Lazo Castro, Jr. vs.

Ateneo de Naga University, 730 SCRA 422, July 23, 2014

Lazo Concepcion vs. Minex Import Corporation/Minerama Corporation, 663 SCRA 497, January 24, 2012

G.R. No. 175293. July 23, 2014.*

CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR., petitioner, vs. ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY, FR. JOEL TABORA and MR. EDWIN
BERNAL, respondents.

Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Retirement; Retirement is a form of reward for an employees loyalty and service
to the employer, and is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, and to lessen the burden of
worrying about his financial support or upkeep.Worthy to stress is that retirement is of a different species from the
reliefs awarded to an illegally dismissed employee. Retirement is a form of reward for an employees loyalty and service to
the employer, and is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, and to lessen the burden of
worrying about his financial support or upkeep. In contrast, the reliefs awarded to an illegally dismissed employee are in
recognition of the continuing employer-employee relationship that has been severed by the employer without just or
authorized cause, or without compliance with due process.

Same; Same; Illegal Dismissals; Reinstatement; Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, entitles an illegally
dismissed employee to reinstatement. Article 223 of the Labor Code requires the reinstatement to be immediately
executory even pending appeal.Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, entitles an illegally dismissed employee to
reinstatement. Article 223 of the Labor Code requires the reinstatement to be immediately executory even pending
appeal. With its intent being ostensibly to promote the benefit of the employee, Article 223 cannot be the source of any
right of the employer to remove the employee should he fail to immediately comply with the order of reinstatement. In
Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, 401 SCRA 424 (2003), the Court ruled that the unjustified refusal of the employer to
reinstate the dismissed employee would entitle the latter to the payment of his salaries effective from the time when the
employer failed to reinstate him; thus, it became the ministerial duty of the LA to implement the order of reinstatement.
According to Triad Security & Allied Services v. Ortega, Jr., 481 SCRA 591 (2006), the law mandates the prompt
reinstatement of the dismissed or separated employee, without need of any writ of execution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; For as long as the employer continuously fails to actually implement the reinstatement aspect
of the decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA), the employers obligation to the employee for his accrued backwages and other
benefits continues to accumulate.For as long as the employer continuously fails to actually implement the reinstatement
aspect of the decision of the LA, the employers obligation to the employee for his accrued backwages and other benefits
continues to accumulate. Castro, Jr. vs. Ateneo de Naga University, 730 SCRA 422, G.R. No. 175293 July 23, 2014

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 175293 July 23, 2014

CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY, FR. JOEL ABORA, and MR. EDWIN BERNAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The employer is obliged to reinstate the dismissed employee and to pay his wages during the period of appeal of the
decision in the latter's favor until the reversal of the decision.

The Case
The petitioner appeals the adverse decision promulgated on May 31, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissed his petition for certiorari by which he had assailed the dismissal of his claim for accrued salaries on the ground
of its having been rendered moot and academic by the intervening dismissal by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) of his complaint for illegal dismissal.2

Antecedents

The petitioner started his employment with respondent Ateneo de Naga University (University) in the first semester of
school year 1960-1961. At the time of his dismissal, he was a regular and full-time faculty member of the University's
Accountancy Department in the College of Commerce with a monthly salary of P29,846.20.3 Allegedly, he received on
February 22, 2000 a letter from respondent Fr. Joel Tabora, SJ., the University President, informing him that his contract
(which was set to expire on May 31, 2000) would no longer be renewed.4 After several attempts to discuss the matter with
Fr. Tabora in person, and not having been given any teaching load or other assignments effective June 2000, he brought
his complaint for illegal dismissal.

The University denied the allegation of illegal dismissal, and maintained that the petitioner was a participant and regular
contributor to the Ateneo de Naga Employees Retirement Plan (Plan); that upon reaching the age of 60 years on June 26,
1999, he was deemed automatically retired under the Plan; and that he had been allowed to teach after his retirement
only on contractual basis.5

On September 3, 2001, Labor Arbiter (LA) Jesus Orlando M. Quinones ruled in favor of the petitioner,6 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of complainant CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR.,
as against respondents ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY/FR. JOEL TABORA and EDWIN BERNAL, and hereby orders,
as follows:

a) Declaring the dismissal of complainant to be illegal.

b) Ordering respondents to reinstate complainants to his former position without loss of seniority rights or other
privileges, or at respondents' option, payroll reinstatement;

c) Ordering respondents to pay complainant the amount of Php 637,999.65.00, representing full backwages;

d) Ordering respondents to pay the amount Php 500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;

e) Ordering respondents to pay complainant the amount of Php 113,799.96, representing 10% of the total amount
awarded as attorney's fees.

All other claims and charges are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the NLRC.8 Simultaneously, they submitted a manifestation stating that neither
actual nor payroll reinstatement of the petitioner could be effected because he had meanwhile been employed as a
Presidential Assistant for Southern Luzon Affairs with the position of Undersecretary; and that his reinstatement would
result in dual employment and double compensation which were prohibited by existing civil service rules and regulations.9

On July 12, 2002, the petitioner, citing the exec Jtory nature of the order for his reinstatement, filed his motion to order the
respondents to pay his salaries and benefits accruing in the period from September 3, 2001 until July 3, 2002.10

In his order dated October 10, 2002,11 LA Quinones, explaining that Article 223 of the Labor Code granted to the
employer the option to implement either a physical or a payroll reinstatement, and that, therefore, the respondents must
first exercise the option regardless of the petitioner's employment with the Government, denied the petitioner's motion, but
ordered the respondents to exercise the option of either actual or payroll reinstatement of the petitioner, viz:

Considerations considered, respondents are hereby directed to exercise their option of whether complainant is to be
actually reinstated, or be reinstated in the payroll within ten (10) days from receipt of this order. Failure to exercise such
option within the period provided shall render complainant's motion for accrued salaries appropriate.
Upon respondents' exercise of option, complainant is directed to abide by the same.1wphi1 Parties are then directed to
inform this office of their respective actions. In the meantime, complainant's motion for payment of accrued salaries and
benefits is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a notice of partial appeal,12 but the notice was denied due course on June 30, 2003.13

Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration,14 the petitioner elevated the matter to the CA by petition for
certiorari.15

In the interim, on June 26, 2004, the petitioner executed a receipt and quitclaim in favor of the University respecting his
claim for the benefits under the Plan,16 to wit:

RECEIPT and QUITCLAIM

Date: June 26, 2004

This is to acknowledge receipt from ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY the total sum of SIX HUNDRED FORTY SIX
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS & 42/100 (P646,828.42) represen: ing full payment of benefits
due me pursuant to the Employees retirement plan. In view of this payment, I hereby waive all my rights, title, interest in
and over my retirement benefits under said plan which is presently under trusteeship of Bank of the Philippine Islands.
BPI is hereby instructed to reimburse the company for the amount paid by it to me out of whatever amount due me under
the said retirement plan.

(sgd.)
CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR.
Employee

A few days later, the petitioner sent the following letter to Fr. Tabora, viz:

June 29, 2004

Fr. Joel Tabora

President, Ateneo de Naga University

Ateneo Avenue, Naga City

Dear Fr. fabora,

This is tJ inform you that I am getting my retirement pay as you have approved, together with the "RECEIPT AND QUIT
CLAIM" which your Treasurer forced me to sign upon your order and/or your lawyer. I will receive pay UNDER PROTEST,
and under the following conditions:

1. That I am getting this retirement pay without prejudice to the case that I have filled [sic] against Ateneo, Fr. Joel
Tabora and Edwin Bernal.

2. That I do not agree nor confirm with your computation as to the number of years of service I have rendered.

3. That the total amount is still subject to verification.

For your information.

(sgd.)
CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR.17
Meanwhile, the NLRC rendered its decision affirming with modification the ruling of the LA on the petitioner's illegal
dismissal case.18

On motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reversed its ruling on August 31, 2005,19 decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision, dated September 3, 2001 of the Labor Arbiter, as modified
by our ruling of October 22, 2004 is hereby ordered SET ASIDE, and in its stead, a new judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.20

In justifying its reversal of its decision, the NLRC held that his execution of the receipt and quitclaim respecting his
benefits under the Plan estopped the petitioner from pursuing other claims arising from his employer-employee
relationship with the University, opining that:

[O]nce an employee executes a quitclaim or release in favor of the employer, he is thereby estopped from pursuing any
further money claims against the employer, arising from his employment. Actually, the execution and signing of the
Receipt and Quitclaim by complainantappellee, in this case, only indicates that he voluntarily waived his rights to his
money awards, as stated in the Labor Arbiter's Decision, as affirmed with modification by the Commission (Second
Division). A person is precluded from maintaining a position inconsistent with one, in which he has acquiesced x x x. Also,
in his signing the said Receipt and Quitclaim, the necessary implication is that the said document would cover any and all
claims arising out of the employment relationship x x x.

Thus, having determined that complainant-appellee had completely received the amount of Php 646,828.42, which is,
actually, the same amount as his retirement benefit, as stated in the Compliance, dated October 2, 2000, of respondents-
appellants, we are, therefore, persuaded to dismiss the case for want of merit. As such, the money claims as awarded in
the September 3, 2001 Decision of Labor Arbiter Jesus Orlando M. Quinones, as affirmed with modification, in our
Decision, promulgated on October 22, 2004, are therefore, to be deleted. In other words, since herein complainant-
appellee had executed tl e Receipt and Quitclaim that represents voluntary and reasonable settlement of his claims, the
said document must therefore, be accorded with respect as the law between the parties.21

Ruling of the CA

On May 31, 2006, the CA dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari on the ground of its having been rendered moot
and academic by the aforecited August 31, 2005 decision of the NLRC, viz:

WHEREFORE, for being moot and academic, the instant petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.22

Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,23 the petitioner appeals.

Issues

In his appeal, the petitioner submits the following as issues:

THE ISSUE BROUGHT IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 82146 IS NOT THE SAME WITH OR SIMILAR TO THE ISSUES IN CA NO.
030821-02.24

II

THE CLAIM FOR ACCRUED SALARIES AND BENEFITS AS AN INCIDENT OF THE ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
PENDING APPEAL AND BROUGHT IN ISSUE IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP. NO.
82146 WAS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC BY THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT PER THE
AUGUST 31, 2005 DECISION RENDERED IN CA NO. 030821-02 BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION25

III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' DISMISSAL OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 82146 IS CONTRARY TO AND VIOLATED
THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN VARIOUS CASES PARTICULARLY THE RECENT CASE OF
ALEJANDRO ROQUERO VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.26

IV

THE ISSUE BROUGHT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY NOW BE DEClDED UPON BY THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT27

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in ruling that the dismissal of his complaint for illegal dismissal by the NLRC had
mocited his petition for certiorari; that the sole issue in his petition for certiorari concerned his claim for salaries and
benefits that had accrued by reason of the respondents' refusal to reinstate him, but the case that had been dismissed by
the NLRC revolved around the validity of his termination; that the CA further erred in ruling that his execution of the
quitclaim and receipt of payment constituted a settlement of his money claims, considering that his waiver pertained only
to his retirement pay; that his entitlement to the accrued benefits and salaries found support in Roquero v. Philippine
Airlines,28 a ruling in which the employer was obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during
the period of the appeal; and that Roquero v. Philippine Airlines declared that even if the decision was reversed with
finality, the employee was not required to reimburse the salary that he had received.

The respondents counter, however, that the petitioner's petition for certiorari had become moot in view of his voluntary
receipt of the benefits and his execution of the quitclaim; that they had complied with the two directives of reinstatement
and payment of full backwages contained in the decision of LA Quinones; that the petitioner was reinstated in November
2002; and that they put up a supersedeas bond pending appeal to answer for the backwages and other monetary claims
that could he awarded to the petitioner.

In fine, the issue is whether or not the petitioner's claim for the payment of accrued salaries and benefits for the period
that he was not reinstated was rendered moot and academic by: (a) his receipt of the retirement benefits and execution of
the corresponding receipt and quitclaim in favor of the respondents; and (b) the dismissal of his complaint for illegal
dismissal by the NLRC. Ruling

We reverse.

Execution of the receipt and quitclaim was not a settlement of the petitioner's claim for accrued salaries

The NLRC held that the petitioner was estopped from pursuing his complaint for illegal dismissal upon his receipt of the
benefits and his execution of the receipt and quitclaim. He insists, however, that the payment he had received in protest
pertained only to his retirement benefits.

We agree with the petitioner.

The text of the receipt and quitclaim was clear and straightforward, and it was to the effect that the sum received by the
petitioner represented ''full payment of benefits ... pursuant to the Employee's retirement plan." As such, both the NLRC
and the CA should have easily seen that the quitclaim related only to the settlement of the retirement benefits, which
benefits could not be confused with the reliefs related to the complaint for illegal dismissal.

Worthy to stress is that retirement is of a different species from the reliefs awarded to an illegally dismissed employee.
Retirement is a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to the employer, and is intended to help the
employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, and to lessen the burden of worrying about his financial support or
upkeep.29 In contrast, the reliefs awarded to an illegally dismissed employee are in recognition of the continuing
employer-employee relationship that has been severed by the employer without just or authorized cause, or without
compliance with due process.

II

Claim for accrued benefits should be sustained despite dismissal of the petitioner's complaint
The petitioner argues that according to Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,30 the employer is obliged to reinstate and to
pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until its reversal by the higher Court; and that
because he was not reinstated either actually or by payroll, he should be held entitled to the accrued salaries.

The argument of the petitioner is correct.

Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement. Article 223 of the
Labor Code requires the reinstatement to be immediately executory even pending appeal. With its intent being ostensibly
to promote the benefit of the employee, Article 223 cannot be the source of any right of the employer to remove the
employee should he fail to immediately comply with the order of reinstatement.31 In Roquero, the Comi ruled that the
unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee would entitle the latter to the payment of his
salaries effective from the time when the employer failed to reinstate him; thus, it b1!came the ministerial duty of the LA to
implement the order of reinstatement.32 According to Triad Security & Allied Services v. Ortega, Jr.,33 the law mandates
the prompt reinstatement of the dismissed or separated employee, without need of any writ of execution. In Pioneer
Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,34 the Court has further observed:

x x x The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending
appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is
quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even penoing appeal. To require the
application for and issuance of a wit of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award v10uld
certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a
reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for
numerous reasons. A mere continuance of postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part
of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate
and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so
declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be
unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid
and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific purpose. Statutes, as a
rule, are to be construed in the lights of the purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. And where the
statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give
effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction
should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the
legislator sought to attain by its enactment. In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under
R.A. No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On appeal, however, the
apr;ellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion.

Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of
labor. In ruling that an order or award for reinstatement does not require a writ of execution, the Court is simply adhering
and giving meaning to this rule. Henceforth, we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is selfexecutory. After receipt
of the decision or resolution ordering the employee's reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re-
admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the
employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the employee of his choice. The notification is
based on practical considerations for without notice, the employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for work or
not.35

Hence, for as long as the employer continuously fails to actually implement the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the
LA, the employer's obligation to the employee for his accrued backwages and other benefits continues to accumulate.36

The next issue concerns whether or not the petitioner's claim for accrued salaries from the time of the issuance of the
order of reinstatement by LA Quinones until his actual reinstatement in November 2002 was rendered moot and academic
by the reversal of the decision of the LA.

The Court holds that the order of reinstatement of the petitioner was not rendered moot and academic. He remained
entitled to accrued salaries from notice of the LA's order of reinstatement until reversal thereof.37 In Islriz Trading v.
Capada,38 we even clarified that the employee could be barred from claiming accrued salaries only when the failure to
reinstate him was without the fault of the employer.

Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner only in November 2002, and that their inability to reinstate him
was without valid ground, they were liable to pay his salaries accruing from the time of the decision of the LA (i.e.,
September 3, 2001) until his reinstatement in November 2002. It did not matter that the respondents had yet to exercise
their option to choose between actual or payroll reinstatement at that point because the order of reinstatement was
immediately executory.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 31, 2006; REMANDS the
records of the case to the Labor Arbiter for the correct computation of the petitioner's accrued salaries from rhe date of the
respondents' receipt of the September 3, 2001 decision of the Labor Arbiter up to the petitioner's actual date of
reinstatement n November 2002; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153569. January 24, 2012.*

LOLITA S. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. MINEX IMPORT CORPORATION/MINERAMA CORPORATION, KENNETH

MEYERS, SYLVIA P. MARIANO, and VINA MARIANO, respondents.

Labor Law; Termination of Employment; To dismiss an employee, the law requires the existence of a just and valid
cause.To dismiss an employee, the law requires the existence of a just and valid cause. Article 282 of the Labor Code
enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latters representative in connection with the employees work; (b)
gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other
causes analogous to the foregoing.

Same; Same; Acquittal of Employee; The acquittal of the employee from the criminal prosecution for a crime committed
against the interest of the employer did not automatically eliminate loss of confidence as a basis for administrative action
against the employee.In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT Co.) vs. NLRC, the Court held that the
acquittal of the employee from the criminal prosecution for a crime committed against the interest of the employer did not
automatically eliminate loss of confidence as a basis for administrative action against the employee; and that in cases
where the acts of misconduct amounted to a crime, a dismissal might still be properly ordered notwithstanding that the
employee was not criminally prosecuted or was acquitted after a criminal prosecution.

Same; Same; Quantum of Proof; The quantum of proof required for convicting an accused is thus higherproof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubtthan the quantum prescribed for dismissing an employeesubstantial evidence.The
employer is not expected to be as strict and rigorous as a judge in a criminal trial in weighing all the probabilities of guilt
before terminating the employee. Unlike a criminal case, which necessitates a moral certainty of guilt due to the loss of
the personal liberty of the accused being the issue, a case concerning an employee suspected of wrongdoing leads only
to his termination as a consequence. The quantum of proof required for convicting an accused is thus higherproof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubtthan the quantum prescribed for dismissing an employeesubstantial evidence. In so
stating, we are not diminishing the value of employment, but only noting that the loss of employment occasions a
consequence lesser than the loss of personal liberty, and may thus call for a lower degree of proof.

Same; Same; The fair and reasonable opportunity required to be given to the employee before dismissal encompassed
not only the giving to the employee of notice of the cause and the ability of the employee to explain, but also the chance to
defend against the accusation.The fair and reasonable opportunity required to be given to the employee before
dismissal encompassed not only the giving to the employee of notice of the cause and the ability of the employee to
explain, but also the chance to defend against the accusation. This was our thrust in Philippine Pizza, Inc. v. Bungabong,
458 SCRA 288 (2005), where we held that the employee was not afforded due process despite the dismissal being upon
a just cause, considering that he was not given a fair and reasonable opportunity to confront his accusers and to defend
himself against the charge of theft notwithstanding his having submitted his explanation denying that he had stolen beer
from the company dispenser. The termination letter was issued a day before the employee could go to the HRD Office for
the investigation, which made it clear to him that the decision to terminate was already final even before he could submit
his side and refute the charges against him. Nothing that he could say or do at that point would have changed the
decision to dismiss him. Such omission to give the employee the benefit of a hearing and investigation before his
termination constituted an infringement of his constitutional right to due process by the employer Concepcion vs. Minex
Import Corporation/Minerama Corporation, 663 SCRA 497, G.R. No. 153569 January 24, 2012

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 153569 January 24, 2012

LOLITA S. CONCEPCION, Petitioner,

vs.
MINEX IMPORT CORPORATION/MINERAMA CORPORATION, KENNETH MEYERS, SYLVIA P. MARIANO, and
VINA MARIANO, Respondents.
 DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The employer may validly dismiss for loss of trust and confidence an employee who commits an act of fraud prejudicial to
the interest of the employer. Neither a criminal prosecution nor a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the crime is a
requisite for the validity of the dismissal. Nonetheless, the dismissal for a just or lawful cause must still be made upon
compliance with the requirements of due process under the Labor Code; otherwise, the employer is liable to pay nominal
damages as indemnity to the dismissed employee.

Antecedents

Respondent Minex Import-Export Corporation (Minex) engaged in the retail of semi-precious stones, selling them in kiosks
or stalls installed in various shopping centers within Metro Manila. It employed the petitioner initially as a salesgirl,1
rotating her assignment among nearly all its outlets. It made her a supervisor in July 1997, but did not grant her any salary
increase. On October 23, 1997, respondent Vina Mariano, an Assistant Manager of Minex, assigned the petitioner to the
SM Harrison Plaza kiosk with the instruction to hold the keys of the kiosk. Working under her supervision there were
salesgirls Cristina Calung and Lida Baquilar.

On November 9, 1997, a Sunday, the petitioner and her salesgirls had sales of crystal items totaling P39,194.50. At the
close of business that day, they conducted a cash-count of their sales proceeds, including those from the preceding
Friday and Saturday, and determined their total for the three days to be P50,912.00. The petitioner wrapped the amount in
a plastic bag and deposited it in the drawer of the locked wooden cabinet of the kiosk.

At about 9:30 am of November 10, 1997, the petitioner phoned Vina Mariano to report that the P50,912.00 was missing,
explaining how she and her salesgirls had placed the wrapped amount at the bottom of the cabinet the night before, and
how she had found upon reporting to work that morning that the contents of the cabinet were in disarray and the money
already missing.

Later, while the petitioner was giving a detailed statement on the theft to the security investigator of Harrison Plaza, Vina
and Sylvia Mariano, her superiors, arrived with a policeman who immediately placed the petitioner under arrest and
brought her to Precinct 9 of the Malate Police Station. There, the police investigated her. She was detained for a day, from
11:30 am of November 10, 1997 until 11:30 am of November 11, 1997, being released only because the inquest
prosecutor instructed so.

On November 12, 1997, the petitioner complained against the respondents for illegal dismissal in the Department of Labor
and Employment.

On November 14, 1997, Minex, through Vina, filed a complaint for qualified theft against the petitioner in the Office of the
City Prosecutor in Manila.

To the charge of qualified theft, the petitioner insisted on her innocence, reiterating that on November 9, 1997 she,
together with Calung and Baquilar, had first counted the cash before placing it in a plastic bag that she deposited inside
the drawer of the cabinet with the knowledge of Calung and Baquilar. She explained that on that night Baquilar had left for
home ahead, leaving her and Calung to close the kiosk at around 8:00 pm; that at exactly 8:01 pm she proceeded to SM
Department Store in Harrison Plaza to wait for her friends whom she had previously walked with to the LRT station; that
she noticed upon arriving at the kiosk the next morning that the cabinet that they had positioned to block the entrance of
the kiosk had been slightly moved; and that she then discovered upon opening the cabinet that its contents, including the
cash, were already missing.

Calung executed a sinumpaang salaysay, however, averring that she had left the petitioner alone in the kiosk in the night
of November 9, 1997 because the latter had still to change her clothes; and that that was the first time that the petitioner
had ever asked to be left behind, for they had previously left the kiosk together.

Vina declared that the petitioner did not call the office of Minex for the pick-up of the P39,194.50 cash sales on Sunday,
November 9, 1997, in violation of the standard operating procedure (SOP) requiring cash proceeds exceeding P10,000.00
to be reported for pick-up if the amount could not be deposited in the bank.
After the preliminary investigation, the Assistant Prosecutor rendered a resolution dated February 4, 1998 finding probable
cause for qualified theft and recommending the filing of an information against the petitioner.2 Thus, she was charged with
qualified theft in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-165426.

The petitioner appealed by petition for review to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied her
petition for review on July 4, 2001.3

As to the petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal, Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera rendered his decision dated December
15, 1998, viz:4

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and against the
respondents declaring the dismissal of the latter from work illegal and ordering her reinstatement to her former work
position with full backwages counted from November 10, 1997 until her actual reinstatement without loss of seniority or
other employees rights and benefits.

Respondents are likewise ordered to pay complainant her monetary claims above as well as moral damages of
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P20,000.00.

Lastly, respondents are liable to pay ten percent (10%) of the total award as and by way of payment of attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal by the respondents, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on December 28, 2000, declaring that the petitioner had not been dismissed, but had abandoned her job after
being found to have stolen the proceeds of the sales; and holding that even if she had been dismissed, her dismissal
would be justifiable for loss of trust and confidence in the light of the finding of probable cause by the DOJ and the City
Prosecutor and the filing of the information for qualified theft against her. 5

The NLRC deleted the awards of backwages, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees, opining that the petitioner would be entitled to an award of damages only when
the dismissal was shown to be effected in bad faith or fraud or was an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to good morals, good customs, or public policy. 6

After the NLRC denied her motion for reconsideration on March 16, 2001, the petitioner challenged the reversal by the
NLRC in the Court of Appeals (CA) on certiorari, claiming that the NLRC thereby committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction for finding that there had been lawful cause to dismiss her; and insisting that the NLRC
relied on mere suspicions and surmises, disregarding not only her explanations that, if considered, would have warranted
a judgment in her favor but even the findings and disquisitions of the Labor Arbiter, which were in full accord with pertinent
case law.

On December 20, 2001,7 however, the CA sustained the NLRC mainly because of the DOJ Secretarys finding of
probable cause for qualified theft, holding:

With the finding of probable cause not only by the Investigating Prosecutor but by the Secretary of Justice no less, it
cannot be validly claimed, as the Petitioner does, in her Petition at bench, that there is no lawful cause for her dismissal.
The felony of qualified theft involves moral turpitude.

"Respondent cannot use social justice to shield wrongdoing. He occupied a position of trust and confidence. Petitioner
relied on him to protect the properties of the company. Respondent betrayed this trust when he ordered the subject lamp
posts to be delivered to the Adelfa Homeowners Association. The offense he committed involves moral turpitude. Indeed,
a City Prosecutor found probable cause to file an information for qualified theft against him." (United South Dockhandlers,
Inc., versus NLRC, et al., 267 SCRA 401, at page 407, supra)

Admittedly, there is no direct evidence that the Petitioner took the money from the drawer in the cabinet in the Kiosk. But
direct evidence that the Petitioner took the money is not required for the Petitioner to be lawfully dismissed for the loss of
the money of the Private Respondent corporation. If circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of
conviction in criminal cases under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, there is no cogent reason why
circumstantial evidence is not sufficient on which to anchor a factual basis for the dismissal of the Petitioner for loss of
confidence.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition at bench is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

On May 13, 2002, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. 8

Issues

In her appeal, the petitioner submits that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IN THE CASE AT BAR,
PARTICULARLY IN FINDING THAT:

1. THERE WAS JUST CAUSE FOR HER DISMISSAL, AND

2. RESPONDENT NEED NOT AFFORD THE PETITIONER DUE PROCESS TO PETITIONER.

Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The decisive issue for resolution is whether or not the petitioner was terminated for a just and valid cause.

To dismiss an employee, the law requires the existence of a just and valid cause. Article 282 of the Labor Code
enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latters representative in connection with the employees work; (b)
gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other
causes analogous to the foregoing.

The NLRC held that the termination of the petitioner was due to loss of trust and confidence. Sustaining the NLRC, the CA
stated:

With the finding of probable cause not only by the investigating prosecutor but by the Secretary of Justice no less, it
cannot be validly claimed, as the Petitioner does, in her Petition at bench, that there is no lawful cause for her dismissal
xxx.

xxx

Admittedly, there is no direct evidence that the Petitioner took the money from the drawer in the cabinet in the Kiosk. But
direct evidence that the Petitioner took the money is not required for the Petitioner to be lawfully dismissed for the loss of
the money of the Private Respondent corporation. If circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of
conviction in criminal cases under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, there is no cogent reason why
circumstantial evidence is not sufficient on which to anchor a factual basis for the dismissal of the Petitioner for loss of
confidence.9

The petitioner still argues, however, that there was no evidence at all upon which Minex could validly dismiss her
considering that she had not yet been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft.

The petitioners argument is not novel. It has been raised and rejected many times before on the basis that neither
conviction beyond reasonable doubt for a crime against the employer nor acquittal after criminal prosecution was
indispensable. Nor was a formal charge in court for the acts prejudicial to the interest of the employer a pre-requisite for a
valid dismissal.

In its1941 ruling in National Labor Union, Inc. v. Standard Vacuum Oil Company,10 the Court expressly stated thus:

xxx The conviction of an employee in a criminal case is not indispensable to warrant his dismissal by his
employer. If there is sufficient evidence to show that the employee has been guilty of a breach of trust, or that his
employer has ample reason to distrust him, it cannot justly deny to the employer the authority to dismiss such
employee. All that is incumbent upon the Court of Industrial Relations (now National Labor Relations Commission) to
determine is whether the proposed dismissal is for just cause xxx. It is not necessary for said court to find that an
employee has been guilty of a crime beyond reasonable doubt in order to authorize his dismissal. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.(BLTB Co.) vs. NLRC,11 the Court held that the acquittal of the employee from
the criminal prosecution for a crime committed against the interest of the employer did not automatically eliminate loss of
confidence as a basis for administrative action against the employee; and that in cases where the acts of misconduct
amounted to a crime, a dismissal might still be properly ordered notwithstanding that the employee was not criminally
prosecuted or was acquitted after a criminal prosecution.

In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. NLRC,12 the Court explained further, as follows:

Fraud or willful breach of trust reposed upon an employee by his employer is a recognized cause for termination of
employment and it is not necessary that the employer should await the employees final conviction in the criminal
case involving such fraud or breach of trust before it can terminate the employees services. In fact, even the
dropping of the charges or an acquittal of the employee therefrom does not preclude the dismissal of an
employee for acts inimical to the interests of the employer.

To our mind, the criminal charges initiated by the company against private respondents and the finding after
preliminary investigation of their prima facie guilt of the offense charged constitute substantial evidence
sufficient to warrant a finding by the Labor Tribunal of the existence of a just cause for their termination based on
loss of trust and confidence. The Labor Tribunal need not have gone further as to require private respondents
conviction of the crime charged, or inferred innocence on their part from their release from detention, which was mainly
due to their posting of bail. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the employer is not expected to be as strict and rigorous as a judge in a criminal trial in weighing all the
probabilities of guilt before terminating the employee. Unlike a criminal case, which necessitates a moral certainty of guilt
due to the loss of the personal liberty of the accused being the issue, a case concerning an employee suspected of
wrongdoing leads only to his termination as a consequence. The quantum of proof required for convicting an accused is
thus higher proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt than the quantum prescribed for dismissing an employee
substantial evidence. In so stating, we are not diminishing the value of employment, but only noting that the loss of
employment occasions a consequence lesser than the loss of personal liberty, and may thus call for a lower degree of
proof.

It is also unfair to require an employer to first be morally certain of the guilt of the employee by awaiting a conviction
before terminating him when there is already sufficient showing of the wrongdoing. Requiring that certainty may prove too
late for the employer, whose loss may potentially be beyond repair. Here, no less than the DOJ Secretary found probable
cause for qualified theft against the petitioner. That finding was enough to justify her termination for loss of confidence. To
repeat, her responsibility as the supervisor tasked to oversee the affairs of the kiosk, including seeing to the secure
handling of the sales proceeds, could not be ignored or downplayed. The employers loss of trust and confidence in her
was directly rooted in the manner of how she, as the supervisor, had negligently handled the large amount of sales by
simply leaving the amount inside the cabinet drawer of the kiosk despite being aware of the great risk of theft. At the very
least, she could have resorted to the SOP of first seeking guidance from the main office on how to secure the amount if
she could not deposit in the bank due to that day being a Sunday.

Yet, even as we now say that the respondents had a just or valid cause for terminating the petitioner, it becomes
unavoidable to ask whether or not they complied with the requirements of due process prior to the termination as
embodied in Section 2 (d) of Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code, viz:

Section 2. Security of tenure. xxx

xxx

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
 (i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving
said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so
desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence
presented against him.

(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. (emphasis supplied)

xxx

We answer the query in the negative in the light of the circumstances of the petitioners termination set forth in her
affidavit, to wit:

xxx

14. While I was giving my statement to the security officer of the Mall, respondents Vina and Sylvia Mariano came
with a policeman and they brought me to Precinct 9, Malate Police Station. Cristina Calung also arrived and
together with the sister of Vina and Sylvia, they operated the booth as if nothing happened;

15. I was detained at the police station from 11:15 a.m., November 10, up to 11:30 a.m., November 11, 1997;

16. After my release from the police precinct, I contacted by phone our office and I was able to talk to respondent
Sylvia Mariano. I told her that since I was innocent of the charges they filed against me, I will report back to work.
She shouted at me on the phone and told me she no longer wanted to see my face. I therefore decided to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents with the NLRC, hence this present suit; (emphasis supplied) 13

xxx

The petitioner plainly demonstrated how quickly and summarily her dismissal was carried out without first requiring her to
explain anything in her defense as demanded under Section 2 (d) of Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the
Labor Code. Instead, the respondents forthwith had her arrested and investigated by the police authorities for qualified
theft. This, we think, was a denial of her right to due process of law, consisting in the opportunity to be heard and to
defend herself.14 In fact, their decision to dismiss her was already final even before the police authority commenced an
investigation of the theft, the finality being confirmed by no less than Sylvia Mariano herself telling the petitioner during
their phone conversation following the latters release from police custody on November 11, 1997 that she (Sylvia) "no
longer wanted to see" her.

The fact that the petitioner was the only person suspected of being responsible for the theft aggravated the denial of due
process. When the respondents confronted her in the morning of November 10, 1997 for the first time after the theft, they
brought along a police officer to arrest and hale her to the police precinct to make her answer for the theft. They evidently
already concluded that she was the culprit despite a thorough investigation of the theft still to be made. This, despite their
obligation under Section 2 (d) of Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code, firstly, to give her a
"reasonable opportunity within which to explain (her) side;" secondly, to set a "hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if (she) so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present (her) evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against (her);" and lastly, to serve her a "written notice of
termination xxx indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify
(her) termination." They wittingly shunted aside the tenets that mere accusation did not take the place of proof of
wrongdoing, and that a suspicion or belief, no matter how sincere, did not substitute for factual findings carefully
established through an orderly procedure.15

The fair and reasonable opportunity required to be given to the employee before dismissal encompassed not only the
giving to the employee of notice of the cause and the ability of the employee to explain, but also the chance to defend
against the accusation. This was our thrust in Philippine Pizza, Inc. v. Bungabong,16 where we held that the employee was
not afforded due process despite the dismissal being upon a just cause, considering that he was not given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to confront his accusers and to defend himself against the charge of theft notwithstanding his
having submitted his explanation denying that he had stolen beer from the company dispenser. The termination letter was
issued a day before the employee could go to the HRD Office for the investigation, which made it clear to him that the
decision to terminate was already final even before he could submit his side and refute the charges against him. Nothing
that he could say or do at that point would have changed the decision to dismiss him. Such omission to give the employee
the benefit of a hearing and investigation before his termination constituted an infringement of his constitutional right to
due process by the employer.

The respondents would further excuse their failure to afford due process by averring that "even before the respondents
could issue the petitioner any formal written memorandum requiring her to explain the loss of the P50,912.00 sales
proceeds xxx she went post haste to the NLRC and filed a case for illegal dismissal" in order to "beat the gun on
respondents."17 However, we cannot excuse the non-compliance with the requirement of due process on that basis,
considering that her resort to the NLRC came after she had been told on November 11, 1997 by Sylvia that she (Sylvia)
"no longer wanted to see" her. The definitive termination closed the door to any explanation she would tender. Being
afforded no alternative, she understandably resorted to the complaint for illegal dismissal.

In view of the foregoing, we impose on the respondents the obligation to pay to the petitioner an indemnity in the form of
nominal damages of P30,000.00, conformably with Agabon v. NLRC,18 where the Court said:

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer
to discourage the abhorrent practice of "dismiss now, pay later," which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The
sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into
special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.

Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered by him.1avvphi1

As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commissions, an employer is liable to pay indemnity in
the form of nominal damages to an employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to
comply with the requirements of due process. The Court, after considering the circumstances therein, fixed the indemnity
at P2,590.50, which was equivalent to the employees one month salary. This indemnity is intended not to penalize the
employer but to vindicate or recognize the employees right to statutory due process which was violated by the employer.

The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity
in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking
into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it
proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of
the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental
right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. (emphasis is in the original text)

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 20, 2001 by the Court of Appeals, but
ORDERS the respondents to pay to the petitioner an indemnity in the form of nominal damages of P30,000.00 for non-
compliance with the requirements of due process.

No pronouncement as to costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.