BILL OF RIGHTS
against him and present evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him (if he so
[G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004]VIRGILIO AGABON, et al. v. NLRC
FACTS
Virgilio and Jenny Agabon worked for respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. as
gypsum and cornice installers from January 1992 until Feb 1999. Their employment
was terminated when they were dismissed for allegedly abandoning their work.
Petitioners Agabon then filed a case of illegal dismissal. The LA ruled in favor of the
spouses and ordered Riviera to pay them their money claims. The NLRC reversed the
LA, finding that the Agabons were indeed guilty of abandonment. The CA modified the
LA by ruling that there was abandonment but ordering Riviera to pay the Agabons
money claims. The arguments of both parties are as follows: The Agabons claim,
among others that Riviera violated the requirements of notice and hearing when the
latter did not send written letters of termination to their addresses. Riviera admitted to
not sending the Agabons letters of termination to their last known addresses because
the same would be futile, as the Agabons do not reside there anymore. However, it also
claims that the Agabons abandoned their work. More than once, they subcontracted
installation works for other companies. They already were warned of termination if the
same act was repeated, still, they disregarded the warning.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Agabons were illegally dismissed
2. Whether Riviera violated the requirements of notice and hearing
3. Is the violation of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing for
termination of employees a violation of the Constitutional due process?
4. What are the consequences of violating the procedural requirements of
termination?
RULING:
Valid dismissal but violation of statutory due process = payment of nominal damages
(P30,000) & balance of 13thmonth pay, etc.
1.No. There was just cause for their dismissal, i.e., abandonment. Art. 282specifies the
grounds for just dismissal, to wit:
a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer or
his duly authorized representative in connection with the employees work
b. Gross and habitual neglect of the by the employee of his duties (includes
abandonment)
c. Fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer or his duly authorized
representative to the employee. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of the employer or any member of his immediate family or his duly
authorized representative.
Any other causes analogous to the foregoing. To establish abandonment, two elements
must be present: a. The unjustified failure of the employee to report for work.
A clear intention to sever e-e relationship, manifested by overt acts. Here, the Agabons
were frequently absent from work for having performed installation work for another
company, despite prior warning given by Riviera. This clearly establishes an intention to
sever the e-e relationship between them, and which constitutes abandonment.
2. Yes. While the employer has the right to expect good performance, diligence, good
conduct and loyalty from its employees, it also has the duty to provide just
compensation to his employees and to
observe the procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of his
employees. Procedure of termination (Omnibus Rules Implementing the LaborCode):
a. A written notice to the employee specifying the grounds for termination and
giving the employee reasonable opportunity to be heard.
A hearing where the employee is given the opportunity to respond to the charges
requests)c.
A written notice of termination indicating that grounds have been established to justify
his termination upon due consideration of alL circumstances. In this case, Riviera failed
to notify the Agabons of their termination to their last known addresses. Hence, they
violated the procedural requirement laid down by the law in the termination of
employees.
3. No. Constitutional due process is that provided under the Constitution, which
involves the protection of the individual against governmental oppression and the
assurance of his rights In civil, criminal and administrative proceedings; statutory due
process is that found in the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and protects the
individual from being unjustly terminated without just or authorized cause after notice
and hearing. The two are similar in that they both have two aspects: substantive due
process and procedural due process. However, they differ in that under the Labor Code,
the first one refers to the valid and authorized causes of employment termination,
while the second one refers to the manner of dismissal. A denial of statutory due
process is not the same as a denial of Constitutional due process for reasons
enunciated in Serrano v. NLRC.
4. The dismissal is valid, but Riviera should pay nominal damages to the Agabons in
vindication of the latter for violating their right to notice and hearing. The penalty is in
the nature of a penalty or indemnification, the amount dependent on the facts of each
case, including the nature of gravity of offense of the employer. In this case, the
Serrano doctrine was re-examined. First, in the Serrano case, the dismissal was upheld,
but it was held to be ineffectual (without legal effect). Hence, Serrano was still entitled
to the payment of his back wages from the time of dismissal until the promulgation of
the court of the existence of an authorized cause. Further, he was entitled to his
separation pay as mandated under Art.283. The ruling is unfair to employers and has
the danger of the following consequences:
a. The encouragement of filing frivolous suits even by notorious employees who were
justly dismissed but were deprived of statutory due process; they are rewarded by
invoking due process.
It would create absurd situations where there is just or authorized cause but a
procedural infirmity invalidates the termination, ie an employee who became a criminal
and threatened his co-workers lives, who fled and could not be found. It could
discourage investments that would generate employment in the economy. Second, the
payment of backwages is unjustified as only illegal termination gives the employee the
right to be paid full backwages. When the dismissal is valid or upheld, the employee
has no right to backwages.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
1.Dismissals based on just causes:
acts or omissions attributable to the employee; no right to claim backwages or to pay
separation pay (separation pay is subject to exception, ie if termination is not based on
serious misconduct or a conduct reflecting the moral depravity of a person, separation
pay may be granted by reason of social justice)
Dismissals based on authorized causes:
involve grounds provided under the Labor Code; employee (and DOLE) is entitled the
payment of separation pay (redundancy and installation of labor-saving devices: 1
month pay or 1 month/yr of service, whichever is higher; retrenchment and closure or
cessation of business: 1month pay or month
per year of service, whichever is higher)
Illegal termination:
employee is entitled to the payment of full backwages as well as reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of allowances and other monetary
claims from the time compensation was withheld until reinstatement; if reinstatement
is not possible, separation pay shall be given.
In the recent case of SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on
behalf of the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement,
and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al., G.R. No. 178552, Oct. 5, 2010, which involved the
issue of constitutionality of the HUMAN SECURITY ACT (anti-terrorism law), the
Supreme Court dismissed the petitions questioning the constitutionality of the said law
on the basis of the following doctrinal pronouncements, which are extensively quoted
below, for research purposes, to wit:
1. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10]
3. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[11]
4. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
5. A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal
interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also
that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it
is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.
6. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show
that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
7. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
8. Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they
may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that
they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As
the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts
have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court
cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or
non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.[16]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
9. While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the
United States of America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU) have both classified
the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes
note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary
Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification
of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.[19] Such statement notwithstanding,
there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA
organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again,
RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present,
petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any
threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
10. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however,
suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.[27] The IBP failed to
sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its
constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to
even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
11. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and
citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of Congress,[28] whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and
personal interest in the proceeding.[29]
12. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has
alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
13. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of
a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest
is key.
14. By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[30]
15. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.
16. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision
of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32]
17. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a
legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must
concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an
actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.
18. The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a
perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a
constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must
be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[38]
19. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being
tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution.
From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is
not its function.[43]
20. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.[44]
21. The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take
the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law
may be abused.[45] Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before
courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
22. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein
certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
23. Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
24. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-
speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.[50] It
added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner
was charged, is not vague.[51]
25. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
26. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized
an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." Claims
of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a
facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A
plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
27. In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical
tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's
claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
28. Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely
on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.
29. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not
operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.[58]
30. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes
that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain
from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.[59]
31. A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting
real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also
on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.[60]
32. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
33. The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all
times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful
conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise
of constitutionally protected rights.[63]
34. The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a
facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively
go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge
against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially,
force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my
opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing
that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
35. It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.
36. In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least
two cases,[67] observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,[68] and that claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held that
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is
not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad
statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression.[71]
37. American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not
involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case
at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.
38. In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at
least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an
ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of
illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy
provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in
these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
39. From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA
9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of
the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and
creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.
40. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to
accede to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at
singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
42. As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the
assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes
future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension
of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Constitutionality of RA 9262 "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004"
JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private
respondent (wife and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank
manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the household help. His
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises
and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he
blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt
suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the
hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was confined for
seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a
child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid
he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her
that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she
confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access
to full information about their businesses.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of
violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary
Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his
firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to
wives/women and not to husbands/men.
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men
against women.
3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and
other women.
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal
violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused
wife, the equal protection guarantee is violated.
Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:
1. Safeguard Human Rights,
2. Ensure Gender Equality and
3. Empower Women
International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights
and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.
1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United
Nations human rights treaties such as the
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
4. Convention Against Torture, and the
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
UDHR
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration. Among the standards under the
UDHR are the following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.
xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
law.
Declaration of Policy in RA 9262
enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the governments
obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by
providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and
other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim.
The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to
ensure gender equality, which is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that
seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality
with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines compliance with the
CEDAW, which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs its
members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate
discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in practice.
CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most
comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW,
in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination
against women, and emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of
rights and respect for human dignity.
2. Philippines obligation as state-party to CEDAW
The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement
for the improvement of their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality
with men. The CEDAW, going beyond the concept of discrimination used in many legal
standards and norms, focuses on discrimination against women, with the emphasis
that women have suffered and are continuing to suffer from various forms of
discrimination on account of their biological sex.
The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms,
which includes promoting gender equality and empowering women, as mandated not
only by our Constitution, but also by commitments we have made in the international
sphere, are undeniably important and essential.
RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of
violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a
father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.
3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to the
Achievement of Governmental Objectives
Historical Perspective:
A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on, the
subjugation of women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,
Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal
Code: all "assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the
view of male superiority."
18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological
assumption that: husband and wife were one body before God; thus "they were one
person under the law, and that one person was the husband," a concept that evidently
found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family
Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men are
expected to take on the dominant roles both in the community and in the family. This
perception naturally leads to men gaining more power over women power, which
must necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence against women is one of the
ways men control women to retain such power.
In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were
under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill,
his wife if she endangered his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law
began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law
developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or
stick no thicker than their thumb.
Statistics:
The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases
involving violence committed against women in the Philippines.
In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or 11,531 out of
15,969 cases involving violence against women were filed under RA 9262.
From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the different
categories of violence committed against women. The number of reported cases
showed an increasing trend from 2004 to 2012,
The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women
and children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal
intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a
conclusion that men need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.
4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and cultural
differences
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women
and men prescribe that they be treated differently under particular conditions in order
to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the disadvantaged position of a
woman as compared to a man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned
from the following recommendations of the CEDAW Committee:
The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough
to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as
well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must
be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women
and men will be required in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of
substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming under
representation of women and a redistribution of resources and power between men
and women.
Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality.
These results may be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying
their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying the same
income levels, equality in decision-making and political influence, and women enjoying
freedom from violence.
The governments commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of
her life are parallel to that of a man, requires the adoption and implementation of
ameliorative measures, such as RA 9262. Unless the woman is guaranteed that the
violence that she endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the government,
which is committed to uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then she can
neither achieve substantive equality nor be empowered.

5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively
undertake ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities
experienced by women and children brought about by years of discrimination. The
equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate
for the government to combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."
RA 9262 is THE ameliorative action
In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that would
address the evil effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply
embedded in the societys subconscious, on Filipino women and children and elevate
their status as human beings on the same level as the father or the husband.
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of discrimination
against women. It is an ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse discrimination"
against. Ameliorative action "is not an exception to equality, but an expression and
attainment of de facto equality, the genuine and substantive equality which the Filipino
people themselves enshrined as a goal of the 1987 Constitution." Ameliorative
measures are necessary as a redistributive mechanism in an unequal society to achieve
substantive equality.
Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality
In the context of womens rights, substantive equality has been defined by the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
as equality which requires that women be given an equal start and that they be
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough
to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as
well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must
be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women
and men will be required in order to address such differences.
Womens struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:
1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the same. But
this model does not take into account biological and socially constructed differences
between women and men. By failing to take into account these differences, a formal
equality approach may in fact perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model this recognizes differences between women and men but
considers womens weakness as the rationale for different treatment. This approach
reinforces the inferior status of women and does not address the issue of
discrimination of women on account of their gender.
3. Substantive equality model this assumes that women are "not vulnerable by nature,
but suffer from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these imposed disadvantages were
eliminated, there was no further need for protection." Thus, the substantive equality
model gives prime importance to womens contexts, realities, and experiences, and the
outcomes or results of acts and measures directed, at or affecting them, with a view to
eliminating the disadvantages they experience as women.
6. The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause (application of the substantive equality model)
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under
RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy
and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological,
historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important
governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and
empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact
essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the
intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification
therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987
Constitution.
Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional provision of equal protection
simply requires that similarly situated persons be treated in the same way. It does not
connote identity of rights among individuals, nor does it require that every person is
treated identically in all circumstances. It acts as a safeguard to ensure that State-drawn
distinctions among persons are based on reasonable classifications and made pursuant
to a proper governmental purpose. In short, statutory classifications are not
unconstitutional when shown to be reasonable and made pursuant to a legitimate
government objective.
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the
failure to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the States mandate to
actively promote the familys total development. Congress also found, as a reality, that
women and children are more susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due
to, among others, the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping
of roles within the family environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On
this basis, Congress found it necessary to recognize the substantial distinction within
the family between men, on the one hand, and women and children, on the other hand.
This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be made in the laws as our law on
persons and family under the Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the
distinctions between men and women in the context of the family.
Justice Leonen: It may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships
should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.
By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the normative constitutional
requirements of human dignity and fundamental equality can become descriptive
reality. The socially constructed distinctions between women and men that have
afflicted us and spawned discrimination and violence should be eradicated sooner.
Power and intimacy should not co-exist.
The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our safe havens from the
helter skelter of this world. It is in that space where we grow in the safety of the special
other who we hope will be there for our entire lifetime. If that is not possible, then for
such time as will be sufficient to create cherished memories enough to last for eternity.
I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law take its full course.
Justice Abad: RA 9262 is a historic step in the Filipino women's long struggle to be
freed from a long-held belief that men are entitled, when displeased or minded, to hit
their wives or partners and their children. This law institutionalizes prompt community
response to this violent behavior through barangay officials who can command the man
to immediately desist from harming his home partner and their children. It also
establishes domestic violence as a crime, not only against its victims but against
society as well. No longer is domestic violence lightly dismissed as a case of marital
dispute that law enforcers ought not to get into.
Chief Justice Puno on Expanded Equal protection and Substantive Equality
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses that the equal protection clause can no longer
be interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. "It
ought to be construed in consonance with social justice as the heart particularly of the
1987 Constitutiona transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to
enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely
egalitarian democracy." This means that the weak, including women in relation to men,
can be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be weak.
Chief Justice Puno goes on: "The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the
human rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the indignity of discrimination
so that in the patently unequal Philippine society, each person may be restored to his
or her rightful position as a person with equal moral status."
SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12
months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month
overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence,
Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on
May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving
an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February
199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and
exemplary damages.
The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770,
representing his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid
contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees
equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for damages as
prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50,
representing three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and
10% for attorney's fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which
was made into law on July 15, 1995.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which
reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate,
but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
on non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly
interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the
fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only
a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however,
as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a
part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in
application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of
the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the
execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998.
Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired
the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998
employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions
of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be
declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for
the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a
business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,
with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs
wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare
of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those
already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate
measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be
equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should
be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to
incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to
be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on
substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited
to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which
the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the
government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state
interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden
is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment
who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in
that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion
of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification
of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the
Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and
determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive
means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such
as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in
maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state
interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination
against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect
the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies,
such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a
justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector,
but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is
composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged
sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands.
The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state
interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of
placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in
place that can be
employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of
OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-
Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary
measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to
migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range
from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23,
2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign
employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of
aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign
principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative
of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Note:
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its
co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that
there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of
judicial determination; (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party
and at the earliest opportunity; and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis
mota of the case, otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some
other ground.
----
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was
applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.
Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent
should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the
fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious matters,
robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo
by malice or manifest or proven negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the
Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its
illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code of
Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain
time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause,
before the fulfillment of the contract.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURE
AAA vs Carbonell
FACTS:
Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center On
May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office
located at another building but when she returned to their office, the lights had been
turned off and the gate was closed. Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told
her to go near him and upon reaching him, he threatened her with the pipe and forced
her to lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his
penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no avail because there was
nobody else in the premises. Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon
threatened to kill her and her family. But when she discovered that she was pregnant as
a consequence of the rape, she narrated the incident to her parents. On July 24, 2002,
petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.
Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a Resolution finding probable cause
and recommending the filing of an information for rape. Arzadon moved for
reconsideration and during the clarificatory hearing held on October 11, 2002,
petitioner testified before the investigating prosecutor. However, she failed to attend
the next hearing hence, the case was provisionally dismissed.
Petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint with a comprehensive account of the
alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Georgina Hidalgo. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner appeared for
clarificatory questioning. On June 11, 2003, the investigating prosecutor issued a
Resolution finding that a prima facie case of rape exists and recommending the filing
of the information.
An Information for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
Fernando, La Union on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415.
Thereafter, Arzadon filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court Proceedings Including
the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to Determine Probable Cause for the Purpose of
Issuing a Warrant of Arrest.
On March 18, 2004, respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell granted the motion and
directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand for determination of
probable cause.
Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable
cause before the Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of
Justice Merceditas Gutierrez found no probable cause and directed the withdrawal of
the Information in Criminal Case No. 6415.
Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzales reversed the July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution finding
that probable cause exists. Thus, a new Information for rape was filed against Arzadon
docketed as Criminal Case No. 6983.
Consequently, Arzadon filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest.
In an Order dated August 11, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell granted the motion
and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand.
Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
claiming that the documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of
probable cause.
Respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order dismissing Criminal Case No.
6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the documentary evidence and transcript of
stenographic notes may sufficiently establish this. Respondent Judge Carbonell argues
in his Comment that the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor is
not binding or obligatory, and that he was justified in requiring petitioner and her
witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine probable cause.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case
No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
HELD:
YES. In the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar, the constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to: 1) personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor or 2) he may disregard the prosecutors report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.
Before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the
certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing
to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant
of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged
is the function of the investigating prosecutor.
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judges personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that
such personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when
there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause.
Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided
that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 without
taking into consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of
prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which
sustain a finding of probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate
the evidence in support thereof. Respondent judges finding of lack of probable cause
was premised only on the complainants and her witnesses absence during the hearing
scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of probable cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,
She attended several clarificatory hearings that were conducted in the instant case. The
transcript of stenographic notes, of the hearing held on October 11, 2002 shows that
she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and the specific time and place of the
incident. She also claimed that she bore a child as a result of the rape and, in support
of her contentions, presented the child and her birth certificate as evidence. In
contrast, Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the weakest of all
defenses.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (and other
consolidated petitions), November 3, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
VELASCO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary
schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons
charged before the prosecutors office of a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited
and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug
testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which
will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory
test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected
to undergo drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary
schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x
x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of
public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo
a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive
for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground
for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law
prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by
the Constitution?
2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY
GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d)
of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Court thus permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec.
36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law
prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by
the Constitution.
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points
out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator
needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to
wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond
these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it
is hereby declared as, unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to
the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine
qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not
the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES,
paragraphs (f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the
Court deduced and applied the following principles: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students
have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and
so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the
right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has
been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged
by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. In the criminal
context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students
for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what
was referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the
probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the
review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in
question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec.
2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as
the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an
office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit,
and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine,
reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion
clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a
search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or
place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a
private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a
possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing.
The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to
be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in
Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be
subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated
to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics
of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e.,
the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible
the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact
that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled
laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by
the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis;
that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the
usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA
9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies
any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore,
the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on
the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search,
and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is,
under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also
labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law
and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in
the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and
to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutors office with a
crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right
to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting
their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and
public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy
and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness
and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.
The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they
are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the
bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on
the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case
would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.
Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011
Facts
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint
alleging of an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent
then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team to back up all the files in
the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and
LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes
were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of
the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft
pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order,
requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC
Officials of fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files
in his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus
Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge
as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority
of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioners answer
to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the
motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the
formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was
dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied
by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an
illegal search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was
lawful and did not violate his constitutional right.
Ratio Decidendi
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue
raised by the petitioner
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI
agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed
public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and
seizure. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the
enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable (objective).
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus
recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
intrusions by police.
OConnor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that
[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the
government instead of a private employer. In OConnor the Court recognized that
special needs authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-
related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government
interests are weighed against the employees reasonable expectation of privacy. This
reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement,
which are related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and
161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No.
127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be
such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his office and computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search
authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on
petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty.
Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519
and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the
computer from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has
absolute right to regulate and monitor.
JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse
alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent,
Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioners
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a
degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and
(f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical
prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that
the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC
found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that
Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative
defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by
Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has
not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled
in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of
a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis--vis the motion
for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood
and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects
during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are
matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings,
when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie
case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue
after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A
biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was
not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was
previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing
has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court
may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This
Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest
of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding
of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search,
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of
probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found
that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving
party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court
can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The same condition precedent
should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE
Ople vs Torres
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner
need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22,
1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee,
are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Issue:
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK
FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION."
Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
declared null and void for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-
important freedom of thought.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because
it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under
A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering
basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen
will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government.
It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his
rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308
gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of
A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of
the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No.
308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that
the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople
assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not
premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover,
the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System
(SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National
Identification (ID) card.
In view of the need for Legislative Act
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony
with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix
a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head
shall be promulgated in administrative orders."
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308
establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life
and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking
domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between
the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute
laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed.
In view of right to privacy
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the
need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308.
But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No.
308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer
application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will
show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that
the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of
population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not
be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote
relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No.
308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for
a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN .
His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether
it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may
include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets
and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent
the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable
information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered
for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of
personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may
be too great for some of our authorities to resist.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the
information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When
the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken,
an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever
purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and we
hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.
60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information
and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing
expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics
and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of
the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
prevent.
In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in
compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and
liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right
to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It
merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such
intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and
well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.

Vivares vs. STC

Case Summary and Outcome

The right to privacy is not violated when a third party downloads images from an
individuals Facebook page that are accessible by friends of the individual or by the
public at large.

Facts

Minors Nenita Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara, along with several others, took
pictures of themselves in their underwear, smoking cigarettes and drinking hard liquor.
A third minor, Angela Tan, uploaded them onto Facebook. A computer teacher at
minors school, Mylene Rheza T. Escuedro, discovered the pictures. The photos were
reported to the Discipline in Charge and the girls were found to have violated the
Student Handbook.

The students were sent to the Principals office where they were chastised and verbally
abused. They were also banned from commencement. Angelas mother filed a Petition
for Injunction and Damages asking that the school be denied from prohibiting the girls
from attending commencement. A TRO was granted allowing the girls to attend
graduation and the Plaintiffs filed a writ of habeas data alleging an invasion of their
childrens privacy by the Defendant.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for habeas data because petitioners
failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors right to
privacy.

Issue
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in the case.

Ruling
A writ of habeas data protects an individuals right against invasion of informational
privacy, and a nexus between the right to privacy and the right to life, liberty or
security must be proven.

In this case, the core issue was the right to informational privacy, defined as the right
of individuals to control information about themselves. To what extent should the
right to privacy be protected in online social networks whose sole purpose is sharing
information over the web? The petitioners argued that the privacy settings on Facebook
limit who can see what information. This gives users a subjective expectation of
privacy. The Court agreed. However, the Court also ruled that before one can have an
expectation of privacy in her Facebook information, he or she must manifest an
intention to keep that information private by utilizing privacy tools. If someone posts
something on Facebook and does not limit who can see that information, there is no
expectation of privacy. The photos in the case at hand were all viewable by the friends
of the girls or by the general public. Therefore, the Court ruled that the Defendants did
not violate the minors privacy rights by viewing and copying the pictures on the
minors Facebook pages.