ADELINO H.

LEDESMA, petitioner
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, respondent.
G.R. No. L23815
June 28, 1974

FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of
Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. He is also counsel de parte for
one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as
such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for
the two defendants. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume
or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, denied the said motion.
According to the respondent judge, "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue
appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission on Elections) and since according
to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government
would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as
Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed.
Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby
designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963,
June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964,
June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964."

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.

RULING: If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the
apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation,
the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered
nugatory. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there
are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings
of self interest.

No.

1. The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the
case has been postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between
duty of petitioner to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar.

2. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal
profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal
profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are
rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

3. The Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
"Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel..." ---manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. The
right to be assisted by counsel is so important that it is not enough for the Court to apprise the accused
of his right to an atty, but is essential that the court assign on de oficio for him if he desires/ is poor.

Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to
remain a member of the profession in good standing.

Disposition Petition for certiorari dismissed.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA

AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002

FACTS:

On September 1998, respondent agreed to legally represent petitioner Dominador Burbe in a money claim
and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract. In consequence to such agreement,
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services he
was accordingly paid and an amount of P25,000.00 for the required filing fee. A week later, petitioner
was informed by the respondent that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that he should
receive notice of its progress. The petitioner waited for several months for the notice from the court but
there was no progress in the case, he was also inquired repeatedly in the respondents Law Office,
however he was told to just wait.

The petitioner decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with the draft of Atty. Magultas complaint
to personally verify the progress of the case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed
by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999. As such, the
petitioner confronted the latter. The respondent admitted that he has not at all filed the complaint
because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose he offered to reimburse him by
issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00.

The petitioner filed a case against Atty. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct. The respondent denied the allegations and alleged that he was never been paid by complainant
for his acceptance and legal fees and that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Atty. Magulta is liable for misrepresentation of funds given to him for
the filing fee.

HELD:

YES. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and
are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. It may be true that they have a lien upon
the clients funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they
may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such
funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve
them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their clients interest within
the bounds of law.
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted
to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the
amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.

People vs Tuanda - A case digest

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs.ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

Facts: Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the Supreme
Court finding her guilty of violating BP 22.

Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her
suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned
law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she
is not guilty of the offense charged.

Issue: WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and
affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda
guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 Melendrez vs Decena
August 24, 1989

Facts:
There was two charged filed against Atty. Decena. First was about a 4k loan obtained by the spouses sec
ured by a real estate mortgage. However, it appeared on the real estate mortgage document that the a
mount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of 4k. He said that the signing of the documents w
as just for formality. so, they did. The spouses religiously paid 10% or 500 as interest for only 3months b
ecause of financial reverses. Consequently, Atty. Decena made a second real estate mortgage document
and the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00. Again, on the assurance that it wa
s only for formality, the spouses signed the new REM document.
After 3 years, they learned that their lot was already sold to someone. So they tried to raise the 10k and
went to Atty. Decenas house but the latter did not accept the money and instead gave them a sheet of
paper indicating that the total indebtedness had soared to 20,400.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a
time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused. It was alle
ged that Atty. Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused without
the consent and approval of the complainants and that he received the amount of P500.00 as an advan
ce payment and he did not inform the spouses about this. And even after he was confronted, he still did
not turn over the money.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Decenas acts show gross misconduct and should therefore be disbarred

Ruling:
As to the first charge, the SC held that Atty. Decena indeed deceived the spouses.From the facts obtaini
ng in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage document
s by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was
a mere formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have a
t least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, par
ticularly the provision appointing him as the complainants attorney-in-
fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants.

As to the second charge, repondent is presumed to be aware of Section 23 Rule 138 that lawyers cannot
without special authority, compromise their clients litigation or receive anything in discharge of a clien
ts claim, but the full amount in cash. Respondents failure to turn over to spouses the partial payment
underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

The SC reiterated that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practi
ce of law but a continuing requirement. Atty. Decena was disbarred.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

1. The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has
been rendered moot by a supervening event.
2. On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him
the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
3. Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has
three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely:
Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
4. The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.
Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
5. Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
6. Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
7. Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired
Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.
Believing in good faith Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and
involving the same parties as "closed and terminated."
8. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
9. As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the
word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
10. OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise: The reasons of Meling in not
disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He
should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a
law professor.
11. The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them
which constitutes dishonesty.
12. As regards Melings use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say: Anent the issue of the use of the
appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable.
13. Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll
of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings
membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.
14. We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC.
15. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

Issue: whether or not Meling be disqualified in the examinations for the bar in relation to the violation of CPR for non-
disclosure of his pending criminal cases

Held: Yes

Ratio:
 1. The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant. Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending
criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character.
2. The Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
3. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court.
4. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll
of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic.

In re Edillon
(A.M. No. 1928; 84 SCRA 554 [1978])

Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining
his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll
of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Issues:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues?

Held:
It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.
Ratio Decidendi:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7
All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover,
there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty
to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary. It is sufficient to state then that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our
1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

OCA vs LADAGA
A.M. No. P-99-1287 Jan. 26, 2001

Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga is the Branch Clerk of Court of the Makati Regional Trial Court and he appeared
as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin. Ladaga was on official leave of absence and his Presiding Judge
was aware of the case he was handling. It has been found that Ladaga did not obtain permission from the
Court that he can appear as counsel for his cousin.

Issue: Whether or not Ladaga is guilty of violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, for engaging in private practice?
Held: No. Ladagas appearance as counsel for his cousin, where he does not receive any compensation,
does not constitute as Private practice as contemplated by law. However, it cannot be denied that is
appearance was done without permission from the Court. With that, the Supreme Court reprimands Atty.
Ladaga with a stern warning.

CATU, Complainant vs. RELLOSA, Respondent

February 19, 2008
Justice Corona

FACTS

Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of the
units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where respondent was the
punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing
to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the
appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the
respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer
when he stood as counsel for the defendantsdespite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as
punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeths request to handle
the case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an
elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the
latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter
prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month with
a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE

WON the findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendations on the
imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.

HELD

NO. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of Professional
Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection to former
government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which they had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an incumbent punong
barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice of
profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials
andemployees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under
RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or
engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the
sangguniang barangay. Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession.

Third, the respondent is bound to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. The
respondent should have secured a prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as
counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that, A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent alos failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which speaks that, A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the integrated bar.

Hence, the respondent is guilty of professional misconduct and is therefore suspended from his office as
an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.