strategies that have not been previously automljtized through training and practice
but which have either to be discovered or be selected frpm an array of known
strategies. People working for specific, challenging goals are more likely to
utilize appropriate task strategies, if they are known, than people working for
vague goals such as "do your best." On the other hand, people with challenging
goals are not always able to discover suitable strategies as readily as those with
vague or easy goals (Earley, Connolly & Ekegren, 1989). This may be because
specific, challenging goals put pressure on people for immediate high
performance and thus prevent thel!l from thoroughly exploring the effectiveness
of the many possible strategies that could be employed. (Research is now being
conducted to look into this matter more closely.)
162 BdwinLOCKE

s. Goal Commitment. Goal setting does not regulate action consistently unless
there is commitment to the goals, that is, unless people are really trying for the
goals in ql1eStion. There are two broad classes .of factors that foster goal
commitment. The first category consists of factors that lead the individual to
conclude that the goal is important. One way to convince people of the
importance of a goal is through leadership. Leaders possess legitimate authority
which in itself motivates compliance. Further, specific characteristics or actions
of the leader may enhance commitment to assigned goals, e.g., supportiveness,
trust, providing a rationale for the goal, pressure (if not excessive), expressions
of confidence in the subordinate, and likability. Other factors that may enhance
the conviction that the goal is important include: peer pressure, competition,
committing publicly to the goal, role models, rewards and incentives, and ego
involvement. Goal conflict, in contrsst, should undermine commitment, because
it implies that the individual is trying to attain two or more incompatible
outcomes.
The second category of factors that enhance goal commitment involves those
which increase the expectation of success or self-efficacy. This can be achieved
by leaders and authority figures who express confidence in the person, and also
by peer role models who demonstrate that the goal can be attained. Providing the
individual with believable task strategies may also enhance selfconfidence. A
major influence on task specific self-confidence, is, of course, actual experience
with the task, i.e., past attainments (Bandura, 1986). Confidence is undermined
when the individual views the goal (or the task) as too diffictilt in relation to his
or her capacities.
k surprising finding of research on goal setting is that there is no inherent
difference in the effectivell.ess of assigned vs. self-set (delegated) vs. jointly
(participatively) set goals in producing commitment. Especially surprising is the
finding that assigned goals (providing some rationale for the goal is provided)
typically lead to the same degree of commitment and performance as participa-
tively set goals. The findings do not show thatparticipatively set goals are
ineffective; they are quite effective. Rather they showed that assigning people
goals is also quite effective, especially when the authority figure is knowledge-
able, legitimate, trustworthy, likeable and has the power to provide rewards for
goal attainment.
Participation in the goal setting and attainment process may have benefits but
these benefits may be more of a cognitive than of a motivational nature. For
example, participation may be useful in facilitating the discovery of useful 10 task
strategies because subordinates often have knowledge about how to perform the
task effectively not possessed by their leader(s).

6. Feedback. It has long been believed that feedback or knowledge of the

results of one's performance automatically or inevitably leads to improved task
performance. When the feedback provides usable knowledge of how to perform
 GOAL SErrING AND PRODUCTNITY ... 163

the task better, this may be true, but when the feedback consists of summary
information about one's overall score thafhas only motivational implications, then
it is not. Only when the feedback is tied to a relevant goal, e.g., to improve
subsequent performance, does performance improve. At the same time, goals do
not lead to consistent improvement in performance in the absence of feedback,
because feedback is needed to track progress in .relation to the goal. Thus goals
and feedback lead to improved performance reliably only when they are both
present. The two together are more effective than either one alone. Knowledge
of results provides information about how well one ill doing, whereas goals
provide standards for evaluating how well one should be doing.

7. Ability, Task Complexity and Situational Factors. A person's ability

limits how well he or she can perform a given task; thus the proper level of
challenge is that level which motivates people to fully use the ability they have.
There is some evidence that motivation and ability interact so that when both are
high they lead to a higher level of performance than one would predict from an
additive model.
With respect to task complexity, studies show that goal setting is somewhat less
effective (and, as noted earlier, sometimes ineffective) on complexthan on simple
tasks. The presumed reason is that on complex tasks, the use of suitable task
strategies is more critical to task performance and at the same time there is less
guarantee that such suitable strategies will be discovered. Thus, it is important
when complex tasks are used to insure that people have access (e.g., through
training) to suitable strategies.
Situational constraints clearly can limit the translation of goals into
performance accomplishments. This is especially important when the constraints
are political, an issue I shall come back to below.

8. Goals and Affect. I noted earlier that goals serve as standards for self-
satisfaction with perfortuance. The wider principle is that affective (emotional)
responses reflect sub-conscious value judgments, that is, estimates of an object,
situation or outcome in relation toone's standards of what is good or beneficial
(i.e., values). Goals are a form of value standard in that they specify what level
of performance is considered good (or minimally adequate).
One prediction that follows from this is that the greater or more frequent the
degree of success in relation to one's goals, the greater the satisfaction with
performance and with the task. Research findings strongly support this prediction.
Two other factors which affect the degree of satisfaction experienced with success
are: the importance of the goal and the degree of instrumentality of:success in
achieving longer-term goals. The wider value underlying the desire for goal
success is the achievement motive. At the deepest .level this motive reflects the
desire to efficacious in dealing with the world in order to achieve one's own
happiness and well-being. Goal setting has also been found to enhance task
164 Edwin LOCKE

interest and reduce boredom, especially on tasks which are inherently dull and
repetitious. Goals may also increase role clarity (the opposite of role ambiguity)
which is associated with work satisfaction.
Setting specific, challenging goals mayor may not, however, reduce stress and
can even increase it by putting more performance pressure on individuals and
allowing less room for ambiguity in assessing performance attainments. Vague
goals such as "do your best". are compatible with many performance outcomes,
as noted earlier, and thus may induce less stress (along with less productivity)
than specific, challenging goals which entail clear-cut standards for defining
success and failure. The degree of stress experienced under a goal setting
program will depend in large part on self-efficacy, that is , task-specific self-
confidence. People are most threatened when they do not think they can meet the
demands placed upon them (Bandura, 1986). The degree and seriousness of
anticipated negative consequences for failure (e.g., being fired from one's job)
will also affect: stress. This is why it is important to assign goals that are
reasonable in terms of a person's ability and to have a supportive (within reason)
leadership climate.

9. The High Performance Cycle. The major findings from goal setting theory
have been integrated into a model called the high performance cycle. This model
starts with individuals choosing or being assigued specific, challenging
performance goals. When accompanied by high self-confidence or expectations
of success, these goals lead to high performance on the dimensions specified by
the goals (quantity, quality, sales etc.), providing that there is: commitmentto the
goals; feedback, adequate ability, training in suitable task strategies if needed,
and an absence of excessive situational constraints. High performance is attained
to the degree that the core goal mechanisms are engaged by the goals (i.e.,
direction of attention, effort, persistence, and the utilization of suitable
strategies). If, in tum, high performance is rewarded (both by oneself and by
others such as one's boss), this leads to satisfaction with performance and with
the job. Satisfaction in turn promotes Commitment to the organization and to its
goals. Such commitment encourages the individual to stay with the organization
(as opposed to quitting) and to accept the next set of challenges provided.

10. Group and Organizational Level Findings. Although we have been

taiking thus far about goal setting at the individual level, the same basic results
have been found in group goal setting studies. Similarly, organizational level
studies of Management by Objectives or MBO, which involves setting goals for
the firm as a whole, have found that it is an effective procedure for improving
organizational performance ...
At the group and organizational levels , however, certain factors take on added
significance as compared to the individual level. One is communication. At the
group lIIld organizational level commUnication among members is crucial to goal
 GOAL SE'ITING AND PRODUcrIVITY ... 165

attainment. All members need to understand what the goal is, why it is important,
and how goal-relevant actions are to be coordinated among the members. With
MBO, top management commitment to the process appears to be a very important
factor in its success; in short, leaders have to lead if they want the goal setting
process to he successful.

GOAL SETTING, FREEDOM OF ACTION AND RIGHTS

I implied earlier that a key factor in the effectiveness of goal setting was the
absence of constraints, particularly political constraints. The key factor that
protects freedom of action in society is the concept of individual rights. To quote
Ayn Rand (1964, p.93), "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning
a man's freedom of action in a social context". A right is a moral sanction offfee
action; it specifies that every person can act as he or she chooses so long as he
or she does not violate the rights of others. The individual's most fundamental
right is the right to life. The right to property (which means the right to produce,
earn or buy property, not the right to force others to provide it) is an
implementation of the right to life. "Without property rights, no other rights are
possible. Since man has to sustain his life by his own effort, the man who has 'no
right to the product of his effort has no means to sustain his life. The man who
produces while others dispose of his product is a slave," (Rand, 1964, p.94).
The existence of individual rights is based on man's nature as a rational being.
Man cannot survive by instinct or through association learning based on
immediate reward and punishment, as in the case oflower animals. Man survives
by a process of conceptual thought, by integrating sensory material, by imagining
what could be and ought to be, by projecting the future, by identifying causes and
effects, by distinguishing truth from falsehood, by solving problems, plauning,
making complex decisions and by formulating goals and implementing them in
action.
The only way to negate the judgment of an individuals' mind is through
physical force. The concept of rights prohibits the initiation of physical force by
one man or group of men against another. "To violate a man's rights means to
compel him to act against his own judgment, or to expropriate his values" (Rand,
1964, p.95).
There are two potential violators of man's rights in society: criminals and the
government. The potentially more dangerous of the two is the government, since
a government has a monopoly over the legal use of force and can use it on
disarmed victitns.A proper constitution limits the power of government over
individuals; specifically it prohibits the government from initiating force against
its own citizenS and limits the use of force only to retaliation against those who
started it (i.e., criminals).
It is true that the government cannot stop an individual from having private
thoughts, but it can stop him from acting on his thoughts. And this negates his
166 Edwin LOCKE

mind in principle, because it prevents him from using his judgment to sustain his
own existence. Preventing man from acting on his thinking is the same, at root,
as preventing him from thinking; both destroy the efficacy of his mind. The
concept of rights prohibits the government from initiating force and thereby
protects man's freedom to act on the basis of his reason.
Morally, the concept of rights is based on the ethics of egoism, the doctrine
that man is an end in himself and not a means to the ends of others. Egoism is
the opposite of altruism, the doctrine which asserts that man exists only to serve
others (e.g., God, the state, the party, the race). If man existed only to serve
others, the concept of rights would be superfluous and unnecessary; there would
be no freedom of action to protect. The life of the individual would be
insignificant. Rational egoism holds that man's highest moral purpose is the
achievement of his own happiness and that man has unlimited freedom of action
within the sphere of his own rights (that is, so long as he does not initiate force
against others; Rand, 1964).
Let us now apply this analysis to goal-directed action under capitalism and
socialism. The economic inadequacies of socialism have been documented by
numerous writers (e.g., Reisman, 1979; Von Mises, 1962). My focus here will
be on its inadequacies with respect to motivating people to produce.

GOAL SETTING UNDER CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM

"Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights,

including property rights, in which all property is privately 01lllled." (Rand, 1967,
p. 19). This means that under capitalism a man has a right to choose his own
goals, that is, his own standards for self-satisfaction. For example, if the
organization is a publishing company and they choose as their goal to pUblish
works which criticize government policies, they are free to do so without political
repercussions. It should be. made clear what is meant by choice in this context.
It means that he can select his goals both in life and in work free from physical
coercion. This does not mean, howeyer, that he can set any goals he wishes
regardless of the context and not suffer any consequences. For example, an
employer might insist that an employee produce a certain amount of output if he
is to keep his job. However, this is not coercion bpt rather a contract between the
individual and his employer. If the employee does not agree with this goal, he is
free to try to persuade his employer of his viewpoint and, that failing, he is free
to reject the contract and seek employment elsewhere. The employer's economic
power, the power of trade, is not the same as the government's political power,
the power of physical coercion. Trade requires voluntary consl'nt; coercion does
not. To quote a previous article of mine (1983);
 GOAL SEITING AND PRODUCTIVITY ...

Under capitalism all transactions between individuals are by voluntary consent and
mutual agreement. Individuals deal with one another through trade rather than
through force. For example, with respect to employment, both management and the
employee have to agree before an employment contract is msde. The government has
no right to intervene in hiring or firing decisions or any other labor-msnagement
issue, (peaceful) dispute, or transaction. Unions are free to try to organize or to
strike and companies are free to deal or not del.: with the unions. Only the use of
force (or fraud, which is a form of force) is prohibited. Neither side is free to use
or threaten to use force.

It is often asserted by critics of capitalism that the worker is at an unfair

disadvantage in dealing with management because the worker is less wealthy,
does not own any means of production, and may be in desperate need of a job;
to use the common slogan, "A hungry worker is not free. "
There are numerous errors implicit in this slogan. First, there is the implication
that workers under capitalism will always be underemployed and on the verge of
starvation. Under [true] capitalism, no one who is willing to work will be without
a job foriong. Even when jobs are lost in one industry or area, they are created
in others. If there is a temporary oversupply of labor, the price of labor will
drop, leading towards full employment. Second, is the implication that workers
can be forced to take any job any employer wants to offer. Because no one has
a monopoly on jobs, a worker who does not like what one employer offers can
go to another. The prospective employee is free to shop around for the best
possible deal. Third, is the implication that capitalist employers will pay
starvation wages. Actually, in a free labor market, it is an employer'S self-interest
not to pay any less than the market wage. An employer who pays less will be
unable to hire or retain employees; they will go to employers willing to pay the
market wage. Fourth, is the implication that real freedom means a guaranteed
job. Freedom under capitalism does not mean and could not mean the guarantee
of a job ... The right to property does not mean the right to force someone else
to provide it. That would be slavery. Property rights refer to the right to seek
property and to keep what is earned. In this respect:

"the rights and risks of employer and employee are fundamentally alike. 1J>ere is no
guarantee that the employer will be able to find the needed employees, or that the
product will sell, or that the company will make enough money to stay in business.
The employer whose judgment is wrong msy lose everything he or she owns"
(Locke, 1983, p. 311).

Under capitalism, the owner or leader must persuade employees not ouly to
accept employment but to become committed to specified work goals by showing
them that attaining such goals will personally benefit them (through financial
rewards, promotions, etc.). Capitalist employers have a vested interest in
168 Edwin LOCKE

objective (accurate feedback) regarding performance in relation to goals, because

such information is crucial to determining the success of their business strategies,
i.e., to making a profit. Both employer and employee are free to choose the
strategies that they thiuk will work best in attaining the goals of the work unit or
of the organization. The government cannot intervene and say: pursue these goals
by these means or risk political consequences (e.g., jail). And when the
individual decides to implement a plan, he is free to do so providing he has the
voluntary consent of his various partners (e.g., bankers, suppliers, investors,
builders, customers, etc.). The government does not have the right to tell him
what it wants him to do backed up by the barrel of a gun. And when the goal is
attained, the individual is free under capitalism to retain the fruits of his efforts
(i.e., money, property, profit). Thus he has an incentive to exert effort mid to
take risks. For people with ability and drive, expectations of success will be high.
And when success is achieved there is the satisfaction of knowiug that it was
earned by one's own honest effort. Success mid' reward in tom spur one to
greater effort in the future.
It should not be inferred from the above that under capitalism goals can be
achieved without a struggle and with,?ut overcOming obstacles. There are always
obstacles to achieving ambitious goals. For example, a capitalist entrepreneur has
to struggle first to come up with a viable business idea. Then he has to obtain
funding from wary and sophisticated investors who are besieged with requests for
funding by many competing entrepreneurs. Then he has to find good partners and
employees, most of who have jobs in other companies and/or competing job
offers. Then he has to find a way to produce his product at a reasonable cost.
Then he has to market it, fighting for the attention of distributors and consumers
who are inundated by requests to buy millions of different products and services.
And, finally, once the product succeeds, he has to worry about competitors from
both home and abroad trying to take away his market share, by offering a similar
product or s~rvice at a cheaper price or an improved product at a competitive
price. But what is important about this struggle is that all the social obstacles
involve other free people pursuing their own goals; they do not consist of
government edicts making his quest illegal. Under capitalism, if the entrepreneur
is capable, persistent and persuasive, he can succeed. Under socialism, he can
not; even trying to succeed, on a free market basis, is a crime.
In a narrower context than that given above, one could say that capitalism is
that social system which allows men to choose their own economic goals, to
choose their own means of pursning those goals and to k"5'P the rewards they
earn from achieving them. Motivationally, capitalism encourages the high
perfurmance cycle.
Under socialism the story is quite different. "Socialism is an economic system
based on government ownership of the means of production" (Reisman, 1979, p.
147). Since all property is owned by the state, there are no property rights.
 GOAL SEITING AND l'RODUCTIVITY ... .16.9

The individual can earn and retain property only by permission. The individual
exists only to serve the state and therefore the state can dispose of him as .it
wishes. All economic decisions are made by state economic planners. They
determine what will be produced and by whom, how it will be produced, how it
wilL be priced, to whpm it will be shipped, etc. They also determine who will be
assigned to what career or job and how much the job holder will be paid.
Although state bureaucrats may allow some choice in the matter of jobs, they
allow it only by permission, not by right.
Under socialism the indivi4ual is free to think about what goals he would
pursue if he were free to do so, but he is not free to implement those thoughts in
action, except at the risk of his freedom and his life. The refusal to obey an order
to work at a certain task or produce a certain amount may be considered treason
by the state. Workers may band together to produce a low amount of shoddy
goods while pretending that they are trying their best ("we pretend to work and
they pretend to pay us "); that is, they may try to deceive the state bureaucrats for
their own self-protection, but they are still not free to make their own choices.
Commitment to the organization is obtained by coercion. Workers are not free,
by right, to seek another employer or even to bargain through an independent
union; the state is the only employer. Even if workers are given permission to
shift to another state job, the sitoation in the new job is not fundamentally
different.
The leader's or manager's problem is similar. He is mandated to obey the
dictates of the state planners even if he knows that their plan (or more
fundamentally, their whole system) is short-sighted, arbitrary and irrational. If
he fails to go along, his career as a manager is over, if not his freedom. He is not
free to start a new company in order to show that his judgment is 'superior,
because it would be against the law, He is not free to innovate because that would
upset the plans of the bureaucrats who insist that "verything must be predictable
and regulated in advance. Nor is he free to risk his own money in a new
enterprise, reaping high rewards if he succeeds (and losing ev"ry-thing if he
fails), because there is no such thing as private property or privat" enterprise.
Thus there is little incentive 'to exert extra effort. Under socialism the manager's
feedback will not be objective (based on prpfit in and loss in the free market) but
political (did he please the authorities or not?). There is no way to use feedback
to set rational goals based on his own judgment; at best he can use his mind to
get around the system for the purpose of short-term survival. Self-confidence is
crushed at the ontset because the'managerknows that he cannot"take the actions
required to produce highquOUty g90ds in an efficient manner. Goals are not set
based on ability (of the individual or the firm) but rather on what the state
demands. Managers and employees are rewarded as much on their political
reliability as on their performance. There is little self-satisfaction even when there
is apparent success, because such success is often fraudulent (based on falsified
170 Edwin 'LOCKE

figures) and has little relation to what customers actually want or need or to
product quality.
It is not surprising, then, that socialism is not capable of producing wealth. It
destroys the essential preconditions required for creating it, viz. individual rights,
including the right of each individual to use his own judgment to choose his own
goals; to plan the means to achieve them; and to reap his own rewards. Rather
it forces people simply to obey the dictates of higher authorities who do not have
the knowledge and could never have the knowledge needed to make the billions
of daily decisions that allow a capitalistic economy to work. Socialism
institutionalizes a low oerformance cycle. Meaningless and arbitrary goals are set
by the bureaucrats. The goals are pursued with little confidence using unsuitable
plans and strategies. Low goal commitment is endemic. Feedback, if present, is
usually falsified or misleading. Low performance is the result. Rewards are non-
existent of based on politics, or on non-existent or low quality production. The
result is that no one is satisfied and there is lower subsequent commitment to the
organization and its goals. At root, Reisman argues, socialism is not a method of
economic production and planning at all, rather it is "an act of destruction"
(1979, p. 151) that results in economic chaos and mass poverty.
Most fundamentally, socialism destroys the ability and desire of the rational
mind to function. By SUbstituting force for trade, socialism prevents people from
setting and pursuing goals that will lead to productiveness and wealth.

REFERENCES
Bandura A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Earley .P., Connolly T. & Ekegren G. (1989). Goals, strategy development and task
performance: Some limits on the efficacy of goal setting. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 74, 24-33.
Binswanger H. (1986). The goal-directednessof living action. The Objectivist Forum, 7,
1-10.
Locke E. (1983). Performance appraisal under capitalism, socialism and the mixed
economy. In F. Landy, S. Zedeck, & J. Cleveland (Eds), Peiformance
measurement and theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Locke E. & Latham G. (1990). A theory of goal setting and task peiformance.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Rand A. (1964). The virtue of selfishness. New York: New American Library.
Rand A. (1967). Capitalism: The unknown ideal. New York: New American Library.
Reisman G. (1979). The government against the economy. Ottawa, IL: Caroline House.
Von Mises L. (1962). Socialism. New Haven: Yale University Press. .
 PART 3

Attitudes toward
and predicting the Future
PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXffiTY PERSPECTIVE

Zbigniew ZALESKI*
Department of PsychOlogy
Catholic University of Lublin
Lublin, Poland

INTRODUCTION

The future conceived as an open temporal space, asa tabularasa for cognitive
cultivation may evoke both positive and negative emotionat attitudes,. The
uncertainty of future personal experiences as well as of :environmental events
elicits different reactions ranging from cheer hope to P!lralyzing anxiety. The aim
of this paper is to present the cQnceptua1ization of hope amlfuture anxiety
concepts, closely relate4 to the future time perspective .. Although none of-these
terms have, as yet, found a firm place in the psychologicaldictionaries, this does
not necessarily imply that these concepts are not important in people'slives and
that they are not familiar to psychologist;;.
Both terms descn'be complementary influences on subjective attitude towards
the future, towards what will/may come. The future events ate not yet real, they
are more or less probable. Tolmau(1932) would say we expect them, Lewin
(1948) that we hope they will be attained, Kelly (1958) believed we anticipate
future states, and Atkinson (1964) adds that we fear or are threatened' by
potential failures or success. For Lynch (1965), hope comes close to being the
very heart of the center ofa human being.
Study of the .relevant literature reveals the asymmetry in use of Hope terms and
Anxiety terms related to the future. The positive attitude expressed in the
cognitive language of expectancy has been a focus of the theoretical and .empirical
stlldies related to achievement motivation (see Heckhallsen, ,1986). The
asyrmnetry in emotion language is just the opposite, with the negative terms being
used more o~n (peeters & Czapinski, 1990). The hope "ndfuture anxiety
cpnstructs are actually linked to distinct literatures; hope to suecess, expectancy
and achievement behavior, whereas futllre anxiety ....\0' neurotic disorders and
clinical descriptions. However, a considerable number :of publications on
helplessness.introduced by. Beck and hisicollaboratQrs does not explain 'the fact
that little has. been written on future related a11l(iety.
174 Zbigniew ZALESKI

While many theorists tend to stress one dominant factor, either a positive (e.g.,
expectancy of success) or a negative (e.g., anxiety), some of them have included
both aspects in their theories of motivation. This applies, for example, to
Atkinson's need of success and fear of failure as equally meaningful motives. AIl
those terms - expectancy, hope, anticipation and fear/anxiety proved to have a
considerable impact on the internal states and overt behavior of an active
individual.
There are many events showing that the future is double-folded. As an example,
I would recall the DDR citizens waiting in September 1989 in Budapest for the
Hungarian decision which would allow them to cross the Western border. Having
personally travelled to the West while still living under the communist regime,
I am rather sure that those people were tom between the intense hope of reaching
West Germany and the fear of being turned back to DDR with all the dreadful
consequences that being taken care of by the STASI agents would result in. Yet
they persisted and won the battIe.
Another example comes from a source more familiar to those of us in the
academic world, that of the Ph.D. students' endeavoring to test the hypotheses
for their dissertations. The hypothesis, arduously prepared by reading a great deal
of literature; encourages the hope of obtaining the expected empirical. results
because it seemS intuitively right, and the student's self-image does not allow the
thought of being wrong. Simultaneously;. during the laborious and time
consuming data'collecting, the student is anxious and afraid that the results may
not. support his hypothesis or that they will even show a reverse relationship not
interpretable within the accepted theory. The more one has 'invested, the more
doubts may be raised about the final outcome, which is naturally difficult to
predict given available clues.
A recent study by Tobacyk, Nagot, and Mitchell (1989) showed that people,
when predicting the future, use various parascientific belief systems which, even
if, often irrational, reflect the desire to obtain accurate knowledge about the
unfolding of future events. Hence, not having the chance to predict we may look
at the future either with hope or fear, the relationship between the two being
varied and flexible. As Averill, Catlin, and Chon (1990) note in their recent book
" ... conceptually hope is more closely related to fear than to optimism" (p. 6).
Hope and fear can be regarded as' complementary components of future attitude
but not necessarily in a mathematical sense that hope = I - fear. Their intensity
may vary and presumingly may appear in different patterns: High hope-High
anxiety; High hope-Low anxiety, Low hope-High anxiety, and Low hope-Low
anxiety, with many other combinations on the intensity continuum. The notion of
a moderate complementarity between hope and future anxiety can be supported
by an analogy to optimism - pessimism dimension. For instance, Dember and
Brooks (1989) found a moderate negative relationship (r=-.S4) between optimism
and pessimism scores on their' O&P-scale. The unidimensional character of such
concepts is not so clear cut. Despite an intuitive polarity the concepts could be
 PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXIEfY PERSPECTIVE 175

separate, though related phenomena. Within the future orientation paradigm, both
concepts should be treated as related one to another.
Another kind of justification of the hope- and anxiety-filled future comes from
the ability to experience ambiguous/ambivalent emotions, such as love and hate
in an intimate partnership (cf. Hendrick, 1989; White and Mullen, 1990),
pain/fear and happiness of a mother giving birth (Apter, 1984), confidence and
doubts/suspicion in business affairs, and faith and doubt in Eternal well-being.
An inherent characteristic of emotions is their fluctuation, topic studied at the
beginning of our century. In the same way, hope and fear can be present in the
process of conceiving an unCertain future. People shift from having hope to lack
of hope or anxiety, the cycles having different lengths of time. One of the
attitudes can predominate, holding a person on either an optimistic or a
pessimistic position. Most probably there are people who have a relatively stable
hopeful or fearful attitude towards the future and they would be particularly
interesting study subjects. If the attitude is more stable, it can have a strong
impact on behavior and on personality traits (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Carver
& Scheier, 1985). Following, both concepts of Hope and Future Anxiety will be
described in a more detailed way.

HOPE

Hope has been defined in a variety of ways, depending on psychological

orientation and the operationalization methodology. The mathematically-oriented
and decision-making researchers have often reduced hope to expectancy measured
on the probability scale from 0 to 1. In contrast, the humanistic psychologists had
broader view on hope. Fromm (1968) maintained that hope is a state of existence,
and May (1953) stated that hope is a good basis for actual action. It is readiness
for action accompanying life and development. When hope disappears, the life
ends - actually or potentially. Hope is not only a cognitive process but also has
existential aspects and has to do with what Gollwitzer and Wicklund (1985) call
self-completion.
Hope has long been bound to human spiritual heritage. It is written in golden
letters in the Bible and other respected scriptures. Hope,'acoordiJ:tg to the Greek
myth about Pandora's box, is what makes life bearable. However, the Greeks
were ambivalent in their view of hope ..
They regarded hope as an evil or asa boon, with some ambivalence towards
it. Hope was "the food of exiles" (Aeschylus).and "man's curse" (Euripides).
Sophocles's Antigone exclaimed "We are of the tribe that hates your filthy hope,
your docile, female hope; hope, your whore" .
St. Paul challenged this notion of hope in his Judea-Christian experience and
declared that hope should stand along side love. St. Augustine, a thousand years
later stated. "Hone has two beautiful dau!!hters. an!!er and coura!!e: an!!er at the
176 Z~igniew ZALESKI

way things are, and courage to work to make things other than they are".
Dickens referred to the "spring of hope and the winter of despair". Tillich (1952)
asserted that: "Hope is easy for the foolish, but hard for the wise. Everybody can
lose himself into foolish hope, but genuine hope is something Plre and. great" (p.
17). .......
People experience hope in their lives in a variety of ways. For example, hope
can be. felt personally in becoming cur, interpers()nally in solving a parent-child
conflict,. internationally in peaceful solution of territory contentions, and in
transcendental perspectives of reaching eternal happiness (!(linger, 1977). Hope,
apart of being the expectation of a positive change or outcome, is a way of being,
a way of life.
The prisoners of concentration camps who lost hope of survival died sooner
than those who did not, they gave up fighting. Frankl (J959), a prisoner himself,
wrote eloquently about" ... man's search for meaning, when one has nothing to
lose except his ridiculously naked life"(p. 13). In those conditions the central
theme of existentialism is encountered. To use Allport's statement, "to live is to
suffer, to survive is to find meaning in the SUffering". Frankl is fond of quoting
Nietzsche "He who has a why to live can bear with almost any how".

HOPE IN SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVE:

DEFlNmONS AND MEASUREMENT

Many scientific disciplines have also offered insight into the meaning of hope
as well. Instillation of hope is. one of the curative factors in psychotherapy
(Marcovitz & Smith, 1983). Sagan (1981), a physician and epidemiologist, wrote
that the dramatic increase in life expectancy is the most important happening in
the hisfury ofhealth. He attributed the decline in death worldwide to the rise of
hope and the declin". in despair and hopelessness. Strong'relationships have been
documented betwee~!J.0F'and survival.
Step into history of psr.chology of hope. During the 1940s the concept of hope
had its defenders. One of ihem was Kurt Lewin (1948) ",ho stressed the
importance of expectancy of success in human aSpirations. He spoke o'f hope as
a link between an actual action .and its outcome in the future. Hope for Lewin
was expectancy that' "som.etime in the fuiure, the real situation ~i11 be changed
~o that it will equal'mY wishes. (1948, p. 103). Another "advocate" for the hope
concept was Carl Menninger, a clinically oriented scholar. Menninger (1942)
wroli', "In scientific circles there is a determined effort to exclude hope from
copcep1;ual thinking, first because of the general obloquy ofadffiitting any
psychological concepts.
.~ " ' ,
into '
materialistic
.
and fanatically empirical science; and
'

seCond, beCause of a fear of corrupting objective judgment by wishful thinking.

But all science is built on hope, so milch so that scienCe is for many moderns a
substitute for religion ... Mail .can't help hoping, even if he is a scientist; he can
orily hope mor~ accurately" (p. 215).
 PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXllITY PERSPECTIVE 177

Carl Menninger chose hope as the topic of his lecture at the annual meeting of
the American Psychiatric Association in 1959. He cautioned that the time was not
yet:ripe for a scientific analysis of hope, but he at least focused attention upon it.
He pointed out that long before love had become a respectable part of science,
philosophers and poets had already been writing about what common folk knew
and experienced.
Menninger spoke about hope out of his experience as a psychiatrist, teaching
young doctors. He observed their initial enthusiasm for their work and _- helped
them to achieve realistic expectations for success, with the appropriate amount -
of hope on the part of both teacher to stUdent, and doctor to patient. "Excess of
hope is presumption and leads to disaster. Deficiency of hope is despair and leads
to decay" (1959, p. 482). He pointed out that psychiatry still shared the general
skittishness around hope. Menninger described hope as the positive expectations
in a stodied situation which go beyond the visible facts. Hope in that sense
accompanies everybody's life efforts including the activities of hard science
disciplines.
More recent approaches. In the foreword to the book "Images of Hope" by
William Lynch (1965), Farber stated that Lynch was aware of the degradation
both the word hope and the experience of hope had undergone. He suggested that
the book was written to remedy this sitoation, namely, a deficiency in the
psychology of hope. Without such psychology, he stated, -there is no adequate
vocabulary to discuss hope. Because of that deficiency, psychology at present is
concerned, only with'the concept of hopelessness for which we have abundant
theory and language (cf. Beck et al.,1974). It is worthy to add that Aaron Beck
received an award at the APA ,convention in Boston in 1990 for his considerable
contribution to the psychology of hopelessness. (A reward for the contribution to
psychology of hope <hopefully> 'awaits its candidate). '
For Lynch (1965) "Hope is indeed an arduous search for a future good of some
kind that is realistically possible but not yet visible" (p.18). He defined hope as
"a sense of the possible" (p. 32). Because the nature of hope is to imagine what.
has not yet happened but is still possible, it is tied ,to the life of the imagination.
As Buber would say, hope imagines the real. This, for Lynch, is an-act- of
collaboratio,11 with a community in a move toward what is-'not yet but could be.
In his 1969 book, Stotland uttered his personal desire that a subjective term like
hope could be treated meaningfully insci'mtific psychology. Stotland presented
a theoretical account of hope' within a systematic framework of seven
propositions, such as "hopefulness is a necessary condition for action" (p . .7). He
believed these propositions to have considerable face validity and to have already
been put forth by what he called "common-sense psychology". He assumed that
an individual could look at his own behavior and develop concepts and schemata
about it, _conceived as associations between concepts in one's cognitive structure.
Stotland postulated that an individual who attributes past successes to personal
actions will develop cognitions in which the self is perceived as confident,
178 Zbigniew ZALESKI

hopeful, and of great worth. A broad spectrum of reported clinical and

experimental stndies is referred to in support of his theory.
Stotland, however, in the course of analyses reduced hope to "an expectation
greater than zero of achieving a goal" (p. 2). Hope, by this definition, was
delineated in terms of probabilities and was a. construct or mediator which tied
together antecedent and consequent events. Hopefulness in regard to high
expectancies of success and positive affect was involved in adaptive behavior,
whereas. Hopelessness as evidenced by low expectancies and negative affect was
a factor of maladaptive behavior.
Despite the scientific rigor ofStotland's work, it seemed to attract little serious
attention. The antihumanistic bias of the day was one of the major reasons why
the hope concept was rather neglected because it hinted at the subjective.
One exception was the stndy by Erickson, Post, and Paige (1975) designed to
provide empirical support for Stotland's theory utilizing .hope as a psychiatric
variable.
Measurement of hope. These authors introduced a Hope Scale to measure both
perceived importance and perceived probability of goal attainment. Among other
findings an interesting was the following: the lower the probability of goal
attainment and the. higher the .importance of a goal, the more the organism will
experience anxiety.
Another tool for the objective assessment of hope was the Hope Index Scale
(Obayuwana et al., 1982), testing whether hope influences the recovery from
mental and physical illness. Hope was defined as a state of mind resulting from
the strength of the ego, family support; religious, educational, and economic
assets;; It correlated negatively with the Beck et al., (1974) Hopelessness Scale.
There have been other attempts to constroct scales measuring hope. One of
these attempts was undertaken by Miller (1983) in Milwaukee who obtained 3
factors: Satisfaction with self, others and life; Avoidance of hope threats; and
Anticipation of future. As it appears in that stndy the main factor is not so much
cognitive .but rather emotional. In conclusion, the hope concept is not a purely
cognitive estimation of chances but it has rather a broader and deeper personal
meaning.
Within the clinical psychology there exists a model of hope in which typical
responses to the occurrence and management of illness could be categoriied
between hopefulness and hopelessness. However, this approach should undergo
a critical review and empirical testing to be.useful to those who found the concept
of hope. relevant to health promotion.
More recently, Snyder (1989) developed a definition of hope in the context of
goal-setting behavior. He proposed that hope is a positive motivational state
which is based on a reciprocally' derived sense of agency and pathways. He also
hypothesized that higher-hope persons should both have more goals in life, as
well as select and maintain more difficult goals. .
 PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXIETY PERSPECfIVE

Hope as motivational agent. The findings from the research on hope have been
used to formulate solutions to socially problematic behavior. Smith (1983) offered
both a political and a psychological explanation of hope and despair applied to the
problems of today's youth. He related behavior deviations to the deficits in
meaning, in hope and in human communion, or, as he put it in St. Paul's
language, deficits in faith, hope, and love. Hope in particular seemed vulnerable
to immediate changes in people's lives. Because it was the sentiment that
connected present and future for people, Smith suggested hope was central to
people's behavioral morale and to their ability to make and live by commitments.
Evidence was also found that hope appeared to be a relatively stable internal
state. Data collected from senior students at the University of Michigan (1975-
1983) showed that the majority were optimists and there was no change between
1975 and 1982 on items relevant to hope. The students were least hopeful for the
world, more hopeful for their own country, and most hopeful for their own lives.
They expressed gloomy expectations about the danger of nuclear war.
People's feelings of hope and despair obviously fluctuate over time and across
situations, or when issues are made particularly salient. But, according to Smith,
the broad division between optimistic and pessimistic responses generally agreed
with the two-thirds/one-third split often found in studies of life satisfaction among
adults.
On the other hand, Smith dealt with two interrelated themes. If people cannot
expect much, of the future, they are likely to live mostly in the present, with a
variety of consequences. Fraisse (1957) called them presentists. When people
have learned that there is little or nothing they can do about improving their
future, about avoiding bad outcomes, they will probably not continue to hope.
Research abounds in this area.
Derivatives of hope in human agency. The idea of "I .can" in a sense of
personal control has found its operationalization under different terms. This
positive belief can be traced in the key-terms of modern, cognitive conceptions
of motivation. For instance, White (1959) introduced the concept of competence.
Rotter (1966) developed an instrument to measure people's generalized
expectations regarding their internal and external locus of control. Weiner and
Kukla (1970; Weiner, 1986) presented an elaborated analysis of attributions of
successes and failures. Seligman (1975) reformulated depression in terms of
human learned helplessness. Bandura (1977) wrote extensively on self-efficacy,
and Kuhl (1983) introduced the concept of action control. '
The notion of personal control and beliefs of infll\ence on events refers to the
roles of self and the environment in the outcomes of action. If people think they
are competent and that the environment is responsive to their efforts, they are
likely to cope actively, to increase their actual skills, resulting in a record of
successes. Conversely, those who believe they are incompetent and that the
environment is unresponsive to their efforts, are likely to withdraw from coping,
resUlting in a record of failures. .
180 Zbigniew ZALESKI

The personal beliefs result in a benign or VICIOUS circle. Smith quoted

Matthew's I:.aw! "To him who hath shall be given; from him who hath not shall
be taken away even that which he hath ... To keep hoping would be a good advice
in times of changing fortunes.
In addition, the more that is invested, the stronger the hope for the future
becomes.
Is hope realistic? The term Hope is related to another concept introduced by
Weinstein (1980) and called "unrealistic optimism" to describe a particular biased
attitude towards future events concerning ourselves and other persons. People
tend to believe that negative, self-independent events, are less likely to happen
to them than to others, and that positive events are more likely to happen to them
than to others. When asked, for example, what is the chance that they (or an
average person) will have a car accident, be robbed, or fall ill, the subjects gave
higher chance for others than for themselves. People knowthat accidents dolcan
happen to anybody but would not admit that their turn could be next; a sort of
"why should the accident happen to me and not anybody else when there are so
many other people in the street'" Altogether this is an unrealistic position, but it
is useful in adaptation to new, hazardous situations. There are similarities
between unrealistic optimism and hope particularly in regard to coping functions.
In a situation where there is no clue for positive outcome, an individual may still
"expect" worthy end. If nothing can be done, slhe may at least wait for it.
The positive bias can be noted in another process pointed out by Kerr (1988).
The citizens of less developed countries selectively create an image of their own
future in the more highly developed countries where the imprint of
industrialization is dominant. This is probably why immigrants from the Eastern
bloc see in the Western reality as having only lovely,positive aspects without
noticing or admitting the exristing negativities. Their process of perception is
strongly, wishfully biased. The hope ofreachil!g wealth ofa "promised land" has
a particular meaning to them.
The 'meaning of hope. Intuitively hope is closely related to optimism, to
looking into the future through rose-colored glasses with faith in a positive end,'
such as in films or theater' plays with "a happy ending". However, hope is not a
species of optimism; it can exist in conditions that rationally deny any optimism,
and yet, people may ..hope.... Hope is less based on evidence (clues); it relates
more to the importance oithe event and personal values. As Averill, Catlin, and
Chon (1990) state: "To oversimplify somewhat, hope tells us about the person's
values, optimism about the person's assessment of the situation".
Their'analyses comparing hopilto want and desire, analyzing the representative
episodes of hope and reports of forbidden hopes yielded premises for so called
rules of hope. The authors describe four such rules: prudential, moralistic,
priority, and action rules. The first emphasizes the realism, that is, that the
uncertainty should be not to() great. The second means that the object' of hope is
personally and socially accepted. According to the third rule the object of hope
 PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXIETY PERSPECfIVE

should match a person's vital interests, it should be important. The last rule, very
loaded in implications, maintains that hope leads to undertaking appropriate
action directed to the achievement of personal goals. This rule has a motivational
character. It describes human attitude towards the future and indicates directional
connections between the inner state and actions. According to these researchers
hope is more an emotion, although more cognitive than other emotions. This
assumption, however, needs more rigid empirical evidence.
Qualitative characteristic of hope. Some preliminary studies have been carried
out by MaDkowska (1985). A group of 100 students were asked to describe the
"hope" concept and other intuitively close concepts like optimism, faith, with use
of the Gough's ACL technique and the Osgood's semantic differential. It
appeared that hope is described by adjectives belonging to the following need-
scales in a rank order: achievement, domination, endurance, deference,
sublimation, order and nurturance.
The common adjectives for hope, optimism and faith were: calm, forgiving,
idealistic, optimistic, persevering, planful, self-confident and trusting, whereas
the specific hope-related adjectives were: anxious, emotional and foresighted.
In a similar way the subjects dealt with other negative concepts such as: hope-
is-not, hopelessness, and helplessness. The results showed some common
characteristics and specific features for each concept.
As common characteristics for the concepts "hope-is-not", hopelessness and
helplessness the following adjectives were found: absent-minded, anxious,
awkward, complaining, despondent, dissatisfied, distrustful, gloomy, indifferent,
pessimistic, quitting, shiftless, whiny, and worrying.
The subjects were also asked td characterize "What would hope be like if it
were a living being?" In their conception hope would be active, creative, wise,
free of boasting, relying on its own competencies, persistent in goal reaJization,
valuing order and peace. Simply stated, this living creature would an optimistic
laborer, patient and ready to make sacrifices.
In order to obtain more statistically elaborated comparisons, the concepts were
assessed on the semantic differential with pairs of.adjectives as anchors:
good (1) - bad (7), important - trivial, active - passive, needed - negligible,
strong - week, true '- false, pleasant - unpleasant, permanent - temporary, real -
fanciful, jnstified - nonjustified.
The factor analysis gave three interpretable factors standing for hope: realism,
goodness and importance, thus reflecting in this way the realism and positive
evaluation of hope.
In order to see the similarities and nonsimilarities between hope and other
concepts the cluster analysis ("Wroclaw taxonomy") was performed. The Cluster
analysis identifies the distances between pairs of concepts and clusters (joins)
them together into bigger cohesive groups. The distance is measured on a 10-
point scale, 0 - indicating no distance and 10 -the highest distance between two
concepts. Figure 1 presents the outComes of such clustering.
182 Zbigriiew ZALESKI

,
~

w
z
w ~
, 7
0

3~
;;
>
g w
z
0
~
~
~
w
z
!
~

Figure 1. Clusters for Hope & other similar, & opposite concepts (after: Mankowska, 1985).

Rope is placed close to optimism, next closest to faith, then to expectancy and
somewhat more distanced from the cluster: religious faith - charity. The first
three clusters are rather clear, whereas the last grouping which includes the
religious faith appears different than the faith defined by an adjective
specification.
We could recall St. Paul's < to Corinthians> triad Faith-Rope-Charity where
hope referred more to relying on Eternity. In contrast, MaIikowska's analyses
showed that psychological hope is rather an outcome of individual activities, of
attribution of causation, of internaicontrol, of experiencing successes and
failures. Rope is a function of causal optimism or of faith in effective influencing
on a course of events, in changeability and in a limited strength of negative
factors, result of which is a positive attitude. Hope can also be to some extent an
effect of social support, meaning the actions of other people. This may explain
to some extent the discrepancy between faith and religious faith.
The link between religious faith and hope is moderate, though some studies
'show its importance. For instance, Peck (1988), in a case study showed that
religiosity inspires hope for release from prison in people sentenced to life
without parole. Perhaps it is so because they themselves can do nothing to change
the present situation and render it into the hands of Eternity. Also in our studies
 PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXIETY PERSPECTIVE 183

on religiosity-hope-charity among the members of the so called "home church"

there were strong significant correlations between religiosity and individual and
social hope (Zaleski, 1990). Because the sample included only a few
nonbelievers, the conclusions have to be treated as preliminary statements or
rather as working hypotheses.
If we look at the negative concepts on figure 1 we can notice that non-hope
(hopelessness) is close to pessimism and helplessness. Feather (1990) reported
similar findings though in a different context. In an analysis of data from school-
graduates regarding their confidence in finding a job, this researcher found a
factor entitled helplessness-pessimism, involving low confidence and high
perceived uncontrollability and helplessness.
Thus, the opposite of hope is not so much despair leading to depression, as
suggested by the clinical psychologists using Beck's hopelessness scale, but rather
helplessness acquired in the course of human negative experiences (failures),
ultimately also resulting in depression.
The scarce analyses to date point, however, at a broader psychological
interpretation of hope than within the E x V model and I share the hope along
with Lewin (1948) and Kelly (1958), that Hope as an important psychological
factor will find its proper place within the frames of personality and particularly
of motivational psychology of future time perspective, fostered so effectively by
the Leuven group in the Research Center for Time Perspective and Human
Motivation (Prof. W. Lens and collaborators).

SUMMARIZING HOPE

In general, the future, conceived as a space of planning and realizing goals and
filled with hope, has a positive motivational property in a sense of instigating and
maintaining constructive actions. However, future is also a space of uncertainty,
of negative views of what may come. Each of these attitudes may be predominant
in a period of time or, as stated earlier, they may also be relatively stable
attitudinal states. When a negative, complex cognito-emotional attitude prevails"
we would have to, deal not with hope, but rather with a fear of future - better
termed Future Anxiety.

FUTURE ANXIETY

Looking into the future, people may be afraid, of many different things and
events. On one hand they fear global disasters such as earthquakes and wars,
explosion of a local' atomic power station, whereas on the other hand they can
fearfully expect more individual but more tangibly painful experiences such as
losing a loved one or becomipg seriously ill. One can be threatened by future
events such as failing in the attainment of personal goals or not being sure how
184 Zbigniew ZALESKI

to behave when a particular and difficult set of social circumstances occurs. Even
if a particular behavior/reaction is predicted now, a person may not .be sure
whether he or she really would act in such a manner and whether this action
would be a solution for the nondesired situation. In other words, individuals
cannot reassure themselves now that the steps will satisfy them. This
unpredictability of our own behavior and its psychological consequences for
ourselves is one of the factors evoking a fear-filled attitude according to the
proverb "the unknown is frightening" .
What would be a reaction to a situation, when no negative stimuli are
encountered by an individual? I would refer to Gurin's et al. (1960) empirically
supported position that the absence of stress does not bring about the presence of
positive affect. Hence, one can speculate that the actual stressors are not conditio
sine qua non of anxiety reactions. The anxiety can arise long before (or after) the
aversive stimulus appears, evidence for this being found in a number of studieS.
Some degree of FA is inherent to goals. Someone who has goals to achieve will
be preoccupied with potential obstacles. The more important goals with low
probability of attainment may stimulate stronger anxiety than less important om;s
(See Stotland, 1969, p. 33). In contrast, those who do not plan for the future may
lead a happy-go-lucky life without thinking of any difficulties they may encounter
(pollyanna effect). On the other hand, not having anything planned for the future
may evoke anxiety about how the future will be when'it comes unexpectedly,
without any preparation or contribution from the actor's side.
Thus, a state of anxiety can be induced if the organism merely "expects" or
awaits a negative event. When we change the perspective from a proximal future
(e.g., expecting an electric shock in a laboratory experiment) to a more distant
future of humans, we can state that it is enough to have a cognitive image of the
possible future negative events in order to feel anxious about them. This is what
FA is about. By FA, a state of worry, discomfort, preoccupation and feaHelated
to the cognitive representation of a more distant future is understood. The
development of FA and its relationships to other anxiety concepts are dealt with
elsewhere (Zaleski,. submitted).

FUTURE ANXIETY OR FEAR OF THE FUTURE

I would like to say more about the concept of FA and its operationalization. It
can be used interchangeably with the term fear of future~ For instance, an
analysis by Wicker et al. (1985) revealed more similarities than differences
betwee)l.fearand anxiety. Factor analysis on the data from 128 undergraduates
and 50 professional fire-fighters showed that both concepts involve pain, threat,
uncertainty and arousal; however, anxiety entailed greater future orientation,
duratio)l, frequency of occurrence, temporal uncertainty, inhibition and sensitivity
of self-concept to evaluation by self and others.
 PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXIETY PERSPECfIVE iSS

On the other hand, n<)xiousness, helplessness and response unavailability.were

greater with fear. The authors suggest that both emotions were context-sensitive,
though there were more similarities than differences between the students and
fire-fighters. This analysis, however, shows that the term anxiety is more future
loaded. In regard to the recent trends in terminology usage I would rather employ
the term "future anxiety" than the notion "fear of the future".
The modem concepts of anxiety also entail the cognitive and emotional states
and processes as its structural components (Morris and Liebert, 1985;
Sch6npflug, 1989; Schwarzer, 1984; Eysenck, 1992). Schiinpflug writes: "The
concept of worry does not make reference to dynamic, emotional states. The
emotional and vegetative involvement provoked by worry cognitions will be
designated as anxiety". When speaking of FA I would like to stress the cognitive,
anticipatory processes as its main source.
Future anxiety can have a more general character; meaning fear of what the
future may bring. But it also can be specifically related to a particular event or
personal states, such as falling ill or having interpersonal problems.

THE GROUNDS OF FUTURE ANXIETY

The condition for this anxiety to exist is a cognitive representation of future

changes, the representation accompanied by negative emotional states. Thus, a
specific characteristic of this anxiety is its cognitive basis and one's awareness of
the experience. "
The antecedents of future anxiety. On the premises of the psychological theories
of anxiety it can be suggested that FA has a set of causal antecedents (correlates)
within which the following can be included: ".. '"
1) An individual proneness to anxious reactions. This is regarded as a
personality characteristic, often measured 'by physiological criteria, but also by
self-report paper and pencil techniques as developed
~", , -.
by Cattell, Sarason,
Spielberger, Taylor, Endler and others; "
2) The past experiences on an individual and social level; i.e., an account of
successes and failures in one's life course;
3) The historical period one lives in and the global social and political events
involving whole nationS (military conflicts, political fights);
4) An appearance of new dangers and threats, e.g., noncurable diseases,
terrorism, decline of morale, rise (}f a military superpower, etc.
A closer look at these conditions allows for a strong assumption that persons
sensitive to aversive stimuli and conditions, described in many theories of
personality and numerous empirical reports as being generally anxious, will most
probably reveal stronger FA.
Also, those who in their course of life have had more painful experiences will
be more prone to react with anxiety when reflecting on their future. Similarly,
Whole populations may reveal lesser or stronger fear in relation to disastrous and
commonly shared events. Human and natural history give many such examples.
186 Zbigniew ZAl,.ESKI

War perspective. For instance, Lynn (1975) compared the nations who took
part in World War II. He was able to show the fluctuation in anxiety in those
nations which suffered military defeat in the war, e.g., Austria, Germany, Italy,
Derimark, Japan. There was an increase in anxiety from 1935 to 1950 when it
reached its maximum and the" a decrease was observed in the years following.
Such changes in anxiety level were not noted in nations that escaped military
defeat and occupation in the war (USA, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, England).
The comparison lacks, however, the inclusion of Eastern countries which
underwent the communist regime in 1945 (poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia).
This research was focused on past events as being the cause of anxiety
experienced 5 years later, but shows that there can be a big gap between the
stimuli and reaction. It is also possible to consider the reverse stimulus-anxiety
pattern, when the anxiety is experienced before an event takes place in the future.
We do not know whether in those nations the expectancy of the possible future
war was stronger than in other nations.To answer this question in part. we could
refer to the spirit of the McCarthy era in 1950's America when a fear of a
possible future invasion of communists was more than pervasive. In the face of
this fear, even some fundamental democracy values were shaken and
underemphasized. There was for instance a declaration of loyalty given to many
outstanding persons to sign. Edward Tolman did not sign it and was fired from
his university. He returned there after this nation-wide obseSsive fear lessened
and fear-related preventive behaviors decreased.
These events show, however, that the government, pushed by the fear of
intellectuals' possible collaboration or support for a hated communist threat,
undertook preventive and defensive decisions, even if this strategy was not in line
with.the image of a democratic America. Similarly, the Polish authorities, fearing
future resistance, made people sign s4nilar declarations in the 1982/83 martial
law period: Fear can disorganize the moral and social system of values and
beliefs more than we would admit in a common sense way of thinking. In sum,
the historical facts can make people more sensitive. to eventual wars, national
conflicts or other disasters and calamities which threaten humanity.
In reference to the fourth factor, anteceding FA, Nurmi (1988) reported that
adolescents in Finland showed more FA in 1987 than five years earlier. How
much this is related to the threat of AIDS, of a nuclear power explosion, a
nuclear war, the hole in the ozone layer, pollution and ecological crisis, has not
been'scrutinized in a rigorous way. The author assumes that there are some links
between fear of the future and "modem" dangers but it is still an empirical
question to answer.
Unrealistic pessimism. There are very recent reports that shed some light on
these problems. Dolinski, Gromski & Zawisza (1987), referring to Weinstein's
(1980) unrealistic optimism, also found an opposite tendency. Just after the
Chernobyl explosion was announced in the mass media, he asked university
female students about the chances of being the victim of a car accident, a
 PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXIETY PERSPECTIVE 187

robbery, having a heart attack, and also of suffering health consequences due to
the increased radiation which can appear after a month, a year, or five years. The
subjects had to estimate the chance for themselves and for an average student (the
others).
A significant optimistic bias was observed in the list of accidental events, hence
similar to Weinstein's reports, whereas the reverse tendencies were found in
assessing the likelihood of suffering from increased radiation. The means for self
and others were respectively 4.49 and 4.07 after a month, 5.81 and 5.22 after a
year (difference sign. at p< .05), and 7.76 and 6.82 after 5 years (difference
sign. at p< .01).
One can easily note that fa1Iing ill in the future has higher likelihood for self
than for an average other; the pessimism being stronger the further in the future
from the explosion. Although people cannot forecast with precision the negative
events, they may, however, worry about and be preoccupied with them. Their
anxiety related to the anticipated events is a psychological reality "here and now"
and can be empirically described. If the future dangers are perceived/presented
as realistic, the attitude often supported by the scientific authority, then the
anxiety will be more conscious. Weinstein's and Dolinski, Gromski, and
Zawisza's results do not resolve the problem of the attitude toward the future but
they support my position stated in the introduction - that both hopeful and fearful
attitudes towards personal future as coexisting states are possible.
Fatalism. Sometimes this negative attitude may be of an extreme character.
Gandeza (1986), studying the attitudes towards the future among Filipinos,
describes them as fatalists and explains their lifestyle as an effect of different
colonizations in the past, nonstable political situation, disastrous typhoons and the
like. The people want to know their future (horoscopes are very popular), but at
the same time they are convinced they can do nothing about it. This results in
fatalistic attitude and behavior. Similar attitudes are observed in Central America,
where the future is attributed to Eternity, therefore beyond personal control.
Gender and age. There are empirical reports indicating that women show
stronger FA than men, which is supposedly dependent on greater overall female
fearfulness (Croke & Borkovec, 1987; Stavosky et al., 1987; Junger, 1987;
Croke et al., 1988; Smith, 1988). Those researchers dealt with areas of concern
such as fear of crime, fear of rape, of nuclear war, and of powerlessness in older
age due to a rapidly changing society. Surveys in several countries have
consistently found that women's fear of violent crime is greater than the actual
chance of being victimized. Having taken this fear seriously, the editors of the
journal "Women and Therapy" (1987) devoted an entire issue to this topic in its
many variations.
FA seems to also be related to age. SusuIowska (1985) asked people of different
age "What do you fear?", and found that the fear of the future as one of many
different fears begins at ages 10-14 (2.8%), with its frequency increasing at ages
15-19 (15_7%)_ TP..ar.hino- it!O: m~Ytm11Tn ~t ~(ypc .,n_"o (,,1 A~\ +.-. "'<>.. . . 1~ .. "" ..+ n .... <>. ...
188 Zbigniew ZALESKI

30-39 (15.7%) and is almost not reported in later age. There is, however, a linear
increase of fear of their children's future. The older individuals become, the more
they are worried about their children's future.
Other investigations in relation to children dealt with the Future Anxiety of
parents of handicapped children, diabetics, alld alcoholics - t~s of people who
are less able to cope with the every day life problems now, and certainly may not
in a future which does not seem to bring about any changes for the better. The
trends ill social processes of alienation, loss of ".Gemeintschaft" and broken
families make them more preoccupied about the future of those who are disabled
(cf. Susu!owska, 1985).
Cultural factors. There are suggestions that FA is a partly culture-related
phenomenon. Research conducted in Holland, US and UK by Arrindell et al.
(1987) on self-reported fears showed that US and UK subjects in comparison to
Dutch students had significantly higher fears of sexual and aggressive scenes
which occur and may occur (in the future). The authors interpret these national
differences interms of higher order conceptual strategies; in the Dutch population
this being more effective.
As the future perspective is predominantly a conceptual structure/image, it
would be interesting to find out the relationship between FA and structuralization
of the future time perspective, eventually considering the national factor. Thus
the cross-cultural comparisons of FA await research. The changes in Eastern
Europe and aunited Germany may influence the attitude towards individual and
nation-wide futures. These res.earch problems rQoted in real historical changes are
worthy of psychological description. Apart from an academic inquisitiveness,
such research also has theoretical benefit in terms of testing the FA concept, its
descriptive properties and pragmatic hints for shaping people's attitudes in
counselling.
More interesting, though, are the motivational properties of FA. Some
assumptions can be already drawn from the theoretical premises.

MOTIVATIONAL PROPERTIES OF FUTURE ANXIETY

At this stage of a more th\'Oretical than empirical elaboration of the concept, we

may speculate about the regulatory implications of FA, such as its influence on
cognitiv.e processes and behavioral activities. Some tenable assumptions can be
formulated. On a cognitive level, FA can lead to (a) an impairment of the
subjective expectancy of positive outcomes of one's own actions, (b) attention
concentration on the present time and events or escapism into the known past,
both mechanisms limiting the temporal space of an individual. On the behavioral
level FA can lead to (a) passive awaiting of what can occur; (b) withdrawal from
risky, open and constructive activities; (c) keeping to the routinized ways and
tested methods of dealing with situations encountered in life; (d) 'undertaking
preventive activities in order to preserve the status quo rather than taking risks
 PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXIEfY PERSPECTIVE

to increase present OppOrtunities; and (e) using different regressive-type detense

mechanisms in order to reduce the negative state. Another issue is that the FA
can not be treated in 1 or 0 values. What is not known is how the different levels
of FA are related to effective (creative) vs. defensive and routinized behavior?
Perhaps the Yerkes-Dodson law may serve as a starting point in speculation.
Relatively low FA may facilitate actions contributing to one's 'own future,
whereas too high FA may cause behavioral passivity or evoke rather immature
defense mechanisms.
Preliminary evidence of FA impact on cognition, emotions, and behavior.
Our prelimiruiry research has shown that people scoring high on the FA scale
reveal some specific cognitive and behavioral patterns (Zaleski, 1989). Such
individuals state that joining a club would not defend them from loneliness in
older age. They cannot personally do anything to improve their lives therefore
there is no point to act, and they do not plan for the future in order to avoid
disappointment. They treat future matters with less humor, have more somatic
symptoms when thinking of the future, are less convinced that acquired
knowledge will be useful in life and take less care of their health and body,
therefore not maintaining their strength for the future in difficult life situations
(giving up). They first cope with small matters in order to delay the crucial and
important actions. They bring up (prepare) children to help parents in older age
and make new friendships with persons who can be helpful in the future. They
may also be more prone to foster the marriage of a daughter to someone for the
sake of money rather than for love if this could provide more security for their
own future. Thus, on a social level, they use others to secure their own future.
They tend to hold power in high regard because it will make life easier. These
last findings go in line with Kipnis' (1976) suggestion that people who doubt their
personal efficacy will tend to use coercion in order to compensate this defiCiency.
I will address this issue with more detail.
Future anxiety and interpersonal influence. In reference to Raven's (1992)
social power theory, Zaleski and Raven hypothesized that supervisors' choices
of power strategies in interpersonal influence would be affected by the intensity
of their future anxiety. The study by Zaleski and Raven (1993) using Zaleski's
Future Anxiety Scale and Raven and Schwarzwald' s Interpersonal Power
Inventory showed that supervisors scoring high in FA use "stronger", more
threatening power strategies when attempting to influence their subordinates:
coercion (threat of punishment), reward, personal coercion (threat of
disapproval), legitimate authority (position power), whereas supervisors low in
FA use more referent power (hased on mutual identification) and
information!expert power.
Those more confident about their future are more likely to use more rational
and more personal strategies. This of course has implications for supervisor
selection.
190 Zbigniew ZALESKI

Future anxiety and affiliation. Intuitively it can be expected that people will
try to make their future more secure. The methods they use will vary. Some of
them may be related to social settings, e.g creating relationships with other
persons with an expectancy of his/her support in the future. It could mean making
an "instrumental" friendship, or fostering a daughter's marriage to a man who
can be useful in the person's older age, etc. The question is, then, whether one
will try to make one's own future more secure via some sort of affiliative honds
or whether one will withdraw from such honds. Would FA pull people together
(group them) or isolate them?
This issue has some reference to the Teichman's (1987) research report testing
the Sarnoff and Zimbardo's (1961) hypothesis that anxiety leads to isolation, and
fear to affiliation. In her study, two groups were used: one group of students
(control) already accepted into a graduate school, and another group
(experimental) whose members were competing with each other for entry. All
subjects were asked whether they wanted to have a final entry interview
individually (isolation) or with other candidates (affiliation). In effect, the
majority of the experimental Ss chose isolation, supporting the hypothesis. But
Albas (1990) argues with this conclusion referring to Albas and Albas (1984)
contrary findings. Thus, in spite of the common belief that more can be achieved
if worked for together, the impact of FA on cooperation or withdrawal from
interpersonal honds remains a research question.
Future Anxiety and the global threats. We could ask what is the underlying
factor of the creation of associations whose aim is to prevent an ecological
catastrophe, to find a remedy for AIDS or to solve political conflicts. As shown
above, coping with FA is linked to the social interactions of an individual.
However, an additional factor also needs to' be considered.
People can also try to make their own future more certain via actions and values
playing a highly important role in their lives, providing perhaps the most
promising and powerful means (buffers). It appears that high emphasis of
religious, humanistic, moral and scientific values is negatively related to FA
intensity. The spiritual values, e.g., religious commitment, seem to reduce
negative attitude towards one's future.
The motivational role of FA could be validated also in real life and field
studies. There are many activities undertaken by individuals, groups and
associations caused by their concern for the future.
Motivational model of hope and anxiety. There is an assumption that an
activity may have causal influence on hope and anxiety states, particularly if the
efforts are related to events over which an individual has personal control. When
a constructive prevention is undertaken, it can enhance hope, needed for a normal
functioning. A tentative model embedding both hope and future anxiety can be
drawn as follows. COGNITIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF FUTURE POSITIVE
EVENTS elicit -+ HOPE which facilitates -+ LIFE ACHIEVEMENT
ACTIVITIES.
 PERSONAL FUTURE IN HOPE AND ANXIErY PERSPECTIVE 191

The tentative model for future anxiety may take a form: COGNITIVE
REPRESENTATIONS OF FUTURE NEGATIVE EVENTS stimulate ->
FUTURE ANXIETY which may lead to either-> 1) COPING, PREVENTIVE
ACTIVITIES which results in -> HOPE INCREASE and -> FA DECREASE, or
-> 2) IMMATURE DEFENSE MECHANISMS which result in -> HOPE
DECREASE and -+ FA INCREASE.
The manner of reacting tu future anxiety may, among other factors, be
dependent on personal controllability of the cognitively represented events. Future
research in this domain will fill in unknown gaps in the interpretation of the FA
concept.

CLOSING NOTES

Both hope and anxiety characterize the psychological realism of living for the
future. It would be tu pretentious tu suggest a balance between them as a desired
state, but it would also be nondesirable to have a strong domination of one over
another. Whereas the positivity effect helps a person to go on in spite of all
obstacles, the negativity effect is a basis of prudential adaptation to expected and
oncoming circumstances (CzapiIiski, 1985, 1988). Peeters (1971) made an attempt
to describe the factors conditioning a positive inclination as well as a shift
towards the opposite direction. According to his conceptualization an individual
has to have a clear attitude towards his life space, that is, to desire or to avoid
elements of that space. The direction in which a person turns is determined by
a general motivation, either motivation for self-actualization or motivation for
"mere survival". The motivation to survive is a limited and restricted substage
included in self-actualization, which additionally entails a need for novelty.
Dominance of this liInited drive can correlate with an increased level of anxiety.
In future tiIne perspective both attitudes of hope and future anxiety are
interwoven and the awareness of these characteristics enables an. individual to
realistically face his own future, which is a space for his personal development
and self-realization via realization of important goals.

* Acknowledgments: Author wants to thank dr Ryan Hulbert for iInproving the

English language.
Author expresses his gratitude tu KAAD and the Catholic University of Leuven
for partial support in collecting the literature & the data in Germany & Belgium
for this paper.

Note. E-MAIL: ZZALESKI@PLUMCSll.Bitnet

192 Zbigniew ZALESKI

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COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS USED IN THE PREDICTION
OF FUTURE EVENTS: ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING

Jerome TOBACYK & Ed NAGOT

Behavioral Science
Louisiana Tech University
Ruston, Lonisiana, USA

INTRODUCTION
The accurate prediction of future events is a critical cognitive determinant of
effective human adaptation. The accurate prediction of future events may
provide both individuals and collectives with a sense of personal control, as
well as with resources to more effectively modify or to adjust to the
environment. Several theories of social cognition emphasize the importance of
accurate predictions of future events. For example, according to attribution
theories (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972), attributions form
the basis for future cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. In social learning
theories stressing perceived personal efficacy or control (Bandura, 1977,
1982; Rotter, 1966), the adaptive significance of the experience of
effectiveness in predicting and influencing future events is emphasized. The
importance of prediction of future events is emphasized in some personality
theories. For example, the fundamental pOstulate in Kelly's (1955) Personal
Construct Theory proposes that all human cognition and behavior is grounded
in attempts to predict (anticipate) future events.
Scientific and technological, developments have enhanced human
understanding and control of the natural world, which in turn have resulted in
more accurate predictions of certain classes of events. Fer example,
considerable precision can be attained in the probabilistic prediction of such
aggregate events as election outcomes, incidences of accidents and diseases,
and mortality rates. However, due to limitations inherent in the human
condition, it is not possible to use scientific procedures to accurately predict
the occurrence or outcome of many critical events in individual lives.
196 Jerome TABACYK & Ed NAGOT

Therefore, various para-scientific belief procedures (e.g., astrology, palm

reading, tarot card reading, etc.) have evolved that purportedly provide
accurate knowledge about the unfolding of future events in individual lives.
Although the notion of predicting future events plays an important role in
various theories of social cognition and personality, little research has
concerned the cognitive dimensions or schemata used by persons in making
such predictions. In Part 1, 'we report the results of an investigation of the
cognitive dimensions used by university students in predicting future -events,
leading to the development of the Prediction of Future Events (PFE) Scale,
which assesses the degree of self-reported belief in the each of seven
dimensions used to predict future events (Tobacyk, Nagot, & Mitchell, 1989).
In Part 2, we show how belief in various PFE dit]lensions is differentially
related to such variables as: (1) preference for the use of Intuition in
perception; (2) belief in superstition, (3) enjoyment of and participation in
games of chance, and (4) attributional complexity.

COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS USED TO PREDICT FUTURE EVENTS

Investigators constructed 60 items to sample a wide range of beliefs about

predicting future events, with items including both normal and paranormal
prediction procedures. This item pool was rated by 349 introductory
psychology college students (188 males, 161 females; mean age = 19.6 Y"!lCs,
sd = 2.5) on a 5-point rating scale: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2),
undecided (3), agree (4), and strongly agree (5).
The ratings of the 60 items were intercorrelated with Pearson product-
moment correlations and factor analyzed by principle axis method. Promax
oblique rotations revealed little dependence of factor dependency, which
allowed,the use of orthogonal rotations. The sixteen factor Varimax solution,
selected as the most clear, accounted for about 65 % of the total variance. Of
these 16 factors, seven appeared interpretable as common .factors. The
remaining factors wereprlmarlly singlets and doublets which were unstable
through further rotations .. The items that loaded greater than + or - .55 on
each of the seven factors were examined and the factors were interpreted.
Factor I, which accounted for approximately 10.7 % of the total variance was
labeled Paranormal Divinatory Procedures. The six marker items concerned
predicting future. "vents by such paranormal divinatory procedures as
astrology, cloud configurations, palm reading and wax drippings from candles.
Factor n, labeled Psychically Gifted Persons, accounted for approximately
9.2% of the total variance. Each of the marker items concerned divinatory
abilities of psychic .individuals (e. g., Some psychics can accurately tell the
future. Some people have an unexplained ability to accurately premct the
future. Psychics provided accurate information to police).
 COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS ... 197

Factor ill, labeled Scientifically Validated Forecasting Procedures, accounted

for 7.2 % of the total variance. The theme of this factor concerned belief in the
accuracy of forecasters whose predictions are based on formal scientific
training, such as physicians, forecasters, stockbrokers, and historians.
Factor IV, accounting for 3.9% of the total variance, labeled Animal
Behavioral Prediction, concerns using animal behavior to predict storms and
natural disasters (e.g., Birds often behave in a disturbed manner before
storms. Unusual behavior in animals precedes earthquakes.).
Factor V, accounting for 3.5 % of the total variance, concerns the belief that
everyone can predict the future without special ability or training (e.g.,
Everyone is capable of predicting the future. Anyone can predict the future.).
Factor VI, accounting for 3.3 % of the total variance, was labeled Religious
Determinism based on the two marker items (The Bible accurately predicts the
future. Only God knows the future.).
Factor VII, accounting for 2.8 % of the total variance, reflects a bipolar
Determinism vs. Freedom dimension loading two marker items (Your future is
determined and cannot be changed. Each person freely determines his/her own
future.). Greater scores on this factor are associated with greater belief that
one's future is determined and cannot be changed, concurrent with less belief
that each person freely determines his or her future. This factor reflects a
basic assumpiion that underlies most prediction procedures (Le., determinism),
rather than a specific procedure for predicting the future.
The findings of this factor analysis indicates that the cognitive structure used
by these university students to predict future events is multidimensional,
because the largest factor accounted for only 10.7% of the total variance,
which is too small to support a unidimensional interpretation.

ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT CONSTRUCTION

A 21 item assessment instrument was constructed to measure belief in each

of the seven dimensions of predicting future events. Seven subscales were
constructed by selecting from two to four marker items from each factor. The
major criterion for item selection was conformity to simple structure.
Table 1 lists the 21 items classified by the seven subscales, as well as the
factor loadings for each item on its original factor.
The Prediction of Future Events (PFE) Scale may be used to study individual
differences in the cognitive dimensions that persons use.in predicting future
events. The descriptive statistics for the 21-item PFE Scale, based on the
responses of 161 females and 188 males, are listed in Table 2: The total PFE
Scale mean for the full sample was 58.12 (sd = 8.63), which is slightly less
than the theoretical midpoint tOr the 21 item scale (63.0).
198 Jerome TABACYK & Ed NAGOT

Table 1. The Factor Loadings of the 21 PFE Scale Items Classified by Subscale.

Item No. Loading Subscale

Paranormal Divinatory Procedures

1 75 The horoscope accurately teLls a persons future .
8 73 Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future
15 .70 Star and pLanet configurations can accurately predict
a person's future .
19 60 Each person's palms have "mapsll that accurately predict
that person's future.
Psychically Gifted Persons
2 .61 Psychics have provided accurate information to the police
in soLving crimes. .
9 .70 Some individuals are born with the ability to predict the
future.
16 .73 Some people have an unexpLained ability to accurately
predict the future.
21 76 Some psychics can accurateLy predict the future .
ScientificaLly VaLidated Forecasting Procedures
3 .59 Doctors can accurately predict the future heaLth of their
patients. ,
10 .74 Stockbrokers can accurateLy predict future stock prices.
17 .58 Forecasters can accurately predict the outcome of an
eLection.
20 62 Historians can accurateLy predic~ the future .
AnimaL Behavior in Prediction NaturaL CaLamities
4 75 Swallows fly very low just- before a storm
11 71 Birds often behave in a disturbed manner before storms .
18 .70 Earthquakes can be predicted by observing unusuaL behaviors
in animals.
Everyone Can Predict the Future
5 59 Everyone is capable of predicting the future .
12 72 Anyone can predict the future once they know the secret

Item No. Loading SubscaLe

Religious Determinism
6 66 Only God knows the future
13 .82 The Bible accurately predicts the future.
Determinism vs. Freedom*
7 '.63 Your future is determined and cannot be changed.
14 82 Each person freely determines their own future .

Note: In computing scores on this subscate, item 14 is reversed and then items
7 and 14 are totaled.
 COGNITNE DIMENSIONS ... 199

Table 2. Predicting Future Events Scale/subscale descriptive statistics and the

results of! tests conducted by sex.
Full Sa~Le Males FemaLes t test
N = 349 N = 188 N = 161 males vs.
M sd M sd M sd femaLes p<

Prediction of Future
Events scale
Total Score 58.1 8.63 58.1 8.62 58.1 8.60 <1.0 ns
Subscates
Paranormal 1.92 0.75 1.80 0.67 2.07 0.80 3.44 .OQ1
Divinatory
Procedures
Psychically
Gi Heel Persons 2.95 0.81 2.93 0.81 2.98 0.81 <1.0 ns
ScientificalLy
Val idated
Prediction 2.81 0.75 2.97 0.72 2.62 0.74 4.38 .001
Procedures
Animal BehavioraL
Predictions 3.33 0.62 3.37 0.64 3.28 0.59 <1.0 ns
Everyone Can
Prech ct Future 2.03 0.87 2.14 0.91 1.89 0.81 2.69 .008
ReLigious
Determinism 4.11 0.93 4.06 0.94 4.17 0.90 <1.0 ns
Determinism versus
Freedom 2.55 1.03 2.38 0.99 2.68 1.06 2.70 .008

The two PFE subscales with a mean score above 3.0 (indicating an absolute
level of belief in the subscale items) were Religious Determinism (M = 4.1)
and Animal Behavioral Predictions (M = 3.3). The two subscales on which
respondents expressed greatest disbelief were Paranormal Divinatory
Procedures (M = 1.9) and Everyone Can Predict The Future (M = 2.0).
The finding that these respondents reported greatest belief in Religious
Determinism is not surprising because this research was conducted in the
"Bible Belt" region of the United States (Arkansas-Louisiana-Mississippi-
Texas), characterized by fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs, often
including literal interpretation of the Bible. It is noted that although
respondents reported greatest disbelief in Paranormal Divinatory Procedures
(M = 1.9), they reported significantly greater belief in Psychically Gifted
Persons (M = 2.9; t(348) , . 16.9, p < .01). This finding supports the notion that
these two dimensions are independent and that a more precise understanding of
individuals' constructions of predicting future events require s~parate
assessment of both dimensions.
200 Jerome TABACYK & Ed' NAGOT

SEX DIFFERENCES INJ'REDICTION OF FUTURE EVENTS

As indicated in Table 2, males and females showed virtually identical

PFE mean scores (M= 58.1). However, there were four significant
differences on PFE subscales. Males reported significantly greater belief on:
(1) Scientifically Validated Forecasting Procedures (M",.k. = 2.97; Mr,=k. ==
2.62), and (2) Everyone Can Predict the Future (M""k. = 2.14, Mr,=", =
1.89). Females reported significantly greater belief on: (1) Paranormal
Divinatory Procedures (M,.=k. = 2.07, M",.", = 1.80), and (2) on the bipolar
Determinism vs. Freedom Subscale (Mr,=", = 2.68, M",.k. = 2.38)
indicating that females believe significantly more strongly than males that their
personal future is determined, concurrent with the belief that they do not have
personal freedom to determine their future.
These findings of significant sex differences in belief in PFE Subscales are
consistent with conventional sex role stereotypes. Males reported a more
agenetic, internally-controlled orientation toward the prediction of future
events, more strongly endorsing subscales that make future predictions
contingent on internal dispositions and upon the use of scientific procedures.
Conversely, females report a more externally-controlled orientation toward the
prediction of future events, emphasizing the role of external forces (e.g., Para-
normal Divinatory Procedures, Determinism) in relation to their personai
lives.

TEST-RETEST RELIABILITIES OF THE PFE SCALE/SUBSCALES

The PFE Scale was administered twice to 61 introductory psychology

students (37 males, 24 females) over a three-week interval. The Pearson
product-moment test-retest reliability of the. total PFE Scale was .84. The
reliabilities of the subscales were: Paranormal Divinatory Procedures, .81;
Psychically Gifted Persons, .90; Scientifically Validated Prediction
Procedures, .73; Animal Behavioral Predictions, .59; Everyone Can Predict
Future, .75; Religious . Determinism, .82; and Determinism versus Freedom,
.77. These reliability coefficients are all satisfactory.

CONSTRUCT VALIDITY OF THE PFE SCALE

Intuition and Prediction of Future Events. According to the Myers-Briggs

interpretation of Jungian Type Theory (Myers & McCaulley, 1985),
perception (Le., information acquisition) is based on two basic processes -
 'COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS .,. 201

sensing and intuition. Sensing involves the direct perception of concrete

sensory data in the immediate environment. Intuition involves the perCeption
of future possibilities, meanings, and relationships by way of insight c
emphasizing perception beyond what is visible to the senses (Myers &
McCaulley, 1985) .. Further, according to this theory, each person develops a
preference for either .sensing or intuition - and tends to rely more on the
preferred perceptual process.
Thus, greater preference for intuition - a future-oriented cognitive process -
might be generally related to greater belief in dispositionally-based procedures
for prediction of future events, such as Psychically Gifted Persons, Scientifi-
cally Validated Prediction Procedures, and Everyone Can Predict the Future.
Therefore, a significant direct correlation is hypothesized between preference
for Intuition, .as measured by the Sensing-Intuition subscale from the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), and belief in these three
PFE subscales.
Further, in the historical development of Western religions, there is often a
dialectical relationship between intuitive and authoritarian epistemological
processes. Although the creative source of religious belief systems is almost
invariably an individual's subjective, intuitive experience, generally. this
SUbjective insight is formally institutionalized into a authoritarian: system of
dogma, prescribing conformity from believers. Thus, within religious belief
systems there is often a conflict or tension between SUbjective, intuitive
personal experience versus authoritarianism (i.e., reliance on authority).
Therefore, a significant inverse correlation is hypothesized between Intuition
(which emphasizes the validity of subjective personal experience) and belief in
the Religious Determinism PFE subscale (which emphasizes the validity of
authority - i.e., of God and the Bible).
To test these hypotheses, 240 university students (120 males, 120 females;
Mean age = 20.2. years; sd = 2.2) completed the PFE Scale and the Sensing-
Intuition Subscale from the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Consistent with
hypotheses, scores indicative of greater Intuition on the Sensing-Intuition
subscale were significantly associated with greater scores, indicating greater
belief, on three PFE subscales: (1) Psychically Gifted Persons (r = .21,
p < .05 full sample; r =.18, p < .05 for males; r = .25, p < .05 for
females), (2) Scientifically Validated Prediction Procedures (r = .15,
p < .05, full sample; r = .10 females, r =.15 for males), and (3) Everyone
Can Predict the Future (r = .20, p < .05 full sample, r = .17 for females,
202 Jerome :TABACYK. & Ed NAGOT

r = .19, P < .05 males). Also as hypothesized, belief in Religious

Determinism showed significant inverse correlations with Sensing-Intuition
scores (r = -.18, P < .0001 full sample; r = -.18, P < .05 for females,
r= -.17 for males).
Superstition and Prediction Qf Future events. According to Jahoda (1969),
superstition involves the construction of over-generalized causal connections
from events that might be more accurately attributed to coincidence. Thus,
superstition appears associated with greater susceptibility to the construction of
illusory correlations - i.e., the tendency, based on expectations of a
relationship between two variables, to either overestimate the degree of
relationship that exists or to impose a relationship when none exists (Fiske &
Taylor, 1984). Consistent with this notion, Tobacykand Wilkinson (1990)
reported significant relationships between belief in superstition and greater
scores on the Magical Ideation Scale, a purported measure of magical thinking
(i.e., belief and reported experiences in forms of causation that by
conventional standards are invalid; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983).
Belief in Paranormal Divinatory Procedures and in .. Psychically Gifted
Persons are frequently explained on the basis of biases and errors in causal
inference making, particularly on the basis of illusory correlations (Alcock,
1981; Marks & Kamman, 1980; Wilson & Tobacyk, 1989). Thus, because
susceptibility to the construction of illusory correlations appears to be a shared
cognitive process. underlying beliefs in superstition, Paranormal Divinatory
Procedures, and Psychically Gifted Persons, it is hypothesized that significant
direct relationships will be recorded between the Superstition subscale of the
Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) and two PFE subscales:
Paranormal Divinatory Procedures and Psychically Gifted Persons.
The PFE Scale and the Superstition subscale of the Paranormal Belief Scale
were completed by 235 university Students (118 males, 117 females). As
hypothesized, Superstition subscale scores showed significant direct
correlations with scores on Paranormal Divinatory Procedures (r = .62,
P < .05 full sample; r == .64, P < .05 females; r = .63, P < .05 males) and
on Psychically Gifted Persons (r = .26, P < .05 full sample; r = .28,
P < .05 females; r = ,27, P < .05 males).
Thus, strong, though indirect, support was provided for the notion that the
construction of illusory correlations is a common cognitive characteristic of
beliefs in superstition, Paranormal Divinatory Procedures, and ~sychically
Gifted Persons.
 COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS ... 203

Preference for games of chance and prediction of future events.

Participatioain and enjoyment of games of chance (e.g., gambling, betting on
sporting events, buying raffle tickets) involves decision-making based.on
future expectations (generally over-optimistic) of the probability of
reinforcement and, therefore should be directly related to beliefs ahout the
prediction of future events. Such gaming situations appear optimal for the
development of self-referential illusory correlations, particularly for the
development of the illusion of control (Langer, 1975), which refers to an
expectancy Of personal success inappropriately higher than objective proba-
bility warrants. Findings from the previous section provide some evidence that
susceptibility to illusory correlations may underlie both superstitious belief
(Jaboda, 1969; Tobacyk & Wilkinson, 1990) and belief in two PFE
dimensions - Paranormal Divinatory Procedures, and Psychically Gifted
Persons. Therefore, it was hypothesized that greater belief in Paranormal
Divinatory Procedures and Psychically Gifted Persons would be associated
with significantlygre<lter self-reported enjoyment of and participation in games
of chance.
Two hundred and thirty-five university students (118 males, 117 females)
completed the PFE Scale and six items that concerned enjoyment of and
participation in games of chance (Le., I enjoy going to the racetrack to bet on
the horses. I would like to arrange a trip to Las Vegas or Atlantic City so I
could gamble in the casinos. I do not bet on sporting events (reversed). I enjoy
playing BINGO for money and prizes. I always buy raffle tickets. I enjoy
practically all games of chance.). Respondents rated their degree of enjoyment
or participation in these activities on a five-point rating scale, with greater
scores indicating greater enjoyment or participation. A "chance index" was
computed. by averaging the six individual chance items.
As hypothesized, self-reports of greater -enjoyment of and participation in
games of chance were associated with significantly greater scores on two PFE
subscales: (1) Paranormal Divinatory Systems (r = .32, p < .05 full sample;
r = .34, P < .05 females; r = .34, p < .05 males), (2) Gifted Psychic
Individuals (r = .16, P -< .05 full sample; r = .18, P < .05 females;
r = .20, p < .05 males). No other PFE subscales were significant for the full
sample or by sex.
As hypothesized, modest significant relationships were recorded between
belief in PFE dimensions .and self-reported enjoyment or participation in
games of chance. These findings are consistent with the notion that the illusion
204 Jerome'TABACYK & Ed 'NAGOT

of control may beashared mechanism underlying belief in Paranormal

Diviruitory Systems, Psychically Gifted,Persons, and preference for games,of
chance. However, further research is needed to more directly test whether the
illusion of Control is a shared mechanism underlying these b e l i e f s . " ' : .,
AttributionaI Complexity and prediction of future events. Relationshipsr. :::!:.
between the prediction of future events and attributional complexity were(.<~:
examined. The Attributional Complexity Scale (Fletcher, Danilovic,:::'" "':'
Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986), purported to assess the complexity of
individual attributional schemata, provides a total attributional complexity
score, as well as scores on seven relatively independent subscales: (1) level of
interest/motivation, assuming that more attributionally complex persons
possess higher levels of interest/motivation to understand' others; (2) prefe-
rence for complex, rather than simple explanations; (3) presence of
metacognition concerning explanations, assuming that greater attributional
complexity is associated with thinking about the underlying processes involved
in causal attribution;' (4) awareness of the extent to which" people's behavior is
a function of interaction with others; (5) tendency to infer abstract or causally
complex internal attributions; (6) tendency to infer abstract, contemporary,
external causal attributions; and (7) tendency to infer external causes operating
from. the past.
The PFE dimensions may be ordered on a continuum ranging from less to
greater attributional complexity, with Paranormal Divinatory Procedures and
Psychically Gifted Persons anchOring the less attributionally-complex end of
the: continuum, while Scientifically Validated Prediction Procedures might
anchor the more attributionally-complexend. The anchoring of the attributio-
nally-simple end of the continuum with these two PFE dimensions is .supported
by the previously reported relationships between superstitious beliefs (probably
the most attributionally-sinlple paranormal .belief dimension) and these two
PFE dimensions. Thus, it was hypothesized that Paranormal Divinatory
Procedures and Psychically Gifted Persons would each show inverSe
correlations with the Attributional Complexity Scale/subscales. Further, it was
hypot1!esized that Scientifically Validated Prediction Procedures would show
direct correlations with Attributional Complexity Scale/subscale scores.
The PFE Scale and the Attributional Complexity Scale (Fletcher, Danilovic,
Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986) were administered to 156 university
students (62 females, 94 males; Mean age = 21.6 years, sd = 3.3) .. As hypo-
thesized, Paranormal Divinatory Procedures showed' significant inverse
 COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS ... 205

correlations (p < .05) with Attributional Complexity Scale total SCore

(r = .25), as well as with six oithe subseale scores: (1) level of motivation,
r = -.22; (2) preference for complex explanations, r = -.15; (3) metacogni-
tion, r = -.28; (4) behavior as a function of interaction with others, r = -.16;
(5) complex internal attributions, r = -.19; and (6) contemporary external
causal attribution~, r = -.1"6. Psychically Gifted Persons showed no significant
corrillations with Affective Complexity Scale/subscale scores, with correlations
ranging from -.09 to .04. Although Scientifically Validated Prediction
Procedures showed positive relationships with Affective Complexity
Scale/subscale scores, with correlations ranging from .01 to .13, none of the
correlations was significant.

SUMMARY

It appears that seven relatively independent cognitive dimensions were used

by these university' students in predicting future events: Paranormal Divinatory
Procedures, Psychically Gifted Persons, Scientifically Validated Forecasting
Procedures, Animal Behavioral Prediction, Everyone Can Predict the Future,
Religious Determinism, and Determinism versus Freedom. The PFE Scale,
constructed on the basis of this obtained cognitive structure, assesses the
intensity of belief in each of these seven dimensions. Evidence for the validity
of the PFE Seale was demonstrated by several modest predicted relationships
with measures of intuition, superstition, preference for games of chance, and
attributional complexity.
Part 2 provided indirect evidence indicating the possibility of relationships
between belief in two PFE dimensions - P1IC"normal Divinatory Procedures
and Psychically Gifted Persons - and less effective cognitive functioning. More
specifically, greater belief in Paranormal Divinatory Procedures showed
significant relationships with superstitious belief, preference for games of
chance, and less attributional complexity. Also, greater belief in Psychically
Gifted Persons showed similar, though, more modest, associations with super-
stitious belief and preferencefof games of chance. One possible process that
might underlie this constellation of findings cqncerns susceptibility to illusory
correlations. Further research mignt more directly investigate relationships
between such cognitive biaseS and errors as the' construction ~f illusory
correlations in relation to individual differences in orientation toward the
future.
 206 Jerome TABACYK & Ed NAGOT

Although the magnitudes of the validity coefficients between PFE subscales

and criteria are modest, it is noted that the PFE Scale is a measure of the
intensity of belief only. Intensity of belief is only one parameter in a predicti-
on equation which might also include measures of belief centrality,
complexity, and integration. Further, degree of belief in various procedures
for predicting future events might well show greater predictability when
combined with moderator variables, including both dispositional variables
(e.g., idealism, self-monitoring, self-consciousness) and situational variables
(e.g., instructions or tasks which prime particular beliefs) in the prediction of
behavioral criteria which are more directly relevant to the belief dimensions.

REFERENCES

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Bandura A. (1982). Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. American Psychologist, 37,
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Eckblad M., & Chapman L. (1983). Magical ideation as an indicator of schizotypy. Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 51, 215-225.
Fiske S., & Taylor S. (1984). Social cognition. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Fletcher G., Danilovic P., .Fernandez G., Peterson D., l!< Reeder G. (1986). Attributional
compleXity: An mdividual differences measure. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 51, 875-884.
Heider F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: W!ley.,
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percepti911. In L. Berkowitz, (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
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Kelly G. (1955). The psychology ofpersonal constructs. New York: Norton.
Langer E. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
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Marks D. & Kamman R. (1980). The psychology of the psychic. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus
Books. .
Myers I. & McCaulley M. (1985). Manual: A guide to the development and use of the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Rotter J. (1966). Generalized, expectancies for internal versus external control of
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80, .1-28 (Whole No. 609).
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development and implications for personality functioning. Journal of Personality and
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1- Tobacyk J., Nagot E., & Mitchell T~ (1989). Prediction of Future Events Scale: assessment
of beliefs about predictiilg the future. Journal of Social Psychology, 129, 819-823.
Tobacyk J., & W!lkinson L. (1990). Magical thinking and paranonnal beliefs. Journal of
Social Behavior and Personality, 5, 255-264.
Wilson J. II, & Tobacyk J. (1989). Lunar phases and crisis center telephone calls. Journal
of Social Psychology, 130, 47-51.
IMPORTANCE OF AND OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM IN PREDICTING
SOLUTION TO WORLD PROBLEMS: AN INTERCULTURAL STUDY

Zbigniew ZALESKI' & Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI Willy LENS

Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Catholic University of Lublin, Poland ,Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium

INTRODUCTION
Since the recent democratization process healed a 50 year period of division
of nations into the Eastern versus Western block, the world is increasingly
taking on characteristics of an open system. The new world environment is
characterized by greater openness, leading to increased communication and
interdependency among nations and societies. This greater openness has also
resulted in increased consciousness by the citizens of all nations that we all
face together a common set of global problems.
Many of today's world problemS such as air and water pollution, resource
depletion, diseases (e.g., AIDS, cholera), starvation, nuclear disasters, etc. are
created by human activities. These world problems in which intentional human
activities play a central role are often the unforeseen consequences of
industrialization, technical innovations or other human endeavors. Many of
these world problems already threaten large populations and will certaiuly
become more serious in the future, notwithstanding the fact that human
behavior is their fundamental cause and cure. All too .often, people, both
individually and collectively, chose immediate gratifications without awareness
or concern about delayed, but potentially disastrous, consequences. In the past,
most people were not aware of such ecological problems as the undesirable
consequences of carbon smoke, exhaust-gases, chemical pollution, animal
manure, unlimited popUlation growth, deforestation, etc. But that is not true
any longer. In g"neral, peopl" do know the facts - th" causes of ecological
probl"ms and many cures. N"v"rtheless, ecological problems are becoming
worse and more widespread. Many people seem not to care at all. This lack of
concern leads to a fundamental question: Why do we not care more about the
long term catastrophic consequences of our present actions, and if we are
concerned, why do not. we behavy differently in order to solve the problems?
The answer to Boniecki's (1977) important, but for many years lonely
question "Is man interested in his future?" depends on what we understand as
the meaning of "man's future". Most people are strongly interested in their
individual future. They are very concerned about their individual future goals
208 Zbigniew ZALESKI, Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI & Willy LENS

and plans, even those in the very distant future. Many people expend
enormous motivated effort, at home and on the job, in order to achieve the
future that they planned' for themselves. They subscribe to retirement plans
and enroll in life and health insurance plans. They stop smoking and/or do
regular physical exercise in order to prevent lung cancer or heart disease.
They do all they can to protect themselves from unpredictable adversity or bad
luck. The time range of some of these plans may even extend beyond the
individual life time.
However', the answer to Boniecki's (1977) question, is less clear when we
extend the frame of reference from that of individual lives to that of all of
mankind (i.e., world society). The future includes not only our individual
goals and aspirations, the achievement of which may be more or less
contingent upon individual actions. The future also includes world society as it
is threatened by the problems and dangers that we referred to above. Many of
these world problems are of a long term nature and are becoming cumulatively
more threatening for mankind. From daily worldwide observations, it seems
that most of us are much less actively concerned about mankind's future than
we are about our individual future. On way to understand this disparity
between concern about the future in our individual lives versus concern about
the future of mankind is to infer that world problems are not integrated into
individual psychological future or their life space. 'Lens and Moreas (this
volume) analyze psychological processes that can partly explain why this is so.
Our individual future time perspective resnlts from anticipating in the near
and the distant future positively and negatively valued events or motivational
goals that we expect to teach or to avoid by our oWn individual effort. Many
of our daily activities are aimed at intentional goals which are situated in a
distant future. The most motivating goals are those that we can foresee, that
are not too difficUlt to achieve, arid that are integrated into specific behavioral
plans or means-ends siructures. The same is true for the solution of world
problems, although these problems and their solutions are generally much
more complex than setting and achieving individual goals. ' '
We contend that people will become actively concerned about world
problems and make them part of their psychological future time perspective if
they perceive them as important (i.e., as having high value) and if they are
convinced that there are solutions possible to which their individual
contributions are necessary (i.e., instrumentality of individual and collective
actions).
Generalizing from Rotter's (1954, 1966) Social Learning Theory, the
expectations are determined by the nature of a particular problem as well as by
generalized expectancies from similar situations. These general expectancies
are crucial for novel, less known issues. The optimism or pessimism of an
individual can be framed as high expectancy of solution and low expectancy of
solving a given problem, respectively. The level of expectations can be related
to the importance of the problem, according to the rule that the leSs probable
outcomes are subjectively valued higher (cf. Atkinson, 1964).
 IMPORTANCE OF AND OFTIMISM-PESSIMISM ...

How important do people perceive various world problems and what are
their expectations regarding the possibilities of solving these problems in the
long term? This is the main research question we try to answer in this
exploratory cross-cultural study. This study included respondents from seven
countries that differ in some substantial features, in order to represent a wide
spectrum for cross-national comparison.
The nations included in the study were selected in order to represent quite
different cultures and levels of technology. India (IN) is a representative state
for Asia - with many serious internal problems: overpopulation, illiteracy,
health care, unemployment, hunger, lack of social security, strong religious
beliefs fostering a passive accepiance of life conditions, and religious conflicts.
Ukraine (U) is a nation without a history of independence and freedom.
Through much of the past the Ukrainian people have lived in an oppressive
political system characterized by a low standard of living. Ukraine, controlled
by a totalitarian system, with a weak economy and isolated from information,
has recently become strongly involved in a national independence movement.
Next, Poland (PL) is a nation in its first period following its political and
economic liberation from a totalitarian system. Poland has a long history of
fighting for independence, in part due to its geographic location as a cross-
roads between Eastern and Western Civilizations. In the last two years the
externally-imposed communist system has been abolished by the Polish
people's efforts. Poland faces many problems related to the transition from a
state controlled economy to a free market economy. Poland has strong
aspirations to enter the European Community.
East Germany (EG) (now reintegrated into a unitary German state) was a
part of the communist block with a highly controlled totalitarian regime.
Although East German respondents were contacted quring the period of
unification, they were very aware of the enormous social differences between
the two parts of the country. During this period, East Germany was literally
"falJing apart". Although physically East Germany was in the new Germany,
this was still prior to the common parliament elections in 1990.
By the same token, West Germany (WG) was occupied with the problem of
unification with East Germany mostly at the expense of the West. Although
this situation evoked hopes (for East Germany), it evoked fears in West
Germany of the consequences of absorbing the former communist society.
West Germany with tragic memories from the last two World Wars is now a
leading world economic power.
Belgium (B) - has a relatively high economic standard, similar to that of
West Germany. Belgium suffered from two world wars but at present is
considered a relatively stable environment.
The USA is a prosperous, highly technological country, leading in many
areas such as politics, science, and economy. A relevant characteristic of
many Americans is that they are less history oriented and rather open to
changes, novelties, and the future.
210 Zbigniew ZALESKI. Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI & Willy LENS

From our perspective, PL, U and EG represented nations that varied on a

dimension of economic hopes and security. When returning tu the future time
perspective, EG might reflect the expectation of shortest time for
improvement, while U might reflect the expectation of the longest. Of courSe
these remarks are speculations, based on the authors' knowledge and
observations, but they aCcurately characterize the atmosphere of political
development in Eastern Europe. Keeping in mind the above national
characteristics, it can be presumed that attitudes toward world problems and
their solution will differ from one nation to another.
Additionally we looked at religion as a relevant factor for being optimistic or
pessimistic about world problems. We assume that religious commitment is a
relevant dimension, regardless of which religion one belongs to. This is
because religion forms a partiCUlar world vision with a time perspective
extending' beyond the individual's life span. Thus, people who find
meaning/purpose in religious values may perceive present events differently
and give them a different interpretation. In sum, those who are more religious
may be more hopeful in their expectations about solving world problems than
disbelievers.
We also investigate relationships between gender and optimism/pessimism
about the solution of world problems. More specifically, we investigated
whether women, who usually score higher on anxiety scales (see e.g., Hang &
Hauser, 1991) would report greater pessimism about the solution of world
problems in the future.

TYPES OF PROBLEMS

In general, world problems can be grouped into two categories based on

their source. Some problems primarily originate from human activity, while
other problems predominately originate from natural forces. Problems
originating from human activity are perceived as relatively controllable by
humans, while those originating from natural forces are viewed as less
controllable. Of course, some problems are ambiguous with reference to
source and perceived controllability (e.g., a flood due to a broken darn). We
distinguish four groups of world problems relevant to human existence,
discussed in literature and in mass media.'
Natural dangers. Humans have always lived with such natural dangers as
earthquakes, volcanos and floods. Today, science and technology allow some
predictability of these natural dangers so thaFnegative consequences can be
reduced or avoided. Of course, human controllability is limited. Volcanic
eruptions cannot be stopped, but they can be predicted and appropriate steps
can be taken to minimize human disruptions.
Indeed, if we compared the cognitive image of a volcano for XXth century
humans with the image of earlier humans, we may speculate that modem
humans are more optimistic \Ind less fearful about future disasters. In addition,
the natural sciell!'es have greatly progressed in providing less mysterious
explanations of natural events.
 IMPORTANCE OF AND OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM ..

Problems based on industrial processes. There are problems due to

organized human activity that has gone out of control. Such problems are
caused by human desires for immediate gratification without concern for the
long-term future negative consequences. These problems often reflect an
alienation (i.e., separation) of intention from outcomes and appear difficult to
solve.
Generally, human technological development was not matched by
reflection/awareness of its negative side effects. For example, smoking
chimneys were often eulogized in themes of painters and poets. Only during
the past two decades have people, mostly in technologically advanced
countries, become aware of and concerned about industrial pollution. Because
the negative effects of industrial pollution accumulate, ecological destruction
can grow faster than the industry itself. This is what we mean by alienation
(i.e., loosing control over the unwanted outcomes). Yet, humanity cannot
imagine its existence without industry. In sum, man himself has evoked the
chain reaction that has become a vicious circle. The growing awareness of the
lack of control over these dangers, in tum, instigates fear and anxiety.
Natural resources, which are the fuel for our industrial productivity, are
limited. This fact is emphasized by ecologically oriented people who realize
that the Earth's resources are limited and irreplaceable. Conflict between our
dependence on natural resources and their increasing shortage becomes more
evident with increasing industrial productivity.
Health problems. Other problems deal with somatic and psychological
health. These problems include "traditional" illnesses, as well as the potential
of "new" illnesses that may appear as a side-effect of industrialization and
modem civilization.
Medical treatment has perhaps always been a part of human history.
However, during the last decades medicine has undergone an authentic
revolution. Many diseases that invariably killed in past times, can now be
successfully prevented or treated. It can be assumed that nations with a high
quality of health services will probably be more optimistic when facing or
imagining the appearance of new diseases. People feel that they dispose of
some tools of defence. Similarly in the primitive societies,the medical people
always had a high prestige. Medicine has proved its power and has gained
high respect among many people.
Our times, however, are different from the ancient period. CiviIization
created specific health problems, connected withtechn610gy, stress and social
tensions, frostration, high competitiveness and achievement orientation.
Similarly to the ecological pollution as the side effect of industrialization, these
illnesses (troubles) are also effects of human social and personal strivings.
Man has introduced a philosophy of interpersonal competition, of social
comparison on many artificial standards or pseudoneeds and values. The stress
and frustration lead to psychological disorders. Again the vicious circle closes,
because man will not withdraw from these needs (and worse - he would rather
create new ones) which means that he will not discharge the psychological
212 Zbigniew ZALESKI. Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI & Willy LENS

disturbances. The awareness of these interrelationships can threaten him.

Social and politi~. problems. Another set of problems concerns
demographic conflicts, large differences in economic standards, social status
differences, asocial behavior (e.g., criminality, delinquency), manipulation,
decline of morale, social alienation, disappearance of local folk culture, and
terrorism. Here we refer to problems that are the consequence of one person's
(or group's) attitude or behavior toward another.
Efforts to improve inter-national, -ethnic, -religion communication and
coexistence have produced much less positive change than desired. Social,
political, and ethnic tensions appear even greater than before-particularly
following the dissolution of the totalitarian Soviet Regime which used military
force to regulate such tensions. Also, the greater openness and scope of the
mass media have resulted in a larger proportion of the world being informed
of such tensions and conflicts than ever before.
Although We have not provided an exhaustive listing of world problems, we
contend that our taxonomy does indicate a relatively comprehensive and
representative survey. In fact, the list of problems used. in our research was
based pn a: pilot study of student responses to the question: "According to your
knowledge, based on your own experience and on your knowledge of
literature and mass media, what are the most important problems faced by
mankind?". A review of the responses revealed individual differences in which
problems were considered important. If we broaden the perspective from
individuals to national groups, it is plausible to assume that the perceptiou of
those problems can differ from one national group to another.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
HYPOTHESES

We formulated some general hypotheses between selected variables and the

respondents ratings of the solvability of these world problems (Le., whether
these world problems will improve or worsen in the future). The basic theme
in hypothesis formation is that cross-national perceptions of the importancy
and solvability of problems will reflect the current and past historical
processes in these nations. These hypotheses are:
HI - The perceived importance and solvability of world problems will be
related to the problem contents, e.g., there will be greater optimism in solving
Natural Dangers (e.g., fle>ods) than problems related to Industrial Technology
(e.g., pollution and ecological disasters).
ID - There will be . cross-national differences in perceived solvability of world
problems because of the differences between nations on such variables as level
of technology, level of science, philosophy of life, and wealth. Those who are
members of economically more adv,\nced societies have more to lose, which
might be linked to pessimism and a!1Xiety. They have reached a high level of
 IMPORTANCE OF AND OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM ...

life and can be more preoccupied with its maintaining. Respondents of those
nations characterized by more difficult social and economic conditions will be
more optimistic-in the sense that whatever changes, it can hardly become
worse than it is now. This rationale implies optimism and may serve as a
collective defence (adaptation) mechanism (cf. Weinstein, 1980).
H3.- The perceived SOlvability of world problems will be inversely related to
the perceived importance of those problem. The problems perceived as more
important will be rated as more difficult to solve.
H4 - Greater religiosity should be associated with greater perceived solvability
of world problems (i.e, greater optiInism). The reliance on Eternity may lead
to greater hope in solving the problems "unsolvable to humans".
lIS - Women will report lower perceived solvability of world problems (Le.,
greater pessimism). This prediction is based upon the general finding that
women show greater anxiety than men, which in turn is associated with
greater pessimism.

SUBJECTS

The subjects were university students in psychology and education from

seven countries: India (N=93), Ukraine (N=65), Poland (N=103), East
Germany (N=67), West Germany (N=150), Belgium (N=104) and USA
(N =282). The mean age of all subjects was 21.45.

ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT

A World Problem Questionnaire (WPQ) was developed. It consists of 32

different types of world pro!>lems encountered by humans. These world
problems were either contemporary or very likely to occur in the future (see
appendix). Each problem was given a label: 1. Nuclear war, 2. Demography,
3. Ecology, 4. Cancer, 5. Civilization diseases, 6. New diseases, 7. Natural
disasters, 8. Psychical diseases, 9. Prejudices, 10. Religious conflicts, 11.
Personal Alienation, 12. Unemployment, 13. Family crisis, 14. Drug
addiction, 15. Resources Exploitation, 16. Manipulation, 17. Alcoholism, 18.
Interpersonal contacts, 19. Poor-rich conflict, 20. Life standard differences,
21. Women's role, 22. FanIily crisis & delinquency, 23. Cultural-moral
deterioration, 24. ConforInism, 25. Ecological destruction, 26. Professional
diseases, 27. Folklore disappearance, 28. Nationalistic conflicts, 29. illiteracy,
30. AIDS, 31. Secularization, 32. Violence & terrorism.
The WPQ, originally in Polil;h, was doubly translated into target language that
is English, Dutch, German and Ukrainian. The cross-cultural compatibility
was rated as satisfactory.
214 Zbigniew ZALESKI, Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI & Willy LENS

PROCEDURE

Each subject rated the perceived importance of each problem on a 5-point

Likert type scale, with scale points ranging from: I .= not important at all to 5
= very important. Next, each subject provided a prediction of the degree to
which each problem will improve (i.e, be solved) or worsen within 50 years,
on a scale from -100 (it will be catastrophic; we consider such a rating
"pessimistic "), 0 - no change in comparison to present, and + 100 (complete
solution, in our terminology - "optimistic"). Subjects could place their
response at any point of the scale. In addition to the WPQ, the Germans,
Poles and Ukrainians assessed their commitment to religious faith on a 7-point
scale and answered (also the Belgian group) Zaleski's Future Anxiety Scale. In
India, the English version was used, because this was the standard language at
the university.
Subjects were university-educated and asked about commonly known and
understood phenomena. Therefore, we assume that, in general, the world
problem descriptions evoke similar connotations (cf. Leung, 1989). The data
were collected in 1990-91:

RESULTS

In our judgment, the 32 WPQ items representatively sample the domain of

world problems. In this preliminary study, we simplified the names of the
world problems in order to facilitate communication. We realize that these
problems are mnltidimensional and complex, and that our data are rich. More
sophisticated analyses of these data will be applied in future studies.
The first step in analysiS, is to show the importance of each world problem
for the full sample and then for each national group. This will provide an
indication of the perceived importance of different problems for different
national groups ..
Personal importance of problems. The results for the ratings of importance
given to each world problem by the full sample and by each national group are
in Table 1.
The MANOVA for 31. importance evaluations with 7 countries as the
independent variable. revealed a significant effect, (Wilks lanibda=.203,
F(I86.4443)= 7.40, p< .000).
The majority of world problems received meap. scores between 3 and 5
indicating the perception of these problems as important relative to the scale
anchors (1- not at all important, 5 - very important, see appendix), which
indirectly proves support for the Validity of our list of world problems. These
world problems do, in fact, refer to important issues.
 "'?i'>-~
IMPORTANCE OF AND OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM ... 215

Table 1. Problem importance in national groups.

West East
Mt Rank. Bet. Ger. Ger. Pol. Ukr. India USA F(6,864) P

1. Nucl. War M 3.90 4 3.59 3.80 4.23 3.87 3.88 4.22 4.31 10.81 .0000
sd 1.03 1.05 1.03 .97 .99 1.01 1.12 .88
2. Demography M 3.97 3 3.67 4.30 4.17 3.76 3.46 4.20 3.91 10.28 .0000
sd 1.01 0.94 0.99 0.92 1.13 1.26 1.01 .93
3. EcoLogy M 4.47 4.31 4.56 4.83 4.53 4.66 4.06 4.20 12.58 .0000
sd 0.78 0.87 0.84 0.58 0.67 0.69 1.03 .82
4. Cancer M 3.63 15 3.34 3.34 3.56 3.92 4.11 3.81 3.97 11.98 .0000
sd 1.06 1.06 1.14 1.09 1.00 1.06 1.20 .92
5. Civil dis. M 3.51 18 3.48 3.20 3.43 3.88 3.64 3.67 3.40 6.26 .0000
sd 1.98 1.07 1.08 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.16 1.02
6. New dis. M 3.64 14 3.36 3.54 3.53 3.86 4.05 3.64 3.54 4.21 .0000
sd 1.07 1.18 1.08 1.25 1.07 1.04 1.25 1.07
7. Natur. dis. M 2.99 32 2.75 2.64 2.87 3.13 3.30 3.57 2.98 9.22 .0000
sd 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.16 1.04 1.17 1.33 1.08
8. Psych. dis. M 3.65 13 3.46 3.45 3.75 3.94 3.67 3.82 3.08 13.21 .0000
sd 1.02 1.06 1.18 1.08 1.05 1.06 1.15 1.07
9. Prejudices M 3.81 7 3.81 4.05 4.30 3.62 3.22 3.68 4.23 15.03 .0000
sd 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.26 1.25 .87
10. Relig. conf.M 3.47 20 3.25 3.52 3.41 3.41 3.36 3.82 3.26 3.45 .0023
sd 1.14 1.17 1.14 1.12 1.16 1.26 1.36 1.16
11. Alienation M 3.12 29 3.27 3.00 3.07 3.19 2.70 3.42 2.56 10.70 .0000
sd 1.19 1.16 1.25 1.23 1.16 1.14 1.33 1.07
12. Un...,loy. M 3.31 26 3.32 3.10 3.52 3.34 3.08 3.66 3.56 4.88 .0001
sd 1.15 1.06 1.16 1.26 1.27 1.23 1.35 1.06
13. Family cris.M 3.74 9 3.85 3.20 3.84 4.15 3.80 3.95 3.84 8.92 .0000
sd 1.20 1.16 1.35 1.38 1.04 1.16 1.25 1. 11
14. Drug add. M 3.37 24 3.34 3.06 3.27 3.63 3.19 3.89 3.71 9.59 .0000
sd 1.20 1.05 1.36 1.35 1.07 1.26 1.34 1.00
15. Resour expo M 3.76 8 3.47 4.01 3.92 3.64 3.75 3.69 4.10 6.57 .0000
sd 1.10 1.12 1.15 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.37 1.00
16. Manipul. M 3.52 17 3.4-1 3.37 3.72 3.81 3.31 3.50 3.29 3.45 .0022
sd 1.15 1.17 1.25 1.25 1.05 1.23 1.17 1.13
17. Alcoholism M 3.15 28 2.77 2.67 3.07 3.77 3.47 3.54 3.02 14.57 .0000
sd 1.21 1.06 1.25 1.14 1.06 1.26 1.37 1. 11
18. Inter. cont.M 3.69 10 3.84 3.51 4.00 3.97 3.29 3.62 3.00 15.67 .0000
sd 1.12 1.04 1.26 1.26 .1.04 1.08 1.32 1.23
19. Poor-rich. M 3.85 6 3.95 4.26 4.21 3.58 3.38 3.41 3.81 12.82 .0000
sd 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.06 1.06 1.34 1.00
20. Stand. dif. M 3.62 16 3.52 3.85 3.89 3.36 3.54 3.49 3.66 3.48 .0021
sd 1.04 1.04 1.14 1.05 1.05 1.15 1.37 1.07
21. Women's roleM 3.44 22 3.03 2.77 3.67 3.94 4.08 3.87 3.61 20.62 .0000
sd 1.27 1.15 1.32 1.34 1.06 1.15 1.34 1.13
22. DeL inquen. M 3.66 12 3.28 3.29 3.84 4.09 3.83 4.01 3.71 9.96 .0000
sd 1.11 1.16 1.15 1.04 1.03 1.13 1.24 1.12
23. Moral dest. M 3.50 19 3.32 3.20 3.69 4.00 3.97 3.42 3.52 7.87 .0000
sd 1.16 1.27 1.24 1.04 1.06 1.04 1.33 1.08
24. Conformism M 3.46 21 3.39 3.18 3.47 3.77 3.55 3.61 3.27 3.75 .0011
sd 1.18 1.25 1.24 1.23 1.07 1.15 1.22 1.16
25. Ecol. dest .. M 4.31 2 4.25 4.46 4.63 4.11 4.42 4.06 4.17 5.69 .0000
sd 0.48 1.03 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.03 .94
26. Profes. dis.M 3.38 23 3.53 3.48 3.36 3.65 4.20 3.46 3.53 4.75 .0001
sd 1.11 1.06 1.17 1.15 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.05
27. Folk. disap .. M 3.01 31 2.65 2.49 2.90 3.15 3.70 3.72 2.73 19.03 .0000
sd 1.22 1.05 1.15 1.23 1.12 1.15 1.35 1.22
28. Natl. con. M3.67 11 3.36 3.70 3.90 3.67 3.45 3.92 3.62 3.53 .0019
sd 1.09 1.05 1.04 1.07 1.16 1.37 1.21 .98
29. III iteraey M 3.06 30 3.03 2.89 2.90 3.05 2.91 3.62 3.79 18.45 .0000
sd 1.16 1.17 1.26 1.25 1.07 1.23 1.25 1.03
30. AIDS M 3.89 5 3.75 3.68 3.90 4.10 4.29 3.90 4.11 5.12 .0000
sd 1.01 1.05 1.18 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.07 1.07
31. Secularize M 3.26 27 3.16 2.71 3.04 3.76 3.97 3.41 2.83 15.82 .0000
sd 1.27 1.27 1.33 1.25 1.07 1.14 1.32 1.31
32. Terrorism M 3.34 25 3.38 2.79 3.62 3.68 3.77 3.05 16.47 .0000
sd 1.08 1.08 1.17 1.03 1.05 1.02 1.12

Mt 3.57 3.44 3.40 3.65 3.72 3.68 3.73 3.55

.54 .52 .54 .54 .41 .49 .58 .54
216 Zbigniew ZALESKI, Zdzislaw'cHLEWINSKI & Willy LENS

The ANOVA showed some differences for importance related to problem

contents and country factor. For the full sample, the world problems rated as
most impor:tant were, respectively from the greatest perceived impor:tance,
Ecology (problem No 3, Mt=4.47, with the lowest sd=.78), Industrial
Pollution (25), Demographic Problems (3), Nuclear War (1), AIDS (30),
Poor- Rich Countries Conflict (19). The world problems perceived as least
important, respectively in order of greater importance were: Natural Disasters
(7, Mt=2.99), Disappearance of Folk Culture (27), Dliteracy (29), Social
Alienation (11), Alcoholism (17), and Secularization (Iaicization) of Life (31).
When making cross-national comparisons, we note which (if any) world
problems were given the highest overall perceived importance scores by each
national group. In comparison with other nations, none of the world problems
received the highest rank from Belgian subjects. The West Germans had the
highest ranks for the following problems: Demographic Problems (2),
Exploitation (15), and Poor-Rich Countries Conflict (19). The East Germans
scored at the highest in Nuclear War (1), Ecology (3), Prejudice (9),
Interpersonal Contacts (18), Life Standard Differences (20), and Ecological
Disaster (25). The PoleS' regarded as the most important: Civilization Diseases
(5), Psychical Diseases (8), Family Crises (13), ManipUlation (16), Alcoholism
(17), Delinquency (22), Cultural Deterioration (23) and Confurmism (24).
Ukrainians gave the highest importance to Cancer (4), New Diseases (6),
Women's Roles (21), Professional Diseases (26), AIDS (30), Secularization
(31); and Terrorism (32). The India subjects had the highest impor:tance scores
in Natural Disasters (7), Religious Conflicts (10), Alienation (11),
Unemployment (12), Drug Addiction (14), Folklore Disappearance (17),
Nationalistic Conflicts (28), and D1iteracy (29). It is apparent that the ranking
reflects the relevance of these problems in each nations past and recent history
- e.g., the Ukrainians, who have recently experienced the nuclear disaster of
Chemobyl, report the highest importance for Cancer, and New Diseases. For
Americans the most impor:tant were Nuclear War (1), Prejudices (9), Ecology
(3) - and the least important Were Personal' Alienation (11), Secularization
(31), and Natural Disasters (7).

PREDICTION OF PROBLEM SOLUTIONS

The zero score on the measure scale is used as a criterion to differentiate

"pessimism'" from "optimism". Our conceptualization of optimism-pessimism
is similar to that of Dember et al. (1989) who state: "Optimism/pessimism as
popularly viewed, might be described as a psychological dimension in which
optimism, at one pole, represents a bias in perceptions and expectations in
favor of the positive featuj'es of life, and pessimism, at the other pole,
represents a negative bias" (p. 102). Pessimism would be interpreted as low
and optimism as high expectancy of a positive outcome. Thus, on our
measurement scale a negative score indicates pessimism, while a positive score
indicates optimism.
 IMPORTANCE OF AND OPTIMISMPESSIMISM ... 217

The MANOVA for 32 solvability predictions with 7 countries as the

independent variable revealed a significant effect (Wilks lambda= .22,
F(I86.'982)= 6,20, p< .(00). For the full sample, the general tendency in
predictions of solvability of world problems is rather pessimistic (26
judgements out of 32, with the total mean Mt=-6.54).
The following ONEWAY analyses for each problem showed the means for
optimism and pessimism. Table 2 lists the means and SDs of the solvability
ratings for each problem in a 50-year time span. First we present the content,
then the inter-nation comparison.
The content comparison. The most pessimistic judgment is accorded to
Ecology (Problem 3), its mean being (Mt=-27.01) placed further from the
neutral point than the most optimistic prediction (Illiteracy; Problem 29) with a
mean of Mt=17.36. Thus, the range of solvability spans 50.80 points on the
scale. In total, 7 problems received positive predictions and 25. received
negative predictions. The ratings of solvability for world problems are
characterized by relatively large SDs. The lowest sd (34.7) is obtained for
Terrorism (32), whereas the highest sd (52.7), for AIDS (30). This variability
in perceived solvability indicates relatively strong individual differences in
subjective predictions.

Table 2. Mean predictions for problem solution in national groups.

Total Rank B WG EG Pl U IN USA F P

1. M 6.26 3 4.53 17.00 18.43 9.10 22.57 61-65 14.33 37.60 .0000
sd 51-25 37.47 42.81 47.44 45.80 48.55 39.09 48.27
2. M 19.3228 23.23 43.13 31.82 13.10 9.41 17.85 11.23 12.95 .0000
sd 52.53 35.45 46.43 46.69 . 48.85 51.06 69.73 43.03
3. M 27.01 32 31.55 36.51 43.64 23.77 29.56 17.58 7.28 9.50 .0000
sd 51.34 38.42 50.37 52.28 47.53 50.09 65.54 46.50
4. M 9.68 2 15.93 2.88 16.36 9.50 12.03 9.10 24.55 11.96 .0000
sd 48.77 34.29 44.79 43.46 47.10 50.35 64.15 46.07
5. M 7.80 18 17.35 16.64 17.58 5.75 -3.09 13.57 3.40 7.10 .0000
sd 40.56 23.29 34.09 39.09 41.25 46.69 57.02 39.46
6. M 16.73 26 14.75 26.79 28.49 21.97 24.42 7.42 8.33 5.96 .0000
sd 41-28 24.47 35.76 32.17 36.83 39.47 66.64 41-37
7. M 4.99 4 6.15 0.69 10.45 11-17 16.08 5.44 5.32 3.72 .01
sd 39.23 21.77 25.63 37.07 30.25 42.05 68.02 31.67
8. M 13.60 24 12.74 31.56 28.04 16.74 8.83 15.80 3.87 19.72 .0000
sd 38.66 22.07 34.86 33.27 37.04 40.66 54.28 31-06
9. M 0.19 8 5.99 9.85 13.85 10.80 24.26 2.68 3.96 6.82 .0000
sd 48.38 35.37 48.57 48.54 34.44 41.27 66.19 44.39
10. M 3.86 11 1.27 15.13 6.67 7.82 23.52 18.14 0.85 9.93 .0000
sd 46.08 34.38 41-04 37.65 38.46 46.97 63.34 38.20
 ~"'~-?~
218 Zbigniew ZALESKI. Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI & Willy LENS

Total Rank B WG EG Pl U IN USA F P

11. M -8.1419 -14.66 -11.72 -10.4! -4.25 18.58 -16.64 0.11 7.11 .0000
sd 45.28 33.75 41.49 40.77 45.39 44.04 58.36 37.05
12. M '7.50 16 -2.26 '6.70 -15.31 0.10 12.38 '14.31 '13.20 4.35 .0002
sd 46.77 37.86 40.48 39.25 47.97 43.71 64.83
13. M 6.88 15 -13.21 -6.12 0.90 11.10 11.17 8.94 7.53 2.84 .009
sd 44.39 32.72 39.95 45.67 41.18 43.07 60.24 43.02
14. M '8.95 21 -6.67 -10.44 6.22 1.17 5.00 -24.43 -3.01 3.95 .0007
sd 43.17 26.03 37.64 43.35 34.93 44.92 63.71 41.56
15. M '23.08 30 '21.05 -34.63 -37.39 '27.23 6.18 '28.90 6.11 4.60 .0001
sd 51.98 41.72 52.55 47.36 48.84 55.36 60.54 47.58
16. M -9.09 22 10.40 20.07 -25.76 -17.33 3.38 9.57 '6.95 8.23 .0000
sd 45.07 28.97 38.06 43.74 43.74 44.75 60.91 40.03
17. M 4.00 6 4.00 '3.06 '4.17 -4.50 1.73 '28.09 '0.60 8.77 .0000
sd 37.59 22.17 28.87 27.24 33.14 40.30 58.55 34.42
18. M '16.9327 -23.04 '25.44 '38.11 '19.00 3.88 -18.57 -4.86 12.39 .0000
sd 42.17 29.47 34.87 35.54 41.36 43.50 59.38 35.33
19. M 16.40 25 15.54 39.91 34.25 2.46 14.26 1.50 15.50 18.67 .0000
sd 48.58 36.38 43.34 46.35 37.36 42.69 61.75 41.12
20. M '19.67 29 '13.28 '32.73 '28.31 '13.44 '2.18 '18.44 '18.64 6.36 .0000
sd 42.17 23.55 38.46 38.12 37.96 44.16 59.14 38.07,
21. M '5.1013 5.15 7.17 2.34 -6.47 9.70 '52.02 -2.04 28.79 .0000
sd 42.86 26.74 42.16 36.95 37.63 45.76 32.56 40.81
22. M '11.26 23 -4.23 '13.47 -17.43 -13.53 1.74 '5.54 '8.01 2.02 .059
sd 39.14 21.90 35.95 34.54 37.37 38.82 58.44 40.46
23. M -8.86 20 -6.33 '8.48 '14.07 -9.50 3.29 '12.03 '7.20 0.64 .70
sd 40.77 29.07 40.68 37.54 39.86 39.61 53.83 36.84
24.M -4.89 12 -5.83 -6.18 '10.46 -0.60 4.55 '9.20 '1.75 1.53 .16
sd 41.47 31.06 37.05 37.53 39.05 40.54 59.93' 33.18
25. M '26.1031 '28.49 -41.04 '50.00 '14.76 -18.99 '17.72 '17.30 9.64 .0000
sd 47.25 35.72 45.04 34.46 44.47 48.31 60.65 44.10
26. M 0.27 9 7.18 '3.21 9.54 10.30 '4.71 '18.86 5.92 6.18 .0000
sd 43.37 30.56 42.54 40.46 39.54 45.73 54.52 40.68
27. M '7.76 17 4.00 11.42 2.72 -18.30 4.92 '20.17 -7.15 5.78 .0000
sd 45.08 33.82 35.58 36.10 44.68 50.34 62.75 36.04
28. M 2.72 7 5.81 1.80 3.78 12.40 23.52 '19.41 0.00 8.01 .0000
sd 46.65 29.93 42.55 41.05 41.44 46.94 64.67 39.13
29. M 17.36 28.08 17.22 19.39 28.92 19.70 9.05 9.45 4.46 .0002
sd 43.26 34.57 41.74 36.25 37.47 40.74 60.59 43.43
30. M 4.61 5 7.11 10.31 7.34 15.84 -12.73 '15.43 8.39 4.78 .0001
sd 52.76 47.16 48.77 43.35 52.49 52.57 64.15 55.86
31. M '1.95 10 '11.44 '10.13 4.84 0.29 29.71 '8.11 1.47 9.63 .0000
sd 44.16 30.96 39.16 34.25 43.92 41.60 59.15 37.08
32. M -6.29 14 -11.76 -1.89 -14.40 -6.97 0.57 1.25 4.09 .0011
sd 34.73 22.42 37.58 30.61 35.74 42.77 33.95
Mt -6.54 -6.47 -12.39 -11.85 -4.13 3.ro -16.50 -2.48
sd 21.48 10.92 16.56 16.41 18.55 24.12 33.49 22.25
 IMPORTANCE OF AND OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM ... 219

For each subject a transsituational index of pessimism-optimism was

calculated based on the mean for the 32 problems. Using these means, a tuta!
mean was calculated for the whole sample giving M,..=-6.54. Additionally the
median and mode were calculated in the same way (Me=-6.l2; Mo=-6.75).
The three values are very close, indicating a symmetric response distribution.
For the full sample, subjects were most optimistic concerning the solvability
of such problems as Illiteracy (29), Natural Disasters (7), AIDS (30),
Nationalistic Wars (28), Cancer (4), and Nuclear War (1). For all other
problems the means were on the pessimistic side of the scale. Respondents
were most pessimistic about the solvability of the following problems (in order
of increasing solvability): Ecology (3), Industrial Pollution (25), Exploitation
of Natural Resources (15), Demographic Problems (2), Deterioration of
Interpersonal Contacts (18), and New Diseases (6). Thus, Ecology and Human
Relationships were perceived as the least solvable (i.e., most likely to worsen
over the next fifty years).
Inter-nation comparison. The analyses revealed strong main effects of
Nation in most of the problems. The inspection of the means in table 2 clearly
shows the predictions for each problem. Some characteristic and more extreme
predictions for the nations will be highlighted.
The India subjects were the most pessimistic, followed by both German
samples. Somewhat less pessimistic were Belgians, Poles and Americans. The
Ukrainians took more neutral position with a slight tendency towards
optimism.
The India respondents were extremely pessimistic in predicting the solution
of problem 1 (Nuclear War) and 21 (Women's Role) and were also
considerably pessimistic with regard to problem 14 (Drug Addiction), 15
(Exploitation of Natural Resources), 17 (Alcoholism), and 27 (Folklore
Disappearance). They expressed some pessimistic foresight in problems 10 and
28 (Religious and Nationalistic Conflicts), 18 (Impoverishment of
Interpersonal Contacts), and 20 (Life Standard Differences). In sum, their
pessimism is mostly directed towards nuclear menace and social issues.
The pessimism in German samples emerged in response to such problems as
ecological destruction and resource exploitation (25, 3, & 15), demographic
tensions and inequality of life conditions (2, 19, & 20), new and psychological
diseases (6 & 8), and social relationships (16 & 18). In sum, the pessimism of
the German samples centered upon issues of ecological disaster, health
disorders and social relationships. The Belgians mostly feared the deterioration
of ecological issues (3, 15, & 25), demographic tensions (2) and interpersonal
contacts (18). Similarly, Poles shared their pessimism regarding ecology and
interpersonal contacts, and additionally were pessimistic about the new
diseases (6). The USA respondents showed less variation among problems and
their pessimism was related to demographic issues and differences between
poor and rich nations (20, 19, & 2), and somewhat to ecology (3).
220 Zbigniew ZALESKI, Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI & Willy LENS

The strongest inter-nation differences were related to nuclear menace

(problem 1), psychological disorders (8), and women's role (21), whereas the
smallest differences resided in moral deterioration (23), conformity (24), and
family crisis (13). Each group expressed a rather consensual pessimism
regarding ecology and social issues. Other comparisons across nations and
problems allow the reader to elaborate on an image of positive and negative
attitodes in this future forecasting.
In looking at rather positive predictions of Americans, Belgians and Germans
for finding remedies for diseases (problem 4, 26, & 30) and also for nuclear
war (1), they could be described as nations trusting high technology. Scientific
endeavors and technological advancements may supply an effective treatment
to these menaces. Much more difficult to deal with are the social problems,
despite well developed social sciences. This result, however, may be partly
due to the student sample (social sciences) in this study.
Relationships between importance and predicting solution. Following our
hypothesis of the inverse relationship between solution prediction and
importance correlations were calculated for each of the 32 world problems
(table 3). The coefficients range from -.12 to -.46, all significant, except for
secularization. The rank correlation for 32 items gave rho=-40.

Table 3. Correlations between importance and prediction.

1. '.121 9. -.305 17. 280 25 . - .360

2. -.404 10. -.390 18. -.435 26. - .291
3. -.291 11. -.482 19. -.433 27. -.191
4 -.250 12. - .401 20. -.506 28. -.404
5. -.213 13. - .281 21. -.203 29. .190
6. -.440 14. - .197 22. -.290 30. -.270
7. -.180 15. - .400 23. -.321 31. - .100
8. -.341 16. -.460 24. -.380 32. -.272

r(.05)=.11 r(.01)=.125 r(.OOl)=.l75

The hypothesis received strong support, though the causal direction is not
obvious. We return to this issue in the discussion.
Religion. An additional aspect of the analysis deals with the relationships
between religious commitment (self-report from 1 = very religious to 7 =
convinced atheist, see appendix) and the optimistic prediction of solvability of
world problems. The analysis included Ss from Germany, Poland and Ukraine
(the IN and B groups were not given this item). Se were divided into two sub-
groups: religious - (scores 1 to 3) and nonreligious (scores 4 to 7), all the
national samples being similarly represented in both extreme groups. Then the
means in predictions were compared for each problem. The results are in
table 4.
 ,~~;~.:
IMPORTANCE OF AND OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM ... 221

Table 4. Predictions in religious and nonreligious groups.

ReLigious (N=202) Nonrel igious (N=125)
M sd M sd t

1. NucLear war 18.36 44.8 13.26 46.0 0.98

2. Demography -10.35 53.2 -42.00 44.1 5.85***
3. Ecology -28.18 48.5 -38.26 51.8 1.80
4. Cancer 0.83 46.4 1.35 46.0 0.10
5. Civilz. diseases -10.00 42.6 -11.60 36.4 0.34
6. New diseases -24.60 38.7 -25.30 32.7 0.18
7. Natural disasters 9.61 33.0 5.00 32.0 1.30
8. Psychical diseases -19.00 39.0 -27.00 33.0 2.00*
9. Prejudices 11.03 42.2 -8.00 45.1 3.91***
10. Rellgious conflicts 10.30 42.0 -15.50 38.0 5.70***
11. Personal alienation 0.00 46.2 -8.00 40.7 1.47
12. Un~loyment 2.00 44 . 5 -10.50 42.7 2.43*
13. Farni Ly crisis -3.00 44.0 -3.60 39.0 0.07
14. Drug addiction -3.00 39.2 -9.00 36.0 1.34
15. Resources exploitation -24.00 53.3 -36.40 49.0 2.16*
16. Manipulation -11.40 41.5 -21.00 41.0 2.00*
17. Conseq. of alcoholism -1.00 35.0 -6.00 28.1 1.41
18. Interpers. contacts -14.70 43.0 -27.60 35.1 2.96**
19. Poor-rich conflict -4.00 45.0 -42.70 40.0 8.03***
20. Life standard differ. -13.00 40.1 -34.00 37.0 4.n***
21. \.lamen1s role 2.00 39.1 7.40 41.7 1.24
22. Farni Ly crh. & del inq. -8.78 39.1 -15.90 33.0 1.79
23. Cultur. &moral deter. -10.70 40.0 -6.00 39.5 0.96
24. Conformism 0.20 39.0 -5.00 36.2 1.25
25. Ecological destruction -13.00 47.0 -40.80 42.2 3.57***
26. Professio. diseases 7.00 40.2 -3.80 46.0 2.14*
27. Folklore disappearance -6.50 44.0 -9.70 38.0 0.67
28. NationaL confLicts -13.70 41.5 2.00 43.5 2.53*
29. Illiteracy 26.20 38.0 16.24 34.2 2.43*
30. AIOS 5.20 51.0 11.10 47.4 1.05
31. Secularization 6.40 46.4 -1.00 35.0 1. 75
32. Violence & terrorism 4.70 37.0 -6.40 35.2 0.42

* p<.OS, ** p<.01, *** p<.OO1

The Differences are in the predicted direction and siatistically significant for
the following problems: Demography, Psychic Disorders, Prejudice, Religious
Conflicts, Unemployment, Exploitation of Natural Resources, Human
Manipulation, Lack of Interpersonal Contacts, Poor-Rich Countries Conflicts,
Economical Status, Industrial Pollution, Nationalistic Conflicts, and Illiteracy.
For only four problems (4, 21, 23, and 30) the differences are opposite to our
prediction but not significant. Thus, in one third of the discussed problems the
differences are significant. These data partly support the hypothesis that
religious people are more optimistic regarding the solution of world problems.
I! is worthy to note that these two groups do not differ (p = .08) in problem 31
(Secularization) .
The scrutiny of the means leads to a general conclusion that the religious
people are more optimistic. They exhibit either more optimism or less
pessimism relatively to the general mean.
Gender differences. The ANOVA with the sex as independent factor
revealed significant differences in 10 problems, showing the greater pessimism
in women than men. In problem 1 (Nuclear War) the F ratio was F=16.43,
p< .001), in problem 12 (Unemployment) F=7.2S, p< .001, in problem 3
222 Zbigniew ZALESKI, Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI & Willy LENS

(Resources Exploitation), 23 (Moral Deterioration), 25 (Ecological

Destruction), 26 (Professional diseases) and 32 (Terrorism) the F ratios were
significant at .05 level. Even though the gender effect is not very strong it
supports to some extent the assumed direction of greater pessimism in women.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Several hypotheses were confirmed. There are significant differences among
problem contents and countries. The predictions of more important problems
are more pessimistic. Religious people tend to be more optimistic. Women are
rather more pessimistic than men.
Behind these results there are undoubtedly deeper psychological processes.
People make their judgements of the future on the basis of their present
experiences and accumulated knowledge of the world. The generalized
expectations and SUbjective meanings elaborated throughout the life course can
influence these predictions (cf. Rotter, 1966).
Negative information seems to evoke more threat to the status quo than the
positive information instigates hope. This is similar to what Peeters (1971)
calls the negativity effect
The negative relationship between the importance and solvability of these
problems is similar to observations gathered by psychologists of decision
making and utility models. The less probable events are usually evaluated
more highly on the utility scale. On the other hand, the important problems
can be interpreted to mean that the situation has deteriorated to a state in
which its improvement will not be easy. Thus the prediction of its solvability
will be lower. The causal direction is not obvious and needs further
clarification.
The general pessimism found in this study rises some questions. All
subjects were young and just starting their independent life. This start happens
often in affluent conditions, which lowers the threshold of frustration. They
receive more than they attain by themselves. Their need satisfaction comes not
from their individual efforts, but rather from the developed society in which
they live. They can oniy fear to lose what they have. The life of an individual
in the civilized societies has become more secure, easy, comfortable, due to
education, medicine, housing, travelling; communication and institutions of
security, e.g., protection of personal rights.
Yet the future is viewed with pessimism in spite of many excellent
achievements in civilized society of the XX century, particularly in technology
and science. The pollyanna principle does not apply to these attitudes (Matlin
and Stang, 1978).
We could refer to the Polish press at the end of the XIX century, where
many known thinkers (e.g., writers) expressed their prediction regarding the
oncoming XX century. Leaving out the detailed predictions (e.g., man
reaching the moon), they believed very heartily that science would improve
 IMPORTANCE OF AND OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM ... 223

human life, the social world and that many human problems would be solved.
It appears, however, that 90 years later the sciences made enormous progress,
but together with this progress, the range and severity of world problems have
considerably increased. Our subjects support this notion in their judgments.
There can be a matter of a partial artifact related to the general pessimism
resulting from the questionnaire itself, stressing the problems (negative by
their nature) and not the future achievements. What if the questionnaire sounds
positive rather than negative? (This led the authors to refonnulate the items in such a
way that there is expressed hope in possible solution to each problem. The data are being
collected by using the "positively" sounding questionnaire).
The cross-national comparisons revealed a relative optimism in Ukrainians.
The sudden, unexpected lifting of a totalitarian regime from Ukraine might
account for this optimism. Whatever now changes in the Ukraine, it can only
be for the better.
We would like to formulate the following general interpretation of our
findings, pointing at a kind of a paradox. It is possible that in a given period
of time, despite the high life standards, a general atmosphere of
disappointment and depression emerges, when everybody (or most of us)
complain about. the status quo and the youth learns it. In such an atmosphere,
they adopt these negative attitudes and through generalization people extend
their fear. This suggestion would refer rather to the most advanced countries.
In contrast, an atmosphere of "spring of democracy" in Ukraine may evoke
the optimism effect. If the former totalitarian regime could be overcome - then
any world problem can be overcome (unrealistic optimism, Weinstein, 1980).
The young people are achievement oriented and optimistic concerning their
personal goals, potential losses and gains in their lives (e.g., Heckhausen,
Dixon, & Baltes, 1989), whereas when facing global matters they report rather
pessimistic attitudes. On one side the young participate in usage of all the
goods of civilization and would not like to lose them. Yet, they also know
about world negative events from the mass media (e.g., massacre in Peking,
war in Kuwait, terroristic attacks). In effect, they fear that many matters
included in the World Problems Questionnaire may get uO satisfactory
solution. Whatever the explanation, the problem of pessimism at this age is
open and stimulating to reflection and interdisciplinary discussion.
Complex reality demands multifactorial interpretations. Our interpretation is
limited but this report may 'evoke reflection on many spheres of human
existence that are considered important. The replication of this study after 50
years could verify the present predictions .

... Acknowledgments: Our thanks to Jerome Tobacyk for improving English language.
The fust author wants to thank the DAAD for partial support in collecting the data in
Gennany and the Fulbright Foundation for supporting his research in USA.

E-MAIL ZZALESKI@PLUMCSll.BITNET
 224 Zbigniew ZALESKI, Zdzislaw CHLEWINSKI & Willy LENS

REFERENCES
Allport G. (1954). The nature ofprejudice. New York: Doubleday.
Aronson E. (1980). The social animal. San Francisco, Freeman
Atkinson J. (1964). An introduction to motivation. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.
Boniecld G. (1977). Is man interested in his future? International Journal of
Psychology, 12,59-64. I
)IoDember W., Martin S., Hummer M., Howe S., Melton R. (1989). The measurement
of optimism and pessimism. Current Psychology: Research and Reviews, 8, 102-
119.
Hang F., & Hauser K. (Eds)(1991). Die andere Angst. Berlin: Argument.
Heckhausen J., Dixon R., & Baltes P. (1989). Gains and losses in development
throughout adulthood as perceived by different adult age groups. Developmental
Psychology, 25, 109-121.
Leung K. (1989). On empirical identification of dimensions for cross-cultural
comparison. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 20, 133-151.
Matlin M., & Stang D. (1978). The Pollyanna principle. Cambridge MA.: Schenken
Nowak S. (1988). Polish society in the second half of the 1980's: An attempt to
diagnose the state ofpublic consciousness. Princeton NJ.: IREX.
Peeters G. (1971). The positive-negative asymmetry: On cognitive consistency and
positivity bias. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 455-474.
Rotter 1. (1954). Social learning and clinical psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Rotter J. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80, 1-28, (Whole No. 609).
Weinstein N. (1980). Unrealisitc optimism about future life events. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 806-820.
 IMPORTAMeE OF AND OPTIMISM-PES.SIMISM ... 225

Appendix:
WORLD PROBLEMS QUESTIONNQIRE
.' Instruction
This questionnaire comprises statements concerning the contemporary problems of
mankind. Read each of them.
Part I. On the answer sheet, please mark the degree of importance you attach to
each statement by crossing a number from 1 to 5 ; eg., if a given problem is very
important to you mark 5; if it does not concern you 'at all mark 1. You can use any
number between 1 and 5 that corresponds to your opinion:
1 - completely unimportant, 2 - unimportant, 3 - neutral, 4 - important, 5 - very important
Part II. Apart from marking the importance, please mark the. degree of change in
each problem that you consider likely to take place within the next fifty years:
Deterioration Improvement
-100% -50% 0% 50% 100%

If you think that"; issue introduced by a given statement is not at all likely to
change, please put your cross in the position 0 %. If in your opinion, however, the
problem will diminish, (improvement), put your cross somewhere between 0% and
100% according to the degree of expected improvement. You can use the whole length
of the line and put the cross in the place that corresponds to your opinion; eg., if an
issue is solved altogether, cross 100%, if the improvement is only inconspicuous -
cross around 10% or 20%.
If you expect an issue to be deteriorating within next fifty years place your cross on
the scale between -100% and 0%; if the deterioration is not significant, mark around
-10%; if it poses a greater threat to humanity than today - mark around -50%; if an
issue assumes catastrophic proportions - cross -100%.

World Problems
1. Nuclear war, brought about either accidentally or deliberately threatens humanity
and may lead to its ,annihilation.
2. The "populatiQ;n explosion" may cause severe shprtages of food, water, and other
basic necessities. As a result, many people would die.

3. The growth of industry. and the use of variojls chemicals kill plants and animals and
poison the soil, threatening human health and life.
4. Cancer is becoming more and more dangerous to mankind. It can lead to many
deaths.
5. The stress of a modem life style brings about many diseases such as ulcers,
sclerosis and hypertension, posing a threat to human health and life.
6. The development of industry, pollution, the high pace of modern life and living
conditions may cause new, unknown diseases that will pose a serious threat to
humanity.
7. Natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcani,q- eruptions 'prove-' impossible to
control and pose a serious threat to people. -~

8. A lack of personal safety, different kinds of life stresses, neglecting psychological

hygiene causes more and more mental dise~es, e.g., depressions, neuroses,
schizophrenia, etc.
 226 Zbigniew ZALESKI, Zdzislaw CIILIlWINSKI & Wdly LENS

9. Hatred between different races grows, and ide.as of racial superiority continue. This
leads to persecution or even to overt aggression and attempts at extermination.
10. Animosity between various religions, each thinking of itself as superior and having
a monopoly on truth, grows. This leads to conflicts or even to religious wars.

11. Science and computerization make people feel redundant and alienated, which may
affect their mental health.
12. New technologies and. - computers eliminate human labor, which leads to
unemployment and the impoverishment of many families.
13 . The importance of the family decreases and its functions are taken over by various
institutions, such as day-care centers and schools. The b!iSic needs of children are
therefore not met, which results in disorders in emotional development and delinquent
. attitudes.
14. Drug addiction may become pervasive and lead to the moral and biological decline
of humanity.
15. The continuous exploitation of the Earth's energy resources leads to their complete
exhaustion.
16. The mass media are used to manipulate and ideologically indoctrinate people by
imposing certain schemes of thinking and behavior. This results in external control as
well as in the loss of one's own opinion, autonomy, self determination, and freedom.
17. Ever-increasing consumption of alcohol threatens to lead. to a degeneration of
people's personalities and to their biological devastation.
18. Large urban environments impoverish or even de'stroy interpersonal relations.
People lose interest in one another and feel10st and lonely. This has negative effects
on their mind and mental health.
19. The gap between the high standard of living in the developed world and the low
standard of living in the undeveloped world broadens. Aid to the undeveloped countries
does not solve their problems and, instead of leading to their self determination, leads
to their political and economic dependence upon the developed countries.
20. Social inequality between the rich Oiving in luxury) and poor (who canuot support
themselves) continues. This causes antagonism, hatred and jealousy.
21. Working women, often tired from work, have less and less time for themselves and
their families. They cannot properly perform their role as mothers and wives. This has
a negative impact on family life (children and/or husband's alienation) and leads to
family arguments and conflicts.
22. The preoccupation with the acquisition of material wealth makes it irupossible for
parents to spend enough time with their children. As a result children turn to
underworld gangs, alcohol, drugs and/or delinquency.
23. The increasing pace of life and the preoccupation with the acquisition of material
wealth. cause people to devote less and less time for developing the higher intellectual
and moral values. As the result, the cultural and moral level of the society will
decrease.

24. Modern life's pressure to conform with others leads to the destruction of
individuality in thinking and action and to the loss of self identity and responsibility.
 ~'-,
227

25. The rapid pace of industrial development, coupled with the lack of sufficient
ecological protection, leads to the destruction of the environment. Steps and deserts
will appear and air and water will be polluted.
26, Insufficient hygiene and work conditions in certain work places (connected with
radioactivity, chemicals) cause the occupational diseases. The health, and even life, of
the employees and of their children is seriously endangered.
27. Because of the comfortable and cosmopolitan nature of cities, village inhabitants
migrate there. This leads to the disappearance of rural culture and folklore.
28. Nationalism, national hatred, and national competition lead to misunderstandings,
aggression, and wars. .

29. The unresolved, but rather increasing, is the problem of illiteracy, which brings the
danger of a considerable decrease of intellectual level of the society.
30. The quickly spreading disease AIDS, which destroys the human iInmune system,
leads to the extinction of humanity.
31. The development of secular philosophies leads to a decline of religion. People
follow its principles less and less in their world perception and conduct. This may lead
to immoral behavior and conduct not respecting the higher (divine) values.
32. The rapidly increasing terrorist violence leads to feelings of gre'at insecurity, fear,
and threat to one's life.
Please check if you have answered all the questions. Thank you for your cooperation.
 228 ZbignicwZALIlSKI;ZdzWaw CHLllWIl'iSKI & WilljI LENS

WORLD PROBLEMS: ANSWER SHEET

Age... ,. Sex..... Occupation ............................. .

Personal importance
ofproblcm
li~ f! Subjective expectation

I.
Ii '
12345
2,12345
3.12345 -100--+--+--+--+--+--""--+--+--+--100
4.12345 -100--+--.- + - - + - - + - - + - - + - - + - - + - - + - - 1 0 0
5.12345 -100--+--+-+-+ ~+--~i----+--+--+---loo
6.12345 -100----+--+--+-+---+--+--+--+-+-100
7. 1 2 3 4 5 ,-~OO-+-+--+--+--+-+--+--+--+---Ioo
8. 123 45 ~100--+ I + , +~-+--+-+---Ioo
9. I 2 3 4 5 -100--+--+--+--+-+--+---+-+--+---100
10. 1 2 3 4 5 -100---+--+-+-+--+--+-+ + +--100

11.12345 -100--+ -t +--+--+--+--+--+--+--100

12.12345 -100-+--+----+--+--+--+--+--+--+--100
.......
13.12345 -100- + I +-+-+--+---+--+-+--100 .............
14. 1 2 3 4 5 -100-+-+--+-+--+ + + + + 100
15. I 2 3 4 5 -100-+--+--+--+--+--+-+--+--+--100
16. I 2 3 4 5 -100-+--+---+ J +-+--+--.-+--+--100
17. I 2 3 4 5 -IOO-+--+-+--+-+ +--+--+--100
18. I 2 3 4 5 -100----+--+-+ + +-+---+--100
19. I 2 3 4 5 -100-+--+--+----+--+-+ + + +--100
20.12345 -100---+--+--+--+----+--+--+'-----'"--+--100

21. I 2 3 4 5 -100-+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+--+--100
22.12345 -100--+-+--+--+-+-+--+--+--+--100
23.12345 -100-+--+--+--+--+---+--+----+--+--100
24.12345 -100-+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--100
25.12345 -IOO-+---+--+--+--+--+--+~+--+--Ioo
26.12345 -100--+ +--+-+ +--+--+---100
27. I 2 3 4 5 -100-+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+---100
28.12345 -100-+ I +--+--+--+----+---+--+---100
29.12345 -100-+--+--+---+--+--+--+--+--+--100
30.12345 -100-+-+--+-+--+--+--+---+--+---100

31. I 2 3 4 5 -100--+---+---+--+--+--+--+--+-+---100
32.12345 -100-+---+---+--+--+--+---+----+---+--100

please describe your attitudc1commitment to religious faith by circling one of the statement.c:; best characterizing you.
1. strongly believing
2. believing
3. doubting, but inclined toward the faith
4. doubting. but not inclined in a ny dired'ion
5. doubting, but inclined IOwan! disbelief
6. nonbelicving
7.definitely nonbelieving
THE PRAGMATICS OF FUfURE ORIENTATION:
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Zbigniew ZALESKI
Department of Psychology
Catholic University of Lublin
Lublin, P\lland

In this last chapter, I will leave aside the summarizing of previous chapters arid
rather develop some suggestions both of the theoretical and pragmatical type. The
book consists of a partial analysis of psychOlogical future. Without any alchemist
of Dr. Faust type, the authors have . penetraled the elusive topic of time
perspective using the available vocabulary of terminology and measurement.
Living in and for the future, making it realistic via personal goals is our destiny.
Without any false ideology of a full control of the future, humans should be
involved in preparing their own as well as the future of oncoming generations.
For instance we should use the earth's resources in such a way that there will
be something left for our children; the non-exploited, nonpolluted earth is the
biggest treasure we can leave for them (Hardin, 1968; Stem, 1978). This
obligation does not impose a harness on our activity of expanding ourselves and
striving for higher standards. In our strivings we dispose of a considerable degree
of freedom, and the developing cumulative technical and spiritual culture offer
new patterns and goals tu pursue. Nevertheless, the obligation should match our
responsibility for actions in striving for higher standards.
Therefore, if we wish to develop ourselves Iully, a major conditions in
achieving this aim is tu elaborate FfP and realize with full responsibility, clearly
set constructive goals (Zaleski, 1991). I refer to all sorts of human activity,
personal growth, social interaction, behavioral change, industrial productivity etc.
History supports us with examples of the effective application of future
orientation in real life. Alexander Machonochie, a reformer of the Crown penalty
system in Australia, argued for a new prison discipline, based on incentives and
clear future goals. He persuaded the State Committee to consider his ideas in
their bill. "It would be advisable", the report noted, "to ascertain by experiment, the
effect of establishing a system of reward and punishment not founded merely upon the
230 Zbigniew ZALESKI

prospect of immediate pain or immediate gratification, but [on) . the hope of obtaining or
the fear of losing future and distant advantages .. The greatobject of a good system for
the government of convicts should be that of teaching them to look forward to the future
and remote effects of their own conduct, and to be guided in their actions by their reason,
instead of merely by their animal instincts and desires" (State Committee 1837-38, (ii),
Report, p. Xliv; after Hughes, 1988, p. 498) . Machonochie's ideas were tested
on Norfolk Island, off the Coast of Australia, between 1840-1844.
Also at present times, these wise ideas are very viable guidelines in crisis
situations, and in critical moments of world political tension, such as, the
democratic changes which are happening in Eastern Europe. Acceptance of the
substantial costs and sacrifices by citizens is more likely if it is anchored in hope
for future advantages.
This thinking could be included to some greater extent in the education system
of young people. We can ask whether people think of and imagine the changes
they will experience during their life span. In other words, is it possible to
prepare young people for the positive and negative events they will face from
now till old age? This idea belongs to developmental psychology in the broadest
meaning of the discipline (cf. Munnicks et aI., 1985) and to psychology of time
perspective (cf. Nuttin 1985).
FTP will not be alike for all individuals. A difference can be expected when
other factors are taken into account. For instance, the FTP may differ in persons
who started an academic career or business in early age, compared to those who
have a chronic disease or other handicap. The perspective, goals and overall .
attitude towards the future, may differ from person to person, and from one
group to another.
This raises many research questions as to individual characteristics of FTP and
its role in human life. To what extent personal hopes and anxieties are projected
onto facing the global matters of the future, in other words how people's view
of the world is affected by their subjective states. A personal philosophy of life,
religion may be a terrain of investigation for psychologists, as these spheres of
human life are by their nature directed towards the future. Also internal vs.
external control seems to offer another pertinent topic of reflection.
In comparison to the number of hours in the education program dedicated to
other subjects, the FTP issues are but a drop in the ocean. People elaborate it on
their own but this process can be helped professionally.
Teaching children how.to delay gratification and to wait for the events such as
a birthday party and expected presents can be the first step in this education. To
make them patiently wait for the effects of their own studies can help to create
a deeper understanding of time dimension separating a present activity from its
effects.
 THE PRAGMATICS OF FUTURE ORIENTATION: ... 231
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Explaining the future consequences of present activities such as planting trees

on the one hand and polluting rivers on the other can lead to increased sensitivity
to what our and other peoples' action can cause in the long run. The effort
invested in such an education program is hard to overestimate. First, this obliges
psychologists to supply reliable knowledge and a comprehensive description of
the phenomenon. Secondly, besides repeating the classic, methodologically
"clean" experiments on limited and narrow issues, I would propose more research
on important problems relevant to life, such as forming a personal future, even
though the methodological demands of its measurement are less fulfilled.
Even though these processes occur naturally, explaining them and stating the
psychological rules will make the FTP more familiar and perhaps it could reduce
the future anxiety raised by the unknown. In many political discussions taking
place in Poland and other postcommuuist countries nowadays the expression "I
hope ... ", "I1we dread/fear that ..... are used very often. In many other political
settings this phenomenon is probably equally frequent, which proves its relevance
and as such should be dealt with more by researchers.
If we roughly divide the globe into the East, Australia, Africa, Latin America,
and the West, we have insufficient knowledge on future orientation in different
cultures. Using time as a nutrient for self-development, cultural heritage, religion,
pace and philosophy of life can add to understanding human living in a cultural
and temporal space.
An actual question as to what Europe should be like in the future, made up of
individuals of different nations, is one of the core issues concerning future
orientation on a grand scale. A realistic imagination in that field can be a great
help in undertaking appropriate political and social decisions now, the effects of
which will be harvested by generations to come (cf. Zaleski, 1992).
Ecology, in particular, comes to our mind as the domain in which the future
perspective is of the greatest importance. The industrial developers and managers
who do not have a longterm perspective can be the initial contributors to what is
often irreversible large scale damages. The psychology of future time perspective
could be a valuable component in their training programs.
Politicians responsible for inter-ethnic arrangements are our second target
group. The Yugoslavian tragedy shows that grouping different nations under one
utopian ideology of "happy communism" did not work in the long run. This was
not a solution to the interethnic problem but rather its temporary suppression and
strengthening on the covert level. The time showed how shortsighted this policy
was. Thus, consideration of the future consequences could have been more
stressed in the decision process of communist leaders and their Western
supporters at the end .of the world war II. This can be, however, included in
programs of political education.
The world is undergoing rapid changes, particularly .in the domain of new
technologi"'f and of communication using a rich system. of symbols. It has to do
with quicker feedback of information about ourselves as individuals, groups and
nations (e.g., quicker information about an event from any comer of the world).
The world of symbols and super-rapid communication is coming and people
should anticipate their futore in order to realize their personal goals and to have
a satisfactory, full of meauing, life. And as A. Bandura suggested (personal
communication) we ought to prepare in advance a theoretical framework of
coping with these future conditions. Therefore I sincerely hope that the
"psychology offutore orientation" will be a challenge for both research-oriented
and practice-inclined psychologists.

REFERENCES
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Nuttin r. (1985). Future time perspective and motivation. Leuven-Hillsdale NJ.: Leuven
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Stem P. (1978). When people act to maintain common resources? A reformulated
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