IMP 004 Fink, Hansen, Mora-Márquez (Eds.) - Logic and Language in The Middle Ages - A Volume in Honour of Sten Ebbesen PDF

Logic and Language in the Middle Ages
Investigating Medieval
Philosophy
Managing Editor
John Marenbon
Editorial Board
Margaret Cameron
Simo Knuuttila
Martin Lenz
Christopher J. Martin
VOLUME 4
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/imp

Sten Ebbesen
Logic and Language in the
Middle Ages
A Volume in Honour of Sten Ebbesen
Edited by
Jakob Leth Fink, Heine Hansen and
Ana Mara Mora-Mrquez
Leidenboston
2013
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Logic and language in the middle ages : a volume in honour of Sten Ebbesen / edited by
Jakob Leth Fink, Heine Hansen, and Ana Mara Mora-Mrquez.
pages. cm. (Investigating medieval philosophy, ISSN 1879-9787 ; volume 4)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-23592-2 (hardback : alk. paper) ISBN 978-90-04-24213-5 (e-book :
alk. paper)1.Philosophy, Medieval.2.Analysis (Philosophy)I.Ebbesen, Sten,
honouree.II.Fink, Jakob L., 1977editor of compilation.
B721.L57 2013
189dc23
2012035192
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Contents
List of Contributors......................................................................................... xi
Preface................................................................................................................. xiii
Introduction...................................................................................................... 1
Sten Ebbesen
1. Preliminary Observations on the Textual Tradition of Boethius

First Peri Hermeneias Commentary...................................................... 13
John Magee
2. Alberic of Paris on Mont Ste Genevive against

Peter Abelard.............................................................................................. 27
Yukio Iwakuma
3. Gilbert of Poitierss Contextual Theory of Meaning and the

Hermeneutics of Secrecy......................................................................... 49
John Marenbon
4. Instantiae and the Parisian Schools..................................................... 65

5. Tempting Moves: Anonymus Cantabrigiensis on Peirastic

Dialectic........................................................................................................ 85
Jakob L. Fink
6. Philosophers and Other Kinds of Human Beings according to

Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury.................................................... 105
Luisa Valente
7. A Logical Joust in Nikephoros Blemmydes Autobiography......... 125

Katerina Ierodiakonou
8. Strange Finds, or Nicholas of Paris on Relations............................. 139

Heine Hansen
viii contents
9. Robert Kilwardby and Albert the Great on Praedicamenta

and Praedicabilia...................................................................................... 155
Alessandro D. Conti
10. Culuerbinus somnians............................................................................ 171

Paul Thom
11. The Anonymus Aurelianensis III and Robert Kilwardby

on the Prior Analytics.............................................................................. 185
Christina Thomsen Thrnqvist
12. Demonstratio ad oculum and Demonstratio ad intellectum:

Pronouns in Ps.-Jordan and Robert Kilwardby............................... 199
Mary Sirridge and Karin Margareta Fredborg
13. A Note on articulatio and University Grammar............................. 221

C. H. Kneepkens
14. Explanation and Definition in Thomas Aquinas Commentary

on Aristotles Metaphysics..................................................................... 239
Fabrizio Amerini
15. Aquinas, Scotus and Others on Naming, Knowing, and the

Origin of Language.................................................................................. 257
E. Jennifer Ashworth
16. Concrete Accidental Terms.................................................................. 273

Simo Knuuttila
17. Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse: Limit-decision

problems in Peter of Auvergne............................................................ 287
Paloma Prez-Ilzarbe
18. Does Loving Every Mean Loving Every Every,

Even Non-existent Ones? Distribution and Universals in the
Opus puerorum.......................................................................................... 305
Laurent Cesalli, Alain de Libera and Frdric Goubier
19. Apparentia and modi essendi in Radulphus Britos Doctrine

of the Concepts: The Concept of Being............................................ 337
Silvia Donati
contents ix
20. Radulphus Brito on Common Names, Concepts and Things..... 357

21. Radulphus Brito on Relations in his Questions on the

Sentences..................................................................................................... 373
Costantino Marmo
22. Buridanian Possibilities.......................................................................... 389

Calvin G. Normore
23. Marsilius of Inghen on the Principle of Non-Contradiction...... 403

Egbert P. Bos
24. Logic, Language and Medieval Political Thought.......................... 419

Roberto Lambertini
Bibliography...................................................................................................... 433
Complete Bibliography of Sten Ebbesen.................................................. 455
Index of Names................................................................................................. 469

Index of Manuscripts...................................................................................... 475
List of Contributors
Fabrizio Amerini, Dipartimento di Antichistica, Lingue, Educazione, Filo-

sofia (A.L.E.F.), Universit di Parma.
E. Jennifer Ashworth, Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo

(em.).
Egbert P. Bos, Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, Universiteit Leiden.
Laurent Cesalli, CNRS, Universit de Lille 3 (UMR 8163, Savoirs, Textes,

Langage) / Dpartement de philosophie, Universit de Genve.
Alessandro D. Conti, Dipartimento di Scienze Umane, Universit dell

Aquila.
Alain de Libera, Dpartement de philosophie, Universit de Genve and

cole Pratique des Hautes tudes, Paris.
Silvia Donati, Albertus-Magnus-Institut, Bonn.
Jakob L. Fink, SAXO-Instituttet, Kbenhavns Universitet.
Karin Margareta Fredborg, SAXO-Instituttet, Kbenhavns Universitet.
Frdric Goubier, Dpartement de philosophie, Universit de Genve.
Heine Hansen, SAXO-Instituttet, Kbenhavns Universitet.
Katerina Ierodiakonou, Department of History and Philosophy of Sciences

(M.I.Th.E.), National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.
Yukio Iwakuma, Fukui Prefectural University.
C. H. Kneepkens, Faculty of Arts, University of Groningen.
Simo Knuuttila, Department of Systematic Theology, University of Helsinki.

xii list of contributors
Roberto Lambertini, Dipartimento di scienze storiche, documentarie, artis-

tiche e del territorio, Universit degli Studi di Macerata.
John Magee, Department of Classics, University of Toronto.
John Marenbon, Trinity College, Cambridge.
Costantino Marmo, Dipartimento di Discipline della Comunicazione, Uni-

versit di Bologna.
Christopher J. Martin, Department of Philosophy, The University of

Auckland.
Ana Mara Mora-Mrquez, SAXO-Instituttet, Kbenhavns Universitet.
Calvin G. Normore, Department of Philosophy, University of California,

Los Angeles.
Paloma Prez-Ilzarbe, Departamento de Filosofa, Universidad de Navarra.
Mary Sirridge, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Louisiana State University.
Paul Thom, School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry, The University

of Sydney.
Christina Thomsen Thrnqvist, Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and

Theory of Science, Gteborgs Universitet.
Luisa Valente, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sapienza Universit di Roma.

Preface
The present volume seeks to honour the work of an outstanding scholar,

generous teacher and good friend. There can be no doubt that Sten
Ebbesens eminent academic contribution to the history of medieval
philosophy over the last forty-five years has had a major impact on the
development of the discipline. His complete bibliography, collected at the
end of this volume, contains more than 250 titles, and his prolific output
on the development of logical and linguistic theory from late antiquity
onwards is second to none. Not only is he the author of numerous lucidly
written books and articles on often difficult historical and philosophical
topics, he has also edited a vast number of Greek and Latin texts, thereby
providing the scholarly world with a veritable treasure trove of sources
without which a comprehensive picture of the development of medieval
philosophy could not be achieved.
Besides his own impressive output, Sten has assisted no less than three
generations of scholars in strengthening their logical and philosophical
acuity and in developing their skills in Latin and Greek paleography and
philology. Over the last thirty years, he has welcomed a steady stream of
scholars from all over the world at the Department for Greek and Latin,
University of Copenhagen. Sten cherishes the idea of an academic prac-
tice fundamentally collaborative, and his many co-authored works with
pupils and friends attest to this.
On 23 June 2011, Sten turned sixty-five, and many of these friends, col-
laborators and former students gathered in Copenhagen for a three-day
symposium at The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters. A
majority of the essays contained in this volume were presented on that
occasion.
The symposium was made possible through generous financial sup-
port from he Royal Danish Academy and from The Danish Council for
Independent ResearchHumanities. It was organised by Professor David
Bloch (Copenhagen), Professor Russell Friedman (Leuven), and the three
editors of this volume. We would like to express our gratitude to both
David and Russ and to the institutions mentioned for their invaluable
support. We would also like to thank Professors Troels Engberg-Pedersen
(Copenhagen) and Lauge Olaf Nielsen (Copenhagen), who generously
offered their assistance in the initial phases of planning the symposium.
xiv preface
For efficient and enjoyable collaboration on more practical matters,

we furthermore wish to thank the staff at the Academy and Michael
Stenskjr Christensen, secretary at the Center for the Aristotelian Tradi-
tion, University of Copenhagen.
Jakob L. Fink, Heine Hansen, Ana Mara Mora-Mrquez

Introduction
Sten Ebbesen
The essays gathered in this volume range over more than eight centuries,
two linguistic cultures (Greek and Latin), and several theoretical disci-
plineslinguistics, logic, metaphysics. Yet they share some important
properties. For one thing, they are all written by people who (a) are my
friends, (b) have had one sort of scholarly collaboration or another with
mesome as early as the 1960s when the youngest contributors were not
even born, and (c) were so kind as to present papers at a symposium
on the occasion of my 65th birthday. For another, the topics of all the
essays fall within fields in which I myself have done research. And finally,
although those fields may not at first glance look to be closely connected,
I shall argue that in fact they are so.
The greater field is that of medieval philosophy, with special regard to
(1) logic and linguistics

(2) the connection between (1) and epistemology and ontology
(3) the interaction between the Greek and the Latin cultural spheres
In what follows I shall try to sketch some aspects of the development of

research on medieval philosophy during the last forty-five years and in
that way both put my own work and the essays contained in this volume
into some context.
When I started my scholarly career in the mid-1960s there were any
number of challenges for anyone wanting to understand something about
the history of medieval philosophy.
One was the lopsidedness of the Neo-Thomistic scholarship that had
until then dominated the stage. Neo-Thomism had occasioned a boom in
studies of theological texts from the late thirteenth century, but the prod-
ucts of the arts faculty had received scant attention, and in particular very
few Neo-Thomists had taken any interest in logic and linguisticsthis
in spite of the fact that much of the medieval discussion of the matters
they were interested in is barely intelligible without a sound knowledge of
the logico-linguistic training with which all philosophers and theologians
had started their scholarly careers. Take any Metaphysics commentary,
2 sten ebbesen
whether by an artista or by a theologian like Aquinas, there will be dis-

cussions of matters that overlap with matters discussed in the context of
the Organon (cf. essay 14 by Fabrizio Amerini), and if you want to study
theologians theories of the signification of names you had better also look
at grammatical works and commentaries on De interpretatione (witness
E. Jennifer Ashworths essay 15). Indeed, as Roberto Lambertini points out
in essay 24, we cannot even read Dantes Monarchia the right way if we
forget about logic.
Neo-Thomism had also produced a lop-sided picture of medieval phi-
losophy in another way by putting almost all the spotlight on the second
half of the thirteenth century to the neglect of earlier and later periods.
Twelfth-century theologians were not quite forgotten, but relatively little
studied, and Abelards commentaries on the Ars vetus were among the
very few purely philosophical works from the twelfth century that had
been edited before the late 1950s. The situation was not much better for
the fourteenth century. William of Ockham was considered an evil nomi-
nalist, and consequently only studied by few, though he began to receive
more attention after the Second World War. John Buridan was mainly
known for his theory of impetus.
A further characteristic of older research, which cannot be blamed on
Neo-Thomism alone, was an obsession with famous men. It is, of course,
true that the famous thinkers, the ones whose names we know, were often
the smartest ones, but if we want a coherent history of medieval philoso-
phy it is not enough to line up the usual suspectsAquinas, Henry of
Ghent, Scotus, Ockham etc.not even if we add all the people that have
in recent years regained some of their well-deserved fameRobert Kil-
wardby, Radulphus Brito, John Buridan etc. Much of the giants thought
only becomes really understandable when seen in the contexts of an on-
going debate the main evidence for which is found in the mass of anony-
mous writings. Mr Anonymus is a very important medieval philosopher.
To turn to point (3), above, the dependence of western scholasticism
on ancient Greek theorising was an obvious fact that nobody ever denied.
It was well-known that Aristotle and Priscian provided the fundamental
books for the study of philosophical disciplines and linguistics, and that
Priscian, though a Latin, relays grammatical theory developed in a Greek
context. The influence of Manlius Boethius commentaries on and com-
panions to the Organon in the formative years of western scholasticism
had also been recognized for a long time, and it had never been a secret
that he was heavily dependent on Greek sources.
introduction 3
Still, in the mid-1960s there was not all that much literature on Boethius
logical works, and L. Minio-Paluello had only recently solved the main
problems concerning who was responsible for which of the Latin transla-
tions of the books of the Organon that the Western schoolmen used. He
convincingly attributed not only the standard versions of the Ars Vetus
but also of Topics and Sophistical Refutations to Boethius, while also point-
ing to the importance of the twelfth-century master James of Venice, who
had done the standard Latin translation of the Posterior Analytics and a
soon-forgotten alternative translation of the Sophistical Refutations besides
translating also several non-logical works from the Aristotelian corpus.
Finally, Minio-Paluello had noticed in a Florence manuscript a consider-
able number of scholia on the Prior Analytics that must have been based
on a Greek commentary, and elsewhere he had found a few scholia on
the Posterior Analytics and the Sophistical Refutations with attribution to
Alexander (of Aphrodisias), the former with matches in Philoponus and
the latter in Michael of Ephesus commentary on the respective works.
Further material with matches in Michaels commentary on the Sophisti-
cal Refutations had become available in L. M. de Rijks Logica Moderno-
rum, vol. 1, from 1962, which contained editions of twelfth-century Latin
texts on fallacies.
To obtain a sounder understanding both of the Greek contribution to
scholastic philosophy and to rectify the lop-sided neo-scholastic picture,
one thing was needed above all: editions. In 1966, I became a part-time
employee of Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi with the job of
editing a collection of quaestiones on the Sophistical Refutations produced
in Paris in the 1270s [25].1 Heinrich Roos, the editor-in-chief of the Dan-
ish corpus, at the time mistakenly believed that those questions were by
Boethius of Dacia and hence merited a place in the corpus. The work on
that edition led to a life-long interest in the Latin tradition of commenting
on Aristotles book about fallacies, but it also made me follow in Minio-
Paluellos track and see if I could find out more about Greek influence on
the Latin exegesis of the work.
For that purpose I made an exhaustive study of everything I could find
in Greek about fallacies from Aristotle to the fall of Constantinople. Since
no ancient commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations has survived, in
1Numbers in square brackets refer to the list of my publications in this volume,

pp. 455467.
4 sten ebbesen
order to understand what might lie behind the medieval tradition I had
to study carefully the late-ancient Greek commentators on other parts of
the Organon, and Boethius too. The results of my investigations appeared
in 1981 [36], but I have had opportunities to return to Boethius on later
occasions [70, 102, 186, 228, 241], and also to the late-ancient and medieval
Greek Aristotelians, some of whom influenced Latin scholastics, while
others from very late Byzantium received an influence from their western
colleaguesif colleagues is the right word, for there was a striking dif-
ference between the rather small learned circles of late Byzantium and
the throngs of professionalized philosophers at the western universities
[104, 140, 141]. In my early publications I tended to be rather harsh in my
judgment of the Byzantine logicians, but in recent years Katerina Ierodia-
konou has on several occasions tried to find a more fruitful way of looking
upon their products, as she also does in essay 7 in this volume.
Back in the 1960s and 1970s studies of Boethius were hampered by
the fact that there were no decent editions of most of his opuscula. We
had to use the unreliable texts provided in vol. 64 of Mignes Patrologia
Latina. The first modern edition was L. Obertellos of De hypoteticis syl-
logismis from 1969. Later D. A. Nikitas has provided a critical edition of
De topicis differentiis (1990), John Magee of De divisionibus (1998) and
Christina Thomsen Thrnqvist of De syllogismo categorico and Introduc-
tio in syllogismos categoricos (2008). We still desperately need a proper
edition of the commentary on the Categories, but until recently I was
convinced I did not need a replacement of K. Meisers 187780 edition of
the two commentaries on De interpretationenow Magee has made me
change my mind, as he has shown that there is much to be learned about
the tradition of the texts that cannot be found in Meisers two volumes
(cf. essay 1).
My early work on traces in Latin texts of a Greek commentary on
the Sophistical Refutations led to the conclusion that the now-lost work
that had helped start the Latin tradition of exegesis was a translation of
Michael of Ephesus commentary, and that the translator was James of
Venice. In my search for Latin sources containing traces of the lost work,
I found several highly interesting works, one of them a voluminous com-
mentary on the Sophistical Refutations from around 1200, whose author
I dubbed Anonymus Cantabrigiensis. The size deterred me from doing
an edition, but four decades after my first encounter with the anonymous
I have gathered the courage to do the job. The edition will probably
appear in 2013, but Jakob Fink has had access to it and discusses an aspect
of its Aristotelian exegesis in essay 5, and the text also plays a role in
introduction 5
Christopher Martins essay 4 because it contains an interesting section

on instantiae.
The first to really see the importanceand the weirdnessof the
twelfth-century technique of producing objections, instantiae, against just
about any claim was Yukio Iwakuma, whose publication on the subject
in CIMAGL 38 (1981) earned him the degree of Licentiate (= Ph.D.) from
the University of Copenhagen. After his stay in Copenhagen (198081),
Iwakuma went on to become the worlds leading connoisseur of twelfth-
century logical texts, and on a couple of occasions we have collaborated
on editions [88, 115] as well as on a collection of sources for the tenets of
the several logical schools of the twelfth century (Nominales, Meludinenses
etc.) [109]. Indeed, one clear Sitz im Leben for the instantia technique was
in inter-school debates, as clearly indicated by Anonymus Cantabrigien-
sis. One major problem in the investigation of twelfth-century logic is to
identify against whom or which school arguments in the preserved texts
are directed, and to which author or school anonymous texts belong (and
most of them are anonymous). In essay 2, Iwakuma casts new light upon
the inter-school debates in twelfth-century Paris.
Perhaps the most sophisticatedand surely the most idiosyncratic
among the schools of the twelfth century was that of the Porretani, the
followers of Gilbert of Poitiers. My interest in the school was roused in
the 1980s when Margareta Fredborg and Lauge Nielsen invited me to
join them to edit the anonymous Compendium Logicae Porretanum, com-
posed by one of Gilberts pupils [52]. Among other things, the Compen-
dium greatly clarified our understanding of Porretanean thinking about
language. Gilberts own thinking was primarily inspired by problems of
theological exegesis, it seems to me, and this goes a long way to explain
his contextual theory of meaning discussed by J. Marenbons essay 3.
Back in the 1970s when I was scouring libraries for manuscripts with
Elenchi-related texts that might contain material of Greek origin, I
found in an Orlans manuscript next to two Elenchi-related texts from
the late twelfth century a commentary on the Prior Analytics from the
same period, and just as the Elenchi-texts contained material derived
from the Greek exegetical tradition, so did the commentary on the Prior
Analytics; moreover, it clearly presupposed a more extensive set of scho-
lia translated from the Greek than what Minio-Paluello had found in a
Florence manuscript several years earlier. This allowed me to form the
general hypothesis that except, probably, in the case of the Topics, the
Latin interpretation of the Ars Nova was helped in its infancy by trans-
lations of Greek commentaries (whether complete or partial), although
6 sten ebbesen
the Latins soon became independent of such help, whence the copying of
the translated works ceased, with the result that we can now only gather
fragments of them. In the case of the Sophistical Refutations it is now clear
that there is an unbroken tradition from the very first Latin commentaries
(about 115075), which to some extent depended on Michael of Ephesus
commentary, to those of the thirteenth century, which only retained a few
vestiges of his work. The same cannot be said with certainty in the case of
the Posterior Analytics, because we simply do not have any commentary
earlier than Grossetestes. But what about the Prior Analytics?
In 1981, I published an extract from the Orlans manuscripts Prior
Analytics commentary [35], but in spite of its interesting contents and its
being the earliest (partly) preserved Latin commentary on the text, only
Iwakuma did some work on it during the next decades, without, however
publishing it. Now, however, Christina Thomsen Thrnqvist has produced
an excellent edition with copious notes that demonstrate the texts affinity
to Greek scholia. We can hope to see it in print in a near future. Before the
discovery of the Orlans text, whose author I dubbed Anonymus Aureli-
anensis III, Robert Kilwardbys Notulae from about 1240 was the earliest
known Latin companion to the Prior Analytics. One would expect there to
be a tradition of commenting on the text linking the two commentaries,
but this has to be tested. A first step in this direction is taken by Thomsen
Thrnqvist in essay 11.
Back in the 1960s there were no in-depth studies of Robert Kilwardbys
works on logic and grammar. Important progress was made in the 1970s
by my late friend P. O. Lewry, who in particular studied the commen-
taries on the Ars Vetus. But in spite of the fact that by the end of the thir-
teenth century it had achieved the status of a classic, next to nothing had
been written about Kilwardbys commentary on the Prior Analytics until
the very end of the twentieth century. We now have a magisterial study of
the work by Paul Thom from 2007. I myself got introduced to Kilwardby
in 1973 when I began to look at his commentary on the Sophistical Refuta-
tions. My next encounter with him took place in 1980 when I was prepar-
ing a lecture about Albert the Greats logic that I had been asked to deliver
at a summer school that the late Norman Kretzmann was organizing at
Cornell University (during which, incidentally, I met Ashworth for the
first time). I read large portions of Alberts paraphrases of the Organon,
but no matter how much I read I could not make head or tail of it. The
man seemed to be blatantly inconsistent on any number of issues. Finally,
the philological part of me took over and said the only way to understand
what is going on must be to identify his sources. And sure enough, many
introduction 7
of the inconsistencies became explicable once it was realized that Albert

had used, and misused, the excellent commentaries produced a few years
earlier by his confrre Robert Kilwardby [see 37]. Albert and Robert are
again joined in both Alessandro Contis essay 9 and in Thoms essay 10.
Kilwardbys massive commentary on Priscian Minor is one that few
have had the courage to engage with. My late friend and teacher Jan
Pinborg was among those few, and it was he who directed the attention
of Margareta Fredborg and Mary Sirridge to that highly interesting text,
which they take up in essay 12 together with Ps.-Jordanus Notulae super
Priscianum Minorem, continuing a collaboration that started in 1980 when
Sirridge spent a year in Copenhagen, during which she produced a partial
edition of Ps.-Jordanus.2 Like myself, Fredborg had studied with Pinborg
in the late 1960s, and she, more than his other Danish pupils, continued
the tradition for working on grammatical texts, while the main load of
research in the area after Pinborg has been borne by C. H. Kneepkens,
Irne Rosier-Catach and Costantino Marmo, all of whose marvellous work
I have had the pleasure of following at close range. In Kneepkens essay 13
Kilwardbys Priscian Minor commentary also plays a prominent role.
In spite of the work on Kilwardby that I have already mentioned, and in
spite of Niels Jrgen Green-Pedersens thorough investigations of the tra-
dition of commentaries on Aristotles and Boethius Topics,3 and scattered
studies by other scholars, it is still a fact that very little is known about
thirteenth-century Organon commentaries from before ca. 1270. The on-
going work on Albert the Greats commentaries in connection with the
Cologne edition of his Opera omnia is sure to bring some enlightenment,
and so is H. Hansens current work on the tradition of commenting on the
CategoriesNicholas of Paris, the subject of essay 8, is just one of several
unedited commentators from the 1230s to the 1260s. Hansen is soon to
release his edition of John Pagus on the Categories, and a few years ago he
published an anonymous commentary on the same Aristotelian work.4
Such editions and the studies that they engender will help redress
an imbalance in our knowledge about the development of logic in the
pre-1270 part of the thirteenth century. For the fact is that we are much
2M. Sirridge, Notulae super Priscianum minorem magistri Jordani: Partial edition and
introduction, CIMAGL 36 (1980), ivxxviii + 1104.
3See, in particular, N. J. Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages
(Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984).
4See H. Hansen, Anonymus Domus Petri 206s Commentary on Aristotles Categories,
CIMAGL 78 (2008), 111203. For the edition of John Pagus commentary, see H. Hansen,
John Pagus on Aristotles Categories (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2012).
8 sten ebbesen
worse equipped with editions of commentaries on the Organon than with

editions of specialized treatises (summulae, treatises on syncategoremes
etc.), and the distilled essence of books of the Organon that we find in
summulistic treatises is no real substitute for the thorough exegesis and
discussion of dubia found in literal commentaries.
Not that the treatises with no direct link to exegesis are not interesting.
After all, that is where some of the radical novelties in logical analysis are
presented, and this is the reason why so many of them have been edited.
Works by William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain and Roger Bacon were
already available (though not in satisfactory editions) before the 1960s,
but many more have been added since. I have even myself made a mod-
est contribution to the stream of such editions [123, 188]. Often these texts
present their analyses in connection with the discussion of sophismata, as
is the case in the text discussed in essay 18 by Frdric Goubier, Laurent
Cesalli and Alain de Libera. De Libera and I first talked sophismata during
a 1984 conference in Stockholm, we continued talking in a series of semi-
nars on thirteenth-century sophismata when I was a guest professor at the
cole Pratique des Hautes tudes in Paris in 1991, and finally from 2001 to
2004 we were partners in a Project Sophismata that he directed. As part of
the project, Goubier came to my rescue so that together we could finish a
catalogue of thirteenth-century sophismata [232] that I had been gather-
ing material for since 1989. During the work our attention was drawn to
the text called Opus Puerorum, which Goubier is now to edit together with
Cesalli. From the Opus the authors of essay 18 have selected to present
its treatment of the sophisma Omnis phoenix est, which gave medieval
logicians ample opportunities to debate several important philosophical
issues.
While Opus Puerorum was probably composed somewhere near the
middle of the thirteenth century, Peter of Auvergnes sophismata are
rather from the 1270s, and also of a different type, the grand sophisma
in which a bachelors initial determination of a sophisma is followed
by lenghty quaestio-like discussions determined by a presiding master.
Ever since the late 1970s I have from time to time been working on an
edition of two overlapping collections of such grand sophismata, which
include two important ones by Boethius of Dacia as well as several by
Peter of Auvergne. A preliminary edition of Peters Socrates desinit esse
non desinendo esse appeared in 1989 [83], but it was not accompanied
by a discussion of the contents; this deficiency has now been repaired by
Paloma Prez-Ilzarbe in essay 17.
introduction 9
As already mentioned, my very first work on medieval philosophy

concerned some Parisian quaestiones from the 1270s believed to be by
Boethius of Dacia. Because the 1270s was the time of our prize Danish
philosopher, Pinborg devoted much attention to the period, and I have
followed in his footsteps. Boethius of Dacia himself soon became one of
my favourite thinkers [175, 182, 204, 205]. He had an impressive theory of
knowledge/science and an unusually clear notion of logic and grammar
as formal disciplines. And then, of course, in his De summo bono he pre-
sented the most spirited defense ever written, I believe, of the notion that
the ideal human being is the ideal philosopher. In essay 6 Luisa Valente
takes us back to twelfth-century foreshadowings of that exalted notion
of the philosophers life.
Among the results of my interest in Boethius and his near-contempo-
raries is a study-cum-edition of texts dealing with the signification and
logical properties of concrete accidental terms, or cats, as I called them
[69, 77]. When embarking on that study I had no idea just how rewarding
the investigation would be, but it turned out that I had hit upon something
that had been a burning issue for late thirteenth-century philosophers,
and which had ramifications in linguistics, syllogistic and metaphysics. As
Simo Knuuttila shows in essay 16, my study cannot remain the last word
on the matter.
Pinborg was also very interested in the subsequent developments in
Paris in the following couple of decades, and concentrated on the work of
Radulphus Brito, whom few had heard of in the 1960s. Among the few was
Pinborgs teacher H. Roos, who at one point chaired a series of workshops
on Radulphus theory of universals, concentrated around the question
utrum species possit salvari in unica specie. Both Pinborg and I participated.
Among the results of our discussions was an article by Roos5 that for the
first time highlighted the role of the notion of apparens in Radulphus, that
is, an external manifestation by which a things form reveals itself. Later
research by Pinborg and myself confirmed the centrality of apparentia in
Radulphus theory of cognition, and the reader can learn more about this
in Silvia Donatis essay (19). Spurred by Roos and Pinborgs interest in
Radulphus, I have repeatedly discussed his theories on a variety of mat-
ters and edited extracts from his voluminous sophismata [26] and his no
5H. Roos, Zur Begriffsgeschichte des Terminus apparens in den logischen Schriften
des ausgehenden 13. Jahrhunderts, in Virtus Politica: Festgabe zum 75. Geburtstag von
Alfons Hufnagel (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974), pp. 32334.
10 sten ebbesen
less voluminous quaestiones on the books of the Organon [44, 73, etc.] as
well as his rather brief Questions on the Metaphysics [166, 176]. Ana Mara
Mora-Mrquez (essay 20) and Costantino Marmo (essay 21) continue the
exploration of Radulphus thought, and though he is now by no means the
virtually unknown person that he was in the 1960s, the sheer bulk of his
work means that there is plenty to do for future research.
I mentioned earlier that in my youth John Buridan was very little
known. It was known, of course, that he must have been of some impor-
tance, as the libraries of Europe held quite a number of manuscripts of his
works, and it was also known that he had dedicated followers long after
his death. But apart from a few details, such as his holding a theory of
impetus to explain projectile motion, even dedicated historians of philoso-
phy had very little idea of what exactly his works contained. It helped a
little when reprints of Renaissance editions of his questions on Ethics and
Metaphysics appeared in the 1960s, but other parts of his oeuvre, including
his logic, remained almost entirely terra incognita, although there were a
few pioneering studies from the 1950s by M. E. Reina.
Two men contributed crucially to change that situation: H. Hubien and
J. Pinborg. In 1975 Pinborg convened a symposium in Copenhagen to dis-
cuss the logic of John Buridan. Out of that symposium grew a decision
to do a joint effort to edit Buridans Summulae. The project has suffered
many delays, but now, thirty-seven years later seven out of the nine trea-
tises (counting the sophismata as treatise 9) have appeared in print, one
more has just been finished, and the last will hopefully appear in a couple
of years. At the 1975 symposium, Hubien could tell that he had an edition
of Buridans Consequentiae in press, that he had transcribed almost the
whole of the Summulae, and that he had transcribed Buridans questions
on both Prior and Posterior Analytics. Hubien put his transcriptions at the
disposal of other participants in the symposium, and until the critical edi-
tion started to appear his makeshift text of the Summulae served as a sub-
stitute. The 1980s saw a couple of American dissertations on Buridans De
anima and a Dutch one on his Physics. In 2003, the first ever monograph
on Buridan appeared, and new studies and editions continue to come out.
My own first foray into the world of Buridan was occasioned by the 1975
symposium [21], but he is one of those splendidly lucid minds to whom it
is always a pleasure to return, and I know that C. Normore, the author of
essay 22, agrees with me. A comparison of Normores essay with the pre-
1975 literature on Buridan makes it impossible to deny that there is such
a thing as progress in scholarship.
introduction 11
The radically novel nominalism of Ockham and Buridan gave rise to a

schism in the academic world that lasted till the end of the Middle Ages,
with nominalists and realists at loggerheads with each other. Among the
contributors to the present volume, A. Conti has done much to illuminate
the world of fourteenth-century realists, some of whom might deserve to
be called super-realists; he introduced me to that world during a stay
in Copenhagen in 1983, and I must admit I was shocked by what I saw.
I have always felt easier in the company of nominalists such as Marsilius of
Inghen, an influential pupil of Buridans, on whose work his fellow Dutch-
man Egbert P. Bos has helped cast light in several publications, including
essay 23 of this volume. I first became acquainted with Marsilius in the
1970s when I was trying to compile lists of questions in all existing ques-
tion commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations. Some of the lists were
actually published [cf. 15], but a larger and revised collection (including
more information about manuscripts of Marsilius work) had bad luck.
It was to appear in a Polish journal, and the editors of the journal had
already done a lot of work to prepare my manuscript for the printers
when a paper factory burned down. In the days of planned economy,
this meant that no paper could be made available to the journal, and my
lists were never published. Anyway, Marsilius is a rising star on the philo-
sophical firmament. As far as I can see, he is in no way comparable to
Buridan when it comes to incisive and novel insights, and he does copy
Buridan a lot, but he certainly was no ones fool either, and will repay
further study. He also was important as a model to be followed at cer-
tain German universities of the fifteenth century, as I learned when, as
editor-in-chief of Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, I super-
vised Andrea Tabarronis 1998 edition of Thuo of Viborgs Questions on the
Metaphysics composed in Erfurt in the 1430s.
Looking back at some 45 years of study of late-ancient and medieval
philosophy, I feel that in the areas that I have been particularly interested
in, much has been achieved. Compared to the history of classical Greek
and Hellenistic philosophy, the development of which I have followed a
little at a distance, our slice of the history of philosophy has progressed
immensely (and I include linguistics thought when I say philosophy),
and this in spite of the fact that I think great advances have been made
in the investigation of Hellenistic philosophy. But, then, it is no wonder.
For many aspects of late-ancient and medieval philosophy there was very
little to build on in the mid-1960s when my career as a historian of phi-
losophy started. Most late-ancient texts had been edited, but even the
12 sten ebbesen
treasure trove that is Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca was exploited

by rather few scholarsit only reached a wider public during the last
couple of decades thanks to Richard Sorabjis Ancient Commentators on
Aristotle project that presents the CAG texts in English translation. Some
of the major medieval theologians were available in more or less satis-
factory editions, but very little had been done to make the works of the
masters of arts available. Several philosophical sub-disciplines had hardly
been studied at all and there were long stretches of time to which little
attention had been paid. We are still far from having a satisfactory pic-
ture of the areas of late-ancient and medieval philosophy that were under-
studied forty-five years ago, but a picture is emerging.
The 1960s was a time when philosophers and linguists often thought
they had a lot in common. For a philologist like myself with philosophical
interests that made excellent sense. I still think so, and I believe that the
present volume not only demonstrates the general progress in the study
of medieval philosophy during the last forty-five years, but also bears out
the truth of the claim that an understanding of the medievals logic-cum-
linguistics is essential to understanding medieval philosophy at all.
1.Preliminary Observations on the Textual Tradition of
Boethius First Peri Hermeneias Commentary
John Magee
Auch einem Philologen steht es wohl an, das Ziel seines

Strebens und den Weg dahin in die kurze Formel eines
Glaubensbekenntnisses zu drngen; und so sei dies
gethan, indem ich einen Satz des Seneca also umkehre,
philosophia facta est quae philologia fuit.
F. Nietzsche
In editing the first of Boethius two commentaries on Aristotles Peri
Hermeneias Carl Meiser essentially worked from a single witness,
F (below), which he ranked both antiquissimus and optimus.1 Readings
from three other Munich manuscripts, E (MS Bayer. Staatsbibl. clm
14401, s. xi), M (below), and T (MS Bayer. Staatsbibl. clm 18479, s. xi), he
reported perpetuo more but with varying degrees of accuracy.2 He further
consulted two St. Gall manuscripts, G (below) and S (MS Stiftsbibl. 817,
s. xixii) omnibus locis paulo difficilioribusciting them only infrequently,
however, in his critical apparatus. From Peri Hermeneias 17b20 on, F pre-
serves excerpted lemmata, and Meiser correctly recognized that the sup-
plemented versions found in other witnesses violate Boethius intention.3
But F is in fact neither antiquissimus nor optimus, and Meisers edition
suffers from a particular failure to distinguish between the three versions
of Boethius Peri Hermeneias translation, two of which form his commen-
tary lemmata. Hence a full assessment of the evidence seems called for. In
what follows, I hope to shed some light on certain salient characteristics
of the textual tradition. Four passages are presented below, as edited from
the following ten manuscripts:
1Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis , pars prior versionem con-

tinuam et primam editionem continens, ed. C. Meiser (Leipzig: Teubner, 1877), pp. viiix.
2Cf. J. Magee, On the Composition and Sources of Boethius Second Peri Hermeneias
Commentary, Vivarium 48 (2010), 15, n. 32.
3Above, n. 1; cf. Aristotle, De interpretatione vel Periermenias: Translatio Boethii, ed.
L. Minio-Paluello, AL 2.1 (Bruges: Descle de Brouwer, 1965), pp. xi; lii.
14 john magee
D MS Paris BNF lat. 6288, s. xxi

F MS Munich Bayer. Staatsbibl. clm 6374, s. ix
G MS St. Gall Stiftsbibl. 820, s. ixx
H MS Paris BNF lat. 6400F, s. xixii
Lo MS Longboat Key Bibl. Schoenbergiensis 101, s. ix/xi
M MS Munich Bayer. Staatsbibl. clm 14377, s. xxi
Ox MS Oxford Bodl. Laud. lat. 49, s. xi
P MS Paris BNF lat. 12960, s. ix
Pa MS Paris BNF lat. 13956, s. ix
R MS Rome Casa dei Padri Maristi s.n. (A.II.1), s. viiiexixin
In the upper apparats, the siglum C indicates readings from lemmata,

citations, or paraphrases of the editio secunda,4 t, readings from the trans-
latio continua,5 and , readings from the Greek.6 Brackets () indicate that
the evidence at issue is either partially or inconsistently attested. (In the
commentaries, c stands for the editio prima.) Nearly all lectiones singu-
lares have been suppressed, as have been a number of trivial variants and
errors shared by two or more witnesses.
4Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis , pars posterior secundam

editionem et indices continens, ed. C. Meiser (Leipzig: Teubner, 1880).
5Aristotle, De interpretatione vel Periermenias (see n. 3 above).
6Aristotle, Categoriae et liber de interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Oxford: Claren-
don, 1949).
boethius first peri hermeneias commentary 15
1.p. 49f. Meiser
49.2 dat autem differentias simplicium nominum et 3 compositorum:
16a22 At vero non 23 quemadmodum in simplicibus nominibus sic

se habet etiam in compositis; 24 in illis enim nullo modo pars sig-
nificativa est, 25 in his autem vult quidem, sed nullius separati,
26 ut in eo quod est equiferus ferus.
9 Simplicis, inquit, nominisquoniam non constat 10 ex aliispartes

ne imaginatione quidem significationis 11 aliquid produnt, ut in eo nom-
ine quod est homo 12 neque ho neque mo quidquam significant nec
significare 13 putantur, idcirco quoniam simplex nomen est. 14 in his vero
quae composita sunt, quoniam ex duobus 15 significativis in unam sig-
nificantiam rediguntur, vult 16 quidem significare aliquid pars sed nihil
separatum 17 designat. in eo enim quod est equiferus dat quidem 18
imaginationem aliquam significationis et putatur significare 19 ferus
hoc est enim quod dixit, vult quidem, 20 sed nihil extra separatum
que significat. si enim hoc 21 ipsum ferus ut pars nominis dicatur,
dimidium nomen 22 dicitur eius quod est equiferus, dimidium autem
23 nomen nihil designat. ergo id quod dicimus ferus 24 cum alia parte
nominis quae est equi unum consignificat 25 equiferus, separatum autem
nihil extra 26 designat. quod si rursus ipsum nomen extrinsecus 50.1 non
in alterius nominis parte ponatur, sibi significat velut 2 nomen. ergo non
est similis in simplicibus nominibus 3 compositis que partium consig-
nificatio sed simplicium 4 quidem nominum partes nec ipsae significant
nec 5 significare putantur, compositorum vero volunt quidem 6 partes
aliquid significare et dant significationis imaginationem 7 et significare
aliquid putantur sed nullius 8 separati retinent significationem.
16a27 Secundum placitum vero, quoniam naturaliter nominum

nihil 28 est sed quando fit nota; nam designant et 29 inlitterati
soni, ut ferarum, quorum nihil est nomen.
16a23 etiam] C : et t25 separati] 26 eo quod est] om. Ct || ferus] C :

om. (t)28 designant] +
16 john magee
DFGHLoMOxP(PaR)
49.3 compositorum + dicit enim FGOx
16a22 vero non GcHOxP : vero DFGLoM : non Mc23 habet HMOxP : -ent DFGLo
26 ferus] R : om. HMPRc
49.9 inquit] FPa2 : -quid DF(in ead. lect.),Pa10 partes DFLoMOxPPa : -ibus F 2GHR(ut
gloss. Lo2M 2)12 nec] neque GOx16 quidem] Pac : om. || significare DGHMOxPac : -ri
FGcLo2(ras)P19 hoc...quidem] ? ut glossema || hoc] autem DMP : om. M 2 || enim] M 2 :
nomen DM : nominum P22 eius HMOxPac : id DFGLoP23 nomen] MPac : -minis M 2 :
om. Pa || designat] F(vid.) : -et ?F cOx : -ant R || ergo...designat (26)] R2 : post designat (26)
repetita R24 consignificat] Pa : + id est H : + ut est Pac26 designat] R2(v. ad loc. 23) :
-nificat : significat Pac || si] c : om. 50.1 sibi] M : ibi F 2 : per se praem. M2 : id est s.
per se Ox : om. F3 consignificatio FGH cLoOxR : non s- PPa : s- HM : nominis praem. Gc :
nominis s- DPac6 significationis] 2 : -es 7 nullius] F 2Loc : -lus FLo
16a28 nam] F 2Gc(vid.),R2(ras) : non DFG(vid.),P || designant] Loc : -at DLo || et] G(vid.) : ut
Gc(vid.),Ox29 inlitterati] Pac : l- || nomen + B D mgFP mgPa
***
Readings are fluid throughout, corrections and glossing undoubtedly
being the source of much of the instability. Where manuscripts are not in
complete agreement with one another, it is sometimes possible to detect
remote connections, as in the case of the interpolations at 49.24 and 50.1.
The pair PaR stands out, with a number of uniquely shared errors (49.16,
26, 50.6, 16a29) and a tendency to cohere where other manuscripts come
into play (49.12, 22, 16a22f.); thus at 16a22f. and 49.22 they side with DFGLo,
M and P moving in and out of the picture. But Pa and R occasionally part
ways (e.g. 49.10, 50.3), and that their common source carried duplices lec-
tiones from which they occasionally selected independently seems clear
from 49.9, 16, 22, 24, and 50.3. Pa is not an apograph of R. At 49.2326 they
read as follows ([[ ]] indicate athetization signs in the text proper of R,
which also has a N<ota> in the margin):
R 23 designant ergo id quod dicimur ferus 24 cum alia parte nominis quae
est equi unum consignificat 25 equiferus separatum autem nihil extra
26 designat [[ergo id quod dicimus ferus cum alia parte nominis quae est
(q. e. ras.) equi unum consignificat equiferus separatum autem nihil extra
designificat]]
Pa 23 designat ergo id quod dicimus ferus 24 cum alia parte nominis quae
est equi unum consignificat (ut est s.l.) 25 equiferus separatum autem nihil
extra 26 designificat (s- p.c.)
Pa might have corrected to the sing. designat (23) on its own, but if it copied
directly from R, why did it adopt the correction to the latters dittography
but then plump for its designificat at 26? It seems far more likely that Pa
and R copied independently from a common ancestor (), which had both
designat and designificat at 26 and, in the dicimus at 23, a minuscule s that
was easily confused with r. As to dicit enim (49.3), either FGOx interpolate
or the others omit. Meiser adopted the words on the mere recommenda-
tion of F, but the general contamination in G and Ox raises serious doubts.
The hoc/autem confusion (49.19) suggests a Tironian Note.
2.p. 83 Meiser
83.1 ...individua namque de nullis aliis praedicantur. quoniam 2 ergo

sunt quaedam rerum universalia alia vero 3 singularia, manifestum
est quoniam omnis adfirmatio 4 aut negatio per haec constituitur:
17b1 necesse est autem 2 enuntiare quoniam inest aliquid aut non,
aliquotiens quidem eorum 3 alicui quae sunt universalia, aliquo-
tiens autem eorum quae sunt singularia.
9 Omnis namque propositio aut singulare habet 10 aut universale subiec-

tum sive adfirmatione adnuat 11 sive abnuat negatione. si quis enim dicat
homo animal 12 est, homo animal non est, universalem rem, 13 id est
hominem animal aut esse aut non esse, 14 proposuit. atque hoc est quod
ait, necesse est 15 autem enuntiare quoniam inest aliquid aut non,
16 aliquotiens quidem eorum alicui quae sunt 17 universalia, homo
enim cum sit universale, animal 18 illi inesse adfirmatio posuit quae dixit
homo animal 19 est et non inesse negatio quae ait homo animal 20 non
est. si vero aliquis sic dicat Socrates 21 disputat, Socrates non disputat,
alicui eorum 22 quae sunt singularia esse et non esse coniunxit. et
23 hoc est quod ait, aliquotiens autem eorum quae 24 sunt singu-
laria, nam cum Socrates singulare 25 quiddam sit, disputatio ei ab adfir-
matione iuncta est 26 sed a negatione seiuncta.
17b3 Si ergo universaliter enuntiet 4 in universali quoniam est aut

non, erunt contrariae 5 enuntiationes (dico autem in universali
enuntiationem universalem 6 ut omnis homo albus est, nullus
homo albus est); quando 7 autem in universalibus...
18 john magee
17b3 autem] C : vero t4 est] + ()5 enuntiationem] ()6 est 1,2]

om.
DFHLoOxP(PaR),(GM)
83.1 namque] vero
17b3 autem H : vero : quidem cett.
83.18 posuit] D cF : -siti P : prop- F 2H : potuit D19 inesse] Pac : e-
17b4 in] D cGc : om. DG || co. er. tr. 5 in] Pac : om. GPa
***
New here is the pairing of GM (), in evidence at 83.1 and 17b3f. At 17b2f.
both H and rightly presuppose corresponsive particles (...), the
second quidem (17b3) being a case of mere repetition, probably due to
homoioarkhton (aliquotiens), in the other witnesses. The latter may have
been an archetypal error, subsequently corrected somewhere above H and
. Which of the two gives Boethius ipsissimum verbum? H rightly consults
the citation at 83.23, while looks to t: Boethius probably shifted only
once, from autem (cC [135.29, 140.24f.]) to vero (t), not from vero (c) to
autem (C) and then back again (t). s omission of in- (83.19) is reminiscent
of 16a29 (1).
3.p. 93 Meiser
17b20 contrarie vero universalem adfirmationem et 21 universa-

lem negationem
5 Planissime omnes exsequitur dicitque contrarias 6 universalem adfir-

mationem et universalem negationem. 7 has enim nos quoque supra
descripsimus, hic vero 8 nunc easdem contrarie demonstrat opponi.
illud quoque 9 addidit, quod eas impossibile sit in eodem veras 10 ali-
quando cognosci. nam sicut contrariorum natura 11 in eodem non potest
inveniri, neque enim uno eodemque 12 tempore aliquid nigrum est atque
album, sic 13 quoque nec contrariae ut utraeque simul sint verae 14 fieri
potest. quod autem adiecit,
17b24 his vero oppositas contingit in eodem,

15 particularem adfirmationem 16 et particularem negationem designat,

particularis namque 17 adfirmatio universali negationi opposita est con-
tradictorie, 18 particularis vero negatio universali adfirmationi. 19 contrar-
iarum igitur oppositae possunt in 20 eodem verae aliquotiens inveniri,
id est particularis 21 adfirmatio et particularis negatio verae ut sint in
22 aliquibus fieri potest, ut est quidam homo albus 23 est, quidam
homo albus non est: utraeque sunt 24 verae.
17b26 Quaecumque igitur...
17b24 contingit] + () || eodem] + (C)()
DFHLoOxP(PaR),(GM)
17b21 negationem] F c(ras) : + (17b2126) ut omnis homo iustus est nullus homo iustus est
quocirca has quidem impossibile est simul veras esse his vero oppositas contingit in eodem
non omnis homo albus est est quidam homo albus M : + (17b2126) ut omnis homo iustus
est nullus homo iustus est usque (sic) quidam homo albus G : + (17b2123) ut omnis homo
iustus (albus H) est nullus homo iustus (albus H) est quocirca has quidem impossibile est
(i. e. h. q. tr. H ac) simul veras esse (e. v. tr. Ox) HOx
93.5 plenissime || omnes] Lo : -is P,? : om. GLoc || dicitque] Pa2 : -t quae PPa : quae R
7 descripsimus] D cR2(ras) : -ptionem D : dis- FPPa8 nunc] c : non Pa : nim R || quoque]
Loc : -od DLo13 nec] R c : ne : om. 14 fieri potest] non p. inveniri G : f. non p. M
17b24 eodem + (17b25f.) non omnis homo albus est et quidam homo albus est H
93.18 adfirmationi] R c : -ne PR19 contrariorum 21 in FOx : om. cett.22 aliquibus]

Pa2 : -quis : -quotiens H c(vid.)23 utrae quae FP
***
This is the point at which Boethius begins excerpting for the lemmata,
incorporating into his comments the intervening Peri Hermeneias text
in the form of citations and paraphrases, as with 17b24 (93.14f.) and 25f.
(93.22f.). , H, and Ox seek to close the gap between 17b21 and 26. evi-
dently interpolated the whole of 17b2126, G abbreviating (n.b. usque
[sc. ad]) either on its own or under the influence of an intermediary.
HOx, by contrast, interpolate only 17b2123, H subsequently compensating
with the addition of 17b25f. after eodem (17b24). The situation is roughly
as follows:
20 john magee
Ct

G
M
Ox
H
where marks the entry point for 17b2126, and its abbreviation (17b21
23). Whether drew from C, t, or both is uncertain. At 17b25f. M has the
correct word order (est quidam homo albus) but omits et (), while H
retains et but transposes est (quidam homo albus est, cf. 93.22f.); confu-
sion in Ct on both counts makes it impossible to ascertain the flow of
readings. The stemma is overly schematic, however, in that confirmation
of requires fuller alignment of (GM, HOx). Interpolated lemmata are
in fact a rare occurrence in Ox, which moves freely between available
options and has little or no authority as an independent witness. As to
the commentary proper, (93.13, 22, probably 5 and 8 as well ) and (93.5,
14 [non], 19) are once again in evidence.
4.p. 117f. Meiser
117.1 ...quod est impossibile et praeter communem cogitationis 2 naturam.

non est igitur verum utrasque, 3 id est adfirmationem negationemque, et
simul mentiri.
18b26 Quae ergo, inquit, contingunt inconvenientia haec sunt et

huiusmodi.
6 Si quis dicat vel in his quae universalia sunt 7 et universaliter prae-

dicantur vel in his quae singularia 8 in propositionibus enuntiantur
unam necessario 9 definite esse veram definite alteram falsam, talia
illum, 10 inquit, inconvenientia consequentur et alia similia, hoc 11 sci-
licet dicens de superioribus argumentis, in quibus 12 ostendebat omnia
ex necessitate contingere si quis 13 unam veram definite alteram diceret
definite mendacem. 14 quaenam vero adserat alia inconvenientia impos-
sibiliaque 15 concurrere his qui unam definite veram 16 proponunt, haec
sunt: si quis enim proponat unam 17 esse veram alteram falsam, tollit, ut
supra dictum 18 est, id quod est utrumlibet in rebus et omnia esse 19
vel fieri ex necessitate constituit, nil a casu nil 20 a propria voluntate,
unde fit ut neque negotiari sit 21 utile nec inire actum, quoniam omnia
consilii ratione 22 tractantur, ipsum autem consilium supervacuum est
23 cum omnia quaecumque futura sunt necesse sit evenire. 24 quid enim
unusquisque dicat, si hoc faciam, 25 illud mihi eveniet atque continget,
si vero hoc, illa 118.1 res eveniet? etenim nihil prohibet quemvis illum
adfirmare 2 aliquid esse faciendum, alium vero negare, 3 cum omnia vi
necessitatis eveniant. nam si omnia 4 quae fiunt nunc ante aliquis vere
praediceret, quis 5 dubitat quin illa quae facta sunt immutabili violentia
6 necessitatis evenerint? hoc est enim quod ait:
18b35 quare ex necessitate erit quodlibet eorum verum erat 36

dicere tunc.
8 Sed ne illud videatur incongruum, 9 quod rerum eventum non ex

ipsarum natura sed ex 10 propositionum veritate et falsitate iudicamus,
hunc 11 scrupulum ipse dissolvit dicens:
18b36 At vero nec hoc differt si aliqui dixerunt 37 negationem vel

non dixerunt;
13 Ad tollendum enim...
18b33 (117.25) vero] Ct : +
DFOxP(PaR),([GM],H), = consensus codicum
117.3 id...negationemque] ? ut glossema || est] Pac : + et || et (om. Ox) simul ego tr. :
post utrasque (2)
18b26 inquit] -quid DP : om. H || huiusmodi + (18b2736) alia si omnis (-es ?Hcomp) adfir-
mationis et negationis (-es et -es H) vel in his quae in universalibus dicuntur universali-
ter vel in his quae sunt singularia necesse est oppositarum (-tionem eorum ) hanc esse
veram illam vero falsam nihil autem (om. H) utrumlibet esse in his quae (+ sunt vel H)
fiunt sed omnia esse vel fieri ex necessitate quare non oportebit neque consiliari neque
negotiari quoniam si hoc facimus (-iamus H) erit hoc si vero hoc non erit nihil enim pro-
hibet in millesimum annum hunc quidem dicere hoc futurum esse hunc vero non dicere
quare (+ quod ) ex necessitate erit quodlibet eorum verum erat dicere (praed- ) tunc
(quare...tunc om. H)
22 john magee
117.10 inconvenientia] c : -ti P || de su. di. tr. 15 de. un. tr. || veram] Pa : + alteram
definite falsam HPa217 veram] + definite : + et H19 nil1 DFP : nihil FcHOx || a] Pa2 :
om. || nil2 DP : nihil FHOx21 quae 22 autem H : enim H2cett.23 sunt FMP : si-
Fccett.118.4 fiunt] Pac : -ant Ox5 dubitet GOx || quin DFGHc : qui in P : quim vel quun
: qun Ox : om. M : post sunt tr. M2
18b35 quare] F : + quod F2Ox || ve. er.2 qu. eo. tr. 36 praedicere || tunc om. DP
118.9 ipsarum] Pa : -a rerum HOxPa210 hunc] G : + enim FG2
18b36 At] id || aliqui FcOxPac : -quid DF : -quit P : -quis H || dixerunt] F : -rit F2H37
dixerunt] F : -rit F2H : + (18b3719a4) manifestum est enim quod sic se habeat res vel si
hic quidem adfirmaverit ille vero negaverit (ne....ad. tr. G) non enim propter negare vel
adfirmare erit vel non erit nec in millesimum annum magis quam in quantolibet tempore
quare si in omni tempore sic se habeat ut unum vere diceretur necesse est hoc fieri et
unumquodque eorum quae fiunt sic se habere ut ex necessitate fieret
118.13 at HMR(in eadem lect.)
***
(Lo missing for this passage.) The lemma 18b26 suggests the conclusion,
+ H = , as adumbrated earlier by 17b21 (section 3 above), although now
without the participation of Ox. At 18b36 H separates from (?) but then
compensates (cf. 17b24 [section 3]) by interpolating 18b3919a4 (nec in
millesimum...necessitate) after mutavit (119.7). At 117.2f. the evidence is
as follows:
: (utrasque) et simul id est et (Paac) (adfirmationem)

DFHP: (utrasque) et simul id est (adfirmationem)
Ox: (utrasque) simul id est (adfirmationem)
The reading (et...et) would appear to reflect repetition through some

confusion over the precise location of the explanatory phrase, id est adfir-
mationem negationemque; the complete absence of et in Ox may reflect a
process of hypercorrection. Assuming the authenticity of et, it is possible
to see that DFHP give the requisite reading but, like the others, leave the
explanatory phrase intruding upon the flow of the main thought, utrasque
et simul mentiri. The explanatory phrase may have been an interlinear
gloss in an archetype (); such glosses, at any rate, frequently disturb
word order in just this way when entering the text proper. 117.2022:
whence it turns out that there is no purpose in either deliberating or tak-
ing action, for (quoniam) everything is conducted by reason of delibera-
tion, but (autem) deliberation itself is superfluous when all that is to be
occurs of necessity. The aim is a reductio, the result petitio principii; but
the general line of thought is clear. As to quoniam/quae (117.21), the point
is, not to specify, but to furnish grounds for the (false) conclusion that
all action is in vain; probably misinterprets a compendium. And as to
autem (117.22), the intensifying ipsum strongly favors an adversative par-
ticle over the explanatory enim; H may be emending another error in .
and are evident also at other points in the passage (117.10, 15, 17, 21,
18b35f.), and is once again in view (117.3, 19, 18b36). Ox remains a move-
able feast.
***
Although these four passages would appear to be suggestive of an order
gradually emerging out of chaos, the impression they create is in fact mis-
leading in that the relative clarity of 3 and 4 is in effect a function of the
advent of a different kind of evidence: as Boethius begins to work with
excerpted lemmata and medieval scribes attempt to fill in the gaps, a new
pattern inevitably comes into view. But do the patterns suggested by the
lemmata have binding force with respect to the text of the commentary
as a whole?
Lorenzo Minio-Paluellos analysis of the lemmata is illuminating in this
respect.7 The medieval tradition of the editio prima, he noted, descends
from a copy connected with Alcuin, traces of which survive in the three
earliest and least contaminated witnesses, R, Pa, and the fragment C (MS
Paris BNF lat. 12949, s. ix). R, the closest to Alcuin and earliest of the group,
goes back to Lyon, and CPa to Corbie, where in all probability c and (C)
t first intermingled. Thus (e.g.) at 17b32f. (95.9f.) Pa has the c readings
(pulcher, foedus) in the first instance and the (C)t ones (probus, turpis)
through correction (, we may note, adopts both simultaneously). P is a
slightly more distant descendant of the same Gallic tradition, but the ori-
gins of F, Gallic or Germanic, are obscure. Among witnesses that supple-
ment the c lemmata with (C)t text, H stands as sole representative of the
Gallic tradition, while those on the Germanic side (with the exception of
F, if Germanic) stand as a group. But, Minio-Paluello cautioned, contami-
nation is rampant throughout, especially from the eleventh century on;
family lines are blurred, and there is no codex optimus or possibility of
strict recension back to the source of the tradition.
7Aristotle, De interpretatione vel Periermenias, pp. xlilvii.

24 john magee
This account is in fact remarkably consistent with the conclusions sug-

gested by the evidence presented above, which despite its limited scope
nevertheless raises important questions for the tradition as a whole. The
stemma below paints in very broad strokes but is meant to draw some of
the questions into focus:

Ct

[?]

R
Pa P ?F ?Lo
G
D M
Ox
H
Is the same as what Minio-Paluello dubbed the corpus or exemplar

Alcuinianum, or does it reach back to some time closer to Boethius
himself? If the latter, then how far removed is it from ? Given the flu-
idity and contamination, what grounds are there for postulating as a
common (Gallic) ancestor of DFLoP? And how stable is the = +
(Germanic) construct? Amidst such uncertainty some indications, based
on the evidence above and elsewhere in the text, would at least appear to
be uncontroversial. Above all, Minio-Paluellos assessment of the contami-
nation that took hold already during the earliest phases of transmission is
correct, and there is consequently no hope either of working from a codex
optimus or of mechanically retracing the steps back to and then emend-
ing. Rather, passages and witnesses have to be weighed on the basis of
their individual merits. With which manuscripts, then, are we to proceed?
Non-interpolated witnesses: FLo, owing to their high level of contamina-
tion, require close scrutiny before being pronounced upon, but DPPaR
are essential to our understanding of this side of the tradition and must
therefore be retained. (PaR) is a firm hypothesis, although its relation-
ship to D and P requires further clarification before any conclusion can
be drawn as to . Interpolated witnesses: GM furnish indispensable data at

numerous points and must be retained. Ox, by contrast, whose commit-
ment to the interpolated lemmata is in any case weak, can and should be
eliminated from consideration. Finally, H, although highly contaminated,
provides for numerous passages readings which are noteworthy and oth-
erwise u
nattested. Whether a late messenger of ancient news or the mere
offspring of some intelligent medieval divinatio, H cannot be dismissed
out of hand.
2.Alberic of Paris on Mont Ste Genevive
against Peter Abelard
Yukio Iwakuma
Sten Ebbesen and I have composed a list of sources which refer to the
logico-theological schools of the twelfth century.1 As a supplement to it,
I have composed another list, this time covering references by name to
masters in logical texts written ca. 11301200. In the present paper, I shall
give some introductory remarks on this second list, which mainly concern
the controversies between Alberic of Paris and Peter Abelard on Mont Ste
Genevive.
General Remarks on the List and on the Albricani
Here is, first, the list of references to masters. Numbers set in bold refer
to the numbering of texts in my list of sources, which can be found in
the appendix to this essay; numbers set in roman refer to sections that
mention one or more masters. Alberic 1.12 thus means that Alberic is
mentioned in text 1 in the first and second sections which contain a refer-
ence to one or more masters. Abbreviations such as P10 etc. are explained
in the appendix.
Adam of the Petit-Pont: 6, 7, 9, 24

Alberic of Paris: 1.12, 46, 811, 1318; 2.13, 4; 3.2; 4.18, 1122; 5.112, 1521, 23;
8; 11; 13.12, 48, 20, 1224, 26, 28, 33, 3547, 5051; 15.7, (9), 11; 16.14, 67; 17.4,
10, 1217, 1923, 25, 2729; 21.1, 3; 25.1, 2(?); 26; 28; 29; 30; 32.1, 310, 11(?), 1214,
15(?), 16(?), 17(?)
James of Venice: 1.2, 46, 912, 1415, 1718, 20; 16.67
Peter Abelard: 1.19; 2.14; 3.12; 4.910, 13, 22; 5.814, 16, 1920, 22; 10; 13.24, 9, 11,
1213, 1516, 1920, 22, 2534, 4749; 14.4; 15.16, 89, 1214; 16.5, 8; 17.1, 3, 57, 9,
11, 16, 18, 20, 2427; 18.111; 19.1, 3; 20; 21.2; 22.2; 23; 27; 30; 31; 32.1, 5, 8, 14, 1819;
33.15; 34.12; 35.12; 36; 37.13
1Y. Iwakuma and S. Ebbesen, Logico-theological schools from the second half of the
12th century: A list of sources, Vivarium 30 (1992), 173210.
28 yukio iwakuma
Peter the Mangeur: 11a

m. R. (Parisiensis) = Robert of Melun: (14.1), 14.2, (14.3); 15.10; 18.1; 19.2; 22.1(?), 3
Roscelinus of Compigne: 17.8; 18.2(?); 22.2
William of Champeaux: 17.2; 32.14
m. Gib.: 28
m. Gallielmus = Gualo(?): 32.(2), 6
Cantaber Guarinus: 12.12
ma. Phi.: 13.42
William de Salbris: 11
Alberic of Paris and Peter Abelard are mentioned much more frequently
than other masters, and in many cases the two masters are mentioned
in the same texts, master Alberic positively and Peter Abelard negatively.
This is not an incidental fact due to an arbitrary selection of sources.
I have surveyed all the extant logic texts so far known, and the list aims
to be exhaustive.
This fact shows that Alberic of Paris, according to John of Salisbury a
bitter opponent of Peter Abelard, was a major figure in the mid-twelfth
century. And, in fact, many manuscripts listed in the appendix have
already been mentioned in the pioneering work by de Rijk.2 I have added
to his results only two major manuscripts: MS Paris Arsenal 910, and MS
Vienna sterreichische Nationalbibliothek VPL 2237. Incidentally, the
Arsenal manuscript contains not only works by followers of Alberic of
Paris (texts 2123), but also by followers of magister R. Parisiensis, who
may well be Robert of Melun (texts 18 and 19), and by Peter Abelard him-
self. The existence of the Arsenal manuscript, which comes from St. Victor
at Paris founded by William of Champeaux, shows that the monastery had
a big interest in logic in the mid-twelfth century.
The Albricani, followers of Alberic of Paris, are mentioned only three
times in the list of the logico-theological schools (nos. 18, 24, and 25b),
although much more frequent mention is made of other rival schools:
Nominales, Meludinenses, Porretani, and Parvipontani. All of the three
sources are dated to the late twelfth century. The theses of the Albricani
mentioned there are certainly those of master Alberic of Paris, as I shall
show in the next section. The shortage of sources mentioning the Albricani
suggests that the label Albricani was not yet coined in the mid-twelfth cen-
tury; instead, the school was referred to by directly mentioning Alberics
2L. M. de Rijk, Some New Evidence on Twelfth Century Logic: Alberic and the School
of Mont Ste Genevive, Vivarium 4 (1966), 157.
alberic of paris on mont ste genevive 29
name. Relevantly, in the preface to Logico-theological schools I cast

doubt on de Rijks identification of the Montani with followers of Alberic.
My doubt is strengthened by the fact that none of the theses ascribed to
the Montani are confirmed to be master Alberics by our new list.
We know nothing of Alberics career except for John of Salisburys report
in his Metalogicon 2.10. John tells us that when he came to Paris around
1136/37 he first attended classes by Peter Abelard on Mont Ste Genevive.
When Abelard left Paris soon afterwards, John attended classes given by
Alberic as well as by Robert of Melun. Afterwards, Alberic went to Bolo-
gna and dedidicit what he had taught and coming back to Paris dedocuit it.
That is all we know about Alberic. According to de Rijk, Alberic left Paris
for Bologna before 1142, and came back to Paris between 1146 and 1159.3
Many works by the followers of Alberic occasionally mention Abelards
teachings in the past tense. It is the case with works in the manuscripts in
Berlin (text 3.2; 4.13; 5.10, 21), Padua (text 13.47), in MS Paris BNF lat. 15141
(text 16.5, 8; 17.1, 3, 7, 9, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27), and MS Vienna VPL 2486
(text 34.1, 2). These texts are, then, dated after Abelard left Paris in 1137,
or, more probably, after his death in 1142.
Some of them have Italian local colour. For example, a passage in C15 in
MS Padova 2087, f. 29rb (text 13), contains the sentence Parmensis sextarius
est sextarius and Parisiensis sextarius est sextarius. And H17 in the Berlin
manuscript (text 5.20) contains the sentence ut iret Venetiam/Anconam.
Moreover, P25, another text in the Berlin manuscript (text 2.3), mentions
a bishop, Girardus, whom de Rijk has identified with Gerardus Crassus,
bishop of Bologna from 1145 to 1165.4 Therefore, the texts preserved in the
Padova and Berlin manuscripts are dated after 1145. Moreover, text 5.10 in
the Berlin manuscript and text 13.8 in the Padova manuscript both refer
once to Alberics teachings in the past tense. This indicates that those texts
were written much later than the others, after the death or the retirement
of master Alberic.
The followers of Alberic of Paris do not always follow their teachers
opinion faithfully, nor do they agree with each other. For example, a pas-
sage in C15 (text 13.45[2.2]) develops an argument against a doctrine of
Alberics, and text 13.43 gives a solution to a question which is different
from Alberics. Another passage in C15 (text 13.30) gives two different
3L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A contribution to the history of early terminist logic,
2 vols. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 196267), vol. 1, p. 87.
4de Rijk, Some New Evidence, 30.
30 yukio iwakuma
expositions of a phrase in Aristotle, one belonging to quidam de nostra

sententia and the other to nos. Disagreement on this or that issue does
not prevent these followers from identifying themselves as belonging to
the same sect. This is also the case with the Meludinenses. The Ars Meli-
duna (MS Oxford Bodleian Library Digby 174, f. 229rb) says: Consueverunt
quoque nostrorum plerique negare duo et tria esse quinque...Nos itaque
recipiemus duo et tria esse quinque. And in fact, another work by the
same school, the Fallaciae Melidunae (MS Paris BNF lat. 4720A, f. 21ra)
asserts: Meludinensis positio est quinque non esse duo et tria nec duo et
tria esse quinque. This suggests that Albricani, Meludinenses, and other
rival schools were something more than a group of masters with a shared
set of views. There must have been other reasons to connect them with
each other as members of the same sect.
The De Sententia magistri nostri Alberici
Each of the rival schools of logic in the mid-twelfth century composed

a list of theses peculiar to the school. So far, we know the Secta Meli-
duna and the Compendium logicae Porretanum. I have discovered another
such list, this time of the Albricani, entitled De sententia magistri nostri
Alberici.
Text 26. Sententia, MS Vienna VPL 2237, f. 31r (the whole text)
De sententia magistri nostri Alberici.
[1] Circa nostram sententiam dicendum est quod positio est, ut ait Aris
toteles, extranea opinio alicuius notorum secundum philosophiam.5 Unde
sciendum est quod principales nostrae sententiae positiones sunt quatuor-
decim, quarum quinque consistunt in hypotheticis, novem in categoricis.
[2.1] Prima in hypotheticis est positio, quod implicita propositio non
sequitur ad explicitam. Unde negamus hanc consequentiam: Si Antichristus
est homo, Antichristus est id quod est homo, et omnes huiusmodi.
[2.2] Secunda est quod ex falsa aliquid sequitur, ut si Socrates est asinus,
Socrates est animal vel Socrates est irrationalis. [against Meludinenses]
[2.3] Tertia est quod ex impossibili aliquid sequitur, sed non quidlibet, ut
si Socrates est asinus, Socrates est rudibilis, sed non sequitur si Socrates est
asinus, Socrates est episcopus vel lapis. [against Parvipontani]
[2.4] Quarta est quod ex affirmativa sequitur negativa, ut in oppositis
vel mediatis vel immediatis, ut si Socrates est albus, Socrates non est niger;
5Aristotle, Topics 1.11.104b1920. For the Latin translation, see Aristotle, Topica, ed.
L. Minio-Paluello, AL 5.13 (Brussels: Descle de Brouwer, 1969), p. 17:1718.
si Socrates est homo, Socrates non est lapis; si est sanus, non est aeger.
[against nominales]
[2.5] Quinta est quod ex negativa sequitur affirmativa, ut immediatis circa
susceptibile eorum, ut si Socrates non est sanus, est aeger, vel si non est
aeger, est sanus, et haec est vera dum Socrates est. [against nominales]
[3.1] Prima in categoricis est nostrae sententiae positio quod nullum ani-
mal est rationale vel irrationale. Habemus enim pro generali quod omnis
categorica de disiuncto est falsa praedicato, si talia disiungantur in prae-
dicato quorum communicatio non potest fieri in subiecto circa subiectum.
Et ita intelligamus illam: nullum animal est rationale vel irrationale, id est
nullum quod est rationale potest esse irrationale.
[3.2] Secunda positio quod congrue et vere dicitur omnis phoenix est
animal.
[3.3] Ter<tia> est quod omnis definitio praedicatur de pluribus; et quod
omnis definitio est individuum, non tamen aliquod individuum praedicatur
de pluribus.
[3.4] Quarta est quod omnis syllogismus est propositio et est argumen-
tatio.
[3.5] Quinta est quod convenienter et vere dicitur Marcus et Tullius sunt,
Marco existente; sed Marco non existente, incongrue dicitur.
[3.6] Sexta est quod hoc nomen homo a pluribus prolatum vel ab uno
pluries plura significat.
[3.7] Septima est quod argumentum est dictum hypotheticae generaliter
propositae, ut dictum huius hypotheticae si aliquid est homo, ipsum est
animal. Dictum huius naturalis est argumentum ad istas omnes argumenta-
tiones Socrates est homo, ergo est animal Plato est homo, ergo est animal,
et sic de ceteris. Dictum vero illius est hoc: aliquid esse animal si ipsum est
homo.
[3.8] Octava est quod nomen singulare et nomen plurale et rectus et obli-
quus et finitus cum suo infinito idem significant.
[3.9] Nona est quod aliquid est falsum; non tamen falsum est aliquid,
immo falsum non6 est.
This is nothing more than a list of theses with little further discussion
and explanation of each thesis, and at first sight the theses sound rather
strange. Fortunately, however, we have sufficient discussions that throw
light on many theses in the texts in our list.
Theses 2.24 are all concerned with Abelards argument against argu-
ments from the locus ab oppositis. This topic is already well studied.7
6non] lectio incerta, NN(?) W, fortasse nihil legendum?

7See C. J. Martin, Embarrassing Arguments and Surprising Conclusions in the Develop-
ment of Boethius Account of Conditional Propositions, in J. Jolivet and A. de Libera (eds.),
Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la Logica Modernorum (Naples:
Bibliopolis, 1987), pp. 377400. For the other studies so far made, see Y. Iwakuma, Nomi-
nalia, Didascalia 1 (1995), 48, n. 5. See also Y. Iwakuma, Influence, in J. E. Brower and
32 yukio iwakuma
It would be enough here to say that each logic school develops its own
thesis in relation to Abelards argument, namely:
Nominales: ex negativa non sequitur affirmativa
Meludinenses: ex falso nil sequitur
Parvipontani: ex impossibili quidlibet sequitur
These three theses are straightforwardly rejected by theses 2.24, respec-
tively. The Porretani and Albricani attack the procedure of Abelards argu-
ment itself in different ways. Alberics refutation of Abelards argument is
recorded in texts 3.2, 5.20, 14.4, 17.27, 32.18, and 32.19.
Thesis 2.5 of the De Sententia, that is, ex negativa sequitur affirmativa,
is closely connected to the previous topic. As I have shown elsewhere,8
it begins with Abelards polemic against arguments from the locus ab
immediatis. His followers, the nominales, summed up his discussion with
the thesis: ex affirmativa non sequitur negativa. Thesis 2.5 is a simple
negation of the nominales thesis.
Thesis 3.1 is nullum animal est rationale vel irrationale. We know what
this thesis means from the discussion in text 17.15, according to which
Alberic proposed a peculiar view on disjunctive sentences. The sentence
S is P or Q is false when S is definitely P or S is definitely Q; it is true only
when S is either P or Q but it is not known whether S is P or Q. Now, any
animal is definitely rational or definitely irrational (a man, for example,
is definitely rational and a donkey is definitely irrational). Therefore no
animal is not rational-or-irrational. This peculiar view of disjunctive sen-
tences is presupposed in the instantiae of the Albricani found in the list
of logico-theological schools (no. 25b). Godfrey of St Victors Fons philoso-
phiae (Logico-theological Schools no. 18) also alludes to this theory of
the Albricani.
Thesis 3.2 is omnis phoenix est animal, and is discussed in texts 2.3, 17.6,
and 17.9.9 This is once more against Abelards view. Abelard asserted in
K. Guilfoy (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2004), pp. 32428.
8Iwakuma, Nominalia, 48.
9Cf. also H10, MS Paris Arsenal 910, f. 171vb: In hac vero universalis definitione [Aristo-
tle, De Interpretatione 7.17a39b1; see De interpretatione vel Periermenias: Translatio Boethii,
ed. L. Minio-Paluello, AL 2.1 (Bruges: Descle de Brouwer, 1965), p. 10:13] exponenda multi
laboraverunt, dicentes universale esse quod actu ipso praedicatur de pluribus individuis,
et non aliter; actu vero praedicari de pluribus est sic praedicari quod plura subsistant indi-
vidua de quibus ipsum praedicatur. Quod plane contra Boethium est, qui solem et phoen-
icem esse universalia affirmat.
P1010 that phoenix is a species although there is always only one individ-
ual. Later, however, in P1111 and P1212 he changed his mind and asserted,
following Vasletus of Angers, that phoenix is not a species because there
is always only one individual. Consequently, Abelard asserted in P1213
that the sentence omnis phoenix est is false, which implies that the sen-
tence omnis phoenix est animal is false. Contrary to this view of Abelards,
Alberic of Paris asserts that phoenix is a species, and so it is true to say
omnis phoenix est animal.
Thesis 3.7 is also against a view of Abelards. I have discussed this topic
elsewhere,14 so I will only recapitulate the result here. Abelard and, fol-
lowing him, the nominales assert that argumentum est propositio. For
example, in the argumentation Socrates est homo, ergo Socrates est animal,
the premised sentence Socrates est homo is an argumentum to prove the
conclusion ergo Socrates est animal. Against this view of Abelards, each
rival school develops its own view of argumentum.
The Meludinenses say that argumentum est verum praemissum in argu-
mentatione efficax illatae conclusionis, namely, the dictum of the premised
sentence which is true and effective to draw the conclusion. Incidentally,
B14 in MS Paris Arsenal 910, ff. 34ra54vb employs this definition of argu-
mentum (f. 45ra). B14 refers positively to magister R. (text 18.1), too, who is
certainly Robert of Melun, and it is a product of a Meludinensis. Further-
more, on a number of occasions (text 18.111) it contrasts Abelards views
with those of Master R. or of nos.
The Porretani call argumentum a habitudo medii ad extrema. B15 (MS
Orlans 283, pp. 156a70b) holds this view with no references to rival the-
ories or masters (p. 159ab). Another work of the school, the Compendium
logicae Porretanum, contains no mention of rival schools either.
10P10 = Logica Ingredientibus, ed. B. Geyer, Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften,

vol. 1, pts. 13 (Mnster: Aschendorff, 191927).
11P11, MS Milan M 63 Sup., f. 77rbvb; cf. also ff. 76rb and 74vb.
12P12 = Abelard, Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum, ed. B. Geyer, Peter Abaelards
philosophische Schriften 2 (Mnster: Aschendorff, 1933). The whole of P12 is contained in
MS Lunel Bibl. Municipale 6, ff. 8ra41ra. I have collated Geyers edition against this manu-
script and found some points where I dare to disagree with his readings. In the following,
I cite both the pagination in Geyers edition and the manuscript. For the issue concerning
the phoenix, see MS Lunel Bibl. Municipale 6, f. 18vb against Abelard, Logica Nostrorum
petitioni sociorum, p. 529 and MS Lunel Bibl. Municipale 6, f. 21ra against Abelard, Logica
Nostrorum petitioni sociorum, p. 534.
13P12, MS Lunel Bibl. Municipale 6, f. 32ra (cf. Abelard, Logica Nostrorum petitioni
sociorum, p. 557).
14Iwakuma Nominalia, 5358.
34 yukio iwakuma
The Parvipontani assert that argumentum est dictum conditionalis trans-

formatae ab argumentatione. For example, in the aforementioned argu-
mentation, the argumentum is the dictum of the proposition si Socrates est
homo, Socrates est animal.
As for the view of the Albricani, it remained a surmise in my previous
paper, but the De Sententia gives evidence for my surmise that, accord-
ing to them, argumentum est dictum generalis hypotheticae. For example,
the dictum of the proposition si aliquid est homo, aliquid est animal is
the argumentum in the previous argumentation. Incidentally, B13 in the
Arsenal manuscript (ff. 58ra82vb) holds this theory and makes a negative
reference to the views of the Meludinenses and Parvipontani (f. 60ra). B13
never mentions Alberics name nor the names of other masters, and so it
is not included in my list. It might be a work of Alberic himself.
Thesis 3.8 of the De Sententia is discussed in detail in H15 (text 15):
H15, MS Paris BNF lat. 15015, ff. 183vb184ra (cont. of text 15.4)
Sed iterum, quoniam vocum significativarum quaedam significativae sunt
naturaliter, quarum nulla nomen est, ad differentiam huiusmodi vocum
post significativum additur ad placitum. Illa enim vox significativa ad pla-
citum est quae est ex institutione humana significativa.
Non tamen idem est vocem esse institutam ad significandum et vocem
esse significativam ex institutione. Duobus enim modis dicitur vox signifi-
cativa ex institutione: vel quia institutio facta sit in ipsa, vel quia communi
institutione significativa est.
Ex impositione vero in ipsa voce facta sunt significativa nomina finita.
In ipsa enim facta est eorum institutio, cum impositor vocabulorum sic ait:
res ista vocetur circus et haec homo. Obliqui autem sunt voces significa-
tivae ex communi institutione. Cum enim vox ista circus instituta est, talis
r(egul)a data est communis quod nominativus casus in -us desinens geniti-
vum terminet in -i, dativum in -o, accusativum in -um, vocativum in -e.
Omnes voces istae circi circo circum circe ex hac communi institutione
significativae erant, nec tamen institutae sunt ad significandum. Multae
enim voces sunt significativae ex institutione quae non sunt institutae ad
significandum, id est in quibus nulla facta est institutio. Sicut enim dicun-
tur orationes voces significativae, id est ex institutione voces significativae,
non quod in singulis orationibus institutio facta sit. Cum enim dictiones
infinitis possint coniungi modis ad orationes faciendas, si in orationibus
singulis institutionem facere voluissent, nullius esset impositionis terminus.
Sed postquam nomina imposita sunt, data est communis regula construendi
dictiones ad orationem constituendam, sic ut nominativus casus cum ter-
tia persona verbi in eisdem accidentibus coniungatur ad demonstrandum
actum verbi inesse rei a nomine significatae, et similiter ad qualitatem circa
substantiam determinandam dictum est construantur adiectiva cum sub-
stantivis in eodem genere et eodem numero et ceteris accidentibus eisdem.
Et sic ex illa communi institutione omnes voces istae Socrates legit Plato
disputat et consimiles significativae sunt. Similiter nomina infinita ex com-

muni institutione |184ra| significativa sunt, ut dictum est. Si quis nomen
infinitare velit, apponat nomini finito negativam particulam, et fit nomen
infinitum, ut ex hoc nomine homo per adiectionem negativae particulae
fit hoc nomen infinitum non homo; et sic in aliis.
For thesis 3.4 of the De sententia, see the section Alberic vs. Abelard on
syllogisms below. As for the other theses (2.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.9), I have
failed so far to discover more detailed discussions and do not know what
exactly they mean.
In addition to these, there are other theses peculiar to the Albricani. For
example, Logico-Theological Schools no. 24 ascribes to the Albricani the
thesis omnia tempora sunt. This is again against the view of Peter Abelard.
Abelard asserts in his C10 (Abelard, Logica Ingredientibus, p. 188) that it is
not true to say praeteritum is but that it was; nor is it true to say futurum
is but that it will be. This amounts to asserting that only praesens is (cf.
a similar passage in his Dialectica).15 Alberic attacks this argument, as is
reported in texts 4.15, 13.38, 27, and 34.2.
Two more well-known theses of the nominales are ascribed to Abe-
lard and negatively discussed. As for quicquid semel est verum, semper est
verum, see text 4.10 and 18.7; and for nihil crescit, see text 18.8.
In the following sections, I shall take up three more issues that were
disputed between Alberic and Abelard.
Alberic of Paris on Universals
As for the problem of universals, there are no sources in our list that dis-
cuss the issue straightforwardly. This does not mean that the problem
itself was forgotten. In many passages Abelards view is alluded to and
mocked (texts 1.19, 13.22[6], 13.30, 13.31, and 21.2). Text 13.38 scornfully
calls the sect of Abelard sibilatores, another name for vocales or nomina-
les. The lack of sources discussing the problem of universals suggests that
the Albricani supposed that it was no longer worth discussing the issue,
although the nominales still asserted their silly theory.
Peoples attitude to the problem of universals had changed radically in
the mid-twelfth century from that in the beginning of the century. This
is suggested by the change of style in the commentaries on Porphyry.
15Peter Abelard, Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk, 2nd ed. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1970),
p. 554:1428.
36 yukio iwakuma
Under the lemma Mox de generibus et speciebus (Isag. 5:10) commentaries

earlier than Abelards P10 (Logica Ingredientibus) simply introduce what
Boethius says about Porphyrys questions in his commentaries. After P10
it becomes customary to add before the discussion of Porphyrys ques-
tions a lengthy and independent discussion of universals, referring to
the nominalistic view together with various realist theories, namely, the
material essence theory, the collectio theory, and the status theory. This
style was adopted even by a realist in P17, a text that sides with the realist
status theory and was written in the late 1120s, according to my dating.
By contrast, two major commentaries written in the mid-twelfth century,
P25 and P20, go back to the older style.16 P25, written by an Albricanus,
contains no discussion of universals as such. P20, which I ascribe to a
Parvipontanus, does discuss universals, but in a very different place, at
the beginning of the discussion of the commonality and difference of the
five predicables.17 P20 simply says that there are two groups of masters,
and according to one universals are only nomina nominum, according to
the other they are only res, with no mention of earlier realist theories. P20
then says that, since both groups are supported by various authoritative
passages, universals are both nomina and res, and develops its own theory
that genera and species are maneries rerum.
The Ars Meliduna (pars secunda) mentions five theories of universals,
namely, those of the nominales, Albricani, Porretani, Meludinenses, and
Parvipontani, in that order.18 The latter four realist theories have little in
common with those proposed at the beginning of the century. In particu-
lar, the theory of the Albricani is introduced as follows:
Ars Meliduna (pars secunda), MS Oxford Digby 174, f. 219ra
Quidam enim, volentes hanc divisionem esse sufficientem rerum alia est
substantia alia accidens, ponunt omnia universalia substantias esse vel acci-
dentia, substantias ut hoc genus substantia et omnia eius inferiora, acci-
dentia ut alia novem generalissima cum eorum inferioribus.
16P19, which I would date to the 1140s, shows a transitory stage. Under the lemma Mox
de generibus, it first resumes what Boethius says in his first commentary, then adds the
view of the vocales (the extant copy ends while opposing the position of the vocales).
17From P20 (MS Vienna VPL 2486, ff. 45ra60vb), this part (ff. 56vb59rb) was extracted
to form an independent treatise on universals P21 (the same manuscript, ff. 1r4r). The lat-
ter is edited by M. Grabmann, Ein Tractatus de universalibus und andere logische Inedita
aus dem 12. Jahrhundert im Cod. lat. 2486 der Nationalbibliothek in Wien, Mediaeval
Studies 9 (1947), 5670.
18As for the nominales, Porretani, Meludinenses, and Parvipontani, I have briefly
discussed elsewhere what theory of universals they asserted. See Iwakuma, Influence,
pp. 31214.
Cuius erroris occasionem sumunt ex verbo Boethii qui in commento

super Praedicamenta,19 loquens de hac divisione substantiarum alia prima,
alia secunda, ait sic: Qui hanc divisionem esse generis in species negaverit,
a via veritatis exorbitat. In quo videtur velle hoc genus substantia ibi dividi;
et ita tam prima substantia quam secunda erit substantia, ut substantia
teneatur in vi generalissimi.
...[counterarguments]
Ponunt praeterea isti, ut diximus, novem esse genera generalissima, acci-
dentia cum eorum inferioribus; et eorum genus esse hoc significatum acci-
dens.
...[counterarguments]
That this is the Albricanis position is proved by the strange and non-
Aristotelian assertion that substantia is a genus of substantia prima and
secunda. The same assertion is made in a work of the Albricani, C15 (text
13.25). The Ars Meliduna says that they rely on a passage from Boethius
commentary on the Categories, but there is no such passage in Boethius
commentary. The mistake is explained by looking at C15:
Text 13.25 (part) C15, MS Padova Biblioteca Universitaria 2087, f. 13va
[3.1] Probatur quod prima substantia est substantia, quia dicit Aristoteles
Prima substantia est quae proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur sub-
stantia,20 ergo prima substantia est substantia.
[3.2] Item habet<ur> Bo(ethius) in secundo commento Periherminiarum,
cum dicit Est autem simplex enuntiatio una affirmatio, deinde negatio. Cum
probat affirmationem et negationem species enuntiationis esse coaequas,
dices <quod>, licet affirmatio sit prior secundum quandam dignitatem nega-
tione, tamen sunt coaequae species enuntiationis; sic[ut] prima substantia,
licet sit prior secunda natura, tamen sunt coaequae species substantiae.
[3.3] Et quicumque hanc non dixerit esse divisionem generis in species, a
via veritatis exorbitat. His rationibus demonstramus illam esse divisionem
generis in species.
The author of the Ars Meliduna follows a text very similar to C15 and
wrongly thinks that the italicised part of [3.3] is contained in the quota-
tion from Boethius.
Now, according to the Ars Meliduna, the Albricanis theory of univer-
sals is simply that universals are substances and accidents. What a simple
answer it is! Or rather, it says almost nothing about universals. And, indeed,
the Albricanis works so far known never directly take up the question of
19This is not in Boethius. Cf. the same phrase in C25, f. 13va [3.3].
20Aristotle, Categories 5.2a1112. For the Latin translation, see Aristotle, Categoriae
vel Praedicamenta, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, AL 1.15 (Bruges: Descle de Brouwer, 1961),
p. 48:3233: Substantia autem est, quae proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur.
38 yukio iwakuma
what universals are. It was seemingly sufficient for them just to refute the
nominalistic position of Abelard and his followers, the nominales.
There is a relevant problem which the Albricani frequently took up
(texts 13.26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34; 15.7; 16.6, 7; 19). It is the question of what is
laid down as the subject in such sentences as homo est species or animal
est genus. Their answer is that it is an individuum, a prima substantia, just
because the sentence is singular, not universal nor particular nor indefi-
nite. For Alberic, who simply solves this issue at the level of grammar, the
issue of universals has little ontological implication.
Mixta substantia
There is another disputed issue between Abelard and Alberic which many
texts in my list report. Authorities say that, on the one hand, the genus
substantia is divided into the species substantia corporea and substantia
incorporea; and, on the other, that a man (homo) consists of body (corpus)
and soul (anima). If so, to which species does the subordinate species
homo belong, whose one part, corpus, is corporeal but whose other part,
anima, is incorporeal?
According to P25 (text 2.2) and P20 (text 33.2), Abelard asserts that
the division substantia alia corporea, alia incorporea is insufficient, and
that there is a third species, mixta substantia, to which the species homo
belongs. Alberic of Paris asserts that the division is sufficient, and that the
species homo simply belongs to corpus.
It is true that Abelard asserts that the division is insufficient and that
the species homo belongs to the substantia mixta.21 However, this problem
has a long pre-history and the situation is not as simple as it would appear
from the description in text 2.2 and 33.2. Another paper would be needed
to describe the long pre-history in detail. Suffice it here to say that the
earliest record of this problem is in the Tractatus Lemovicensis, a work
by a proto-vocalist before Abelard, and in P3, which I ascribe to William
of Champeaux.22 I date both of them to the late eleventh century. In P3,
21Abelard, Dialectica, p. 557; P10 (Abelard, Logica Ingredientibus, p. 4849) MS Milan

Bibl. Ambrosiana M 63 sup., f. 7rbva; P12 (Abelard, Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum,
pp. 54750) MS Lunel Bibl. Municipale 6f. 25vavb, ff. 29vb30vb.
22For these two texts, see Y. Iwakuma, Vocales Revised, in T. Shimizu and C. Burnett
(eds.), The Word in Medieval Logic, Theology, and Psychology (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009),
pp. 8691.
William develops the position that from one point of view the division
is sufficient, but from another it is insufficient, and from the latter view-
point we should add the third species of substantia.23 Abelard (P10, Logica
Ingredientibus, pp. 48:1049:11) borrows one aspect of Williams theory
and attacks the other. In this way, Abelard forces William to defend the
position left to him, and to assert that the division is sufficient. Since then,
it was a traditional position for realists to assert that the division is suffi-
cient in one way or another. In the development of the controversy, many
points were brought out and discussed.24
P25 and P20 simply follow this realist tradition. However, if we look
more carefully, there is some discrepancy between these and other
sources. Both P25 and P20 ascribe the following theory to Abelard:
Text 2.2 (part) P25, MS Berlin lat. fol. 624, f. 74vb
[5.1] Dicit m(agister) P(etrus) quod homo dicitur tribus modis. Accipitur
enim homo pro exteriori et pro anima et pro composito ex anima et cor-
pore; sed philosophi acceperunt hominem pro exteriori tantum.
Text 33.2 (part) P20, MS Vienna VPL 2486, f. 51ra
[4.0] Quod autem m(agister) P(etrus) dicit quod hoc nomen homo acci
pitur nomen corporis tantum et nomen compositi ex anima et corpore et
nomen animae tantum, verum est.
However, Abelard himself ascribes the theory to somebody else.
P12 (Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum), MS Lunel Bibl. Municipale 6,
f. 30rarb (pp. 54849)
[5.0] Quaerunt quidam an illud compositum sit homo et si sit animal
rationale mortale.
[5.1] ...
[5.2] <E>t sciendum quod secundum eos bene dicitur homo est com-
positus <homo est> hoc compositum etsi hoc loco hoc nomen homo sit
designativum totius, id est interioris <et exterioris> hominis. <S>ed primi-
tus alio modo accipiebatur, cum dicebatur hoc compositum |549| non est
homo. <H>omo enim non erat tunc nisi designativum unius partis, scilicet
corporis, quod quidem ex institutione habet significare secundum eius ety-
mologiam; <n>am homo dicitur ab humo.
23P3 = Ps.-Rabanus super Porphyrium (P3), ed. Y. Iwakuma, AHDLMA 45 (2008), 11416.
24It is recorded in P9 (MS Paris BNF lat. 13368, f. 178va), P17 (MS Paris BNF lat. 3237,
ff. 127vb128ra), and commentaries on Boethius De divisione: D1 (MS Paris Arsenal 910,
f. 94ra, MS Orlans 266, p. 124b), D3 (MS Orlans 266, p. 186a).
40 yukio iwakuma
P17, the realist commentary dated to the late 1120s, also ascribes the theory
to a group of realists, not to Abelard.
P17, MS Paris BNF lat. 3237, f. 127vb
[4.0] Alii vero, qui similiter substantiae divisionem sufficientem per duo
membra fieri aestimant, tamen a praedicta secta dissentiunt. Hominem
enim ex anima <et corpore> componi, et rem esse essentialiter et naturaliter
unam, et corpoream asserunt esse. Et tria dicunt significari ab hoc nomine
quod est homo, hominem interiorem et exteriorem et compositum; homi-
nem vero interiorem appellant animam, corpus vero iunctum animae quod
est inanimatum (vel ut quibusdam placet, animatum) nec tamen insensibile
exteriorem; compositum vero qui fit ex anima et corpore qui est animal
rationale mortale.
We may give the following two possible explanations of this discrepancy.
One possibility is that P25 and P20 was written much later, when the
authors did not have the exact knowledge of the real controversy between
Abelard and Alberic. This would mean that the evidence of P25 and P20
is unreliable. The other possibility is that Abelard later, that is, on Mont
Ste Genevive when he was challenged by Alberic of Paris, adhered to the
theory. In P12 (Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum) cited above, Abelard
gives no counter-argument against the theory. It shows that the idea is not
necessarily disagreeable to him. I do not know so far which possibility is
nearer to the truth.
Alberic vs. Abelard on Syllogisms
Alberic and Abelard disputed various issues on syllogisms. Text 31 dis-

cusses the following five questions:
1. Quaeritur de syllogismo si sit oratio, et si sit indicativa vel alia.

2. Quaeritur si syllogismus argumentatio sit.
3. Quaeritur etiam si in syllogismo loci sint assignandi,...
4. Quaeritur etiam de veritate et falsitate syllogismorum si syllogismi
aliqui falsi sunt vel omnes veri.
5. A question on a syllogism in a special case.
In these questions, Abelards name (m. P.) is always mentioned and his
position refuted, and the authors answers can always be shown to be
Alberics by other texts.
As to the first question, everybody accepts the positive answer, since
Boethius defines a syllogism thus: Syllogismus est oratio in qua positis
quibusdam atque concessis etc.25 The gist of this question is at another

point. As I have discussed elsewhere,26 William of Champeaux identifies
a syllogism with a hypothetical sentence, e.g., he deals with the syllogism
omne M est P, omne S est M, ergo omne S est P in the hypothetical form
si omne M est P, tunc si omne S est M, omne S est P. Against William,
Abelard clearly distinguishes syllogisms from hypothetical sentences, but
in his B12 he does not clearly state what oratio means in the definition of
the syllogism. According to text 31[1.1], Abelard answers this question by
asserting that syllogismus est oratio, hoc est collectio orationum, and so he
does not accept the Aristotelian definition of oratio, that is, vox significa-
tiva ad placitum etc. This position of Abelard is recorded in text 5.11, too.
Presumably, Abelard took this position on Mont Ste Genevive when he
was confronted with Alberics question about what kind of oratio a syllo-
gism is. Contrary to Abelard, Alberic asserts (text 31[1.3]) that a syllogism
is an oratio which is a vox significativa etc. The Introductiones Montanae
maiores (text 17.2), indeed, asserts that a syllogism is an oratio enuntiativa.
The second question of text 31 is closely connected to the first. Alberic
asserts that a syllogism is an oratio, and therefore he cannot accept that a
syllogism, an oratio, is a species of argumentatio, which Boethius defines
as per orationem argumenti explicatio.27 However, says text 31[2.1], every-
body, including Abelard, accepts this definition on the basis of Boethius
words huius autem duae sunt species, una quae syllogismus, altera quae
vocatur inductio.28 Text 31[2.2], then, proposes a new interpretation of
Boethius: huius id est orationis per quam fit explicatio...non huius id
est argumentationis. The same interpretation is proposed in B13, which
I have ascribed above to an Albricanus, or possibly to Alberic himself:
B13, MS Paris Arsenal 910, f. 69va
Argumentatio est per orationem etc. (1183a9) Definit argumentationem.
Nota etiam quod hoc nomen argumentatio in propria accipitur signi-
ficatione ad designandum officium argumentatoris.29 Et quod ita sit quod
argumentationem, quae species actionis30 est, hic definierit, manifestum
25Boethius, De syllogismo categorico, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 64 (Paris: Migne, 1860),

col. 821a:812.
26Y. Iwakuma, Are Argumentations propositions?, in A. Maier and L. Valente (eds.),
Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language (Florence: Olschki, 2004),
pp. 8386.
27Boethius, De differentiis topicis, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 64 (Paris: Migne, 1860),
col. 1174d89.
28Boethius, De differentiis topicis, col. 1183a1011.
29argumentatoris] arg(u)m(en)tatis ut videtur A.
30actionis super lineam, arg(u)m(en)t(ati)o(n)is in textu A.
42 yukio iwakuma
est ex eo quod orationem tanquam instrumentum, quo fit illud officium,

demonstravit. Per orationem enim exercetur actio talis ut per instrumentum
suum, scilicet explicatio argumenti quae argumenti est demonstratio facta
per orationem.
Si autem, ut quidam volunt, hic definivisset argumentationem, id est ora-
tionem explicantem argumentum, ut ratio definitionis postulat, a nomine
orationis tamquam a nomine generis inchoandum esset, definiendique31
ratio prohibet ne in definitione alicuius genus ipsius tanquam instrumentum
demonstretur. Item, si syllogismum speciem argumentationis esse Boethius
intendisset, in syllogismi definitione argumentationem ut eius proximum
genus et non orationem posuisset. Syllogismo etiam definitio argumentatio-
nis conveniet, si species eius esset; sed non universaliter ei convenit, verbi
gratia sicut syllogismo illi in quo concluditur certissimum aliquod.
Est itaque tenendum quod argumentatio, species scilicet actionis, defini-
tur32 a Boethio, cum dicitur argumentatio est explicatio etc.
Huius autem etc. (1183a10) Duobus modis legitur littera ista. Uno, ut ad
orationem fiat demonstratio, sic: huius scilicet orationis duae sunt species,
una quae est syllogismus, altera indu<c>tio. Alio vero sic, ut ad argumentatio-
nem fiat demonstratio, hoc modo: huius scilicet argumentationis duae sunt
species id est duo sunt modi argumentandi, syllogismus et indu<c>tio, hoc
est unus qui fit syllogismo, alter qui fit inductione. Et in hoc demonstran-
tur quae propriae species sunt argumentationis. In hoc enim quod dicitur
quendam modum argumentandi fieri[t] syllogismo, demo<n>stratur syllogi-
stica argumentatio sub argumentatione contineri; per hoc vero quod dicitur
alt(erum) inductione fieri, demo<n>stratur argumentatio, quae inductione33
fit, tanquam species argumentationis.
Three other questions of text 31 are all relevant to another of Abelards
views, namely, that syllogisms need no support from loci, but that the
complexio syllogistica establishes its validity even when its premises are
false.
William of Champeaux was the first to deal with syllogisms in terms of
loci, introducing locus a subiecto/praedicato or locus ab antecedenti/conse-
quenti, which are not found in Boethius De differentiis topicis. Following
this realist tradition, text 31 asserts as the answer to question 3 that syl-
logisms need support from loci (see also texts 17.25 and 18.3), and as the
answer to question 4 that syllogisms with false premises are false (this is
thesis [3.3] in the De Sententia magistri nostri Alberici; see also texts 1.19
and 17.25).
31definiendique] q(uae) diffinie(n)di A.

32definitur] diffinat(ur) ut videtur A.
33inductione] i(n) diccione A.
The fifth and last question of text 31 is an artificial one: whether the
following valid syllogism nullus homo sedens stat, sed Socrates est homo
sedens, ergo Socrates non stat is true or false, when Socrates happens to
stand up before the conclusion is made and the conclusion becomes false.
This is a counter-argument against Abelards view that valid syllogisms are
always true.
Abelards answer is reported as follows (text 31[5.2]). Conclusions
should be understood with respect to the time when the premises are
proposed and conceded; therefore at the time when the two premises are
conceded, the conclusion Socrates non stat is true, even after Socrates
actually stands up. No such questions and answers are found in Abelards
works. On the other hand, similar discussions are often found in texts by
the Albricani (see texts 4.10, 13.33[4], 17.6[4], 17.9, 18.5, and 18.7). It must
have been a favorite issue for the Albricani, since Alberic seemingly suc-
ceeded in driving Abelard into inconvenientia on this point. This topic
surely reflects a real controversy between Alberic and Abelard on Mont
Ste Genevive.
Conclusion and Further Perspectives
I have so far discussed, in a preparatory way, major disputed issues

between Abelard and Alberic, mainly from sources by the Albricani. Some
opinions ascribed to Abelard are actually found in his writings, some are
not. There are many other texts in my list not touched upon in the present
paper. More detailed study of the list should shed new light on Abelards
teachings on Mont Ste Genevive in his last yearsa period from which
we have none of his own writings.
But I have yet another purpose in composing this new list. Our texts are
always full of anonymous references to other philosophers theories, such
as quidam dicunt, etc. My list, together with the list in Logico-theological
Schools, makes it easier for us to identify those quidam, and perhaps also
the provenance of anonymous texts, along the lines of what I have just
shown above: B13 (not in the list of sources) is a work of an Albricanus,
B14 of a Meludinensis, and B15 (not in the list of sources) of a Porreta-
nus. Such future studies would provide a better understanding of twelfth-
century logic.
44 yukio iwakuma
Appendix: List of Sources
The list of sources is arranged according to manuscripts, since, in many

cases, a manuscript contains a series of texts which are intentionally cop-
ied together for some reason or another. Full transcriptions of the texts on
the list are available on my site: http://www.s.fpu.ac.jp/iwakuma/papers/
MastersII.pdf
Key:
B* Refers to commentaries on Boethius De differentiis topicis according to
the numbering of Niels Jrgen Green-Pedersen34
C* Twelfth-century commentaries on the Categories according to the num-
bering of John Marenbon
H* Twelfth-century commentaries on the De Interpretatione according to the
numbering of John Marenbon
P* Twelfth-century commentaries on Porphyry according to the numbering
of John Marenbon35
SE* Refers to Latin commentaries on the Sophistici elenchi and treatises on
fallacies according to the numbering of Sten Ebbesen36
* Texts that were discussed in de Rijks 1966 work on the Parisian schools
of logic37
# Texts by followers of master Alberic.
MS Text Folios Edition (or other relevant information) Other

Berlin Lat. 1.120 65ra73va Anon. Glose in Aristotilis Sophisticos *
fol. 624 elencos, ed. de Rijk, in Logica
Modernorum, vol. 1, pp. 186255. (SE5)
2.15 73vb76rb (P25) *#
3.12 76rb80vb (Commentary on Boethius, De *#
syllogismis hypotheticis)
34N. J. Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages (Munich: Philoso-
phia Verlag, 1984), pp. 41827.
35J. Marenbon, Medieval Latin Commentaries and Glosses on Aristotelian Logical
Texts, before ca. 1150 AD, in C. Burnett (ed.), Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian
Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin traditions (London: Warburg Institute,
1993), pp. 77127; repr. with supplements in J. Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and
the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), chap. 2.
36S. Ebbesen, Medieval Latin Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical
Texts of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in Burnett, Glosses and Commentaries,
pp. 12977.
37de Rijk, Some New Evidence, 157.
Table cont.
4.122 81ra87vb (C17) *#
5.123 87vb96vb (H17) *#
Darmstadt 6 1v
2282
Dresden 7 (Now lost)
Dc. 171A
Florence 8 11r marg.
San Marco 125
Munich 9 65r68v Anon., Tractatus anagnini 1, ed.
clm 4652 de Rijk, in Logica Modernorum,
vol. 2.2, pp. 21732
Munich 10 1r3v (De locis)
clm 29520(1
Munich 11 1r2v (P18) *
clm 29520(5
Nrnberg 11a 55r72v Anon., Abbreviatio montana, ed. #
27773 de Rijk, in Logica Modernorum,
vol. 2.2, pp. 73107
Oxford 12.12 6ra7va (P19)
Laud. lat. 67
Padova 2087 13.151 ff. 1ra48vb (C15) *#
Paris 2904 14.14 pp. 259a262b Treatises on logic
+ IaVIIa
Paris lat. 4720A 10ra17vb SE8, which is preserved in two MSS,
namely, here and Uppsala C.924.
See 24 below
Paris lat. 15015 15.114 180ra199ra (H15) *#
Paris lat. 15141 16.18 1ra46vb Anon., Summa Sophisticorum #
elencorum, ed. de Rijk, in Logica
17.129 47ra104rb (Introductiones montanae maiores, *#
edition in preparation by E. P. Bos and
J. Spruyt)
Paris 18.111 34ra54vb (B14)
Arsenal 910
19.13 83ra91rb (H21)
20 91vavb (B17)
46 yukio iwakuma
Table cont.
21.13 145ra147rb (C16) #
22.13 147rb162vb (C20) #
23 163ra186vb (H10) #
Uppsala 24 10ra17vb Anon. Parisiensis, Compendium
C.924 Sophisticorum elenchorum, ed.
S. Ebbesen, CIMAGL 66 (1996), 253312.
This MS has a more reliable text than
MS Paris Lat. 4720A. For discussion of
the two MSS see S. Ebbesen, Anonymus
Parisiensis, Compendium Sophisticorum
elenchorum, CIMAGL 66 (1996), 25457.
(SE8)
Vienna 25.12 27r28v (C25) #
VPL 2237
26 31r (De sententia magistri nostri Alberici) #
Vienna 27 101ra106ra (Quaestiones Vindobonenses 1)
VPL 2459
Vienna 28 1v marg.
VPL 2486
29 4r (C29 not in Marenbon) #
30.12 6ravb (I call this text Notes) *#
31 38rbvb (Quaestiones de syllogismis) #
32.119 38vb42va + Anon., Introductiones montanae *#
37ra38rb + minores, which is preserved in two
42va43rb MSS, namely, here and Wolfenbttel
56.20 Aug. 8o, and edited on the basis
of the two MSS by de Rijk in Logica
Modernorum, vol. 2.2, pp. 771
33.15 45ra60vb (P20) *
34.12 67rbvb (Notes on quantitas)
Wolfenbttel 35.12 80v81v Anon., Fallaciae Guelferbytanae, ed. *#
56.20 Aug. 8o Y. Iwakuma, Some hither-to unedited
texts on logic in ms Wolfenbttel,
56.20 Aug. 8o, Journal of Fukui
Prefectural University 1 (1992), 1215
36 147v149v Anon. Introductiones Guelferbytanae, *#
ed. Y. Iwakuma, Some hither-to
unedited texts on logic, 1520
Table cont.
37.13 149v155v Anon., Tractatus de dissimilitudine
argumentorum, ed. de Rijk, in Logica
156r162r The Introductiones montanae minores,
preserved in two MSS, namely, here and
Vienna VPL 2486. Cf. 32 above
3.Gilbert of Poitierss Contextual Theory of Meaning
and the Hermeneutics of Secrecy
John Marenbon
Contemporary philosophers, at least those in the analytic tradition, usu-

ally begin their thinking about language by considering the most straight-
forward communicative situations. Special problems arise, not from the
communicative context, but from what is attempted to be said. Suppose,
for example, John remarks that the book on the table is red, when there is
no book on the table; or Bertrand tells us that the present King of France
is bald. Most twelfth-century and later medieval philosophers, looking to
the early chapters of On Interpretation for the framework of their seman-
tics, shared these priorities. A mark of this approach is how Aristotle
explicitly concerns himself with spoken signs: written signs are significant
only secondarily, through them. And, for most twelfth-century writers in
this tradition, difficulties arise, as today, from the subject-matter: when,
for example, one wants to say that Homerthough long deadis a poet,
or, that Man is an animal, if one holds that there is no such thing as the
universal, animal.
Gilbert of Poitiers is an exception. He thinks about language from the
perspective of a communicative situation which is doubly unstraightfor-
ward: that of the interpreter of a written text by an author long since
dead; and of a text which, he claims, is deliberately written in such a way
as not to be readily understood. As a result, Gilbert hardly at all engages
in the type of semantic discussion which has led his near-contemporary,
Peter Abelard, rightly or wrongly, to be compared to present-day philoso-
phers of language.1 Rather, he is led by his position as a textual interpreter
towards what might be called a contextual theory of meaning, in which
1Peter Abelards relation to contemporary philosophy of language has been the subject
of an interesting debate between Peter King and Christopher Martin: see C. J. Martin,
Imposition and Essence: Whats new in Abelards theory of meaning, in T. Shimizu and
C. Burnett (eds.), The Word in Medieval Logic, Theology and Psychology (Turnhout: Brepols,
2009), pp. 173214. This debate is discussed in my Abelard in Four Dimensions (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming). Abelard does indeed stress the impor-
tance of context for understanding words, but he is thinking in terms of the context of
a single sentence, and the application of general rules not a resort to the authors mind.
There is, however, some similarity between Gilberts approach to Boethius and Abelards
50 john marenbon
the whole context of a passage needs to be considered in order to dis-

cern the authors intended sense. But this theory is developed and used
by Gilbert in a special and unexpected way as a result of the view that
the learned have a duty not just to discover, but also to hide, truths
a hermeneutics of secrecy. Gilberts position as a pioneer of the distinc-
tion between ordinary verbal meaning and the intended authorial sense
has been recognized.2 It has not, however, been properly linked to his
positionindeed his predicamentas an exegete, nor therefore to the
hermeneutics of secrecy. The aim of the following pages is to show these
links and their consequences in Gilberts thinking about language and his
way of writing.
How Gilbert Went about Commenting on the Opuscula sacra
The text which set Gilbert off on his unusual semantic path is by Boethius,
his Opuscula sacra. Gilbert finished his commentary on it by 1148, when
he successfully defended his views against Bernard of Clairvauxs attack
at the Council of Rheims.3 Earlier he had written two other commentaries
that survive, one on the Psalms, probably from before 1117, and one on the
Pauline Epistles, from ca. 1135.4 But it is in the commentary on the Opus-
cula sacra alone that Gilberts distinctive philosophical ideas are found.
Given that, from the time of the Psalms commentary, Gilbert seems to
have concentrated on teaching sacred doctrine, it is not surprising that
he should have made this text the vehicle for his thinking about logic,
metaphysics and language, as well as God. Boethiuss set of Opuscula was
the one theological work, other than the Bible, which was, and had long
been, studied as a school text, subjected to extensive glossing as its con-
tents were explained, sentence by sentence.5 For teachers who had been
claim to uncover the inuolucra in the texts of Plato and other ancient authors so as to
reveal what they wished to say about the Trinity.
2See below, n. 14, for the literature.
3On the trial, see now L. Catalani, I Porretani: Una scuola di pensiero tra alto e basso
medioevo (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), pp. 6476.
4For Gilberts career and work, see H. C. van Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta: Sa vie, son oeuvre,
sa pense (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1966), pp. 973; L. Nielsen, Theology
and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1982), pp. 2546; T. Gross-Diaz, The
Psalms Commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers: From Lectio Divina to the Lecture Room (Leiden:
Brill, 1996), pp. 124. Gross-Diaz, The Psalms Commentary, pp. 2735, argues convincingly
for a dating of the Psalms commentary to before Anselm of Laons death in 1117.
5A commentaryreally collected glosseson the Opuscula was edited by E. K. Rand,
Johannes Scottus (Munich: Beck, 1906; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966), and attributed to
gilbert of poitierss contextual theory of meaning 51
highly trained in logic and the other liberal arts and who wanted, while
discussing Christian doctrine, to use and develop what they had learned,
the Opuscula were the obvious, and perhaps the only, choice.
But was his commentary on this text the only opportunity Gilbert
took to develop his philosophical views? Maybe his teaching, as a mature
scholar as well as a young man, covered other, more straightforwardly
logical texts. His followers would produce a wide range of non-theologi-
cal works, including a Porretan textbook of logic and one of grammar, as
well as a commentary on the Categories.6 Would not their masters teach-
ing have shown similar breadth? The evidence makes this conclusion
unlikely. Gilbert was known for his Biblical commentaries, and that on
the Opuscula sacra. He appears not to have taken any trouble to claim as
his own or preserve any other philosophical teaching he may have done.
By contrast, the commentary on the Opuscula is clearly a polished, fin-
ished composition, which was recognized as his work, and which at the
Council of Rheims he defended as his own.7 Moreover, even when they
wrote on logic, as in the Porretan logical text-book, his followers empha-
size the very theme which was stimulated by the Opuscula sacra, the dif-
ferent types of discourse belonging to different disciplines. It does not,
then, seem to be a distortion, based on the limits of surviving evidence,
John Scottus (Eriugena). Scholars agree that he was certainly not its author, but the search
for its real author (Heiric of Auxerre? Remigius of Auxerre?) has not been conclusive,
because it is wrong to think that a gloss tradition such as this has an author. The tradi-
tion is clearly much more complex than has been realized. For further bibliography, see
J. Marenbon, Boethius (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 214, n. 37 (to chap. 9).
6For further details, see J. Marenbon,A Note on the Porretani, in P. Dronke (ed.),
A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988), pp. 35357, and Catalani, I Porretani.
7The works editor, N. Hring, Commentary and Hermeneutics in R. L. Benson and
G. Constable (eds.), Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1982), p. 176, asserts that Gilbert must have published all his commentaries
anonymously and without inscription. His evidence for this is the lack of uniformity in
the titles and the fact that only a few manuscripts contain an attribution. Yet some manu-
scripts of each commentary are attributed (see van Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta, pp. 46 and
55 for the Psalms and Pauline commentaries; at least three twelfth-century manuscripts
of the Boethius commentaryMS Basel Universittsbibliothek O II 24; MS Paris Arsenal
1117B; MS Arras Bibliothque de la Ville 967show clearly that the work is Gilberts: see
The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, ed. N. M. Hring (Toronto: Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966) [hereafter: Commentaries], pp. 1334). Commentar-
ies written in the twelfth century in general circulated either entirely anonymously, or
without (contemporary) ascription in some or often many manuscriptsas in the case
of Gilbert. A reasonable conclusion would be that, in these latter cases, the author did
deliberately announce his authorship, but many copyists ignored it.
52 john marenbon
to think of the mature Gilbert as basing his philosophical thinking around

exegesis of Boethiuss theological works.
But he faced an enormous problem. The philosophical views Gilbert
wished to propose were not at all the same as those which, on a straight-
forward reading, Boethius enunciated. This difference would have mat-
tered less, had Gilberts approach allowed him to use the text under
discussion merely as a point of departure for his own views. Even the
ninth and tenth-century glossatorsincluding those on the Opuscula
sacrafelt free to mingle with glosses of literal explanation comments
which developed their own preoccupations. The most usual form of early
twelfth-century logical commentary, as exemplified by Abelards Logica
ingredientibus, incorporated a word-by-word explanation of the text (the
continuatio), but subordinated this element to discursive, often extended
discussions, where the distinctive views of the medieval writer could be
expounded.8 The same freedom is found in, for instance, Abelards Bibli-
cal commentaries. By contrast, in all three of his surviving commentaries,
Gilbert considers it his duty as an exegete not just to explain every word
of his authors text, but to make this explanation central, by weaving his
own comments round the words of the Bible or Boethius. The commen-
tary thus becomes a vast, tortuous paraphrase of the authoritative text,
leavened by some introductory passages and (though not in the Commen-
tary on the Psalms) by occasional discursive interludes. His seriousness
of purpose as an expositor, apparently subservient to his chosen author,
is further emphasized by what seems to have been his preference, in all
three commentaries, that the text itself should be set out in columns
parallel to his exposition.9
Fortunately, some of Boethiuss own comments provided Gilbert with
the solution to his problem. At the start of the first opusculum Boethius,
unwilling to make his discussions about divine things available to lazy and
ill-disposed readers, promises to use a terse style and to veil the secrets he
8See J. Marenbon, Medieval Latin Commentaries and Glosses on Aristotelian logical

Texts, before ca. 1150 AD, in C. Burnett, Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical
Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin traditions (London: Warburg Institute, 1993),
pp. 77127 [repr. with additions in J. Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Con-
text of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000)], at pp. 8589.
9Although Hring rejected the idea that the appearance of these manuscripts was
due to Gilbert (Commentaries, p. 43), Gross-Diaz (Psalms Commentary, pp. 3551) shows
how the format, common to copies of all three commentaries, is an innovation in Biblical
exegesis which it is hard to explain except as Gilberts choice.
is revealing from the innermost depths of philosophy by using words with

novel meanings.10 Gilbert takes up the idea: Boethius, he says, wrote
in such way that he would obstruct the entrance of the careless and pre-
sumptuous from understanding, but he would command the attention of
the studious and diligent, whilst to those who pressed with the fervent
application of their minds he would open it.11
Boethius repeats a similar idea at the beginning of the third opusculum,
commending the obscurities of brevity as guardians of arcane things
which restrict them to the worthy. Gilbert adds to his commentary a
whole preface based on these remarks, in which he distinguishes between
the different levels of readers and explains that only a select few will be
able to understand the ebdomathat is to say, the obscure conception
which he will be presenting. As he explains:
Those sorts of enthymemes which are called ebdomades are altogether far
from the sense of simple people. And those who have exerted themselves in
many things and who also come tested by sophistical exercises are moved
by wonder at them and...they admit only a few, and very well tested, peo-
ple to them.12
Gilbert is thus able to read Boethiuss text in such a way as to find in it the
views which he himself thinks are right, even when, read literally, it would
contradict them. Whether or not he really believed that he was revealing
Boethiuss hidden meaning, rather than proposing his own views under
the cover of Boethian authority, it is hard to say. Reverence for authori-
ties in the Middle Ages, although rarely simple, was greater than we may
find it easy to imagine; and one form of reverence is to suppose that a
great figure like Boethius is as good a philosopher, and in the same kind
of way, as oneself.
The Contextual Theory of Meaning
As theoretical backing for the exegetical strategy he believes justified

by Boethiuss own intentions and method, Gilbert develops his contex-
tual theory of meaning. Near the beginning of the commentary on the
10Boethius, De trinitate prologue (ed. C. Moreschini, De consolatione philosophiae,

Opuscula theologica (Munich: Saur, 2000), p. 166:1119).
11Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries pp. 53:1854:23.
12Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries, p. 186:7377.
54 john marenbon
first treatise, De trinitate, at the point where Boethius, continuing from

his promise, mentioned above, to use a terse style so as to veil secrets,
declares that he drives away those unworthy to read what he has written,
because they are unable to grasp it with their intellect, Gilbert remarks:
Now there are three: the matter (res), the understanding (intellectus) and
speech (sermo). The matter is conceived by the understanding, signified by
speech. But neither the signs of speech (sermonis nota) can show whatever
the matter is, nor acts of intelligence find everything of that matter and so
concepts cannot include them all.
Speech remains outside even the concept. For the word (vox) does not
put forward so much of the matter by its signification as the intelligence
conceives. The signification of a piece of writing stands in a similar relation
to its authors concept. And so it is clear that the person who listens or reads
judges the concept of the orator or the writer from what his signification
puts forward. But he does not rightly discern about the matter except from
the sense of that orator or writer.13
This passage has been much discussed by writers on Gilbert.14 It begins,
apparently, with the three elements central to twelfth-century semantics
(and indeed to philosophy of language today): res, intellectus, and sermo.15
But this verbal similarity to standard discussions only brings out the nov-
elty of Gilberts perspective. Gilbert proposes neither a direct relationship
between words and things, nor the semantic triangle of On Interpretation,
in which words link to things by means of thoughts in the mind. Rather,
he offers a sort of inverted triangle, presented, characteristically, not
13Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries, pp. 67:5568:64: Tria quippe sunt: res et intellec-
tus et sermo. Res intellectu concipitur, sermone significatur. Sed neque sermonis nota,
quicquid res est, potest ostendere neque intelligentie actus in omnia, quecumque sunt
eiusdem rei, offendere ideoque nec omnia conceptus tenere. Citra conceptum etiam rema-
net sermo. Non enim tantum rei significacione uox prodit quantum intelligencia concipit.
Similiter et scripture significacio ad auctoris sui conceptum se habet. Unde manifestum
est quid, qui audit uel legit, oratoris quidem seu scriptoris conceptum ex his, que signifi-
cacio prodit, perpendit. Sed de re non nisi ex eiusdem oratoris seu scriptoris sensu recte
decernit.
14See B. Maioli, Gilberto Porretano: Dall grammatica speculativa alla metafisica del con-
creto (Rome: Bulzoni, 1979), pp. 3740; J. Jolivet, Tournures, provenances et dfaillances
du dire: Trois textes du XIIe sicle, in P. Legendre (ed.), Du pouvoir de diviser les mots et les
choses (Brussels: Gevaert, 1998), pp. 6568; L. Valente, Virtus significationis, Violentia usus:
Porretan views on theological hermeneutics, in A. Maier and L. Valente (eds.), Medieval
Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language (Florence: Olschki, 2004), pp. 16874 and
(more generally on Gilberts interpretative approach to meaning) her Praedicaturi sup-
ponimus: Is Gilbert of Poitiers approach to the problem of linguistic reference a pragmatic
one?, Vivarium 49 (2011), 6873.
15Cf. Maioli, Gilberto, p. 38; Jolivet, Turnures, p. 67.
from the perspective of the speaker, or even the listener, but rather that
of the reader or, more precisely, the interpreter. Moreover, when Gilbert
talks about the res, he is not, as would be usual in a twelfth-century (or
twenty-first century) semantic discussion, indicating a concrete thing (for
example, the dog sitting here or the chair on which I am sitting) or even
a universal thing. He clearly uses res in the sense of how things are, the
fact of the matter or, more simply (as in the translation here) matter.
Underlying Gilberts thought in this passage was probably a comment
by one of his favourite authors, Hilary of Poitiers, which would itself go on
to play an important role in the development of legal ideas about inter-
pretation: The understanding of what has been said should be taken from
the causes of their being said, because the matter (res) is not subject to
speech, but matter to the thing.16 The immediate context of this remark is
Hilarys objection to heretical authors who misinterpret scripture by tak-
ing words out of context. But, more generally, Hilarys assertion of the pri-
macy of matter over words is linked to an apophatic strain in his thought.
As he says a little earlier in the same chapter:
There should be no doubt for anyone that use should be made of teachings
in order to gain knowledge of divine things. For human weakness of mind
may not by itself follow the knowledge of heavenly things, nor can the sense
of bodily things take up for itself the understanding of invisible things.17
Hilarys line of thought here is that, because of their ineffability, heavenly
things need to be understood through the doctrine God has provided
that is to say, Scripture, which must then be read with the aim of grasp-
ing what it teaches about the matter and not wilfully distorted by taking
verbal meanings out of context.
The more particular point of Hilarys remark is transformed by Gilbert
in the light of his own, very different circumstances. He is not attacking
heretics who distort the obvious intended meaning of an authoritative
text, but rather explaining and justifying why his author drives away the
mass of unworthy readers. As he goes on to say:
16Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate 4.14:2628 (ed. P. Smulder, 2 vols., CCSL 6262A (Turn-
hout: Brepols, 197980), vol. 1, p. 116): Intellegentia enim dictorum ex causis est adsu-
menda dicendi, quia non sermoni res sed rei est sermo subiectus. The comment would,
in adapted form, be used in the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX of 1234 (book 5, title 40):
for the background and use of this comment, see the essays in Legendre, Du pouvoir. For
Gilberts predilection for his fellow Poitevin Hilary, see Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy,
pp. 27 and 38.
17Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate 4.14:58 (p. 115).
56 john marenbon
And so [Boethius] with good reason wards off from the reading of his trea-
tise those who scorn the understanding of the author, from which there
comes speech or writing, and who think that the signification suffices for the
judgement of the thing orif they are seeking something to which the cer-
tain signification does not direct themthey set about not so much grasp-
ing what is in truth, but bringing up what fits the signification.18
Readers mark out their unfitness by giving a merely verbal reading, of
the sort described here. But, from what Gilbert has already explained,
Boethiuss mechanisms of concealment will ensure that such readers, who
will take words in their normal meanings, will not be able to grasp his
teachingand so they would better not even try to read his commentary.
Even those who read properly, however, grasping Boethiuss intentions,
need to be aware that the authors thought falls short of the divine reali-
ties with which it is concerned and so that, even understood properly, his
writing is limited to showing what may be conceived about the divinity,
not what it really is.19 Here Gilbert takes up Hilarys apophatic theme, in a
way which will form a third element in his thinking about language, along
with the context theory of meaning and the hermeneutics of secrecy.
Gilberts Theory of Meaning in Practice: quod ests and quo ests
One way in which Gilbert puts his contextual theory of meaning to work
in practice is linked to a fundamental metaphysical distinction he makes,
between concrete wholes, particular members of natural kindswhat he
calls quod estsand their formswhat he calls quo ests. It is by their
forms that concrete wholes are what they are. That man standing there,
for instance, can be referred toas we would put itunder many descrip-
tions: the man, John, the rational thing, the body, the white thing,
and so on. For Gilbert, the man, John, the rational thing, the bodily thing
and the white thing are all quod ests, and each quod est is made what it
is by a singular quo est: man-ness or humanity, for example, makes the
quod est man; bodiliness the quod est the body. Quo ests can be simple,
like bodiliness, or complex, like man-ness, which is made up of other quo
ests, including bodiliness, life, rationality and mortality.20

20See J. Marenbon, Gilbert of Poitiers, in P. Dronke (ed.), A History of Twelfth-Century
Western Philosophy, pp. 34142; Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy, pp. 4749, for fuller
details.
Ordinary language marks out the distinction between quod ests and quo
ests: Socrates, human being, rational thing, homo, rationale are words
for quod ests, whereas Socrateity, humanity, rationality and their Latin
equivalents are words for quo ests. But, for Gilberts exegetical purposes
which involve foisting on Boethius what, to the reader today, seems a
contrived and implausible interpretationit is important to be able to
take the same expressions sometimes as indicating quod ests, sometimes
quo ests, depending on their context. In a discussion that begins with
an explicit reference to his context theory of meaning,21 Gilbert goes on
to state the widely repeated dictum of Priscians, Every name signifies
diverse thingssubstance and quality, but twists it to his own purposes,
interpreting it to say that, for example, white thing signifies that which
is called a white thing, which is the substance of the name, and that by
which it is called white, which is the same names quality. That is to say,
according to Gilbert every noun has two significations: of an id quod
substanceand an id quoquality.22 Only one of these significations,
however, is that which is intended in a given proposition, and it is for the
interpreter to decide which, on the basis of his philosophical acumen.
Gilbert has already provided a set of sample passages for interpretation:
(1) The white thing is a body.

(2) The white thing is an accident.
(3) The man (homo) is capable of laughter.
(4) Man (homo) is the form of individuals.
The good interpreter will realize that white thing signifies a quod est in
(1) but a quo est in (2), and that homo in (3) stands for a quod est and in
(4) for a quo est.23 Gilbert then gives a set of paired sentences:
(a) animal est sensibile. (b) animal est genus hominum.
(a) sensibile est corpus. (b) sensibile est differentia.
(a) risibile est homo. (b) risibile est proprium hominis.
(a) album est corporeum. (b) album est accidens.24
and explains that the predicates in the propositions marked (a) are to
be taken as signifiying quod ests (should be understood with regard to

58 john marenbon
the substances of the names), and those in the propositions marked (b)
as signifying quo ests (should be understood with regard to their quali-
ties). In all these examples, the two-fold meaning which the interpreter
is supposed to find is, in fact, contrived: although all the (b) propositions
do indeed need to be read as Gilbert indicates, they are in every case
very awkwardly phrased, and instead of the substantial or denominative
terms (human being, white thing) one would expect an abstract noun
(humanity, whiteness).
Gilberts Theory of Meaning in Practice:

Natural Science, Mathematics, Theology
Gilbert was able to apply his theory of meaning far more thoroughly than
in these examples thanks to a passage in the De trinitate where, drawing
on Aristotles Physics, Boethius distinguishes between the three parts of
speculative knowledge: natural science, which studies things that are in
motion and non-abstract; mathematics, which studies what are without
motion but non-abstract; and theology, which is concerned with what are
without motion and abstract and separable. Gilbert understands these
divisions in the light of his metaphysics. Both natural science and math-
ematics take the things of the created world as their subject-matter. The
work of dividing the quo ests of concrete wholes into the vast patterns of
forms that structure them belongs to natural science. Mathematics has a
quite restricted role. As Gilbert expresses it, mathematics considers the
non-abstract forms of objects in the world (nativa) in a way other than
they arethat is abstractly. It separates quo ests, such as bodiliness and
colour, from the concrete wholes to which they belong and considers
them along with other quo ests of their own sort, grouping them under the
different Aristotelian categories of accidents. Theology is distinct because
of its subject matter: not natural objects, but God.25
25The best analysis is in K. Jacobi, Natrliches SprechenTheoriespracheTheolo-

gische Rede: Die Wissenschaftslehre des Gilbert von Poitiers (ca. 10851154), Zeitschrift fr
philosophische Forschung 49 (1995), 51128 (on the Categories, see pp. 52122). For a dis-
cussion of mathematics, see J. Marenbon, Gilbert of Poitiers and the Porretans on Math-
ematics in the Division of the Sciences, in R. Berndt, M. Lutz-Bachmann and R. M. W.
Stammberger (eds.), Scientia und Disciplina: Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im
12. und 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), pp. 3669.
The type of interpretation which the difference between the disciplines

requires fits exactly Gilberts contextual theory of meaning. Mathematics
does not just have a different method of analysis from natural science;
it also interprets the same words differently. And the same is true, even
more strikingly, in theology. The wise interpreter has to see whether the
writer intends a remark as natural science, mathematics or theology (or
as more than one of these) before he can understand it.
Unfortunately, Gilbert does not give many examples of mathemati-
cal discussion. One of them is the following very compressed, confusing
passage:
For in natural science man is said to be a species of a genusthat is of the
genus animal or body. But in mathematical investigations man is said to
be a species not of a genus but only of individuals. This is why, because
of the way in which, in nature, forms are gathered together and make con-
crete wholes, a genus is said to be predicated of a species; but, according to
mathematical abstraction, it is accepted that not a genus, but the genus of
a genus, is truly and conformably predicated of what is, not a species of a
genus, but only a species of individuals.26
Gilberts point here is that if, talking in terms of natural science, I say
Man is a species, I mean that man is a species of a genus, such as animal
or body. The proposition is true, with man having its normal significa-
tion of a quod est, because among the forms naturally joined together to
make the complex form of man-ness is the form of animality and the form
of bodiliness, and so the man is an animal and a body. In mathematics,
however, Man is a species must be understood as a proposition about the
quo est man-ness. Man-ness does not belong to a genus such as animal-
ity, although animality is a part of man-ness: whereas man is an animal,
man-ness is not animality, but it is a quality (that is to say, the genus of
a genus).27 The same sentence, then, can carry a quite different meaning,
depending on the branch of science according to which it is supposed to
be understood.
26Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries, p. 86:317: In naturalibus enim dicitur homo spe-

cies generis i.e. animalis aut corporis. In mathematicis uero non generis sed indiuiduo-
rum tantum dicitur species homo. Ideoque naturalis concretionis proprietate dicitur
genus de specie predicari. Mathematice uero abstractionis proprietate non genus sed
generis genus de ea, que non generis sed indiuiduorum tantum species est, uere et conse-
quenter predicari conceditur.
27See Marenbon, Gilbert of Poitiers and the Porretans, pp. 3940 for a fuller discussion.
60 john marenbon
It is in reading theologically, however, that the most striking and

widespread changes take place.28 The central point of Gilberts whole
commentary is to show how, once philosophers have a grasp of how the
natural world is structured, they can learn to talk to some extent about
God. In part, Gilbert believes that this aim can be reached by a theory
of arguments. Each discipline, he considers, has its own self-evident
principles.29 The student of theology must be aware both that the prin-
ciples of natural science do not continue to operate when God is being
considered, but that some of its rules can be transferred in an adapted
form (by proportional transumption, as he calls it, adapting an idea from
Boethiuss Topics). In part, though, Gilbert reaches his theological objec-
tives through his theory of language and interpretation. When proposi-
tions are understood within theology, they take on a different meaning
from what they have in natural science.
Consider two examples of how, according to Gilbert, propositions are
to be understood in theology. The first is not, in fact, far from Boethiuss
own comments, themselves based on Augustine. The meanings of The
man is just and God is just are different, because the quo est by which
the human is just is different from the quo est by which he is a human,
whereas God is just by all that he is.30 In the second example, however,
Gilbert takes his own stand about a passage of Boethius which is highly
unclear. In the third of his Opuscula sacra, Boethius begins with a set of
axioms, each of them very briefly stated. Gilbert states early on that the
words of the axioms will be understood in different ways within different
disciplines. The second axiom, for instance, begins by asserting that esse
and id quod est are different from each other (diversum), but, as Gilbert
explains:
It seems that we should note here that to be (esse) and to be something
(esse aliquid) are said in many ways according to the different usage of
different philosophers in different disciplines (facultates).31
An apparently straightforward proposition such as The body exists or
The human exists is understood as being said by a certain extrinsic
28Valente (Virtus significationis, 172) links Gilberts views on meaning with his views
about theological language, quoting a passage that occurs shortly before the one cited
here in n. 32.
29Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries, pp. 189:67190:3.
31Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries, p. 193:5153. There is a detailed discussion of the
two interpretations of axiom 2 in Maioli, Gilberto, pp. 19298.
denomination from its principle: that is to say, The human exists means
The human is gaining its existence from God. The persons quo est,
humanity, is not, therefore, that by which the human exists, by which
it is, but that by which it is something.32 Those, however, who work in
other disciplines, concerned not with God but his creation, either hold
that things both exist and are something in virtue of the same thing, so
that to be is always predicated equivocally; or else they make a differ-
ent contrast, saying that things exist, by their quo ests (the humanity, for
instance, of a human) and they are something by the accompanying acci-
dents of quantity and quality.33 Gilbert then remarks that:
What follows will teach us that both this rule and the other ones following,
except for the seventh, ought to be understood here both according to the
usage of theologians and of other philosophers. But, with the exception of the
seventh, I shall exemplify them all in natural philosophy, in order for them
to be more significantly demonstrated (ut significantius demonstrentur).34
It would be natural to expect that, as the interpreter, Gilbert would go on
to expound both the natural and the theological readings of the rules. But,
in fact, he means that he will exemplify these rules, except the seventh,
only in natural philosophy.35
Why does he draw back from what should be the very heart of his expo-
sition of this opusculum and, indeed, the whole set? Klaus Jacobi conjec-
tures that:
Because theological speech is a transferred speech, it is of prime importance
to explore precisely the speech from which we necessarily set out. Only
when this logico-semantic research has led to clear results can we begin
with them to formulate the rules for transference into theology.36
But this does not explain why, having started with an interpretation
according to natural science, Gilbert does not then consider how a theo-
logical reading might be framed. Gilberts own comment suggests that the
32Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries, p. 193:5560: Cum enim dicimus corpus est

uel homo est uel huiusmodi, theologici hoc esse dictum intelligunt quadam extrinseca
denominatione ab essentia sui principi. Non enim dicunt corporalitate corpus esse sed
esse aliquid.
33Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries, p. 193:66194:3.
35See K. Jacobi, Philosophische und theologische Weisheit: Gilbert von Poitiers Inter-
pretation der Regeln des Boethius (De hebdomadibus), in Berndt, Lutz-Bachmann and
Stammberger, Scientia und Disciplina, pp. 7178.
36Jacobi, Philosophische und theologische Weisheit, p. 77.
62 john marenbon
meaning can be brought out more fully when it is put in terms of natural
science. Possibly the apophatic strain, inherited from Hilary, is evident
here: although a theological interpretation is there, in principle, to be
given, it would not be sufficiently graspable for Gilberts readers.
The Hermeneutics of Secrecy and Gilberts Own Way of Writing
Or perhaps Gilbert is leaving it to those few readers who are capable to

work out the theological reading for themselves. It would certainly not be
the only instance of Gilberts making difficulties for his readers by delib-
erately hiding his thought. As an exegete who approvingly emphasizes
his chosen authors decision to conceal his true meaning, Gilbert is in
a somewhat paradoxical position. He describes his function as an inter-
preter (interpres)who is neither an author, expressing his own views,
nor a mere paraphraser (recitator)as being to straighten out the dif-
ficulties of the text, putting words that have been transposed, figures of
speech and linguistic novelties into ordinary discourse.37 Yet, if he reveals
the hidden doctrine of his text for everyone to understand, will he not be
frustrating his authors intention to hide it from the unworthy? Gilberts
response seems to have been, on the one hand, to offer a very full expla-
nation of what, in his own idiosyncratic view, Boethius thought (though
stopping short of some areas of theology); but, on the other hand, devising
his own, far more thorough version of Boethiuss linguistic strategies, to
veil his own explanations in an obscurity that only those who properly
understood his own thought could penetrate.
The first and most important piece of evidence for this assertion is
Gilberts way of writing in this commentary. Every reader struggles with
it. It is no accident that there are no translations of the commentary, and
that in their books and articles scholars normally restrict themselves to
rendering isolated phrases and sentences. Of course, philosophers some-
times write in a tortuous style without in any way wishing to conceal their
thoughts (think of Kant, for instance). But it is striking that Gilberts com-
mentary on Pauladmittedly, a much less philosophical discussion
does not present the same problems for the reader.38 Moreover, the
37Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries, pp. 54:4155:48.

38The Psalms commentary cannot be used as a comparison, because most of the mate-
rial is taken from earlier sources.
difficulty of Gilberts style in the opuscula commentary is of a particular

kind, very suited to preventing the casual reader from grasping his mean-
ing. Unless readers have a good idea of Gilberts thought in general, they
will find it hard to grasp, and often even to construe, particular passages.
Gilbert uses, from the start, an idiosyncratic technical vocabulary, rich
in synonyms, which can only be picked up in the course of reading the
whole commentary. And his way of constructing sentences means that
it is often impossible, working just from the ordinary (or even Gilberts
special) meaning of the words and the rules of syntax, to make out their
meaning. Rather, the reader must be able to guess, from knowledge of
Gilberts system, what the sentence might be saying, and then see how
the words fit together, perhaps revising the original guess in the process.
In this way, Gilbert forces his readers, if they are not to be completely
baffled, to interpret according to his contextual theory, looking, not to the
signification of the words, but to the authorshere the commentators
understanding. For a striking example of this way of writing, look at the
text cited in n. 26, along with the literal translation and then the explana-
tion, intended to bring out the very far from obvious sense.
Gilbert even goes so far as to test his readers acuteness by deliberately
misleading them, setting a trap to lead the unwary into misunderstand-
ing. One of his central doctrines is the distinction between singularity and
individuality. Gilbert is a type of trope theorist (just like Abelard). There
is no universal rationality or whiteness. Rather each instance of white-
ness or rationality or any accident or differentia is a singular thing. But
these singular things are not individuals. The only individuals are the
quod ests of which the quo ests are the whole propertiesan assemblage
of all the accidental and differential quo estsof a singular member of
a natural kind: for example, Plato, Socrates, Sten Ebbesenbut not, for
instance, man, which does not pick out the whole property of anything.39
Yet, in one of his most important discussions of this idea, Gilbert writes
as follows:
39On Gilberts theory of individuation, see Maioli, Gilberto, pp. 33340; J. J. E. Gracia,
Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Munich: Philosophia
Verlag, 1984), pp. 15578; Marenbon, Gilbert, pp. 34548; Nielsen, Theology and Philoso-
phy, pp. 5862; K. Jacobi, Einzelnes-Individuum-Person: Gilbert von Poitiers Philosophie
des Individuellen, in J. Aertsen and A. Speer (eds.), Individuum und Individualitt im Mit-
telalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996), pp. 321; L. Valente, Gilbert of Poitiers, in H. Lagerlund
(ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, 2 vols. (Dordrecht: Springer), vol. 1, pp. 41213.
64 john marenbon
Man and sun are called by the grammarians appellative names and by
the dialecticians dividual names. Plato and his singular whiteness are
called by the same grammarians proper nouns, and by the dialecticians
individual nouns.40
Man and Plato are straightforward examples of an appellative/dividual
and a proper/individual name. Sun is a characteristically unobvious, but
correct example of an appellative, as Gilbert will explain. But why does
Gilbert include Platos singular whiteness as an example of a proper/
individual noun, so implying that this singular whiteness is itself an indi-
vidual? Here and elsewhere in the Commentary, Gilbert makes it com-
pletely clear that this whiteness is indeed singular, but not an individual.
He says it in so many words: Therefore no part of the property of any
creature is naturally an individual. To this statement, however, he adds a
remark which gives the clue to his procedure a few lines earlier: although
it is often called an individual by reason of its singularity.41 The com-
ment about singular whiteness is not, when examined carefully, a direct
remark by Gilbert about what is the case, but his report of how grammar-
ians and dialecticians speak. Dialecticians do indeed call Platos singular
whiteness an individual noun, because this whiteness is singular, but
this usage, in Gilberts view, is misleading. The unwary reader, however,
will be trapped, since Gilbert introduces this example without comment,
along with the other, genuine ones.
***
This essay, like the others in the volume, is a tribute to Sten Ebbesen: a
rather back-handed tribute, since it is all about obscurity in communica-
tion, yet honouring a scholar who, both in his own writing and in his
choice of texts, has always sought clarity and shied away from mystifica-
tion? Nonot at all, as the alert reader will already have seen. Gilbert
has an extremely well worked-out metaphysics and theory of the sci-
ences, including theology, which he chooses to conceal from ordinary,
casual readers, not because he wishes to avoid his ideas being understood
but, on the contrary, because he wants them to be grasped fully and pre-
cisely, or not at all. Gilbert is not a confused or unclear thinker, but an
esoteric one.

41Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries, p. 274:7880: Ideoque nulla pars proprietatis cui-
uslibet creature naturaliter est indiuidua quamuis ratione singularitatis indiuidua saepe
uocetur.
4.Instantiae and the Parisian Schools
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of studying the logic of the twelfth-
century Parisian schools, something to a great extent made possible by the
work of Sten Ebbesen, is the development there of a strategy of producing
and multiplying, endlessly so it seems, various kinds of argument known
as instantiae. They are invoked to oppose a given argument1 but are not
simply what we now call counterinstances, arguments, that is, with the
same logical structure as those challenged but which are agreed to have
true premisses and a false conclusion. Although they may take this form,
instantiae need not have the same structure as the argument opposed
and may, indeed, be sophistical. The result is that it is often difficult to
see their relevance to the target or even to understand precisely what
objection is being raised.
The standard method of counterinstances was well known to twelfth-
century logicians from Boethius frequent use of it in De syllogismo hypo-
thetico to prove the invalidity of denying the antecedent and affirming
the consequent. Boethius also employs the technique in his discussions
of conversion in De syllogismo categorico and Introductio ad syllogismos
categoricos but unlike Aristotle in the Prior Analytics does not prove that
candidates fail to be categorical syllogisms by producing counterinstances.
The theory of instantiae extends the resources available in opposing argu-
ments to include the theory of topical inference and seems to have its
origins in remarks made by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations, Topics,
and Prior Analytics.
1See Y. Iwakuma, Instantiae: A study of twelfth century technique of argumentation

with an edition of ms. Paris BN lat. 6674f. 15, CIMAGL 38 (1981), 191; Y. Iwakuma, Instan-
tiae Revisited, CIMAGL 44 (1983), 6180; S. Ebbesen and Y. Iwakuma, Instantiae and the
12th Century Schools , CIMAGL 44 (1983), 8185; Y. Iwakuma, Instantiae: An introduc-
tion to a twelfth century technique of argumentation, Argumentation 1 (1987), 43753;
Y. Iwakuma, Two More Instantia Texts: An edition, Zinbun. Annals of the Institute for
Research in Humanities (Kyoto University), 24 (1989), 1388.
66 christopher j. martin
Instantia is a common enough word in classical Latin and in the Mid-

dle Ages continued to be used in its classical sense to mean immediacy,
urgency, importunity, and presence. While both the noun and the verb
insto centrally include the notions of threat and challenge, however, nei-
ther is recorded as having been employed classically to mean an objection
to an argument.2 The words apparently acquired this sense for the first
time when Boethius used instare for and instantia for
in translating the Categories, Sophistical Refutations, Topics, and Prior
Analytics. Neither word occurs in De interpretatione, and only the verb, and
that only once, in the Categories.3 Aside from his translations, Boethius
himself seems to use instare just once to mean to object to a claim and
nowhere uses instantia to mean an objection.
Given what we know of the availability of Boethius translations in the
twelfth century, it is surely relevant that the first appearance of instan-
tia where it does seem to have a logical sense is in Peter Abelards Log-
ica Ingredientibus. In his gloss on the sole occurrence of instare in the
Categories,4 Abelard suggests that with the word Aristotle wishes to indi-
cate importunity (importunitas), employing here the term that he uses in
De interpretatione to characterise the sophistical objections (sophisticas
importunitates) which must be avoided in an account of contradictory
opposition. In commenting on this latter phrase, Abelard famously tells us
in the Ingredientibus that he has read the Sophistical Refutations.5 Later,
in his commentary on Aristotles refutation by reductio in the Categories
of the claim that great and small are contrary quantities, Abelard char-
acterises somethings being both great and small as an instantia of the
absurdity that this would entail, that is, that something would support
contraries.6
Here Abelard uses instantia non-technically for a particular case of a
general objection. There is, however, nothing in Boethius commentary
corresponding to Abelards remark nor indeed to his analysis of the argu-
ment as a reductio. He certainly knew something of the Sophistical Refuta-
tions but not it seems of the Topics or of that part of the Prior Analytics
where instantiae are discussed. It thus seems reasonable to suppose that
2See Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, s.v. Instantia, IIB. The term is recorded with this sense
only in Boethius translations of Aristotle.
3See the Greek and Latin indices to Aristoteles Latinus.
4Peter Abelard, Logica Ingredientibus, ed. B. Geyer, Peter Abaelards philosophische
Schriften, vol. 1, pts. 13 (Mnster: Aschendorff, 191927), p. 161.
5Abelard, Logica Ingredientibus, p. 400.
6Abelard, Logica Ingredientibus, p. 197.
instantiae and the parisian schools 67
the term was imported into the philosophical vocabulary from Boethius
translation of the Sophistical Refutations from around 1120,7 and that we
see the first trace of it in Abelards analysis of Aristotles argument.
The term instantia is used only twice in Boethius translation of the
Sophistical Refutations. Most importantly in chapter nine,8 where Aristo-
tle notes that the preceding discussion has located the various sources of
sophistical, or apparent, elenchi, and that once these have been estab-
lished their solutions have also been established since, he says, instantiae
are their solutions.9 Unfortunately, as well as being the first reference
to instantia, this is also the first in the book to the solution (solutio) of
sophistical arguments, and like instantia, solutio is not used in the other
works of the Organon available at the beginning of twelfth century.10
The relevant sense of solution becomes clear as we proceed through
the Sophistical Refutations. A syllogism is defined in chapter one as usual
by Aristotle quite generally as an argument whose conclusion is different
to and follows necessarily from its premisses.11 Note, however, that neither
Aristotle nor Boethius has a technical term for a proposition playing the
role of premiss and Boethius translates Aristotles as propositio.
Aristotle goes on to tell us that an elenchus is a syllogism with the con-
tradiction of a conclusion,12 and then in chapter nine that it is a syllogism
to a contradiction.13 We are also told in the Sophistical Refutations that
dialectical, in contrast to doctrinal, that is, demonstrative, argumentation,
deduces contradictions from generally accepted (probabilis) principles
and, again in contrast to doctrinal disputation, that it proceeds interroga-
tively14 with the premisses of the syllogism obtained by the questioner
from the respondents answers to the questions he puts to him. The first
twelfth-century readers of the Sophistical Refutations, apparently following
7If, indeed, that is when the Logica Ingredientibus was written, Abelards is the first
reference to the Sophistical Refutations as available in the twelfth century.
8Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 9.170a36b8. The other is Sophistical Refutations
11.172a1821, where the sense is, non-technically, an objection to a claim.
9Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 9.170a36b8. See E. Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or
The Sophistici Elenchi (London: Macmillan, 1866), p. 122. Poste suggests that 9.170b5 may be
a reference to a lost chapter on the varieties of enstasis, something he thinks is confirmed
by a reference in Rhetoric 2.25 to be discussed below.
10The term is of course common elsewhere with the meaning of a solution or an
explanation.
11Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 1.164b27165a2.
12Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 1.165a23.
13Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 2.165a38b8; 9.170b12; 10.171a45.
14Confirmed in Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 11.171a45 and 172a1718.
a scholium from Alexander,15 thus understood an elenchus to be a syl-

logism constructed by the questioner in a dialectical disputation and con-
cluding with the contradictory of a claim conceded by the respondent.
A sophistical elenchus16 is an argument which appears to be an elenchus
but fails to be one either17 (a) by being a syllogism which proves a conclu-
sion that only appears to be the desired contradiction, or (b) by failing to
prove its conclusion either (i) because, although its premisses are true, the
conclusion does not follow from them, or (ii) because, although the con-
clusion does follow, one or more of the premisses is false. A solution, or
determination (determinatio), of an apparent elenchus shows just where
the fault lies, and so Aristotle must suppose that an instantia reveals in
some way what is wrong with the argument to which it is opposed.
The term instantia is hardly ever used in the texts collected by de Rijk
in the first volume of the Logica Modernorum as evidence for the develop-
ment of the theory of fallacy in the twelfth century. In the Summa Sophis-
ticorum Elenchorum, associated by de Rijk with the school of Alberic
of Paris, however, it appears when the traditional distinction is drawn
between the first fifteen chapters as book one and the rest as book two.
The Sophistical Refutations as a whole is a textbook on the theory and
practice of contentious (, litigiosus) disputation. That is to say, dis-
putation which, like dialectical disputation, proceeds by interrogation and
response, but for which the goal is not practice, the examination of gener-
ally accepted claims, or the investigation of first principles,18 and so the
truth, but rather simply the defeat of ones opponent in any of five ways:
by seeming to refute him (redargutio), by forcing him to concede either
something false or something unbelievable, to commit a solecism, or to
repeat himself.19 In book one Aristotle is concerned with the construction
15For the use of the Greek scholia on the Sophistical Refutations attributed to Alex-
ander, see S. Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotles Sophistici Elenchi,
3 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1981). The Greek commentaries that are the source of the Alexander
scholia take an elenchus to be an argument by reduction to impossibility against someone
who accepts the premisses but rejects the conclusion of a given syllogism. The elenchus
argues from the contradictory of the conclusion and some other accepted claim, to the
opposite of one of the given premisses, of another already conceded claim, or of a claim
proved in another syllogism. See the text of Ps.-Alex. 2 (Michael of Ephesus) and the dis-
cussion in Ebbesen, Commentators, vol. 3, p. 149. For the Latin references to Alexander on
this point, see Ebbesen, Commentators, vol. 2, pp. 35859.
16Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 1.165a14.
17So Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 10.171a910 and 18.176b29177a8.
18On the various forms of disputation see R. Smiths introduction in Aristotle: Topics,
Books I and VIII; Translated with a commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
19Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 3.165b1218.
by the questioner of sophistical arguments and in book two with the way
in which the respondent should solve such arguments when they are
employed against him. According to Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum,
the first part thus deals with solutions to arguments which are not instan-
tiae, while the second has to do with instantiae.20 Again, the term does
not seem to have a technical sense and the point of the observation is per-
haps simply that the second part of the book deals with objections which
may be raised as arguments proceed rather than with the invention and
solution of fallacies considered apart from their disputational context.
That instantia does not have its later technical sense in Summa Sophis-
ticorum Elenchorum is not surprising, since its author seems not to have
known of the Topics or Prior Analytics.21 What is surprising, however, is
the appearance in the work of a new technical term with something of
the sense that is later taken on by instantia and which is used to designate
an argumentative strategy employed by Aristotle in chapter twenty-two
of Sophistical Refutations. Here, after discussing the solution of a series of
sophistical arguments involving what are only apparently similar expres-
sions by asking the question required to distinguish between them and so
to expose the fallacy of figure of speech (figura dictionis), Aristotle, the
Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum tells us, determines the following
argument:
A man does not possess only one penny,
but he gives only one penny;
therefore he gives what he does not possess.
According to Aristotle the inference fails because what follows is not
that someone gives what he does not possess, but rather that he gives
something in a manner in which he does not possess itthat is, he pos-
sesses his one penny with other pennies, but he gives it without giving any
others.22 Aristotle then notes that it is as if we were to argue: A man may
give rapidly what he does not possess rapidly; therefore a man may give
20Anon., Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A

contribution to the history of early terminist logic, 2 vols. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 196267)
vol. 1, p. 429.
21See the Index Locorum in de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. 1. There are no quotations
from or references to either work in the text, but de Rijk cites a few parallels to Alexander
of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Topica. Nor do we find problema or positio used in the techni-
cal sense of the Topics in the text. In the Glose in Aristotilis Sophisticos Elencos, ed. de Rijk,
Logica Modernorum, vol. 1, pp. 191255, on the other hand, we find references to the Topics,
an apparent quotation from Prior Analytics 1.25, and the technical use of these terms.
22Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 22.178a36b7.
what he does not possess. In this case, however, it is manifest that the
conclusion has not been inferred from the premisses.
According to Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum, the argument which
manifestly fails was called by certain masters a falsificatio, and it explicitly
contrasts the use of this strategy with the determination of a sophisti-
cal argument by locating and giving an account of the fallacy committed.
Falsificatio is to be employed, we are told, when we have no interest in
explaining to our opponent what is wrong with his argument but sim-
ply wish to show that it fails. Though the name is an obvious one, there
is nothing in Boethius translation to suggest the characterisation of the
defeating move as falsificatio, and while the adjective falsificatus is clas-
sical, the abstract noun seems to appear for the first time in the middle
of the twelfth century. Aristotles strategy, we are told, may be employed
against all sophistical arguments, where
a falsification of an argument is the production of a similar argument (argu-
mentationis inductio per similitudinem) in which must be included such, and
as general, and as many <claims> as there are in the original argument, and
in which the falsehood appears more clearly than it does in the original
argument.23
I noted above that Aristotle defines a syllogism in the Sophistical Refuta-
tions in the same general way that he defines it elsewhere in terms of the
conclusion following necessarily from the premisses. Abelard in his Dialec-
tica argues that there are two ways in which the requirement for necessity
may be met.24 On the one hand, it may be guaranteed by what Abelard
calls the complexio, and we would call the form, of the argument. That
is, by the premisses and conclusion being such that no matter what we
uniformly substitute for the terms which occur in them, we cannot obtain
an argument with true premisses and a false conclusion. Paradigms of
such forms are the figures and moods of the categorical and hypothetical
syllogism. Later writers would classify them as complexional, in contrast
to local, arguments. These latter, according to Abelard, are such that the
necessity of the connection between premiss and conclusion holds only
for uniform substitution of terms signifying things related in a particular
way. It does so because there is a necessary truth, a maximal proposition,
to the effect that things so related, standing, that is, in a particular local,
23Anon., Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum, pp. 43839.

24Peter Abelard, Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk, 2nd ed. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1970),
pp. 25356.
or topical, relationship, are connected in the way required. For example,

Socrates is a human being; therefore Socrates is an animal, where the nec-
essary connection between premiss and conclusion is guaranteed by the
maximal proposition that of whatever a species is predicated, its genus is
predicated. Local arguments are enthymematic since the maximal propo-
sition which guarantees the necessity of the connection between premiss
and conclusion is not considered to be part of the argument.
Aristotles putative proof that one may give what one does not have is
not of canonical syllogistic form, but in terms of the above classification
it is complexional, and according to Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum
only complexional arguments may be falsified.25 The thought behind this
is perhaps that it is only in the case of complexional arguments that fal-
sification can isolate and expose the fallacy in the required way, though
it is hard to see why one might suppose that to be so, and, as we will see,
for the theory of instantiae enthymemes are the main target of attack.
The aim of sophistical disputation is to defeat ones opponent, and
to that end Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum allows that as well as
employing true falsifications to expose the errors in faulty arguments,
we may also employ sophistical falsificationsarguments, that is, which
appear, but only appear, to be manifestly fallacious instances of the same
complexioto falsify sound arguments.26
Making another distinction, Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum notes
that direct (recta) falsification by the production of a similar but mani-
festly fallacious argument may take fifteen different forms as set out in
what it refers to as the Liber Fallaciarum,27 a name tantalisingly close
to that of the Liber Fantasiarum which Abelard tells us that he wrote.28
Unfortunately, neither he nor Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum says any
more about these works. With direct falsifications Summa Sophisticorum
Elenchorum contrasts indirect falsification, of which there are apparently
two forms. The first, mentioned only in passing, is employed when we
accept the conclusion which our adversary draws, and derive from it an
absurdity,29 the second when we point out to him that the premisses of
his argument are true but its conclusion false. Far from these providing
a decisive refutation of his argument, however, Summa Sophisticorum
25Anon., Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum, p. 440.

28Abelard, Dialectica, p. 448.
Elenchorum maintains that they are only to be employed when we cannot

find a direct falsification. We are not told what is wrong with reduction
to absurdity, and though the reluctance to employ an indirect argument
recalls that expressed by Aristotle in the Topics,30 the consideration
invoked against it there, that the absurdity may not be obvious, does not
seem be in play here.
We are told, on the other hand, what is wrong with what we might
suppose to be the most decisive objection to an opponents argument.
Pointing out to him that his premisses are true but his conclusion false
will generally be ineffective, Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum claims,
since he may anticipate and block our move by formulating his premisses
ambiguously and so presumably by responding to our proposed falsifi-
cation by conceding that his premisses are indeed, appropriately under-
stood, false.
Once we are allowed to employ sophistical falsification and to anti
cipate and block our opponents moves in this way, we might wonder
why, if the disputants are sufficiently ingenious, a sophistical disputation
need ever end. Some twelfth-century masters shared this concern:
Some said that falsifications should not be induced in disputation, because
disputation would then have no end. For if an argument is offered, the other
will falsify it, and then when he presents an argument, the first will falsify
this; and so the disputation would go on ad infinitum.31
The Sophistical Refutations is either the last book of or an appendix
to the Topics,32 and with the recovery of the Topics, perhaps ten years
after the Sophistical Refutations,33 twelfth-century logicians acquired a
much more complete account of the theory of dialectical disputation
assumed by Aristotle in the latter work, and the technical language to
describe it, including the term instantia.
Their reading of the Topics will have confirmed for twelfth-century
masters that dialectical disputation proceeds interrogatively, and they will
have learnt that it is concerned with a problem (problema), a claim, that
30Aristotle, Topics 8.2.157b34158a2.

32J. Brunschwig, Aristote: Topiques, 2 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 19672007), vol. 1,
pp. xviiixx.
33Minio-Paluello argues that the influence of both the Sophistical Refutations and the
Topics can be detected in the Ars Disserendi published in 1132. See L. Minio-Paluello, The
Ars Disserendi of Adam of Balsham, Parvipontanus, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 3
(1954), 13640.
is, about which there is some doubt and which the respondent agrees to
uphold in the face of the argument against it developed by the questioner.
As it is maintained by the respondent in the disputation, the problem is
referred to as a thesis (positio). The disputation proceeds by the ques-
tioner putting questions to the respondent to which he is required to reply
affirmatively or negatively, by declaring his ignorance, or by challenging
the question as unacceptable in some way.34 If he answers affirmatively,
then the corresponding proposition becomes a premiss, and, presumably,
if negatively, its contradictory or contrary. The aim of the questioner is
to refute the respondent by showing that a contradiction follows from
the thesis and the premisses that he accepts. The aim of the respondent
is to avoid refutation if possible, and if he cannot, to show that the con-
tradiction follows simply from the admission of the thesis and not from
any other move made in the argument. Since the questioner wishes to
have his claims accepted, he must proposeand the respondent should
acceptonly what is acceptable (probabilis). In contrast to what is known
as examinatory (temptativa) disputation and which investigates the par-
ticular beliefs of an individual respondent, acceptability in dialectical dis-
putation is acceptability to everyone, to many people, or to all, many, or
the best known of the wise.35 A list of alternatives which is not found
in the Sophistical Refutations but which was already known to twelfth-
century logic from Boethius De differentiis topicis.
As well as designating the problematic proposition admitted by the
respondent in a dialectical disputation, positio, according to the Topics,
is used in a narrower sense for any unusual belief held by a well known
philosopher. From the Sophistical Refutations our twelfth-century readers
already knew that one of the goals of sophistical disputation is to lead the
respondent to say something unbelievable, and that one way to do this is
to collect the theses (positiones) characteristic of the philosophical school
to which he belongs so that they might be employed as premisses from
which an absurdity may be deduced.36
Boethius translation of the Topics employs the term instantia forty
times. Generally, in the first seven books it seems simply to mean an objec-
tion with no suggestion that anything more technical might be involved.
Aristotle does, however, once, in book two, characterise an instantia more
34Aristotle, Topics 8.67.

35Aristotle, Topics 1.1.100b2123.
36Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 12.172b3132.
precisely as an argumentum against a thesis, where the very familiar term

argumentumdefined by Boethius, following Cicero, in De differentiis
topicis as reason bringing conviction where something was in doubt and
drawn from a dialectical locusmeans, according to Aristotle, a dialecti-
cal syllogism.37 Finally, in book eight, Aristotle gives an account of four
different forms of instantiae which, he tells us, a respondent may employ
to block the deduction by his opponent of a false conclusion.38
First the respondent may destroy the claim which if accepted would
be responsible for the derivation of a falsehood. Simply to show that some
premiss is false is, however, not enough. Rather, the respondent must
locate the fallacious move in the argument and show that it is unaccept-
able. Second he may raise an instantia to the opponent himself; and third
he may object to the way in which the opponent formulates his questions.
The fourth, and poorest, kind of instantia is one which it would take the
opponent longer to answer than the time available for the discussion.
According to Aristotle, only the first kind of instantia provides the solu-
tion to an argument, while the other three are merely devices for delay-
ing, or preventing, the conclusion from being drawn. It is this first kind
of instantiae that the theory developed by logicians in the twelfth cen-
tury is concerned with and in constructing it they perhaps drew upon the
account of dialectical premisses in book one of the Topics. A dialectical
premiss, recall, is a proposition which is acceptable to the respondent in
a dialectical disputation. Aristotle believes that acceptability is preserved
in two kinds of transformation which may thus provide us with new
premisses:
Those are also dialectical premisses which are similar to what are accept-
able, and also the contraries of what seem acceptable proposed as a contra-
diction, as well as opinions drawn from the arts.39
Thus, according to Aristotle, if the claim that knowledge of contraries is
the same is acceptable, then so is the claim that perception of contrar-
ies is the same, and likewise if the claim that there is numerically one
skill of flute-playing is acceptable, so is the claim that there is numeri-
cally one skill of reading. Aristotle says nothing, however, to indicate what
kind of similarity is required, or how alike similars must be in order for
this inference to hold. The second kind of transformation, in contrast,
37Aristotle, Topics 2.2.110a11.

38Aristotle, Topics 8.10.160b33161a15.
is much closer to being a purely formal one. Aristotles example is that

if the claim that one should do good for ones friends is acceptable, then
so is the negation of the contrary claim, that is, that one should not
harm ones friends. It will likewise be acceptable that one should not do
good for ones enemies, and finally that one should harm ones enemies,
where the contrary is predicated of the contrary. Aristotles third way of
obtaining acceptable premisses is simply to appeal to an authority in the
appropriate domain. Aristotle does not connect these methods for finding
acceptable premisses with instantiae in the Topics, but if we now turn to
the Prior Analytics, we can see that twelfth-century logicians would have
had a good reason for doing so.
An important feature of twelfth-century logic is the privileging that
we find, for example, in the Ars Meliduna of a short list of dialectical
lociusually the loci from a part, from a whole, from equals, and from
oppositesas the only source of necessary argumenta. This list has its
origin in Boethius two works on the categorical syllogism and was surely
confirmed for twelfth-century readers by Aristotles remarks on proof in
Prior Analytics 1.27. The Prior Analytics, indeed, may initially have played
a more important rle in the development of the theory of topical argu-
mentation in the twelfth century than the Topics.
After working through the complexities of modal inference and the
metalogic of the syllogism, a twelfth-century reader might have found
it rather comforting to come finally in Prior Analytics 2.26 to something
relatively familiar in the discussion of instantiae. According to Aristotle
here, an instantia is an objection raised by the respondent in a dialecti-
cal disputation to a premiss proposed by his opponentit is a propositio
opposed to a propositio.40 He apparently assumes that the opponents syl-
logism has entirely universal premisses, and so the instantia may be either
a contrary universal or contradictory particular proposition. It must be
proved, according to Aristotle, by the respondent using a categorical syllo-
gism which, without a clear explanation, he insists can only be in the first
or third figure.41 A respondent should, for example, oppose the claim that
all contraries are the subject of a single science, by objecting universally
(universaliter instantem) with a syllogism in Celarent that no contraries
40Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.26.69a37b1.

41See W. D. Ross, Aristotles Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1949), pp. 49295.
are the subjects of a single science since all contraries are opposites and
no opposites are the subjects of a single science.42
Aristotle closes the chapter by listing other forms of instantiae, namely,
those ex contrario, ex simili, and secundum opinionem, which he says he
will consider elsewhere. This is, of course, almost precisely the list of
sources for alternative premisses given in the Topics, and it is easy to see
how they might have been linked together by a twelfth-century reader.
If the acceptability of some claim as a premiss implies the acceptability
of appropriately similar claims and the denials of appropriately contrary
claims, then instantiae which are effective as objections to such claims
will be equally effective against the original premiss. Our twelfth-century
masters would thus have been able to find in Sophistical Refutations,
Topics, and Prior Analytics, material with which to construct an account
of different forms of instantiae.
Finally from Aristotle, we should note some remarks in Rhetoric 2.25.
Here he refers us to a distinction which he claims to have made in the
Topics between four different types of instantiae. The list he goes on to
report, however, aside from the first kind of instantia, is not the one given
in Topics 8 but rather that of Prior Analytics 2.26. Aristotle thus tells us
in the Rhetoric that the respondent may firstly form an instantia to the
questioners claim by asserting either the contrary universal or the con-
tradictory particular proposition. Secondly, the respondent may object
in contrario, so that if the questioner proposes, for example, that a good
man does good for all his friends, the respondent should bring forward
the instantia that a bad man does not do evil. The recipe for forming
acceptable premisses given in the Topics yields a bad man does evil for
all his friends, and the instantia is, exactly as we would expect, the denial
of this.43 Thirdly, the respondent may form an instantia a simili, and so
if the questioner proposes that men who are harmed hate those who
harm them, the respondent, Aristotle tells us, should object that those
who are done good to do not always love their benefactors. Unfortunately,
he does not explain what difference he supposes there to be between
his two examples, and this second instantia seems to be generated in
42Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.26.69b812.

43If Aristotle himself intended us to construct instantiae by employing the method
for forming dialectical premisses given in Topics 1.10, the problem that the reference to
the Topics has caused all commentators on the Rhetoric is solved. See E. M. Cope, The
Rhetoric of Aristotle, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1877), vol. 2, p. 323;
W. Grimaldi, Aristotle: Rhetoric II; A commentary (New York: Fordham University Press,
1988), p. 357.
precisely the same way as the first. Finally, Aristotle notes, the respondent
may reply with an objection drawn from a well known authority.
Yukio Iwakuma has published a number of texts containing many
instantiae and has edited but not yet published others, most importantly
the Ars Meliduna in which, he estimates, they constitute some two thirds
of the very long text.44 For the most part, instantiae are given without
further explanation or, indeed, anything to help us decide whether they
are effective or not. Fortunately, we can make some progress in under-
standing the use of the instantiae by referring to another text published by
Ebbesen and Iwakuma45 in which there is a more general account of the
procedure, a commentary on the Sophistical Refutations called by Ebbesen
Anonymus Cantabrigiensis (AC).46 Here I will discuss only the treatment
of instantiae and ignore the crucial problem of dating. The forthcoming
publication by Ebbesen of the full text will reveal an apparently incontro-
vertible reference to 1204. If AC was written then or later and its content
records contemporary teaching activity, we will have to reconsider our
account of the development of logic in the second half of the twelfth cen-
tury, but that is much too daunting a task to begin here.
Although Aristotle does not mention them there, AC offers an account
of instantiae in commenting on Aristotles summary of the solution of
elenchi in Sophistical Refutations 18. The preceding chapters have, accord-
ing to AC, been concerned with apparent or sophistical solutions, and
now Aristotle turns to true solutions, that is, to showing of what is false
that it is false.47 This may be done either by destroying a false premiss
or by a division which shows that the conclusion does not follow from
the premisses either by exposing the fallacy or by exposing the falsity
of the argument by giving a more evident example. Since Aristotle in
the remainder of the Sophistical Refutations is concerned only with the
first kind of solution (by division), AC adds here an account of the sec-
ond, whose general description corresponds to that of falsificatio given in
Summa Sophisticorum Elenchorum but which is, according to AC, achieved
by the use of an instantia to an argumentation either in particulari, in
simili or in contrario.48
44Iwakuma, Instantiae: A study, 2.

45Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, ed. S. Ebbesen
and Y. Iwakuma, Instantiae and 12th century Schools , 8285.
46The commentary is found in MS Cambridge St. Johns D12, ff. 80r111v.
47Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 110rab (not included in the published
text; I quote from Ebbesens transcription).
48Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, 82.
The use of instantiae turns for AC on the observation that every argu-
ment derives its force from a universal proposition.49 In the case of
categorical syllogisms this is included in the argument, since all the pre-
misses are included in the syllogism and one at least must be universal.
For enthymemes, on the other hand, the proposition is external to the
argument. According to the theory of enthymematic inference as it was
developed in the twelfth century there are two ways in which this can be
true. First, an enthymeme may have been obtained simply by suppressing
one of the premisses of a categorical syllogism. Second, it may be a topical
inference warranted by an externally posited maximal proposition. False
syllogisms are solved, according to AC, by the destruction of the appropri-
ate universal proposition and, as in Prior Analytics 2.26, nothing is said
about particular premisses. Enthymemes are solved with instantiae.
An instantia in particulari is what we would now properly call a coun-
terinstance. That is, an enthymeme of precisely the same form as the
original and relying on the same universal proposition, but which the
opponent will grant to be invalid. A particular case, that is, in which
the argument fails. Without referring to the Prior Analytics, AC gives as
an example an enthymeme relying on just the universal proposition to
which, as a premiss in a syllogism, Aristotle opposes an instantia in 2.26.
Aristotles proof of the contrary of the premiss is converted by AC into a
counterinstance:
In particulari as in the case of an argument such as this: (A1) These are con-
trary; therefore, they belong to one and the same discipline. The externally
conceived universal proposition is of all contraries, there is one and the
same discipline. And the following instantia may be given: (I1) The known
and the unknown are contrary; therefore there is one and the same disci-
pline of the known and the unknown.50
(I1) is an argument with a true premiss and a manifestly false conclusion,
relying on the same suppressed universal premiss of all contraries there
is one and the same discipline, a particular instance of the same logical
structure as the original but whose invalidity is evident. The respondent
defeats the questioner by showing that he cannot appeal to his exter-
nally posited proposition to guarantee the truth of the conclusion given
that of the premiss. As AC points out, however, an instantia in particulari
will work only if the questioner agrees with the respondent that some

argument based on the same universal proposition is not valid. If such

an argument cannot be found, then the respondent must rely on another
form of instantia.
The respondents first recourse is to an instantia in simili formed by find-
ing a clearly invalid argument based upon a universal proposition which
the opponent agrees is similar to the one upon which his own enthymeme
relies. AC characterises this new universal proposition as obtained by
collatio simplex, simple comparison. The example we are given is, how-
ever, hardly helpful. Suppose that the questioner argues
(A2) This is an individual; therefore it is predicated of only one,
relying on the universal proposition every individual is predicated of only
one, the respondent, we are told, should counter with
(I2.1) The name Ajax is a proper name; therefore it applies to only one,
relying on the similar universal proposition every proper name applies to
only one thing.51
AC offers no further explanation, nor indeed any apology, for what
seems to be a sophistical instantia, or at least one which is easily resolved
by distinguishing with qualifying descriptions between the various bear-
ers of the name.
Confirming this concern, we find that the same example and also that
given by AC for an instantia in contrario are said to be sophistical in the
treatise published by Iwakuma as the Tractatus de locis argumentationum
(Tractatus).52 In this work instantiae are brought against enthymemes
analysed as topical inferences. Tractatus holds that only loci from the
short list provide warrants for necessary argumenta, and in this case we
are in fact dealing with one of those, the locus a pari (from an equal ),
which warrants the inference from a description,53 or better a definition,
to what is described, or defined. Tractatus insists that
in each of these modes there is an argumentum and it is said to be a pari,
and it has necessity from the locus, that is, a pari. Nor may there be an
instantia other than one which is false and apparent.54

52Anon., Tractatus de locis argumentationum, ed. Iwakuma, Instantiae: A study,
1260.
53Anon., Tractatus de locis argumentationum, 1617.
If simple comparison does not provide an instantia effective against the

questioner, the respondent must seek finally to formulate one per con-
trarium. The example given by AC is one whose universal proposition
asserts the contrary of a subject which is the contrary of the subject of
the opponents propositionone of the formulae employed for generat-
ing new dialectical premisses in Topics 1.10. In this case, we are told, since
individual and appellative name are contrary and so are predicated of
one and agrees with several, the respondent should give as his instantia
(I2.2) The name phoenix is an appellative name; therefore it agrees with
several,
relying on the universal proposition every appellative name agrees with
several. Like the instantia in simili, this very argument is also given in the
Tractatus as a sophistical objection to the locus a pari.55
AC says nothing more about the relation between the various instantiae
and nothing at all to indicate why the second and third forms of instan-
tiae might be effective where a proper counterinstance is not available.
For these instantiae to work the opponent must accept their premisses
and the externally posited universal propositions and agree that the con-
clusion is false. The premiss and conclusion are presumably supposed to
be chosen to guarantee just this, but the acceptability of the alternative
universal proposition will depend on its relation to the original. This rela-
tionship is in twelfth-century terms itself a topical one. For the instantia
a simili it is expressed in the topical rule for the locus a simili that like is
predicated of like. Likewise, for the instantia in contrario by the rule for
the locus ab oppositis that contraries are predicated of contraries. Both
of these rules are emphatically rejected by Abelard in his Dialectica as
entirely lacking in necessity and probability. We thus seem to be dealing
here with what Abelard and the author of the Tractatus would regard as
sophistical instantiae, but that is certainly not how they are presented in
AC. Rather, it goes on to characterise them as secundum veritatem and
available for use against everyone in contrast to instantiae usable only
against the members of particular schools and those which are sophistical
(secundum apparentiam).
The exposition of instantiae secundum veritatem closes with AC distin-
guishing without further explanation between instantiae in particulari,
in simili, and in contrario which are directed at an argument, and those

in universali and in particulari which are directed at a premiss (propo-

sitionem), referring us to the Topics for information about the latter.56
Ebbesen and Iwakuma are doubtful about this reference and from what
we have seen a more appropriate one would be to the Prior Analytics. It
is a curious coincidence, however, that AC agrees with the Rhetoric in
referring to the Topics. The date of the first translation of the Rhetoric
into Latin is unknown, but its modern editor does allow that it could
be before the beginning of the thirteenth century,57 in which case some
influence on the Parisian schools might be possible. But equally well, as
we have seen, neither reference to the Topics is misguided, since Aristotle
provides us there with recipes for constructing precisely the instantiae to
arguments employed in the Rhetoric and by AC.
Instantiae constructed secundum opinionem may, according to AC, like
those which apply to everyone, be formulated in universali, in particulari,
in simili, or in contrario.58 The targets at which it directs them are the
Melidunenses and Parvipontani, called here the Adamitae.
Suppose one of the Melidunenses argues:
(A3) If that which runs moves, then something moves; therefore if nothing
moves, that which runs does not move.
AC recommends as a suitable corrective the instantia in universali that
(I3.1) nothing follows from what is false and it is false that nothing moves,
where the most famous and characteristic thesis of the Meliduneses was
that nothing follows from what is false. This is an instantia in universali
directed at the conclusion rather than providing an appropriately related
but manifestly invalid argument. The result, however, is the same. A gen-
eral principle to which the Meliduneses are committed prevents them
from inferring the conclusion from the premiss in this way.
The premiss of the enthymeme has as its antecedent an implicit propo-
sition, and it seems from the account of such propositions given in the Ars
Meliduna that the Melidunenses would agree that the conditional is true
just so long as its antecedent is true. The argument given by AC suggests
that the conclusion is supposed to be a natural consequence since it is
only to these consequences that the thesis that nothing follows from what
is false applies. Presumably, then, the premiss must express a connection

57Aristotle, Rhetorica: Translatio anonyma sive vetus et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka,
ed. B. Schneider, AL 31.12 (Leiden: Brill, 1978), p. xiii.
which is just as strong. The discussion of implicit propositions in the Ars

Meliduna contains, however, no mention of the truth of the antecedent
required in general by the Melidunenses for the truth of a natural conse-
quence. It allows, however, that an implicit proposition entails the simple
proposition got by dropping the qualification, as in if a human being who
runs disputes, then a human being disputes, which parallels the premiss
of the enthymeme.59 Note that the unstated universal proposition in (A3)
is presumably the inference warrant for contraposition, and so we are
now, and in all of the examples of instantiae according to an opinion,
dealing with topical enthymemes rather than those obtained simply by
dropping a universal premiss from a syllogism.
Contraposition is certainly a serious problem for the Melidunenses, and
ACs example of an instantia in particulari is also directed at it:
(I3.2) If Socrates is not a stone, Socrates is not a pearl; therefore if Socrates
is a pearl, Socrates is a stone.
Here the Melidunenses are presumably supposed to be in trouble because
the antecedent of the conclusion is false and so they cannot accept the
conditional. In fact, they seem to have a reply to such objections. They
grant that the premiss is true provided that its antecedent is true and that
the conclusion is not true. For them, however, this does not mean that the
conclusion is false, since when the antecedent of a conditional is false it
is not a well-formed (congrua) natural conditional.60
As an example of an instantia in simili according to opinion AC shows
us how to deal with a follower of Adam Parvipontanus who argues that
(A4) The genus animal is genus to the species human being; therefore every
human being is an animal,
to which we should oppose
(I4) The genus animals (animalia) is genus to the species <human being>;
therefore every human being is animals.
The universal proposition supporting the Parvipontanian enthymeme
(A4) is presumably every genus is predicated of its species, and, assuming
59See Anon., Ars Meliduna on implicit propositions, ed. F. Giusberti, in A Treatise on

Implicit Propositions from around the Turn of the Twelfth Century, CIMAGL 21 (1977),
108. I have revised Giusbertis emendation of the quoted conditional to conform to the
rule given for it.
60Ars Meliduna 4.40 (ed. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. 2.1, p. 389).
that the emendation is correct, it is difficult to see what the similar but
different universal proposition supporting (I4) might be. We do not,
I think, yet know enough about the Parvipontani to say why they would
have accepted the premiss and rejected the conclusion of (I4). A guess
might be that someone who thought that no distinction can be made
between a whole and its parts would accept the use of the collective term
animals as the name of the genus.
The example of an instantia in contrario secundum opinionem is again
directed against the Melidunenses. If one of them argues,
(A5) These are opposites; therefore from whatever one is predicated of, the
other is removed,
we should object with
(I5) The species human being and the property risible are equals (paria);
therefore of whatever the species is predicated, the property is also
predicated.
The reasoning here is clear enough. The universal proposition for (A5)
is the familiar principle that from whatever one opposite is predicated
of, the other is removed, and for the instantia (I5) the contrary principle
that of whatever one equal is predicated, the other is predicated.
The problem, then, is to say why, assuming that the Melidunenses
would indeed agree that (A5) and (I5) stand or fall together, they would
have found (I5) offensive. The Ars Meliduna suggests a possible reason but
apparently not one which its author himself would accept though perhaps
his reference is to other members of the school who would. The fifth of
five varieties of equals recognised in the Ars Meliduna are those which
signify equals absolutely...for example, human being and able to laugh
<or> animal and sensible....those of the...fifth sort have a mutual and
necessary consecution according to almost everyone, except that many
assert that species follows from property but not conversely, on account of
Porphyrys saying that property is naturally posterior to species.61
AC concludes its accounts of instantiae with examples of their sophistical
use.62 First against the argument
(A6) This is white; therefore it is coloured,
61Anon., Ars Meliduna 3.B.21 (vol. 2.1, pp. 34849).

one may produce the instantia in universali

(I6.1) This did not become white, therefore it did not become coloured,
or, alternatively, in particulari
(I6.2) That became white; therefore it became coloured.
It is not clear what difference AC intends between the two cases, though
the fallacy itself is obvious enough: the application of rules of inference for
punctual constructions to inceptive verbs for which they are not appro-
priate. A version of the same fallacy provides the example of a sophistical
instantia in simili where, against
(A7) This was done; therefore it is necessary that this was done,
AC offers
(I7) This is so; therefore it is necessary that this is so,
which is sophistical, as AC notes, because the logic of claims about the
past is not appropriately similar to that of claims about the present.
Finally, in contrario, against
(A8) These are equals; therefore of whatever one is predicated, the other is
predicated,
we are given
(I8) These are opposites; therefore from whatever one is removed, the other
is removed.
Again the fallacy, although AC does not explain it, is obvious enough, and
turns on an incorrect formulation of the general proposition appropriately
contrary to that on which the enthymeme rests.
The discussion of instantiae in AC is brief but it can, it seems to me, pro-
vide us with a tool to begin to understand the use of the technique in the
twelfth century. We must in particular take care to distinguish between
instantiae which hold in general and those which hold only against one
school or another. As we become better able to do this, we will become
better able to understand the logical theories developed by each of them
during one of the most productive periods in the history of logic.
5.Tempting Moves:
Anonymus Cantabrigiensis on Peirastic Dialectic
Jakob L. Fink
It is most likely imprudent to write about the reception of Aristotles

Sophistical Refutations in a volume honouring Sten Ebbesen. First of all,
there is not much to be said that the honouree himself has not written
already on the topic, and secondly, such a contribution is likely to bring
Sten more grief than pleasure, if I know him well. In spite of these consid-
erable risks, I will engage in precisely this kind of project and in doing so,
I take some courage in the thought that my exact topic has not received
much interest from Sten or anyone else.1 Should this contribution draw
attention to a neglected issue in the medieval reception of Aristotles writ-
ing on fallacies, this would be a most suitable homage to Stens work.
For contemporary philosophers Aristotles Sophistical Refutations is mainly

of interest for its contribution to logical theory. Classifying and analyzing
fallacies remains a respectable logical issue even today.2 Aristotles medi-
eval interpreters certainly also took a strong interest in fallacies as part
of logical theory (logica docens), but in addition they never lost sight of
the practical utility of studying fallacious argument (logica utens).3 In this
respect the medieval approach to the Sophistical Refutations is more sen-
sitive to the fact that Aristotles investigation of fallacious arguments has
a real question-and-answer context. This focus on the competitive social
background of arguments manifests itself among mid-twelfth to early
thirteenth-century Parisian masters whose philosophical activity unfolded
1Though see S. Ebbesen, Zacharias of Parma on the Art of Tempting, in B. Mojsisch and
O. Pluta (eds.), Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi (Amsterdam: Grner, 1991), pp. 21126.
2See P. Fait, Aristotele: Le Confutazioni Sofistiche; introduzione, traduzione e commento
(Rome and Bari: Editori Laterza, 2007), p. ix.
3See S. Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotles Sophistici Elenchi,
3 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1981), vol. 1, pp. 8889; S. Ebbesen, The Way Fallacies Were Treated
in Scholastic Logic, CIMAGL 55 (1987), 10734.
86 jakob l. fink
in fierce competition between different schools. The Anonymus Canta-

brigiensis commentary on the Sophistical Refutations is by one such early
thirteenth-century master. I want to bring out here how the Anonymus
Cantabrigiensis (AC) interprets peirastic argument, a very peculiar form
of argument that pops up in Sophistical Refutations chapters 2, 8, 9 and
11 mainly (chapter 11 being crucial). There are two main reasons for nar-
rowing the focus in this way. First of all, we have no modern investigation
of the medieval approaches to peirastic argument and since AC is among
the earliest extant commentaries on the Elenchi, though not the earliest,
which actually include a treatment of Sophistical Refutations 11, this seems
to be a good place to start such an investigation.4 Secondly, peirastic is
a topic which is hotly disputed among contemporary scholars of Aristo-
tle, not least because it raises questions that go far beyond purely logical
matters into epistemology and the methodological status of Aristotelian
dialectic.5 In the last section of this paper, I shall briefly focus on a point
in AC that I think deserves attention from contemporary colleagues of our
thirteenth-century master.
The peirastic argument (temptativus syllogismus) is designed for testing

or examining an answerer with respect to his knowledge. Its purpose
is to establish the answerers ignorance concerning a specific scientific
discipline (Sophistical Refutations 11.171b46). The situation is this: some
person declares himself knowledgeable in a given science. The peirastic
4Anon., Glose in Aristotilis Sophisticos Elencos, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A

contribution to the history of early terminist logic, 2 vols. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 19621967),
vol. 1, pp. 23335 deals very briefly with chapter 11; Anonymus Aurelianensis I, Commen-
tarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, ed. S. Ebbesen, in CIMAGL 34 (1979) stops in chapter 6
(Sophistical Refutations 168b27). Anonymus Laudianus, In Sophisticos Elenchos (unedited)
does cover SE chapter 11 and appears to be a near contemporary of AC; see Anonymus
Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos, ed. S. Ebbesen (Copen-
hagen: Royal Danish Academy, forthcoming), Introduction, sections 12 for relative dates
and further discussion.
5See R. Bolton, The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic, in D. Devereux and
P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Mtaphysique chez Aristote (Paris: ditions du CNRS,
1990) and the responses to this paper in the same volume by J. Brunschwig, Remarques sur
la communication de Robert Bolton, and D. T. Devereux, Comments on Robert Boltons
The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic. See also R. Bolton, The Aristotelian
Elenchus, in J. L. Fink (ed.), The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 27095.
tempting moves 87
questioner takes this claim to knowledge up for examination. By use of

question-and-answer argument based on a specific type of premises (to
which we shall come back) the questioner either succeeds in showing that
the answerer is an ignoramus or he does not succeed. In the first case the
answerer is shown up as a charlatan, that is, as someone who only appears
knowledgeable; in the latter casewhich is not treated by Aristotle in the
Sophistical Refutationsthe answerer defends the claim to knowledge at
least in the sense that he is not shown to be an ignoramus. Peirastic, as
this is described in the Sophistical Refutations, is an aggressive, refutative
form of dialectic. But despite the fact that the peirastic argument aims
at showing up the answerers ignorance, the questioner performing the
test is not required to have knowledge himself (11.172a2327). Peirastic is,
in other words, a complex form of argument and, as we shall see in sec-
tion 10 below, contemporary scholars disagree about how it is supposed
to work.
Today peirastic in its genuine form is seen as non-fallacious and so non-
sophistic argument. The genuine peirastic argument is a potent weapon
against a cunning form of deceptive argument, the type of argument that
pretends to offer scientific proof based on proper principles of a given
science as for example Brysos squaring of the circle.6 By proving that
the circle can be squared, Bryso solves a problem that real science had
not been able to solve. Thus, Bryso directly challenges geometry and the
scientific authority of master geometricians. Aristotles interest in peiras-
tic argument is twofold. He wants to classify Brysos argument as sophis-
tic, and AC follows him in this, but Aristotle is not only concerned with
classification. Peirastic argument is also designed to expose the kind of
intellectual imposture involved in Brysos argument.7 A strange feature of
Brysos argument is that it deceives without falling under any of the thir-
teen types of fallacy analyzed by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations. It
is deceptive in another way and so calls for special treatment.
Contemporary interpreters of the Sophistical Refutations are somewhat
puzzled by Aristotles inclusion of this kind of argument in a treatise on
fallacies.8 Not only is it difficult to grasp the logic of peirastic arguments,
6Fait, Le Confutazioni Sofistiche, pp. xxxivv.

7Peirastic examines the one who claims to have knowledge the pretender to knowl-
edge ( ) (2.165b56) and is aimed at showing up
ignorance (11.171b46). All translations from Greek and Latin are my own.
8Fait, Le Confutazioni Sofistiche, p. xxxii; see also L.-A. Dorion, Aristote: Les Rfutations
Sophistiques; introduction, traduction et commentaire (Paris: Vrin, 1995), pp. 21314 (ad
165a39).
88 jakob l. fink
it is furthermore unclear what utility such arguments have. Let us pose

the following questions to AC and see what he has to offer: (1) what is the
logic of peirastic argument and (2) why should one study and practice
peirastic arguments? I will focus on the first question in sections 38 and
on the second in section 9.
Understanding the logic of peirastic argument is primarily a question

about accounting for its premises. Here is what Aristotle says:
Peirastic arguments proceed (a) from the beliefs of the answerer and
(b) from what one who claims to have the scientific knowledge [in some
area] must necessarily know.9
Most contemporary interpreters take (a) and (b) in combination to form
one necessary and sufficient condition for peirastic premises.10 Thus, in
order to work a peirastic argument must proceed from premises (a) which
the answerer believes to be true and (b) which accord with some basic
constituents of the science in question. On this reading there is only one
form of peirastic argument. AC thinks differently. He claims that there
are two forms of peirastic argument, and he can do so only because he
takes (a) and (b) as separate sufficient conditions for such arguments.
In doing so he is depending on the Latin rendering of the Elenchi which
obscures the fact that the Greek controls both genitives
and . However, his reason for taking this position is clear
enough:
Know, therefore, that there are principally two distinct types of peirastic
argument. For one proceeds from what is common, another from principles.11
9Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 2.165b46:

.
10Fait, Le confutazioni sofistiche, pp. 1056. Bolton, The Epistemological Basis of Aris-
totelian Dialectic, p. 214.
11Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos, f. 83vb:
Sciendum ergo quoniam principaliter duae distinguuntur temptativi species. Temptativo-
rum enim alius fit ex communibus, alius fit ex principiis. The commentary is found in MS
Cambridge St. Johns D12, ff. 80r111v. When quoting it, I quote from Stens forthcoming
edition (see n. 4 above).
tempting moves 89
The interpretational crux in this statement is what to do with the under-

determined ex communibus (literally from what is common). This prob-
ably means from common principles as opposed to proper principles
which is a distinction AC has introduced earlier.12 The form of peirastic
argument that proceeds ex communibus corresponds to (a), the beliefs of
the answerer, whereas the argument proceeding ex principiis corresponds
to (b). Peirastic ex communibus imitates dialectic materially, as our author
puts it, that is, it imitates dialectical premises. However, whereas dialectic
reasons from premises that are acceptable without further qualification,
peirastic premises must be acceptable to the answerer.13 Among contem-
porary scholars this clause is taken to mean that the answerer in peirastic
must be committed to the truth of the premises he concedes (in Socratic
studies this is called the say what you mean requirement).14 But appar-
ently AC wants to make a slightly different point. This is clear from his
assertion earlier that peirastic argument is based on apparent principles.
He is discussing how the four types of argument mentioned by Aristotle
in chapter 2 differ from each other materially:
In matter they differ in that principles are the matter of demonstrative dis-
putations, acceptable propositions the matter of dialectic, apparent prin-
ciples the matter of peirastic and apparently acceptable propositions the
matter of sophistic.15
In its matter peirastic relates to demonstration as sophistic relates to dia-
lectic meaning that peirastic proceeds from what appears to be demon-
strative principles whereas sophistic proceeds from what appears to be
acceptable propositions. So the apparent principles of peirastic are prin-
ciples that seem proper to a specific science but really are not. What our
author seems to say when he maintains that peirastic ex communibus pro-
ceeds not from what is acceptable to all (ex simpliciter probabilibus), but
12See Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 83rb: Communia vero principia

sunt illa quae sunt ex terminis ad nullum genus determinate pertinentibus, quorum tamen
consideratio ad omnia potest transferri, qualia sunt principia dialecticae...
13Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 83vb: Ex communibus fit qui dialecti-
cum imitatur in materia...Hunc ita discribimus: temptativus est qui fit ex probabilibus
respondentinon dico ex simpliciter probabilibus, sed talibus quae videntur ei cum quo
sermo conseritur.
14See, e.g., R. Bolton, Aristotles Account of the Socratic Elenchus, Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 11 (1993), 13335.
15Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 82vb: Materia quidem quoniam prin-
cipia sunt materia demonstrativae disputationis, probabilia materia dialecticae, apparen-
tia principia temptativae, apparentia probabilia sophisticae.
90 jakob l. fink
from what is acceptable to the answerer (talibus quae videntur ei cum quo
sermo conseritur), is that peirastic ex communibus proceeds on the basis
of what the answerer believes to be, or accepts as, proper principles of a
science (even though others might not accept this).
In face of the fact that peirastic is said to proceed from apparent princi-
ples, it is slightly odd that AC divides peirastic argument from principles
(ex principiis) in a way which includes argument from genuine princi-
ples. The division is sensible enough, however, with respect to Aristotles
later distinction between eristic and pseudographic arguments, since AC
interprets pseudographic arguments as a form of peirastic ex principiis.16
Peirastic argument ex principiis is subdivided into (i) an apparent argu-
ment from genuine principles; (ii) a genuine, that is, valid, argument from
apparent principles; and (iii) an apparent argument from apparent prin-
ciples. This yields the following division:17
Peirastic
(a) Ex communibus (b) Ex pricipiis
(i) Apparent argument (ii) Genuine argument (iii) Apparent argument

Genuine principles Apparent principles Apparent principles
From a contemporary point of view, this division has a striking advan-

tage in that we might use it to draw a distinction between genuine pei-
rastic argument, which argues ex communibus, and deceptive arguments
some of which are in fact eristic but in appearance scientific, (ii) and (iii),
and one of which it would be natural to interpret as pseudographic, that
is, as a formally defective argument from genuine scientific principles,
that is, (i).18 After all, the three subdivisions falling under peirastic argu-
ment ex principiis are all necessarily deceptive: (i) deceives formally,
(ii) deceives materially and (iii) deceives both formally and materially.19
16Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 100rbva.

17Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 83vb.
18Our author wavers somewhat between defining peirastic argument as argument
from apparent principles or as apparent argument from genuine principles (see section
7 below). He will later designate (iii) as apparently peirastic (apparenter temptativus), see
f. 98va.
19Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 83vb.
tempting moves 91
Brysos argument must be an instance of either (ii) or (iii) since it is based

on principles that only appear to be genuinely geometric, but are in fact
common (see Sophistical Refutations 11.172a29). However, AC does not
use the division to distinguish between genuine peirastic (ex communi-
bus) and deceptive peirastic (ex principiis).
The division is used, instead, to distinguish between Aristotles treatment

of peirastic in the Sophistical Refutations and in the Topics. In Sophisti-
cal Refutations Aristotle treats peirastic argument ex communibus only,
according to AC.20 We may, then, ignore peirastic argument from prin-
ciples for the time being.
If, however, peirastic argument is based on apparent principles one
should like to know how AC thinks such an argument differs from ordi-
nary sophistical arguments. As it turns out, he is not prepared to interpret
peirastic arguments as sophistical fallacies. The thing is that both sophis-
tical fallacies and peirastic arguments operate on the basis of premises
that appear to have a certain quality which, in fact, they do not have. Our
author states the difference to be that:
Some propositions seem apparently acceptable because of lack of expe-
rience, even though they arent; others because of an implicit sophistical
fallacy. The peirastic [dialectician] should focus on those whose apparent
acceptability is due to ignorance, the sophist on those due to a fallacy.21
An implicit fallacy corresponds to one of the thirteen types of fallacy hid-
den somewhere and somehow in an argument. We know already that pei-
rastic arguments operate from apparent principles and we are now told
that such arguments do not deceive because of an implicit fallacy. They
deceive, it seems, because the answerer does not notice, or know, that
the premises of the argument contain (in some way) one or more appar-
ently proper principles of the science in question, and so such arguments
deceive because the answerer is ignorant with respect to this particular
20Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 84ra.

21Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 84ra: Apparentium alia videntur
propter imperitiam probabilia, cum non sint; alia propter sophisticam fallaciam implici-
tam. Ad ea quae ignorantia facit videri probabilia declinare debet temptator, ad ea quae
propter fallaciam sophista.
92 jakob l. fink
scientific discipline.22 From his statements so far, it would seem that our
author considers all peirastic arguments deceptive (it will later be clear
that this can hardly be his position; see section 7). Yet, peirastic argu-
ments are not covered by any of the thirteen fallacies on Aristotles list.
The cause of the deception is, in a sense, the ignorance of the answerer.
Not being sophistical, peirastic arguments nevertheless deceive and so
should be interpreted as paralogisms according to AC:
Likewise, some, but not all, paralogisms are sophistical arguments, for one
kind of paralogism appears to be an argument according to some fallacy
(even though it isnt), whereas another kind of paralogism is no sophistical
argument, that is, the kind that appears to be an argument due to inexperi-
ence alone and not according to some fallacy. This one is peirastic rather
than sophistic.23
A paralogism is an argument that deceives either formally or materially. If
it deceives formally, it is not properly speaking an argument. If, however,
it deceives materially it is a paralogism in a more restricted sense. Such
a paralogism might be formally valid but it lacks demonstrative force.
Our author refers to such arguments as paralogisms with respect to dem-
onstration and one type of peirastic ex principiis is of this type.24 As it
turns out, sophistic and peirastic arguments are actually opposed to one
another:
In fact, there is an opposition between sophistic and peirastic. For no pei-
rastic argument is sophistic insofar as it is peirastic. Only an argument that
has an implicit fallacy is called sophistic; but no peirastic argument insofar
as it is peirastic deceives through an implicit fallacy (my italics).25
22This interpretation draws some support from Aristotles remark in 11.172a6 that an
argument such as Brysos works with people who dont know what is possible or impossible
within the confines of each science ( ).
23Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 96va: Item quidam paralogismus est
sophisticus syllogismus et non <omnis, qui> sc. propter aliquam fallaciam videtur esse syl-
logismus cum non sit; alius autem non est sophisticus syllogismus, qui sc. propter solam
{sophisticam ms.} imperitiam videtur et non propter aliquam fallaciam, et iste magis
temptativus est.
24Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 80va. Later, at f. 100rb, it is explicitly
pointed out that not all peirastic arguments ex principiis are paralogisms except in a cer-
tain respect, namely, as paralogisms of demonstrations (in respectu sunt paralogismi, i.e.
paralogismi demonstrationum). This last point probably means that they are paralogisms
materially in that they use premises that appear to be proper principles of a given science
but are not = (ii) in the division found in section 3 above.
25Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 96vb: Sophistici vero ad temptativum
est oppositio, quoniam nullus temptativus ex eo quod est temptativus est sophisticus.
tempting moves 93
The difference between sophistic and peirastic lies in the ignorance of the
answerer. One of the thirteen types of fallacy may trick even a knowledge-
able person. But it will not thereby have established that he is ignorant
in the field in question. If a peirastic argument succeeds it will establish
the answerers ignorance in a discipline that he claims to know.26 In con-
trast to sophistic argument, peirastic is not merely a matter of appropriate
logical skill. It is a matter of the answerers real or apparent knowledge
(, scientia) and so should have an epistemological dimension.
This focus on establishing ignorance brings us back to the division of

peirastic argument ex communibus and ex principiis and to the problem
concerning the premises of peirastic. Peirastic premises should (a) be
the beliefs of the answerer and (b) accord with what one must neces-
sarily know, if one knows a given science. Now, AC has claimed that
(a) belongs to peirastic ex communibus and that this form of peirastic is
the only one on Aristotles agenda in the Sophistical Refutations. But here
is the problem then: how can a peirastic argument ex communibus estab-
lish the ignorance of the answerer concerning a specific science, that is,
how can an argument on the basis of common principles establish igno-
rance concerning a subject matter which is based on principles proper to
this subject and this subject only? In his comments on chapter 2, AC sees
the problem but gives no satisfactory solution to it.27
In order to see how AC solves the problem, we have to go to his com-
ments on chapter 9, where he establishes a link between dialectical prin-
ciples and the proper sciences, and to his comments on chapter 11, where
he explains how a peirastic argument ex communibus establishes the
answerers ignorance.
Sophisticus vero dicitur solum ille qui fallaciam habet implicitam, temptativus vero nullus
ex eo quod temptativus decipit ex fallacia implicita.
26Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 97ra (ad 8.169b27).
27He suggests (f. 83vb) that arguments ex communibus are called peirastic because in
earlier days peirastic was a matter of testing principles of a given science, whereas in his
own day people are only exercised in the common principles of dialectic. This obviously
only explains why arguments from common premises are called peirastic.
94 jakob l. fink
AC establishes the link between dialectical principles and the proper

sciences in his comments on Sophistical Refutations 9. In this chapter
Aristotle points out that the dialectician cannot grasp all sources of refu-
tation without also having knowledge of everything. The problem is that
no discipline covers everything (9.170a2023). True refutations (
) are, of course, possible. A true refutation establishes the contra-
dictory of a false claim and so arrives at a true conclusion, for example the
diagonal is not commensurate with the sides (9.170a2326). However, in
order to establish such a geometrical conclusion, the dialectician should
know the principles of geometry; to establish a true conclusion in medi-
cine, he should know the principles of this discipline etc. In short: the
ability to establish all sorts of true refutation presupposes knowledge of
every science and everything (9.170a2734). The way out of this problem
is to distinguish between proper principles and what Aristotle calls what
is common (). The passage is infested with difficulties which I will
lightly skip over:
Its clear, therefore, that one shouldnt grasp the sources of all refutations,
but the sources28 depending on dialectic. For these are common to every
discipline and skill. It belongs to the knowledgeable person to study refuta-
tion according to his particular field of knowledge, to see whether it isnt
genuine but just seems so, and if it is genuine why it is so. On the other
hand, refutation which is from what is common and confined to no single
discipline, belongs to the investigation of the dialecticians.29
We gather from this statement that some sources () of refutation are
common, and that it is the business of dialecticians to study and master
these, and that some are proper to any one given scientific discipline. AC
has probably had this distinction in mind in his treatment of peirastic
and his introduction of the term communia right from the beginning of
his commentary.30 As we have seen (section 3) he introduces the term
into his interpretation of peirastic premises in commenting on chapter 2
28For brief remarks on the term /locus which I here render source, see N. J.
Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages (Munich: Philosophia
Verlag, 1984), pp. 2029.
29Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 9.170a3439:

. ,
, ,
.
30See Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 83rb.
tempting moves 95
despite the fact that Aristotle does not use it here. However, commenting
on chapter 2, AC only stressed that peirastic ex communibus proceeds on
the basis of what the answerer believes to be, or accepts as, proper princi-
ples. In his comments on chapter 9, he elaborates on the term communia
and paves the way for solving the central problem with respect to peirastic
ex communibus: how a peirastic argument on the basis of common prin-
ciples can establish the answerers ignorance in a specific science.
It is not unimportant to note that our author (without arguing for this
claim) takes the in Aristotles statement above to mean principles.31
He further distinguishes between two sorts of principles which will be
found in any science, that is, principles which make up the subject matter
of the discipline (principia circa quae) and principles from which the dis-
cipline proceeds (principia ex quibus).32 With these assumptions in mind,
he addresses the term common and its relation to dialectic:
Now, some principles are proper, some common. This is true both for those
principles which make up the subject matter and for those from which the
discipline proceeds. Proper principles are such as number in arithmetic
and triangle in geometry. Likewise, the principle mentioned by us earlier
on a given straight line etc. is proper to geometry. Common principles are
such as pertain to one discipline in such a way that they may be applied to
another, for example these: genus, species, definition, and these: of what-
ever the species is true, the genus is also true, of whatever the definition is
true, the definiendum is true.33
The examples of common principles are all in fact instances of what AC
calls dialectical principles. Terms such as genus, species, and definition
make up the subject matter of dialectic (circa quae) and propositions such
as of whatever the species is true, the genus is also true constitute princi-
ples from which dialectic proceeds (ex quibus).34 However, the important
31Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 98rb: ergo manifestum quoniam non

sunt sumendi loci i.e. principia (the italicised text is the Latin version of Sophistical Refuta-
tions 9.170a34).
33Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 98ra: Principiorum autem alia sunt
propria, alia sunt communia, tam eorum sc. circa quae quam eorum ex quibus est ars. Pro-
pria sunt ut numerus proprium principium est arithmeticae et triangulus geometriae.
Item, proprium est geometriae principium quod prius diximus Supra datam rectam etc.
Communia sunt quae ita ad unam [p]artem pertinent quod ad aliam possunt transferri
{transfere ms.}, quemadmodum ista: genus, species, definitio; et haec De quocumque
species et genus De quocumque definitio et definitum.
34Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 98ra. The distinction corresponds to
Boethius locus differentia and locus maxima, for which see Green-Pedersen, Tradition of
the Topics, pp. 6065.
96 jakob l. fink
point is that AC suggests an overlap between the principles of dialectic

and the principles of all ordinary sciences. After all, the common prin-
ciples pertain to one discipline in such a way that they may be applied
to another. Dialectical common principles obviously hold an important
position with respect to the sciences in that the dialecticians investiga-
tion of his common principles allows him to argue about these principles
even when they are applied in scientific argumentation. For this reason,
it seems, AC claims that dialectical principles really should be called prin-
ciples of disputations rather than principles of a discipline (magis dispu-
tationum principia quam artis dici debent).35
However, with a view to peirastic this leads to a serious problem. The
dialectical principles were divided into terms such a genus etc. (prin-
ciples circa quae) and maxims such as of whatever the species is true,
the genus is true (principles ex quibus). Now, the maxims actually seem
to consist of derived either directly or indirectly from Aristotles
Topics or Boethius De differentiis topicis.36 The question then is whether
AC is prepared to argue that every in the Topics will find immediate
acceptance with any answerer since the first condition to be satisfied by a
peirastic premise is that it corresponds to the beliefs of the answerer (a). It
is certainly possible to take this position, since the part of an Aristotelian
which is normally referred to as the reason generally consists in a
rule of inference that will seem acceptable to people with no expert knowl-
edge.37 Further, medieval commentators were apparently willing to apply
the term acceptable (probabilis, ) not only to dialectical premises
but also to dialectical maxims, so the position would not be extraordinary.
Now, from the point of view of someone who approaches Aristotelian dia-
lectic on the basis of Boethius, this position might be unproblematic. But
from the point of view of Aristotles Topics it does seem to be a difficult
position (for one thing not all give the reason, and so it seems that
one would have to argue that a is intrinsically acceptable irrespec-
tive of whether it gives the reason or not; for another it seems logically
suspect to assume that a rule of inference acts as a premise in the infer-
ence, even though this might be acceptable to Boethius and to someone

36For a sample of maxims, see f. 98ra. De quocumque species, et genus = Aristotle,
Topics 4.1.121a2526. The remaining are pretty common maxims and could come from any-
where (as Niels Jrgen Green-Pedersen informs me).
37See Green-Pedersen, Tradition of the Topics, pp. 2728.
tempting moves 97
trained in his understanding of a or locus and how it works).38 It is

unfortunately not clear whether our author sees these problems at all, so
let us leave the matter at this.
From his comments on chapter 9 it has not only emerged that AC
establishes a link between dialectical common principles and the proper
sciences. We gather also that he thinks about communia (1) as terms like
genus, species, definition etc., and (2) as a not entirely well-defined class of
maxims (perhaps the or those parts of a that give the reason).39
In defence of AC it should perhaps be noticed that Aristotle himself seems
to think about the common principles as rather general, comparing them
to negations (11.172a38). A negated term such as not-man will obviously
be more general than man and if the common principles are like this
they will not be entirely well-defined.
In order to see how the peirastic argument ex communibus can establish

ignorance concerning a specific science, we will have to turn to our authors
comments on chapter 11. He explains here the peculiar feature of peirastic
that even the questioner who is ignorant about the science in question will
be able to perform the test and show up the answerers ignorance.
AC explains how this might work by pointing out that the communia
with which peirastic dialectic operates are more or less like elements
or starting points of demonstrations (sunt quasi initia demonstrationum
artis).40 He does not elaborate further on this claim but he must mean
that these common principles are necessary but insufficient conditions
for having scientific knowledge. This would also explain why he talks
38Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 110rb seems to think that a rule of

inference, here called a universal proposition, might stand in the argument or outside the
argument: every argumentation derives its force from some universal proposition, a uni-
versal proposition, I say, which is either posited in the argumentation or known from out-
side the argumentation (my italics) (omnis argumentatio vim suam contrahit ex aliqua
universali propositioneuniversali dico vel in argumentatione posita vel extra argumenta-
tionem concepta.). On Boethian grounds this is unproblematic, see Green-Pedersen, Tra-
dition of the Topics, p. 66, but on purely Aristotelian grounds this is in fact a problem, see
M. Schramm, Die Prinzipien der Aristotelischen Topik (Leipzig: Saur, 2004), p. 96.
39Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 98rb: Communia sunt quae ita ad
unam [p]artem pertinent quod ad aliam possunt transferri, quemadmodum ista: genus,
species, definitio; et haec De quocumque species et genus De quocumque definitio et
definitum. Text cited above n. 33.
40Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 101va (text somewhat corrupt).
98 jakob l. fink
about peirastic ex communibus as a part of demonstrative science (pars

demonstrativae) whereas he thinks peirastic ex principiis merely mocks or
imitates demonstrative science.41 His suggestion that peirastic ex commu-
nibus forms a part of demonstrative science, by the way, makes it unlikely
that he would consider all peirastic arguments deceptive and paralogisms
(see section 3 above).
Be that as it may, even though the communia are necessary constitu-
ents in any specific science, one may know them without having knowl-
edge of the science in question:
These may be known even if a discipline is completely unknown, but if they
are not known there will be ignorance of the discipline. It is possible for
someone to perform a test and reveal ignorance of the discipline through
these even though he is himself ignorant of the discipline (my italics).42
The idea is, I think, clear enough: a self-professed master geometrician
who does not know that whatever he calls a triangle, he also calls a fig-
ure will not have very well-founded knowledge of geometry and even a
non-specialist will be able to lead him into holding an impossible claim43
concerning geometrical questions by use of the piece of information that
a triangle is a figure and that of whatever the species is true, the genus is
true. The non-specialist peirastic questioner is in an advantageous posi-
tion since his refutation of the answerer requires no knowledge of the
principles of the discipline in neither the questioner himself nor in the
answerer. It is only required that the answerer argues (concedes prem-
ises) on the basis of what follows ( ), as Aristotle puts it
(11.172a2325). Follows how and what? Some interpreters think that Aris-
totle talks about what follows upon or from the discipline in question,
either as derived facts known by the questioner and taken from some sci-
ence or as corollaries of the principles which the answerer claims to know
(since he claims to know the science). Others think that what follows are
predicates following a subject as the more general term follows a subordi-
nate term.44 AC interprets Aristotles (ex consequentibus)
in the following way:

42Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 101va: Huiusmodi autem sciri pos-
sunt arte penitus ignorata, sed ignorabitur {ignorabam ms.} ars nisi ista sciantur. Potest
autem per haec aliquis temptare et ostendere artis ignorantem, cum tamen sit et ipse eius
ignorans.
43See Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 97ra.
44Derivative facts known by the questioner, see E. Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or
The Sophistici Elenchi (London: Macmillan, 1866), p. 39. Corollaries of the principles of
tempting moves 99
From what follows with respect to the discipline, that is, from the common
principles that are connected to the discipline and follow it because they are
the starting points of demonstrations within it.45
That the common principles are connected (coniuncta) to a discipline prob-
ably means that they are necessarily associated with the proper principles.
In other words what follows does not follow from the proper principles
but will be required by anyone who wishes to produce demonstrations in
the science. Such items are the common principles necessarily associated
to any proper science (genus, definition, maxims, etc.) Knowing them
implies no knowledge of the science in question, but not knowing
them implies ignorance of the science in question (11.172a2627).
The peirastic argument ex communibus may establish the answerers
ignorance because the common principles are necessary constituents in
any science and because not knowing these to be necessarily associated
with the proper principles of the science, the answerer proves his own
ignorance by conceding premises that conflict with what he should know
if he really knew the science he pretends to know.
Any interpretation of peirastic dialectic will have to answer how the non-
specialist, ignorant questioner knows the common principles through
which he may confute the pretender to knowledge and establish his igno-
rance. Aristotle seems to suggest that the common principles are part of
mans natural rational outfit. All men try their hand at examining claims
to knowledge, all men engage in refutations even if only in a most unme-
thodical manner (11.172a3035).46 AC has nothing in particular to say on
this point and he seems not to be aware of the problem.
This is clear from his comments on a passage which is crucial to
the question. In Sophistical Refutations 9, Aristotle introduces what is
the science the answerer pretends to know, see R. Bolton, The Problem of Dialectical
Reasoning () in Aristotle, Ancient Philosophy 14 (1994), 122 and 124. Predicates
following as more general terms, see Fait, Le confutazioni sofistiche, p. 160.
45Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 101rb: ex consequentibus artem, i.e. ex
communibus quae sunt coniuncta arti et consequentia illam quia sunt initium demon-
strationum eius.
46A similar point is made in Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.1.1354a36 to which AC probably did
not have access, see Ebbesen, Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Introduction, section 4. His lack
of acquaintance with the Rhetoric probably also explains why he does not know or use
the distinction between common and special , see Rhetoric 2.22. See, however, the
remarks by C. J. Martin in his contribution to this volume, p. 81, n. 57.
100 jakob l. fink
common () as what falls under no specific science (see section 6

above). Immediately after follows this statement:
For if we have the constituents of acceptable arguments concerning any
subject, we have the constituents of refutations also.47
In his comments, AC does not directly address what an acceptable argu-
ment ( ) means or what exactly its constituents (
) are. These questions are obviously relevant for answering the ques-
tion about mans access to the common principles, since they suggest
that men will find not only certain premises but also certain arguments
acceptable, which should invite us to inquire why this is so. However, our
author focuses on the conditional if we have the constituents etc. and
answers it affirmatively:
It is clear from the Topics that we have the constituents of acceptable
arguments; hence we also have the constituents of refutations since every
acceptable argument may become a refutation, namely, if it is constructed
with a view to contradicting.48
ACs position seems to be that if you know what a dialectical argument to
a conclusion looks like, you will also know what a refutation looks like,
since a refutation is a dialectical argument to the opposite of some claim.
And you do know what a dialectical argument looks like, if you know the
Topics. On the central question AC does not take us any further.
I hope by now to have represented ACs interpretation of the logic of pei-

rastic argument in a fairly adequate manner. Before we can ascertain on
what points AC deserves serious attention from contemporary scholars,
we should briefly address the question about why the philosopher should
study and practice peirastic arguments.
The answer to this question connects, I believe, with the competitive
social context of dialectical argument in Paris at the time of AC (see sec-
tion 1). In the Foreword to his commentary, AC points out that the study of
47Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 9.170a39b1:

,
48Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 98va: Ex Topicis quidem constat nos
habere ex quibus sunt probabiles syllogismi; inde etiam habemus ex quibus elenchi[s],
omnis enim probabilis syllogismus potest esse elenchus, sc. ut fiat ad contradicendum.
tempting moves 101
the Sophistical Refutations is useful for philosophy (ad philosophiam) and

for ones renown (ad gloriam). It is useful for philosophy for the reasons
Aristotle gives in chapter 16 of the work but there is no reason to go fur-
ther into this here. Our author does not directly address why the study of
peirastic is useful. But this is clear, I think, from his considerations about
the utility of the whole treatise for ones renown. Echoing again chapter 16,
our author states that the Sophistical Refutations is useful:
For ones renown since it is a matter of renown to seem well-trained in every
subject and behave as an ignoramus in none.49
A Parisian master should study Aristotles treatise on fallacies so as never
to lose face in a debate with other competing masters or their follow-
ers. His acquaintance with fallacious arguments enables him to avoid
refutation with respect to the tenets of his school.50 Experience in pei-
rastic argument should prevent him from behaving as an ignoramus with
respect to any scientific subject whatever (in nullo inscie se habere). This is
the reason why Aristotle includes a treatment of peirastic in the Sophisti-
cal Refutations and this is why studying and practising such arguments is
useful for a philosopher.
10
One of the central aims at the Centre for the Aristotelian Tradition in
Copenhagen is to present potentially useful ideas from the medieval inter-
preters of Aristotle to present-day Aristotelian scholarship. With a view to
peirastic I would focus on one point in particular and that is our authors
interpretation of the common principles (, communia) or what is
common.
There are two particularly important currents in the contemporary
interpretation of these. One is logical and represented by Paolo Fait, for
example, the other is epistemological and represented by Robert Bolton.
The discussion about the common principles has a considerable impact
on how one interprets the philosophical capacity and methodological sta-
tus of Aristotelian dialectic. The following is only a brief and somewhat
49Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, Commentarium, f. 80r: Ad gloriam quidem, gloriosum

enim est in omnibus exercitatum videri et in nullo inscie se habere.
50For the tenets of the different schools and their rivalry, see S. Ebbesen, What Must
One Have an Opinion About?, in S. Ebbesen, Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Aldershot/Farnham:
Ashgate, 20089), vol. 2, pp. 6983.
102 jakob l. fink
truncated outline of these positions and it serves merely as a background

for evaluating the interpretation of AC.
According to the logical approach, Aristotles common principles
are items that belong to no science in particular, they belong to all sci-
ences equally, and concern the whole of reality (terms such as being,
one, same or axioms like the principle of non-contradiction). Further,
the are sometimes counted in among the common principles also.51
According to the epistemological approach, the common principles are
not surprisinglyepistemologically common, that is, common in the
sense that they are known by all men. They will be propositions which
are maximally acceptable because they are empirically warranted and so
more intelligble to all men or to us ( ).52
One weakness of the logical current is that the number and variations
of inferences based on common principles in the logical sense seem very
limited, and so it is not clear how peirastic can establish ignorance on the
basis of these. A weakness of the epistemological current is that it is not
very clear how common principles taken as maximally acceptable propo-
sitions could extend to all sciences. How, for example, could a maximally
acceptable premise (an ) concerning ethics also be maximally
acceptable with respect to all other sciences.
Now, I would not claim that AC solves these problems. I dare not even
submit that his position on the issue of the common principles is very
clear. However, he does seem to advance one idea which could be useful
for the way we would interpret peirastic today. As outlined in the pre-
ceding sections 68, our author interprets the common principles rather
generously in the sense, at least, that he is willing to include dialectical
premises () as well as dialectical rules of inference () under this
heading and in the sense that he is prepared to take both as being accept-
able. By doing so he may inspire an answer to the two objections that
haunt the outlined contemporary interpretations of Aristotles . For
by including dialectical premises under the common principles we could
argue that the peirastic dialectician obtains an empirically founded basis
for his refutation of the answerer (the epistemological current) and so
he may construct a rich variety of suitable arguments in his proving the
answerer ignorant (the soft spot of the logical current). But by including
51Fait, Le confutazioni sofistiche, p. 150. Dorion, Les Rfutations Sophistiques, p. 299,

restricts the common principles more drastically to include only axioms.
52Bolton, Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic, p. 217.
tempting moves 103
the rules of inference we can push the claim that the dialectician obtains
a rational basis applying to all sciences and disciplines (the logical cur-
rent) and so avoid the problem that taken as premises the common prin-
ciples do not apply to all sciences (the soft spot in the epistemological
current). This interpretation, obviously, has its own difficulties, some of
which have been noted in the preceding sections. But it seems promising
as a point we could pick up from our medieval colleague from Paris for
further investigation.
6.Philosophers and other Kinds of Human Beings
according to Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury
Luisa Valente
To celebrate Sten Ebbesens birthday I would like to offer a paper about

Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury; two twelfth-century thinkers who
share with Sten and his favourite medieval mastersBoethius of Dacia,
Radulphus Brito and John Buridan, mutatis mutandisan interpretation
of philosophy which emphasizes rationality, logic, and freedom. In par-
ticular, I intend to consider, although of necessity in a somewhat partial
and provisional manner, both Peter Abelards and John of Salisburys
views regarding the status of the philosopher within the context of their
thoughts on the variety of kinds of human beings.
I will begin by analysing a passage from Macrobiuss Commentarii in
somnium Scipionis, for the text of book 1, chapter 8 is explicitly quoted by
Abelard in both his Theologia christiana and Dialogus inter philosophum,
iudeum et christianum. Macrobiuss views are, in my opinion, one of the
chief sources of Abelards and Salisburys own representations of philoso-
phers whether they are real or simply ideal persons.
Macrobius and the Four Degrees of Virtue according to Plotinus
In book 1, chapter 8 of his Commentarii, Macrobius deals with the ques-

tion of happiness as concerns those persons with an active role in civic
governance (civitatum...rectores et servatores; rerum publicarum rectores).
Macrobius attempts to reconcile Ciceros view of the happiness of civic
governors with the position of those who hold that philosophers alone
can be happy (beati). According to the latter view, it is virtue that makes
a person happy, and since virtue is proper to those who are on the path
to wisdom (philosophantes), only those who pursue wisdomnamely,
philosopherscan be happy. Here, the words philosophantes and philo
sophi appear to be employed in an entirely synonymous manner. Those
who hold this opinion, writes Macrobius, identify wisdom (sapientia) with
knowledge of divine things, and direct virtue towards the contempt of
corporeal matters and the accomplishments of an ascetic and contempla-
tive ascensio:
106 luisa valente
sed de beatitate quae debetur conservatoribus patriae pauca dicenda

sunt....solae faciunt virtutes beatum, nullaque alia quisquam via hoc
nomen adipiscitur. unde qui aestimant nullis nisi philosophantibus inesse
virtutes, nullos praeter philosophos beatos esse pronuntiant. agnitionem
enim rerum divinarum sapientiam proprie vocantes eos tantum modo
dicunt esse sapientes, qui superna et acie mentis requirunt et quaerendi
sagaci diligentia comprehendunt et, quantum vivendi perspicuitas praestat,
imitantur: et in hoc solo esse aiunt exercitia virtutum, quarum sic officia
dispensant. prudentiae esse mundum istum et omnia quae mundo insunt
divinorum contemplatione despicere, omnemque animae cogitationem in
sola divina dirigere: temperantiae omnia relinquere, in quantum natura pati-
tur, quae corporis usus requirit: fortitudinis non terreri animam a corpore
quodam modo ductu philosophiae recedentem, nec altitudinem perfectae
ad superna ascensionis horrere: iustitiae ad unam sibi huius propositi con-
sentire viam unius cuiusque virtutis obsequium. atque ita fit ut secundum
hoc tam rigidae definitionis abruptum rerum publicarum rectores beati esse
non possint.1
Since the text is an elaboration of Plotinus Enneades 1.2,2 the problem,
argues Macrobius, is far more complex, for Plotinus himself distinguishes
between the four degrees of the four traditional virtues: political virtues,
purifying virtues, virtues of the purified mind (purgati et defecati animi),
and exemplary virtues (exemplares).3 While political virtues are proper
to man as a social animal, purifying virtues are proper to man as a being
capable of receiving the divine or even becoming divine (hominis qua
divini capax est). Moreover, while political virtues are connected with the
active life (negotiosae), purifying virtues are proper to the contemplative
(otiosi), or those who retire from public duty (qui a rerum publicarum acti
bus se sequestrant) in order to embed themselves in things divine (solis
se inserere divinis). Next we have those virtues proper to the purified
mind, cleansed of any stain of this world (purgati iam defecatique animi
et ab omni mundi huius aspergine presse pureque detersi), and exemplary
virtues, which are the ideas in the divine mind, from whence all other
virtues flow:
1Macrobius, Commentarius in somnium Scipionis 1.8 (ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner,

1970), pp. 36:3037:22).
2See also Porphyry, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, ed. E. Lamberz (Leipzig: Teu-
bner, 1975), pp. 2235.
3R. Saccenti, Quattro gradi di virt: il modello etico dei Commentarii di Macrobio
nel XII secolo, Medioevo 31 (2006), 69101. T. Ricklin, Von den beatiores philosophi
zum optimus status hominis: Zur Entradikalisierung der radikalen Aristoteliker, in
J.A.Aertsen and A. Speer (eds.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000),
pp. 21730, esp. 22526.
philosophers and other kinds of human beings 107
sed Plotinus inter philosophiae professores cum Platone princeps libro De

virtutibus gradus earum vera et naturali divisionis ratione compositos per
ordinem digerit. quattuor sunt inquit quaternarum genera virtutum. ex his
primae politicae vocantur, secundae purgatoriae, tertiae animi iam purgati,
quartae exemplares. et sunt politicae hominis, qua sociale animal est. his
boni viri rei publicae consulunt, urbes tuentur: his parentes venerantur,
liberos amant, proximos diligunt: his civium salutem gubernant: hic socios
circumspecta providentia protegunt, iusta liberalitate devinciunt...his vir-
tutibus vir bonus primum sui atque inde rei publicae rector efficitur, iuste
ac provide gubernans, humana non deserens. secundae, quas purgatorias
vocant, hominis sunt qua divini capax est, solumque animum eius expe-
diunt qui decrevit se a corporis contagione purgare et quadam humanorum
fuga solis se inserere divinis. hae sunt otiosorum qui a rerum publicarum
actibus se sequestrant. harum quid singulae velint superius expressimus,
cum de virtutibus philosophantium diceremus, quas solas quidem aestima-
verunt esse virtutes. tertiae sunt purgati iam defecatique animi et ab omni
mundi huius aspergine presse pureque detersi. illic prudentiae est divina
non quasi in electione praeferre, sed sola nosse, et haec tamquam nihil sit
aliud intueri: temperantiae terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed peni-
tus oblivisci: fortitudinis passiones ignorare, non vincere, ut nesciat irasci,
cupiat nihil (Iuv. 10.360): iustitiae ita cum supera et divina mente sociari ut
servet perpetuum cum ea foedus imitando. quarte sunt quae in ipsa divina
mente consistunt, quam diximus vocari, a quarum exemplo reliquae
omnes per ordinem defluunt. nam si rerum aliarum, multo magis virtutum
ideas esse in mente credendum est. illic prudentia est mens ipsa divina,
temperantia quod in se perpetua intentione conversa est, fortitudo quod
semper idem est nec aliquando mutatur, iustitia quod perenni lege a sem-
piterna operis sui continuatione non flectitur. haec sunt quaternarum quat-
tuor genera virtutum, quae praeter cetera maximam in passionibus habent
differentiam sui. passiones...primae molliunt, secundae auferunt, tertiae
obliviscuntur, in quartis nefas est nominari.4
It is possible to interpret this subdivision of the degrees of the four classi-
cal virtues as corresponding to the subdivision of human types, and thus
to identify three distinct kinds of human beings in Macrobius text; each
of which is ultimately capable of happiness insofar as each practices a
distinct kind of virtue. Of these types, there are:
those who govern, or at least support or defend, cities, called civi

tatum or rerum publicarum rectores, and who, as such, practice polit-
ical virtues;
4Macrobius, Commentarius in somnium Scipionis 1.8 (pp. 37:2239:14).

108 luisa valente
those who are dedicated to the purely contemplative life, who seek
wisdom and purification but, having yet to reach them, remain in
contact with this world. They are called philosophantes (synonymous
with philosophi), and they practice the purgative or purificatory
virtues;
and lastly, those who are dedicated to the contemplative life alone,
having reached a completely purified mind (cuius animus purgatus
est), and who thus live separately (se sequestrant), their virtues being
those proper to a purified mind.
For our present purpose, it is the last two types of human beings which
are the most relevant. Both typify those who have chosen the contempla-
tive, and thus refused the active, lifealbeit in differing ways. The specu-
lative life of the philosophantes is in fieri; they are still in contact with this
world and the people who inhabit it. Those, on the contrary, whose minds
have been completely purified live a solitary and ascetic life.
According to Macrobius, both types of contemplative human beings
exemplify in different ways each of the four traditional virtues:
wisdom (prudentia), for the philosophantes, consists in focusing

ones attention on the divine, and in disdaining the worldly, while for
those whose mind is purified it consists in knowing only the divine,
intuiting it as if nothing else existed;
temperance, for the philosophantes, is indicative of their personal
separation from all bodily appetites to the greatest extent allowable
by nature, while for men whose minds have been purified it reflects
the total oblivion of all corporeal necessities;
force, for the philosophantes, is the negation of all fear of the souls
potential separation from the body, while for the man whose mind is
purified it signifies a complete disregard for the passions;
Finally, justice, for the philosophantes, includes the practice of all vir-
tues, while for those whose mind has already been purified it is asso-
ciated with the imitation of the divine mind and its eternal laws.
If the aim of the virtues is to make people happy, writes Macrobius, then
those who live and govern cities (civitatum rectores) are also capable of
happiness, for they pursue their own variation of the virtues. Like the
philosophantes, civic governors are on the path to heaven: the main dif-
ference between them is that, while civitatum rectores begin their jour-
ney from the earthly realm, philosophantes begin their journey from the
divine. Nonetheless, it is clear that Macrobius still believes that the con-
templative life is to be held superior to the active life of the city-dweller.
When Cicero wrote, Macrobius argues, that God loves nothing more than
cities, he did not mean absolutely, but only in relation to other earthly
things. This is the reason why Cicero added among the things which are
on the earth:
si ergo hoc est officium et effectus virtutum, beare, constat autem et politicas
esse virtutes: igitur et politicis efficiuntur beati. iure ergo Tullius de rerum
publicarum rectoribus dixit: ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruantur: qui ut osten-
deret alios otiosis, alios negotiosis virtutibus fieri beatos, non dixit absolute
nihil esse illi principi deo acceptius quam civitates, sed adiecit, quod quidem
in terris fiat, ut eos qui ab ipsis caelestibus incipiunt discerneret a rectoribus
civitatum, quibus per terrenos actus iter paratur ad caelum.5
In other words, although Macrobius thinks that there is also a particular
kind of happiness to be found on earth, he holds that the kind of hap-
piness sought by the comtemplative humans who inhabit the heavenly
realm is undoubtedly much superior.
Finally, Macrobius stresses that the uniqueness (proprium) of cities or
states (civitates), when compared to other groupings of human beings, is
that they are grounded upon respect for the law:
illa autem definitione quid pressius potest esse, quid cautius de nomine civi-
tatum? quam concilia, inquit, coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates
appellantur. nam et servilis quondam et gladiatoria manus concilia homi
num et coetus fuerunt, sed non iure sociati. illa autem sola iusta est multi-
tudo, cuius universitas in legum consentit obsequium.6
Consequently, when studied with other sources (in particular, the
Timaeus), Macrobiuss text helps to shed light upon some aspects of
Abelards own rich and complex representation of the ancient philoso-
phers and their role in an ideal human society.
Ancient Philosophers in Peter Abelards Writings: General lines
The role ascribed to the ancient philosophers in Peter Abelards writings

has long been studied.7 The subject offers a variety of different aspects,
5Macrobius, Commentarius in somnium Scipionis 1.8 (p. 39:1625).

6Macrobius, Commentarius in somnium Scipionis 1.8 (p. 39:2632).
7See, for example, T. Gregory, Abelard et Platon, in E. M. Buytaert (ed.), Peter Abelard
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974), pp. 3864 (repr. in T. Gregory, Mundana sapientia:
110 luisa valente
the best known of which describes the ancient philosophers function

in human history and their reception of a special revelation from God.
Briefly, the ancient philosophers were, according to Abelard, examples
and models of morality for the gentiles, just as the prophets were exam-
ples of morality for the Jews, and the apostles and monks are, or should
be, for Christians. Even though they lived before the incarnation of Christ,
they were graced with a special revelation, through which they were able
to have knowledge and understandingalthough to a limited extentof
some of the key doctrines of Christianity.8 Crucial here, is the fact that
this special revelation was, in Abelards view, not a supernatural revela-
tion, but was grounded in natural reason: it was the result of a personal
transformation and purification; at the same time, intellectual and moral,
speculative and practical. This is because, to be a philosophera point
Abelard insists upon, often quoting from Roman Stoics such as Seneca
means immersion not just in knowledge and doctrines but also, and per-
haps even more so, immersion in a life which is in accordance with the
virtues. For Abelard, philosophy is thus a way of life reminiscent of the
Forme di conoscenza nella cultura medievale (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1992),
pp. 17599); J. Jolivet, Doctrines et figures de philosophes chez Ablard, in R. Thomas
(ed.), Petrus Abaelardus (10791142): Person, Werk und Wirkung (Trier: Paulinus Verlag,
1980), pp. 10320 (repr. in J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pense mdivale: Ablard; Doctrines du
langage (Paris: Vrin, 1987), pp. 185202); J. Jolivet, Ablard et le Philosophe: (Occident et
Islam au XIIe sicle), Revue de lHistorie des Religions 164 (1963), 18189 (repr. in Jolivet,
Aspects, pp. 5361); J. Jolivet, Dialettica e mistero (Milan: Jaca Book, 1996), passim (esp.
pp. 50ff., 61, 76ff., 99). Gilson underlined the relevant role played by the ancient philo
sophers (in particular Cicero and Seneca) in Peter Abelards, as well as in Eloisas, thought
and life; cf. . Gilson, Hlose et Ablard (Paris: Vrin, 1948), passim; . Gilson, La tholo
gie mystique de Saint Bernard (Paris: Vrin, 1969), pp. 18189. See also J. Marenbon, The
Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), passim and
esp. pp. 30510; P. Zerbi, Philosophi e logici: Un ventennio di incontri e scontri; Soissons,
Sens, Cluny (11211141) (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, 2002), esp. pp. 938
(= chap. 2: Philosophia e Philosophi per Bernardo e per Abelardo); C. G. Normore, Who
is Peter Abelard?, in T. Mathien and D.S. Wright (eds.), Autobiography as Philosophy: The
philosophical uses of selfrepresentation (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 6475; L. Valente,
Exhortatio e recta vivendi ratio: Filosofi antichi e filosofia come forma di vita in Pietro
Abelardo, in A. Palazzo (ed.), Lantichit classica nel pensiero medievale (Porto: FIDEM,
2011), pp. 3966. In this paper I have made use of a part of the research presented in the
Italian article Exhortatio e recta vivendi ratio. I would like to thank the editors of both
books for allowing me to do so.
8See e.g. Peter Abelard, Soliloquium, ed. C. Burnett, Peter Abelards Soliloquium: A
critical edition, Studi Medievali 25 (1984), 88591; 889: Neque enim Grecia tot philosophi-
cis rationibus armata, evangelice predicationis iugo colla tam cito submisisset nisi antea
scriptis philosophorum, sicut Iudea prophetarum, ad hoc esset preparata.
sense used by Pierre Hadot to define the ancient philosophical schools.9

In this manner of living, communities play an important role.
The City of the Philosophers according to the Theologia Christiana
In the Theologia Christiana, Abelard begins his discussion of the lives of

the ancient philosophers with a description of their communities. Abelard
is convinced that the ancient philosophers founded and ordered cities in
which the citizens (not all of whom were philosophers) lived according to
rational criteria; criteria which were ultimately compatible with Christian
revelation. It is well known that Abelard considered many of the ancient
philosophers, even before revelation, to have been Christian, since they
were thought to have shared in the same divine logos. Human reason,
as such, was understood by him as a manifestation of divine grace. Abe-
lard is convinced that the pagan and Christian traditions are, at heart,
the same. Consequently, while describing those communities which were
guided by philosophers, he combines pagan with Christian vocabulary
and, in so doing, ends up inventing an ideal society that is neither pagan
nor Christian: a community made up of different groups and governed by
principles of reason and equity:
Quod si post fidem ac moralem doctrinam philosophorum finemque seu
intentionem recte uiuendi ab eis assignatum, uitam quoque ipsorum inspi-
ciamus, et quam diligenter rei publicae statum instituerint atque ipsorum
ciuium simulque conuiuentium uitam ordinauerint, reperiemus ipsorum
tam uitam quam doctrinam maxime euangelicam seu apostolicam perfec-
tionem exprimere, et a religione Christiana eos nihil aut parum recedere....
Quibus, ut diximus, et fides Trinitatis reuelata est et ab ipsis praedicata, et
spes immortalitatis animae et aeternae retributionis exspectata, pro qua
mundum penitus contemnere et terrenis omnibus abrenuntiare et se ipsos
dura macerare inedia non dubitauerunt, ponentes nobiscum amorem Dei
finem et causam omnium, ut supra satis meminimus.10
One should consider, thinks Abelard, not only the ancient philosophers
theories about virtue, but also their doctrines concerning the rectitude
of an active life (vitae activae rectitudo), since, for them, the life of the
city and its governors (rectores) is based upon the right reasons for living
9See C. Normore, Who is Peter Abelard?; Valente, Exhortatio e recta vivendi

ratio.
10Peter Abelard, Theologia Christiana 2.43 (ed. E. M. Buytaert, CCCM 12 (Turnhout:
Brepols, 1969), p. 149:585606).
112 luisa valente
(rectae rationes vivendi). According to Abelard, three classes of humans

lived in the city of the philosophers: the married (coniugati), the governors
(rectores), and the temperate (continentes). The philosophers established,
in harmony with evangelical predication, the best way of life for each of
the three classes, and chose the life of the continentes for themselves. This,
Abelard explains, is the same manner of living that is now adopted by
monks and clerics:
Nunc autem, praeter diligentem uirtutum descriptionem a philosophis
datam, iuuat et eorum de actiuae uitae rectitudine doctrinam inspicere,
cum rectis rationibus uiuendi ciuitatum et eorum rectorum instituerent
uitam; deinde quantum ipsi quoque suis de rectitudine uiuendi obtempe-
rauerint dictis, uel amplius fecerint quam aliis imponerent iuxta quod et
de uera scriptum est sophia: Quae cepit Iesus facere et docere (Acts 1:1), ac si
diceret: prius facere, postea docere. Instituerunt autem, iuxta euangelicam
praedicationem, tam coniugatorum quam rectorum quam continentium
uitam, cum et ciuitatibus quasi coniugatorum conuentibus modum uitae
assignauerunt, et quales ipsi rei publicae rectores esse oporteret definierunt,
et in se ipsis continentium atque abstinentium uitam expresserunt, quam
nunc clerici siue monachi profitentur.11
The philosophers organized life in their city according to the principles
of charity (caritas) and equity (aequitas); principles which are also to be
found in the Gospels, and which are now meant to guide the monastic
life. In addition, no property in the city was private, and governors were
no more than the distributors of public goods:
Ciuitatum autem conuentus tanta proximi caritate iunxerunt, ut, omnibus
in commune redactis, nihil ciuitas nisi fraternitas uideretur, et nihil aliud
rectores ciuitatis quam rei publicae dispensatores dicerentur, ut iam tunc
illam primitiuae ecclesiae apostolicam praesignarent uitam, de qua in Acti-
bus apostolorum dicitur: Quia erant eis omnia communia, et nihil suum dice
bat aliquis, sed unicuique distribuebatur prout opus erat (Acts 4:32). Cuius
nunc uitae se professores monachi dicunt, cum haec omnibus recte conu-
iuentibus philosophi iure assignauerint, iuxta illam de aequitate caritatis
regulam: Diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum (Mt 19:19 etc.).12
This description of the cities of the ancient philosophers is a Chris-
tian adaptation of the description of the ideal city in Platos Republic.13
Abelard was not able to read Platos Republic, but he knew the summary of
11Abelard, Theologia Christiana 2.45 (p. 150:62236).

13See Marenbon, The philosophy of Peter Abelard, pp. 3047.
it located at the beginning of the Timaeus in Calcidiuss translation. In his

Theologia christiana, Abelard attempts to demonstrate the concordance
of the ancient philosophers state with the evangelical ideals, replacing
the three classes of Platos city with the three orders of the church, the
notion of which he could have acquired from patristic literature. In Cal-
cidiuss version of the Timaeus, Plato first distinguishes a class of farm-
ers and those who practice the other arts and a class of young people
who are destined to war (the two classes corresponding to the workers
and defenders of Platos Republic). The members of the second class are
described as both brave in the defence of [their] fatherland and fellow
citizens and mindful, by moral obligation, of [their] duty to preserve
peace:
cultores agrorum ceterarum artium professores;

destinata bellicis negotiis iuventus:
in tutela patriae ciuiumque ferociores;
in pacis officiis religione sapientes.14
Instead of this, Abelard adopts the distinction of the three orders of

church members:
married people (coniugati) or simple believers;

governors (rectores) or prelates;
and temperate persons (continentes) or monks.15
14Plato, Timaeus: a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, ed. J. H. Waszink

(London: Warburg Institute; Leiden: Brill, 1975), p. 8:49. P. E. Dutton, Illustre civitatis
et populi exemplum: Platos Timaeus and the transmission from Calcidius to the end of
the twelfth century of a tripartite scheme of society, Mediaeval Studies 45 (1983), 79119,
investigates the history of the analogy between the triad sapientes, militares, vulgares and
organic triads as caput, cor, pubis; an analogy which has its roots in Platos Republic via
Calcidius commentary on Platos Timaeus.
15Established by Augustine and Gregory the Great; cf. e.g. Gregory the Great, Mora
lia in Iob 32.20.35 (ed. M. Adriaen, CCSL 143B (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), p. 1656:1419).
This triad was popular in the twelfth century and was used by, among others, Bernard of
Clairvaux. See O. G. Oexle, Tria genera hominum: Zur Geschichte eines Deutungsschemas
der sozialen Wirklichkeit in Antike und Mittelalter, in L. Fenske et al. (eds.), Antike und
Mittelalter: Institutionen, Kultur und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter; Festschrift J. Fleckenstein
(Sigmaringen: J. Trorbecke, 1984), p. 492; G. Folliet, Les trois catgories de chrtiens: Survie
dun thme augustinien, Lanne thologique augustinienne 14 (1954), 89; R. Quinto, Teo-
logia allegorica e teologia scolastica in alcuni commenti allHistoria scholastica di Pietro
Comestore, Archa Verbi 6 (2009), 7683. Abelard uses this triad, together with the idea
of the analogous social and historical role played by philosophers, prophets and monks,
as key notions in his Sermo 33, which also contains an important section concerning the
114 luisa valente
As we can see, the philosophical model of the ideal city in Platos

Republic and the patristic model of the three church orders of the Fathers
are very different from each other, and both, moreover, are also substan-
tially different to the utopian, proto-communist cities imagined by Abe-
lard. However, in order to adapt the patristic triad to the platonic model,
Abelard modifies them both and, as a result, ends up with a hybrid system
in which:
the simple citizens are not defined in relation to their function (e.g.,
workers and producers), but rather in relation to their inability to
live in celibacy (coniugati);
the governors (rectores), who in Platos Republic were the philoso-
phers, are identified as the priests, bishops, etc.;
and there is no special place for the warriors or defenders, but the
philosophers are a defined class of citizens, who are characterised by
their ascetic lifestyle (continentes).
The most important change in Abelards city is the independence of

the philosophers, who comprise a distinctive class that lead an ascetic
lifeclearly a change that makes it easier to identify them with Chris-
tian monks.16 It is not clear, however, how conscious Abelard was of the
fact that he was substantially transforming Platos model as found in
the Republic. Nevertheless, it appears that he wasat the very least
aware that distinguishing a class of purely contemplative people (once
philosophers, now monk-philosophers) was a significant change. For, later
in the Theologia Christiana (2.6667), Abelard identifies Macrobius as the
primary intellectual behind this transition. The context is the descrip-
tion of Plotinus four degrees of the virtues, as we have already read in
Macrobiuss commentary on the Ciceronian Dream of Scipio. Macrobius,
claims Abelard, was himself aware of the superiority of the contemplative
ancient philosophers: see Peter Abelard, Sermones 33 (ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 178 (Paris: Migne,
1855), col. 582bc). Regarding the possibility of identifying this sermon as, at the very least,
part of Abelards Exhortatio ad fratres et commonacos, which is usually considered to have
been lost, see my article Exhortatio e recta vivendi ratio, pp. 4749.
16The deeply ascetic character of Abelards ideal philosopher is testified to in many
places in his works. See e.g. Abelard, Theologia Christiana 2.94104 (pp. 17378). With
respect to Abelard and monasticism, see at least J. Leclercq, Ad ipsam sophiam Christum:
Le tmoignage monastique dAblard, Revue dascetique et de mystique 46 (1970), 16181,
D. E. Luscombe, Pierre Ablard et le monachisme, in R. Louis, J. Jolivet and J. Chtillon
(eds.), Pierre Abelard Pierre le Vnrable (Paris: CNRS, 1975), pp. 27178 and J. Miethke,
Abaelards Stellung zur Kirchenreform: Eine biographische Studie, Francia 1 (1973), 15892.
life, and separated the active life of the governor from the contemplative
life of the philosopher. Abelard quotes the whole passage from Ciceros
Dream in which Scipio states that the defenders of the fatherland will
have a place in the heavens, where they will enjoy eternal happiness. Like
Macrobius, Abelard also comments on the fact that Cicero had added the
words among the earthly things to his affirmation of Gods love for cit-
ies (civitates) over and above other earthly things. In Abelards opinion,
Cicero wished to indicate by this, the sense in the domain of active life,
which consists in assisting ones neighbours through labour:
Ad hoc et illa pertinet exhortatio quam rectoribus rei publicae Tullius scribit,
inducens scilicet auum Scipionis cum eo per somnium ita loquentem: Sed
quo sis, Africane, alacrior ad tutandam rem publicam sic habeto: omnibus
qui patriam conseruauerint certum esse in caelo definitum locum, ubi beati
aeuo sempiterno fruantur. Nihil est enim illi principi, Deo, qui omnem mun-
dum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat acceptius quam concilia coetusque
hominum, iure sociati, quae ciuitates appellantur. Bene autem subdidit ex
his quae in terris fiant, hoc est in communi hominum habitatione, quod
ad actiuam referendum est uitam quae in necessitatibus proximi, cum quo
inhabitat, amore quoque ipsius laborat in terrenis, ut habeat unde tribuat
necessitatem patienti (Eph. 4:28) et ei fructum sui communicet laboris.17
Yet the contemplative life is much more worthy than the active life, main-
tains Abelard, explaining why Macrobius, who had recognized this, dis-
tinguished the active life of the rectores from the contemplative life of
the philosophers. Additionally, and corresponding to the two degrees of
purifying virtues and to those virtues which belong foremost to the puri-
fied mind, the philosophers distinguished two subclasses within their own
group: there are some philosophers who are purified, living apart from
the world and from other human beings; but there are also philosophers,
who, still in the process of purifying themselves, remain in contact with
the world.18 Now, the social status of the purified philosophers is much
greater than that of those philosophers who remain in the process of puri-
fication; properly speaking, the latter should not be called philosophi, but
philosophantes. In contrast to Macrobius (see above), Abelard uses the
word philosophans here in a sense which is somewhat different from that
of philosophus and slightly pejorative.19 The philosophantes, or purifying

18Cf. Jolivet, Doctrines et figures de philosophes, p. 110; Saccenti, Quattro gradi di
virt, 81.
19With respect to the polysemic term philosophans, see P. Michaud-Quantin and
M. Lemoine, Pour le dossier des philosophantes, AHDLMA 35 (1968), 1722; G. Schrimpf,
116 luisa valente
philosophers, lived in common as coenobitic monks, and thus correspond

to the Essenes amongst the Hebrews. Having completed their period of
purification and abstinence, the purified philosophersthe only phi-
losophers stricto sensuleft the school of the philosophantes and lived
alone in total self-sufficiency, happiness and contemplation as anchoretic
monks:
Maioris quippe meriti solitaria uita est contemplationis qua nos nimius
diuini amoris feruor ad contemplationem diuinae uisionis suspendit, omni
iam mundanarum necessitatum sollicitudine postposita, et quasi in caele-
stibus nostram tenet conuersationem. Quod nec ipsa Macrobii expositio
notare praetermisit, actiuam rectorum uitam per hoc a contemplatione phi-
losophorum distinguens. Duos itaque continentium ordines in philosophis
concluserunt, cum alios adhuc purgari per abstinentiae ac studii assiduita-
tem dicunt,qui fortasse philosophantes rectius quam philosophi dicendi
sunt,et communi habitatione studiorum, formam coenobitarum tenent
monachorum, qualem et Iosephus in XVIII Antiquitatis libro uitam Esseno-
rum describit...alios iam purgati ac defecati animi esse in quorum carne
iam per diutinam abstinentiam mortificata nullus iam irrepere uel dominari
concupiscentiae motus ualet, qui iam solitaria habitatione uiuentes, suo
ipsi sufficiant praesidio. Qualium perfectam anachoretarum uitam dicimus.
Quos quidem iuxta Hieronymum Ad Rusticum monachum scribentem de
conuentu monasteriorum egredi oportet, quasi de schola philosophantium,
ut illic sub regula disciplinae instruantur atque tam exemplo aliorum quam
uerbo ad perfectionem erudiantur, et a recenti consuetudine uoluptatum
abducti purgentur. Hic purgati iam et in omnibus instructi cunctisque ten-
tationum motibus repulsis, quasi sui ipsorum uictores, sui regimen securi
suscipiant et ad uidendum Deum purgatis iam mentibus toti anhelent, ut
iam nulla hominum frequentia uel aspectu ab illa contemplationis celsitu-
dine reuocentur.20
These lines also help, in my opinion, to clarify why Peter Abelard appears
to have consideredboth in the Theologia christiana and the Historia
calamitatumthe solitary life on some occasions, and the social life on
others, to be the ideal lifestyle for philosophers.21 It is not simply the result
of character or personal idiosyncrasies, for even though Peter Abelards
life was marked indelibly by his own communal responsibilities, on one
Philosophiphilosophantes: Zum Selbstverstndnis der vor- und frhscholastichen

Denker, Studi medievali 3a serie 23 (1982), 697727; R. Schoenberger, AntiquiPhilosophi
Philosophantes: Die Philosophie als Problem im 13. Jahrhundert, in L. Honnefelder,
R. Wood, and M. Dreyer (eds.), Albertus Magnus und die Anfnge der Aristoteles Rezeption
im lateinischen Mittelalter (Mnster: Aschendorff, 2005), pp. 795819.
20Abelard, Theologia Christiana 2.6667 (pp. 159:932160:964).
21Cf. Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, p. 307.
hand, and his desire for solitude, on the other, the theme is also deeply
interwoven into his philosophical beliefs. In any case, there is no problem
of contradiction here, nor should this be taken as a critical point in his life
or doctrine. For, with regard to both his exaltation of the communitarian
and the solitary ideal, his words reveal to us just how seriously Abelard
took his monastic habit, and just how far his representation of (ancient)
philosophy was connected to his monastic ideal.
John of Salisbury
John of Salisbury was a student of Abelards and, like his master, he

devoted great attention in his writings to reflection upon the life and sta-
tus of (ancient) philosophers. In the following section, we will examine a
few texts in order to show the general concordance between both Salis-
burys and Abelards approach to the question concerning the two types
of philosopher. Nonetheless, I would also like to emphasize Johns notice-
ably stronger appreciation for the active side of life.
For John of Salisbury, the theoretical and practical aspects of the philo
sophical life are interconnected, although it is the second of the two which
is predominant. Theoretical inquiries, he maintains, are only acceptable if
they are useful in directing us towards a virtuous manner of living.22 The
first degree of the philosophical life consists in seeking the truth about
things, their natures and their properties; while the second degree con-
sists in faithfully pursuing that truth, where what is meant by truth is
not simply a function of human knowledge and language but, also the
illuminating evangelical truth which underlies all other truths. Both
degreesseeking truth and following itare only accessible to those
22For Johns practical conception of philosophy and, consequently, the status of the
philosopher, see H. Liebeschtz, Medieval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John of
Salisbury (London: The Warburg Institute, 1950; repr. 1980); M. Dal Pra, Giovanni di Salis
bury (Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1951), pp. 5363; P. Delhaye, Le bien suprme daprs le Poli
craticus de Jean de Salisbury, Recherches de thologie ancienne et mdivale25 (1953),
20321; G. Dotto, Giovanni di Salisbury: La filosofia come Sapienza (Assisi: Edizioni Por-
ziuncola, 1986); C. Burnett, John of Salisbury and Aristotle, Didascalia 2 (1996), 1932;
C. Grellard, Le socratisme de Jean de Salisbury, in S. Mayer (ed.), Rception philosophique
de la figure de Socrate (Lyon: Institut de recherches philosophiques, 2006), pp. 3559;
C. Grellard, La renaissance mdivale du scepticisme: Jean de Salisbury Academicus (Paris:
Les Belles Lettres, forthcoming); S. Salamandra, Filosofia e sommo bene nel pensiero di Gio
vanni di Salisbury (tesi di laurea magistrale, Sapienza University of Rome, 2011), chap. 2;
I would like to thank Christophe Grellard, Silvia Salamandra, and James Lancaster who
generously offered assistance to me during the preparation of this article.
118 luisa valente
who are free, in the sense that they have achieved spiritual freedom from
vanity and injustice:
Ardua quidem res est professio ueritatis et quae incursantibus errorum tene-
bris aut negligentia profitentis frequentissime uitiatur. Quid enim uerum sit
quis recte examinat rebus incognitis? Notitia autem rerum, eo quod uias non
dirigit contemptoris, iustitiae aculeos exacerbat in poenam delinquentis. Est
ergo primus philosophandi gradus genera rerum proprietatesque discutere,
ut quid in singulis uerum sit prudenter agnoscat. Secundus, ut quisque id
ueritatis quod ei illuxerit fideliter assequatur. Haec autem philosophantium
strata illi soli peruia est qui de regno uanitatis proclamat in libertatem, qua
liberi fiunt quos ueritas liberauit, et Spiritui servientes colla iugo iniquita-
tis et iniustitiae subduxerunt. Vbi enim Spiritus Dei, ibi libertas; metusque
seruilis uitiisque consentiens exterminator Spiritus Sanctus est.23
The true philosopher, for Salisbury, is someone who not only knows truth
and teaches it, but someone who applies it in a practical manner to his
own life. As a result, the highest aim of a philosopher should be that of
embodying charity. The true and unchangeable rule of the philosophers
(where the word rule likely also holds a monastic connotation)24 is that
one shouldboth while reading and learning, as well as during hours of
labour or leisuretend towards the cultivation of charity:
Qui uero philosophando charitatem acquirit aut dilatat, suum philosophan-
tis assecutus est finem. Haec est itaque uera et immutabilis philosophan-
tium regula ut sic in omnibus legendis aut discendis, agendis aut omittendis
23John of Salisbury, Policraticus l. 4, Prologus (ed. K. S. B. Keats-Rohen, CCCM 118

(Turnhout: Brepols, 1993), p. 231:115). Cf. also John of Salibury, Metalogicon 2.1 (ed. J. B.
Hall and K. S. B. Keats-Rohen, CCCM 98 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), p. 57:1930): At ueritas
materia est prudentiae et uirtutum fons quam, qui plene nouerit, sapiens est, qui amauerit,
bonus, et beatus qui tenuerit eam. Vnde nostrorum doctissimus poetarum uitae beatae
monstrans originem ait. Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, atque metus omnes et
inexorabile fatum subiecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis auari. Et alius fide et notitia
ueritatis praestantior. Felix qui potuit boni fontem uisere lucidum. Felix qui potuit grauis
terrae soluere uincula. Ac si aliis uerbis dicant sed eodem sensu. Felix cui rerum collata
est intelligentia, quia quo familiarius fluida et ad momentum transeuntia innotescunt,
eo amplius apud mentem sui compotem peritura uilescunt. Nec iugo premitur uitiorum,
quem de seruitute ueritas in libertatem uindicat et educit. Impossibile enim est ut diligat
et colat uanitatem, quisquis ex toto corde quaerit et amplectitur ueritatem.
24Similar to Abelard, Johns concept of philosophy is not independent from the patri
stic view of philosophy as imitatio Christi, and thus as the monastic life. Cf. . Jeauneau,
Jean de Salisbury et la lecture des philosophes, in M. Wilks (ed.), The World of John of
Salisbury (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 77125 (at p. 87 the author writes of a nuance
monastique et cistercienne in Johns notion of philosophy); J. Domanski, La philosophie,
thorie ou manire de vivre? Les controverses de lAntiquit la Renaissance (Fribourg: Cerf,
1996), p. 63; C. Nederman, John of Salisbury (Tempe: Arizona State University, 2005), pp.
4143.
quisque uersetur ut proficiat caritati.... Loqui ergo uera et iusta, philoso-

phantibus et non philosophantibus commune est. Vera et falsa loqui, bona
docere et mala non philosophantium est. Sed et recta dumtaxat interdum
docet uanus philosophi imitator; sed qui recta quae docet sequitur, uere
philosophus est.25
In chapter 8 of book 7 of his Policraticus, John reflects on the status of
the philosopher in relation to the question of happiness and the means
required to attain it. All rational beings seek happiness, writes John; they
do it in different ways, but everyone agrees that happiness can only be
reached through virtue. Thus, where virtue is the highest good in via,
happiness is the highest good in patria. Moreover, philosophy is the only
means by which we are capable of approaching happiness:
Illud autem quo omnium rationabilium uergit intentio uera beatitudo est.
Nemo etenim est qui non uelit esse beatus; sed ad hoc quod desiderant non
una uia omnes incedunt. Vna tamen est omnibus uia proposita sed quasi
strata regia scinditur in semitas multas. Haec autem uirtus est; nam nisi per
uirtutem nemo ad beatitudinem pergit.... Virtus ergo felicitatis meritum est,
felicitas uirtutis praemium. Et haec quidem bona sunt summa, alterum uiae,
alterum patriae. Nichil enim uirtute praestantius, dum exul peregrinatur a
Domino, nichil felicitate melius, dum ciuis regnat et gaudet cum Domino....
Vnum igitur et singulare summum omnium bonorum beatitudo est, sed ab
eo est aliud quodammodo quorundam collatione summum et eo ipso super
ius aliis quod ad illud, quod uere singulariter et unice summum est, fami-
liarius accedit. Ceterum ad neutrius apprehensionem nisi philosophia duce
humana infirmitas conualescit. Quisquis enim sine ea ad beatitudinis uiam
tendit, quasi cecus in lubrico tendens ad alta praesumptuosus cadit. Vnde
eam diuinarum et humanarum rerum compotem esse Crisippus asseruit,
nec umquam satis posse laudari quae uitia expellit, uirtutes ostendit et con-
fert, et in humana infirmitate diuinam quodammodo reparat integritatem.26
Crisippus, continues John in the following lines, argued that those who
do not practice philosophy are akin to animals, since they do not use
their native intelligence. Ignorance of philosophy, as such, makes them
25John of Salisbury, Policraticus 7.11 (ed. Webb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909),
p. 136:15; 1620). Dotto, Giovanni di Salisbury, p. 159, underlines the fact that the idea of
charity as the aim of philosophy is to be found in many places of Salisburys works. Note
also the frequent use of the word philosophans, which does not seem to have the same
negative connotation as it does in Abelards quotation which we have seen supra. John
uses philosophans frequently: 27 times in his Policraticus (mainly books 7 and 8) and 20
times in his Metalogicon. In Abelards works we find philosophans just 9 times (this data
was gathered from research and an analysis of the Patrologia Latina Database).
26John of Salisbury, Policraticus 7.8 (ed. Webb, p. 118:9119:13).
120 luisa valente
a sort of monstrous being, an irrational animal inside the body of a

rational one:
Et, ut sensum suum expressius proferat, omnes qui non ab illa uel ad illam
uigilant (quod tamen ab illa est) brutis animalibus dicit esse conformes,
immo et stupendum contra naturam miraculum in corporibus humanis
brutos homines esse.27
We also find in Salisburys discussion of happiness in book 7, a representa-
tion of the different kinds of human beings, reminiscent of the treatment
Peter Abelard provided, which was based upon Macrobiuss theory of vir-
tues. Among those who are genuine human beings, Salisbury contends
in other words, among those who have some knowledge of philosophy,
thus elevating them above the subordinate status of animals in human
bodiesthere are three kinds: some enjoy the happiness offered by
knowledge, and are called the sapientes or cultores Dei; others come close
to the full enjoyment of it, and these are the philosophi or amatores Dei;
and others are not philosophers, yet seek to become soqui desiderant
esse philosophiand thus imitate them:
Tria uero genera hominum qui homines sunt (alios enim brutos dicit) esse
asseruit (sc. Crisippus). Alii enim iam iocunditate sapientiae perfruuntur,
et hii sapientes sunt; alii accedunt ut fruantur, et hii sunt philosophi; alii
adspirant ad accedendum, scilicet qui nondum sunt et esse philosophi con-
cupiscunt. Constant enim esse quam plurimos qui nondum philosophantur
et uitam philosophorum si non opere, saltem desiderio emulantur. Ego sen-
tentiam eius tanto securius approbo, quanto eam mihi uidere uideor sancti
Spiritus auctoritate subnixam, dicente propheta: Concupiuit anima mea
27John of Salisbury, Policraticus 7.8 (ed. Webb, p. 119:1418). This idea could be remi-
niscent of a remark made by Boethius in his commentary on Ciceros Topics. Even though,
Boethius writes, necessary things are often preferred to unnecessary things, in some cases
unnecessary things are preferable. Doing philosophy, e.g., is not necessary, yet it is much
better to live as a philosopher than not to live as one. Living is something which human
beings share with animals, but living philosophically is something which is permitted to
very few people, those who are able to make use of their reason; see Boethius, Commentaria
in Ciceronis Topica, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 64 (Paris: Migne, 1860), col. 1161c: Quaedam...cum
non necessaria sint, meliora sunt necessariis. Nam vivere necessarium est, et sine eo sub-
sistere animal nequit. Philosophari vero non est necessarium, melius tamen longeque
excellentius est philosophum vivere quam tantum vivere: illud enim raro paucisque etiam
utentibus ratione concessum; illud pecudibus commune nobiscum. Sua quoque alienis
jure meliora esse dicuntur, veluti hominibus ratio potius quam voluptatis appetitio: illud
enim proprium est hominis, illud alienum; rara quoque vulgaribus meliora sunt. Atque
hic locus approbat id quod superius dictum est, philosophantem vitam ipsa vita esse
meliorem: nam quae rara sunt, facile id quod vulgare est antecedunt. On Boethiuss notion
of philosophy, see G. dOnofrio, Boezio filosofo, in A. Gallonier (ed.), Boce ou la chane
des savoirs (Louvain: Peeters, 2003), pp. 381419.
desiderare iustificationes tuas in omni tempore (Ps. 118). In quo michi tres
praemissos ordines manifeste uidetur expressisse. Cum enim Plato sapien-
tem dicat esse cultorem Dei, quis alius habendus est sapiens, quam ille qui
moratur in iustificationibus Domini et mulcente se conscientia bonorum
operum uerae felicitatis saporem tota mentis auiditate iam praegustat et
sentit? Proculdubio nequaquam illius expers est cui agnita beatitudo dulce-
scit, et ei expetibilium cumulus adest qui in uita gustat et uidet quam suauis
est Dominus. Philosophus autem, cuius intentio dirigitur illuc ut sapiat,
eodem auctore amator Dei est et uitia subigens rebus agnoscendis applicat
animum ut his agnitis ad ueram beatitudinem possit accedere. Haec enim
hominem beatum faciunt si et uitiorum soluantur uincula, et quasi quibus
dam gradibus contemplationis lucidum et indeficientem fontem boni detur
inuisere.... Nullum tamen officium est militiae aut domi quod non philo-
sophia pertractet, quippe quae sola excludit uitia, et sine qua nichil recte
inter homines geri potest. Sicut autem morari in iustificationibus, id est
in expletione mandatorum Dei, sapientem facit..., sic animum explendis
aptare ea demum philosophia uerissima est. Sed sunt qui nondum explent
aut aptantur explendis, approbant tamen quod suspiciunt in aliis, et illis
auctore Deo desiderant conformari. Est ergo gradus eminentissimus eorum
qui in iustificationibus occupantur; medius quorum animus expeditus est a
uitiis ut ex amore occupetur in illis; infimus qui desiderant expediri ut hoc
ipsum concupiscere possint; qui, etsi non sint, desiderant esse philosophi.28
Even though the order is inverted and the terminology is not identical,
we have here a distinction which is, at its core, very similar to that made
by Abelard regarding rectores, philosophantes, and philosophi iam purgati
ac defecati animi (see above). Likewise, it is possible to read in this text
an echo of Macrobiuss distinction between the varying types of human
beings. While for all three authors happiness can only properly be found
in the future life after death, in ones embodied life it still remains possible
28John of Salisbury, Policraticus 7.8 (ed. Webb, p. 119:18121:10). John also mentions in
another place, but in a more negative tone, those who imitate the philosophers without
really being philosophers. These people undertake philosophical studies, not in order to
reach sapientia, but only in a vain hope to become rich; see Policraticus 7.15 (ed. Webb, pp.
156:12157:2): Quis enim philosophatur ut sapiat? Nam, ut rebus abundent aut temporali-
ter floreant, uidebis multos, etsi non philosophentur, tamen philosophos imitari. Ceterum
facilius est ut diuitiae philosophantem impediant quam ut philosophiae quippiam confer-
ant; Deo enim et Mamonae fideliter non seruitur. Ne uerearis ut quis patriam deserat, ut
paupertatem spontaneam amplectatur, ut studio uacet; nam philosophia ipsa labor uide-
tur inutilis nisi fructus opulentiae consequatur. Alios ut sciant curiositas excitat; alios, ut
scire uideantur, elationis stimulo uanitas urget; alios ad quaestum cupiditas inflammat.
Rarus est qui caritatis aut humilitatis pede sapientiae vias scrutetur ut doceatur aut doceat.
Nam ad immundae uoluptatis aut uanae utilitatis ineptias omnia referuntur; in his enim
finis est animae aberrantis. Philosophia interim uiaticum est, paucorum tamen, quia alia
uia longe uidetur esse compendiosior; nam, ut dici solet, amor ingenii neminem unquam
hominem diuitem fecit.
122 luisa valente
to reach a form of happiness by living either the speculative life of the

purified sapientes or the speculative life of philosophers who are not yet
sapientes but are on the path towards it, or even by living an active life,
yet desiring and imitating the speculative life of philosophers.
Conclusion
This comparison of the philosophical life with the life of other classes of
human beings has something in common with the writings of the thir-
teenth-century Parisian master of arts, Boethius of Dacia. In fact, expressed
in Aristotelian terminology, we find in Boethiuss most famous work, De
summo bono,29 the following theses, very similar to those of Peter Abe-
lard and John of Salisbury which we have described: living a life without
philosophy goes against human nature, and is rather like living the life of
an animal; the intellect is that which is divine in human beings; human
happiness and the highest good attainable in our earthly life is the know
ledge and contemplation of the universe and its cause; philosophy, virtue
and happiness are interconnected such that true happiness can only be
reached through the practice of virtue, which can only be reached, in turn,
through the practice of philosophy; the speculative life is superior to the
active, and yet an active life which seeks philosophy and virtue is, even
if the lowest, still a degree of the highest good and highest happiness in
this life. As a result, it seems that very similar considerations concern-
ing the different possible ways of living, and particularly the two differ-
ent philosophical ways to live, appear in both Peter Abelard and John of
Salisbury as Christian and, to a certain extent, even as monastic adapta-
tions of Platonic, Neoplatonist and Stoic topoi; whereas, in the writings of
the thirteenth-century Parisian art masters they appear as a consequence
of reading and commenting upon Aristotles Nichomachean Ethics. One
could ask whether Abelards and Johns attitude concerning ethical and
meta-philosophical problems played a role in promoting the assimilation
of Aristotelian philosophy. In fact, the difference between Abelards and
29Boethius of Dacia, Opuscula: De aeternitate mundi, De summo bono, De somniis, ed.

N. J. Green-Pedersen, CPhD 6.2 (Copenhagen: GAD, 1976), pp. 36977. On Boethiuss
notion of science see S. Ebbesen, Boethius of Dacia: Science is a serious game, Theoria 66
(2000), 14558 (repr. in S. Ebbesen, Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Aldershot/Farnham: Ashgate,
20089), vol. 2, pp. 15362).
Johns intellectual world and that of the thirteenth-century arts masters

is so wide that the following words are probably correct: their attitude
pregured rather than inuenced the development of thirteenth-century
scholasticism.30
30C. Burnett, John of Salisbury and Aristotle, 32, where these words are referred to
John of Salisburys attitude towards Aristotle.
7.A Logical Joust in Nikephoros Blemmydes
Autobiography1
Katerina Ierodiakonou
In his seminal book Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotles Sophis

tici elenchi, Sten Ebbesen is rarely complimentary about the Byzantine
scholars who worked on logic. He seems, nevertheless, to respect, at least
to some degree, Nikephoros Blemmydes (1197/8ca. 1272), the thirteenth-
century monk and scholar who composed, among other philosophical
and theological works, an introductory compendium in two books, the
first summarizing logic and the second physics.2 Ebbesens verdict on
Blemmydes Epitome logica is the following:
Blemmydes compendium is no brilliant work and contains few, if any,
surprises for the reader. But it is neither verbose nor foolish...Blemmydes
was no mere copist...although almost all examples and explanations that
occur in the chapters on fallacies have parallels in the scholia and Anony-
mus Heiberg, we never find a long passage verbatim repeated from them.
Blemmydes used them, but he rephrased the passages he borrowed, and he
did so in a way that proves he understood them.3
In fact, Blemmydes logical textbook is said to have been both the most
circulated compendium of logic during the Byzantine era as well as very
influential in the West after its 1607 Latin translation.4 This is not, how-
ever, the work by Blemmydes that I intend to focus on here. Rather, I
want to study more closely some paragraphs from another work by him,
1This paper is a small token of my gratitude to Sten Ebbesen for introducing me over
the years to interesting topics in Byzantine logical texts, but also for often reminding me of
the need to have a critical stance towards them. I would also like to thank Joseph Munitiz
for his useful suggestions and Paul Thom for bringing to my attention western medieval
texts that raise similar logical issues to those discussed by Blemmydes. Finally, the skype
discussions with Susanne Bobzien over this text have been, as always, very helpful.
2Nikephoros Blemmydes, Epitome logica & Epitome physica, ed. J. Wegelin, PG 142
(Paris: Garnier Fratres, 1885), cols. 6751004 and 10041320.
3S. Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotles Sophistici elenchi, 3 vols.
(Leiden: Brill, 1981), vol. 1, pp. 33032.
4L. Benakis, Commentaries and Commentators on the Logical Works of Aristotle in
Byzantium, in R. Claussen and R. Daube-Schackat (eds.), Gedankenzeichen: Festschrift fr
Klaus Oehler (Tbingen: Stauffenburg, 1988), p. 8.
126 katerina ierodiakonou
namely, his autobiography in two books, which has been edited and trans-
lated under the title A Partial Account by Joseph Munitiz.5
The Partial Account is Blemmydes spiritual testament that was originally
delivered to the monks of his foundation, the monastery of the Lord Christ
Who Is, when he reached his sixty-sixth year. The first book was delivered
in May 1264 and the second in April 1265. The contents of the two books
overlap at times, but they are mostly complementary and deal with dif-
ferent aspects of Blemmydes life, displaying a difference of emphasis and
selection. The first traces the path that led him to the monastic life and its
consequences, whereas the second narrates his career as a scholar and a
theologian. In general, the material we find in Blemmydes text cannot be
said to present what we nowadays would expect from the autobiography
of someone who was treated both by his contemporaries as well as by
the immediately following generations as the leading philosopher of his
time, as the true and paradigmatic philosopher. For instance, Blemmydes
pupil, the historian George Akropolites (1217/2082), describes him as the
most accomplished in the academic branches related to philosophy,6
while George of Cyprus (ca. 124190), the Patriarch Gregory II, declares
that Blemmydes was not only the most learned among the Greeks of the
time, but even the most learned Greek ever.7 In the two books of his
autobiography, however, Blemmydes includes little information about
his intellectual development and writings, scarce information about his
teachingmainly about his problematic relations to his students and not
about the philosophical content of his courses, no information about
his philosophical leanings and preferences.
What Blemmydes chooses to narrate, instead, are events which sound
so weird and bizarre that they have raised modern scholars eyebrows and
5Nikephoros Blemmydes, Autobiographia sive curriculum vitae necnon epistula univer

salior, ed. J. A. Munitiz, CCSG 13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1984); Nikephoros Blemmydes, A Par
tial Account, trans. J. A. Munitiz (Leuven: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1988).
6George Akropolites, Annales 32:2327, in Georgii Acropolitae opera, ed. A. Heisenberg,
vol. 1 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903; repr. with corrections by P. Wirth, Stuttgart, 1978):

, ,
, .
7George of Cyprus, De vita sua 181:1224, in La tradition manuscrite de la correspondance
de Grgoire de Chypre Patriarche de Constantinople (12831289), ed. W. Lameere (Brussels
and Rome: Institut historique Belge de Rome, 1937):
, ,
, .
a logical joust in blemmydes autobiography 127
urged them to think of this text either as religious and hagiographical,8

or as the outpourings of a neurotic.9 I am referring, in particular, to the
incidents which Blemmydes describes involving assassination attempts
against him (1.29; 1.4143; 2.41), charges of embezzlement (1.50) and mercy
killing (1.57), accusations of sexual irregularities (1.14), denunciations of a
homosexual (1.21) and the Emperors concubine (1.70), fierce rivalries and
court machinations (1.2325; 1.8284), miracles and divine interventions
(1.5; 1.7; 1.2526; 1.5253; 1.66; 1.71; 2.34; 2.81); for it is such incidents that
cover most of the first book and part of the second. At least, the second
book seems to be closer to a philosophers autobiography. It includes sec-
tions on Blemmydes studies (2.7; cf. also 1.210) and love of books (2.22;
2.44; cf. also, 1.58; 1.6364), a small section on his writings (2.7576), and,
most importantly, sections which provide us with surprisingly detailed
accounts of his arguments in five public disputations; namely, as a young
student against his professor of logic, Demetrios Karykes (2.817), as
spokesman for the Church on three occasions against the Latins and the
Armenians (2.2540; 2.5060; 2.6166), and finally as a defendant in a her-
esy trial (2.6774).
I have tried elsewhere to crack the riddle of this astonishing text with
its strange and unorthodox sections side by side with the, undeniably
fewer, standard and more sober accounts of Blemmydes theological and
philosophical endeavours.10 I have undertaken to show that even the
weird incidents that Blemmydes narrates from his life may be interpreted
as suggestive signs of a true philosophers character and behaviour, that
is, as signs that are meant to carry a certain significance linked with his
theoretical views. But, here, I want to look closer at one of the sections
whose relevance to Blemmydes philosophical portrait is more obvious,
namely, his ardent and sordid debate with his professor of logic, Deme
trios Karykes.
8Cf. G. Misch, Geschichte der Autobiographie, vol. 2.2 (Bern: A. Francke,1962), pp. 831
75; J. A. Munitiz, Self-Canonisation: The Partial Account of Nikephoros Blemmydes, in
S. Hackel (ed.), The Byzantine Saint (London: Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, 1981),
pp. 16468; J. A. Munitiz, Hagiographical Autobiography in the 13th Century, Byzanti
noslavica 53 (1992), 24349; M. Angold, The Autobiographical Impulse in Byzantium,
Dumbarton Oaks Papers 52 (1998), 22557.
9Cf. I. evenko, Blemmyds et ses Autobiographies, in A. Guillou (ed.), La civilt
bizantina dal XII al XV secolo (Rome: LErma Di Bretschneider, 1982), pp. 11637.
10K. Ierodiakonou, The Philosophers Self-Portrait in Thirteenth-Century Byzantium,
forthcoming.
The discussion between Blemmydes and Karykes took place in 1224 in

Nymphaion, a small town close to Smyrna in Asia Minor, which became
the favourite winter residence for the Nicaean emperors during the thir-
teenth century. Blemmydes was twenty-six years old and, as he him-
self tells us in his autobiography (1.4; 2.7), he had studied grammar in
Prusa early on in his life, then poetry, rhetoric, and the first books of the
Organon in Nicaea at the age of sixteen, medicine in Smyrna for seven
years (121421), and finally the Prior Analytics in the Skamander region
somewhat later. About his teacher of logic in Nicaea, Demetrios Karykes,
we know very little, mainly from what Blemmydes himself writes about
him (1.2021; 2.2528). He was greatly esteemed for his learning and held
many important offices at the imperial administration; for instance, he
was in charge of the central treasury of the Empire and bore the title of
consul of the philosophers. But Blemmydes also presents him as someone
who was often carried away by his passions, jealous and vengeful, preoc-
cupied with the intrigues of the court and the Church, and especially as
someone unable to win the theological debate over the Latin representa-
tives in 1234 in Nicaea on the issue of the procession of the Holy Spirit.
Concerning his public debate with Karykes, Blemmydes narrates it in a
rather long section of the second book of his autobiography, which cov-
ers ten paragraphs in Munitizs edition (2.817), and introduces it in the
following way:
Among the literary elite there was the famous Demetrios Karykes, the judge,
sevastos, hypatos of the philosophers and Grand Logariast. He had achieved
all these high honours because of his learning. When I was still very young he
had taught me logic. He was a very old and very erudite man. The Emperor
had charged him to make known and present in public any literary abil-
ity that I might show; instead Karykes, inspired by a most unphilosophical
jealousy and cunning, tried to present me as an ignoramus. As it happened,
I was able to show him up hoist on his own petard, twisting his perversity11
in another way, as I should not have done (trans. Munitiz).12
11Psalm 17:27.
12Blemmydes, Autobiographia 2.8:111: ,
, .
,
. ,
, , ,
. ,
, .
So, the debate takes place in front of the emperor, John III Vatatzes, who
asked Karykes to present in public the young mans erudition, though
it is not the first time that Blemmydes meets the Emperor. But it was
obviously important for the young Blemmydes to display his intellectual
vigour and he felt very bitter towards his teacher, thinking that he tried
to degrade him. Blemmydes in his old age is still proud of succeeding to
prove that it was his teacher who was an ignoramus; and it is not at all
clear from the text of his autobiography that he regrets it. For the phrase
in the last sentence that Munitiz translates as as I should not
have done, following in this Georg Mischs suggestion, is used later in the
same text (2.44) to mean the greatest possible or completely, which may
be the sense here, too, as Munitiz himself points out.
It is worth quoting Munitizs comment on this debate:
The account of the long joust with Karykes, reported with such satisfaction,
brings to the surface evident flaws (i.e. of Blemmydes character): it is dif-
ficult to feel attracted by the vanity and petty erudition of this pugnacious
student, even if he seems to excuse himself at one point. As an old man
Blemmydes can still delight in the public discomfiture he had inflicted in a
minor rhetorical exercise. One cannot but wonder if his personal develop-
ment had not been stunted at some point (Partial Account, p. 32).
I fully agree with Munitiz regarding Blemmydes personality. But is his
long joust with Karykes just a minor rhetorical exercise? And even if it
really is, could we still perhaps detect in it some interesting issues that
arise from its logical content?
Let me give you a brief summary of the content of this debate (2.916). We
are told, at first, that Karykes burst out with a proposition that he seems
to have constructed from the first verse of Psalm 1:
The one that has not entered the council of the wicked is a blessed man.13
No more information is given about the context in which this proposition
was introduced, and it is not clear what Blemmydes was supposed to do
exactly when being presented with it. What Blemmydes says, though, is
that, since he at once hit upon the , a term which he often uses
meaning a cunning stratagem, he constructed the following valid syllo-
gism with an absurd conclusion:

.
The one that has not entered the council of the wicked is a blessed man.
An ox does not enter the council of the wicked (being an irrational being).
Therefore, an ox is a blessed man.14
And similarly, Blemmydes remarks, every horse, every bird, every fish,
every lump of iron, piece of sponge, fragment of rock-crystal, everything
irrational, speechless, senseless, and motionless is a blessed man, a con-
clusion which is, of course, absurd.15 Hence, Blemmydes ridicules Karykes
initial proposition, referring to it ironically as extraordinary ()
and irrefutable (), and suggests that the first premise should
have been constructed differently; either Karykes should have said:
Any man who has not entered the council of the wicked is blessed,16
or even better,
Any man that has not entered the council of the wicked, and who has virtu-
ously performed the related actions mentioned is blessed,17
taking, thus, into consideration not only the first but also the next verses
of Psalm 1.18 In both these cases, Karykes would have been able to avoid
the absurdity of the conclusion inferred; instead, Blemmydes writes
boastfully:
The leader of the philosophers was open-mouthed, rendered helpless by his
own trickery before such an audience (trans. Munitiz).19
So, since the young man proved to be the winner of this round in the
dialectical game, the protocol required him to posit a question to his

. , .
, . ,
; , ,
.
15Blemmydes, Autobiographia 2.10:37: , ,
, , <>,
.
.
, .
18 , / /
, / , /
.
.
questioner. Thus, Blemmydes manages, by way of question and answer, to

elicit from Karykes the following syllogism in the third figure:
Every philosopher has knowledge of beings as beings.
Every philosopher is a man.
Therefore, every man has knowledge of beings as beings (no matter if he be
a goatherd, a cowboy, a groom, or a swineherd).20
The syllogism is valid, Karykes concedes, but the conclusion is absurd.
He admits that he fell into error and puts the blame on an intervening
question that Blemmydes posed to him, namely, how many categories of
beings there are. Blemmydes ridicules his teacher once again, pointing
out that:
Those who are versed in the dialectical process are not led astray, even
if there is much more of an interruption in the line of argument (trans.
Munitiz).21
Furthermore, Blemmydes takes it on him to suggest the solution to
the puzzle: reverse the order of the premises, he says, and the conclu-
sion inferred would not be absurd; for in this way, minor term would be
included in the extension of the major term:
Every philosopher is a man.
Every philosopher has knowledge of beings as beings.
Therefore, everyone who has knowledge of beings as beings is a man.22
Thus presented, the logical debate between Blemmydes and Karykes
sounds like a rhetorical squabble between two extremely vain and obnox-
ious men. And it certainly is; but, I think, there is more to it, too. For the
solution that Blemmydes suggests to his own puzzle is quite interesting.
20Blemmydes, Autobiographia 2.15:515:

, ; . . ;
. , ; .
, , , , ,
. ;
; , ,
. The text, here, mistakenly refers to a syllogism in the second and not
in the third figure (2.15:13); cf. Munitiz, Partial Account, p. 102, n. 25.
, .
22Blemmydes, Autobiographia 2.16:815:
, ,
, , ,
. , ,
, .
It brings into play the extension of the major and minor terms of the syl-
logism under discussion, a subject which Blemmydes discusses in detail
earlier on in the same section, after Karykes question and before his own.
In fact, what Blemmydes has to say in this text is so general that it reads as
if it comes from a logical textbook, though there is nothing similar in his
Epitome logica. Let me quote the first part of this text, that is, paragraph
13 in Munitiz edition:
In all figures using affirmative universal propositions, the conclusion is com-
mensurate () with the premises, provided that the term peculiar to the
major includes that in the minor or that both can be mutually converted
(as is the case with definitions ( ) and definables ( ), or
with proper qualities and their subjects ( )). For
example if somebody asserts that a horse or a man or something similar
() is an animal, and at the same time a substance, he can conclude
that all animals are substances, a universal and true conclusion in a third
figure syllogism. Again if he asserts that all such are substances, and any
animal is a substance, he can with these affirmative propositions in a sec-
ond figure syllogism arrive at a true affirmative conclusion, because animal
is included in the extension of the term substance, and man-and-things-
of-the-same-genus () are included in that of animal. The terms of
the minor premises are included in those of the major: in the first case,
substance belongs to the major, animal to the minor, while man-and-other-
animals are common to them both; in the second case, it is substance which
is the common term, animal is proper to the major, and the subordinate
terms are proper to the minor. All these syllogisms are exceptions to the tra-
ditional norm (because according to the latter, third figure syllogisms always
result in particular conclusions, and second figure syllogisms always result
in negative conclusions), even if they do not fail to be true. In the case of
the first syllogism, there is a fault because of the quantity of its conclusion;
and in the case of the second, because of its quality, and moreover as a pre-
liminary consideration, because a disparity of quality [is needed] between
the propositions (trans. Munitiz).23

, ,
, ,
, ,
, , , ,
, , ,
,
, , , .
, , , , ,
, , , , , .
, , ,
Blemmydes suggests in this paragraph that we can get valid syllogisms in

the second and third figures which have not been recognized as such in
the Aristotelian tradition. For both in the second and in the third figure,
if the premises are universal affirmative, we get a valid syllogism with a
universal affirmative conclusion, as long as the minor term is included
in the major, or in other words, as long as the minor term has a smaller
extension than that of the major. Blemmydes example of such a syllogism
in the second figure runs as follows:
Every animal is a substance.
Every man is a substance.
Therefore, every man is an animal.
And his example of such a syllogism in the third figure is:
Every man is a substance.
Every man is an animal.
Therefore, every animal is a substance.
Blemmydes of course acknowledges that, according to Aristotles syllo-
gistic, valid syllogisms of the second figure can only have premises of a
different quality and negative conclusions, while valid syllogisms of the
third figure can only have particular conclusions. Besides, this is what he
himself presents as a general rule in his Epitome logica (94445). Still, in
his autobiography Blemmydes finds the chance to defend the view that
syllogisms as the above are indeed valid, as long as their major term has
a larger extension than that of their minor.
Similarly, Blemmydes claims, we get additional valid syllogisms in
the second and third figures, if their major and minor terms are co-
extensive, and can thus be converted to each other. More specifically, he
refers to two different cases in which this holds; first, when the major
and minor terms are definienda and their definitions, and second, when
they are proper qualities and their subjects. This is the topic of the next
part of Blemmydes small text on logical theory, namely, paragraph 14 in
Munitizs edition, in which he gives and comments on examples of syllo-
gisms in the second and third figures with universal affirmative premises
and co-extensive extreme terms:
, , , . ,
, , , ,
.
In the same way as for the syllogisms just mentioned, so also for syllogisms
in which the major and minor terms of the premises can be predicated of
one another. For if every stone is a substance, and an independent thing,
which does not require something else for its existence, then every sub-
stance is such a thing. Again, if a man is a substance, and a mortal, ratio-
nal animal is also a substance, then every man is a mortal, rational animal.
The third and second figures result in universal affirmative conclusions, if
they are composed of definitions and definables, and they may also be con-
verted. If everything of a certain size is extended, and is also an animal,
then everything extended is divisible. Again, if a man is an animal, and any
laughing entity is an animal, then every laughing entity is a man. The third
and second figures which deal with proper qualities and their subjects, are
convertible and have the same conclusions, all affirmative universals and
none particular (trans. Munitiz).24
There are particular issues to be raised in connection with this paragraph,
for instance whether the extension of the definiendum is actually the same
as the added extensions of the definientia. Let us focus, however, on Blem-
mydes main thesis, namely, the addition of further valid syllogisms in the
Aristotelian syllogistic.
Blemmydes suggests that we get further syllogisms in the second and
third figures that should be treated as valid, as long as their major term is
of a larger or of the same extension as that of their minor. But the exten-
sion of the terms of syllogisms was not discussed by Aristotle in his Prior
Analytics for a good reason; Aristotle wanted to construct a system of
logic, in which the terms used were meant to be variables, and variables
have no extension. Still, when Aristotle introduced the syllogisms of the
first figure, he remarked that the major term includes the middle, and the
middle includes the minor:
Whenever, then, three terms are related to one another in such a way that
the last is in the middle as in a whole and the middle either is or is not in
the first as in a whole, it is necessary for there to be a perfect syllogism with
respect to the extremes. (I call middle the term that is itself in another and
in which there is also anotherthe one that also has the middle position.

. , ,
, , . ,
, , .
, ,
. , ,
, , .
, , ,
.
Extremes are what is in another and that in which there is another) (trans.
Striker).25
And some lines further down:
I call major the extreme that contains the middle, and minor the one that
is under the middle (trans. Striker).26
But these explanations of the major and minor terms are of no use in the
case of syllogisms of the second and third figures, not even in the case
of syllogisms of the first figure, apart from the first mood, that is, the so-
called Barbara.
On the other hand, it is probably such remarks that prompted some
Aristotelian commentators to search for a general description of the
extreme terms of syllogisms that could apply to all figures. And it is for
this reason that they raised the question whether the terms of syllogisms
in the second and third figures are major and minor by nature () or
by convention (). Indeed, there is a rather long passage in Alexander
of Aphrodisias commentary on the Prior Analytics, in which this particu-
lar issue is discussed systematically.27 Alexander says that, according to
his teacher Herminus, there are major and minor extremes in the second
figure by nature, and gives us the detailed account that Herminus sug-
gests of how we can judge which they are. According to Herminus, the
major and the minor term of a syllogism can be distinguished, since they
are at a different distance from a superordinate term common to both;
for example, he says that from the terms bird and man, the term bird
should be treated as the major, since it is nearer to the common genus
animal. But Alexander rightly points out that Herminus criterion is use-
less, if the two terms do not belong to the same genus (); even if
they do, Alexander continues, it is not always easy to find such a common
term. Hence, Alexander rejects Herminus suggestion, and says that it is
not only a waste of time but it is not even true.
25Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.4.25b3237:

,
.
, . For the
translation, see G. Striker, Aristotle: Prior Analytics Book I; Translated with an introduction
and commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009).
26Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.4.26a2123: ,
.
27Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentar
ium, ed. M. Wallies, CAG 2.1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1883), pp. 72:1775:34.
Similarly, John Philoponus in his commentary on the Prior Analytics

also claims that the extreme terms in the second and third figures are
by convention and not by nature.28 Moreover, he settles the issue, by
suggesting a general rule for the syllogisms in all figures that does not
take into account the extension of the extreme terms but their function;
according to this rule, the major term of a syllogism is the predicate of
its conclusion, while the minor term is its subject. Philoponus solution
has been appreciated by modern scholars working on ancient logic; Jan
ukasiewicz claims that it deserves to be regarded as classic, and Gnter
Patzig finds it logically faultless but, of course, not an interpretation of
Aristotles definitions.29
Blemmydes, too, seems to follow Philoponus, when in his Epitome logica

(936) he gives the general rule that the major premise has the same predi-
cate as the conclusion. In his autobiography, on the other hand, Blem-
mydes chooses instead to pay attention to the extension of the extreme
terms, and thus introduces some further valid syllogisms that do not
belong to Aristotles syllogistic. But he does not seem to be particularly
concerned about the fact that he blatantly deviates in this respect from
the Aristotelian tradition. To quote him once again, he explicitly says:
All these syllogisms are exceptions to the traditional norm...even if they
do not fail to be true.30
This is, I think, a startling statement coming from a Byzantine scholar.
Does this mean that Blemmydes, here as elsewhere, follows some previ-
ous commentator? Or is this piece of logical theory something which he
himself introduces for the first time in Byzantine logic? If Ebbesen is right
in his verdict, and most probably he is, that Blemmydes work contains
few, if any, surprises for the reader, there must have been other commen-
tators who deviated in this respect from the Aristotelian tradition.
28John Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica Priora commentaria, ed. M. Wallies, CAG

13.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1905), pp. 67:1868:8, 87:1019.
29J. ukasiewicz, Aristotles Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic,
2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 32; G. Patzig, Aristotles Theory of the Syllogism
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1968), pp. 12021. Cf. also W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 6971; M. Mignucci, Aristotele: gli Analitici Primi
(Naples: Loffredo, 1969), pp. 21921.
30Blemmydes, Autobiographia 2.13:1719: ...
(cf. n. 23 above).
To detect Blemmydes sources, though, is not an easy task. It would

require carefully collecting and systematically studying unedited Byzan-
tine commentaries on Aristotles Prior Analytics as well as unedited Byzan-
tine logical textbooks and treatises. But perhaps it would prove not to be a
waste of time. For even if Alexander is right to think that developments in
logic, such as the one we find in Blemmydes autobiography, do not deserve
a place in the Aristotelian logical system, to understand the motivation
behind them could give us insight into the application of logic in Byzan-
tine times. For instance, it might be the case that the syllogisms added by
Blemmydes were in fact of some use in theological debates, which were
undoubtedly far more significant than the logical joust between Blem-
mydes and Karykes. However, this still needs to be done.
8.Strange Finds, or Nicholas of Paris on Relations
Heine Hansen
altitudo et profunditas maris sunt unum in re

Anonymous of Paris 16618
In a letter to Des Bosses dated 21 April 1714, Leibniz writes the following:
You will not, I believe, admit an accident that is in two subjects at the same
time. My judgment about relations is that paternity in David is one thing,
filiation in Solomon another, but the relation common to both is a merely
mental thing, whose foundation is the modifications of the individuals.1
That no accident can be in several subjects at the same time, is a claim on
which Avicenna had already insisted some seven hundred years earlier:
Do not, he urges in the chapter of his Metaphysics devoted to relations,
believe that one accident is in two subjects.2 For the Persian polymath,
as for Leibniz, this means that a real (as opposed to a merely mental )
relation is not to be construed as a single accident that is in the two
(or more) substances it relates.
Avicennas point was later cited with approval by Thomas Aquinas,3
and according to the standard story of medieval theories of relation it is
one to which the entire medieval philosophical tradition was explicitly or
implicitly committed.4 As Mark Henninger puts it:
1G. W. Leibniz, The LeibnizDes Bosses Correspondence, ed. B. C. Look and D. Rutherford
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 326: Neque enim admittes credo accidens,
quod simul sit in duobus subiectis. Ita de relationibus censeo aliud esse paternitatem in
Davide aliud filiationem in Salomone, sed relationem communem utrique esse rem mere
mentalem, cuius fundamentum sint modificationes singulorum.
2Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina 3.10 (ed. S. Van Riet, 3 vols.
(Leuven: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 197783), vol. 1, p. 177): Igitur nullo modo putes quod unum
accidens sit in duobus subiectis...
3Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum 1, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2: Ad secun-
dum dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt, ut Avicenna dicit, quod eadem numero relatio
est in utroque extremorum; quod non potest esse, quia unum accidens non est in duobus
subiectis.
4J. R. Weinberg, The Concept of Relation: Some observations on its history, in
J. R. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction: Three essays in the history of thought
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), pp. 61119. See also J. E. Brower, Medieval
Theories of Relations, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
140 heine hansen
Today we might talk of one symmetrical relation R of colour similar-

ity between two pieces of white chalk, a and b. But for the medievals, if
there are two really distinct substances, there must be two really distinct
accidents.5
It is undeniably true that the view that Avicenna and Leibniz proscribe
was never a majority view, but as a strange find made by Sten in a mid-
thirteenth-century sophism and presented in a 1995 article seems to sug-
gest, things are perhaps not as straightforward as the standard story would
have us believe.6
In the following, I shall present a similar find from a couple of logical
commentaries written by Nicholas of Paris that confirms this suspicion.
I shall do so in five steps. First, since Nicholas of Paris is not, perhaps, the
most well-known figure of the medieval philosophical tradition, I shall say
a few words about who he is. Second, I will give a brief preliminary sketch
of his view of the nature and ontological status of relations. Third, I will
try to spell out the assumptions that seem to have been instrumental in
leading him to adopt this view. Fourth, I shall sum up the view andto
the extent that the commentaries allowtry to expand a little upon it.
Fifth, I shall make a few concluding remarks.
As far as can be gathered from the scarce information we possess, Nicho-

las was a master teaching in Paris at some point in the second quarter
of the thirteenth century. University documents show that he was dead
by March 1263, but his reputation was apparently big enough that the
schools of master Nicholas were still used as a geographical point of
2010Edition),URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/relations-
medieval/>.
5M. G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval theories 12501325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989), p. 4. For an attempt to understand why Leibniz and many of his scholastic prede-
cessors thought that this must be so, see S. Penner, An Accident that is Simultaneously in
Two Subjects: Leibniz and some predecessors on the possibility of two-subject accidents,
forthcoming.
6See S. Ebbesen, Tantum unum est: Thirteenth-century sophismatic discussions
around the Parmenidean thesis, The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995), 18384. The find, which
Sten referred to as his strangest find, is mentioned again in S. Ebbesen, The Paris Arts
Faculty: Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, Radulphus Brito, in J. Marenbon (ed.), Medi-
eval Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 271. The sophism in question is found in MS
Paris BNF lat. 16618, ff. 142r45r. I refer to its author as Anonymous of Paris 16618.
strange finds 141
reference even after he had passed away.7 It is also possible that he is the
master Nicholas with the prominent buttocks who appears in a satirical
poem from the second quarter of the century, alongside John Pagus and
John Pointlasne (fl. ca. 1250) as the vanguard of the armed forces of Dame
Logic, who are marching from Paris to take up battle against the humanist
grammarians of Orlans.8
A number of Nicholas writings are still extant but most remain
unedited.9 Apart from a treatise on syncategorematic terms, several com-
mentaries on the authoritative logical texts are explicitly ascribed to him
in the manuscripts (Porphyrys Introduction, Aristotles Perihermeneias
and Sophistical Refutations, the anonymous Book of Six Principles, and
Boethius On topical differences).10 Given the renown that Nicholas appar-
ently enjoyed, these texts must prima facie be considered as important
evidence for a period in the history of Aristotelian logic that we still know
relatively little about.
Besides the texts mentioned, there are also a number of anonymous
commentaries that with varying degrees of plausibility have been attrib-
uted to him.11 Among these is a commentary on Aristotles Categories of
which I am currently preparing an edition. As I have argued elsewhere,
this commentary should be regarded as authentic. I will argue for its
authenticity more fully in the introduction to the edition.12
7R.-A. Gauthier, Preface in Thomas Aquinas, Expositio Libri peryermenias: Editio altera
retractata (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1989), pp. 66*67*.
8Henry dAndeli, The Battle of the Seven Arts, ed. and trans. L. J. Paetow (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1914), pp. 3334. For the proposed identification, see H. A. G.
Braakhuis, Obligations in Early Thirteenth Century Paris: The Obligationes of Nicholas of
Paris(?) (MS Paris, B. N. lat., 11412), Vivarium 36 (1998), 154.
9An edition of Nicholas treatise on syncategorematic terms can be found in H. A. G.
Braakhuis, De 13de eeuwse tractaten over syncategorematische termen, 2 vols. (PhD diss.,
Leiden University, 1979). A partial edition of his commentary on the Perihermeneias can be
found in H. Hansen and A. M. Mora-Mrquez, Nicholas of Paris on Aristotles Periherme-
neias 13, CIMAGL 80 (2011), 188.
10See O. Weijers, Le travail intellectuel la Facult des arts de Paris: Textes et matres
(ca. 12001500), vol. 6, Rpertoire des noms commenant par LMNO (Turnhout: Brepols,
2005), pp. 19197.
11Weijers, Travail intellectuel, pp. 19397.
12H. Hansen, John Pagus on Categories (PhD diss., University of Sydney, 2009), pp.
32*37*. See also M. Grabmann, Die Logischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Paris und ihre
Stellung in der Aristotelischen Bewegung des XIII. Jahrhunderts, in M. Grabmann, Mitte-
lalterliches Geistesleben, 3 vols. (Munich: Max Hueber, 192656), vol. 1, pp. 22248.
142 heine hansen
The core of Nicholas view of relations is found in his commentaries on

both the Book of Six Principles and the Categories, but it emerges in more
detail in the latter, since the Categories contains a chapter specifically
devoted to the category of relation whereas the Book of Six Principles
does not.13
In outline, Nicholas view seems to be the following. Take what in medi-
eval debates is regularly considered as a prototypical relational situation:
someones being the father of someone else. How is this situation to be
explained? It seems that, on Nicholas analysis, it is to be accounted for
by appealing to a relation, R, which is an accident and a real and irre-
ducible constituent of extramental reality, and two individual substances,
a and b, that jointly are the subject that R is in. Davids being the father
of Solomon, to take Leibniz example, involves a relation, which we may
call paternity, and two individual substances, David and Solomon, that
together are the subject for this relation.
Nicholas appears, in other words, to take a view of relations on which
such an item is to be construed as an extramental accident that belongs
at the same time to the two (or more) substances that it relates. The view
seems to be a version of that which Avicenna, Aquinas, and Leibniz were
unanimous in explicitly rejecting. What motivates Nicholas to adopt it?
As already indicated, Nicholas formulates his view of relations within his

interpretation of the theory of categories as it is presented by Aristotle
in the Categories and expanded upon in the Book of Six Principles. It was
widely recognized that the latter text had not been written by Aristotle,14
but since it provided the sort of discussion of the final six categories that
is missing in the Categories, it was a supplement for which there was a
13The commentary on the Book of Six Principles is found in MS Vatican Biblioteca

Apostolica Vat. lat. 3011, ff. 11rb21vb. The commentary on the Categories is found in MS
Munich Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm. 14460, ff. 42ra62ra. Note that when I quote from
the manuscripts I standardise the orthography. I do the same when quoting from modern
editions.
14P. O. Lewry, The Liber Sex Principiorum, a Supposedly Porretanean Work: A study in
ascription, in J. Jolivet and A. de Libera (eds.), Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux
origines de la Logica Modernorum (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), pp. 25178 (for Nicholas view
of the authorship issue, see p. 266).
strange finds 143
definite need, and as such it constituted a standard part of the philo-

sophical curriculum at the time. As a consequence, it came to have some
influence on the interpretation of the doctrine of the categories, and as
we shall see, it also influenced Nicholas view of the nature of relations,
insofar as what seems to be one of the main assumptions motivating his
view comes directly from it.
Before spelling out what I take these main assumptions or complexes of
assumptions to be, let me make a brief, but not unimportant, terminologi-
cal point. I have been speaking of relations and the category of relation,
but if one looks at Aristotles Greek text one will search in vain for a cor-
responding abstract noun. Aristotle speaks only of that which is ,
towards something. Nicholas, however, and anyone else using Boethius
Latin translation without recourse to the Greek original, would have been
unaware of this fact, since in this translation Aristotles becomes
sometimes ad aliquid, sometimes relativum, and sometimes relatio. Ren-
dering the Greek expression in this last way is not, however, entirely with-
out a basis in the Corpus Aristotelicum. It is clear from a passage in the
fifth book of the Metaphysics that Aristotle himself recognized a use of
in which it refers to the properties (equality and similarity are the
examples given) in virtue of which the things that bear them are called
(in the examples used: equal and similar).15 Whether or not it can be
justified in the context of the Categories, Boethius translation did enable
the schoolmen to easily mark precisely the distinction Aristotle seems to
be referring to in the Metaphysics passage, in the same way that Aristotles
own Greek allowed him to mark a similar distinction with respect to the
category of quality, where he explicitly distinguishes between
and , qualitates and qualia.16 Consequently, Nicholas has no qualms
about speaking of the category or genus of relation. In fact, this is how he
usually refers to it. He also seems to take it that, strictly speaking, the cat-
egory collects relations (relationes) rather than relatives (relativa), just as
the category of quality collects qualities and not items qualified. He does,
nonetheless, acknowledge the fact that much of Aristotles discussion of
the category of relation is taken up with concreta such as father and son
rather than abstracta such as paternity and filiation.17
15Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15.1021b68: ,

.
16Aristotle, Categories 8.10a27b11.
17See, for example, Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, MS Munich Bay-
erische Staatsbibliothek Clm. 14460, f. 52vb: Vel possemus dicere quod definit relationem
144 heine hansen
Let us now turn to what seems to be the main assumptions or pieces

of doctrine that lead Nicholas to formulate the view of relations that he
does.
(1) In chapter two of the Categories, Aristotle presents a division of things

that are (eorum quae sunt), traditionally known as the ontological square.
This division is generated by letting the technical notions of being said of
a subject and being in a subject and their respective negations crosscut.
According to the traditional interpretation, being said of a subject picks
out universals while its negation picks out particulars, and being in a sub-
ject picks out accidents while its negation picks out substances. This yields
the four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive types of beings
tabulated in table 1.
Based on Aristotles text, the following exemplification of the four
types seems natural. Type (IV) items are items such as particular men
and horses, whereas type (I) items are the species and genera, such as
man and horse, to which type (IV) items belong. Type (III) items are attri-
butes such as whiteness and grammatical knowledge, which, in turn, are
the genera and species of type (II) items, the latter being their particular
instances, for example, a particular whiteness or a particular grammatical
knowledge.18
Table 1.Division of beings in Categories 2

Said of a subject In a subject Item
+ (I) Universal substance
+ (II) Particular accident
+ + (III) Universal accident
(IV) Particular substance
in concreto et non in abstracto propter hoc quod causa erroris habuit ortum a concreto
et non ab abstracto.
18The nature of type (II) items in Aristotle is somewhat controversial these days. The
interpretation presented here is the traditional one, to which Nicholas subscribes (cor-
rectly, I believe). For an overview of the modern debate and a defense of a version of the
traditional interpretation, see M. Wedin, Aristotles Theory of Substance: The Categories
and Metaphysics Zeta (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 3866.
strange finds 145
Not too surprisingly, Nicholas is committed to this traditional interpreta-

tion.19 The same goes for what may be called the key thesis of the Catego-
ries ontology, namely, the claim that the existence of type (IV) items, that
is to say, of particular substances, constitutes a necessary condition for the
existence of the remaining three types. As Aristotle puts it,
all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or
in them as subjects. So if the primary substances did not exist it would be
impossible for any of the other things to exist.20
So basically, if we think that relations are to be counted among the things
that are, and unless we take them to be primary substances or among the
items said of such substances as of a subjectwhich according to the
ontological square would make them universal substanceswe will have
to say that they are among the kind of items that are in such substances as
their subjects. We cannot, as McTaggart would later suggest, fairly answer
the question in what is a relation? by saying that it is not in anything but
that it is between two or more terms.21
(2) In chapter four of the Categories, Aristotle presents a second division.

This is the famous division of the categories. It is presented as a division
of uncombined expressions and based on the different kinds of items that
such expressions signify.22 These are ten in number: substance, quan-
tity, quality, relation, where, when, position, having, action, and passion.
Nicholas is a realist about these items. That is to say, he takes them to
constitute ten mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive most general
kinds of extramental being. They constitute, as he would say, the parts
of being.
19Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 42rb: Deinde ponit divisionem

entis sic: Eorum quae sunt, id est entium. Et est quadrimembris divisio hoc modo: Eorum
quae sunt quaedam sunt substantiae universales, quaedam accidentia particularia, quae-
dam accidentia universalia, quaedam substantiae particulares. Sed non ponit per haec
verba, sed per circumlocutionem...
20Aristotle, Categories 5.2b6:
.
Translation by J. Ackrill, Aristotles Categories and De Interpretatione: Translated with notes
and glossary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 6.
21J. M. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 192127), vol. 1, p. 82.
22Aristotle, Categories 4.1b2527:
.
146 heine hansen
Nicholas is clear that the study of these kinds or parts of being as such
belongs to metaphysics rather than to logic (Aristotles short treatise on
categories was usually thought to belong to the latter). Nonetheless, the
logician studies these kinds of being insofar as they are signified by means
of speech.23 Taken in this way, an item in the ontology becomes what
Nicholas calls a sayable (dicibile),24 and when such sayables are ordered
according to increasing levels of generality, from the level of particulars
to that of a maximally general item, they constitute a category.25 Strictly
speaking, then, a category is not a generic hierarchy of beings (entia) but
of sayables (dicibilia). There is, nonetheless, a pretty straightforward cor-
respondence insofar as a sayable subject to categorial inclusion just is an
item in the ontology considered relative to languagea point on which
Nicholas insists.26 Ultimately, then, category distinctions are based on and
mirror ontological distinctions: for each category there is a corresponding
kind of being. In what follows, therefore, I shall for the sake of conve-
nience simply ignore this complication and use the term category in the
sense of most general kind of being. Either way, it is clear that according
to Nicholas relations are to be counted among the things that are.
(3) We now have two partitions of the domain of being: the fourfold one
found in chapter two of the Categories and the tenfold one which occurs
in or is implied by chapter four. How do the two partitions fit together?
Like most people before and after him, Nicholas assumes that the first
may simply be superimposed on the second so that items belonging to the
first of the ten categories, namely, substance, are not in a subject, while
items belonging to the final nine categories are in a subject. Since the
category of relation is among these nine categories, all items belonging to
this category will be in a subject.
23Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 42ra: Metaphysica est de toto ente
et partibus entis simpliciter in quantum ens, logica vero est de toto ente et partibus entis
in quantum significantur per sermonem.
24Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 43rb: dicendum quod dicit
dicuntur et non sunt quia non intendit hic de decem partibus entis simpliciter, sed in
quantum sunt dicibilia et significantur per sermonem.
25Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 42ra: praedicamentum enim
est collectio praedicabilium, praedicabile autem idem est quod dicibile incomplexum
ordinabile.
26Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 42vb: Potest dici quod aliquid
componitur intellectui cui nihil respondet in re extra, ut chimera, et tamen per nomen
significatur intelligibile vel imaginabile, licet non sit res eius. Sed oportet quod dicibile
incomplexum ordinabile in praedicamento significet aliquid quod sit res et pars entis.
strange finds 147
These three assumptions do not, of course, necessitate the view that

a relation is in the two or more substances it relates. It is still open for
someone who holds them to claim that the subject of a relation is a single
individual substance, but that in contrast to absolute accidents such as
qualities and quantities, relations are accidents that somehow point to or
are directed towards something outside of that subject even though they
are not in that outside something. Indeed, this type of view of relations
was one of the dominant approaches in the Middle Ages.27
(4) This leads us to the fourth assumption, and this is where the afore-
mentioned Book of Six Principles enters the story. In his introduction, the
anonymous author, having listed the ten categories, presents the topic he
intends to deal with in the following way:
Now, of the items mentioned each constitutes the designation of an uncom-
bined expression. As such, it will either be something that subsists or some-
thing belonging to it. Now, each of the things that belong to what exists
either comes to it extrinsically or is found to be strictly internal to the sub-
stance (as, for example, line, surface, and body). Each of those that require
something external will of necessity be either an action, a being affected,
a disposition, a being somewhere, a being sometime, or a having. Of those
that subsist and those that require only that in which they exist an adequate
treatment has already been given in the book entitled On the categories, of
the rest I shall now treat.28
As this piece of text was usually understood, the anonymous author is
here giving a sort of division of the ten categories. First, he posits the
distinction between substance and accident, referring to the former as
that which subsists or exists and the latter as that which belongs to what
subsists. Second, accidents are distributed into two main groupings:
(a) those that are internal or intrinsic to the substance to which they
belong, and (b) those that are extrinsic to it. Intrinsic accidents are said to
require only that in which they exist, while extrinsic accidents are said
27Henninger, Relations, pp. 46; Brower, Medieval theories.

28Anon., Liber sex principiorum, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, AL 1.7 (Bruges: Descle de Brou-
wer, 1966), p. 38: Singulum vero eorum quae dicta sunt incomplexionis eius quae in voce
est notatio est. Hoc vero erit vel subsistens vel contingens. Eorum vero quae existenti
contingunt singulum aut extrinsecus advenit aut intra substantiam simpliciter considera-
tur (ut linea, superficies, corpus). Ea vero quae quod extrinsecus est exigunt, aut actus aut
pati aut dispositio aut esse alicubi aut in mora aut habere necessario erunt. Sed de his quae
subsistunt et quae solum in quo existunt exigunt, in eo qui De categoriis inscribitur libro
sufficienter disputatum est, de reliquis vero continuo.
148 heine hansen
to require something external. Third, the passage strongly suggests that

the accidental categories of quantity, quality, and relation, which are the
three categories besides substance that Aristotle treats extensively in the
Categories, require only the subject or substance to which they belong,
and are thus to be classified as intrinsic, while the remaining six catego-
ries require, in addition to such a subject, something external to it, and so
are extrinsic. This, at least, is how Nicholas understands the text.29 And so,
we end up with the following picture of the Aristotelian categories:
Things that are
Not in a subject In a subject

(Accidents)
Intrinsic Extrinsic
Substance Quantity Relation Quality Where When Position Having Action Passion
Figure 1.Aristotles categories
Nicholas insists that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic acci-
dents should be drawn on the basis suggested in the Book of Six Principles.
He says:
That is said to belong extrinsically which requires something besides the
subject in which it is, as, for example, an action, which requires not only an
agent but also a patient; similarly also with a passion. That, however, is said
to belong intrinsically which requires nothing besides the subject in which it
is, as, for example, the whiteness in me requires nothing besides me.30
29See, for example, Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 44vb: Ad aliud
dicendum quod tot sunt membra divisionis et non plura, quia omne quod est aut est sub-
stantia aut accidens, et sic primum membrum substantiae. Si vero sit accidens, hoc est
dupliciter; aut enim est accidens intrinsecus adveniens aut extrinsecus.... Si est intrin-
secus adveniens, aut inest substantiae principaliter a parte materiae, et sic est quantitas,
aut a parte formae, et sic est qualitas, aut a parte coniuncti, et sic est relatio. Si vero est
extrinsecus adveniens, tunc primo et immediate non inest substantiae, sed mediante ali-
quo intrinseco; aut ergo mediante quantitate vel qualitate vel relatione.
30Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Libro Sex Principiorum, MS Vatican Biblioteca
Apostolica Vat. lat. 3011, f. 14ra: Ad aliud: quod istud dicitur extrinsecus affixum quod
aliquod exigit praeter subiectum in quo est, sicut actio, quae non solum exigit agentem
sed patientem; similiter et passio. Illud vero dicitur intrinsecus affixum quod nihil exigit
praeter subiectum in quo est, ut albedo in me nihil exigit praeter me.
strange finds 149
It is objected, however, that this is problematic. More specifically, it is

argued that the proposed characterizations of extrinsic and intrinsic
accidents are incompatible with the classification of relation as a type of
intrinsic accident. The objection is found in the commentary on the Book
of Six Principles:
If, however, [an accident is extrinsic] because it requires another subject
besides the one that it is in, then it still seems that relation is extrinsic,
because paternity is in a father as its subject but it still requires another
subject, namely, a son.31
Nicholas replies to this objection by saying that it rests on a mistaken view
of what the subject of the relation in fact is:
Paternity insofar as it names a relation is not in the father but in the father
and son, and these two are one, and so neither of them requires another
subject.32
What seems to be the same point is made again in the commentary on
the Categories:
And if on the basis of this you object that relations will have to be counted
among the accidents which belong extrinsically since they require some-
thing besides the subject that they are in, it is to be said that a relation does
not require something besides the subject that it is in, for the specific rela-
tion that is paternity and filiation is in the father and son as in one subject
and not in each of them taken separately.33
In other words, Nicholas wants to retain the distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic accidents and the grounds for it suggested by the Book of Six
Principles, as well as the distribution of the nine accidental categories that
it also suggests, according to which relation belongs among the intrinsic
31Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super LSP, f. 14ra: Si autem propter hoc quod exigit
aliud subiectum praeter id in quo est, tunc adhuc videtur de relatione, quia paternitas
est in patre tanquam in subiecto et tamen exigit adhuc aliud subiectum, scilicet filium;
ergo etc.
32Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super LSP, f. 14ra: Ad tertium, quod paternitas non est in
patre prout nominat relationem sed in patre et filio, et ista sunt unum, et ideo non exigit
unum eorum alterum subiectum.
33Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 54ra: Et si obicias propter hoc
quod relatio erit de numero accidentium extrinsecus affixorum eo quod exigit aliud praeter
subiectum in quo est, dicendum quod relatio non exigit aliud praeter subiectum in quo,
quia ista species relationis, paternitas et filiatio, est {sunt ms.} in patre et filio tanquam in
uno subiecto et non etiam in unoquoque per se. Nicholas takes a relation and its converse
to be identical. More on this below.
150 heine hansen
accidents.34 The problem he is faced with is that if one thinks of a rela-

tion as a sort of property which is in one of the relata as its subject but
that, so to speak, points to (and so requires) something outside of that
subject, namely, the other relatum, then relations seem to come out as
extrinsic accidents, since according to the proposed characterization this
is precisely what an extrinsic accident is.35 Nicholas solves the problem by
claiming that the subject that a relation is in is, in fact, the two (or more)
substances that it relates taken jointly, not one or each of them taken
separately, and claims that the relation is in these substances as in one
subject (tanquam in uno subiecto).36
We seem, in sum, to end up with three types of accidents: (i) an acci-
dent which is in a single particular substance as in a subject; (ii) an acci-
dent which is in two or more particular substances jointly as in a subject
(these substances are said to be one subject); and (iii) an accident which
is in a single particular substance as in a subject but somehow requires
something besides that subject. Types (i) and (ii) are intrinsic, type
(iii) is extrinsic.
Relations are accidents of type (ii), but note that they are not the only
accidents of this type. Indeed, Nicholas refers to a non-relational kind of
accident to elucidate the claim that paternity is in the father and son as
in one subject and not in each of them taken separately:
...just as the number four is in four men as in one subject.37
This sort of conception of number seems to have been common in the
decades around the middle of the thirteenth century.38 Basically, on this
34The classification is admittedly somewhat curious, but it was widely accepted at the
time Nicholas was writing; see H. Hansen, John Pagus on Aristotles Categories (Leuven:
Leuven University Press, 2012), p. 121*; H. Hansen, Accounting for Aristotles Categories:
Some notes on the medieval sufficientiae praedicamentorum, in C. T. Thrnqvist and
B. Bydn (eds.), The Reception of Aristotles Works during the Middle Ages: Collected essays,
forthcoming.
35The objection seems a bit sloppily expressed in the commentary on the Book of Six
Principles; strictly speaking, extrinsic accidents do not seem to require another subject.
36Note that Scotus knows and explicitly rejects this approach; see John Duns Scotus,
Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis 5, q. 11 (ed. R. Andrews et al., 2 vols.
(St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1997), vol. 1, p. 583): Relatio realis non est
ens per se, nec intervallum inter duo extrema, nec in duobus ut in uno subiecto, sed in uno
et ad aliud. (my italics).
37Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 54ra: sicut quaternarius est in
quattuor hominibus tanquam in uno subiecto.
38C. Trifogli, Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century (ca. 12501270): Motion, infinity,
place and time (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 22426.
strange finds 151
approach, number is a real and fully extramental accident belonging to

the category of quantity. The number four, to take Nicholas example, is a
real and fully extramental accident jointly possessed by the four men. It is
not in each of them taken separately, but collectively they are the subject
that it is in. Nicholas basically extends this analysis to relations.
We have now seen the pieces of doctrine that seem to motivate Nicholas
basic view of the nature of relations. Let me try to say a little more about
his understanding of the items belonging to this category.
Recall Nicholas analysis of the relational situation that is someones,
say, Davids, being the father of someone else, say, Solomon. According
to Nicholas, this situation is to be explained by appealing to a relation,
let us call it paternity, which is an accident and a real and irreducible
constituent of extramental reality, and two individual substances, David
and Solomon, that jointly possess this accident. I will very briefly draw
attention to three further aspects of Nicholas analysis.
First, Nicholas holds that the relation paternity and its converse filia-
tion are in fact the same relation. Similarly, dominion and serfdom are the
same relation. Or to put it another way, paternity-and-filiation is one spe-
cies under the genus of relation, dominion-and-serfdom is another species
under the same genus:
Master and slave are of one relation, as is father and son, since paternity
and filiation is one species of relation. But it is called by different names
according to the different ways of comparing the extremes, so that one is
called son, the other father; and these different ways of comparing them are
superposition and supposition. For in comparing the father to the son we
call it paternity, but in comparing the son to the father we call it filiation.39
39Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 52va: Dominus et servus sunt

unius relationis, sicut pater et filius, cum paternitas et filiatio sit una species relationis. Sed
sortitur diversa nomina secundum comparationes extremitatum diversas, ut hic dicatur
filius, hic pater; et illae diversae comparationes sunt superpositio et suppositio. Per com-
parationem enim patris ad filium dicitur paternitas; per comparationem filii ad patrem
dicitur filiatio. Unde dico quod pater et filius nulla substantiali differentia differunt. Pater-
nitas et filiatio, dominium et servitus, quae sunt diversae species, differunt substantiali
differentia. For the notions of superposition and supposition, see the quote from Peter of
Spain in the note immediately below.
152 heine hansen
On this view, it seems that the relational situation that is Solomons being
the son of David is to be explained by appealing to exactly the same three
items as Davids being the father of Solomon, namely, David, Solomon,
and the relation which we before called paternity but which we would
now call filiation. So it looks like Nicholas holds, as seems intuitively plau-
sible, that there is actually just one situation here, and that this situation
involves only one relation. We may, however, consider this relation in two
different ways, and depending on which way we consider it, we call it by
a different name (unless, of course, we are dealing with a symmetric rela-
tion; then we would use the same name).40 This view, sometimes called
the identity of converses, is also endorsed by the Anonymous of Paris
16618. Its like the depth and height of the sea, he explains, in reality they
are one and the same thing (unum in re), but conceived as extending from
the surface to the bottom we call it by one name, conceived as extending
from the bottom to the surface we call it by another.41
Second, it seems that, strictly speaking, Nicholas would explain the
relational situation in question by means of David, Solomon, and a par-
ticular instance of the species of relation that is paternity-and-filiation,
just as he would explain the situation of Socrates being white by means
of Socrates and Socrates whiteness, which is a particular instance of the
species whiteness.42 In the lingo of chapter two of the Categories (see
table 1 above), the relation included in the assay will be what we labelled
a type (II) item, namely, an item that is in a subject but not said of a
40Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), pp. 3435:
Relativorum quaedam dicuntur secundum aequiparentiam, ut quae eodem nomine
dicuntur, ut similis simili similis et aequalis aequali aequalis et vicinus vicino vicinus. Alia
vero secundum superpositionem, ut dominus, duplum, triplum. Alia vero secundum sup-
positionem, ut servus, subduplum, subtriplum, quia ista supponuntur aliis et alia super-
ponuntur istis. Dominus enim superponitur servo et pater filio et duplum dimidio; servus
vero supponitur domino et filius patri et dimidium duplo.
41See Ebbesen, Tantum unum est, 184, n. 19: sicut altitudo et profunditas maris sunt
unum in re, sortiuntur tamen diversa nomina in diversis extremis, scilicet in profundo et
superficie maris. For a relatively recent defense of the identity of converses, see T. Wil-
liamson, Converse Relations, Philosophical Review 94 (1985), 24962; see also K. Fine,
Neutral Relations, Philosophical Review 109 (2000), 133. Note also D. Armstrong, A Theory
of Universals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 94: speaking ontologically,
there is no such thing as a relation and its converse. There is simply the relation hold-
ing between a and b, the particular a playing one role in the relational situation and b
another.
42Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 46vb: Sed accidens non potest
esse sine eo in quo est; corrupto enim Sorte, corrumpitur albedo Sortis, et non potest esse
sine eo in quo est, quia non salvatur albedo Sortis in alio a Sorte.
strange finds 153
subject, rather than a type (III) item, in this case the species paternity-
and-filiation, which is said of this type (II) item as of a subject.
Third, Nicholas seems to take it that a relation is always founded on
instances of some non-relational kind:
A relation comes to be by means of the coming to be of things belonging to
another genus. For example, Socrates has a quality, and if a similar quality
comes to be in Plato, a similarity has now come to be, and so a relation. And
in this way, by means of the coming to be of other things, as for example by
means of the coming to be of a quality, a relation comes to be. Hence, the
species of relation do not come into being by themselves but by means of
things belonging to other genera.43
So relations are founded on instances of some non-relational kind,
although they are not reducible to them (Nicholas is not a foundationist).
Consequently, we might want to include in our explanation of a given
relational situation not only the instance of the species of relation in
question and the two or more particular substances which this instance is
in as in one subject, but also the non-relational properties on which the
relation is founded.
In closing, let us go back to the quote from Leibniz with which we began.
As it turns out, Nicholas view of relations is not actually on the surface in
immediate conflict with what Leibniz is saying. Nicholas is not admitting
an accident that is in two subjects at a time. According to him, a real
relation is in fact in one subject, it is just that this one subject somehow
consists of two or more substances.
The question is, of course, what Nicholas insistence that these two or
more substances are in fact one subject amounts to. Is he committing to
some thing (a subject) that is made up of those substances and exists
in addition to them? Perhaps not. One, it is difficult to see how such an
entity could be fitted into the ten-category ontology that Nicholas seems
committed to. Two, a subject in the Categories sense of the term is, as
43Nicholas of Paris, Rationes super Praedicamenta, f. 52vb: Aliter possumus dicere,

et melius, quod relatio generatur per generationem rerum alterius generis. Verbi gratia,
Sortes habet qualitatem, et si similis qualitas generetur in Platone, iam est similitudo
generata, et ita relatio. Et ita per generationem rerum aliarum, ut per generationem
qualitatis, generatur relatio. Unde species relationis non egrediuntur in esse per se, sed
per res aliorum generum.
154 heine hansen
John Ackrill points out, a mere label for whatever has anything said
of it or in it.44 To insist that, in the case of a relation or a number,
the subject that the accident is in, although it is in fact several individual
substances, is nonetheless one subject, is perhaps to say nothing more than
that the accident is in those substances only jointly, and not in each of
them individually.45
However that may be, Leibniz would presumably have rejected the
central move. For him, apparently, one subject here equals one substance.
And clearly, as we have seen, there is a deeper tension between Nicholas
approach to relations and the judgment about these matters that Leib-
niz professes in the letter to Des Bosses. Where Leibniz sees two things
(paternity in David, filiation in Solomon), which we may somehow rep-
resent as one (the relation common to both, which is a merely mental
thing), Nicholas apparently sees only one thing (a real extramental acci-
dent jointly possessed by David and Solomon), which we may somehow
represent as two.
44Ackrill, Aristotles Categories, p. 76.

45The question of whether or not this deflationary account of subject in Aristotle
should be attributed to Nicholas is a central but difficult one. So far I have found nothing
in his commentaries that allows us to answer it with any certainty and I shall therefore
leave the exploration of this issue as a matter for future research. It is worth noting, per-
haps, that the Anonymous of Paris 16618 says that father and son for all their being two
particular entities (supposita) are one individual (individuum) of a relation. See Ebbesen,
Tantum unum est, 184.
9.Robert Kilwardby and Albert the Great
on Praedicamenta and Praedicabilia
Alessandro D. Conti
It is a fact that from a textual point of view Robert Kilwardbys commen-

taries on Aristotle are the main source of Albert the Greats corresponding
paraphrases. From a purely doctrinal point of view, however, it is another
story. In general, even though both of them can be considered as moderate
realists, Kilwardby and Albert developed two quite different philosophical
and theological views. Albert was always far more aware of the philosoph-
ical entailments of the texts he was commenting on than Kilwardby was,
and he was able to manage a more sophisticated logical and interpretative
machinery. He was also open to influences from Arab philosophers. As far
as theologically neutral philosophical subjects were concerned, Kilwardby
tried to reconcile his reading of Aristotle with the teaching of Augustine,
supporting Aristotles opinions only where he judged that he could. Yet,
he used all of his intellectual resources and ecclesiastical authority in
fighting against the new Aristotelian trend. Paradoxically, as far as the
doctrines on praedicabilia and praedicamenta are concerned, Kilwardby
appears to be a bit more faithful to Aristotle and a bit less Neo-Platonic
than Albert.1
In what follows, in order to support this evaluation I shall illustrate
Kilwardbys and Albert the Greats different opinions on categories and
universals as they appear in their commentaries on the Ars Vetus.2 First,
1On Kilwardbys life, works and thought, see H. Lagerlund and P. Thom (eds.), A Com
panion to the Philosophy of Robert Kilwardby (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming); on Alberts, see
A. de Libera, Albert le Grand et la Philosophie (Paris: Vrin, 1990); M. Hoenen and A. de
Libera (eds.), Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus: Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mit
telalters (Leiden: Brill, 1995); A. de Libera, Mtaphysique et notique: Albert le Grand (Paris:
Vrin, 2005). On Kilwardbys commentaries on the Logica Vetus, see P. O. Lewry, Robert Kil
wardbys Writings on the Logica Vetus: Studied with regard to their teaching and method (D.
Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1978), esp. pp. 204352; on Alberts theory of categories
and universals, see R. McInerny, Albert on Universals, in F. Kovach and R. Shahan (eds.),
Albert the Great: Commemorative essays (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), pp.
318; B. Tremblay, Albertus Magnus on the Subject of Aristotles Categories, in L. Newton
(ed.), Medieval Commentaries on Aristotles Categories (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 7398.
2In Kilwardbys Parisian course on the Logica Vetus we find a close familiarity with the
texts of Aristotle, but the Augustinianism which is found in fully developed form in his
156 alessandro d. conti
I shall summarize Kilwardbys main ideas on praedicamenta and prae

dicabilia; then, I shall sketch Alberts doctrines; and finally, I shall com-
pare their two versions of moderate realism in order to show similarities
and differences between them.
As is well known, in the fourth chapter of the Categories, Aristotle lists

ten items (substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, affection, where,
when, position, possession) that he describes as what is signified by sim-
ple expressions (as opposed to complex expressions). Since late antiquity
the list of categories was considered both as a classification of things and
as a classification of the signs signifying those things. As a consequence,
during the Middle Ages, many disputes took place about it. Depending on
their general evaluation of the division into categories, that is, whether it
primarily concerns things in the world or signs of them, it is customary
to classify medieval authors as either realists or nominalists. Nominalists
additionally maintained that the division into ten categories is a partition
of terms on the basis of semantic criteria, and that there are only two
(or three) real categories of things: substance and quality (and quantity).
By contrast, realists (1) considered the categorial table to be primarily a
division of beings and only derivatively an homologous division of terms,
and (2) held that the ten Aristotelian categories are the supreme genera
of beings, irreducible to one anothereven though there were some sig-
nificant differences among them when it came to establishing the nature
and ontological status of these genera.
Following Boethius,3 Kilwardby supports a sort of conciliatory solution,
according to which (1) the partition into ten categories is a division of
later writings, such as the questions on the Sentences and the Responsio de 43 quaestionibus
Iohannis Vercellensis, is present only in germ. The core of his doctrine on praedicabilia and
praedicamenta is, however, almost the same in his earlier and later workseven if there
are some differences in his views on the problem of individuation and the ontological
status of relations. For a brief comparison between Kilwardbys semantic and ontological
theories in the Logica Vetus and in his later writings, such as the De ortu scientiarum and
the commentary on the Sentences, see A. D. Conti, Semantics and Ontology in Robert
Kilwardbys Commentaries on the Logica Vetus, in Lagerlund and Thom, Companion,
forthcoming.
3See Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 64 (Paris:
Migne, 1860), cols. 159c160a, 161a, 162a, and 169cd. On Boethiuss interpretation of Aris-
totles Categories, see J. Shiel, Boethius Commentaries on Aristotle, Mediaeval and Renais
sance Studies 4 (1958), 21744; S. Ebbesen, Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator, in
kilwardby and albert on praedicamenta 157
signs signifying a division of things existing outside the mind qua signi-
fiable by linguistic expressions, and (2) things belonging to one catego-
rial field are really distinct from those belonging to another; substances,
for instance, are really distinct from quantities, qualities, and relations;
quantities are really distinct from substances, qualities, and relations, and
so on. For this reason, he asserts that the Aristotelian Categories deals
with voces precisely as they are significant.4 This does not mean, however,
that the book does not deal with things in any sense. Since it is concerned
with the utterances qua significant, it is impossible to treat them without
at the same time taking into consideration the things signified. So, in his
commentary on the Categories, Kilwardby on many occasions assumes
that the particular passage (or theory) at issue concerns things and not
utterancesfor instance, when he speaks of the table of categories and
of substance, quantity, relatives, and quality.
In the thirteenth century almost all realist authors (1) regarded cate
gorial items as composed of two main aspects: (a) the inner nature or
essence, and (b) their peculiar mode of being or of being predicated (modi
essendi vel praedicandi); and (2) maintained that the ten categories divide
those categorial items according to their modes of being (or of being predi
cated) and not according to their inner natures or essences. Kilwardby
does not distinguish a categorys essence from its mode of being (or of
being predicated), but his way of deducing the ten categories is in a way
J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung, 2 vols., Kommentierung, berlieferung,

Nachleben (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987), vol. 2, pp. 286311; A. D. Conti, Boezio commentatore
e interprete delle Categorie di Aristotele, in A. Degrandi et al. (eds.), Scritti in onore di Giro
lamo Arnaldi offerti dalla Scuola Nazionale di Studi Medievali (Rome: Edizioni dellIstituto
Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, 2001), pp. 77102.
4Robert Kilwardby, Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum, MS Madrid Biblioteca
Universitaria 73 (henceforth M), f. 10vb; MS Cambridge Peterhouse 206 (henceforth P),
f. 42ra: Cum sit necessarium ad eam quae est apud Aristotelem praedicamentorum doc-
trinam nosse quid sit genus et quid species, quid differentia etc., et cum iam determina-
tum sit de his, consequenter descendendum est ad ipsa praedicamenta et determinandum
est de ipsis. Est igitur, ut dicit Boethius, scientia Praedicamentorum de decem vocibus
decem prima rerum genera significantibus. Non enim est de vocibus penes diversas figu-
rationes vocum, quae sunt inflexio casuum aut temporum, sed de vocibus in quantum
significativae sunt, quae quidem significatio non absolvitur ab ordine, secundum quod
dicit Boethius quod infinitam multitudinem rerum comprehendit Aristoteles in paucitate
decem generum. Et quia haec ordinatio non absolvitur a sermone, ideo dicit de decem
vocibus, et iterum quia haec ordinatio non est separata a rebus, nec speculatio de ordi-
nabilibus erit separata a speculatione rerum, sed coniuncta, unde nec est inconveniens,
ut quidam obiciunt, demonstrare quasdam passiones de ordinabili in quantum est res.
On this particular topic Albert the Great does not follow Kilwardbys reading, but the rival
interpretation; see his Liber de praedicamentis tract. 1, cap. 1 and cap. 7 (ed. A. Borgnet
(Paris: Vivs, 1890), pp. 150 and 163).
based on differences in the form of existence. In his opinion, there are

two fundamental forms of existence proper to things: subsistence (quod
subsistit), which characterizes substances, and contingency (quod contin
git), which characterizes accidents. The latter is subdivided into three less
general modes, which all have an essential dependence on the existence
of substance: from inside (intra), from outside (extra), and partially from
inside and partially from outside (medio modo). Each of these three modes
is subdivided into three other ways: being in the substance in virtue of its
matter (ex parte materiae); being in the substance in virtue of its form (ex
parte formae); and being in the substance in virtue of the whole compo
site of matter and form (ex parte coniuncti). If something from inside is in
the substance in virtue of its matter, then it is a quantity; if in virtue of its
form, then it is a quality; if in virtue of the whole composite, then it is a
relation (relatio). If something from outside is in the substance in virtue
of its matter, then it is a where (ubi); if in virtue of its form, then it is a
when (quando); if in virtue of the whole composite, then it is a possession
(habitus). If something partially from inside and partially from outside is
in the substance in virtue of its matter, then it is an affection (passio); if
in virtue of its form, then it is an action (actio); if in virtue of the whole
composite, then it is a position (positio).5 Kilwardbys method of finding
the ten categories implies an anti-reductionist approach to the matter,
which was partially dropped in his De ortu scientiarum, where he seems to
take only substances, quantities, qualities, and perhaps actions and affec-
5Kilwardby, Super librum Praedicamentorum 5 (M, f. 14ra; P, f. 44vb): Primum dubi-

tabile <est> de numero dividentium in ipsa divisione decem membra habente, sive de
numero praedicamentorum, qui potest sic accipi: incomplexum aut significat substantiam
aut accidens, quia aut quod subsistit aut quod contingit. Quod autem contingit substantiae
hoc non potest esse nisi tripliciter, scilicet aut intra, aut extra, aut medio modo; et quo
cumque istorum modorum contingat, semper necesse est habere essentialem respectum
ad id cui contingit, scilicet ad substantiam. Contingit autem ex parte substantiae materiae,
aut substantiae formae, aut substantiae coniuncti. Quod contingit igitur intra ex parte
materiae quantitas est (materia enim omnino numerabilis est), ex parte formae qualitas,
ex parte coniuncti relatiohaec enim sunt quae intrinsece substantiae adveniunt. Quod
autem contingit extra ex parte materiae ubi, ex parte formae quando, ex parte coniuncti
habitus. Quod autem contingit medio modo ex parte materiae passio, ex parte formae
actio, ex parte coniuncti positio. His igitur modis se habet quod contingit. Quod subsis-
tit est substantia. Substantia autem, quia est per se ens et principium aliorum, est dis-
positio ceterorum ad causalitatem; et ideo remanet indivisa. Sic igitur in universo sunt
decem praedicamenta: substantia, quantitas etc. Et patet sufficientia dividentium ex prae-
dicta divisione.
tions, to be things in the full sense, and all the other categories to be real
aspects (habitudines) of those things.6
As far as the relation between being (ens) and the ten categories is con-
cerned, Kilwardby argues that, from a metaphysical point of view, being is
not a meta-genus in relation to the categories, since it does not manifest
their essence, nor is it predicated univocally of them. Being is analogous
in relation to them. It is a sort of basic metaphysical constituent of every-
thing which is, since it is shared by the items belonging to the ten catego-
ries according to different degrees (secundum prius et posterius). This fact
differentiates analogy from univocity, as univocal things share a certain
nature or essence all in the same manner and to the same degree. From a
logical point of view, by contrast, being is equivocal in relation to the ten
categories, since logicians do not consider it as common to the categories
because of their differences in participating in it.7
Fundamental to Kilwardbys doctrine of the categories seems to be a
form of isomorphism among language, thought and the world. Like many
other medieval authors of his times, he appears to be convinced that our
thought is directly modelled on reality itself, so that it is able to reproduce
reality in its elements, levels and relations; and by means of its connection
to thought, ensured by the act of signifying, which turns utterances into
words, our (spoken and written) language is firmly linked to reality, in
spite of the conventional nature of its signs.
Among the many kinds of entia that Kilwardby admits, perhaps the
most important one is that consisting of universal essences. The topic
of universals is among the most disputed in medieval philosophical lit-
erature. Textually, any medieval discussion on the problem of universals
derives from the well-known passage in the Isagoge (1:1316), where Por-
phyry raises his famous series of questions about the ontological status of
universals and their relation to individuals: (1) whether genera and species
exist in themselves or are nothing but mere concepts; (2) whether, if they
6See Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum 33 (ed. A. G. Judy (London: The British
Academy; Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1976), pp. 11822).
7Robert Kilwardby, Notulae super librum Porphyrii 5 (M, f. 5rb; P, f. 36vb): Ad haec
ergo dicendum primo quod ens est aequivocum quantum ad logicum, multipliciter dictum
quantum ad primum philosophum. Logicus enim non videt istam unam naturam partici-
patam ab omnibus, secundum tamen prius et posterius, quam videt primus philosophus.
Et hoc est eo quod non habet substantialem pertractationem de huiusmodi sicut primus
philosophus. Unde ponit ens aequivocum; non sic autem metaphysicus, sed multipliciter
dictum, scilicet secundum prius et posterius, quia per prius de substantia, per posterius de
aliis. Unde ponit huiusmodi esse medium inter univocum et aequivocum.
have an extramental form of existence, they are corporeal or incorporeal;

and (3) whether they exist apart from perceptible objects or in and by vir-
tue of them. From a purely philosophical point of view, however, all scho-
lastic theories of universals respond to an implicit semantic question: is
there something in the world which corresponds to the common nouns of
our language in the same way as individuals correspond to proper names?
The answer of realists was affirmative, negative that of nominalistseven
though, within each group, authors disagreed about the peculiar modes of
being of universals and the nature of their relation to individuals.
Kilwardby was a moderate realist, and the semantic origins of his view
on universals are quite evident. In the second lectio of his commentary
on the Isagoge, he states that (1) there are universals in the extramen-
tal world (dicimus quod universalia sunt) as well as in the mind; (2) they
are not corporeal (corporea), even though some of them (such as man or
animal) are apt to be related to bodies (corporalia); and (3) they exist in
singulars. According to him, universals (or common natures or essences)
are the real significata of general nouns, such as man and animal. He
conceived of universals as metaphysical entities, somehow existing inde-
pendently of our minds, which are necessary conditions for our language
to be significant. Common nouns would be meaningless if they did not
signify something existing in the world and having the peculiar feature of
being somehow present in many individual items. In Kilwardbys view, a
general noun gives a name to a certain set of individual items only by way
of the essence that it directly signifies and which is common to a certain
group of singulars as their own nature.8
With regard to the question whether there are universals in the world
or not, the main argument that Kilwardby produces for proving their real
existence is that there are universals because knowledge is of universals,
and if universals were not real (in re), our knowledge of the world would
be empty.9 To the counterargument that whatever is is singular or in
8Kilwardby, Super librum Praedicamentorum 6 (M, f. 15va; P, f. 46ra): Substantiae

secundae non recipiunt intentionem substantiae nisi quia declarant quidditates et essen-
tias primarum; Super librum Praedicamentorum 7 (M, f. 17ra; P, f. 47rb): Posset enim ali-
quis credere ex his secundam substantiam significare tale quale quale significat accidens.
Hoc ergo removet distinguendo hoc ipsum quale qualiter conveniet secundis substantiis
et qualiter accidentibus, innuendo genera et species significare quale substantiale et qua-
litates quae sunt formae substantiae (quae sunt quidditates et essentiae primarum), tamen
differenter, per hoc quod genus est forma communior, species vero specialior. Et hoc est
quod dicit: Plus autem in genere etc.
9Kilwardby, Super librum Porphyrii 2 (M, f. 2va; P, f. 34rb).
singulars, and whatever is in singulars is itself singular, he replies that

universals are not present in singulars as inhering forms ( formae impres
sionis), but as purely related forms (per relationem tantum), since those
forms which are universal are connected to the matter of the singulars to
which they are ascribed as their filling-up principles.10 To a second argu-
ment, that whatever exists (omne quod est) is individual (unum numero),
Kilwardby, utilizing Boethian terminology, answers that this rule does not
apply to universals, as they are not that which is (id quod est) but rather
that by which something is (quo est). For this reason, according to him,
no universal in re is numerically one in each of its singulars or numeri-
cally one in all its individuals. Instead, he thinks of a universal as a pure
form having a modal unity based on an agreement in essence between all
individuals of the same type.11 This agreement in essence can be consid-
ered either according to its concreteness (the existence the universal has
in many individual things at once) or according to its abstract being (as a
construct of our mind). Taken in the first way, the universal form, despite
its essential unity, has an existence that differs according to the different
matter of the numerically distinct individuals, like the many images of one
thing in the fragments of a splintered mirror.12 Taken in the second way,
the form most properly has the status of a universal, that is, something
common, which is shared as a whole by a multiplicity of singular items.
Hence, Kilwardby in a sense recognizes that common essences have a
threefold manner of existence (in the mind of God, in singular items, and
in our minds), but he does not seem to take into consideration Avicennas
10Kilwardby, Super librum Porphyrii 2 (M, f. 2va; P, f. 34va): Ad haec igitur dicimus
quod universalia sunt. Et ad primum contra obiectum dicendum quod omne ens in sin-
gulari tamquam forma impressionis est singulare; et dico formam impressionis quae reci-
pit distensionem secundum distensionem materiae. Universale autem non est per hunc
modum in singulari, sed est per relationem tantum, quia forma cui accidit universalitas
{universale mss.} est relata ad multas materias quas nata est replere, sicut vir unus multas
potest replere mulieres.
11Kilwardby, Super librum Porphyrii 2 (M, f. 2va; P, f. 34va): Ad aliud dicendum quod
minor est falsa, si recte sumatur. Suberit enim haec assumptio: universale est id quod
estet haec est falsa; est enim quo est et quidditas et essentia et forma individui. Nec est
unum numero in quolibet singulari, ut posuerunt Adamitae, sed est unum per modum
secundum quem forma per se considerata dicitur una, scilicet per convenientiam vel per
simplicitatem suae essentiae.
12Kilwardby, Super librum Porphyrii 5 (M, f. 5rb; P, f. 37ra): Et exemplariter potest videri
qualiter ipsa species numeratur in ipsis individuis: sicut enim videtur obiectum in speculo
integro unam facere formam vel similitudinem, si autem frangatur speculum multiplicatur
illa forma in alias formas per multiplicationem fractionis, sic et de ipsa specie videmus
quod, cum sit una forma et essentia completa in se, numeratur tamen in materialibus sive
in particularibus.
suggestion about the indifference to universality and particularity proper

to the common nature or essence. He thinks that universals in re are
material forms which need the matter proper to singulars in order to exist,
while universals in intellectu are abstract forms which depend completely
on our mind for their being. He denies that universals exist in our minds
only, since the essences of singular substances are substances, and if they
existed in our minds only, they would be accidents of our minds, and so
some substances would be accidents relative to something elsea con-
clusion which is clearly unacceptable.13
His position on the question of the relationship between universals and
individuals would demand a soft attitude towards the problem of defining
and classifying the types of identity and distinction. As is evident, within
his system, universals in re have to be seen at the same time as partially
identical-to and partially different-from their own singulars. Kilwardby is
not aware of this consequence entailed by his approach and therefore fails
to develop a suitable theory on this topic. In dealing with the relationship
between species and proprium, however, he implicitly revises the com-
mon notions of identity and distinction, since he describes species and
13Kilwardby, Super librum Porphyrii 2 (M, f. 2vb; P, f. 34va): Universale in substantiis

est substantia; in genere accidentis accidens. Et est universale ens per se, non tamen ter-
minatum locis et superficiebus propriis, ut singulare, et etiam est ens in aliquo, sed non
ut ens in aliquo erat ratio accidentis. Intelligendum etiam quod universale consideratum
secundum sui naturam et sui essentiam est substantia et quidditas individui, ut ostenditur
in VII Philosophiae Primae; consideratum quidem secundum esse et modum qui sequitur
ipsum ex esse suo in intellectu, sic non est substantia, ut similiter ostenditur in septimo.
Et sunt hi duo modi considerationis oppositi: forma enim, hoc quod est in sua natura
vel essentia, materialis est, et ex actu materiae consistit, ut dicit Aristoteles et Averroes
quod quidditates rerum non sunt sine individuis. Forma vero in modo abstractionis esse
et actum sumit ab intellectu; hic autem modus est formae non ut est in materia. Dubitatur
quarto: supposito quod universalia sint, quaeritur utrum sint res an non sint res, sed solum
in intellectu, ut posuit Plato....Ad haec igitur notandum quod universale duplex habet
esse, esse in anima et esse in rebus extra. Universalia igitur sunt res (sunt enim quiddita-
tes et essentiae rerum, ut patet in VII Metaphysicae), nec sunt universalia ideae solum in
mente divina, ut posuit Plato, quamvis sint causae formales et exemplaria universalium.
Nec probant prius positae rationes quod universalia sint solum in intellectu, sed quod
sint in intellectu. Et hoc verum est secundum esse quod habent in anima, scilicet secun-
dum quod habent esse per abstractionem a singularibus, et sunt in modo abstractionis, et
sumunt esse et actum ab intellectu. Et quod non habeant esse solum in anima accipitur
ex hoc quod, si universale, id quod esset, esset in anima; universale autem, id quod est, est
substantia; in aliquibus accideret substantiam secundum veritatem esse in anima; et cum
non posset esse in ipsa sicut potentia aut habitus, ut patet per rationes potentiae et habi-
tus in II Ethicorum, accideret quod esset in ipsa sicut passio et accidens; et ita accideret
quod substantia secundum veritatem esset accidens respectu alicuiusquod est impossi-
bile. See also Albert the Great, Super Porphyrium De quinque universalibus tract. 1, cap. 3
and cap. 5 (ed. M. Santos Noya (Mnster: Aschendorff, 2004), pp. 2425 and 3132).
proprium as two items which share the same reality and differ because of
their essences,14 but this was not specifically intended to offer an answer
to the problem of the relationship between universals and individuals.
Neither does he consider the question of the origin of universals, nor does
he expand on their relation to language, although (1) he distinguishes a
logical consideration of universals, treating them in their connection with
language as communes rationes or intentiones of what exists, from a meta-
physical consideration, abstracting from language and treating them in
their relation to being itself; and (2) he finds the unity of this study in the
intentional rather than in the real order.15
Albert considers the theories of categories and universals as parts of the

discipline of logic, whose general goal is to teach how to get to what is
unknown by means of and through what is known.16 Since, in Alberts view,
what is known is either something incomplex (that is, what is signified by
simple terms or expressions such as Sortes or homo) or complex (what
is signified by sentences, such as Sortes est homo), the different parts of
logic are to deal with these two different kinds of objects (the incomplex
and the complex) of our knowledge, making use of different conceptual
tools.17 In particular, the doctrines of praedicabilia and praedicamenta are
about what is incomplex, and utilize definition and description as concep-
tual tools. The theory of praedicabilia deals with that which is incomplex
considered insofar as it is able to play the role of predicate in a sentence.
It therefore distinguishes five kinds of universals (or praedicabilia), namely,
genus, species, difference, proprium and accident, on the basis of the five
different ways in which a predicate can be connected with the subject. The
theory of the categories studies incomplex things from the point of view of
the mutual relations of similarity and difference between their natures and
modes of being.18 Moving from these premisses, Albert concludes that the
object of the Categories is the incomplex being qua divisible into genera.
14Kilwardby, Super librum Porphyrii 9 (M, f. 8rb; P, f. 39va).

15Kilwardby, Super librum Porphyrii, Prooemium (M, f. 1rbva; P, f. 33rbva).
16Albert the Great, De praedicamentis tract. 1, cap. 1 (p. 149).
17Albert the Great, Super Porphyrium tract. 1, cap. 5 (p. 32).
18Albert the Great, De praedicamentis tract. 1, cap. 1 (pp. 14951).
Its main parts are substance and accident, the latter of which is subdivided
into nine genera: quantity, quality, relatives, etc.19
Yet, according to Albert, no knowledge is possible for men without lan-
guage. So, he thinks that in the description of the object of the categorial
doctrine it is necessary to add a reference to language itself. As a conse-
quence, he further qualifies the object of the Aristotelian tract as dicibile,
since what is incomplex and divisible into genera is also the object of the
significative power of linguistic expressions (per dispositum sermonem ad
significandum).20 In this way, like Kilwardby, Albert saves the semantic
aspects proper to the doctrine of the categories, but, unlike him, he con-
siders them as secondary in relation to the ontological aspects and entail-
ments of the theorya reading which fits his realist interpretation of the
Aristotelian treatise better.
Consistently with this choice, when he comments on the fourth chapter
of the Categories, Albert supports the two following theses: (1) the catego-
rial table divides the incomplex beings considered insofar as they are able
to play the role of predicates (praedicabilia) or subjects in a predication.
(2) The problem of the number and distinction of the ten categories (the
problem of the sufficientia praedicamentorum) can be solved by deduc-
ing them from the incomplex being according to differences in the modi
praedicandi.21
The second thesis is connected with the question of the relationship
between being and categories. According to the standard interpretation of
the opening passages of the Categories (1.1a112) equivocal terms are cor-
related with more than one concept and refer to a multiplicity of things
with different natures, whereas univocal terms are correlated with only
one concept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing one and the same
nature. Being (ens) is a paradigmatic case of an equivocal term and
animal (animal) of a univocal one. Commenting on the first chapter of
the book, Albert states that being (ens) is somehow (ad unum) equivo-
cal with respect to the categories, as it is shared by the ten categories
in ten different ways: directly by substance, secondarily by accidents. By
19Albert the Great, De praedicamentis tract. 1, cap. 1 (p. 150): Et ex his planum est
quid sit huius libri subiectum: est enim subiectum ordinabile in ratione praedicabilis vel
subiicibilis, secundum quod stat sub voce talem ordinem signante....Partes autem huius
subiecti sunt ordinabilia secundum diversum modum praedicandi in substantia, et in acci-
dente, et in accidentibus secundum omnia novem genera accidentium.
20Albert the Great, De praedicamentis tract. 1, cap. 1 (p. 150). See also Albert the Great,
Super Porphyrium tract. ult., cap. 3 (p. 147).
c ontrast, the summum genus of each category is predicated univocally of

the entities which fall under it; and substance is in a certain way com-
mon to the accidents derivatively, since they derive their own being from
it, as the substance is the substrate of existence of the accidents.22 Even
though Albert affirms that his own method of deducing the ten Aristote-
lian categories is based on their modes of being predicated (nos, quantum
possumus, studebimus ex propriis horum generum modis praedicandi osten
dere huius numeri rationem), in point of fact, he does not utilize modes of
being predicated in drawing the ten categories from being. On the con-
trary, he constantly employs modes of being and speaks of ens per se, ens
in alio, ad aliud se habere, absolute inesse secundum materiam and secun
dum potentiam formae, etc. He admits two fundamental modes of being:
(1) being by itself, proper only to substance; and (2) being in something
else, proper to the nine genera of accidents. The latter is subdivided into
(a) being in something else absolutely (inesse absolute), which is proper
to quantities (which inhere in something else, namely, substance, in vir-
tue of the matter) and qualities (which inhere in something else, namely,
substance, in virtue of the form); and (b) being in something else in virtue
of a relation to a third res (esse ad aliud), which is proper to relatives (ad
aliquid) and the remaining six categories.23
As is evident, according to this view, categorial items are of two main
kinds, namely, substance and accident, and are distributed among four dif-
ferent levels of being, each feebler than the preceding one: (1) substance,
(2) quantity and quality, (3) relation, and (4) the remaining six categories.
By contrast, according to Kilwardbys account, the only important differ-
ence of level in reality is that between substance and accident. In Alberts
opinion, substance seems to be not only the occasion of the existence of
any other kind of being, since everything comes to be by being in a sub-
stance, but also the true being itself of the accidents, since he claims that
what is by itself is substance, which is the primary genus of everything

23Albert the Great, De praedicamentis tract. 1, cap. 7 (pp. 16465): Est autem per se, ut
per se ens praedicabile est substantia, et est genus omnium primum, et aliorum omnium
quoddam principium. Ens autem non per se praedicabile vel subiicibile, est accidens
de necessitate: et hoc est ens in alio ut in subiecto, quod in duo secundum Aristotelem
dividi habet. Accidens quidem aut est accidens secundum inesse, aut secundum aliquem
modum ad aliud se habere. Si autem est accidens sive aliquod cadens secundum abso-
lute inesse, tunc inest aut secundum materiam...aut inest absolute secundum potentiam
formae...Si primo modo inest, sic est quantitas. Si autem secundo modo inest, tunc est
qualitas, quae dispositio est substantiae ad operationes aliquas et ad actus.
which is and a sort of first principle of everything else (per se ens praedica
bile est substantia, et est genus omnium primum, et aliorum omnium quod
dam principium).24 On the contrary, Kilwardbys method of finding the
ten categories and his solution to the problem of the relationship between
substance and accidents imply an anti-reductionist approach to the mat-
ter, since all the accidents are very different from each other and deeply
rooted in substance with regard to their being.
According to Albert, a universal is anything which is apt by nature to be
present in many things at once and to be predicated of them.25 Hence, it is
a general (that is, common to many items) form, since only forms can be
predicated of what they are in.26 Such forms are the essences, or formae
totius, of the singular items, that is, those forms which are predicated of
that in which they are and express in its completeness the being of that
in which they are. These forms are distinct from the formae partis, which
are those forms that, united with matter, bring about individual compos-
ites, as for example the souls of men, which in union with bodies give
rise to human beings.27 The forma totius, or universal, can be designated
in two different ways: either just in itself, simply as a form, or insofar as
it makes known the total being of that of which it is the form (ut forma
totius totum esse dicens cuius est forma). The former is signified by means
of an abstract noun, such as humanitas, and is not predicated of the indi-
vidual composite, because it is not identical with it.28 The latter is signi-
fied by a concrete noun, such as homo, and is predicated of the individual
composite, since it is identical with it and is that by means of which the
individual composite is what it is, a man, a cat and so on.29
Following Avicenna,30 Albert maintains that the universal form, even
if one and the same essence, has a fourfold mode of being: (1) in the light
of the divine intellect; (2) by itself, before being instantiated in the con-
crete things; (3) (instantiated) in the singular items; and (4) in the human
intellect. As it is present in the divine mind, which is its efficient cause,
the universal is something absolutely simple, pure, immaterial, incorpo-
24Albert the Great, De praedicamentis tract. 1, cap. 7 (p. 164).

27Albert the Great, Super Porphyrium tract. 1, cap. 8 (p. 38). See also Albert the Great,
Metaphysica 7, tract. 1, cap. 1, and 8, tract. 1, cap. 3 (ed. B. Geyer (Mnster: Aschendorff,
1964), pp. 31617 and 391).
28Albert the Great, Super Porphyrium tract. 1, cap. 1 (pp. 1718).
30Avicenna, Logica 3 (in Opera philosophica (Venice, 1508; repr. Louvain: Edition de la
bibliothque S.J., 1961), f. 12va).
real and incorruptible, but able to act on the possible intellect of men.
Considered by itself, the universal is a simple, incorporeal, and immutable
nature, flowing from the light of the divine intellect. Considered as it is
instantiated in the singulars, the universal is something embodied (incor
poratum), individuated and multiplied in the singular items, so that it is
identical with them. Finally, as it is present in the human intellect, which
abstracts it from the individualising properties connected with matter and
quantity, the forma totius is properly universal, since our mind gives the
form the universality in actu that it has got only potentially.31 This pro
perty of being common to many things, or universality, derives from the
second way of existing proper to the form and not from the third one, as
it is closely connected with the degree of simplicity of the form. In any
case, in each of these four different states, the form has a complete being.
Albert disagrees with those authors who thought that the universal by
itself has an incomplete form of being, and reaches a complete one only
when instantiated by individuals.32
The being proper to common natures is identical with the being of
their singulars considered only as primary substances of a certain nature
or type.33 This entails that the being of the common nature considered by
itself and the being which is proper to it when it is considered as instanti-
ated by its singulars are partially identical and partially different. In fact,
common natures considered qua universal and individuals considered qua
individuals are different from each other because of their opposite consti-
tutive principles and modes of being, since common natures are undeter-
mined and individuals perfectly determined in themselves.34 According to
this interpretive scheme, the relationship between common natures and
singulars is ultimately grounded on individuation, since no instantiation
is possible without individuation, since common natures and singulars are
distinct on the level of form, but linked together on the level of being and
full existence by individuation.
As Albert thinks that common natures viewed as simple and unde-
termined forms have a mode of being of their own, independent of the
existence of the individuals that instantiate them, he does not totally
accept the principle that everything depends on primary substances with
respect to existence and being, stated by Aristotle in the fifth chapter of
the Categories (2a352b6) and admitted without any restrictive clause by

ilwardby.35 Albert maintains that if all the individuals belonging to a cer-

K
tain natural species were annihilated, their corresponding nature would
still remain, even though only potentially, as a mere metaphysical possi-
bility (esse indeterminatum et in potentia) in the light of the divine mind,
which is the very source and cause of any nature or essence.36
If the foregoing analyses are correct, then Robert Kilwardbys and Albert
the Greats worlds are quite different. As in Boethiuss system, so in Kil-
wardbys metaphysical system matter appears to be the main principle of
the existence of anything, since in the sublunar world no form can pass
from a state of potential being (proper to what is common) to a state of
actual being (proper to what is singular) without matter, which causes
the process of individuation, through which (sub-lunar) realities are pro-
duced. On the contrary, Alberts world is a medieval Neoplatonic-Aristote-
lian world, which shares many features proper to the world described by
the realists of the later Middle Ages, such as Wyclif and Paul of Venice.37
More in particular, as far as the problems of the subject matter of the
Aristotelian treatise and the relationship between being and the ten cate-
gories are concerned, although Albert follows Kilwardby on many specific
points (for example, Alberts expressions ens dicibile and ens ordinabile
are already present in Kilwardbys commentary on the Categories), they
disagree on the general evaluation of the tract. Like Boethius, the English
master claims that the Categories deals with voces as they are significant,
while Albert thinks that the subject matter of the book is a peculiar kind
of being: the ens dicibile ordinabile in genera. Consequently, he empha-
sizes the ontological aspects of the theory of equivocation, univocation,
and analogy; on the contrary, they are almost ignored by Kilwardby, who
is much more interested in the semantic aspects of the theory. What is
more, unlike Kilwardby, Albert considers the fourfold division into indi-
vidual substance, universal substance, individual accident, and universal
accident introduced by Aristotle in the second chapter of the Categories
as important as that into the ten categories found in the fourth chapter.
35Kilwardby, Super librum Praedicamentorum 6 (M, f. 14vb; P, f. 45va).

36Albert the Great, Super Porphyrium tract. 1, cap. 5 (p. 33); tract. 1, cap. 6 (p. 35); De
praedicamentis tract. 2, cap. 4 (pp. 17274).
37See A. D. Conti, Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages, in Newton,
Medieval Commentaries, pp. 369409.
As a result, he seems to conceive of the partition into categories as subor-

dinate to a more general division of the ens ordinabile into substance and
accident, as we have already seen.
As far as the doctrine of universals is concerned, the differences between
Kilwardby and Albert are even more evident. Alberts position is just the
opposite of Kilwardbys. Following Aristotle and Boethius, the English
master had stressed that primary substances are the necessary condition
of existence for all other items in the world, universal substances included.
Nothing could exist if primary substances stopped existing, given that,
from the point of view of being and full existence, accidents and second-
ary substances always presuppose primary substances. Albert thinks that
universals have a mode of being of their own, so that we can say that a
certain common nature is (something real) although its individuals are
not. Moreover, the division into four different modes of being proper to
the universal forms admitted by Albert is absent as such in Kilwardby,
even though in different places of his commentary on the Ars Vetus he
speaks of ideas in the mind of God, universal (or common) forms, and
universal (or general) concepts present in our minds. Finally, Kilwardbys
explanation of the nature of real universals and their relationship to sin-
gulars is dissimilar to that of Albert. According to the English master, who
follows Boethius closely on this subject, the universal is not that which is
(id quod est) but that by which something is (quo est) and is multiplied in
its individuals so that there is not the same common essence in each of
them. Alberts theory anticipates all the main topics of the late fourteenth-
century realist view on universals: (1) the distinction between forma partis
and forma totius; (2) the standard account of the relationship between uni-
versals and singulars, which are partially the same and partially distinct,
as they are the same identical things if conceived as first intentions and
differ from each other if conceived as second intentionsa thesis that
one century later Wyclif was to develop and improve by defining more
accurately the logical structure of this partial identity and difference;38
(3) the primacy of common natures or essences over any other kind of
being, as they are directly connected with the ideas in the mind of God,
by means of which He created the world.
38According to Wyclif, universals and individuals are really the same and formally
distinct, since they share the same empirical reality, which is that of individuals, and
considered as universals and individuals have opposite basic principles, namely, the
natural-tendency-to-be-common (communicabilitas) for universals and the impossibility
of being common (incommunicabilitas) for individuals.
10.Culuerbinus somnians
Paul Thom
The thirty-third chapter of the Prior Analytics discusses two arguments

having a singular term as minor and that same term qualified by an
adjective as middle. The translation is not uncontroversial. According to
Robin Smith, the terms are in one case always is, thinkable Aristomenes,
Aristomenes, and in the other will perish tomorrow, musical Miccalus
and Miccalus.1 Boethius has semper est, intelligibilis Aristomenes,
Aristomenes, and corrumpetur cras, musicus Miccalus, Miccalus.2 Fol-
lowing Smiths translations, the syllogisms under discussion are:
Thinkable Aristomenes always is; but Aristomenes is thinkable Aristomenes;
so Aristomenes always is.
Musical Miccalus will perish tomorrow; but Miccalus is musical Miccalus; so
Miccalus will perish tomorrow.
Aristotle remarks that these are not genuine syllogisms: the major premise
needs to be taken as a universal,3 but people sometimes behave as if there
is no difference between saying A belongs to B and A belongs to all B.4
Presumably, the point of this remark is that if the major premise in these
arguments were to be preceded by a sign of universality then we would
have genuine syllogisms.
Gisela Striker observes that Aristotles examples in this chapter seem
to have produced more confusion than clarity.5 In this paper I outline
some of Robert Kilwardbys comments on the passage, and the ways those
comments were received by three later scholars.
1R. Smith, Aristotle: Prior Analytics; Translated with introduction, notes and commentary
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), pp. 16263.
2Aristotle, Analytica priora: Translatio Boethii (recensiones duae), Translatio anonyma,
Pseudo-Philoponi aliorumque scholia, Specimina translationum recentiorum, ed. L. Minio-
Paluello, AL 3.14 (Bruges: Descle de Brouwer, 1962), pp. 74:2275:12.
3Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.33.47b2728, 3536.
4Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.33.47b3637.
5G. Striker, Aristotle: Prior Analytics Book I; Translated with an introduction and com-
mentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), p. 216.
172 paul thom
Kilwardby
In commenting on this chapter, Robert Kilwardby starts by considering

the traditional rule that a dividing name such as every cannot be added
to a discrete term. This seems like a promising starting-point, because if
we can assume that Aristotle accepts this rule then we can make sense of
his attitude to the troublesome arguments. His position will be that, if the
arguments are formulated with an indefinite major premise then they are
invalid, but if the major premise is formulated as a universal (as required
for a syllogism) then something else is wrong with them: the major prem-
ise is ill-formed.
Kilwardby begins by rehearsing some reasons in favour of the rule
about dividing names and discrete terms. It is in the nature of a dividing
name as defined by Priscian that it is a duobus uel pluribus.6 And it is
in the nature of a discrete name that it is not divided by subjective parts.
Moreover, a dividing name can only be added to a term under which
it is possible to take a plurality of separate things; and this is not pos-
sible with a discrete term. So a discrete term cannot be preceded by a
dividing name.7
Robert goes on to consider and successively reject three proposals for
watering the rule down so as to allow for some exceptions. Each of these
proposals formulates a way in which thinkable Aristomenes and musical
Miccalus might be understood as general terms; and he introduces each
with a Sed dicet.
According to the first of these restrictions, even though a dividing name
cannot be attached to a discrete term standing alone, it can be attached to
a discrete term that is preceded by an adjective under which it is possible
to take a plurality of separate things. And this is what Aristotle has in mind
when he talks about thinkable Aristomenes and musical Miccalus.8 Kil-
wardby does not say what, according to this proposal, is meant by these
6Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 2.31 (ed. M. Hertz, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1855
59; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961), vol. 1, p. 61:2324): Diuiduum est, quod a duobus uel
amplioribus ad singulos habet relationem uel plures in numeros pares distributos.
7Robert Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum, MS Florence BNC Conv. Soppr. J.10.48, f. 50ra:
Videtur enim quod non sit possibile tam per naturam nominis diuidui quod a duobus uel
pluribus etc. quam per naturam nominis discreti quod non diuiditur per partes subiec-
tiuas. Adhuc nomen diuiduum solum potest addi termino in quo est accipere unum extra
alterum; hoc autem non potest in termino discreto.
8Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum, f. 50ra: Sed dicet quod termino discreto absolute addi
non potest sed per aliquid sibi adiunctum sub quo est accipere unum extra alterum, ut
cum dicitur Omnis Micalus musicus et Omnis Aristomenes intelligibilis.
culuerbinus somnians 173
phrases; whatever they might mean, he rejects the proposal on the gram-
matical ground that an adjective by itself cannot be the subject of a verb
and cannot effect a distribution. It can perform these functions only via a
substantive to which it is adjoined. Only when it is understood as adjoined
to a substantive can an adjective function as a general term. But if the sub-
stantive to which it is adjoined is a singular term then neither it nor the
substantive has that capacity; and so the aggregate of the adjective and a
discrete term cannot possess the capacity.9 This argumentation implies
that, whatever expressions like thinkable Aristomenes and musical Mic-
calus mean, they cannot be general terms.
The second of the restrictions considered by Kilwardby proposes that,
even if an adjective cannot by itself effect a distribution over separate
individuals, it still possesses some sort of generality; and so a dividing
word can be attached to a discrete term preceded by an adjective when
the adjective is construed in such a way that it retains its generality, and
a distribution is then effected because of the adjectives generality rather
than because of the discrete term to which it is attached.10 He rejects
this second restriction on both grammatical and metaphysical grounds.
Grammatically, he says that no adjective of itself can be the subject of
a verb, nor can any adjective by itself effect a distribution. Thinkable
Aristomenes and musical Miccalus are not general terms, even though
thinkable and musical have some sort of generality. Metaphysically, he
argues that whiteness in Socrates is not divided in him, and so just as
Socrates cannot be distributed neither can the whiteness in Socrates, and
therefore we cannot say Every white Socrates, because the suppositum of
Socrates, and of white, is a unique individual.11
9Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum, f. 50ra: Sed contra, nomen adiectiuum neque uerbo
supponit neque distributioni subiacet per se sed mediante substantia substantiui adiuncta;
sed substantia substantiui singularis non subiacet distributioni; quare nec adiectiuum per
ipsum. Quare aggregatum ex nomine discreto et termino adiectiuo non potest subiacere
distributioni, cum neutrum habeat naturam qua distribuatur.
10Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum, f. 50ra: Sed dicet quod ipsum adiectiuum commune
est aliquot modo, et fit circa ipsum constructio per nomen discretum non tamen tanta
constructio quam adhuc distribui possit per contentis. Et ita non subiacet distribucioni
per nomen discreto sed magis ex sua communitate.
11Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum, f. 50ra: Sed contra, non habet de se ut supponat
uerbo neque quod subiaceat distributioni. Adhuc albedo in Sorte non diuiduatur in ipso,
quare nec sicut Sortes distribui potest sic nec albedo in Sorte. Et ita non erit conuenienter
dictum Omnis Sortes albus quia unicum et indiuiduum est suppositum tam Sortis
quam albi.
174 paul thom
A third proposal takes up this metaphysical point, and suggests that

there are two sorts of accidents. Some, like whiteness, are not suscepti-
ble of multiplication in the same individual, but others, like thinkability
or music, are susceptible of such multiplication. So, while we cannot say
Every white Socrates we can say Every thinkable Aristomenes, where
this means Every thinkability in Aristomenes. The idea seems to be that
some, but only some, genera of accidents are such that there cannot be
two specifically different species of that genus present in the same indi-
vidual substance.12 According to this idea we can say Every thinkability in
Aristomenes is alwaysbut our statement is then false. Kilwardby rejects
this proposal, saying that if thinkability is distributed in a single individual
as proposed, then in a first figure syllogism whose major premise distrib-
utes a predicate over all thinkabilities, the minor term will fall within that
distribution; that is, in the present case the minor term will stand for some
particular thinkability or thinkabilities. But this is obviously not so in the
minor premise as stated, which is about Aristomenes, not about thinkabil-
ities. Further he argues, independently of whether Aristomenes is taken
with a universal sign, thinkable is an improper differentia of Aristomenes
in respect of always existing. Because of this, the inference will be invalid
and there will be no syllogism.13 In the end, Kilwardbys position is thus
that the traditional rule is correct, and a dividing name cannot be added
to a discrete term, even if that term is preceded by an adjective.
12Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum, f. 50rab: Sed dicet quod quedam accidentia ita indi-
uiduo insunt quod non suscipiunt in eodem multiplicationem secundum speciem sicut
album inest Sorti, et propter additionem talis accidentis siue adiectiui non potest {om.
ms.} addi signum uniuersale termino discreto; quedam autem ita insunt {sunt ms.} quod
in eodem sunt multiplicabilia secundum speciem ut intelligibile in Sorte est in eodem
multiplicabile secundum speciem. Similiter musica in Sorte est multiplicabilis secundum
speciem. Et gratia talium adiectiuorum potest termino discreto addi signum uniuersale.
Unde sic dicto omnis intelligibilis Aristomenes semper est, id est Omnis intelligibilitas
in eo semper est. Hoc autem falsum est.
13Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum, f. 50rb: Sed contra, in omni dispositio huius debet
minor extremitas sumi sub medio distributo; et iam dictum est quod distribuitur intel-
ligibilitas et musica in hoc indiuiduo. Quare minor sub eo debet accipi si fiat sillogismus.
Hoc autem manifeste falsum est. Neque enim Aristomenes cadit in distributione intel-
ligibilis neque Micalus in distributione musici. Quare non contingit dicere maiorem esse
falsum cum signum distributionis et sillogismum bonum. Adhuc intelligibile est differentia
impropria Aristomeni respectu eius quod est semper esse, siue sumatur cum signo uniu-
ersali siue sine. Similiter musicum est differentia impropria Micalo in respectu eius quod
est corrumpi cras, siue sumatur cum signo siue sine. Quare siue addatur signum uniuersale
maiore siue non, peccabit consequentia, et non erit sillogismus. Quod est concedendum.
Having dismissed these attempts to construe thinkable Aristomenes

as a general term, Kilwardby closes his discussion by glossing Aristotles
summary remarks about the Aristomenes example.
Now, Aristotle states that the major premise has to be taken as a uni-
versal, and that it is false that every thinkable Aristomenes always is, since
Aristomenes is perishable.14 But Kilwardbys discussion may have left the
impression (1) that thinkable Aristomenes is a singular term. Aristotles
statement that the major premise has to be taken as a universal may leave
the impression (2) that this term needs to be prefixed by a sign of univer-
sality. Together, these impressions imply that Aristotle is willing to add
a sign of universality to a singular term. Since Kilwardbys local aim is
to defend the rule prohibiting the adding of a sign of universality to a
singular term, and his global aim is to defend the truth of Aristotles state-
ments, he has to defuse one or other of the above impressions. He needs
to show that Aristotles text is consistent with acceptance of the rule pro-
hibiting the prefixing of a sign of universality to a discrete term. He does
not actually show this. But it can be shown that Aristotle is not commit-
ted by what he says in this chapter to allowing a sign of universality to be
prefixed to a discrete term, because even if (1) Aristomenes and think-
able Aristomenes are singular terms, it does not follow that (2) Aristotle
thought these terms could be prefixed by a sign of universality.
Kilwardby glosses Aristotles statement that the major must be a uni-
versal as meaning, not that the major proposition has to be taken univer-
sally in these terms, but that in the first figure the major premise has to be
a universal. Thus, if there is to be a syllogism then the premise about think-
able Aristomenes being imperishable has to be a universal. And he glosses
Aristotles second statement, not as meaning that a universal proposition
in these terms is false, but that it is false that a universal proposition can be
made with these terms.15 According to Aristotle the reason for this falsity

, . ,
, .
15Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum, f. 50rb: Unde cum dicit Sed oportet uniuersaliter
AB sumi propositionem, non intendit per hoc propositionem debere accipi uniuersalem
in talibus terminis, sed maiorem in tali dispositione debere accipi uniuersalem quia est
dispositio prime figure. Per hoc autem quod dicit Hoc autem falsum quod proponebat
omnem Aristomenem intelligibilem etc., non intendit quod propositio uniuersaliter in
talibus terminis sit falsum, sed quod falsum sit ipsam posse accipi uniuersalem in talibus
terminis; et hoc innuit per hoc quod sequitur, scilicet cum Aristomenes sit corruptibilis.
Per hoc enim signat Aristomenem indiuiduum esse et sensibilis cui non licet addere sig-
num uniuersale.
176 paul thom
is that Aristomenes is perishable; Kilwardby interprets this as saying that

because Aristomenes is a sensible individual, it is false that a universal
statement can be made about him. This attributes to Aristotle the belief
that no singular is imperishable. It also attributes to him a belief that it
cannot be congruently said that every thinkable Aristomenes is imperish-
able, and more generally an acceptance of the grammatical rule that a
sign of universality cannot be attached to a singular term. Robert accepts
this grammatical rule and he wants to read Aristotle as endorsing it too.
This, however, does not show that nothing Aristotle says in this chapter
implies that a sign of universality can be put before a singular terma
point to which I shall return.
Albert
Thanks to a celebrated article by Sten Ebbesen, we know that on syllogis-

tic questions Albert the Great generally follows Kilwardby at uncomfort-
ably close quarters.16 In his discussion of chapter 33, however, he does not
mention most of what Kilwardby says. He ignores most of the three-stage
dialectic in which Kilwardby considers and rejects successive refinements
of the idea that a sign of universality may in certain conditions be attached
to a discrete term. Indeed he appears to dismiss large parts of Kilwardbys
account as being unworthy of his consideration when he says:
But some people, in their dreaming, have invented many things at this point,
which we do not bother with.17
The reference must surely be to his usual model, Kilwardby, against whom
he has (for the moment) turned.
Albert does, however, agree with Kilwardbys overall conclusion:
For it is certain that if a name is singular, it belongs to one single thing which
has no parts, over which parts it can be distributed. And if an adjective is
added to the subject, it does not thereby receive any generality, but instead
the adjective receives the discreteness of singularity from the substantive
16S. Ebbesen, Albert (the Great?)s companion to the Organon, in A. Zimmermann

(ed.), Albert der Grosse: seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981),
pp. 89103 (repr. in S. Ebbesen, Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Aldershot/Farnham: Ashgate,
20089), vol. 2, pp. 95108).
17Albert the Great, Liber I Priorum Analyticorum tract. 7, cap. 3 (ed. A. Borgnet (Paris:
Vivs, 1890), p. 657a): Quidam autem somniando hic multa finxerunt, de quibus non
curamus.
standing under it: and so, with an adjective in its nature as adjective, it can-
not be distributed.18
But he is confused about Kilwardbys glosses on Aristotles summary state-
ments. He writes:
But if there is to be a syllogism, the proposition AB has to be taken as a uni-
versal through a universal distributive signwhich cannot be done with a
discrete singular term. On account of which, the proposition, declaring that
every thinkable Aristomenes always is, is false, that is, incongruous, because
it says that that which cannot be distributed (since Aristomenes is perish-
able, that is, singular and sensible) is distributed by a universal sign.19
Kilwardby presupposes a sharp distinction between what is false and what
is incongruously expressed. On his view, a sentence in which a sign of uni-
versality is attached to a discrete term, or to a discrete term qualified by
an adjective, is incongruous. There is no proposition to be false. Albert,
however, thinks that the sentences incongruity is the same as its express-
ing a false proposition. Moreover, he thinks the falsehood arises because
the sentence says, of something that cannot be distributed by a sign of
universality, that it is so distributed. Kilwardby makes no such claim; and
rightly so, because to do so would be to confuse what a sentence says with
what must be the case in order for the sentence to be congruous.
In place of Kilwardbys dreams, Albert proposes two other ideas, which
he says are a little different (aliquantulum) from each other. First he
endorses an interpretation according to which thinkable Aristomenes
means the discrete thing that is understood in the name Aristomenes.20
Second he endorses an interpretation, purportedly Al-Farabis, according
18Albert, Liber I Priorum Analyticorum, p. 657b: Certum est enim quod si nomen singu-
lare sit et uni soli conveniat, et partem non habeat, quod distribui pro partibus non potest:
et si addatur adjectivum subjecti, non ex illo recipit communitatem, sed potius adjectivum
ex singulari sibi substante recipit singularitatis discretionem: et ideo cum adjectivo ratione
adjectivi distribui non potest.
19Albert, Liber I Priorum Analyticorum, p. 657a: Sed si debeat syllogismus, oportet pro-
positionem AB majorem sumere universaliter per signum universale distributivum, quod
in termino discrete singulari fieri non potest: propter quod hoc falsum est, hoc est, incon-
grue propositum, quod proponebat omnem intelligibilem Aristomenem semper esse; quia
dicit illud distribui per signum universale quod distribui non potest, cum Aristomenes sit
corruptibilis, hoc est, sensibilis et singularis.
20Albert, Liber I Priorum Analyticorum, pp. 656b657a: Sit enim in quo est A major
extremitas semper esse (hoc est, incorruptibile esse sicut universale est incorruptibile) in
quo autem B medium sit intelligibilis Aristomenes, hoc est, hoc discretum quod nomine
Aristomenis intelligitur; in quo vero C minor extremitas sit Aristomenes simpliciter sub
nomine Aristomenis significatum.
178 paul thom
to which the thinkable Aristomenes is the intellective Aristomenes.21

Albert does not notice that on either of these interpretations thinkable
Aristomenes is a singular term, and so the Aristotelian sophism instanti-
ates the valid form:
x is yy is A
x is A
Accordingly, the argument is valid even if not syllogistic. Aristotles view,
however, is that the argument is invalid, since it has true premises and a
false conclusion.
This point is also relevant to an evaluation of Kilwardbys interpreta-
tion. Robert shows that Aristotles statement that the major must be uni-
versal can be maintained consistently with the rule that a singular term
cannot be governed by a sign of universality. However, if consistency is
to be maintained with all that Aristotle says in chapter 33, then if think-
able Aristomenes is a singular name, the argument is valid, contrary to
Aristotles statement. And, as we saw earlier, Kilwardby excludes the pos-
sibility that thinkable Aristomenes is a general term. So, he is committed
to holding that thinkable Aristomenes is a singular name, if it is a name
at all. Since, as we have seen, Aristotles text appears to rule out treating
thinkable Aristomenes as a singular name, Kilwardby is committed to
saying that it is not a name at all. He does not see this consequence; but
some modern commentators have adopted this interpretation. For exam-
ple, Ross understands the major premise to mean An Aristomenes can
always be thought of, and he points out that on this analysis the proposi-
tion does not contain any term thinkable Aristomenes.22
Peterhouse 206
Sten Ebbesen notes that MS Cambridge Peterhouse 206, ff. 98133v

contains an anonymous Prior Analytics commentary. He dates this com-
21Albert, Liber I Priorum Analyticorum, p. 657ab: Attendendum est hic quod qui-
dam et satis bene in eodem sensu hoc aliquantulum aliter exponunt, quantum ad hoc
quod dicunt, quod intelligibilis Aristomenes, ut dicunt, est intellectivus sive sapiens Aris-
tomenes, et multa intelligens: et caetera non mutantur ab expositione praedicta: et haec
est expositio Alfarabii et vera. (I have not found this interpretation in Al-Farabi.)
22W. D. Ross, Aristotles Prior and Posterior Analytics: A revised text with introduction
and commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 401. This interpretation is also men-
tioned by Smith, Aristotle: Prior Analytics, p. 163. See also A. Bck, Philoponus on the fal-
lacy of accident, Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987), 13146.
mentary to the 1250s or 1260s.23 This commentary, whose incipit is Logica

dupliciter, is interesting for its numerous citations of Kilwardby on the
Prior Analytics.
The author quotes or paraphrases the whole of Kilwardbys Aristomenes
question. He finds Kilwardbys approach to the problem of Aristomenes
unsatisfactory because it conflicts with Aristotles acceptance of the state-
ment that thinkable Aristomenes always exists. For, if we assume that
thinkable Aristomenes is a singular, this statement implies that existing
forever is compatible with being a singular,24 whereas, as we saw ear-
lier, on Kilwardbys interpretation Aristotle believes that no singular is
imperishable.
Having dismissed Kilwardbys approach, our author spends some time
discussing what he says is a subtler theory. According to this theory, if
Sortes is, let us say, white, a grammarian, and thinkable, we can distin-
guish his being white from his being a grammarian and his being think
able. We can quantify over this plurality of beings (esse) in Sortes by saying
something of the form Every Sortes; and thus there is a sense, though an
improper one (aliquo modo quamuis improprie) in which a sign of univer-
sality can be added to a discrete term.25 This theory is found in William of
Sherwoods discussion of whether a sign of universality can be added to a
discrete term, in his Syncategoremata.26 In that discussion, Sherwood says
23S. Ebbesen, The Prior Analytics in the Latin West: 12th13th centuries, Vivarium 48
(2010), 103. Ebbesen, The Prior Analytics, 1034, 114, 122, 132 notes some other thirteenth-
century manuscripts that cover the question whether a sign of universality can be added to
a discrete term; these include an anonymous commentary dating from the 1270s (Pseudo-
Boethius of Dacia, q. 92 on book 1), the commentary by Radulphus Brito dating from the
1290s (q. 57 on book 1), and an anonymous commentary from the 1290s on book 1 (q. 92).
It would be interesting to see how, if at all, the thoughts in these commentaries are con-
nected with Kilwardby.
24Anon., Super libros Priorum Analyticorum, f. 125ra: Sed quod hec expositio nulla sit
uidetur quia simul stant esse singulare et esse semper. Aristomenes enim intelligibilis est
singulare et tamen secundum Aristoteles hec est uera Aristomenes intelligibilis semper
est.
25Anon., Super libros Priorum Analyticorum, f. 125ra: Alii autem dicunt subtilius quod
in quolibet indiuiduo possit reperiri plura esse, v.g. esse album, esse grammaticum, esse
intelligibile. Et ita ratione horum esse aliquo modo quamuis improprie potest termino
discreto siue indiuiduo addi signum uniuersale.
26William of Sherwood, Syncategoremata, ed. J. R. ODonnell, Mediaeval Studies 3
(1941), 49: Ad aliud dicendum quod improprie aliquo modo potest hoc signum omnis
addi termino singulari; singulare enim, licet sit unum secundum rem, est tamen multa
secundum rationem, et gratia hujus multitudinis apponitur hoc signum. Et est sensus:
omnis Aristomenes semper intelligibilis est pro Aristomenes secundum omne esse suum.
R. Kirchhoff, Die Syncategoremata des Wilhelm von Sherwood: Kommentierung und histo
rische Einordnung (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 24647 says Nicholas of Paris and Henry of
Ghent argue that a universal sign cannot be added to a discrete term, Robert Bacon says
180 paul thom
that an individual which is unum secundum rem can be multa secundum

rationem, giving the examples of being white, a grammarian and a musi-
cian; because of this multiplicity of esse in the individual we can (though
improperly) add a sign of universality to a discrete name. In this improper
sense, the sense of a statement Every x is A is x according to all its
esse is A.
Our author makes it clear that being white is a subjective, not an inte-
gral part of Sortess essea point which Sherwood had not made.27 He
elaborates on Sherwood in other ways too. He rejects a suggestion that the
being-thinkable in Aristomenes is indivisible, proposing instead that there
are several thinkabilities in Aristomenes, according to some of which
Aristomenes is perishable and according to others of which Aristomenes
is not perishable. Thus Every thinkable Aristomenes always is, in this
improper sense, is false because according to some of the thinkabilities in
Aristomenes he is perishable.28
But, our commentator continues, this reply seems to conflict with
Metaphysics 5.6 where Aristotle says that Coriscus is the same as musical
Coriscus. By way of deflecting this appeal to Aristotle, the author points
out that there can be multiple esse in a singular suppositum; and the Sher-
wood-type view he is defending does not claim that there is a plurality of
supposita (Aristomenes and thinkable Aristomenes) but that in thinkable
Aristomenes there is a plurality of esse, in virtue of only some of which
thinkable Aristomenes is perishable.29
a common name can be understood in a proper name, and Peter of Spain says a universal
can be added to a discrete term.
27Anon., Super libros Priorum Analyticorum, f. 125ra: Cum enim dicitur Omnis Sortes
est, hoc est Sortes secundum omne sui esse est. Et ita esse album in Sortem est pars
subiectiua respectu esse in ipso.
28Anon., Super libros Priorum Analyticorum, f. 125rab: Sed queritur utrum hac
ratione possit concedi hinc esse uniuersalem, scilicet Omnis Aristomenes intelligibilis
semper etc. Et uidetur quod non, quia hoc totum Aristomenes intelligibilis est subiec-
tum, quod patet per minorem propositionem. Et ita contrahitur hic Aristomenes ad
aliquod sui esse singulare. Huic possit dicere quod in Aristomene sunt plura esse intelli-
gibilia, eo quod secundum aliquod sui esse intelligibile est corruptibile, et secundum ali-
quod non. Unde cum dicitur Omnis Aristomenes intelligibilis etc. hec est Aristomenes
secundum omne sui esse intelligibile semper est, quod falsum est. Huius falsitas cau-
sam subiungit Aristoteles cum dicit Cum sit corruptibile, supple quantum ad aliquod
sui esse.
29Anon., Super libros Priorum Analyticorum, f. 125rb: Quod autem dicitur in quinto
Philosophie Prime in alia translatione, scilicet quod Sortes non est in multis, idem enim
est Sortes et Sortes musicus...Et ita ratione istorum esse aliquo modo quamuis improprie
potest attribui ei signum uniuersale. Apposito ergo signo ad maiorem, falsa erit propositio,
Sense might be made of all this in an ontology that includes both con-
crete and abstract individuals, where each abstract individual is an esse
which may be related to concrete individuals by being present in them.
Allowing then for quantification over these abstract individuals, we can
relativize any statement that F inheres in x (where x is a concrete indi-
vidual) to some esse in x. The statement then becomes F is in x by virtue
of the esse E in it. This statement can be further analysed as E is in x, and
whatever E is in, F must be in. As a limiting case we have the proposition
x is F, which means For any esse E in x: whatever E is in, F must be in. If
this is the idea then the argument with indefinite major runs:
Some essence E in thinkable Aristomenes is such that whatever E is in
must be imperishable; but Aristomenes is thinkable Aristomenes; there-
fore any essence E in Aristomenes is such that whatever E is in must be
imperishable.
With a universal major it runs:
Any essence E in thinkable Aristomenes is such that whatever E is in must be
imperishable; Aristomenes is thinkable Aristomenes; therefore any essence
E in Aristomenes is such that whatever E is in must be imperishable.
The Peterhouse author thinks that the first major is true and the second
false. He also judges the first argument to be invalid, and the second valid.
The second argument is indeed valid given the extra premise that any
esse in Aristomenes is in thinkable Aristomenes. Thus the interpretation
agrees with what Aristotle says; it has provided us with an improper sense
in which all those statements are true. However, in doing so it has taken
thinkable Aristomenes as a singular term, and if we then ask about Aris-
totles statements read in their proper sense, we find that one of them is
false, namely, the statement that the first argument is invalid. For, as we
saw in discussing Albert, if both premises are singular propositions and
the major is given its ordinary sense, then the argument is valid.
Nifo
Thanks to a reference in the work of Jennifer Ashworth, we know that

Agostino Nifo in his 1553 commentary on the Prior Analytics refers to
non quia termino discreto nullo modo possit addi signum, sed quia Aristomenes secun-
dum sui esse est corruptibilis.
182 paul thom
Kilwardby under the name Culuerbinus.30 There is more than one such
reference in Nifos commentary, and one of them relates to our present
topic. Here Nifo makes it clear that the reference is to the 1499 edition
of Kilwardbys Notule on the Prior Analytics when he refers to Robertus
Culuerbinus whose commentaries have recently been edited under the
inscription Egidius Romanus.31
Nifo mentions the suggestion that the problem is actually about intellec-
tive Aristomenes, that is, Aristomeness soul. He rejects this interpretation,
saying that it would make the universal proposition Every intellective
Aristomenes always is true, not (as Aristotle says) false.32 He then goes
on immediately to say that Albert says many things that do not please
himthus making it plain that he knows the interpretation he has just
rejected is Alberts.33 He also notes that Aristotles word is dianoetus and
that it must be translated intelligibile not intellectiuus.34
He goes on to consider an interpretation according to which we are
to speak in the manner of Plato (secundum Platonis locutionem). On this
view, Aristomenes is a common term which signifies two thingsthe
intellective Aristomenes (Aristomeness soul) and the human animal.
Thus, the indefinite proposition Intellectiuus Aristomenes semper est is
true because Aristomeness soul is immortal; but the corresponding uni-
versal proposition is false because the human animal is not immortal. The
indefinite proposition Aristomenes est intellectiuus Aristomenes is also
true because one of the things that is Aristomenes (namely, Aristomeness
soul) is the intellective Aristomenes. He rejects this interpretation for two
reasons. It makes the major premise true if stated universally (because
everything that is the intellective Aristomenes is immortal); and the rea-
son for thinking the minor premise to be true (namely, that Aristomenes
30E. J. Ashworth, Developments in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, in D. M.

Gabbay and J. Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 2, Medieval and Renais-
sance Logic (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008), p. 615, n. 31.
31Agostino Nifo, Super libros Priorum Aristotelis (Venice: apud Iunctas, 1553), f. 89rb
va: Robertus Culverbinus, cuius commentaria nuper edita sunt sub Egidii Romani titulo.
32Nifo, Super libros Priorum, f. 89rab: Dixerunt intellectiuum Aristomenes semper
esse secundum intellectiuam partem, nam licet Aristomenes non semper sit, secundum
tamen eam partem, quod est intellectus, immortalis est. Sed haec solutio ambigui quic-
quam habet, nam eadem ratione illa vniuersalis vera erit, omnis intellectiuus Aristomenes
est immortalis, et semper est. Quoniam omnis Aristomenes secundum partem intellec-
tiuam semper est. Hanc autem Aristoteles falsam esse ait.
33Nifo, Super libros Priorum, f. 89b: Albertus multa dicit, quae mihi non placent.
34Nifo, Super libros Priorum, f. 89b: Dianoetus enim hic ab Aristotele pro intelligibili
accipitur, non intellectiuo. Sed pro eo, quod intelligi potest.
stands there for the intellective Aristomenes, rather than for the human
animal) is also a reason for thinking the conclusion to be true. In these
two ways the interpretation conflicts with what Aristotle says, namely,
that the major is false when stated universally, and that the conclusion is
false even though the minor premise is true.
He next considers a third interpretation, said to be found in the exposi-
tions of the ancients, according to which Aristomenes dianoetos means
the rational being that is Aristomenes. The previous interpretation had
assumed that every could be added to the singular term intellective
Aristomenes; but on the present interpretation every is added to the
denominative name rational being (rationale).
Nifo reports Kilwardbys overall conclusion;35 and one of his comments
also seems to refer to Kilwardbys second proposed restriction.36 He
accepts Kilwardbys view that Aristotles statement that the major should
be taken universally must be understood hypotheticallyas meaning that
the major must be taken universally if there is to be a syllogism. And he
draws Kilwardbys inference that Aristotle cannot be charged with violat-
ing the common regula sorticolarum forbidding the addition of a universal
sign to a discrete name. However, his understanding of this rule differs
from Kilwardbys: whereas Kilwardby understood the rule to exclude cer-
tain utterances as incongruent, Nifo attributes to Aristotle the view that
the rule excludes certain utterances as false. The view he attributes to
Aristotle is that Every thinkable Aristomenes is imperishable is a well-
formed sentence but one that expresses a falsehood.37
35Nifo, Super libros Priorum, f. 89va: Vtrum vero terminus singularis possit vniuersal-
iter distribui, Culuerbinus bene dicit. Ait enim ipsum nec per se, nec cum adiectiuo posse
distribui, per se quidem non, cum sit discretus, cum adiectiuo minime, quoniam per adiec-
tiuum non tollitur discretio.
36Nifo, Super libros Priorum, f. 89va: Potest tamen terminus discretus distribui per
adiectiuum, quoties adiectiuum sumeretur per modum nominis substantiui, hoc pacto,
omne album quod est Socrates est visibile, omne musicum quod est Miccalus potest
interire.
37Nifo, Super libros Priorum, f. 89rb: Propterea saluo meliori iudicio, dicerem illam esse
veram Intelligibilis Aristomenes semper est. Dianoetus enim hic ab Aristotele pro intel-
ligibili accipitur, non pro intellectiuo. Sed pro eo, quod intelligi potest. Modo intelligibilis
Aristomenes semper est, non enim aliquando intelligibilis Aristomenes est, et aliquando
non est, sed intelligibilis Aristomenes semper est, similiter et secunda, quae fuit Aristo-
menes est intelligibilis Aristomenes etiam vera est, veluti Socrates est Socrates albus,
et Plato est Plato philosophus....Propterea addit Aristoteles, sed oportet AB maiorem
vniuersaliter sumere, supple si syllogistica debet esse coniugatio illa. At si sic vniuersaliter
sumatur AB maior falsa est, cum putet atque significet omnem intelligibilem Aristomenem
semper esse, et haec vniuersalis falsa sit omnis intelligibilis Aristomenes semper est, patet
quia Aristomenes, est intelligibilis Aristomenes, qui non semper est, cum sit corruptibilis.
184 paul thom
Nifo, like Albert, wants to subscribe to a version of Kilwardbys interpre-

tation. But whereas Albert thought that the offending universal premise
could be categorised as false because incongruous, Nifo had the good
sense to settle for simple falsity.
Ex his apparet Aristoteles non affirmasse distributionem posse addi termino discreto vel
singulari, cum non loquatur categorice, sed hypothetice, dicit enim si nulla coniugatio
syllogistica esse debet, oportet AB propositionem vniuersalem esse, et si vniuersalis est,
falsa est. Ecce quomodo hypothetice loquitur. Quare ex his non habetur aliquid contra
communes sorticolarum regulas.
11.The Anonymus Aurelianensis III and Robert Kilwardby
on the Prior Analytics
Christina Thomsen Thrnqvist
The Anonymus Aurelianensis III
There can be no doubt that Sten Ebbesens discovery of a large fragment

of a Latin commentary on Aristotles Prior Analytics in MS Orlans Bibli-
othque Municipale 283 (twelfth century)1 is one of the most important
findings for the study of the reception of Aristotelian syllogistic theory.
Not only is the Orlans commentary, together with the series of Floren-
tine scholia on the Prior Analytics identified by Lorenzo Minio-Paluello
in the early 1960s,2 the only evidence we have that the Analytics were
studied by the westerners between late antiquity and the time of Abelard,
it is also the earliest known Latin commentary on the Prior Analytics. The
Orlans commentary has been dated to 11601180 by Ebbesen.3
The Anonymus Aurelianensis III (so named tentatively by Ebbesen)
is a literal commentary on Prior Analytics 24a1046a34. The text runs to
ca. 53,000 words on 26 folia. The last sentence is cut off at the break of
f. 203, and, while the text is left incomplete, it may not be a coincidence
that the break occurs so close to the division between the second and
third main section of the first book of the Prior Analytics, that is, between
1For codicological descriptions of the manuscript, see C. Cuissard, Catalogue gnral

des manuscrits des bibliothques publiques de France, vol. 12, Orlans (Paris: Plon, 1889),
pp. 138ff.; S. Ebbesen, Anonymus Aurelianensis II, Aristotle, Alexander, Porphyry and
Boethius: Ancient scholasticism and 12th century western Europe, CIMAGL 16 (1976), 12;
S. Ebbesen, Analyzing syllogisms or Anonymus Aurelianensis IIIthe (presumably) ear-
liest extant Latin commentary on the Prior Analytics, and its Greek model, CIMAGL 37
(1981), 4 (repr. in Ebbesen, Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Aldershot/Farnham: Ashgate, 20089),
vol. 1, p. 173); E. Pellegrin and J.-P. Bouhot, Catalogue des manuscrits mdivaux de la bib-
liothque municipale dOrlans (Paris: CNRS E ditions, 2010), pp. 36972. Cuissard was cor-
rected on a number of points by Ebbesen, whose corrections are confirmed by Pellegrin
and Bouhot.
2Aristotle, Analytica priora: Translatio Boethii (recensiones duae), Translatio anonyma,
Paluello, AL 3.14 (Bruges: Descle de Brouwer, 1962), pp. 295372.
3Ebbesen, Analyzing syllogisms, 7.
186 christina thomsen thrnqvist
the account of the discovery of arguments in chapters 2731 and the reso-
lution of arguments in chapters 32ff.
In addition to some minor works on medicine and a fragment of Augus-
tines De fide et operibus, the manuscript contains several other anony-
mous works on logic, e.g., a literal commentary on the Sophistici elenchi
and a certain De paralogismis edited by Ebbesen under the titles Anony-
mus Aurelianensis primus4 and secundus5 respectively. In a series of
studies,6 Ebbesen has demonstrated (1) a close affinity between the three
anonymi and an anonymous commentary on the Sophistici elenchi in MS
Cambridge St. Johns D.12;7 (2) similarities between the Florentine scholia
and Anonymus Aurelianensis III (henceforth: Anon. III), suggesting that
both works drew on a common source tentatively named Commentum
Graecum by Ebbesen: a Latin translation of a Greek commentary on the
Prior Analytics by a contemporary of Philoponus or possibly a Byzantine
compilation of material dating from the same period; (3) a clear depend-
ence of Anon. I and Anon. II on James of Venices translations of commen-
taries on the Sophistici elenchi and the Posterior Analytics, which taken
together with (1) suggests that the Commentum Graecum may also have
been translated by James.
Ebbesens preliminary analysis of the work rested on some sample
passages.8 A later comparison9 of the whole text to the commentaries
on the Prior Analytics by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius Hermiae,
Philoponus, and the Florentine scholia has corroborated Ebbesens pre-
liminary analysis on several points and provides additional evidence
of the anonymous commentary being dependent on the ancient tradi-
tion, that is, ample further evidence of a connection between Anon. III
and the Florentine scholia and many additional parallels between Anon.III,
the scholia, and Philoponus, but also instances where Anon.III deviates
from Philoponus but agrees with Alexander, as well as several instances
4S. Ebbesen, Anonymi Aurelianensis I Commentarium in Sophisticos elenchos,

CIMAGL 34 (1979), ivxlviii + 1200.
5Ebbesen, Anonymus Aurelianensis II, 1584.
6Ebbesen, Anonymus Aurelianensis II, 113; Ebbesen, Anonymi Aurelianensis I,
vxlvii; Ebbesen, Analyzing Syllogisms, 120.
7The Anonymus Aurelianensis I and II have both been dated to the second half of the
twelfth century by Ebbesen; see Anonymi Aurelianensis I, xxviiif.; Anonymus Aurelianen-
sis II, 2. For the date of the Anonymus Cantabrigiensis, see S. Ebbesen, Context-sensitive
Argumentation: Dirty tricks in the Sophistical Refutations and a perceptive medieval inter-
pretation of the text, Vivarium 49 (2011), 79.
8Ebbesen, Analyzing Syllogisms, 411.
9C. Thomsen Thrnqvist, The Anonymus Aurelianensis III and the Reception of Aris-
totles Prior Analytics in the Latin West, CIMAGL 79 (2010), 2541.
anonymus aurelianensis iii and robert kilwardby 187
where Anon. III is not paralleled in the scholia but in the ancient com-
mentators.
Thus, we may now on the basis of a full analysis conclude that the
Orlans commentary preserves a considerable quantity of ancient material.
However, one of several important questions that still remain is whether
it can be established that the Orlans commentary, and thus indirectly the
translation of the Greek commentary used by both the Florentine scholia
and Anon. III according to Ebbesens hypothesis, exerted any influence on
the reception of the Prior Analytics in the medieval West. If such an influ-
ence can be demonstrated, a subsequent task would be to quantify and
define it. The question is also still highly relevant for our understanding
of the Florentine scholia, and for future studies on the formation of the
Latin tradition on Aristotles syllogistic theory it will be necessary to care-
fully investigate the influence of both works. To quote Ebbesen: The pos-
sibility remains that the Greek commentary was only known to a limited
circle and left few marks on the later Latin tradition. Thirteenth-century
commentaries should be carefully studied to see whether this possibility
can be discarded.10
One thirteenth-century work highly relevant for a first comparative
analysis of Anon. III and the later Latin tradition is Robert Kilwardbys
commentary from ca. 1240, which until the discovery of Anon. III was
considered to be the earliest extant Latin commentary on the Prior Ana-
lytics. A systematic comparative analysis of both works will have to wait
until critical editions of both works appear,11 but important research on
Kilwardbys commentary has lately been carried out by Paul Thom12 and
enables some preliminary observations.
The Definition of the Syllogism
In his monograph Logic and Ontology in the Syllogistic of Robert Kilwardby,

Thom concludes13 that Kilwardbys exposition of Aristotles definition of
10Ebbesen, Analyzing Syllogisms, 7.

11Critical editions of both works are currently being prepared: Kilwardbys commen-
tary is being edited by Paul Thom, whereas I am preparing an edition of Anon. III. All pas-
sages from Kilwardby here included are quoted from Paul Thoms forthcoming edition of
Kilwardbys Notule libri Priorum, which is to appear in the British Academy series Auctores
Britannici Medii Aevi published by Oxford University Press.
12P. Thom, Logic and Ontology in the Syllogistic of Robert Kilwardby (Leiden: Brill,
2007).
13Thom, Logic and Ontology, p. 48.
the syllogism in Prior Analytics 24b182014 deviates on some substantial

points from the explanation of the definition in Anon. III. One notable
difference mentioned by Thom is the interpretation in Anon. III of
, which is not paralleled in Kilwardby:
Per hoc autem, quod sequitur, aliud remouentur perridiculi syllogismi et
tres coniugationes inutiles, quibus scilicet infertur ex certo certum uel ex
incerto certum uel ex incerto incertum. Quae prorsus sunt inutiles; quarta
enim sola est utilis, qua scilicet infertur ex certo incertum.15
It may here be added that there is at least one agreement between
Boethius exposition in the De syllogismo categorico and Anon. III which is
not found in Kilwardbys treatment. Whereas in Kilwardby, the differentia
excludes useless premise pairs and induction,16 induction
in Boethius exposition in De syllogismo categorico is explicitly excluded
by the differentia .17 Compare the exposition in Anon. III:
Per hoc ergo, quod hic dictum est ex necessitate, remouentur inductiones,
quae, etsi quandoque habeant necessitatem, numquam tamen habent
necessitatem complexionis, quam Aristoteles hic significare intendit.18
In the exposition of , the Anon. III, unlike both Kilwardby and
Boethius, makes an explicit distinction between the necessitas rerum
of inductive reasoning as opposed to the necessitas complexionis of
the valid syllogism. This is one of the features that tie the Aurelianenses
closely together; the same distinction is found in both the Anon. I and the
Anon. II in the exposition of the same lemma.19

.
15Anonymus Aurelianensis III, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 30 (ad 24b19) (ed.
C. Thomsen Thrnqvist, forthcoming). As pointed out by Ebbesen, Analyzing syllogisms,
5, this interpretation is found also in Philoponus. See John Philoponus, In Aristotelis Ana-
lytica Priora commentaria, ed. M. Wallies, CAG 13.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1905), pp. 33:3434:6.
16Robert Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum 1.1, lect. 4:24ff. Note that Kilwardby discus-
ses three different readings of the Aristotelian definition; see Thom, Logic and Ontology,
pp. 4148.
17Boethius, De syllogismo categorico, ed. C. Thomsen Thrnqvist (Gothenburg: Univer-
sity of Gothenburg, 2008), p. 71:213. Cf. Philoponus, In Analytica Priora, p. 34:1030. In the
Dialectica, Abelard draws closely on Boethius exposition; see Abelard, Dialectica, ed. L. M.
de Rijk, 2nd ed. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1970), p. 232:24233:20.
18Anon. III 32 (ad 24b19). For further evidence that Boethius De syllogismo categorico
has been used by Anon. III, see Ebbesen, Analyzing syllogisms, 5, and Thomsen Thrn-
qvist, The Anonymus Aurelianensis III, 3739.
19See Ebbesen, Anonymi Aurelianensis I, 24, and Ebbesen, Anonymus Aurelianensis
II, 25f.
It comes as no surprise that Abelards exposition in the Dialectica is

close to Boethius since the De syllogismo categorico is Abelards primary
source for Aristotles syllogistic theory,20 but it may be noted that Abelard
unlike Boethius and Kilwardby, but like both Anon. I and Anon. III, and
also Alexander, Ammonius, and Philoponus, states that the differentia
excludes the hypothetical syllogisms:
Idcirco in definitione syllogismi post oratio adiungitur in qua positis. Prima
differentia est et pertinet ad materiam et remouentur per hoc hypothetici
syllogismi, in quibus non ponuntur aliqua absolute sed duo uel alterum
eorum sub condicione, ut ex eis inferatur. Remouentur etiam quaecumque
orationes sunt aliae ab enuntiatiuis, quoniam in eis nihil ponitur, cum nihil
affirment uel negent.21
The above remark that excludes all other kinds of sentences
than the predicative is closely paralleled in the ancient commentators,22
but not found in Boethius, Abelard or Kilwardby.
Hence, we must conclude that the exposition of the Aristotelian
denition of the syllogism in Anon. III not only differs on a number of
points from Kilwardby but that in these differences it is decidedly closer
to the ancient commentators.
The Order of the Terms
In addition to the exposition of Aristotles definition of the syllogism, the

different explanations of the order of the terms in the three figures offer
interesting points of comparison. In 1.6.28a1215, Aristotle states that in
the third figure, the middle term is the last in order:
20On Abelards exposition of the syllogism, see C. J. Martin, They had added not a
single tiny proposition: The reception of the Prior Analytics in the first half of the twelfth
century, Vivarium 48 (2010), 16263, nn. 1213.
21Anon. III 29 (ad 24b18f.) Cf. Abelard, Dialectica, p. 232:1821: In eo vero quod ex
concessis infert, argumentum habere monstratur atque a quibusdam ipoteticis proposi-
tionibus differt, que, cum formam sillogismi tenea[n]t earum complexio, non sunt tamen
antecedentes propositiones concesse; Ebbesen, Anonymi Aurelianensis I, 23f.; Alexan-
der, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium, ed. M. Wallies, CAG 2.1
(Berlin: Reimer, 1883), p. 17:510; Philoponus, In Analytica Priora, p. 33:610; Ammonius, In
Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium, ed. M. Wallies, CAG 4.6 (Berlin:
Reimer, 1899), p. 27:914.
22Alexander, In Analytica Priora, p. 17.4f.; Ammonius, In Analytica Priora, p. 26:3033;
Philoponus, In Analytica Priora, p. 33:26.
, ,
, .
, .23
As pointed out by Striker,24 the statement that the middle term is last in
order seems to refer to the standard formula used in, e.g., 1.6.28a18:
.25 The Anon. III gives the explanation
that since the predicate is always superior to the subject and the major
extreme is predicated twice, the minor once and the middle term never,
the middle term comes last in order:
Longius: Quod eo dicit, quoniam in hac figura ad probationem syllogismi
nusquam (aut paene nusquam) conuertitur maior extremitas; unde, cum
minor extremitas ad hoc saepius conuertatur, modo subiecta medio, modo
de ipso praedicata, dicitur propior medio et affinior, quam prima extremi-
tas. Postremum est medium. Cum enim praedicatum semper primo suma-
tur, ut praedicetur de medio uel de alterutro extremo, quod supponitur ei,
sumitur posterius eo. Quare, cum in hac figura posterior sit minor extremi-
tas quam prima, medium, quod etiam posteriori illi supponitur, iure postre-
mum dicitur.26
The explanation in Anon. III may be compared to the Florentine scholion
on 1.6.28a13:
Et hic longius natura est intelligendum. Nam qui semel subicitur propin-
quior est medio eo qui semper praedicatur.27
Kilwardby gives two explanations. The first is close to the one found in the
Anon. III and the Florentine scholia, whereas the second explains 1.6.28a13
by reference to the order of the terms in the pairs of premises subsequently
used for demonstrating the useless combinations in the third figure. The
latter explanation is explicitly rejected:
Et notandum quod medium dicitur hic ultimum positione et extra extremi-
tates quia habet condicionem ultimi in ordine predicamentali; tantum enim
subicitur. Maior autem extremitas dicitur esse remocior a medio quia habet
condicionem eius quod primum est in predicamento; tantum enim predi-
catur. Minor autem extremitas dicitur esse propinquior medio quia habet
condicionem medii predicamentalis; subicitur enim et predicatur. Aliter
23Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.6.28a1215.

24See G. Striker, Aristotle: Prior Analytics Book I; Translated with an introduction and
commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), p. 104.
25Cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotles Prior and Posterior Analytics, pp. 301f.
26Anon. III 105 (ad 28a13f).
27Ps.-Philoponus et al., Scholia, p. 297.17f. (see n. 2 above).
autem solet intelligi, scilicet de terminis inferius positis in hoc capitulo apud
inutiles coniugationes; ibi enim semper ordinatur primo maior extremitas,
secundo minor, tercio medium. Sed talis ordinacio accidit huic figure, et
ideo prima expositio melior.28
Kilwardbys first explanation is paralleled in Philoponus exposition
of 1.6.28a13:
,
, ,
,
.

, .
.29
The Order of the Figures
Another interesting point of comparison is the discussion of the rationale for

the order of the figures. Aristotle comments on the order in 1.4.26b2833:
(
),

. .
Additional explanations are added at an early stage of the exegesis: The
explanation that the first figure is first because the other figures are gen-
erated from it is a commonplace with the ancient commentators; it is
transmitted by Boethius in De syllogismo categorico30 and also found in
Anon. III. To this is often added another explanation: it is only in the first
28Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum 1.6, lect. 12:3648.

29Philoponus, In Analytica Priora, p. 101:1118. The expositions of 1.6.28a1215 may be
compared to the explanations of 1.5.26b3639, where Aristotle comments on the order of
the terms in the second figure and states that the middle term is first in position. In this
case, however, the Anon. III in 87 (ad 26b3739) seems to be referring to the order of the
terms in the standard formula: Iuxta medium: Quod eo dicitur, quoniam primo attribuitur
ei tamquam propinque et tandem attribuitur alteri tamquam remote. Foras: Cum non sit
medium positione ut supra, positione uero est primum, eo quod dicitur, quoniam primo
sumitur, ut maiori extremitati attribuatur, et in positione etiam terminorum semper quod
primo ponitur, medium assignatur. Kilwardby, however, in Notule libri Priorum 1.5, lect.
11:22738, gives an explanation that corresponds to the exposition of 1.6.28a1215. As in the
case of 28a1215, Kilwardbys exposition has a close parallel in Philoponus (In Analytica
Priora, p. 87:38).
30Boethius, De syllogismo categorico, pp. 51:252:6.
figure that the middle term is the middle in every aspect, that is, not only
as the shared term, but also in position. This is found in both Alexander
and Philoponus, but not in Boethius.31 The Anon. III, however, has it:
Propter hoc iterum prima dicitur, quoniam, cum medium diuerso modo
positum diuersas figuras faciat, in hac sola proprie medium esse dicitur, cum
sit medio loco positum inter extrema; inter summum enim et minimum
medium est, quod suppositum uni superponitur alteri. Quo modo locatum est
medium in prima figura. In secunda uero uel tertia non ponitur medium
inter extrema, sed tamquam extra positum supponitur utrique aut super-
ponitur.32
Compare Kilwardbys explanations below: the first figure is first, because
it generates the other two figures. Aristotles explanation that only the
first figure renders conclusions of all four possible combinations of quali-
ties and quantities is used by Kilwardby to explain also the ordering of the
second and the third figure:
Prima enim quia perfectissima et potens in omnem conclusionem ante alias
ordinatur tamquam mater et perfectio aliarum. Secunda uero ante terciam,
tum quia eius medium est primum positione et medium tercie ultimum
positione, tum quia potest in duplex problema scilicet uniuersale et parti-
culare, tum tercia non possit nisi in particulare, tum quia ipsa descendit a
prima per conuersionem maioris, tercia uero per conuersionem minoris.33
This last explanation is not found in the Anon. III, but paralleled in another
early Latin work, the Dialectica Monacensis.34 Also, the Ars Burana35 gives
a somewhat different explanation that the second figure is prior to the
third, becauseunlike the third figurethe second is capable of drawing
31See Alexander, In Analytica Priora, p. 47:2021; Philoponus, In Analytica Priora,

p. 65:1217.
32Anon. III 67 (ad 25b32).
34Anon., Dialectica Monacensis, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum: A contribu-
tion to the history of early terminist logic, 2 vols. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 196267), vol. 2.2,
p. 499:1419: Post hec sciendum quod iste tres figure ordinate sunt secundum quod magis
vel minus possunt. Prima enim recte precedit quia potest concludere universalem, parti-
cularem, affirmativam, negativam. Secunda vero nullam affirmativam potest concludere;
tamen precedit tertiam, quia potest concludere tam universales quam particulares, cum
tertia concludit tantum particulares.
35Anon., Ars Burana, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. 2.2, p. 197:1922: Et
dicitur hec figura secunda, idest prior tertia, ratione dignitatis. Hec enim dignior illa esse
perpenditur, tum quia in ea sillogizatur universalis affirmativa, quod in illa non fit, tum
quia in ea medium praedicatur, quod in illa non fit.
a universal affirmative as conclusion and because the middle term is the

predicate of the premises in the second figure.
As to the interrelation of the second and third figure, Kilwardby above
refers to the fact that the second figure is generated by conversion of the
major premise, whereas the third is generated by conversion of the minor.
Alexander has a similar remark:
,
( , ), .36
This reason for the superiority of the second figure over the third is not
found in Boethius, but it is paralleled in Anon. III:
Harum uero secunda uocatur, quae de prima fit per conuersionem maioris
extremitatis tamquam dignioris, et tertia dicitur, quae fit per conuersionem
minoris tamquam indignioris.37
Some Further Observations
Having treated conversion of the modal propositions in chapter three,

Aristotle turns to the treatment of categorical syllogisms in the first figure
and states in 1.4.25b2627 that he will now say through what ( ),
when () and how () every syllogism comes about. The Anon. III38
interprets as refering to the terms, to the figures, and
to the modes, and so does not only the Florentine scholia,39 but also Alex-
ander40 and Kilwardby:
Primo dat intentionem cum continuatione dictorum ad dicenda et cum
modo procedendi, dicens quod cum hec determinata sint dicendum est
per que fit sillogismus, scilicet quantum ad terminos et propositiones, et
quando quantum ad figuras, et quomodo quantum ad modos.41
36Alexander, In Analytica Priora, p. 94:1517.

37Anon. III 67 (ad 25b32).
38Anon. III 66 (ad 25b26f.): Per quae, cum scilicet dicet, quod per terminos. Et quando,
cum scilicet sic disponuntur, ut terminus subiectus in prima praedicetur in secunda uel
idem praedicetur in utraque uel idem subiciatur. Et quomodo, scilicet propositionibus sub
aliquo modorum dispositis.
39Ps.-Philoponus et al., Scholia, p. 296:1822: Per quae, id est per tres terminos;
quando id est cum maiori extremitati subiacet medium et de minori praedicatur, vel
cum de utraque praedicatur, vel cum utrique subiacet; quomodo, id est vel universaliter
vel particulariter vel affirmative vel negative.
40Alexander, In Analytica Priora, pp. 41:3342:17. Philoponus (p. 71:1824), however,
takes to refer to the figures when expounding 1.4.25b26f.
Furthermore, in the exposition of Aristotles definition of term () in

1.1.24b1618, Anon. III explains 24b16 by an etymological reference:
Eadem enim dicuntur et elementa propositionum et termini, sed elementa
dicuntur, quoniam ab eis constitutio propositionum incipit, et termini, quia
resolutio propositionum in ipsis terminatur, quoniam non est logicorum
resoluere terminos in syllabas et litteras.42
The etymological explanation is found also in Boethius and Philoponus,
but not in Alexander.43 Compare Kilwardby:
Adhuc dubitatur cum similiter resolvatur sillogismus in propositionem sicut
propositio in terminum, quare magis terminus diffinitur per hoc quod in
ipsum resolvitur propositio quam propositio per hoc quod in ipsam resol-
vitur sillogismus? Et dicendum quod hoc est quia completa est resolutio ad
terminum, sed non est completa ad propositionem. Stat enim resolutio in
termino et non in propositione.44
As pointed out by Ebbesen, all three Anonymi Aurelianenses as well
as the Anonymus Cantabrigiensis thoroughly discuss the distinction
between the syllogisms form and matter.45 It may be noted that in a pas-
sage from the Anonymus Cantabrigiensis quoted by Ebbesen, the com-
mentator distinguishes between the materia principalis of the syllogism,
that is, the terms, and the syllogisms materia secundaria, the premises.46
Kilwardbys commentary distinguishes between the terms and the
premises in a similar but not identical way, that is, between the terms as
materia remota et indisposita, and the premise as materia propinqua et
disposita:
Et sic inuenimus in sillogismo ordinem esse in materiis et in formisin
materiis quia terminus est materia eius remota et indisposita, propositio
uero materia propinqua et disposita.47
It may here be noted that the Dialectica Monacensis has a similar
distinction,48 but also that it is not found in Anon. III. The distinction
42Anon. III 27 (ad 24b16).

43See Boethius, De syllogismo categorico, pp. 13:1914:2; Philoponus, In Analytica Priora,
p. 25:812.
47Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum 1.4, lect. 10:31720. See also Ebbesen, Analyzing syl-
logisms, 6, and Thom, Logic and Ontology, pp. 56ff.
48Anon., Dialectica Monacensis, p. 491:1016: Notandum ergo quod omne totum
constat ex materia et forma. Cum autem sillogismus sit quoddam totum, necesse est ipsum
used in the Anonymus Cantabrigiensis is not paralleled in Anon. III either,

but it is employed in the Ars Burana, although the order is reversed so that
materia principalis designates the premises and the materia secundaria
the terms:
Materia sillogismi duplex est, scilicet principalis et secundaria. Principalis
materia sunt propositiones ex quibus contexitur sillogismus. Et dicuntur
principalis materia quia, resoluto sillogismo, primo loco occurrunt. Secun-
daria materia sillogismi sunt termini ex quibus constant propositiones. Que
item secundaria materia ratione resolutionis dicuntur: resoluto enim sillo-
gismo secundo loco occurrunt.49
A systematic analysis of the account of the syllogisms matter and form
in Anon. III compared not only to the Anon. I and II and the Anonymus
Cantabrigiensis but also to Kilwardbys commentary and other thirteenth-
century works on the syllogism is called for. As an example, note the
conclusion in Anon. III that the syllogism is a composite entity and as a
composite entity it must have both matter and form:
Ad quod dico, quoniam consideratio cuiuscumque compositi in duobus
attenditur, in materia scilicet eius et forma. Forma autem syllogismi duplex
est, scilicet dispositio terminorum, quae figura uocatur, et dispositio pro-
positionum, quae dicitur modus, et utraque unica est ad omnia genera syl-
logismorum...Sicut autem forma syllogismorum est duplex, ita et materia
duplex, scilicet termini et propositiones.50
This is closely paralleled in the Florentine scholion on 1.1.24a26:
Quoniam omne compositum ex materia et forma; syllogismus autem com-
positus; ergo ex materia constat propositionibus, forma autem modificatione
in omnibus figuris. Ait ergo quoniam materia, id est propositionibus, distat
demonstrativus a dialectico; forma vero, id est modis et figuris, non distabit
syllogismus syllogismo secundum quamlibet materiam.51
constare ex materia et forma. Materia autem sillogismi duplex est, scilicet propinqua et
remota. Remota materia sunt tres termini: ex tribus enim terminis constat omnis sillogis-
mus et impossibile est quod ex pluribus vel paucioribus fiat. Propinqua vero materia tres
propositiones sunt.
49Anon., Ars Burana, pp. 195:31196:4.
50Anon. III 7.
51Ps.-Philoponus et al., Scholia, p. 295:1924.
Furthermore, the remark is paralleled not only in the Dialectica

Monacensis,52 but also in Kilwardby.53 The distinction is not found in
Boethius De syllogismo categorico, so it cannot be the source here.
Some of the most striking parallels between Anon. III and some other
early medieval works on the Prior Analytics are the summaries of the
principles governing which combinations of premises yield a valid con-
clusion in each figure. As convincingly shown by Thom,54 this systema-
tisation is found already in Alexander and in some Arabic sources such
as Al-Ghazali, but in a more fully developed form in Kilwardby. As an
example, see the passage below in which Kilwardby provides a systematic
account of the principles governing which premise-pairs yield a valid con-
clusion in the first figure and a demonstration of the outcome of the appli-
cation of these principles. At the end of the procedure, out of the sixteen
possible combinations of quality and quantity, four valid modes remain:
Quibus suppositis fiat talis combinacio: cum sillogismus fiat ex duabus pro-
positionibus aut utraque est uniuersalis aut utraque particularis aut maior
uniuersalis et minor particularis aut econuerso. Unumquodque autem
istorum quatuor subdiuiditur in quatuor per combinationes affirmationis
et negationis. Si enim utraque sit particularis, aut utraque est affirmatiua
aut utraque est negatiua aut prima affirmatiua et secunda negatiua aut eco-
nuerso; et omnes iste quatuor combinationes sunt inutiles quia ex particu-
laribus non sillogizatur. Si autem maior sit particularis et minor uniuersalis,
ibi sunt eedem quatuor combinationes, sed omnes inutiles quia maior in
prima figura debet esse uniuersalis. Si autem utraque sit uniuersalis et affir-
matiua, non est peccatum contra aliquod principium, et ideo utilis coniu-
gatio. Si autem utraque negatiua, uel maior affirmatiua et minor negatiua,
sunt due coniugationes inutiles, quia ex negatiuis non sillogizatur; in prima
etiam figura non sillogizatur ex minori negatiua. Si autem maior fuerit nega-
tiua et minor affirmatiua et ambe uniuersales, est utilis coniugatio quia non
peccat contra aliquod principium. Si autem propositio maior sit uniuersalis
et minor particularis, aut utraque est affirmatiua, et est utilis coniugatio, aut
maior negatiua et minor affirmatiua, et est adhuc utilis, aut utraque nega-
tiua aut tantum minor, et sunt due inutiles. Suppositis ergo dictis principiis
manifestum est quod due propositiones sillogistice, que sexdecim modis
se possunt habere, tantum quatuor utiles coniugationes facere possunt,
52Anon., Dialectica Monacensis, p. 491:1013: Notandum ergo quod omne totum con-
stat ex materia et forma. Cum autem sillogismus sit quoddam totum, necesse est ipsum
constare ex materia et forma.
53Kilwardby, Notule libri Priorum 2.2, lect. 52:21820: Sillogismo cum sit quoddam com-
positum debetur materia et forma, quarum si deficit in altera sillogismus non erit.
54Thom, Logic and Ontology, pp. 12227.
d uodecim autem faciunt inutiles. Et ita patet sufficientia sillogismorum

prime figure et quare tantum quatuor sunt.55
As Thom points out, both the Ars Burana and the Dialectica Monacensis
contain similar divisions;56 of these, the systematisation in the Dialectica
Monacensis is closest to Kilwardbys, but the two accounts differ in that
the Dialectica Monacensis, unlike Kilwardby, does not in each case tie the
exclusion of a certain useless premise-pair to a certain principle.57
Now compare the introduction to chapter four of the first book of the
Prior Analytics in Anon. III. The anonymus commentator also starts from
the total number of possible combinations of quality and quantity in the
premises: of four possible combinations in which both premises are uni-
versal, two are excluded, that is, combinations in which both premises
are universal negatives or the minor premise is a universal negative. Then
the four possible combinations in which both premises are particular as
well as the four possible combinations where the major premise is par-
ticular and the minor universal are all excluded. Finally, of the remaining
four possible combinations which have a universal major and a particular
minor, two are excluded: the combination in which both premises are
negative and that which has a negative minor and an affirmative major:
De hac ergo syllogistica forma hic agit Aristoteles primo docens, quid sit
prima figura, inde ostendens omnes diuersitates coniugationum tam utilium
quam inutilium, quae possunt fieri in ea. Quod ut possit intelligi, scien-
dum est duas propositiones, in quibus dispositio terminorum facit primam
figuram, esse aut ambas uniuersales aut ambas particulares aut prima est
uniuersalis et sequens particularis aut e conuerso. Sed cum ambae sunt
uniuersales, quattuor modis possunt uariari. Aut enim ambae sunt affirma-
tiuae aut ambae priuatiuae aut prima affirmatiua et sequens negatiua aut
e conuerso. Quarum quattuor coniugationum duae quidem sunt efficaces
conclusionis, scilicet quae habent utramque propositionem affirmatiuam
aut primam negatiuam et sequentem affirmatiuam, aliae duae minime.
Si autem ambae sint particulares, quattuor similiter uariantur modis, sed
omnes hae sunt ad syllogizandum inutiles. Similiter si prima sit particularis
et sequens uniuersalis, quattuor uariantur modis, et hae sunt omnes ad colli-
gendum inutiles. [similiter si prima sit particularis et sequens sit uniuersalis,
uariantur quattuor modis et hae etiam sunt omnes ad colligendum inutiles]
Item si praecedat uniuersalis sequente particulari, quattuor etiam uariantur
modis, sed harum coniugationum duae sunt efficaces, quae scilicet habent

56See Anon., Ars Burana, pp. 198:25199:16; Anon., Dialectica Monacensis, pp. 498:5
499:4.
57Thom, Logic and Ontology, pp. 12527.
utramque affirmatiuam aut priuatiuam primam et sequentem affirmatiuam,

reliquae uero inutiles. Harum ergo sedecim coniugationum quattuor sunt
utiles, aliae omnes inutiles.58
Unlike Kilwardby, the Anon. III does not explicitly invoke a general princi-
ple in each case, nor is there, as in Kilwardby, a systematic account of the
principles that hold for each figure; it is tempting to assume that Anon. III
represents an earlier stage in the development.
Concluding Remarks
To sum up, a comparative analysis of the sample passages above does

not imply a close affinity of the Anon. III and Kilwardbys commentary,
but rather that the Anon. III and some other early Latin works on the
Prior Analytics share certain exegetical material that is paralleled in the
ancient tradition, but not found in Boethius De syllogismo categorico or
to my knowledge in any other minor treatise known to have acted as
intermediary between the ancient and medieval Latin tradition. A sys-
tematic analysis of the anonymous Orlans commentary and all extant
thirteenth-century commentaries on the Prior Analytics is however still
needed to define the possible influence of the Commentum Graecum on
the reception of Aristotles Prior Analytics in the medieval West. There is
ample material for anyone willing to undertake such a study; in a recent
article, Ebbesen lists thirteen commentaries on the Prior Analytics from
the second half of the thirteenth century alone.59
58Anon. III 67 (ad 25b32).

59S. Ebbesen, The Prior Analytics in the Latin West: 12th13th centuries, Vivarium 48
(2010), 103f.
12.Demonstratio ad oculum and Demonstratio ad
intellectum: Pronouns in Ps.-Jordan and Robert Kilwardby
Mary Sirridge and Karin Margareta Fredborg
Quis accipit praemium?

Qui interficiet tyrannum, praemium accipiat.
Quem accuso?
Hominem, quem vitupero accuso, et ille est idem isti.
How many pronouns would the medieval professor of linguistics or phi-
losophy of languagethe grammariandetect in these exchanges? From
the modern perspective, this is a trick question. For our medieval theo-
rist, only the relative pronoun he (ille) and the demonstrative him (isti)
are true pronouns. Who (Quis, Quem) is an interrogative noun here;1 its
signification is extremely broad; and a question asked with quis or quem
calls for an answer featuring a referring expression whose signification is
narrower, e.g., Ajax, or more narrow still, e.g., that Ajax, pointing to Ajax.
Whom (quem) in the answer to the second question is a relative noun; its
signification is fixed by its antecedent, hominem. Qui in the first exchange
is an infinite noun,2 since the point of the answer is that whoever kills a
tyrant should get a reward. Idem can function as a relative pronoun, as in
Ajax venit ad Troiam, idem fortiter pugnavit;3 but it is an adjectival noun
here. For our medieval grammarian, aliquis, ullus, alicubi, talis, and qualis
are all nouns as well.
Thus for the medieval grammarian a very large number of referring
expressions are considered nouns.4 The theory of the pronoun develops
in tandem with the theory of the noun. This approach has its roots in
Priscians Institutiones Grammaticae. Early medieval grammarians writing
1Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae 17.33 (ed. M. Hertz, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner,

185559; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961), vol. 2, p. 129:5). Institutiones Grammaticae here-
after: IG.
2Priscian, IG 17.29 (vol. 2, p. 127:12). Modern grammars classify such expressions as
indefinite pronouns.
3Priscian, IG 17.56 (vol. 2, p. 142:10).
4Priscian, IG 2.271 (vol. 1, p. 59:2124). There follows a brief explanation of each variety
of appellative nouns, with selected examples. Cf. Peter Helias, Summa super Priscianum,
ed. L. Reilly (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993), pp. 22133.
200 mary sirridge and karin margareta fredborg
commentaries on the text were content to follow the text with its criss-
crossing organization and ad hoc solutions to particular problems of syn-
tax. But when, in the course of the thirteenth century grammar set out to
redefine itself as a linguistic science on the Aristotelian model, problems
arose.5 Many of these are simply the result of the intersection of a theory
from late antiquity and later medieval grammarians who have a much
greater interest in scientific rigor understood on the Aristotelian model;
but others arise from genuine pressure points in Priscians approach that
are revealed by this more rigorous reasoning. Theories about the noun
and pronoun are located at such a pressure point.
Ps.-Jordan, who was active most probably about the middle of the thir-
teenth century, and Robert Kilwardby, whose commentary is perhaps a
generation later, are writing at this critical juncture. Both wrote stand-
ard, literal commentaries on books 1718 of Institutiones Grammaticae,
in which Priscian develops his theory of syntax; but both commentaries
begin with an introduction that attempts to define grammar as a science
in Aristotelian terms. It is the purpose of this paper to show how these
two important grammarians writing at a critical point handled the func-
tion and semantics of pronouns and other referring expressions.
The Priscianic Source Material
Medieval theories about pronouns were presented in Priscians Institu-

tiones Grammaticae, which corresponded to set university courses.6 The
courses focussed either on Priscian Maior (PMai), books 116, in which the
parts of speech are discussed individually; or on Priscian Minor (PMin),
books 1718, in which Priscian presents a syntactic theory, in which larger
units (constructiones, orationes) are built up out of the grammatically
admissible or grammatically required combinations of the individual parts
of speech.7 But PMin in fact begins with its own separate presentation of
5J. Pinborg, Speculative Grammar, in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (eds.),

The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982), pp. 25469.
6See C. H. Kneepkens, The Priscianic Tradition, in S. Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachtheorien
in Sptantike und Mittelalter (Tbingen: Gnter Narr, 1995), pp. 23964. Cf. A. de Libera
and I. Rosier, La pense linguistique mdivale, in S. Auroux (ed.), Histories des ides
linguistiques, vol. 2, Le dveloppement de la grammaire occidentale (Lige: Mardaga, 1992),
pp. 11586.
7See K. M. Fredborg, William of Conches and his Grammar, in B. Obrist and I. Caiazzo
(eds.), Guillaume de Conches: Philosophie et science au XIIe sicle (Florence: SISMEL
pronouns in ps.-jordan and robert kilwardby 201
the various parts of speech and their defining properties.8 And, in medi-
eval practice, even a commentary on PMai will freely refer to the relevant
discussion in PMin, and vice versa. At a minimum, then, a commentary on
Priscians presentation of the syntax of the pronoun in PMin will include
(i) the brief discussion of the pronoun at the beginning of PMin; and
(ii) the extended discussion of the properties and various syntactic func-
tions of pronouns which begins like this:
I consider it necessary before I discuss the construction of the individual
pronouns to discuss their properties, so that by treating of these, the theory
of construction may be made clear.9
In fact, the outlines of relevant material are more blurry. For example,
immediately prior to the official announcement of the presentation of
pronominal syntax quoted above is a discussion of why there is no article
in Latin, which includes a lengthy argument that demonstrative nouns
and pronouns, given their function, cannot be considered to be articles. In
addition, pronouns are bound to appear in discussions of the other parts
of speech with which pronouns combine, for example in the discussion
of the person of the verb.
Nouns are said by Priscian to signify substance and quality.10 The
question of whether an expression can signify both substance and quality
without being equivocal is dealt with from the twelfth century onwards by
saying that Priscian means that nouns signify substances under or by way
of a quality.11 One species of noun, the proper nouns, signify exactly one
individual by way of some proper quality;12 the other species of noun, the
edizioni del Galluzzo, 2011), p. 333: We have a word class grammar with a dependency
syntax, where all syntagmas are analysed primarily as binary entities, rather than by over-
all sentence analysis.
8Priscians stated aim in this section is to explain the order in which the parts of
speech are discussed in the subsequent exposition.
9Priscian, IG 17.54 (vol. 2, p. 141:35): Oportere iudico, antequam de singulorum con-
structione pronominum dicam, disserere de eorum proprietatibus, ex quibus manifestum
tradendae fiat documentum constructionis.
10Priscian, IG 2.18 (vol. 1, p. 55:6): Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem
significare. Priscian, IG 17.15 (vol. 2, p. 117:11): Nomina enim tertiarum sunt personarum
indicativa [id est tertias indicant personas] quippe quae nomina substantiam et quali-
tatem vel generalem vel propriam significantia similiter in omnibus possunt intellegi per-
sonis inesse.
11Cf. L. G. Kelly, The Mirror of Grammar: Theology, philosophy and the modistae (Amster-
dam: John Benjamins, 2002), pp. 6972.
12Priscian, IG 2.25 (vol. 1, p. 58:25): The proper noun on the other hand, signifies for
any individual its unique (privatam) substance and quality of any individual whatsoever.
Proper nouns, as Priscian points out, are subject to both (a) equivocity/homonymy, when
appellative nouns, signify multiple individuals by way of some common

or general quality. But as we see from the example with which we began,
interrogatives, relatives and infinites (quis, qui) are nouns as well, although
nouns with very general signification. Such expressions lack the defining
properties of pronounsthey cannot be used in place of a proper noun,
nor do they discriminate between first, second and third person, as ego, tu
and sui do.13 Instead they signify substance, although indefinite and gen-
eral <substance> as quis, qui, and quality, although indefinite and general
<quality> as qualis.14
A correspondingly small number of referring expressions are left to be
considered pronouns. There are personal pronouns (ego, tu, sui). Third
person pronouns (ipse, idem, is, hic, iste, ille) function as relatives and/or
demonstratives. When they function as relatives, their signification is fixed
by an antecedent referring expression; when they function as demonstra-
tives, their signification is fixed by demonstration, either of some present
corporeal thing (demonstratio ad oculum) or of some absent or incorpo-
real thing (demonstratio ad intellectum). There are also derived pronouns
(meus, tuus, suus).
Problems
There are some general problems with the Priscianic inheritance. One
problem, obviously, is its very richness and wealth of details often ruining
the clarity and structure especially of PMin. For any part of speech, the
presentation of its syntax will be scattered throughout the Institutiones,
with many discussions driven by the need to make particular construc-
tions intelligible, e.g., the need to explain the function of the possessive
pronoun in such constructions as interest mea/interest mei. These dis-
cussions of particular syntactic problems pose a challenge for commenta-
tors who are in pursuit of a scientific grammar, since the commentators
are much more interested than Priscian in connecting the resolution of
they designate more than one individual by chance and in word only, and not because of
a conception of a common substance or quality; and (b) synonymy, as we see with Tullius
and Cicero. See Priscian, IG 2.24 (vol. 1, p. 58:513); Priscian, IG 2.26 (vol. 1, p. 59:13).
13Pronouns on the other hand show a definite substance in some certain (first, second,
or third) person, and the deixis of the demonstrative pronouns makes the pronouns not
only signify substances but also co-signify the accidental features attached to them; see
Priscian, IG 17.33 (vol. 2, p. 129:15).
14Priscian, IG 2.30 (vol. 1, p. 61).
specific issues to their basic theory of the part(s) of speech in question, and
not just coming up with an ad hoc explanation that seems fairly sensible.
A second problem is that Priscians vocabulary challenges his Aristotelian
interpreters. He relies almost completely on a single meaning-cum-reference
notion, signification; he more or less lets context make it clear whether
an expression which is said to signify something is to be understood as
referring to that something or just to mean this or that. Already by the
mid-thirteenth century, the notion of the suppositum is being used, e.g.,
by Ps.-Jordan and Kilwardby, to designate the individuals referred to by
a noun or the subject term of a statement. Also used non-technically are
genus/generic and species/specific (which often just mean more and less
general); property (proprium), which is frequently used more or less inter-
changeably with accident (accidens) and quality (qualitas). In connection
with the lemma: Accidit pronomini relatio...(IG 17.56, vol. 2, p. 141:20), for
example, commentators who have adopted Aristotelian terminology will
ask how Priscian can refer to demonstration and relation, which are essen-
tial to the signification of pronouns, as accidental.
Some problems with Priscians theory, however, are the result of extend-
ing the theory of the noun to cover so many kinds of noun. Particularly the
view that the interrogative quis and the relative/indefinite qui are nouns is
not unproblematic. Their declensions, after all, follow the pattern of pro-
nouns. Priscians argument that if questions asked with quis are normally
answered by nouns, the questions must be about the same sort of thing,
that is, substances qualified, just much more generally, is not entirely con-
vincing. For by what sort of quality exactly are who (quis) and of what
sort (qualis) connected to substanceswhichness and howness? And for
that matter, what sorts of quality are alterity (alius) and anyhood (ullus)?
Furthermore there is a question about whether the interrogative quis and
the relative/indefinite qui are the same expression, as Priscian says, even
if their oblique forms are the same. And if they are the same expression,
how is the difference between interrogative, relative, and indefinite to
be understood?15 If these are three different meanings of one expression,
15Cf. I. Rosier, Relatifs et relatives dans les traits terministes des XIIe et XIIIe si-
cles, Premire partie: Termes anaphoriques et rgles danaphore, Vivarium 23 (1985), 122;
I. Rosier, Relatifs et relatives dans les traits terministes des XIIe et XIIIe sicles, Deuxime
partie: Propositions relatives (implicationes), distinction entre restrictives et non-restrictives,
Vivarium 24 (1986), 121; I. Rosier, Discussions mdivales sur la corfrence, in L. Danon-
Boileau and A. de Libera (eds.), La rfrence: Actes du Colloque de St-Cloud sur la rfrence
(Paris: Editions Ophrys, 1987), pp. 3562; I. Rosier and J. Stefanini, Thories mdivales
du pronom et du nom relatif, in S. Ebbesen, G. L. Bursill-Hall, and K. Koerner (eds.),
then we seem to be faced with an equivocation. The modern reader would

probably be perfectly satisfied with the solution to all questions of this
sort that said that the qualities associated with these anaphoric nouns
really have to do with how things are being thought about and referred to,
not with any real quality they have. But this is no telling solution for theo-
rists who tend to think that the qualities by which all nouns signify things
have primarily to do with how realities are understood by the mind.16
Even with its much more circumscribed subject matter, we are faced
with some fundamental problems in Priscians basic theory of the pro-
noun. If the pronoun is said to be an expression that takes the place of a
proper noun, then it seems problematic that there are many contexts in
which the pronoun cannot function grammatically like a noun, e.g., like
Romam in vado Romam, and asinus in asinus Sortis.17 Moreover, if
pronouns are supposed to take the place of proper nouns, why is it that
they have plural forms? And if we add Priscians theory that pronouns
in themselves signify bare substance18 (substantiam meram), it becomes
unclear how they can take the place of proper nouns, which signify sub-
stance by way of some distinct, proper quality (substantiam et qualitatem).
Moreover if they signify bare substance, why do they have oblique forms,
which typically signify substance in relation to something or other, e.g., as
the recipient of action or as a possessor of something. Finally, regardless
of what bare substance really means, it seems clear that pronouns do
have some qualitative meaning; some pronouns have gender, for example,
and others signify substance under the personal property of being the
one speaking, or the one being spoken to, or being close up vs. far away,
etc.and what of the same (idem), which Priscian treats as a pronoun?
It seems fairly clear that some of these questions can be answered by
invoking the other part of Priscians theory about the pronoun: the pro-
noun has been invented on account of the verb, namely, in order to allow
discrimination of also first, second person in referring expressions, since
De Ortu Grammaticae: Studies in medieval grammar and linguistics in memory of Jan Pin-
borg (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990), pp. 285303.
16Cf. Kelly, Mirror of Grammar, pp. 69ff.
17Cf. Ps.-Jordan, Notulae super Priscianum Minorem, ed. M. Sirridge, CIMAGL 36 (1980),
37. His first solution is that pronouns have the construction of nouns nominaliter retenta,
and not of the noun aduerbialiter acceptum.
18Cf. E. J. Ashworth, Singular Terms and Singular Concepts: From Buridan to the early
sixteenth century, in R. L. Friedman and S. Ebbesen (eds.), John Buridan and Beyond: Topics
in the Language Sciences 13001700 (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences
and Letters, 2004), p. 132: The name signifies substance with quality, that is, a referent plus
its nature, a pronoun signifies substance without quality, that is, a bare referent.
the noun is in itself of an indeterminate third person, and therefore can-

not be the subject of a first and second person verb without the addition
of a pronoun. This would explain why there are plural pronouns (though
not very precisely how there can be such forms, if pronouns are tied to
proper nouns).
But supposing that we can make consistent sense of the basic functions
of taking the place of a proper noun and discrimination of person, there
are also questions to be raised with respect to Priscians theory that pro-
nouns, by their meaning (de vi vocis), signify bare substance and have their
signification in context fixed by demonstration or relation. Here significa-
tion means reference. Priscians example is that if someone asks Who is
fighting? and we answer Ajax, the questioner can still ask Which Ajax?
since proper nouns are subject to equivocation. But if we then answer
That Ajax, pointing at the relevant heroic combatant, then there is only
one individual who can be meant. Similarly, if I say Ajax was at Troy, and
Ajax fought bravely, it need not be the same Ajax who was at Troy and
who fought bravely; but if I substitute the second Ajax with ille and say,
Ajax was at Troy, and he fought bravely, it is clearly the same Ajax who
is referred to, since he (ille) is in this instance a relative pronoun whose
reference is fixed by its antecedent in context, though it could of itself
de vi vocis apply to any male whatsoever.
Priscians idea, clearly, is that as a relative the pronoun attaches to the
proper quality that fixes the reference of a proper noun. In Ajax was at
Troy, and he fought bravely, it could still, it seems, be either Ajax son of
Telamon, King of Salamis, or Ajax from Locris who is described; but it is
in any event the same one who is said to have been at Troy and to have
fought. Demonstration, on the other hand, fixes the referent more pre-
cisely than the noun; it resolves equivocation, by attaching the noun to a
particular individual.19
A problem arises for the theory that pronouns have their reference fixed
by demonstration or relation, however, when the pronouns in question
are not the usual demonstratives of the third person, or when the dem-
onstration concerns someone or something that for some reason or other
is not present to be pointed out. Ego and tu are, after all, pronouns and
they are not relative pronouns and so should involve demonstrationbut
19As Priscian notes, IG 17.63 (vol. 2, pp. 145:18146:6), I can know enough about, e.g.,
Virgil, to uniquely individuate him, his proper quality, and still not know who he is, until
someone says, of someone approaching, That fellow is Virgil (Hic est Virgilius).
it is not obvious that they do so. Priscians answer is: the first person and
second person pronouns always do pick out the speaker and the person
spoken to as present to the eyes.20 And for pronouns like hic and ille used
of things or persons who are not present, we do not have any demonstra-
tion to the eye (demonstratio ad oculum), but only demonstration to the
intellect (demonstratio ad intellectum).
It is not entirely clear, however, what Priscians demonstratio ad intel-
lectum amounts to (IG 17.57, vol. 2, p. 142:24). Priscians own example is
Virgils angry goddess (Aeneid 1:253) who exclaims, referring to the sorry
tale of Aeneass tribulations, Is this the reward of piety? Here hic is used of
a series of events, each once present, but now all absent and only present
to the mind. To Kilwardby, with his grasp of the new psychology, it is
obvious that also references to intelligibles must involve a demonstratio
ad intellectum.21
Some Solutions
Ps.-Jordan addresses the semantics of pronouns by making the interest-

ing distinction that nouns (signifying substance and quality) single out
their referents, which he calls the function of nomen nominans, whereas
pronouns single out their referents with the help of demonstration, which
attaches to them, so to speak, the quality by which a proper noun would
pick out its referent:
So it must be said there is a noun that singles out its referent, but there is
also a type of noun which only potentially singles out the referent; <it does
so> that is, by attaching to a quality. It is this latter type of noun, whose
reference is due to the power of demonstration, that is understood in the
pronoun, as was said above, and not a noun that singles out its referent.22
20This solution immediately raises questions among the commentators. Both William
of Conches and Peter Helias comment on Priscians discussion here of the apostrophe, in
which someone is addressed in second person who is not present, see appendix Q.2.4;
Kilwardby similarly (appendix Q.2.4) worries about first and second person usage in cor-
respondence (in litteris) when neither person is present, and concludes that speaker and
addressee are ut presentes.
21That Priscian does not make explicit reference to demonstration of intelligibles is
perhaps due to his common sense Platonism; cf. S. Ebbesen, The Tradition of Ancient
Logic-cum-Grammar in the Middle AgesWhats the Problem?, Vivarium 45 (2007), 149.
22Ps.-Jordan, Notulae super Priscianum Minorem, 55: Dicendum quod est nomen nomi-
nans et nomen nominabile, id est ipsa qualitas. Nomen nominabile intelligitur in prono
mine ex vi demonstrationis, ut dixit superius, et non nomen nominans. Cf. Kelly, Mirror
of Grammar, p. 74.
Earlier, Ps.-Jordan had advanced the argument that in a perfect construc-

tion the pronoun could not function as a predicate after the copula, e.g.,
ego sum ego, since the predicate must indicate the quality or nature
of the subject, and pronouns do not signify quality directly as their pri-
mary signification, but only indirectly by the addition of the power of
demonstration.23
This distinction corresponds to Kilwardbys handling of demonstration,
relation, of personalis proprietas, and suppositum. His discussion of the
pronouns and anaphoric nouns, and even the article, focuses on the ques-
tion of what the referent or suppositum is for these three word classes,
the noun and the pronoun, and the Greek (or French li, le, etc.) article,
if, indeed, an article has any suppositum. It is then flatly denied that the
article has any suppositum of its own at all. For an article preceding a
noun indicates only a recognition of that the noun has been used earlier
(secunda notitia), so the article by itself signifies not a suppositum of its
own, but that of the accompanying word. For this Kilwardby gives a nice
analogy between the article and another empty term, the arithmetical
figure zero: the article has no independent meaning, just as the figure
zero, says Kilwardby, in the algorism contributes to signifying a number
by holding a position in the series of numerals, but does not signify any
individual number by itself.24
Suppositum must here mean not the grammatical subject with which
the verb agrees, rather it must have a semantic use, being the referent of
a term or bearer of a form.25 The suppositum of pronouns and nouns are
taken by Kilwardby to be formless. Kilwardby distinguishes between the
personal property of pronouns and the qualities by which nouns pick
23Ps.-Jordan, Notulae super Priscianum Minorem, 41: pronomen non significat formam;
igitur si apponitur cum verbo substantivo non potest construi...Constructio referenda est
ad intellectum vocis (= IG 17.187, vol. 2, p. 201:1112) sed qualitas non est de intellectu vocis
pronominis, sed solum ex vi demonstrationis.
24Kilwardby, In PMin, MS Oxford Corpus Christi College 191 (= O), f. 23ra; MS Cam-
bridge Peterhouse 119 (= P), f. 125va (ad IG 17.27, vol. 2, p. 124:14): Nullum enim suppositum
significat sicut nomen vel pronomen, sed solam discretionem qua {que P} significatur in
altero ipsum stare sub notitia secunda. Et est exemplum competens de ciphra in Algo-
rismo {algorisso O} que nullum numerum de se representat, sed per ordinationem cum
aliis figuris significat et numerum maiorem {minorem P} representat {et...representat]
illas...representare P}. Sic enim articulus nullum suppositum significat. Non significat
etiam notitiam secundam proprie loquendo sed solum quandam discretionem, per quam
significat dictionem cum qua ordinatur stare sub secunda notitia. Ex his patet articuli
natura in generali.
25Cf. E. J. Ashworth, Language and Logic, in A. S. McGrade (ed.), The Cambridge Com-
panion to Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 90.
out their significata, e.g., the proper quality of the proper noun. The per-
sonal property of pronouns by which some pronouns pick out their sup-
posita as only first person (ego) or only second (tu) person or third person
is like the person of verbs, the property of being the person speaking,
the person being spoken to, or the person spoken about. A pronoun, e.g.,
the third person pronoun, will pick out all its supposita under the same
property; the power of demonstration makes the reference determinate.
One of the most important differences between the pronouns and the
anaphoric nouns, semantically as well as syntactically, is that relative and
demonstrative nouns are indifferent to any determinate personalis pro-
prietas, and being nouns signify in the third person, but only in an inde-
terminate way. This is because nouns signify quality as well as substance,
that is, they indicate the nature of their supposita; and thus the nomina
are unspecified (or unspecifiable?) with regard to person. Pronouns, on
the other hand, signify mere substance and no quality, except for the
personal property that they share with verbs; but their vis demonstra-
tionis/relationis makes their supposita determinately identifiable either
by cross-reference or by literal demonstration (demonstratio ad oculos/ad
sensum)or by what is later called demonstratio ad intellectum.26
The pronouns have definite demonstration and relation, whereas the
interrogative, indefinite and relative nouns (e.g., quis/qui, or uter/uterque)
have only indefinite demonstration and relation according to Kilwardby.
Thus proper nouns have the capacity to make discrete and definite refer-
ence to an individual by way of the proper quality by which the individual
is known and on the basis of which the name is conferred and used. Pro-
nouns achieve the same definite reference in context by demonstration
and relation. Anaphoric nouns, lacking both possibilities, cannot refer
determinately:
Demonstration and relation, which are accidental to the infinite quality
and infinite substance qualified by infinite quality that are signified, can-
not cause discrimination and determinate picking out of persons. This is
why relative and demonstrative nounsunlike pronounsdo not pick out
persons determinately.
The quality which is inseparable from the substance signified, being part
of the signification of this kind of word class (nouns), clearly prevents such
discrimination...
Also, it must be added that infinite and unqualified substance may be
made finite in two ways, either by being made discriminate in itself by
26Priscian, IG 17.57 (vol. 2, p. 142:24).

<adding> the demonstration and relation belonging to a pronoun; or by

discrimination and determination connected with the one who under-
stands, and this is by way of a quality under which the substance is
understandable.27
Demonstratio ad oculum/Demonstratio ad intellectum
As we have seen with the demonstration and relation of pronouns and

anaphoric nouns (quis, qui), the intellect makes a substance discernible
by its mediating property or nature (qualitas), a theory which is further
discussed in a set of quaestiones in Kilwardbys commentary to Priscians
distinction between demonstratio ad sensum/ad intellectum (see IG 17.58
59, vol. 2, pp. 142:25143:26) (for the text, see the appendix below).
The first question deals with anaphoric pronouns added to nouns, iste
homo, or to proper names like iste Robertus, where there is a strong deixis/
demonstratio ad sensum, as is the case with ego and tu and the relative
pronouns in third person (Q.1.2). Accidental qualities are also referred to
either in demonstratio ad oculum/ad intellectum concerning non-present
supposita (Q.1.4). Although the pronoun iste may grammatically be com-
bined immediately (immediate) with appellative nouns and participles,
iste is deemed redundant in ordinary sentences combined with proper
names, since, e.g., Robertus and Plato themselves refer directly to a par-
ticular suppositum by their Robertness or Platonity.28 Finally, demonstra-
tio ad sensum involves necessarily and immediately also accidents, which
would include quality (Q.1.5).29
In Q.2 demonstration inherent in first and second person pronouns
(ego, tu) can only be demonstratio ad sensum, since they are directly
27Kilwardby, In PMin, O f. 17va, P f. 119rb (ad IG 17.15, vol. 2, p. 117:7): Demonstratio

autem et relatio, que accidunt qualitati infinite sive substantie qualificate qualitate infin-
ita, non causant personarum discretionem et finitatem, et ita patet quare nomina relativa
vel demonstrativa non sunt persone discrete sicut pronomina. Patet etiam quod qualitas
immediate adherens substantie ens aliquod de significatione partis orationis impedit dis-
cretionem talem, et si qualitas suscepta aliunde mediante demonstratione et relatione
compatiatur eam et alico modo fit eius causa....Adhuc addendum est quod dupliciter
potest substantia infinita {infinita] finita O} et mera finitari. Aut scilicet per discretionem
factam in se ipsa, et hoc fit per demonstrationem et relationem pronominis; aut per discre-
tionem et finitationem factam in compara/ O f. 17vb /tione ad intelligentem, et hoc fit per
qualitatem mediante qua substantia est intelligibilis. Cf. Rosier and Stefanini, Thories
mdivales.
28Cf. Boethius, In librum Aristotelis , ed. C. Meiser (Leipzig: Teubner,
1880), p. 137:67 (= PL 64, col. 463a).
29Cf. Priscian, IG 17.74 (vol. 2, p. 150:2027).
involved in the locutionary context (Q.2.3). Only in the figurative language

of anastrophemostly in literary impersonations or fictional dialogue
can ego and tu be referring to a non-present person and thereby represent
demonstratio ad intellectum.
In Q.3 Kilwardby discusses demonstratio ad intellectum as reserved for
non-present and solely intelligible entities (Q.3.4). Visual recognition
rather than using one of the other four sensesis involved in any demon
stratio ad sensum, since the demonstration by means of such pronouns
is on par with sign language, e.g., nodding, pointing, all of which is also
picked up visually. To Kilwardby as a grammarian, it is local distance
(rather than temporal distance) that is said to be inherent in the signifi-
cation of hic (the one here), iste (the one there), ille (the one even more
remote); the distinction applies only to demonstratio ad sensum, not ad
intellectum (Q.4).30
Finally (Q.6), pronouns both signify and refer to the same suppositum,
whereas the anaphoric nouns quis, qui, and the relatives qualis, quantus,
signify one thing but refer to quite another, namely, to the correlatives
talis, tantus, which in turn signify quality, which pronouns do not. Here
the anaphoric nouns are unlike pronouns, and more like the adjective
similis. Only the derived possessive pronouns meus, tuus, suus, refer to dif-
ferent referents (or supposita) than the third person referent which they
signify (Q.6.4).
Accordingly, this small set of quaestiones, although they have little of
philosophical significance to say about sentences involving first and sec-
ond person demonstration/relation, offer a carefully worked out set of
tools for reference, indicating degrees of particularity and tackling seman-
tically the difference between the Priscianic pronouns and the function
and semantics of the anaphoric nouns.
The Function of Pronouns in Context
Twelfth-century grammarians like William of Conches used to discuss

the difference between nouns and pronouns in terms of signification and
30Since the notion of propositional truth is not of main concern to grammar, the
temporal aspect of suppositum being still there (or something of the past) is rarely dis-
cussed in grammar, whereas it enters into the discussion of logicians, e.g., Buridan; cf.
E. J. Ashworth, Singular Terms and Singular Concepts: From Buridan to the early sixteenth
century, p. 134.
function, significatio et officium.31 Appellative nouns, e.g., homo, signify

the species man, but their function (officium) is to refer to (nominare)
the individuals of the species, whereas the pronouns have the function of
standing for proper names without signifying any proper quality, but pick-
ing out the referent as distinct from other referents. Ps.-Jordan, as we have
seen above, called the particularity of the referent of a pronoun nomen
nominabile as distinct from the ordinary function of the nouns of referring
to (nominare) individuals; if both the substance and the property of that
substance associated with the noun are to be understood, he adds, a noun
must be added to the pronoun, e.g., ego Priscianus, in order to identify
the suppositum.32 Another passage in Jordan confirms that no discrete
qualitas is here involved, but a discrete personalis proprietas.33
Kilwardby discusses the same potentiality of the pronoun inherent in
its very signification: By itself ego is indeterminate, but if we add Rob-
ertus, it becomes determinate as in Ego Robertus.34 Likewise, just as a
pronoun signifies mere substance, because it refers to the suppositum
which by itself is formless, the copula or est is said to signify mere sub-
stance, since it signifies something which is the suppositum, that is form-
less and expecting a determination by quality or form.35 And he adds the
interesting observation that the pronoun signifies the sentence subject
31Cf. Fredborg, William of Conches, pp. 37576 (Appendix 2 [12][14]); Peter Helias,
Summa super Priscianum, p. 633:8092; C. H. Kneepkens, Het Iudicium constructionis,
4 vols. (Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1987), vol. 1, p. 326.
32Ps.-Jordan, Notulae super Priscianum Minorem, 55: Ut igitur suppositum pronominis
definiatur quoad utrumque, nomen additur <pronomini>.
33Ps.-Jordan, Notulae super Priscianum Minorem, 33: Significat enim pronomen indis-
tinctum suppositum sub distincta proprietate personae per ipsam impositionem; dis-
tinguitur autem suppositum postea per accessum demonstrationis et relationis. Et hoc
est quod dicit Priscianus in illo capitulo: Sed ad pronominis ordinandam constructionem
(IG 17.175, vol. 2, p. 198:10). Videamus quod pronomina et verba singulis vocibus singulas
significant personas, quod plane de supposito non potest intelligi, sed de personali pro-
prietate. Illud ergo quod primo finitatur per demonstrationem vel relationem est supposi-
tum personale; illud autem quod posterius finitatur est personalis proprietas et econverso:
quod distinctius repraesentat vox est hoc personalis proprietas; quod indistinctius, hoc est
suppositum. Et loquor ex parte impositionis.
34Kilwardby, In Pmin, O f. 47va, P 150va (ad IG 17.69, vol. 2, p. 148:25): Sicut substantia
per pronomen nude significata forme adiunctionem expectat, ut ego Robertus, eodem
modo substantia significata per verbum substantivum ex parte predicati desiderat forme
determinationem, ut ego sum Robertus.
35Kilwardby, In Pmin, O f. 47va, P f. 150va (ad IG 17.69, vol. 2, p. 148:25): ergo qua ratione
pronomen dicitur significare substantiam meram, quia dicit suppositum, quod potest deter-
minari omni forma, et nullam formam circa ipsum determinat, debet verbum substantivum
dici significare meram substantiam, quia significat quiddam quod est suppositum, nullam
formam determinans de se, sed expectans cuiuslibet forme determinationem.
(per modum suppositi) and functions as matter <to be determined by

form>. In the same manner the copula signifies substantively (per modum
esse), which in relation to the subject is form, but in relation to the predi-
cate the copula must have a subject.36
The capacity to signify just mere substance is again the way of dif-
ferentiating the two functions of idem, which sometimes functions as a
pronoun (same) but sometimes as a nomen meaning alike. Just as many
words that may belong to more than one word classmost commonly
the indeclinables, e.g., before (ante) being now an adverb, now a preposi-
tion, etc.idem is discussed according to the words double meaning and
syntactical potential. For just like the word same, which is sometimes an
ordinary adjective by which we attribute sameness to something, idem
occasionally is quite plainly an adjective (nomen <adjectivum>) in certain
constructions with the dative,37 in which it means just identical with
and functions as the contrary of the adjective different from (diversum).38
Idem in this sense is used to attribute idemptitas to something, and so it is
an adjectival noun.39 Only when there is no hint of signifying anything but
mere substance as a pure relative expression is idem a pronoun.40
To go from one word class to another as idem does here, clearly involves
both syntactic potential and semantic change. Idem always keeps its lexi-
36Kilwardby, In Pmin, O f. 47va, P f. 150va (ad IG 17.69, vol. 2, p. 148:25): Et sic michi
videtur quod hec substantia per pronomen designata est solum per modum suppositi et
per modum materie; per verbum autem substantivum per modum esse, quod comparando
ad suppositum forma est, comparando autem ad predicatum apponendum ei est supposi-
tum et materia, et respectu huius dicitur esse mera.
37Ps.-Jordan, In PMin, MS Leipzig UB 1291, f. 29vb (ad IG 17.52, vol. 2, p. 139:20): Nullum
pronomen ex natura sua construitur <cum> dativo, sed idem ex naturali suo respectu con-
struitur cum dativo, ut Sortes est idem sibi, ergo non est pronomen. Kilwardby, In PMin,
O f. 36rb; P f. 139va: Adhuc pronomina cum dativo non construuntur neque simpliciter
cum obliquis nisi quandoque in constructione partitiva cum genitivo. Sed idem cum dativo
construitur, ut homo est idem alii.
38Ps.-Jordan, In PMin, MS Leipzig UB 1291, f. 29vb (ad IG 17.52, vol. 2, p. 139:20): Con-
traria nata sunt fieri circa idem vel in eodem genere. idem et diversum sunt contraria. Ergo
cum diversum sit in genere partis quod est nomen, similiter idem erit nomen. Kilwardby,
In PMin, O f. 36rb; P f. 139va: Adhuc, cum idem et diversum contraria sint, et diversum
nomen sit {sit] om. P}, erit idem nomen.
39Ps.-Jordan, In PMin, MS Leipzig UB 1291, f. 29vb (ad IG 17.52, vol. 2, p. 139:20): Ad hoc
dicendum quod idem prout significat formam concretam substantie que forma est ydemp-
titas, sic est nomen, et sic procedunt argumenta. Sed prout significat substantiam meram
sub relatione sic est pronomen, et sic est hic. Kilwardby, In PMin, O f. 36rb; P f. 139va: Et
dicendum secundum quod ostensum est quod ipsum est nomen quando relationem signi-
ficat et abstractum facit de se etc. {etc.] om. O} Cum tamen relatio accidens, intelligitur in
{in] om. P} significatione {significatio P} eius que tunc est substantia pura, pronomen est,
et sic est uno modo / P f. 139vb / nomen et alio {alio] alio modo O} pronomen.
40Ps.-Jordan, In PMin, MS Leipzig UB 1291, f. 29vb (ad IG 17.52, vol. 2, p. 139:20): Sed
prout significat substantiam meram sub relatione sic est pronomen.
cal value having to do with identity (idemptitas), but it functions very dif-
ferently when it picks out a referent under the quality of sameness, from
the occasions when, functioning as a pronoun, it just picks out a referent
as being identical to one referred to previously.
Conclusion
Though certainly not advancing in big leaps away from some of the dif-
ficulties of Priscian Minor, Kilwardby and Ps.-Jordan made significant
advances in clarity and theoretical sophistication. They successfully used
the notion of suppositum to remedy the blur between signification and
referent, and straightened persona into the difference between personalis
proprietas and substance referred to (suppositum). Kilwardby, in particu-
lar, distinguished between the pronouns signification of mere substance
per modum suppositi and the way in which the copula/verbum substan-
tivum signifies bare substance per modum esse. Kilwardby also drew an
interesting parallel between the function of the noun in Ego Robertus
and Ego sum Robertus. And both Ps.-Jordan and Kilwardby were pre-
pared to allow functional distinctions between words belonging to diverse
word classes, as is the case with idem (and hinc); here we have a word
in one word class eventually trespassing far enough into the functional
domain of another word class that it actually changes its major grammati-
cal classification and becomes an adjectival noun, just as hinc effectively
is an adverb.
Appendix 1
Demonstratio ad oculum/Demonstratio ad intellectum

Robert Kilwardby, In PMin (ad IG 17.57, vol. 2, p. 142:24)
P = MS Cambridge Peterhouse 191-II (ff. 112r229v), f. 142ra; manuscrit de base
O = MS Oxford Corpus Christi College 119 (ff. 11r-124r), f. 39rb
Q.1.1.Consequenter queritur de demonstratione, et primo queritur cum

quedam demonstratio sit ad sensum et quedam ad intellectum et quedam41
absentis quedam presentis, quomodo dicatur quod demonstratio est
accidentium que oculis etc. (IG 17.64, vol. 2, p. 146:57), et quod demons-
tratio facit cognitionem presentium.
41quedam] om. O.
2.Ad quod dicendum quod secundum Petrum Heliam42 demonstra-

tio est oculis vel intellectui certa rei43 representatio,44 et ita illud verbum
Prisciani45 demonstratio est accidentium que possunt oculis conspici non
intelligendum est de omni demonstratione, sed solum de demonstratione
potissime dicta cuiusmodi est demonstratio in prima et secunda persona
et in aliquo pronomine tertie quod46 ad sensum demonstrat.47
3.Adhuc48 cum dicitur quod49 demonstratio facit50 cognitionem / P
f. 142rb / presentium, non est intelligendum quod semper facit51 cognitio-
nem rei que actualiter presens est, sed vel eius que presens est actualiter52
vel absentis in ratione presentis considerate.53
4.Adhuc54 videtur falsum quod dicitur demonstrationem finitare sub
stantiam pronominis per qualitatem accidentalem universaliter, quia55 sic
dicendo iste homo vel ego Robertus iam finitur per substantialem.
5.Et dicendum quod etiam56 in hiis sermonibus primo pertinet
demonstratio ad qualitatem accidentalem. Pertinet enim ad accidentia
subiecta sensui;57 cum enim dicitur58 iste homo demonstratur homo ad
sensum, sed homo sub sensu non cadit nisi mediantibus accidentibus, et
ita pertinet adhuc demonstratio immediate ad qualitatem accidentalem
vel ad ipsam ut accidentalem, sicut quando demonstratur absens.
42post Heliam] quod del. P.

43certa rei] circa rem P.
44Peter of Spain (Non-Papa), Summa Absoluta Cuiuslibet, ed. C. H. Kneepkens, Het
Iudicium Constructionis, vol. 4, p. 30: demonstratio est oculis uel intellectui certa rei rep-
resentatio. Cf. Peter Helias, Summa super Priscianum, p. 955:2829: Pronominalis demon-
stratio est vel oculis vel intellectu<i> rei proposite certa demonstratio. We would like to
thank C. H. Kneepkens for pointing out the reference to Peter of Spain (Non-Papa) and for
looking through the text of this appendix.
45Cf. Priscian, IG 17.64 (vol. 2, p. 146:1523): Pronomina vero ea, quae ad nihil aliud
aspiciunt per demonstrationem nisi ad propriam aliquam substantiam et ad ei accidentes
qualitates, quae possunt oculis conspici, ut album vel nigrum, longum vel breve,
voce autem ipsa pronominis non manifestantur nisi substantiae.
46quod] quo P.
47demonstrat] demonstratur P.
48adhuc] ad huc P et sic saepius.
49dicitur quod] om. O.
50facit] faciat O.
51facit] faciat O.
52actualiter] accidentaliter O.
53considerate] considerare P.
54ante adhuc] si add. O.
55quia] om. O.
56etiam] om. O.
57sensui] sensu P O.
58dicitur] om. P.
6.Adhuc cum demonstrativum pronomen tertie persone possit adiungi

immediate participio et nomini communi sic iste scribens iste homo,
quare non bene adiungitur immediate nomini proprio sic iste Sortes.
7.Adhuc cum sit demonstrativum prime, secunde et tertie persone,
quare potest nomen proprium immediate adiungi prime et secunde per-
sone59 ut ego Robertus, tu Cicero, magis quam tertie.
8.Ad primum dicendum quod pronomen demonstrativum significat
substantiam propriam de vi vocis et de vi demonstrationis cointelligitur
qualitas propria, et hec duo sunt significata60 per nomen proprium, et
ideo si apponatur proprium nomen pronomini61 nugatio erit, nisi fuerit
propter causam necessariam. / O f. 39va / Sic autem non est ex additione
nominis communis vel participii immediate, sicut patet intuenti.
9.Adhuc si additur proprium nomen pronomini prime aut secunde
persone, fit propter necessitatem evocationis, ut ego Sortes vel tu Sortes,
et ita licita est illa immediata adiunctio. Si autem additur62 pronomen ter-
tie immediate non fit propter evocationem quia tertia non evocat tertiam
et sic patet secundum. Potest tamen demonstrativum tertie et nomen pro-
prium mediante verbo sibi apponi, ut63 iste est Virgilius.
Q.2.1.Consequenter queritur de differentiis demonstrationis, et primo

cum circa primam et secundam personam non possit esse nisi demon
stratio, demonstratio autem quedam est ad sensum et quedam ad intellec-
tum, quare circa illas non fit demonstratio ad intellectum, sed ad sensum
tantum.
2.Adhuc demonstratio ad sensum quedam est prope, et64 quedam
longe, quare igitur65 non est prima et secunda persona demonstrativa ad
sensum a longe, sicut a prope.
3.Et dicendum quod prima et secunda semper presentes sunt in locu-
tione, quia prima est que de se loquitur, secunda ad quam quis loquitur
et non sunt a locutione distantes, et ideo proprietati illarum repugnat
demonstratio ad intellectum que pertinet ad rem intelligibilem vel ad rem
absentem et demonstratio ad sensum a longe.
59quare...secunde persone] in marg. add. O.

60significata] singnificata et sic saepius etiam singnifica- pro significa- P.
61pronomini] pronominis P.
62additur] addatur O.
63ut] om. P.
64et] om. P.
65igitur] om. O.
4.Si autem obiciatur quod in litteris ponuntur pronomina prime et

secunde persone et tamen utraque non est presens,66 dicendum quod
et si67 presentes non sint ambe, sunt tamen68 ut69 presentes per propria
nomina in principio litterarum posita ad que pronomina faciunt demon
strationem, sicut infra dicet (IG 17.59, vol. 2, p. 143:8).70
Q.3.1.Consequenter queritur de ista divisione demonstrationis ad sen-

sum et71 ad intellectum. Ex quo enim72 omne pronomen demonstrativum
est vox significativa, et vox offert se sensui, cum sit signum, significatio73
autem intellectui, cum sit significatum,74 videtur quod omne pronomen
demonstrativum demonstret tam ad sensum quam ad intellectum.
2.Adhuc cum multi sint75 sensus, scilicet quinque particulares et unus
communis, quare magis vocat Priscianus demonstrativum ad sensum
demonstrativum oculorum quam aurium aut narium vel huiusmodi.
66post presens] et add. P.

67et si] si P.
68post tamen] ad del. P.
69ut] s.l. add. P.
70Cf. William of Conches, In PMin, MS Paris BNF lat. 15130, f. 105rb (ad IG 17.59, vol. 2,
p. 143:8): Inveniuntur tamen. Quamvis per iste debeat sermo esse de re presente, tamen
sepe ponunt illud auctores in designatione absentis. Licet tamen. Dixerat ego esse
demonstrativum ad oculos, similiter tu, sed quia auctores per apostropham sepe ponunt
illa ubi non fit demonstratio ad oculum, notat illam figuram, ne reperientes illam Priscia-
num falsum iudicandum <dicerent>. Continuatio. Quamvis per tu dirigatur sermo ad
secundam presentem, tamen licet uti figura, protulisse auctores de absentibus {p.au.qua.
per ms.} id est dirigens sermonem ad absentem, quasi ad presentem, sed ne putaretur
quod hoc fieret propria locutione, dicit per figuram conversionis. Deinde notat eam Greco
nomine id est kata scilicet per, apostropham. Apostropha est quando loquimur ad
absentem quasi ad presentem, qui dicitur apostrophe id est conversio, quia numquam fit
hec figura / f. 105va / nisi prius locuti sumus de tercia persona. Quia ergo convertitur oratio
de una persona ad aliam, apostropha id est conversio vocatur. Tune. Cum Iuvenalis locutus
fuisset de Poncia ut de tercia persona dicens: sed Poncia clamat (Sat. 6:638), convertit
se ad illam ut ad presentem dicens: Tune duos etc. (Sat. 6:641). Cf. Peter Helias, Summa
super Priscianum, p. 959:2632: apostrophe conversio, et est quedam figura quando ad
rem absentem dirigimus sermonem tamquam ad presentem, sicut apud Iuvenalem, Tune
duos etc. Et ibi per hoc pronomen tu ad rem absentem dirigitur sermo. Falsum est ergo
quod superius diximus ego et tu semper esse demonstrativa oculorum. Ideo sic intelli-
gatur. Tu semper est demonstrativum oculorum vel quasi oculorum. Semper enim rem
quasi presentem designat.
71et] om. P.
72enim] om. O.
73significatio] signum O.
74significatum] signatum O.
75sint] sicut P.
3.Adhuc, cum plures sint potentie anime quam76 sensitiva et intellec-

tiva, sicut ymaginativa, memorativa, et huiusmodi, quare dat duo mem-
bra demonstrationis per sensum et intellectum, et non per aliquam aliam
potentiam sive virtutem.
4.Ad primum dicendum quod / P f. 142va / oppositio verum conclude-
ret, si diceretur demonstrativum ad sensum aut77 ad intellectum78 propter
id quod per vocem intelligitur, sed non est ita. Immo demonstrativum ad
sensum dicitur, quia res79 demonstrata sub sensu est,80 et demonstrati-
vum ad intellectum, quia res demonstrata non est sub sensu, sed vel est
absens vel intelligibilis.
5.Ad secundum dicendum quod completissimus et dignissimus
sensus81 est visus, qui plurimas rerum differentias nobis facit cognosci.
Adhuc demonstratio fit nutu aliquo corporali sicut motione manus vel
capitis vel digiti82 vel alicuius talis, cuius nutus corporalis visu apprehen-
ditur, et ideo dicitur potius demonstrativum oculorum quam alicuius alte-
rius sensus.
6.Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut dicit Aristoteles in Primo Secundi
De Sompno et Vigilia, omnia que cognoscimus sensu vel intellectu
cognoscimus,83 unde omnem demonstrationem que fit ad sensum et ad
intellectum reducit. Est enim demonstratio propter cognitionem, et com-
prehenditur sub demonstratione ad intellectum omnis demonstratio que
non est ad sensum.
Q.4.1.Consequenter queritur circa subdivisionem, et primo quare

prope et longe non sunt differentie relationis sicut84 demonstrationis.
2.Adhuc si debeant esse demonstrationis / O f. 39vb / solum, quare magis
sunt demonstrationis oculorum quam demonstrationis ad intellectum.
3.Adhuc quare magis accipiuntur85 differentie demonstrationis penes
differentias loci quam penes differentias temporis. Dicitur enim demon
strativum prope et longe, sed non ante et retro.
76quam] quam bis O.

77aut] sive O.
78post intellectum] propter id quod auditur de voce vel add. O.
79res] rei P r. O.
80est] esse P.
81sensus] sensuum O.
82digiti] digitorum O.
83Aristotle, On Dreams 1.458a33b3.
84post sicut] est add. O.
85accipiuntur] accipitur P.
4.Ad primum dicendum quod omnis relatio facit naturaliter cognitio-

nem intellectivam, quia facit cognitionem absentis vel eius quod est ut
absens. Apud intellectum autem non est diversitas apud apprehensionem
penes maiorem vel minorem86 distantiam apprehensibilis, quia intellectus
non est virtus corporalis aut organica. Apud sensum autem consistit penes
hec diversitas sicut patet, et sic patet87 tam primum quam secundum.
5.Ad tertium dicendum quod penes distantiam secundum locum
magis vel minus fit diversitas in cognitione sensitiva, penes autem diffe-
rentias temporis non, quia nichil sub sensu cadit nisi sub presenti et quod
presens est, et ideo non potuit demonstrativum ad intellectum diversifi-
cari penes differentias temporis sicut penes differentias loci.
Q.5.1.Deinde queritur de alia subdivisione, scilicet quare demonstratio

absentis et demonstratio non sensibilis sed intelligibilis magis dividant
demonstrativum quam relativum.
2.Adhuc quare magis demonstrativum ad intellectum quam ad sensum.
3.Ad primum dicendum quod omnis relatio pertinet ad cognitionem
absentis, et ideo non cadit dicta divisio.
4.Ad secundum88 dicendum quod contra demonstrationem ad sen-
sum est quod res89 demonstrata sit solum intelligibilis vel quod sit absens
et ideo non sic dividitur demonstrativum ad sensum.
Q.6.1.Adhuc dubitatur90 de demonstratione pronominis in compara-

tione ad demonstrationem nominis.91 Queritur enim quare per nomen92
demonstrativum aliud demonstratur quam significatur, per pronomen
demonstrativum idem significatur et demonstratur.
2.Et iuxta hoc queritur cum sit pronomen primitivum et derivativum
quare in pronomine primitivo omnino idem significatur et demonstratur,
in derivativo autem alico modo aliud significatur et aliud demonstratur.
3.Ad primum dicendum quod quedam sunt demonstrativa substantie,
quedam accidentium. Demonstrativa substantie pronomina sunt que, quia
significant substantiam et super illam immediate advenit demonstratio93
86minorem] mi P.
87et sic patet] om. P (homoioteleuton).
88secundum] tertium O.
89res] rei P.
90dubitatur] om. P.
91nominis] pronominis P.
92per nomen] pronomen P.
93demonstratio] om. P.
ad finiendum eam, omnino idem significant et demonstrant scilicet sub

stantiam. Demonstrativa vero accidentium per pronomina94 non possunt
significari, et ideo significantur per nomina ut talis, tantus et huiusmodi,
ista vero demonstrativa alico modo relativa sunt scilicet ad aliud depen-
dentia. Significant enim substantiam sub aliquo accidente secundum quod
convenit cum alico / P f. 142vb / in eodem accidente, ut talis idem est quod
huic similis, per hanc dictionem similis significatur substantia cum qua-
litate in95 comparatione ad aliam substantiam demonstratam96 per hoc
quod dico huic ut conveniunt in qualitate. Ex significatione igitur substan-
tie sub accidente significatur unum ex comparatione eius ad aliam sub
stantiam cui assimilatur in accidente, et ex accidentali97 demonstratione
illius rei datur ex demonstratione aliud intelligi, et sic patet primum.
4.Ad secundum dicendum quod pronomen primitivum unam perso-
nam tantum significat et demonstrat eandem, dirivativum autem duas
habet personas, scilicet personam possessoris sub genitivo primitivi quam
demonstrat98 et personam possessionis99 infinite quam significat et non
demonstrat, verbi gratia, meus id est mei vel100 servus vel equus etc., et
ideo pronomen primitivum non potest aliud significare et aliud demon
strare sicut potest pronomen derivativum.
Suppositum vs. Personalis proprietas

Robert Kilwardby, In PMin, P f. 144rb, O f. 41rb (ad IG 17.58, vol. 2,
p. 142:25)
Et distinguendum est101 sicut prius102 scilicet quod persona tertia que est
suppositum et res significata, per partem que dicitur suppositum respectu
94post pronomina] que del. O.

95in] tum a.c. O sub p.c. O.
96demonstratam] demonstrativa P, fortasse demonstrative legendum est.
97accidentali] actuali P.
98sub...demonstrat om. O.
99sub genitivo...possessionis] in marg. dextr. O.
100vel] om. P.
101distinguendum est] dicendum P.
102P f. 143rb, O f. 40rbva (ad IG 17.61, vol. 2, p. 144:14): Dubitatur hic primo de hoc quod
dicit in principio lectionis {in principio lectionis] om. O} sola pronomina sub diversis voci-
bus facere diversas tertias personas...Adhuc aut loquitur de persona que est suppositum
aut de illa que {illa que] illis quo P} est personalis proprietas. Si de illa que est suppositum,
tunc sunt diverse tertie persone {persone] om. P} apud nomen et verbum, sicut apud pro-
nomen, quia non possunt adeo multe res significari per pronomen quin adhuc plures per
verbum et nomen possunt significari. Si de persona que est personalis proprietas, sic non
sunt diverse tertie in pronomine. Omnia enim pronomina tertie persone sub una personali
omnium accidentium illius partis, et persona que dicitur personalis

proprietas.103
Primo modo accipiendo personam non est univoce persona in verbo
et in pronomine, quia respiciendo ad personam que est suppositum fit
pronomen cuiuslibet persone, verbum autem solum tertie, et ista persona
ex una parte est substantia, ex alia parte actio vel passio.
Secundo modo accipiendo personam utrobique est persona univoce
dicta in illis. Iste enim rationes quod aliquis de se loquatur, quod ad ipsum
vel de ipso fiat sermo104 univoce insunt pronomini et verbo, et tamen non
est ibi105 univocatio106 modo potissimo, sed modo analogie,107 quia iste
rationes insunt verbo per relationem108 ad substantiam existentem sub
eisdem, et sic intelligendum quod pronomen accipit personam verbi et sic
possunt concedi109 rationes ad partem primam inducte. Rationes autem
inducte ad secundam partem possunt solvi per predicta. Procedunt enim
accipiendo ex110 parte verbi personam, que est personalis proprietas, et ex
parte pronominis personam, que est suppositum...Sciendum tamen est
quod loquendo de persona que est suppositum111 ipsius actus eadem est
persona in pronomine et in112 verbo, et respiciendo ad illam dicitur intran-
sitio fieri sub idemptitate personarum sicut intuenti patebit. / P f. 144va /
proprietate cadunt, scilicet sub illa de qua fit sermo inter primam et secundam. Sic igitur
videtur quod pronomina non {non] om. P} faciunt diversis vocibus diversas tertias per-
sonas {personas] om. O} magis quam nomen aut verbum. Cf. Ps.-Jordan on personalis
proprietas and the function of pronouns above.
103Cf. O f. 55ra (ad IG 17.91, vol. 2, p. 158:22): Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est
persona, scilicet persona que est suppositum et que est personalis proprietas.
104est persona...sermo] om. O.
105post ibi] equivocatio del. O.
106post univocatio] uno add. P.
107analogie] analogice O.
108relationem] rationem O.
109concedi] om. O.
110ex] a P.
111 sciendum...que est suppositum] om. P (homoioteleuton).
112in] om. P.
13.A Note on articulatio and University Grammar
C. H. Kneepkens
Introduction
Two works on medieval linguistic thought devote serious and comprehen-

sive attention to the notion of linguistic articulation and its application by
modistic grammarians in their reflections on semantics.
As emphasised by Jan Pinborg in his invaluable work Die Entwicklung
der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter,1 the notion of the double semantic articu-
lation was of paramount importance to modistic grammatical thought. It
enabled the modistae to strictly determine the linguistic status of the pars
orationis against the dictio, and to give scientific underpinning to their
claim that the modi significandi and their mutual relationship with the
modi essendi and modi intelligendi are well defined and distinct areas of
research rooted in reality. According to Pinborg, the origin of this develop-
ment can be traced to Priscians semantic description of articulare in his
discussion of the vox as restricting by bestowing meaning on. Early and
mid-thirteenth-century masters such as magister Jordanus2 introduced a
more or less confused notion of articulation at the word and sentence
levels. By intertwining discussions on notions of articulare used in the
doctrines of the vox and the article (articulus) and adducing the doctrine
of the double imposition in these discussions, modistic grammarians were
able to develop a full-fledged operative theory of double articulation, as
exemplified in Boethius of Dacia: the prima articulatio concerns the sig-
nificatum speciale and makes a vox into a dictio, while the secunda articu-
latio relates to modi significandi and makes a dictio into a pars orationis.3
Consequently, double articulation was a key notion in modistic thought,
1J. Pinborg, Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter (Mnster: Aschendorff,

1967), pp. 4245. Thanks are due to Dr. Robert Olsen (Groningen) for help with the English
translation of this article.
2For this master, see M. Sirridge, Jordan, in H. Stammerjohan (ed.), Lexicon Grammati-
corum: Whos Who in the History of World Linguistics (Tbingen: Niemeyer, 1996), p. 491b.
3Boethius of Dacia, Modi significandi sive quaestiones super Priscianum maiorem, ed.
J. Pinborg and H. Roos, CPhD 4.1 (Copenhagen: GAD, 1969), pp. 262:83263:112. Pinborg,
Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie, p. 44 refers to C. Thurots Notices et extraitsde divers
manuscrits latins pour servir lhistoire des doctrines grammaticales au moyen ge (Paris:
222 c. h. kneepkens
one that was heavily critized during the dispute between the modistae
and their nominalistic opponents that occurred in Erfurt in the 1330s.4
In his Mirror of Grammar, Louis G. Kelly explores the background of
the rise of the modistae by examining the philosophical and theological
achievements of the foregoing periods that enabled the modistic gram-
marians of the second half of the thirteenth century to develop and elabo-
rate their specific approach to speculative grammar.5 Kellys first chapter
is devoted to modistic semantics and the history of the intellectual frame-
work within which such ideas reached maturity. Not surprisingly, the
terms and related concepts articulare/articulatio and imponere/impositio
play a prominent role in Kellys discussion.6 One of Kellys findings is that
the modistic grammarians often considered terms relating to articulatio
to be synonymous, particularly the articulatio ad placitum and impositio.
Any difference between the two terms may be derived from the fact that
articulatio is a functional term denoting the linkage between signifier
and signified as a state, and impositio a formal term denoting the assign-
ment of meaning as a process. Furthermore, like Pinborg, he points out
that, for the modistae, both terms were operative on two semantic levels:
the impositio prima and secunda, and the articulatio prima and secunda.7
Kelly starts his historical investigations of the grammatical notion articu-
latio by reviewing Lucretius and the Roman School Grammar tradition.
He then discusses Augustine, Boethius and Priscian, Vincent of Beauvais
and Master Jordan, before concluding with a reference to the modist John
of Dacia.
In both discussions of double imposition and articulation, there is a seri-
ous gap with regard to the period from Priscian to the 1270s. To increase
our understanding of the immediate roots of early modistic grammar, this
essay will focus on the notion of articulatio and examine the development
of it, while paying special attention to the achievements of the early uni-
versity grammarians of the thirteenth century.
Imprimerie Impriale, 1869; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1964), p. 487 for a medieval testi-
mony to the modistic character of the doctrine of double articulation.
4Pinborg, Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie, p. 181.
5L. G. Kelly, The Mirror of Grammar: Theology, philosophy and the modistae (Amster-
dam: John Benjamins, 2002).
6Kelly, Mirror of Grammar, pp. 1523 (this section is entitled Articulation, Imposition
and Porphyry).
7Kelly, Mirror of Grammar, pp. 19, 21.
a note on articulatio and university grammar 223
Articulatio from Antiquity to the Pre-University Period
Priscians appearance on the grammar scene changed the linguistic views

about articulation. He does not interpret the role played by articulare in
the doctrine of the vox in the traditional way, relating it to pronuncia-
tion and related features, but semantically as copulatus cum significatione,
allowing the notion of literatus to perform the function formerly attributed
to articulatus.8 This move brought the notion of articulatio close to that
of impositio, a term that was also known to Priscian and used with regard
to name-giving. The result is that Priscian distinguished between four
types of voces: articulata literata, articulata illiterata, inarticulata literata,
inarticulata illiterata.9 The impressive commentaries on Priscian of the
Glosulae tradition that started in the last decades of the eleventh century
only commented on Priscians description of articulatus and neglected the
traditional pre-Priscian interpretation.10
Peter Helias (fl. 114050) is a key figure in the history of medieval
grammar. He stands at the end of the Glosulae tradition and at the begin-
ning of the era of large grammatical textbooks (Summae). Moreover, his
Summa super Priscianum and, particularly, the part on the Priscian maior
remained a basic textbook for generations of grammarians, who used this
work either directly or indirectly through encyclopaedic works in which
large excerpts of this part of the Summa are found, such as, for example,
Vincent of Beauvais Speculum doctrinale. In discussing the doctrine of
8Unlike Priscian, who accepted articulatus as a semantic notion, the Roman School
Grammar tradition, which was also followed by Augustine and Boethius, used articulare/
articulatio to indicate the phenomenon that is nowadays called articulate in English, that
is, uttering distinctly or clearly pronouncing a word, with the addition for Antiquity and
the Middle Ages: to the effect that all the voice elements of the word in question can be
transposed into letters; cf. Kelly, Mirror of Grammar, pp. 15ff.
9Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 1.1 (ed. M. Hertz, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1855
59; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961), vol. 1, pp. 56): Vocis autem differentiae sunt quattuor:
articulata, inarticulata, literata, illiterata. Articulata est, quae coartata, hoc est copulata
cum aliquo sensu mentis eius qui loquitur, profertur. Inarticulata est contraria, quae a
nullo affectu proficiscitur mentis. Literata est, quae scribi potest, illiterata, quae scribi
non potest. Inveniuntur igitur quaedam voces articulatae, quae possunt scribi et intel-
ligi...quaedam, quae non possunt scribi, intelliguntur tamen, ut sibili hominum et gemi-
tus: hae enim voces, quamvis sensum aliquem significent proferentis eas, scribi tamen non
possunt. Aliae autem sunt, quae quamvis scribantur, tamen inarticulatae dicuntur, cum
nihil significent, ut coax, cra. Aliae vero sunt inarticulatae et illiteratae, quae nec scribi
possunt nec intelligi, ut crepitus, mugitus et similia.
10William of Conches is a notable exception; for the texts, see I. Rosier, Le commen-
taire des Glosulae et des Glosae de Guillaume de Conches sur le chapitre De Voce des
Institutiones Grammaticae de Priscien, CIMAGL 63 (1993), 11544, esp. 13334.
224 c. h. kneepkens
the vox articulata, Peter Helias summarises the tradition prior to him and
closely follows Priscians text, though he interestingly introduces the notion
of consignificatio alongside significatio in the description of articulatus. It
is important to stress that, for Helias, consignificatio does not mean, in
this context, the secundariae significationes (that is, the meaning-bearing
grammatical accidents) as it does in early thirteenth-century grammatical
writings.11 Instead, it indicates the type of meaning of syncategorematic
words, which are always dependent for their full meaning on their func-
tion in a sentence.12 Actually, this does not involve the phenomenon of
double imposition, but the distinction between the imposition of signifi-
cative words and co-significative or syncategorematic words.13
Another reference to the term complex of articulare is found in Helias
discussion of the article as a part of speech, which appears twice in his
Summa in almost the same wording: the first time in his comments on the
dictio in general in the Super maiorem, the other time, more concisely, in
a survey of the parts of speech in the Super minorem.14 The Latin gram-
marians were well-aware of the fact that the article is present in the
Greek language, but absent in Latin. Nevertheless, some relative nouns
and demonstrative and relative pronouns were considered to fulfill its
function in Latin. Medieval grammarians encountered discussions of this
deficiency and the substitutes that the Latin-speaking people used instead
of articles, in Priscians Institutiones grammaticae.15 In his Super minorem,
11For consignificatio and consignificata in early thirteenth-century grammar, see

I. Rosier, Res significata et modus significandi: Les implications dune distinction
mdivale, in S. Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachtheorien in Sptantike und Mittelalter (Tbingen:
Gunter Narr Verlag, 1995), pp. 13568, esp. p. 137; I. Rosier, Modisme, pr-modisme, proto-
modisme: vers une dfinition modulaire, in S. Ebbesen and R. L. Friedman (eds.), Medieval
Analyses in Language and Cognition (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences
and Letters, 1999), pp. 4581, esp. p. 56; C. H. Kneepkens, Significatio generalis and signifi-
catio specialis: Notes on Nicholas of Paris contribution to early thirteenth-century linguis-
tic thought, in Ebbesen and Friedman, Medieval Analyses, pp. 1743, esp. p. 31.
12See Pinborg, Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie, p. 33; cf. Peter Helias, Summa super Pris-
cianum, ed. L. Reilly (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993), pp. 69:70
70:75: Vox alia articulata est, alia inarticulata. Rursus vox alia litterata, alia illiterata.
Articulata est illa que copulata est alicui significationi sive consignificationi. Artare enim
est copulare, unde sumptum est articulo articulas diminutivum. Inarticulata est illa que
nulli significationi sive consignificationi coniuncta est; and p. 195:1718: omnis enim et
nullus et huiusmodi nomina nichil significant sed tantum consignificant.
13Cf. Kelly, Mirror of Grammar, p. 19; this implies that Vincent of Beauvais description
articulata est quae copulata est significationi sive consignificationi, which is an excerpt
from Helias Super maiorem, does not pertain to double imposition.
14Peter Helias, Summa super Priscianum, pp. 18587, 87679.
15Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 2.16 (vol. 1, p. 54) and 17.2729 (vol. 2, pp. 12427).
Helias follows Priscians discussion closely and deals with the definition of
the article, its name and etymology, the distinction between prepositive
and subjunctive articles, and the linguistic status of the words that served
as their substitutes in Latin. For Helias, the noun articulus resembles the
participle articulatus insofar as it also derives from the verb artare, which
he interprets as coniungere.16 However, the distinction between preposi-
tive and subjunctive articles that the medieval grammarians encountered
in Priscian was more interesting for their reflections on the doctrines of the
article and articulation. Prepositive articles are positioned before a noun
when declined to discern gender, case and number.17 Since Latin lacks
articles, the demonstrative pronoun hic/hec/hoc is used to fulfill this func-
tion: hic homo/hec mulier/hoc mancipium/huius hominis etc. Accordingly,
prepositive articles and their substitutes always function at the lexical
and declension levels. The subjunctive articles have a different function.
They are relative words and only occur in a sentence. Generally, they are
always put after the word they refer to, that is, their antecedent. When a
sentence is expanded by means of a relative clause, a sentence-internal
hierarchy of several referential and syntactic levels is created. Peter Helias
illustrates this phenomenon and its analysis with the sentence: Virgilius
scripsit Bucolica; is scripsit Georgica; idem scripsit Eneida. The proper
noun Virgilius makes the first supposition18 of the extra-linguistic entity
that the sentence is about;19 the relative pronoun is, which functions as
a subjunctive article, makes the second supposition and the first relation,
while the relative pronoun idem, which also functions as a subjunctive
article, makes the third supposition and the second relation.20
16Peter Helias, Summa super Priscianum, p. 185:1619: Articulus autem sumitur a verbo
articulo as, quod diminutivum est ab arto as. Articulare vero idem est quod copu-
lare. Inde dicitur articulus, eo quod refertur et per relationem precedenti dictioni quo-
dammodo copulatur, immo et orationem copulat orationi per relationem; p. 876:5861:
Articulus itaque est pars orationis apud Grecos...Dicitur autem articulus ab artando.
Artare vero est coniungere.
17Peter Helias, Summa super Priscianum, p. 186:2731: quidam tamen articuli ex officio
quodam dicuntur prepositivi, eo, scilicet, quod in declinatione preponuntur nominibus ad
discernenda genera et casus sicut hic et hec et hoc apud nos, nec ibi significant rela-
tionem sed solam generum et casuum discretionem, licet idem articuli in constructionibus
relative ponantur.
18In the Super maiorem, the term suppositio is supplanted by cognitio.
19Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 17.27 (vol. 2, p. 124:14ff.) uses the expression
prima/secunda notitia suppositorum.
20Petrus Helias, Summa super Priscianum, p. 877:8387: Virgilius scripsit Bucolica; is
scripsit Georgica; idem scripsit Eneida. Per hoc nomen Virgilius fit ibi prima rei suppo-
sitio, per hoc nomen is facio secundam rei suppositionem et primam relationem. Per hoc
226 c. h. kneepkens
The Period of Early University Grammar
One looks in vain for any reference to articulatio or related concepts in

the writings of the syntacticians of the late twelfth century, such as Robert
of Paris and Robert Blund. The same also holds true for the Absoluta cuius-
libet by Peter of Spain (Non-Papa), a text that largely supplanted Helias
Super Priscianum minorem in grammar instruction. Unfortunately, we are
ill informed about the history of grammar education in the early universi-
ties in Paris and Oxford due to an almost complete lack of texts.21 No uni-
versity commentary on the Priscian maior or minor has been discovered
that can be dated to the period between ca. 1200 and 1230.22 The earliest
texts that we have at our disposal are Robert Kilwardbys commentary
on Priscian minor and a selection of quaestiones from Nicholas of Paris
commentary on the first book of the Priscian minor, both texts dating to
ca. 123540.23 In all probability, the students examination guide pre-
served in MS Barcelona Arxiu de la Corona dArag Ripoll 109 belongs
to the same period.24 The Summa gramatica by Roger Bacon, who was
pronomen idem facio terciam rei suppositionem et secundam relationem. Helias makes
the analysis more complicated by claiming that, in this example, the pronoun/article is
is a prepositiverelativearticle. Moreover, it should be remarked that reflection on the
phenomenon did not start with Peter Helias, who was only a link in a long chain, albeit a
highly influential one.
21For grammar education in the early universities, see S. Ebbesen and I. Rosier-Catach,
Le trivium la Facult des arts, in O. Weijers and L. Holtz (eds.), Lenseignement des
disciplines la Facult des arts: Paris et Oxford, XIIIeXVe sicles (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997),
pp. 97128, and I. Rosier-Catach, La tradition de la grammaire universitaire mdivale, in
M. De Nonno, P. De Paolis, and L. Holtz (eds.), Manuscripts and Tradition of Grammatical
Texts from Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cassino: Edizioni dellUniversit degli Studi di
Cassino, 2000), pp. 44998.
22For a bio-bibliography of Robert Kilwardby, see O. Weijers and M. B. Calma, Le tra-
vail intellectuel la Facult des arts de Paris: Textes et matres (ca. 12001500), vol. 8, Rper-
toire des noms commenant par R (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), pp. 198219, and J. F. Silva,
Robert Kilwardby, in H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy
between 500 and 1500 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), vol. 2, pp. 1148a53a.
23For Nicholas of Paris, see H. A. G. Braakhuis, De 13de eeuwse tractaten over syncategore-
matische termen (Ph.D. diss., Leiden University, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 31739; H. A. G. Braakhuis,
Logica Modernorum as a Discipline at the Faculty of Arts of Paris in the Thirteenth Cen-
tury, in Weijers and Holtz, Lenseignement des disciplines, pp. 12945; O. Weijers, Le travail
intellectuel la Facult des arts de Paris: Textes et matres (ca. 12001500), vol. 6, L-M-N-O
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 19197; C. H. Kneepkens, Nicholas of Paris, in H. Stam-
merjohann (ed.), Lexicon grammaticorum: A bio-bibliographical companion to the history
of linguistics, 2nd ed. (Tbingen: Niemeyer, 2009), p. 1083.
24Anon., Le Guide de ltudiant dun matre anonyme de la Facult des Arts de Paris au
XIIIe sicle, ed. C. Lafleur (Qubec: Facult de Philosophie, Universit Laval, 1992); see also
acquainted with Kilwardbys commentary, was most likely written some

years later.25
Kilwardby includes Priscians division of the vox into litterata/illitterata
and articulata/inarticulata in his discussion of the subject matter of gram-
mar in the prologue to his commentary Super Priscianum minorem, where
he equates articulatus with significativus.26 He adapts this division in such
a way, however, that the category of the vox litterata inarticulata consists
of the littera and the syllaba, and he does not make any mention of Pris-
cians animal cries such as coax.27 The lettered and articulated voces are
the dictio and the oratio, which he associates with two different grammati-
cal domains: the dictio with the etymologia (that is, the doctrine of the
parts of speech with emphasis on morphology) and the oratio with the
diasynthetica, which corresponds to our notion of syntax.28 This means
C. Lafleur and J. Carrier (eds.), Lenseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe sicle: Autour du

Guide de ltudiant du ms. Ripoll 109 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997).
25I. Rosier-Catach, Roger Bacon and Grammar, in J. Hackett (ed.), Roger Bacon and the
Sciences: Commemorative essays (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 67102, esp. p. 68.
26Cf. n. 28 below; Kilwardbys discussion of the vox in his Notule on Aristotles Peri
hermeneias does not offer anything new with respect to the discussions in his Notule
super Priscianum minorem; see Robert Kilwardby, Notule super librum Perihermeneias, ed.
P. O. Lewry (unpublished edition), pp. 1920: Ad illud ergo dicendum quod...uox sim-
pliciter proprie est in hominibus, minus proprie in brutis, minime proprie in inanimatis,
ut dicimus quod quedam inanimata uocant, ut tuba et lira, set ubi proprie uox, ibi pro-
prie differentia uocis. Manifestum ergo quod dicitur significatiua que aliquid significat
homini; non significatiua que nichil significat homini. Quod patet ex uerbis Prisciani
dicentis quod uox articulata est que profertur copulata cum aliquo sensu mentis eius qui
loquitur. Si ergo sensus mentis est intellectus, ut uult Priscianus dicens {fortasse glossa
in Institutiones grammaticae, vol. 1, p. 5:1}, sensibile idest intelligibile, et mens est solius
hominis, et loqui similiter, per hec tria manifestum est quod significatiua est differentia
uocis humane. Vnde dicit Priscianus quod mugitus est uox inarticulata, idest non signifi-
catiua. Et sic est aliqua diuisio; si uero extendamus uocem, nulla est diuisio, set est omnis
uox significatiua.
27See n. 9 above.
28Robert Kilwardby, Notule super Priscianum minorem, MS Vat. BAV Chigi L.V.159,
f. 1ra: Si uox litterata, aut simpliciter aut contracta. Si simpliciter uox litterata, ergo debet
gramatica tractare de omni uoce litterata etiam de non-significatiua....Adhuc sequeretur
cum uox litterata primo inueniatur in litteris, quod gramatica primo et principaliter esset
de litteris. Quod falsum est, quia non agit de litteris nisi propter orationem congruam et
perfectam. Si subiectum sit uox litterata contracta, aut ergo uox articulata aut inarticulata.
Sed neutra potest esse subiectum totius gramatice, cum in aliqua parte eius agatur de uoce
litterata inarticulata sicut de littera et sillaba, in aliqua autem de articulata sicut de dictione
et oratione. Nec potest aliter contrahi uox, ut uidetur, ad hoc ut sit subiectum gramatice,
quia iste sunt proprie differentie uocis. Cum igitur neque littera neque sillaba neque dictio
neque oratio neque aliquid commune ad hec possit esse subiectum gramatice, queritur
quid erit eius subiectum....Adhuc sic sumpto subiecto diuidi potest gramatica secun-
dum diuisionem ipsius subiecti sic. Cum gramatica sit de oratione constructa, aut igitur
228 c. h. kneepkens
that he implicitly accepts articulation at two levels: the lexical (word) and
the syntactic (phrase or sentence).
In Kilwardbys comments on Priscians discussion of articulus (Insti-
tutiones grammaticae 17.27),29 we encounter new developments in the
doctrine of semantic articulation. Priscian deals, in this section, with the
notitia30 of the supposita, that is, the linguistic presentation of a know-
able form of whom or what the talk is about, that is, the referent of a
word, phrase or sentence.31 Kilwardbys discussion of the part of speech
of the article (articulus) derives from Helias comments on this topic in
his Super maiorem, but he replaces Helias term cognitio with Priscians
term notitia.32 The first presentation of a person or thing as knowable
in a sentence is called the notitia prima and is based on the imposition
of the word, which, in turn, occurs on the basis of the quality or form
of the person or thing in question and provides a vox with significatio.33
considerat ipsam in se et sic diasintetica, aut in suis partibus et hoc dupliciter, scilicet uel
in partibus significatiuis et sic ethimologia, uel nonsignificatiuis et hoc dupliciter. Aut
enim est pars nonsignificatiua simplex et de tali est ortographia, aut composita cuiusmodi
est sillaba, et de tali est prosodia, dico pro aliquo accidente ipsius sillabe.
29The Latin grammatical tradition was, as already mentioned, well aware of the fact
that the article is absent in Latin. Kilwardbys reflections on this phenomenon are as fol-
lows (Super minorem, ff. 7vb8ra): Et dicendum quod parcium orationis quedam sunt de
esse gramatice sicut nomen et uerbum et aliquo modo pronomen et participium, quedam
autem sunt de bene esse, scilicet partes indeclinabiles. Partes autem que sunt de esse
gramatice oportet manere easdem apud omnes. Partes autem que sunt de bene esse non
oportet. Huiusmodi pars est articulus. Nomina enim Greca sunt confusa sub eadem termi-
natione seruancia omnia genera, omnes casus et huiusmodi, sicut sunt apud nos nomina
que uocamus indeclinabilia siue monaptota, ut gelu, cornu. Et ideo excogitabantur
articuli ad distinguendum diuersos casus, diuersa genera, diuersos numeros et sub eadem
uoce. Si autem nomina eorum inflexa essent sub diuersis terminationibus, non eguissent
articulis. Nos autem habemus uoces inflexas secundum terminationes diuersas. / Quare
articulus non erat nobis necessarius. Patet igitur quod absentia articuli apud nos et pre-
sencia eiusdem apud Grecos non diuersificant gramaticam essentialiter apud nos et apud
illos, sed solum accidentaliter.
30For Peter Helias use of cognitio and suppositio instead of Priscians notitia, see nn.
1819 above.
31For this interpretation of suppositum, see S. Ebbesen, Early Supposition Theory
(12th13th cent.), Histoire pistmologie Langage 3 (1981), 3548, esp. 3638 (repr. in
S. Ebbesen, Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Aldershot/Farnham: Ashgate, 20089), vol. 2, pp. 114).
32In all probability, the discussion of the article that Kilwardby found in the Absoluta
cuiuslibet, which he considered to be Helias Super minorem, was too meagre for his pur-
poses; see C. H. Kneepkens, The Absoluta cuiuslibet attributed to P.H.: Some notes on its
transmission and the use made of it by Robert Kilwardby and Roger Bacon, in I. Angelelli
and P. Prez-Ilzarbe (eds.), Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain (Hildesheim: Olms,
2000), pp. 373403.
33Kilwardby, Super minorem, f. 10va: Ad hoc dicendum quod duplex est noticia, prima
scilicet et secunda. Prima noticia rei fit per qualitatem siue per formam a qua fit uocis
impositio. Secunda fit per dispositiones siue per comparationes accidentales ipsius rei per
A novelty in this discussion of articulus is Kilwardbys claim that the

imposition does not involve any knowledge about the meaning-bearing
secondary grammatical categories, which he calls the consignificationes.
These consignificationes and the functions of the word in question in a
sentence that gives information about the actual dispositions and circum-
stances of the significatum as presented in the sentence in question are
not involved in the imposition as such.34 This is why, in his discussion
of the articles, he calls the significatum, that is, the extra-linguistic thing
signified, the suppositum, for it is the suppositum, that is, the bearer, of the
consignificata that are signified by the consignificationes. Kilwardby calls
knowledge of the consignificata of the thing signified its notitia secunda.
Conferring the consignificationes on a word happens by two processes: the
prima and secunda articulatio. The first articulation regards the word out-
side a sentence or phrase and establishes its meaning-bearing secondary
grammatical categories, such as case, number and gender. The second
articulation concerns the word used in a sentence.35
As to the doctrine of articulatio, Kilwardby offers two important inno-
vations: (1) he distinguishes the vox articulata at the lexical level and at
the level of the sentence; (2) in the doctrine of the article, he presents
a distinction in signification between significatio and consignificatio. The
significatio is the result of the impositio; it is confused with respect to the
quas ipsa res accipit diuersas consignificationes, scilicet diuersa genera, diuersos numeros
et casus et huiusmodiet hoc dico quantum ad articulos declinationisaut per quas ipsa
res fit ordinabilis respectu alterius in oratione, scilicet secundum quod ab ea exit actus
uel secundum quod ipsa recipit actum uel huiusmodi et hoc dico quantum ad articulum
constructionis. Prima igitur noticia fit per ipsam impositionem dictionis.
34Kilwardby, Super minorem, f. 10vb: Ad quintum dicendum quod equiuocatur suppo-
situm. Procedit enim oppositio de supposito uerbi, et in diffinitione articuli accipitur non
solum sic, immo etiam pro significato dictionis confuse, antequam articuletur per diuersas
consignificationes aut ordinationes. Significatum enim est subpositum et fundamentum
consignificationum.
35Kilwardby, Super minorem, f. 11rb: Et dicendum quod articulus declinationis articulat
primam noticiam que est impositio termini, per secundam noticiam que est consignifica-
tio termini. Significatio autem et consignificatio per eandem partem representantur, sed
significatio dinoscitur ex parte principali, consignificatio autem ex parte finis, dico autem
apud nos, et non habent signa diuersa representatiua eorum. Et ideo articulus declina-
tionis licet naturaliter medium sit inter significationem impositionis et consignificatio-
nem, non tamen ponitur medio loco secundum situm. Sed quia preponi debet articulus
ei per quod fit artatio et hoc est consignificatio per eandem dictionem representata cum
significatione, ideo articulus declinationis articulato per ipsum preponitur. Similiter etiam
articulus prepositiuus constructionis inmediate distinguit casum in dictione sicut nomi-
natiuum uel accusatiuum per hunc modum ordinationis ut potest ab eo exire actus uel
ut potest terminare actus. Et quia super distinctionem casus, qui est consignificatio, cadit
inmediate, ideo preponitur articulato per ipsum.
230 c. h. kneepkens
consignificationes and the position of the relevant word in a sentence or

construction; this state of confusion is removed by the article or its substi-
tutes, the case endings that present the second notitia.36 Both the articu-
latio prima and secunda are exclusively operative in the domain of the
consignificationes. Furthermore, in this section Kilwardby clearly associ-
ates the prima notitia with the significatio and the impositio dictionis, and
the secunda notitia with the consignificatio termini, that is, the meaning-
bearing grammatical accidentia.37
The grammmatical legacy of Nicholas of Paris is unimpressive. In addi-
tion to two minor commentaries on Donats Barbarismus and Ps.-Priscians
De accentibus, we only have what nowadays would be called a partial edi-
tion of a commentary on Priscian minor. It consists of dubitabilia with
corresponding solutions, commonly considered the most interesting and
original part of a university commentary. Consequently, the divisio textus
and expositio are missing. Although the author does not explicitly mention
the term articulation, he makes an interesting allusion to this phenom-
enon which allows us to conclude that for him the prima notitia was the
signification that results from the impositio dictionis: the semantic relation
between the thing referred to and the signifying vox. The function of the
article was to indicate the secunda notitia, which belonged to the domain
of grammatical accidents:
Dubitatur primo de diffinitione articuli. Et uidetur quod sit inconueniens.
Articulus enim diuiditur in articulum constructionis et declinationis. Sed
articulus declinationis non facit secundam noticiam. Ergo ista diffinitio non
conuenit cuilibet articulo. Et ita uidetur diminuta....Ad primum dicendum
quod articulus declinationis non facit secundam noticiam. Et tamen dif-
finitio est competens, quia solum diffinit articulum constructionis. Cuius
ratio est quod hic determinat de constructione. Et ideo solum articulum
ad constructionem pertinentem diffinit. Vel aliter potest dici quod conuenit
36Kilwardby, Super minorem, f. 10vab: Sed quia adhuc de se est significatio confusa
respectu consignificationum ordinationum diuersarum, adduntur ei articuli ad demon
strandum secundam noticiam circa ipsam secundum predictum modum. Hec patent
manifeste in Gallico quod distinguit articulos. Si enim dicatur mester, confusum est
adhuc respectu casuum et respectu ordinationum diuersarum in oratione. Si enim dicitur
li meistre determinatur in eo nominatiuus et determinatur ei ratio ordinationis / ut ab
eo potest egredi actus, quod patet sic dicendo li meistre lit. Si autem dicatur le mestre
determinatur ei accusatiuus et ratio ordinationis, ut recipiat actum sic io uei le mestre.
37A similar view is found in the Tractatus de constructione by Gosvin of Marbais, who
was active in the third quarter of the thirteenth century; see Gosvin of Marbais, Tracta-
tus de constructione, ed. I. Rosier-Catach (Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1998), p. 51, and her refer-
ences to S. Lusignan, Parler vulgairement (Paris: Vrin, 1986), pp. 2627 and Kilwardbys
commentary.
cuilibet articulo, quia prima noticia habetur per relationem significati ad

uocem significantem, secunda uero habetur quantum ad diffinitionem acci-
dentium.38
The Students Examination Guide39 provides its readers with the know
ledge that should enable them to pass examinations in the Faculty of Arts.
It contains introductory sections and review questions with correspond-
ing answers in the fields of natural, moral and rational philosophy. The
section on grammar deals with such introductory issues as the subject
matter and division of grammar and goes over the four textbooks (Pris-
cian maior and minor, the Barbarismus and De accentibus) that were pre-
scribed by the cardinal legate Robert of Couron in his letter of 1215 to the
University of Paris.40 Discussing the subject matter and parts of grammar,
the anonymous master deals with Priscians fourfold division of the vox.
The vox lit(t)erata articulata is subdivided into the two kinds presented
in Kilwardbys prologue to his Priscian minor commentary. The first kind
is the result of an articulatio simplex and concerns single words, as only a
simple concept is involved. The author calls this articulation the articula-
tio ad significandum. The vox li(t)erata articulated by this articulation is
the subject of etymologia or morphology, and is dealt with in the Priscian
maior. The other kind of the vox li(t)erata articulata is the result of articu-
latio composita. It concerns the construction of two words and an intellec-
tus compositus is involved.41 The vox lit(t)erata articulated by articulatio
composita is the subject of dyasinthetica or syntax, which is dealt with in
the Priscian minor:
De uoce uero ratione qua est articulataest enim articulatio duobus modis:
quia in simplici intellectu uel composito, ideo secundum hanc materiam
sunt alie due partes gramatice, inquantum una agit de simplici articula-
tione et est articulatio ad significandum. Et hec pars dicitur ethimologia
uel interpretatio dictionum. Et hec pars determinatur in...Alia enim pars
est que est de articulatione composita. Et hec determinatur in Minori uolu-
mine. Et dicitur dyasinthetica a dya, quod est duo, et sinthesis, quod est
38Nicholas of Paris, Questiones super primum Priscianum q. 8 (MS Oxford Bodleian Lat.
misc. f.34, f. 8va).
39See n. 24 above.
40For a discussion of the section of grammar in the Guide, see I. Rosier, La gram-
maire dans le Guide de ltudiant, in Lafleur and Carrier, Lenseignement, pp. 25579,
esp. pp. 26667.
41This is the binary constructio dictionis cum dictione consisting of a dependens and a
terminans; it became the basic type of construction in Latin grammar from the last quarter
of the twelfth century onwards.
232 c. h. kneepkens
compositio: ibi enim agitur de constructione uel compositione dictionum

que in duobus consistit adunitis.42
This section is a summary of Kilwardbys discussion about the subject
matter and division of grammar in the prologue to his Priscian minor
commentary. It is interesting, however, to see, that in this study aid we
encounter not only the twofold division of the vox articulata, but also
explicit mention of the notions underlying it, the articulatio simplex and
composita. Furthermore, the articulatio ad significandum as described here
closely resembles the impositio dictionis. In the part of the Guide that deals
with the Priscian minor, the student is asked why Priscian gave priority
to the treatment of articles (dictiones articulares) rather than pronouns.
The answer is twofold: articles are principles of construction, and they
distinguish some accidents that may act as means for nominal construc-
tion. Like Kilwardby, the author of the Guide claims that there is a close
connection between articles or their Latin substitutes and the meaning-
bearing secondary grammatical categories:
Item solet queri quare prius agit de constructione dictionum articularium
quam pronominum. Ad hoc dicimus, sicut dictum est, quod articuli sunt
principia construendi et etiam, sicut patet, de articulis qui discernunt que-
dam accidentia que sunt media construendi nomen.43
The commentaries on Priscian belonging to the university grammar
tradition44 follow the path traced by their forerunner Kilwardby in his
discussion of the vox lit(t)erata articulata as the possible subject of gram-
mar. If university masters mention the notion of articulatio, they mostly
accept Priscians semantic interpretation of it. They also adopt and specify
his distinction between the articulatio at the lexical and syntactic levels,
for unlike Kilwardby several of them explicitly use the notions of first and
second articulation when dealing with the doctrine of the vox articulata.
Unfortunately, a serious problem for the evaluation of their respective
contributions to the discussion is that the active teaching period for the
majority of these masters can only be approximately established. It is very
difficult, therefore, to determine their mutual relationships and exactly
assess the value of their contributions. Master Jordan does not use the
term articulatio, but speaks about speech that is articulated on a first
42Anon., Guide de ltudiant, p. 82.

43Anon., Guide de ltudiant, p. 128.
44For the university grammar tradition and the masters Jordan, Arnold and De Quili-
Verbi, see Rosier-Catach, La tradition, pp. 44998.
level, which is a word that signifies by means of its proper imposition, and
speech that is articulated in consequence, which is a sentence (or phrase),
the meaning of which is based on the impositions of its meaningful parts.45
The also unknown magister Arnoldus explicitly distinguishes between the
first and second articulation in his commentary on the Priscian minor. In
his view, imposition plays a central role in bringing about the first articu-
lation of a vox, for it is through imposition that a vox becomes articulated
to signify one concept. Second articulation relates to binary constructions
in which the modes of signifying play a directive role.46
Very few commentaries, however, mention Kilwardbys reflections on
the notitia prima and secunda in his discussion of articles and the arti-
cle-like words in his comments on Priscians Institutiones grammaticae
17.27. Kilwardbys views are absent from the commentaries by Jordan and
Arnold, though present in the commentary by a master called De Quili-
Verbi, whose text is close to Gosvin of Marbais remarks on this subject,47
although De Quili-Verbi explains the term accidentia by referring to modi
45Jordan, Notulae super Priscianum minorem, ed. M. Sirridge, CIMAGL 36 (1980), 2:

Vel aliter potest dici quod grammatica diversificatur secundum ea quae requiruntur ad
sermonem ordinatum ad significandum. Haec autem sunt: literatum, articulatum, debito
modo pronuntiatum. Articulatum est duobus modis: primo, et ex consequenti. Articula-
tum primo est dictio quae significat per suam propriam impositionem. Articulatum ex
consequenti est oratio quae significat per impositionem partium. See also Kelly, Mirror
of Grammar, p. 19.
46Magister Arnoldus, Super Priscianum minorem, MS London BL Harleian 2535, ff.
1vb2ra: Aut gramatica est de sermone inquantum est articulatus. Sed hoc potest esse
dupliciter secundum quod dupliciter est articulatio: prima et secunda. Prima articulatio
habet fieri per actualem uocis impositionem ad significandum per quam impositionem
ipsa uox articulatur ad representandum unum mentis conceptum ita quod non opposi-
tum. Qua articulatione uocis Priscianus loquens in principio maioris uoluminis dicit quod
articulata uox est que cum aliquo sensu mentis eius qui loquitur est copulata. Secunda
autem articulatio dictionis habet fieri per actualem ordinacionem dictionis cum dictione
sub accidentibus determinatis ita quod non sub oppositis. Aut igitur erit de sermone
articulato articulacione prima, et sic est secunda pars gramatice que dicitur ethimologia
in qua fit consideratio de uoce quantum ad est significatiua et artata ad significandum.
Que pars gramatice traditur a Prisciano a principio illius partis: Et dictio est pars usque in
finem maioris uoluminis, et dicitur ethymologia: ars et sciencia de flore sermonis uel de
sermone florido. Est enim de sermone significatiuo. Sermo autem significatiuus dicitur
floridus sermo propter hoc quod sicut flos est decor et ornamentum, et significacio. Aut
erit consideratio de sermone articulato articulatione secunda, et sic est tercia pars gra-
matice que dicitur dyasinthetica in qua fit perscrutacio de constructione dictionis cum
dictione in qua dictiones articulantur ad modos significandi <de>terminatos sub quibus
debite construa<n>tur ita quod non sub oppositis. Que pars gramatice traditur a Prisciano
in minori uolumine, et dicitur dyasintetica a dya quod est de et / sin quod est con
et thesis quod est positio, quasi scientia est de compositione et ordinacione dictionis
cum dictione.
47See n. 37 above.
234 c. h. kneepkens
significandi.48 Kilwardbys ideas also appear in the Lectura super minori

volumine Prisciani by the enigmatic master Robertus Anglicus, who, how-
ever, remains silent about articulatus/articulatio in his discussion of the
causa materialis or subject matter of grammar.49
Pseudo-Kilwardby, the author of a commentary on Priscian maior that
for decades was attributed to Kilwardby,50 presents a more complicated
notion of articulation which conflicts with Kilwardbys view in more than
one respect. Unlike Kilwardby, he argues that the littera and syllaba also
are articulated voces, though at a different level. They may not be inde-
pendently articulated on their own like a word or phrase, but function
only as articulated voces in something else. The articulated vox that func-
tions on its own has a threefold division, based on the final causes of the
three sermocinal disciplines: congruum, verum and ornatum. A vox can be
articulated with respect to (linguistic) congruity; this happens in an artic-
ulation that concerns the general modes of signifying. The vox articulated
in this way is the subject of grammar. A vox can become articulated with
respect to truth in an articulation that concerns the significata specialia.
The vox articulated in this way belongs to logic. Finally, a vox can become
48Magister de Quili-Verbi, Super Priscianum minorem, MS Paris BNF lat. 15035, f. 20va:
Vnde debemus scire quid sit prima notitia et quid secunda. Prima notitia est cognitio sig-
nificati dictionis. Secunda notitia est cognitio significati ipsius dictionis per sua accidentia,
scilicet per suos modos significandi, sicut per casum, numerum et sic de aliis. For this
master de Quili-Verbi, see Rosier-Catach, La tradition, pp. 46669.
49Robertus Anglicus, Lectura super minori uolumine Prisciani, MS Florence BNC Conv.
Soppr. D.2.45, f. 5r: Ad huius autem diffinitionis plenam expositionem notandum quod
duplex est suppositum, scilicet suppositum actus ut persona supponens uerbo, et est sup-
positum qualitatis ut altera pars significati ipsius nominis, scilicet substantia que dicitur
esse suppositum respectu qualitatis. Noticia autem prima huius substantie habetur per
qualitatem siue formam uniuersalem uel particularem. Secunda uero noticia habetur per
articulum aduenientem ei et ipsam coartantem. Si enim dicam antropos elthen, idest hic
homo uenit, sicut ista dictio articularis hic contrahit hominem ut stet pro masculo, ita iste
articulus oc contrahit antropoc ut stet pro masculo. Si uero dicerem antropoc elthen, iste
articulus prepositus hoc {! ms.} contrahit antropoc ut stet pro femella. Antropoc enim est
communis generis. Diffinitur etiam sic articulus apud Grecos: Articulus est pars orationis
casualis significans secundam rei noticiam quantum ad declinationem in tribus acciden-
tibus, scilicet in genere, numero et casu. Tota tamen utilitas declinationis consistit in his
tribus. For a discussion of the several masters called Robertus Anglicus in the thirteenth
century, see A. Grondeux and I. Rosier-Catach, La sophistria de Robertus Anglicus (Paris:
Vrin, 2006), pp. 7283.
50See S. H. Thomson, Robert Kilwardbys Commentaries In Priscianum and In Barba-
rismum Donati, New Scholasticism 12 (1938), 5265. Kilwardbys authorship of this com-
mentary is questioned by P. O. Lewry, The Problem of Authorship, CIMAGL 15 (1975),
12+17+.
articulated with respect to linguistic embellishment; this happens in an

articulation that concerns the decent word order. The vox articulated
in this way pertains to rhetoric. Ps.-Kilwardby clearly allots the articula-
tion involving the modi significandi generales to grammar, whereas logic
is concerned with the significata specialia.51 We must bear in mind that
the general modes of signifying are constitutive of the parts of speech.
According to Ps.-Kilwardby, they are the exclusive domain of grammar.
Final Remarks
Priscians semantic interpretation of articulatus in the doctrine of the vox

became dominant in theory-directed grammatical treatises, notwithstand-
ing the fact that it was in complete conflict with mainstream opinion in
Latin antiquity.
In the period before Kilwardby, discussions of the article and its Latin
substitutes indicate an etymological relationship between articulatus and
articulus, but any direct link between the doctrines of the semantic articu-
latio and the articles articulatio is lacking. The function of the preposi-
tive article in indicating and clarifying some accidentia of the nomen is
stressed by Peter Helias, and displays a slight relationship between the
article and the secondary grammatical categories. Although Peter Helias is
aware of the doctrine of the first and second imposition,52 no association
has been made with the vox articulata or the prepositive article.
51Ps.-Robert Kilwardby, Commentum super Priscianum maiorem, ed. K. M. Fredborg et al.,

The Commentary on Priscianus Maior Ascribed to Robert Kilwardby, CIMAGL 15 (1975),
1146, esp. 39: vox litterata dicitur duobus modis: uno modo dicitur litterata quia est prin-
cipium litterationis, alio modo quia constat ex litteris. Similiter articulata dicitur duobus
modis: uno modo in se, alio modo in altero. Primo modo dictio et oratio, secundo modo
littera et syllaba. In se tripliciter: una est articulatio respectu congrui quae est quantum ad
modos significandi generales, alia respectu veri et hoc est quantum ad significata specialia,
alia respectu ornatus et hoc fit quantum ad ordinem verborum et decentiam. Dicendum
ergo quod vox litterata quantum ad litteratam primo et secundo modo et articulata primo
modo et secundo articulatione prima quae est respectu congrui est subiectum grammati-
cae commune per predicationem.
52See, for example, his discussion of the sentence Socrates habet ypoteticos sotulares
cum cathegoricis corrigiis in Summa super Priscianum, p. 833:2632; see also S. Ebbesen,
The Present King of France Wears Hypothetical Shoes with Categorical Laces: Twelfth-
century writers on well-formedness, Medioevo 7 (1981), 91113 (repr. in Ebbesen, Collected
Essays, vol. 2, pp. 1530).
236 c. h. kneepkens
Robert Kilwardbys widely used commentary on Priscian minor also

appears to have been a seminal work that encouraged the transformation
of Priscians notion of semantic articulation into the concept of double
articulation that was so crucial to modistic semantic theory. In his discus-
sion of the vox, we meet, for the first time in the history of grammar, the
explicit distinction between the vox articulata at the lexical and syntactic
levels. In the generation of university grammarians following Kilwardby
(e.g., master Arnold), the syntactic level is converted to the level of binary
construction that became one of the central syntactic notions in thir-
teenth-century grammar.
In the doctrine of the article, Kilwardbys commentary also presents
two kinds of articulation: at the lexical and syntactic levels, both of
which relate, however, to the domain of the consignificationes, that is, the
meaning-bearing secondary grammatical categories. The meaning con-
ferred on the vox by imposition is confused as far as the grammatical acci-
dentia or consignificationes are concerned. This confusion is removed by
the prima and secunda articulatio. Kilwardbys notion of impositio relates
significatio to Priscians dictio, whereas his notion of articulatio relates
consignificatio to Priscians pars orationis.
The university grammarians in the period following Kilwardby also
introduce the term articulatio in the doctrine of the vox articulata. This
means that the phenomenon of Priscians semantic articulation was given
a fixed, technical term, articulatio, that corresponds to a related operative
concept. In the comments on the doctrine of the article, one can observe
an increasing inclination to consider the secunda notitia specifically con-
significationes and modi significandi-orientated.
The commentary of Ps.-Kilwardby presents, as its central conclusion,
the view that the semantic articulation of the vox with regard to the
significata specialia does not belong to the domain of grammar, but of
logic. Grammar is exclusively concerned with the articulation of the gen-
eral modes of signifying of the vox articulata that are constitutive of the
several partes orationis. This implies that pars orationis as pars orationis
exclusively belongs to the domain of grammar.
Ps.-Kilwardbys view on the articulation of the vox is also found, in
a more elaborate way, in Boethius of Dacias Modi significandi. Accord-
ing to Boethius, the second articulation relates to the modi significandi
and necessarily presupposes the result of the first articulation,53 which

involves the determinatum significatum (Ps.-Kilwardbys significatum spe-
ciale). For him, the first and second articulation are two hierarchically
arranged stages of the imposition of the vox, which he also associates with
the prima and secunda notitia.54
53For the doctrine of double articulation in modistic language theory, see also
C. Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio nella scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 12701330; La semi-
otica dei modisti (Rome, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, 1994), pp. 62, 79, 128,
15354, and I. Rosier-Catach, Grammar, in R. Pasnau (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medi-
eval Philosophy, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), vol. 1, pp. 196216,
esp. p. 197.
54Boethius of Dacia, Modi significandi, pp. 262:89263:98: Et quia naturaliter prius est
significare quam significare hoc modo vel illo sicut nominaliter vel verbaliter, ideo cum
vox in sua impositione artatur ad determinatum significatum, artatur etiam ad determi-
natum modum significandi; et haec est articulatio vocis secunda sive artatio eius, quia
modus significandi naturaliter sequitur significatum et praesupponit ipsum, et sicut vox
imposita ad significandum primam facit notitiam ipsius significati, sic modi significandi
designantes circa ipsum significatum diversas proprietates et modos essendi, secundam
ipsius significati faciunt notitiam. For Boethius contribution to modistic linguistics, see
Pinborg, Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie, pp. 7886.
14.Explanation and Definition in Thomas Aquinas
Commentary on Aristotles Metaphysics
Fabrizio Amerini
In his forty-year career, Sten Ebbesen has dealt with a great number of
medieval topics, and metaphysics has not escaped his notice. In a series
of texts that, in recent years, Sten has published in the Cahiers de lInstitut
du Moyen-ge Grec et Latin and elsewhere, he has, among other things,
directed the attention of scholars to the presence of sensitive logical and
semantical issues in the commentary tradition on Aristotles Metaphysics.1
In this paper I want to continue this line of investigation and focus on
the interconnection between logic and metaphysics. I will not, however,
approach this issue from the usual perspective of the relation between
these two sciencestheir borders, methods and subject-matter. My con-
cern, rather, is to discuss the contribution that (syllogistic) logic can give
to metaphysics, that is, the role that it can play in a metaphysical explana-
tion of natural phenomena. Since the medievals normally read Aristotles
Metaphysics as a work applying the Posterior Analytics theory of science to
the field of metaphysics, (syllogistic) logic is supposed to structure the way
of doing investigation in metaphysics. An interesting example of such an
interconnection is given by Metaphysics 7.17, the chapter where, according
to some contemporary interpreters, Aristotle extends the Posterior Analy
tics explanation theory from attributes to substances. The present paper
deals with Thomas Aquinass interpretation of this chapter.
1See, e.g., S. Ebbesen, Words and Signification in 13th-Century Questions on Aristotles

Metaphysics, CIMAGL 71 (2000), 71114, and S. Ebbesen, Radulphus Brito on the Metaphys-
ics, in J. A. Aertsen, K. Emery, and A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philoso-
phie und Theologie an der Universitt von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts (Berlin:
De Gruyter, 2001), pp. 45692 (repr. in S. Ebbesen, Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Aldershot/
Farnham: Ashgate, 20089), vol. 2, pp. 197208). See also S. Ebbesen, Five Parisian Sets of
Questions on the Metaphysics from the 1270s to the 1290s, in F. Amerini and G. Galluzzo
(eds.), A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on the Metaphysics (Leiden: Brill,
forthcoming).
240 fabrizio amerini
Aquinas on the Logical Character of Aristotles Examination

of Substance in Metaphysics 7
At the beginning of his commentary on book seven of the Metaphysics,

Aquinas notices the affinity between logic and metaphysics. This is quite
usual. The occasion is given by Aristotles claim that the examination of
the notion of substance, understood as essence, will be first set forth in a
logical way (, logice).2 It is not easy to establish what Aristotle pre-
cisely meant by .3 What is certain, however, is that for many con-
temporary interpreters Aristotle changes the way of scrutinizing substance
not starting in book eight but from the last chapter of book seven. At the
very beginning of 7.17, in fact, Aristotle states that he wants to approach
afresh the question of substance: since substance is some sort of principle
and cause, the examination of substance must, he claims, restart from
this point.4 Aquinas regards such anticipation as unnecessary, for there
is a point in 7.17 where Aristotle explicitly reconnects the examination
of substance qua principle with the preceding examination of substance
qua essence.5 For Aquinas, such a connection shows that in 7.17 Aristo-
tle is continuing to investigate substance in a logical way. Moreover,
since Aquinas links the logical way with definition and predication, such
a connection also shows that in 7.17 Aristotle aims to illustrate, in a very
general way, in what sense essence and definition can be explanatory of
a things substantiality. Only with book eight does Aristotle come to the
metaphysical investigation properly speaking, when he introduces the
notions of form and matter into the analysis and accounts for them as
metaphysical principles of a things substantiality.6 Of course, this does
not mean that in book seven Aristotle never mentions form and matter,
but when he does, Aquinas explains, he is either anticipating what he will
say in the subsequent book,7 or he is still scrutinizing matter and form in a
2Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.4.1029b13.

3For the state of discussion, see G. Galluzzo and M. Mariani, Aristotles Metaphysics,
Book Zeta: The contemporary debate (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2006).
4Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.17.1041a67: ,
.
5Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.17.1041a2730.
6Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio 8, lect. 1,
n. 1681 (ed. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1950), p. 402).
Henceforth, this commentary is referred to as Exp. Met.
7See, e.g., Aquinas, Exp. Met. 7, lect. 11, n. 1536 (p. 370).
explanation and definition in thomas aquinas 241
logical way.8 But before looking more closely at Aquinass interpretation,

let me briefly trace Aristotles line of reasoning in 7.17.
An Outline of Metaphysics 7.17
7.17 can be divided into two parts. In the first half (1041a6b11), Aristotle
clarifies how to address correctly, in the case of substances, a causal expla-
nation, while in the second half (1041b1133), Aristotle excludes a material
element or something composed of material elements from serving as the
explanatory principle of a material substances being. For our purposes,
the first part is significant, because in it Aristotle recalls some aspects
of the analysis of definition and explanation devised in book two of the
Posterior Analytics.9 First, Aristotle notes that every explanatory proce-
dure must start with a -question and such a question must make
evident the belonging of something to something else. Why is the musi-
cal man a musical man?, to take Aristotles example, is not a well-formed
question, because the cause of the identity of a thing with itself cannot be
searched for, so such a question must be rephrased as Why does musical
belong to man? to obtain the right explananda. If an explanatory proce-
dure must account for the fact that a given accidental property belongs to
a given subject, Aristotle further notes that every explanatory procedure
must presuppose the evidence of the fact that has to be explained (). In
his example, when we ask Why does musical belong to man?, we must
already know that man is musical because our enquiry aims precisely at
the cause of this fact, namely, that being musical belongs to man. The
same must be said for the existence () of the thing involved in the
fact. No explanatory procedure can be undertaken for the existence of
a thing, because existence must always be presupposed. Indeed, asking
Why does a musical man exist? is equivalent to asking Why is the musi-
cal man a musical man?, but this second question is, as was said, mean-
ingless. In such a case, the evidence of the fact, namely, the existence of a
(musical) man, already provides a full answer to the question about why a
(musical) man exists and is a musical man. The fact that a thing is identi-
cal with itself or that it exists admits of no further explanation.
8Aquinas at times hesitates on this point. See, e.g., Exp. Met. 7, lect. 2, n. 1275 (p. 321);
7, lect. 13, n. 1576 (p. 379).
9See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.2.90a14ff.; 2.10.94a4ff.
By such brief remarks, Aristotle recalls that a correct explanatory proce-

dure always has to involve two terms and must make manifest the cause
of the inherence of one of them in the other. This implies that every
-question must be correctly articulated to obtain the right explananda.
This is required in the case of substances as well as in the case of natural
events like thunder and artifacts like a house. What is worth noting is that
in 7.17 Aristotle also applies this standard Posterior Analytics translation-
mechanism to substances and their essential properties: as in the case
of thunder or house, to ask What is a man? or Why does a man exist?10
must be properly expanded into Why are flesh and bones a man? or Why
does man belong to the animal-kind? In this case, Aristotle argues, it is
the substantial form that gives the cause of the matters being arranged
in such and such a way and hence explains, in the case of man, why flesh
and bones have the form-man or why man exhibits the animal-kind.
At this point, Aristotle concludes that explaining a phenomenon always
amounts to searching for its cause and that the cause is the of
such a phenomenon, logically speaking (): in some cases, namely,
when generation and corruption are concerned, the cause is of the effi-
cient type, while in some other cases, namely, when being is concerned,
it is of the final type. What does Aristotle mean by the sentence that the
cause is the , logically speaking? Philologists disagree on this
sentence. Christ and Jaeger, for example, expunge it on the grounds that
it anticipates the conclusion of 1041b79; but Ross gives an interpreta-
tion that makes the expunction unnecessary.11 According to Ross, Aris-
totle means something like the following: to state the matter abstractly
(), the cause is the of the inherence of the predicate in
the subject. But in the concrete, the expresses the final cause, in
some cases, or the efficient cause, in other cases. In other words, accord-
ing to Ross, Aristotle would argue that the formal cause is not actually a
distinct cause over and above the final and the efficient.12
This is an outline of the first part of the chapter. As we shall see shortly,
Thomas Aquinas resists the reading proposed by Ross, especially Aristotles
10The Greek text at 1041b1 has . Interpreters such as Bonitz suggest

introducing a ( <> ) to maintain the parallel between the case of man
and those of thunder and house. On this issue, see W. D. Ross, Aristotles Metaphysics,
2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), ad loc.
11For a status quaestionis, see M. Frede and G. Patzig, Aristoteles Metaphysik Z (Munich:
Beck, 1988), ad loc.
12Ross, Aristotles Metaphysics, vol. 2, p. 223. For the same idea, see Posterior Analytics
2.11.94b1821.
implicit invitation to reduce the formal cause either to the final or to the
efficient cause. What, then, does Aristotle attempt to do in the final chap-
ter of book seven, according to Aquinas?
Aquinass Interpretation of Metaphysics 7.17
When medievals comment on this chapter, they seem to be interested in

ascertaining two points of Aristotles doctrine of substance: first, whether
Aristotle regards substance qua essence also as a principle and a cause,
and second, whether the explanatory (why-questioning) procedure and
the definitional (what-questioning) procedure are reducible in the case
of substances. The main purpose is to establish whether an explanatory
procedure can be undertaken for simple items such as man.
As far as I can tell, medieval commentators fundamentally give the
same response to the first question.13 They hold that in 7.17 Aristotle
reproposes a basic tenet of his theory of science, namely, the logical
equivalence between the practices of defining and explaining things. In
this respect, the reference to the and to is significant
for medievals. As to Aquinas, he takes the adverb as qualifying generally
the difference between the points of view of the logician and the meta-
physician: both endow the with explanatory force, but while
the logician includes in the of a given phenomenon its intrinsic
causes (that is, the formal and the material) as well as its extrinsic causes
(the efficient and the final), the metaphysician considers only the intrinsic
causes.14 What is noteworthy for the present issue is that Aquinas assumes
that the explanatory procedure can give rise to two different explanations
depending on whether intrinsic or extrinsic causes are concerned.
(S1) Normally, we raise a why-question to search for the cause of a
given phenomenon. For example, when we wonder Why does it thunder?
and we respond that It thunders because noise occurs in the clouds, we
have pointed out the cause of thundering. In this case, the answer gives
13There are, however, commentators who do not raise any questions at all on this
chapter. This is the case, for example, with Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito, Giles of
Rome, John Duns Scotus and Antonius Andreae in their respective Quaestiones in Meta-
physicam.
14Aquinas, Exp. Met. 7, lect. 17, n. 1658 (p. 396): Logicus enim considerat modum prae-
dicandi, et non existentiam rei. Unde quicquid respondetur ad quid est, dicit pertinere
ad quod quid est; sive illud sit intrinsecum, ut materia et forma; sive sit extrinsecum, ut
agens et finis. Sed philosophus, qui existentiam quaerit rerum, finem vel agentem, cum
sint extrinseca, non comprehendit sub quod quid erat esse.
the formal cause of thunder by making clear the fact that a certain kind of
form, namely, the noise, inheres in a certain kind of matter, namely, the
clouds. The formal cause is tasked with accounting for the matters being;
in the example of thunder, a certain kind of noise, which has yet to be
fully specified, is intended to explain the clouds feature of having sound,
and in doing so, it is intended to explain the existence of thunder and its
identity as a phenomenon of a given kind.
(S2) In a second step, once the cause of a given phenomenon has been
even approximately identified, we can reiterate the why-question and
search for the cause of the cause of the phenomenon under inquiry. For
example, if we pursue our investigation about thunder and ask Why does
noise occur in the clouds?, our response can be ultimately that noise
occurs because fire is extinguished. In the case of natural events like
thunder, our explanatory procedure ends with pointing out the funda-
mental efficient cause (just like, in the case of artifacts such as a house,
the explanatory procedure ends with indicating the fundamental final
cause of the arrangement of matter). On this account, the efficient (or
the final) cause is tasked with a different goal, that is, accounting for the
conditions for the forms being present in the matter. Unlike the formal
cause, the efficient (and the final) cause is not intended to explain the
kind-identity of thunder (or house); its role is, rather, to explain the condi-
tions for each instance of thunder (or house) concretely to occur, that is,
for the formal cause to be able to confer being to matter.15
We shall return to this important two-step process at the end of the
article. For present purposes, it suffices to note that Aquinas seems to
see nothing wrong with saying that the efficient and the final causes are
the causes of the formal cause. This is in agreement with what Aquinas
has already stated in his commentary on book five of the Metaphysics,
the chapter on cause, where the efficient cause is presented as the cause
of the causality of both matter and form (causa causalitatis et mate-
riae et formae): the efficient cause makes matter able to receive form
and form able to inform matter.16 One must not forget, though, that for
Aquinas the efficient and the final causes are extrinsic causes of a pheno
menon, metaphysically speaking, so the causal dependence of the formal
cause on the efficient or the final cause does not necessarily entail the
15Aquinas, Exp. Met. 7, lect. 17, nn. 165657 (p. 396). See also Thomas Aquinas, Expositio
libri Posteriorum 2, lect. 7 (ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1989),
p. 198:3141). The latter work is henceforth referred to as Exp. Post.
16Aquinas, Exp. Met. 5, lect. 3, n. 782 (p. 215).
elimination of the formal cause, its reduction to the efficient or to the

final. If this is what Aquinas also means by the distinction between the
logical and metaphysical account of a phenomenon, he would not accept
a series of efficient or final causes as the fundamental explanatory rea-
son, metaphysically speaking, for a certain kind of phenomenon having a
certain kind of being. From Aquinass point of view, the formal cause is
more fundamentally explanatory, metaphysically speaking, than the effi-
cient and the final causes are, and this is so because it is related to matter
more intimately than the final and, above all, the efficient causes are. This
conclusion holds in the case of natural events and artifacts, but alsoand
more stronglyin the case of natural substances.
There are three reasons, I think, that can explain this aspect of Aqui-
nass commentary. The first is that, for Aquinas, every phenomenon (natu-
ral or artificial) can be described as the inherence of a certain property in
a subject that is composed of matter and form, so the hylomorphic model
is crucial for understanding Aquinass interpretation of Aristotles theory
of scientific explanation. The second, related reason is that, for Aquinas,
only form can act directly upon (prime) matter, so only the formal cause
is able to provide an internal explanation of the existence of a given phe-
nomenon and of the kind of phenomenon it is. This explains why, from
Aquinass perspective, the matters actualized being cannot be reduced
to the conditions (especially of the efficient type) that have permitted
the forms being actually present in the matter. The third reason is that
Aquinas believes that, unlike in the case of artifacts, in the case of natu-
ral substances the final cause somehow coincides with the formal cause.
This means that, in the case of natural substances, if reduction holds, it
is the final cause that must be reduced to the formal cause and not vice
versa. Aquinas acknowledges that, since any other cause is ordered to the
final one, the final cause can be called the cause of the causes (causa
causarum).17 On the other hand, he also knows that the identification
between formal and final cause in the case of natural substances is open
to debate, for some philosophers deny that Aristotle allows that natural
substances exist for an end (propter finem). Aquinas seems to agree that,
in the case of natural substances, the formal cause plays the major role,
but at the same time he stresses that Aristotles recourse to the examples
of artifacts within the discussion of substances in 7.17 unequivocally shows
that for him natural substances as well exist for an end. If so, since the
17See, e.g., Aquinas, Exp. Met. 5, lect. 3, n. 782 (p. 215).

final cause of the substances being is that for the sake of which they are,
and this is the form, Aquinas can draw the conclusion that the final cause
is internal to natural substances and identical with the formal cause. In
other words, in the case of natural substances, the final form does not
indicate anything else for the sake of which substances are, but rather the
form for the sake of which their matter is.18
As noted, medieval commentators tend to give the same response to
the first question mentioned above: they assume that Aristotle considered
substance qua essence as principle and cause, and therefore assume that
Aristotle endowed it with explanatory force. This is quite natural for the
medievals, since they take as a commonplace that essence, as expressed
by the definition, principally states the form of the defined thing, and form
is the cause of the matters and the composites being. Nonetheless, they
recognize that the interconnection between definition and explanation
calls for further clarification when it applies to substances, because, as
Averroes and Albert the Great point out, it appears incorrect to start off
an explanatory procedure in the case of simple substantial items, since in
their case no cause could explain the inherence of the essential properties
in the subject.19 Aristotles question Why does man belong to animal? is in
fact misleading according to Albert, because there is no cause of the fact
that man is an animal other than its being a man. In a section of 7.17 that the
medievals read as a corollary (1041b911), Aristotle himself concedes that
in the case of simples ( ) neither explanation nor teaching is
possible, but a different kind of investigation must be developed.
It is not clear what Aristotles point about simples is. If, on the one
hand, Aristotle seems to repropose in 7.17 his doctrine of the logical inter-
connection of definition and explanation, he appears, on the other hand,
to recognize that neither can the explanatory procedure be regarded as
properly definitional nor is the definitional procedure properly explana-
tory: in fact, by raising a -question on the absolute being of a thing,
Aristotle claims, the why or the fact that this is that is not yet made evi-
dent.20 As mentioned, Bonitz struggled to avoid the opposition between
definition and explanation in the case of substances by reading the
18Aquinas, Exp. Met. 7, lect. 17, nn. 165960 (p. 396). See also Summa contra Gentiles
3.24 and 3.64; Summa theologiae 1.2.3.
19Averroes, In Metaphysicorum libros Commentarium 7.59 (Venice: apud Junctas, 1572;
repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962, f. 207gi); 7.60 (f. 208g); Albert the Great, Metaphysica 7.5.8
(ed. B. Geyer (Mnster: Aschendorff, 1964), pp. 384:63385:17).
20Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.17.1040a32b2.
at 1041b1 as <> , but Ross convincingly

argued that such a conjecture is unnecessary because Aristotle already
supported the reduction of definition to explanation in Posterior Analytics
2.2.89b3990a21. What is new in 7.17, according to Ross, is that Aristo-
tle extends to the definition of substances the reduction he elaborated in
the Posterior Analytics for the definition of attributes.21
Thomas Aquinas seems to have worries about such a reduction in the
case of substances. It is true that, in his works, Aquinas often recalls that
the two procedures lead to the same result and that this is what permits
the translation of definitional procedures into explanatory procedures. But
Aquinas also stresses that such procedures reach the same result in differ-
ent ways.22 This second claim seems to mean two things for him. First, it is
a mistake to think that a definitional procedure can be imposed for things
for which there can be no explanatory procedure; but second, it is also
a mistake to think that the definitional procedure can be eliminated in
favor of the explanatory procedure. According to Aquinas, neither overlap
nor opposition holds between definition and explanation, and the reason
is precisely that they account for the same phenomenon, but not in the
same way. In fact, the response to a what-question makes explicit what
the response to a why-question states only implicitly, namely, the essence
of a thing, just like the response to a why-question makes explicit what
the response to a what-question states only implicitly, namely, the cause
of the essence of a thing.
Aquinas also acknowledges that someone could remark (just like Bonitz
does) that Aristotles doubt about simples is unjustified, since what is at
stake in 7.17 is not the definition of simples but rather the possibility of
explaining them. Aquinas, however, replies (just like Ross does) that such
an objection can be obviated. Since a definitional procedure can always
be translated into an explanatory procedure, in the section of the chapter
devoted to simples Aristotle was suggesting, once more, that even in the
case of simple material substances a causal investigation is possible and
that it must proceed only after the why-question has been correctly formu-
lated. Only a well-formed why-question can make manifest the fact that
the form is the cause of such-and-such an arrangement of matter, which
allows a thing to belong to a certain natural kind. Nevertheless, Aquinas
insists, the goal of the first half of the chapter is not to give arguments for
21Ross, Aristotles Metaphysics, vol. 2, p. 224.

22See, e.g., Aquinas, Exp. Post. 2, lect. 1 (pp. 17576); 2, lect. 8 (pp. 203:133204:214).
reducing definition to explanation, as argued by Ross and other modern-

day interpreters, but rather to clarify the connection between explanation
and definition, that is, to make evident the explanatory character of the
definitional procedure even in the case of substances.23 And for Aquinas
this clarification is precisely a result of the logical approach that Aristo-
tle adopts in book seven. Since substance qua essence being some sort
of cause and principle is the point of departure of Aristotles argument
and not his point of arrival, Aquinas consequently assumes that Aristotles
main purpose in 7.17 is simply to make this stipulation clear. Aristotles
core argument of the chapter therefore runs as follows for Aquinas:
(i) that about which no why-question can be raised, but to which

every other question can be traced back, necessarily is principle
and cause;
(ii) but substance qua essence satisfies this condition;
(iii) therefore, substance qua essence is principle and cause.24
Aquinass argument presupposes much of his interpretation of the Poste-

rior Analytics explanation theory. Reconstructing the causal (efficient or
final) story of a phenomenon is for Aquinas an important cognitive path
in order to discover its essence and the conditions for such an essence to
obtain.25 The reason is that, as Aquinas also says in his commentary on
Metaphysics 2, no causal chain (no matter of what kind) can be infinite,
and since no why-question can concern essence, it follows that, when a
causal chain cannot be further extended, it has reached (even provision-
ally) the essence of the investigated phenomenon.26 At that point, the
essence can be expressed by way of a definition.27 It must be remembered,
however, that, for Aquinas, the causal traceability of a phenomenon does
not coincide with its essence. This is true at least for the metaphysician,
23See Aquinas, Exp. Met. 7, lect. 17, n. 1651 (p. 395); nn. 166365 (p. 397), especially n. 1663.
24Aquinas, Exp. Met. 7, lect. 17, n. 1649 (p. 395): Est autem vis suae rationis talis. Illud,
de quo non quaeritur per quaestionem propter quid, sed in ipsum alia quaesita reducun-
tur, oportet esse principium et causa: quaestio enim propter quid, quaerit de causa. Sed
substantia quae est quod quid erat esse, est huiusmodi. Non enim quaeritur propter quid
homo est homo, sed propter quid homo est aliquid aliud. Et similiter est in aliis. Ergo
substantia rei, quae est quod quid erat esse, est principium et causa.
25See Aquinas, Exp. Post. 2, lect. 7 (p. 200:25568).
26Aquinas, Exp. Post. 2, lect. 36 (pp. 18396). See also Aquinas, Exp. Met. 2, lect. 24
(pp. 8491).
27See Aquinas, Exp. Met. 2, lect. 2, nn. 299300 (p. 85); Exp. Post. 2, lect. 7 (p. 198:27ff.).
See also Aquinas, Exp. Post. 1, lect. 33 (p. 120:44ff.); 1, lect. 34 (p. 124:9ff.).
as was noted above. If some relevant causal (efficient or final) chains can
help the metaphysician to find out the essence of a given phenomenon,
it remains that, for the metaphysician, it is only the essence (that is, the
formal cause, above all) that can establish the kind-identity for the inves-
tigated phenomenon and explain its necessary properties.
Until now, we have spoken of essence and definition in an absolute
way. Aquinass position on the interconnection between explanation and
definition is, however, much more articulated than that presented here. In
particular, in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics Aquinas follows
Aristotle in carefully distinguishing between two types of definition: the
quid est-definition (e.g., thunder is a noise in the clouds) and the prop-
ter quid-definition (e.g., thunder is a noise of fire being extinguished in
the clouds). While the former does not express the cause of the defined
phenomenon and can be only the conclusion of a demonstration, Aqui-
nas explains, the latter can express the cause and can be exhibited as
the middle term in the appropriate causal demonstration that concludes
with the existence of the defined phenomenon.28 Relying on this distinc-
tion, we could complicate the process of explanation and describe it as
a movement from a quid est-definition to a propter quid-definition, that
is, to a definition that has been supplemented by a reference to the fun-
damental efficient or final cause. This important distinction, however,
does not occur in Aquinass commentary on 7.17. Why does Thomas not
introduce it?
It is not easy to answer this question. A possible reason could be that
such a distinction is not present in 7.17 and in general it appears unnec-
essary to account for Aristotles argument of the chapter. Nevertheless, it
is presupposed to a certain degree. In fact, when Aquinas unqualifiedly
speaks of definition, he seems to have in mind the quid est-definition, while
when he relates definition to explanation, he seems to refer to the propter
quid-definition. But there can be a second, stronger reason that explains
Aquinass omission. It concerns his distinction between the points of
view of the logician and the metaphysician. If we connect the distinction
between the two kinds of definition with the two-step process illustrated
above, we can conclude that the metaphysician especially deals with quid
est-definitions, while the logician makes use of propter quid-definitions; in
other words, the distinction between the two types of definition could be
28On this, see Aquinas, Exp. Post. 2, lect. 8 (pp. 203:78ff.). For further details, see Exp.
Post. 1, lect. 16 (p. 61:6196) and 2, lect. 1 (pp. 17576).
traced back to the distinction between the points of view of the logician
and the metaphysician. Finally, a third reason could be invoked. It is that
such a distinction, as we shall see shortly, albeit relevant for the case of
attributes, somehow collapses in the case of substances.
Explaining Attributes vs. Explaining Substances
The impression that an interpreter can retain from Aquinass commen-

tary on 7.17 is that Aquinas sees no special problem with applying the
Posterior Analytics explanation theory to substances. Indeed, Aquinas
seems to think that it is possible to explain why a given substance is a sub-
stance of a given kind. One aspect of his interpretation of 7.17, however,
demands further attention, and it is an aspect that concerns a point of
difficulty in Aristotles text. Aristotle concludes the first part of the chap-
ter by stating that in every explanatory procedure about substances we
are looking for the cause of matter (this is the species) whereby matter
is something (this is a substance). The phrase whereby matter is some-
thing translates the Greek , which William of Moerbeke renders
into Latin as qua aliquid est.29 This text actually allows two different
interpretations:
(I1) the cause of matter (that is to say, the formif Christs expunction
of the parenthetical sentence this is the species ( )
is rejected, as Ross suggests) is that whereby matter is something.
(I2)the cause of matter (that is to say, the form) is that whereby some-
thing is.
Opting for (I1) or (I2) is not without consequences for the general assess-
ment of the chapter. On the first interpretation, to which Ross seems to
incline, the explanatory procedure applied to attributes and substances
is seen as similar: both have the form Why does B belong to A? and, in
both cases, one searches for the cause of Bs belonging to A. On the second
interpretation, by contrast, a definitional procedure is intended to reveal
the cause of a things being A, and this explains why, given that the exis-
tence of the explanandum is presupposed, the definitional procedure is
29Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.17.1041b79: ( )

. . For the Latin rendition, see Aristotle, Metaphysica: Recensio
et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem, AL 25.3.2 (Leiden: Brill, 1995),
pp. 166:928167:929.
endowed with explanatory force. More importantly for the present argu-
ment, the equivalence between the two questioning practices can give rise
to different results in the case of substantial simples. On the first interpre-
tation, equivalence obtains only if one proves that simples are somehow
composed; on the second interpretation, it instead obtains if one proves
that explanation is possible also for simples.30
Aquinas seems to favor the second interpretation (I2), but he also rec-
ognizes that, according to Aristotles doctrine, the why-question can be
posed only about things that exhibit, more or less superficially, a com-
positionalhylomorphic or hylomorphic-likestructure. Following this
intuition, Aquinas limits Aristotles exclusion of simples from the domain
of explainable things to the supernatural substances, the only substances
not composed of matter and form.31
Aquinass interpretation was very successful and was followed by many
other commentators.32 There are, however, interpreters who challenge
it. Antonius Andreae, for example, criticizes two points. First, Aquinas
equates the why-question and the what-question, but as is clear, this
is a mistake, for even if definitional procedures can be translated into
explanatory procedures, the definitional procedure of itself does not have
any explanatory force. Second, Aquinas believes that in the corollary to
the first part of the chapter by simples Aristotle meant to refer to super-
natural substances. For Antonius, this is also a mistake. By this reference,
Antonius notes, Aristotle only meant to reaffirm in 7.17 the basic differ-
ence between two scientific practices, namely, that of defining simple
items and that of explaining complex facts or phenomena.33
Antonius remark is worth noting. In fact, 7.17 contains a tension that
surfaces in Antonius criticism of Aquinas. It concerns the problem of the
inter-translatability of definition and explanation when simple substantial
items are concerned. There is no doubt that, following the indications of
the Posterior Analytics, a medieval interpreter can have sound arguments
30On these different interpretations, see Anonymus Zimmermanni, Quaestiones in

Metaphysicam 7.36 (MS Cambridge Peterhouse 152, f. 43rb).
31Aquinas, Exp. Met. 7, lect. 17, nn. 166971 (pp. 39798).
32See, e.g., Alexander of Alessandria, In XII Metaphysicorum libros expositio 7.17 (Ven-
ice: apud Simonem Galignanum, 1572, ff. 240vb41ra), and Augustine of Ancona, Quaes-
tiones in Metaphysicam 7.17 (MS Innsbruck Universittsbibliothek 192, f. 129vb). For other
cases, see Anonymus Zimmermanni, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam 7.37 (f. 43rbva), and
William of Bonkys, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam 7.37 (MS Cambridge Gonville and Caius
College 344, f. 81rbvb).
33Antonius Andreae, Expositio Metaphysicorum 7.2.17 (in John Duns Scotus, In XII
libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. L. Wadding, Opera Omnia 4 (Lyon: Durand,
1639), p. 293ab).
to ascribe to Aristotle the thesis that, in all cases, definitional and explana-
tory procedures can be translated into each other. Aristotle clarifies the
reason for their translatability in Posterior Analytics 2.2.90a9ff., where he
identifies the essence of a phenomenon with the fundamental cause, that
is to say, the one that is explanatory of the necessary properties exhibited
by the phenomenon in question and of its following causes. The funda-
mental cause is supposed to be unique, so the essence is the fundamental
cause not only because it explains the concrete occurrence of a phenom-
enon (indeed, that does not suffice, since different causal stories can
explain the occurrence of the same phenomenon), but also, and rather,
because it explains the kind itself of the phenomenon. It is indeed the
type that accounts for all the necessary properties characterizing every
token belonging to that type.34 As already pointed out, in 7.17 Aristotle
clarifies that such a cause is of the efficient type when generation and cor-
ruption are concerned and of the final type when being (like in the case
of artifacts) is concerned. But (1) what makes some features the essence
and the fundamental cause? And (2) how can this machinery apply to
substances?
In a recent article devoted to Aristotle and definition, David Charles
provides an illuminating response to the first question: a feature (or a
collection of features) counts as the fundamental cause and the essence
if it is prior both in some relevant causal order (notably, efficient or final)
and in the order of definition. In particular, something is prior in defini-
tion if it is what it is independently of any other relevant causal feature
and if the other elements in the relevant causal story of a thing are defined
in terms of it. This permits the conclusion that, for Aristotle, the essences
of natural phenomena can be definitely established through an accurate
examination of the relevant causal story of such phenomena.35
From a medieval perspective a response like the one advanced by
Charles could only be accepted with some qualifications. First of all,
although the medievals generally accept the logical interconnection
between the two questioning-procedures, as was said, nonetheless most
of them elaborate a non-reductionist account of their relationship. This
is the case of Thomas Aquinas. The interplay of the two procedures is
34See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.3.90b16; Topics 6.4.141a27ff.

35D. Charles, Definition and Explanation in the Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics,
in D. Charles (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),
pp. 286328. For further discussion, see D. Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
evident in Aquinas,36 but what he finally suggests by his discussion of the

interconnection between definition and explanation in his commentary
on the Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics 7.17 is that if causal explana-
tion is needed to discover essence and to endow it with explanatory force,
nonetheless the essence of a phenomenon cannot be reduced to its causal
(efficient or final) story.37
A second qualification also has to be introduced. As noted, much of the
problem with 7.17 depends on the fact that Aristotle extends the Posterior
Analytics explanation theory to substances. The second question above
was how this theory applies to substances. In answering this question,
David Charles observes that 7.17 is but a preliminary chapter because the
demonstration provided for the case of a house, which should parallel the
one provided for the case of thunder and be introductory to that of man,
only partially does so. In the case of artifacts, Aristotle replaces the effi-
cient cause, which plays a key role in the case of natural events like thun-
der, with the final cause. But only in 8.2 does Aristotle perfect this parallel
by replacing being a house with a relevant paraphrase of it (being a shel-
ter for men). At this point, if one projects the 8.2 analysis of house back
to 7.17, one obtains a demonstration for the case of man that parallels that
for the case of house, a demonstration in which being a man is ultimately
replaced with its final cause (being two-footed).38
Speaking this way, Charles underscores the similarities rather than the
dissimilarities that Aristotle would have seen between the explanation of
house and that of man, and makes the explanation of man fundamentally
depend on the causal action exerted by the form-man on matter. That cer-
tainly makes good sense. The dissimilarities are, however, important if one
looks at the parallel between house and man from Aquinass standpoint.
Indeed, he thinks that house and man cannot be explained in the same
way. The reason for the non-parallel is that while the matter of which the
form-house is predicated (bricks and stones) exists before and indepen-
dently of the form-house, the matter of which the form-man is predicated
(flesh and bones) does not. As a consequence, the syllogism that Aristotle
could have had in mind aims, for Aquinas, at a different goal. It cannot
explain why matter exhibits a certain form, precisely because matter does
36See, for example, what Aquinas says about thunder in Exp. Post. 2, lect. 3 (pp. 183
86). See also Exp. Post., 2, lect. 45 (pp. 18792).
37Aquinas, Exp. Post. 2, lect. 1 (p. 176:174238).
38For a slightly different reconstruction of the argument, see I. Bell, Metaphysics as an
Aristotelian Science (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2004), pp. 16986, at pp. 17273, 176.
not exist before and independently of form. It rather has to help us decide
whether a member belongs to a kind, whether an already formed matter
can belong to the kind-man. This purpose is better reached if man is
defined as rational animal. It is in virtue of animality and rationalitys
belonging to a certain type of matter that humanity can belong to the
same type of matter. This is Thomas point.
This reformulation makes clearer the abstractly explanatory function
achieved by essence and its logical relation to definition. The definition
of man summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for decid-
ing whether a certain material substance is a man, and for this reason
definition is explanatory. Reading the argument in this way, one could
attempt to reconcile the above interpretations (I1) and (I2) of 1041b78:
stating that the form is the cause whereby the matter is something, is
equivalent to stating that the form is the cause whereby something exists.
Here something (aliquid) not only denotes a given concrete thing, but
also connotes the kind of the thing. This makes understandable Aquinass
final conclusion that the form, understood as substance qua essence, is
the cause whereby a certain thing or matter can exist as a substance of a
certain kind.39
Conclusion
Aquinas seems to think that the extension of the Posterior Analytics expla-
nation theory to substances can be accepted with some reservations.
Firstly, the efficient and the final causes cannot be treated as explanatory
of the forms acting upon matter but only of the forms being present in the
matter. That is to say that they are explanatory of the formal cause only
extrinsically and that the formal cause is actually a distinct cause over and
above the final and the efficient causes. These conditions hold especially
in the case of substances. Secondly, the forms acting upon matter cannot
be treated as a case of predication, because form can be predicated of
matter neither essentially nor accidentally. This is so because the forms
acting upon matter re-identifies matter as something else, and for this
reason no proper explanation can be given of the fact that a certain mat-
ter exhibits a certain form. As anticipated, in the case of substances, there
seems to be no room for distinguishing between the quid est-definition
and the propter quid-definition. Unlike in the case of thunder or house, in
39Aquinas, Exp. Met. 7, lect. 17, nn. 166768 (p. 397).

the case of man there are two constraints that must be respected: one, no
matter can exist before and independently of form; two, no third element
is capable of explaining the forms acting upon matter. This second step
is made by Aristotle in the second half of the chapter where he proves,
according to Aquinas, that essence is neither a material element nor com-
posed of material elements but is the primal and immediate cause of the
matters and the composites being.40
Aquinas also seems to think that the Posterior Analytics explanation
theory can be extended to substances only if it is understood, so to speak,
as a decision procedure concerning the members belonging to a kind.
When Aristotle asks Why does man belong to animal?, he does not
mean to ask why the species man is of the rational-animal-kind, because
this fact is primitive and unexplainable; rather, he wants to know why a
given material thing belongs to the kind-man. Although complicated in
its details, the mechanism imagined by Aquinas in the case of substances
is simple in essence. It must be situated in the logical perspective that
specifies Aristotles investigation of substance in book seven. The question
What is A? entails the answer A is BC; such an answer is well-given when
being BC provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for explaining
why a thing x is A: if x is BC, then x is A; in turn, a pertinent explanation
helps us to spell out BC. This interpretation allows Aquinas to maintain
that both matter and form express the essence of a material substance,
although only form is the ultimate cause of it.41 Definition has an explana-
tory power for Aquinas, and the connection of substance qua principle
with definition gives us the right perspective from which the Posterior
Analytics explanation theory can play a role in the investigation of sub-
stance developed by the metaphysician. Finally, as we have seen, Aquinas
recommends that we distinguish the points of view of the logician and of
the metaphysician. If for the logician the definition expressing the essence
can refer to all four causes, for the metaphysician it must include only the
formal and the material cause.
40See Aquinas, Exp. Met. 7, lect. 17, nn. 167279 (pp. 39899).
41As far as I know, Richard of Clive is one of the few commentators who raise the
question whether the what-question asks only for the form of the defined thing (utrum
questio quid est querat de forma tantum); see Quaestiones in Metaphysicam 7 (MS Worces-
ter Chapter Library Q 13, f. 154vab). This conclusion should be the logical consequence
of two theses: first, that the why-question gives only the form of the explanandum, and
second, that the what-question and the why-question are logically convertible. For a
similar argument in the modern-day literature, see F. A. Lewis, Substance and Predication
in Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 17380, at p. 177.
15.Aquinas, Scotus and Others on Naming, Knowing,
and the Origin of Language
E. Jennifer Ashworth
Many medieval discussions start from the fruitful intersection of two appar-
ently opposed texts. My two texts are Adams naming of the animals in
Genesis and Aristotles remark (in Latin translation) that spoken language
is ad placitum, and I shall use them to discuss three problems, the origin
of language, our ability to name God,1 and our ability to name animal spe-
cies. I shall refer to various texts by Aquinas, the commentaries on Genesis
written by Henry of Ghent2 and Peter John Olivi,3 article 73 of Henry of
Ghents Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum,4 and the treatment of Sen-
tences 1, distinction 22 by John Duns Scotus in the five different versions of
his commentary. The first version is the Lectura, written in Oxford before
1300.5 The second version is the Ordinatio, begun in Oxford as a revision
of the Lectura, but never completed.6 The third version is the Reportatio
1For this issue in Henry of Ghents Summa and Scotus Lectura, see E. J. Ashworth,
Can I speak more clearly than I understand? A problem of religious language in Henry
of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham, Historiographia Linguistica 7 (1980), 2938.
2Henry of Ghent, Lectura Ordinaria Super Sacram Scripturam Henrico de Gandavo
adscripta, ed. R. Macken, Opera Omnia 36 (Leiden: Brill; Leuven: Leuven University Press,
1980). For Henrys authorship, see G. A. Wilson, A Note Concerning the Authorship of
the Lectura Ordinaria attributed to Henry of Ghent, Recherches de thologie ancienne et
mdivale 56 (1989), 22731.
3Peter John Olivi, Peter of John Olivi on Genesis, ed. D. Flood (St. Bonaventure, NY: Fran-
ciscan Institute, 2007). For discussion of Genesis commentaries, see G. Dahan, Nommer
les tres: Exgse et thories du langage dans les commentaires mdivaux de Gense 2,
1920, in S. Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachtheorien in Sptantike und Mittelalter (Tbingen: Gunter
Narr Verlag, 1995), pp. 5574.
4For discussion and a text-edition, see I. Rosier-Catach, Henri de Gand, le De Dialec-
tica dAugustin, et linstitution des noms divins, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica
medievale 6 (1995), 145253. The partial edition of the Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum
article 73, appears on pp. 195253. When quoting from article 73, I quote from and refer
to Rosier-Catachs edition. The full article can be found in Henry of Ghent, Summa Quaes-
tionum Ordinariarum (Reprint of the 1520 edition), (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Insti-
tute; Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: F. Schningh, 1953), ff. cclxiii vcclxxx v. When
I quote articles other than article 73, I quote from and refer to this edition.
5John Duns Scotus, Lectura 1.22 (ed. Bali, Opera Omnia 17 (Vatican City: Vatican Poly-
glot Press, 1966), pp. 3012).
6John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 1.22 (ed. Bali, Opera Omnia 5 (Vatican City: Vatican
Polyglot Press, 1959), pp. 33947).
258 e. jennifer ashworth
Parisiensis, produced in Paris where Scotus lectured ca. 13024.7 Alterna-

tive Reportationes are found in Reportatio I-A (the Reportatio examinata),8
and Appendix A to the edited version of the Ordinatio (pp. 38393). Repor-
tatio I-A and Appendix A are different, though Appendix A is often wrongly
called Reportatio I-A in the secondary literature, and it is not complete. In
addition to these versions, there are extensive adnotationes, found in the
edited version of the Ordinatio (pp. 33947).
Before I look at my chosen texts, I shall say a few words about the
semantic framework prevalent in the thirteenth century. Logicians focused
on individual categorematic terms, since they tended to assume that we
begin by naming actual physical objects, on the basis of our cognition of
the world around us, and that syncategorematic terms are acquired sec-
ondarily, enabling us to construct phrases and sentences. Categorematic
terms are signs, and the basic semantic notion was signification, which
should not be confused with meaning. A sign is something that represents
or makes known, and a term has signification when it functions as a sign.
Following a crucial passage in Aristotles Peri hermeneias (1.16a35), logi-
cians held that spoken terms are signs of concepts, and at least from the
second half of the century, concepts were in turn regarded as representa-
tive signs of things. However, while both the concept and the thing are
signified directly or indirectly by a spoken word, neither the concept nor
the thing is properly described as a meaning of that word. Exactly how
words were related to mental features, and what it was that counted as a
thing, were the subjects of much discussion. For the logician Lambert of
Auxerre (or Lagny) the primary significate of a categorematic term was
an intelligible species and its secondary significate was a common nature.
For others the primary significate was not an intelligible species but a
concept, Aquinass inner word, and for yet others the primary significate
was the common nature itself, whether this was identified with the con-
tent of a universal concept or was taken to be ontologically separate from
the concept and its external referents, the individuals.9 All of these theo-
ries were taken to be compatible with the belief that we use our words to
7John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensa 1.22 (in Opera Omnia 22 (Paris: Vivs, 1894),
pp. 261a267b).
8John Duns Scotus, The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture Reportatio I-A, ed. and
trans. A. B. Wolter and O. V. Bychkov, 2 vols. (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute,
20048), vol. 2, pp. 115.
9For discussion, see G. Pini, Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of signification
in the second half of the thirteenth century, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (1999),
2152; G. Pini, Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries,
aquinas, scotus and others on naming 259
refer to individuals. Mental contents and common natures do not cut us

off from the external world, and even if the thing that serves as a primary
significate for the word man is a concept or, alternatively, a common
nature, when I say that a man is running, I am talking about an actual per-
son. Terms referring to past or future objects required some extra expla-
nation, as did privative, negative, and fictional terms, but I shall ignore
these problems.
Now I shall turn to my two key texts. First, there is Aristotle, who, in
Boethiuss translation of Peri hermeneias 2.16a1920, defines the nomen,
the noun or name, as vox significativa secundum placitum, or a spoken
sound significant by convention. Conventional is a standard translation
of the Latin phrase secundum placitum, and the common alternative ad
placitum, while some translators prefer the word arbitrarily. However,
neither translation is a good one so far as the later Middle Ages are con-
cerned. Arbitrarily does not work because, as we shall see, the choice of
a vox or spoken sound is often said to be motivated in some way. Con-
ventional or by agreement do not work because the initial imposition
of a word, that is, its institution as a significative term, is often said to
be the work of one impositor. It is literally at his good pleasure that the
word is chosen. The convention that follows is a matter of the acceptance
by others of this first imposition, and the continued use of the term by a
community. Accordingly, I shall either use the Latin phrase ad placitum
or the translation at pleasure.
This problem of translation is closely related to the message of my
second text. According to Genesis 2.19, God brought all the animals and
birds to Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam
called every living creature, that was the name thereof. Thus, human
language began with the imposition of names on the different species of
medium-sized physical objects: no one seems to think that Adam gave
each individual animal or bird a proper name. But the process gives rise
to various questions. If we leave aside the view, found especially in some
sixteenth and seventeenth-century logicians, that God infused the names
into Adam, then Adam must have chosen words of his own free will. But
did he make this choice on the basis of knowledge that he had? And if
so, is there some kind of natural relationship between the species that he
named and the words that he chose? That is, were the spoken sounds so
Vivarium 39 (2001), 2051. For discussion of other relevant issues, see I. Rosier-Catach, La
parole efficace: Signe, rituel, sacr (Paris: Seuil, 2004).
chosen that merely hearing them would reveal whatever species it is that
they signify? Finally, is it the case that, as the first impositor, Adam had
some special authority? More generally, is he to be taken as a model for
any future imposition of language, and if so, what features of his situation
are important?
I will start with the issue of natural signification. We have to be care-
ful here about the use of the word natural. It is not being used in the
sense applied to ordinary English or French when opposed to the formal
languages of symbolic logic and mathematics. Nor is it used in two other
senses generally accepted by medieval thinkers. They agreed that such
human utterances as groans are natural in that they are the same for all,
and in that they are instinctive signs of our passions as opposed to inten-
tional signs of our concepts. They also agreed that language is natural
to us in that we are social creatures with a need to communicate, and
in that our physical structure provides an obvious means for such com-
munication. The issue we are now concerned with is whether a spoken
word such as man has a natural relationship to the thing signified, in
this case, the human species. In his commentary on my chosen Aristo-
tle text (In PH 1.4.47), Aquinas remarks that there are three approaches
to the signification of a name: on one view, signification is entirely non-
natural, so that any name can be attached to any thing; on a second view,
it is entirely natural, so that names are as it were similitudes of things;
on a third view, it is non-natural in the sense intended by Aristotle
whereby the signification does not come from nature, but natural in the
sense that the signification agrees with the natures of things. Aquinas
does not enlarge on either of the last two views in his Peri hermeneias
commentary, though, as we shall see, other parts of his writings support
the third view, as do the writings of some post-medieval Thomists.10
The strong view of natural signification involves the claim that words
are similitudes of things. One version of this view involves onomatopeia, a
feature of some words that was widely noted by grammarians, who used
Priscians example of taratantara to express the sound of a trumpet.11
However, the mimicking of a things sound by the word naming it only
10See Domingo de Soto, Summulae (Burgos: Juan de Junta, 1529), f. 5vb; Antonius
Rubius, In librum I de Interpretatione (London, 1641), p. 373b. For Aquinas on language,
see E. J. Ashworth, Aquinas on Significant Utterance: Interjection, blasphemy, prayer, in
S. MacDonald and E. Stump (eds.), Aquinas Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1999), pp. 20734.
11Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae 8.103 (ed. M. Hertz, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner,
185559; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961), vol. 1, p. 450).
covers a very few cases, and a much more elaborate discussion of various
possibilities is found in Henry of Ghent, who drew heavily on Augustines
De Dialectica, and followed him in attributing the strong view to the Stoics.
After an initial discussion of types of similitude (Summa art. 73, 199203),
Henry made two points preliminary to his main discussion (2079). First,
any imposition must involve an act of will, so even natural signification
will be ad placitum in some sense. Second, any imposition must involve
some cognition of the object named, however vague, so our mental states
cannot be ignored. However, he makes it clear that the strong view of nat-
ural signification requires determinate and distinct knowledge on the part
of the impositor, though this is not necessary for the Aristotelian view.
Then, after a renewed discussion of different kinds of similitude, Henry
introduced a new kind of similitude between spoken word and thing that
he called a similitude of imitation (20912). He does not explain it fully,
other than to say that it involves not equality but some kind of propor-
tional relationship.
There are two types of such similitude that Henry uses in relation to
the specific problem of naming God. In the first, there is a similarity of
imitation between the sound of the spoken word and the properties of
the thing spoken of. Accordingly, one might possibly say that words very
strong in sound relate to Gods absolute strength as reflected in or imitated
by the intellect (210). In the second case, there is a similarity between the
sound of the spoken word insofar as it affects the senses and the thing
itself insofar as it affects or is imitated by the intellect. For instance, if the
spoken word strikes the senses softly or harshly while the species named
strikes the intellect softly or harshly in some proportionate manner, then
there would be an appropriate relationship of agreement between the
spoken word and the species. No humanly-instituted word could possibly
capture such a relationship when speaking of God because we can have
no appropriate experience of Gods nature.12 On the other hand, inno-
cent Adam might perhaps have been able to name animals in this way,
if indeed he did so naturally adds Henry (210). Henrys main conclusion
is that while there may be cases of onomatopeia, where the things named
can themselves be heard, this theory of natural signification is generally
of no use (203), and is certainly of no use for naming God (212). Nor can
fallen man name animal species in that way, whatever Adam might have
done, since no human being is now capable of knowing the quiddity of
12At first, Henry seems to suggest that this is possible, but he finally rejects it (210, 212).
a sensible substance or accident perfectly (211).13 Later Henry cautiously

remarks (222) that if there were a natural name of God, the obvious can-
didate would be Tetragrammaton, as discussed by Maimonides.
I now turn to the more moderate view of natural signification whereby
it is the names signification rather than the name qua vox or spoken
sound that agrees with the nature of the thing named. This is apparently
the view of Aquinas himself, and seems to be at least implicit in the work
of other thinkers. Quoting Aristotles Metaphysics 4.7.1012a2425, Aquinas
frequently claims that the ratio that a name signifies is the definition14 or
the intellects conception of the thing signified by the name (ST 1a.13.4c),
and he writes that the definition expresses an essence (ST 1a.13.1c). In an
important passage in the Summa theologiae (3.37.2c) he writes: names
should correspond to the properties of things. And this is obvious in the
names of genera and species, for as Metaphysics 4 says, the ratio that the
name signifies is the definition, which designates the proper nature of
the thing. Adam was obviously able to institute names of this sort, for in
three discussions of whether Adam had perfect cognition of natures Aqui-
nas puts forward a sed contra argument that he accepts to the effect that
Adam must have had such cognition, since he was the original impositor
of names, and names must be in conformity with natures.15 What we have
here is the view that while imposition may be at pleasure, it is nonethe-
less motivated and rational rather than arbitrary. Indeed, Aquinas writes
(In PH 1.6.81) that a phrase signifies ad placitum, that is, according to the
institution of human will and reason.
Henry of Ghent in his Genesis commentary takes up and clarifies the
very same theme.16 He distinguishes two elements in the nomen: the vox
and the signification. So far as the choice of a spoken sound is concerned,
the imposition is indeed purely ad placitum, but since the ratio that the
name signifies is the definition, a condition for naming is full knowledge
of essences and the corresponding ability to distinguish them from one
another. Wisdom is required for this, and Adam performed like the best
metaphysician. What he did was to carve up nature in the right way, so
13Henry makes it clear here that the naming of species is basic, as he did earlier in his
Genesis commentary (see Lectura Ordinaria, p. 206). He also notes that natural significa-
tion is at least possible: quantum est ex natura rei et vocis posset esse impositio ex origine
naturali.
14For example, Aquinas, ST 1a.13.6c.
15Aquinas, In Sent. 2.23.2.2. s.c. 1; QDV 18.4., s.c. 4; ST 1a.94.3 s.c. Adam did the naming,
but the knowledge required was infused by God: ST 1a.94.3 ad 1. Cf. QDV 18.4 ad 3.
16Henry of Ghent, Lectura Ordinaria, pp. 2036.
that each name through its signification corresponded to an essence. The

actual sound that Adam chose to make was irrelevant. Henry adds that
after the tower of Babel, things are not perhaps so appropriately named,
though even in the Summa he allows art and reasoning to play a role
(art. 73, 253).
Peter John Olivis commentary on Genesis, much of which was pub-
lished in the sixteenth century in a version attributed to Aquinas,17 is par-
ticularly interesting, because he gives an alternative account of how one
could give full weight to rational motivation in Adams naming of the ani-
mals while holding that there is no special knowledge or reasoning power
required for the imposition of the very first names in Adams language.18
Olivi remarks first of all that no great knowledge (scientia) is required to
impose primitive names, although it is required for many derived names.19
He then suggests that God wished to see what Adam would call the ani-
mals, because the names of animals were as if derived from primitive
names, those of the first genera or rationes of beings, the first bodies of
the world, and the first principles of mixable or mixed things. In order
to carry out this secondary imposition, Adam would have to have had
special abilities and knowledge of the basic principles. In other words, he
would have to be the ideal metaphysician referred to by Henry of Ghent.
Olivi also took care to note that the process of derivation he had in mind
went much further than the grammarians derivation of one word-form
from another. It included transumptio, that is, figures of speech, especially
metaphor, the study of relations, and analogy. He added that Adams skill
in doing all this would not be impaired by the possible assumption that
he was given the knowledge of the primitive non-derived names by God,
instead of imposing them himself. So far as the phrase, that was the name
thereof, was concerned, Olivi suggested that this merely meant that the
names Adam imposed were those still extant in Hebrew at the time Moses
was writing.
Whether or not Adams language survived in the form of Hebrew, and
whether or not it was natural in any sense, does not settle the question of
the status of subsequent impositors, still less does it tell us what should
17See S. Piron, Note sur le commentaire sur la Gense publi dans les oeuvres de Tho-
mas dAquin, Oliviana 1 (2003), http://Oliviana.revues.org/index3.html.
18Peter John Olivi, On Genesis, pp. 12425.
19The notion of a primitive name was used by the grammarians; see, e.g., Priscian,
Institutiones grammaticae 4.1.1 (vol. 1, p. 117); John of Dacia, Summa gramatica, ed. A. Otto,
CPhD 1 (Copenhagen: GAD, 1955), pp. 31019.
be said about ordinary language users. It was obvious that the wide vari-
ety of spoken languages, the invention of new words, and the changing
uses of old words required some account of these matters. Aside from
Roger Bacon, there was general agreement that imposition required some
authority on the part of the impositor or impositors,20 and this authority
stemmed from superior knowledge.21 Imposition also required acceptance
on the part of a linguistic community. As an early sixteenth-century logi-
cian pointed out, one man with authority, the Roman emperor Domitian,
tried to name a month after himself, but no one agreed to use it.22 More-
over, Aquinas, Olivi and Henry of Ghent insisted on the importance of
common usage. Aquinas, citing Aristotle, twice said that what speakers
normally intend to signify should be our guide,23 and in one passage of
the Summa theologiae (1a.67.1c), he explicitly allowed a choice between
original imposition and common usage. In a short question edited by
Delorme, Olivi remarked that because a word is ordained to have a certain
signification commonly and by a common intention or the good pleasure
of men, no one by his own authority can change that signification with-
out explaining this clearly to his hearers.24 In his Quaestiones logicales he
referred to the good pleasure of those who institute and those who accept
institution, and emphasized the common intention and voluntary usage
of speakers and hearers.25 In his Summa, Henry of Ghent pointed out that
successful communication required an established custom or some kind
of pact among users (art. 73, 24344), and he also remarked that the use of
words would be in vain if they had no determinate signification (248).
In the first of the two passages I have just cited, Henry remarked that
both speaker and hearer need some knowledge of the thing signified, and
at this point, we might ask how much ordinary users of language need
to know. In the last question of article 73, Henry analysed the ways in
20See, e.g., John of Dacia, Summa gramatica, p. 190, on the conditions for imposition.
Cf. Roger Bacon, De signis, in K. M. Fredborg, L. Nielsen and J. Pinborg, An Unedited Part
of Roger Bacons Opus maius: De signis, Traditio 34 (1978), 131.
21See Ps.-Kilwardby, Commentum super Priscianum maiorum, ed. K. M. Fredborg,
N. J. Green-Pedersen, L. Nielsen and J. Pinborg, in The Commentary on Priscianus Maior
ascribed to Robert Kilwardby, CIMAGL 15 (1975), 7677. Cf. John of Dacia, Summa gra-
matica, pp. 19192.
22Juan de Celaya, Dialectice introductiones (Aureliacii, 1516(?)), sig. B6r.
23Once in his commentary on Aristotles Posterior Analytics (In PA 1.4.33), and once in
the Summa contra gentiles (SCG 1.1).
24Peter John Olivi, Quid ponat ius, ed. F. M. Delorme, in Question de P. J. Olivi, Quid
ponat ius vel dominium ou encore De signis voluntariis, Antonianum 20 (1945), 32829.
25Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones Logicales, ed. S. F. Brown, Traditio 42 (1986), 34243.
which the relationship between naming and knowing could vary for such
users, and argued that a speaker could in a way signify God more truly
than he understood (25053). He described a case in which the speaker
is using words imposed by someone with a more perfect understanding.
This speaker and the impositor, or another speaker with an equal under-
standing to the original impositor, can use the same word to signify and
name the same thing, especially when they are focussing on the name or
confused concept rather than the definition.26 It can then happen that the
person with a lesser understanding can signify the thing more truly than
the one with a better understanding if the latter fails to think through
what he is saying. For instance, if both are speaking of the plurality of the
divine persons, then if the one who understands the Trinity less well says
that they are many by distinction, he signifies the plurality as perfectly
as the one who understands better, and he signifies it more perfectly if
the latter mistakenly expresses himself by saying that the divine persons
are many by diversity or difference. At the end of the question, Henry
said that the achievement of the one with a lesser understanding arises
from usage and chance, rather than from art and reasoning. This remark
suggests that neither the speaker with a better understanding nor the
original impositor are going to signify more clearly than they understand.
It remains to be seen whether a single person at a single time can under-
stand God more truly than he signifies or names him. I shall return to that
problem below.
Given that users may apparently use a name in the way intended by
an original impositor, whether or not we have knowledge equal to his, we
must now ask, what knowledge must an ordinary impositor have? Adam
was supposed to have perfect knowledge of natural things, though in pas-
sages very significant for our subsequent discussion John Duns Scotus
denied this, on the grounds that it would detract from Christs perfect
knowledge.27 Although no one was going to claim that ordinary imposi-
tors have anything like perfect knowledge, the discussion of Adam and
the weaker sense of natural signification suggests that their imposition
ought to be rationally motivated, and what could it be motivated by
except knowledge?
26For another reference to the distinction between the confused concept associated
with a name as opposed to the distinctness of definitions, see Henrys Genesis commentary
(Lectura Ordinaria, p. 206).
27Scotus, Reportatio, p. 263a. See also Reportatio I-A, p. 5; Appendix A, p. 388.
It sometimes seems as if the answer to that question might be etymol-

ogy, and certainly there are frequent appeals to etymology, particularly the
popular derivation of the word lapis (stone) from quod laedat pedem or
what hurts the foot. Irne Rosier-Catach has argued that these appeals
are paradoxical when combined with the insistence that words are insti-
tuted ad placitum.28 However, this argument is misleading. The use of ety-
mology is of course rationally motivated, as Henry of Ghent suggests in
his Summa,29 but it requires the presence of terms that are already signifi-
cant, as Olivi made clear, and hence is a way of progressing from primi-
tive terms to derived terms. Moreover, apparent appeals to etymology are
often primarily epistemological. Thus Aquinas, like Scotus after him, uses
lapis as an example of how we move from an awareness of properties to
the naming of substances whose quiddities we do not know.30
In general, Aquinas has a strong doctrine of the relationship between
naming and knowing, though he does not make any clear distinction
between the position of the original impositor and the position of sub-
sequent users of the name. He constantly claims that we name as we
know31 and, as I said above, his arguments for Adams perfect knowledge
depended on the premiss that naming must be dependent on know-
ing. What separates fallen man from innocent Adam is not the ability
to impose names but the knowledge that would allow us to achieve a
perfect match between signification and thing signified at the moment
of imposition. When the word signifies a property such as heat, cold or
whiteness, there is such a match (1a.13.8c), but the case of animal species
is a lot more complicated. In Quaestiones de veritate (4.1, ad 8) Aquinas
says that when essential differences are unknown to us, we name a thing
in accordance with accidents or effects in place of the essential differ-
ences, and in another work he even says that our cognition is so weak
that no philosopher can perfectly investigate the nature of a fly.32 At other
times he is a lot more sanguine. In the Summa theologiae (1a.13.8, ad 2), he
28Rosier-Catach, Henri de Gand, 151.

29Henry of Ghent, Summa art. 32, q. 4 (f. cxciii r): Si vero inspiciamus ad rationem
impositionis nominis, lapis imponitur a proprietate agendi. Cf. Scotus, Appendix A,
p. 393.
30See, e.g., Aquinas, ST 1a.13.8c and ad 2; ST 2a.2ae.92.1, ad 2; and QDV 4.1, ad 8. Cf.
Scotus, Ordinatio, pp. 34344; Reportatio I-A, pp. 89; Appendix A, pp. 39293.
31Aquinas, ST 1a.13, prologue: unumquodque enim nominatur a nobis, secundum
quod ipsum cognoscimus. See also ST 1a.13.3c; ST 1a.13.8, ad 2.
32The Sermon-Conferences of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Apostles Creed, ed. and trans.
N. Ayo (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 20.
writes: according as we are able to know the nature of some thing from
its properties and effects, so we can signify it by a name. Hence, because
we can know the substance of a stone from its property, this name lapis
signifies the nature of a stone as it is in itself, for it signifies the definition
of a stone, through which we know what a stone is. The ratio that a name
signifies is the definition. To sort out these different claims, we need to
make a distinction between the name and the definition. The first and
proper object of the intellect is a quiddity, about which we cannot be
deceived,33 so we do start with knowledge of the thing named, but we
start with an incomplete act. We know the thing indistinctly and under
a certain confusion, and so, it seems, we can give it a name that allows
us to identify it. We then move gradually to the distinct and determinate
knowledge of a thing as captured in a definition.34 In this way, it seems
that the impositor, and also the subsequent user, can name a species of
animal successfully, even without the full understanding of its nature that
will only be achieved later, if at all.
This process does not work so well when we are speaking of God. What
we intend to signify is the divine nature, and this is why the believer and
the pagan can contradict each other when one says God is an idol and
the other denies it.35 However, we do not and cannot achieve an under-
standing of the divine nature in itself, and so we can never name God
other than imperfectly. In his Sentences commentary, Aquinas says: since
utterances are the signs of understandings according to Aristotle, the same
judgment must be made about the cognition of a thing and the naming
of it. Whence, just as we know God imperfectly, so we also name him
imperfectly as if by stammering, as Gregory said.36 In the Summa theo-
logiae (1a.13.5c), he remarks that the name wise said of God must exceed
the signification of the name, since that is circumscribed by our cognitive
situation. That is, wise as a name is first imposed on creatures, and can
only signify something creaturely, for that is all we know. How such a
name can be used of a God whose nature we cannot grasp can only be
explained by means of an appeal to analogy.
Henry of Ghent does speak of our intention to name Gods nature in
article 32, question 4 of his Summa (f. cxciii r), where he distinguishes
between what we understand distinctly of a thing, and what we intend
33Aquinas, ST 1a.85.5c; ST 1a.85.6c.

34Aquinas, ST 1a.85. 3c and ad 3; 1a.85.5c.
35Aquinas, ST 1a.13.8c and ad 2; 13.10, ad 1.
36Aquinas, In Sent. 1, d. 22, q. 1, a. 1. See also ST 1a.13.1c and ad 1, ad 2.
to signify in that way, but, as Irne Rosier-Catach points out, the notion
of intention does not figure in his main discussion of naming God.37 Like
Aquinas, he insists that, since we can only know God through creatures,
we can only name God in a derived manner through names imposed on
creatures (art. 73, 21516). Like Aquinas, he appeals to his own version of
analogy to explain how we do this.38 More generally, he insists that our
ability to express anything through words depends on our cognition, so
that an impositor or one user at one time can name only as he knows.39
However, he goes beyond Aquinas on one issue: it is not just that naming
and knowing go hand in hand, so that the imperfection of our under-
standing and the imperfection of our naming are equally balanced. Rather,
our ability to understand can exceed our ability to name, for, following
Augustine,40 Henry sets out to prove that God must be more truly under-
stood than he is signified or named (25053). His reason seems to be an
Augustinian one, for he claims that since spoken words are more material
in nature than our reasoning power, it follows that in signifying they can-
not be in conformity with the divine things understood to the extent that
the reason can grasp those things.41 Indeed, this principle even applies to
created things (25152). Of course, Henry does not intend to argue that we
can properly understand Gods nature: he makes full use of Augustines
second point, that God is more truly than he is thought to be.
John Duns Scotus, in the various versions of his commentary on Sen-
tences 1, distinction 22, sets out explicitly to combat Henry of Ghents
views and also, indirectly, those of Thomas Aquinas.42 In the Lectura,
he writes: The proposition Nothing can be named by us more properly
than it is understood is false, as is what some people say, namely, that
37Rosier-Catach, Henri de Gand, p. 187.

38See especially Henry of Ghent, Summa art. 21, q. 2 (ff. cxxiii vcxxv v), and art. 73,
22536. For discussion of analogy, see E. J. Ashworth, Les thories de lanalogie du XIIe au
XVIe sicle (Paris: Vrin, 2008).
39E.g., Summa art. 73, 215, and 237: Qui enim perfectius et expressius rem concipit,
perfectius et expressius eam verbis exprimere potest.
40Augustine, De Trinitate 7.4.7: Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et verius est
quam cogitatur.
41Scotus (Reportatio, p. 267b; Reportatio I-A, pp. 1415) reinterprets the reference to
Augustines De Trinitate by suggesting that all Augustine meant was that concepts (cogita-
tiones), when considered merely as natural representative signs, must represent more truly
than voces, which are ad placitum signs.
42For discussion of Scotus, see O. Boulnois, Reprsentation et noms divins selon Duns
Scot, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 6 (1995), 25580; G. Pini, Sco-
tus on Knowing and Naming Natural Kinds, History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (2009),
25572.
as we understand so we signify, and because we can understand God

only through creatures, we can only signify him by names taken from
creatures.43 It is important to note here that Scotus had already aban-
doned the theory of analogical signification lying behind that final claim.
In his commentary on Sentences 1, distinction 3, he argued that we must
be able to apply univocal concepts to God,44 and in his early logical works
he had argued that analogical terms were impossible on the grounds that
we can have no appropriate rationes for them to signify, even though,
metaphysically speaking, there are analogical relations.45 Scotus firmly
believes that we are able, at least in principle, to name God by a name
signifying his essence properly or distinctly even though we do not under-
stand that essence (Reportatio, p. 265b), just as we can name corporeal
substances properly or distinctly by names signifying their essences with-
out knowing those essences distinctly. Indeed, this must be the case if we
are to name anything at all, for a key premiss of all Scotuss arguments is
our inability to know any substance as such, whether it is a wall (Lectura,
p. 301), the sacramental bread before and after consecration,46 or anything
else (Ordinatio, pp. 34445). Of course, Scotus agrees that we must have
some cognition or other, since we cannot impose names on things that
we have never encountered in any way and that are completely unknown
to us. Naming must be preceded by some sort of understanding.47 How-
ever, what we need to know does not have to be detailed or sophisti-
cated, and here Adam may still serve as the model impositor, for, Scotus
writes in all three versions of the Reportatio, Adam did not have perfect
knowledge.48 He named things that he apprehended, but he did not com-
prehend them.49
In order to understand what it is to apprehend something as opposed
to comprehending it, we need to look at two senses of distinct that seem
to lie behind Scotuss discussion (Reportatio, p. 266b). We can apprehend
something distinctly when we are able to separate it from another thing.
43Scotus, Lectura, p. 301. Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio, p. 343.

44Scotus, Ordinatio 1, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Bali, Opera Omnia 3 (Vatican City: Vatican
Polyglot Press, 1954), pp. 1544) (main response to question).
45For discussion and text translation, see E. J. Ashworth, Analogy and Metaphor from
Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus and Walter Burley, in C. Bolyard and R. Keele (eds.),
Later Medieval Metaphysics: Ontology, language and logic (Fordham University Press,
forthcoming).
46Scotus, Reportatio, p. 265b; Reportatio I-A, p. 8.
47Scotus, Reportatio, p. 267b; Reportatio I-A, p. 1.
48See n. 27 above.
49Scotus, Reportatio, p. 263a. Cf. Appendix A, p. 388.
For instance, we can think of man as an animal that is distinct from horses,
donkeys and so on (Appendix A, p. 392). In another sense, we can conceive
or comprehend something distinctly when we have a proper ratio of it,
when we understand all the elements that enter into its definition. Scotus
also uses two senses of proper, as he explains in Appendix A (p. 390). Any
name that signifies something that can belong only to the thing spoken of
is proper, but an absolutely proper name is one that primarily signifies the
thing under its proper ratio, the ratio that specifies its essence. So far as
our cognition is concerned, we can at best have only a confused concep-
tion of God or of an animal species, even if we can distinguish God from
creatures or humans from horses. Nonetheless, we can signify God and
animal species more distinctly and properly than we conceive them.
How this comes about is clarified in Appendix A (pp. 39091), where
Scotus outlines the four levels of perfection that might be found among
language users, though in fact only the first three are. First, there is mere
utterance of a name, in the way that a bird can be taught to do. Sec-
ond, there is uttering a name while knowing only that it is an ad placitum
sign of something or other, in the way that a Latin speaker who does not
know Hebrew might utter a Hebrew word. Third, there is uttering a name
as a sign of something of which one has only a general concept, though
intending to express what it is a sign of. Here Scotuss example is that of a
man who, having only a concept of animal, utters the word man, intend-
ing to express by the name what others conceive by it and what it was
imposed to signify, even though he only knows it was imposed on some
species of animal. He subsequently gave another example, saying that we
are at the third level when what we intend to signify by the name homo
is some species of the genus animal, distinct from horses and so on. We
do not intend to signify just the accidents, or just a description. Rather we
intend to signify man as having a ratio propria or specific nature properly
specified, even though we do not know it.50 The fourth level of perfection
would occur if someone uttered a name as a sign expressive of a proper
concept in particular. If this level were ever achieved, it would reflect a
50Scotus, Appendix A, p. 392: Per hoc nomen homo non intendimus significare tan-
tum animal (patet), sed aliquid sub animali, distinctum ab equo et aliis; unde haec est
nobis vera homo per se distinguitur ab equo etc. Nec intendimus significare per hoc
nomen homo aliquod accidens vel aliqua accidentia, immo speciem in genera substan-
tiae tantum....Nec intendimus significare aliquam descriptionem ex animali et accidente
(vel accidentibus), immo aliquid per se unum et in se natum habere per se unum concep-
tum definitivum; quod autem intendimus significare sub propria ratione, nec tamen illud
sic intelligimus, hoc nominamus imperfecte secundum tertium gradum...
perfect relationship between what we intend to signify and our actual

knowledge of the significate. However, we do not achieve it, at least in
this life.
Throughout Scotuss arguments, what is most important in naming
is what we intend to signify (Ordinatio, pp. 34546), and our intentions
will come into play whoever imposes the first words, and in whatever
way they were imposed. In principle, it is possible for the wayfarer to
impose names on the divine essence as such, but Scotus expresses doubt
about whether this actually occurs (Reportatio, p. 266a). However, there
are revealed names of God, such as Adonai or Tetragrammaton, and
we can use these while intending to signify whatever it is that God or
angels intended.51 On the other hand, we can and do impose names on
animal and other species, and here Adam enters the picture once more.
In Appendix A, Scotus writes that just as, if Adam, understanding man
under his proper ratio, had imposed a proper name on him, I when using
it would intend to signify in accordance with this imposition, so I, when
faced with something not yet named, might impose a name on it intend-
ing the name to signify in the same way as if it had been imposed by
another.52 He then (Appendix A, pp. 39293) uses the standard example
of the word lapis to illustrate his point. I know a stone only as something
that hurts the foot, but, operating at the third level of perfection, I impose
the name to signify the substance under its proper ratio. It seems that I
can do this quite independently of whether there ever was or could have
been a perfect impositor. All that is needed is the intention to name that
stuff there in the way that a perfect impositor would if there were one.
In the Ordinatio, he concludes that even if it were true that no one could
impose a name that signifies a thing more distinctly than he understands
it, it remains true that anyone can use a name that signifies a thing more
distinctly than he understands it.53
51Scotus, Reportatio, p. 266a. Cf. Lectura, p. 302; Ordinatio, pp. 34647; Reportatio I-A,
p. 11.
52Scotus, Appendix A, p. 392: Sicut enim si Adam intelligens hominem sub propria
ratione, imposuisset sibi nomen proprium, quo ego utens intendo illud significare sicut
est sibi nomen impositum (de quo tamen non habeo conceptum nisi imperfectum in uni-
versali, vel per accidens vel in quadam descriptione), sic si idem nondum nominatum
similiter intelligerem, possem sibi nomen imponere, intendens per illud nomen sic ipsum
significare sicut nunc intendo significare per nomen ab alio impositum.
53Scotus, Ordinatio, p. 347: Et si illa propositio esset vera quod nullum nomen potest
imponi alicui distinctius quam intelligatur, haec tamen est falsa quod nullus potest uti
nomine, distinctius significante rem, quam ipse possit intelligere; et ideo simpliciter
In conclusion, we should note that lying behind all the discussions I

have examined there is a realist assumption. The world really does con-
tain distinct animal and other species, and the function of imposition is to
name these species as correctly as possible. Accordingly, the imposition of
names must involve as rational a response to the world as is compatible
with our cognitive capacities. Innocent Adam is then the perfect model
for how names should come about, and there is no conflict between Gene
sis and the Aristotelian assumption that the actual words chosen are up
to us. Any complications that arise, especially in the case of naming God,
come from our cognitive weakness rather than the model. On the face of
it, Scotus adopts a quite different approach through his insistence that
naming is a matter of intention rather than knowledge, and hence that
semantic and epistemological questions must be separated. However, his
scattered remarks about Adam, and about the fourth level of perfection,
lead me to suspect that innocent Adam is still largely his model, and that
his insistence on intention as opposed to knowledge arises from his pro-
found scepticism about our ability to know essences rather than a desire
to reform semantics.54
concedendum est quod multis nominibus potest uti viator, exprimentibus essentiam divi-
nam sub ratione essentiae divinae.
54I would like to thank the organizers of the University of Toronto Colloquium in
Medieval Philosophy 2011 for inviting me to present a version of this paper, and Giorgio
Pini for his useful comments. Needless to say, I would also like to thank Sten Ebbesen for
all I have learned from him in the past thirty-five years.
16.Concrete accidental terms
Simo Knuuttila
In his article on late thirteenth-century debates about concrete accidental

terms, published in the memorial volume for Jan Pinborg, Sten Ebbesen
considers the various ways in which modist writers and some of their con-
temporaries understood the nature of concrete and abstract accidental
terms and their role in predication.1 There was surprisingly great interest
in this question even outside the theory of grammar, partly because it
was associated with philosophical topics pertaining to the ontology and
semantics of the categories, the psychology of intellection, and other simi-
lar themes in metaphysical realism. In what follows, I shall comment on
some issues taken up by Ebbesen and add some further examples of the
questions related to accidental terms in the discussion of the copula is
and de re modalities.
From Fictions to Formalities of Abstract Accidental Terms
Let us begin with Ebbesens analysis of Boethius of Dacias modist con-

siderations of the differences between the adjective white as a concrete
accidental term and the substantive whiteness as an abstract accidental
term. In dealing with this distinction, Boethius stresses that dialectical
and grammatical considerations are closely related. According to him,
the significatum of a word is a thing plus its modus essendi. There is a
corresponding modus intelligendi through which the words signify things.
The so-called modistae represented a realist metaphysical position
instead of thinking that the intellectual and sensory cognitive powers
somehow construct the reality, they preferred to think, like Aristotle,
that intelligibility and perceptibility are objective aspects of things which
are actualized in the cognitive activities of human beings. Even though
1S. Ebbesen, Concrete Accidental Terms: Late thirteenth-century debates about prob-
lems relating to such terms as album, in N. Kretzmann (ed.), Meaning and Inference in
Medieval Philosophy: Studies in memory of Jan Pinborg (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 107
74 (repr. in S. Ebbesen, Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Aldershot/Farnham: Ashgate, 20089),
vol. 2, pp. 10951).
274 simo knuuttila
i ntentional being in thought or perception is different from being in the

extramental world, it is anchored there. In addition to these requisites, the
modist writers think that words have modi significandi which are influ-
enced by the modi intelligendi and, through these, by the modi essendi.
Modist writers were interested in correspondences between these orders
and had various opinions on the degree of this isomorphism.2
According to Boethius, signifying nouns are associated with some sort
of intelligible content as well as with an idea of permanence in what is
grasped, either as being a substance which is a permanent thing par excel-
lence or as being associated with a substance. The nouns may signify per
modum substantivi or per modum adiectivi. Boethius argues that because
the significative modes are influenced by the modes of understanding and
it is understood that there are ontologically independent substances, these
are signified by the substantive mode of signification. It is also understood
that things of other categories than substance are distinct from the sub-
jects in which they occur as dependent on substances. These are signified
by the adjectival mode of signification. While the substantive mode of
signification involves a conception of the object as independent of other
things, the adjectives do not signify things in this way but as occurring in
other things. Because of these modes of being, the thing which is signified
by this noun albedo can be signified in both a substantive mode and an
adjectival mode.3
This quotation expresses the kernel of the various problems of the
modist approach to abstract and concrete accidental terms. It is assumed
that white and whiteness signify the same, that is, induce one who
understands the words to think about the same quality, although in dif-
ferent ways, depending on whether the thing is signified by an adjec-
tive or a substantive. It was not seen as problematic that the substantive
and adjective signify the same, and even the modes of signifying were
in fact closely related because it was usual to read Socrates is white as
2For modism in general, see J. Pinborg, Speculative Grammar, in N. Kretzmann,

A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 25469; C. Marmo, The Semantics of the
Modistae, in S. Ebbesen and R. Friedman (eds.), Medieval Analyses in Language and Cogni-
tion (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999), pp. 83104;
I. Rosier-Catach, Grammar, in R. Pasnau (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Philoso-
phy, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), vol. 1, pp. 196216.
3Boethius of Dacia, Modi significandi sive Quaestiones super Priscianum maiorem q. 44
(ed. J. Pinborg and H. Roos, CPhD 4.1 (Copenhagen: GAD, 1969), p. 124); Ebbesen, Concrete
Accidental Terms, pp. 12023.
concrete accidental terms 275
Whiteness inheres in Socrates or something similar. However, if the sig-

nificatum is substantively signified as independent and adjectivally as
dependent, one may wonder why Whiteness is white is not true. One
answer was that these alternatives are related to two different levels of
being, the substantive mode of signifying referring to an essential order
and the adjectival mode to an existential order. While whiteness, signified
by albedo, could be treated as an ontologically independent entity in the
essential order, white as a concrete accidental term was taken to refer to
whiteness in a subject. Boethius of Dacia, who argued against the possibil-
ity of the independent essential order of things, thought that the substan-
tive signification of forms should be understood as fictitious in the sense
that there is no corresponding mode of being or understanding.4 Non-
existent things are not white, to be sure, but one may wonder whether
this is a better answer than that abstract things are not white. Or did he
mean that what is fictitious is the separateness of the essences, not their
reality? In Boethius view, if we realize that whiteness and white signify
the same and do not follow the misleading mode of signifying associated
with whiteness, both terms let us understand an underlying subject.5
It is white and has whiteness.
After a detailed discussion of the as-if-semantics of abstract accidental
terms in Boethius of Dacia, Ebbesen explains how Radulphus Brito and
John Duns Scotus introduced a further ontological and semantic level in
answering an argument against the modist assumptions, the central point
of which was as follows. If Socrates is white is analysed into Socrates is
whiteness as it is in the subject, it seems that the qualification as it is in
the subject can be left out because it is accidental to whiteness. But Soc-
rates is whiteness is not true. Therefore the modist premises that white
and whiteness signify the same and that white signifies whiteness in a
subject are false. Brito and Scotus argued that whiteness does not sig-
nify the ultimate abstraction with respect to white things, the essence of
whiteness or, as Scotus says, albedineitas. This nature or formality is the
same thing as signified in different ways by the terms album, albedo and
albedineitas. One should not simply regard the substantive signification
of whiteness as analogous to that of humanitasit rather corresponds to
4Ebbesen, Concrete Accidental Terms, pp. 12427.

5This is how I understand Ebbesens interpretation in Concrete Accidental Terms,
pp. 12729.
276 simo knuuttila
homo which refers to the instances of humanitas.6 The idea of increasing

the number of formal entities is in line with the thrust on the explanatory
power of formal natures in the modist tradition. It is not very surpris-
ing to find this argument in Scotuss main work because his early logical
treatises were influenced by modist doctrines and this formalism was the
aspect of modist philosophy which Scotus developed independently in
his metaphysics of formalities.7 Let us take a look at some aspects of this
theory from the point of view of concrete and abstract accidental terms.
Scotist Considerations
A metaphysical thesis widely debated in the late thirteenth century and

also popular among the modist thinkers was Avicennas statement that
the common natures in themselves are neither one nor many. While
horseness as such is only horseness, it has existence in the mind as a uni-
versal and in extra-mental particulars as their essence.8 Scotus modified
this view by providing common nature with a less than numerical unity.9
Common nature is the principle of community between things having this
nature. It has objective being as the content of a concept which is accom-
panied by the second intention of universality as plural applicability.10
There is a formal distinction between these common formalities and their
individual instantiations.11 The singular manifestations are individuals by
6John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 1.5.1, n. 20 (ed. C. Bali, Opera Omnia 4 (Vatican City: Vati-
can Polyglot Press, 1956), pp. 1920); S. Ebbesen, Concrete Accidental Terms, pp. 13234;
C. Marmo, Ontology and Semantics in the Logic of Duns Scotus, in U. Eco and C. Marmo
(eds.), On the Medieval Theory of Signs (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1989), pp. 14393.
7For Scotus modism, see R. Andrews, Andrew of Cornwall and the Reception of
Modism in England, in Ebbesen and Friedman, Medieval Analyses, pp. 10516.
8Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina 5.1 (ed. S. van Riet, 3 vols.
(Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 197783), vol. 2, p. 228:23334); T. B. Noone, Universals and
Individuation, in T. Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1025.
9Scotus, Ordinatio 2.3.1, q. 1, nn. 3334 (ed. C. Bali, Opera Omnia 7 (Vatican City:
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1973), pp. 4035); John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia 2.12, q. 5,
nn. 8, 1112 (ed. L. Wadding, Opera Omnia 11.1 (Lyon: Durand, 1639), pp. 32728); L. Hon-
nefelder, Scientia transcendens: Die Formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realitt in der
Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns ScotusSurezWolffKantPeirce)
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), pp. 12427; L. Honnefelder, Duns Scotus (Munich: Beck, 2005),
pp. 1034.
10Scotus, Ordinatio 2.3.1, q. 1, n. 42 (p. 410); Noone, Universals and Individuation,
pp. 10811.
11Scotus, Ordinatio 2.3.1, qq. 56, n. 188 (p. 484); Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, p. 133.
their intrinsic individuality called thisness (haecceitas); no extrinsic prin-

ciple of individuation is required.12
Even though Scotuss examples of common natures or formalities are
mostly substances, he thought that one could regard any singular cate-
gorical item as an individual instantiation of its proper common nature.13
While some common natures are simple, such as the nature of whiteness,
many of them are complex, such as that of human beings and other com-
posite substances, which are associated with various common constitu-
ents from other categories.14 As Scotuss metaphysics tends to conceive
concrete beings as large collections of really distinct instantiated formali-
ties, it is of some interest that one of his metaphysical guidelines was the
parsimony principle that plurality should not be posited without neces-
sity. Scotus thought that his theory of categorical beings represented such
a simplification in comparison to Aquinass view.15
Scotus criticizes the view of Aquinas and some of his contemporaries
that the verb is, when used existentially, means the actuality of the sub-
ject, and when it is used as a copula, it means the way in which the sub-
ject is actual, this actuality being specified by the nominal predicate. The
copula is and the predicate word which accompanies it are the predi-
cate part of a proposition.16 Aquinas associated categorical things with
a proper nature (propria ratio) or essence and the mode of being (esse)
which varies between the categories, these two elements determining the
meaning of the copula and the predicate noun. While the first category
involves terms which pertain to independent things, the other catego-
ries involve terms which inhere in a substance: for an accident to be is
12John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis 7.13, nn. 11924
(ed. R. Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1997), pp. 25862);
Reportata Parisiensia 2.12, q. 5, n. 8 (p. 327); Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, pp. 13031;
Honnefelder, Duns Scotus, pp. 1056; Noone, Universals and Individuation, pp. 11821.
13Scotus, Ordinatio 1.5.1, nn. 1821 (pp. 1720); Scotus, Ordinatio 2.3.1, q. 4, n. 89
(pp. 43334).
14See P. King, Scotus on Metaphysics, in Williams, Cambridge Companion to Duns
Scotus, pp. 4956.
15Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum 8.1, n. 22 (pp. 4034); according to
G. Pini (Scotus Realist Conception of the Categories: His legacy to late medieval debates,
Vivarium 43 (2005), 91), Scotuss doctrine of the categories amounts to a dramatic onto-
logical simplification.
16Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias expositio 1, 5, n. 73; 2, 2, n. 212
(ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1964), pp. 29; 85); for Scotus criticism, see John
Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in duos libros Perihermenias 1.5 (ed. R. Andrews et al. (St. Bon-
aventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2004), p. 173).
278 simo knuuttila
to be in another thing.17 Scotus abandoned the distinction between the

essence and the modes of existence as the constituents of being in the
categories, thinking that postulating such elements in categorical things
themselves was based on confusion between combining things in predica-
tion and the ways they exist in the world.18 Scotus maintained that inher-
ence is not a component part of anything. It belongs to the category of
action or passion and enables the accidents to be related to substances.19
In Scotuss view, all categorical items are really distinct from each other,
and inherence is required to account for the union between a substance
and its accidents.20
Scotuss simplification of the ontology of categories was accompanied
by a reconsideration of the semantics of the copula. Since Abelard, it had
not been unusual to characterize predication in terms of inherence or
identity, that is, reading An A is B as B inheres in A or The same thing
which is A is B. Abelard himself preferred the identity view in dealing
with Trinitarian formulations and this became an influential approach
in theology.21 Aquinas makes use of both formulations in philosophical
contexts, with a preference for the inherence view, which he took to be
the only acceptable one for adjectival predicate terms.22 These two ways
of describing predication were often taken as non-exclusive alternatives
in late thirteenth-century treatises.23 Scotus stresses, however, that the
copula is does not mean inherence. In his early treatise on Aristotles
17Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.28, a. 2; Quaestiones de potentia q. 8, a. 2.

18See G. Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An interpretation of Aristotles Cat-
egories in the late thirteenth century (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 14750. In his commentary
on Aristotles Metaphysics, Aquinas attempts to derive the Aristotelian categories from
various modes of predication, arguing that the diverse categorical modes of existence
are expressed by analogous uses of is of predication; see Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim
libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio 5.9, nn. 89092 (ed. M. R. Cathala and R. Spiazzi
(Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1950), pp. 23839). For different interpretations, see J. F. Wippel,
Thomas Aquinass Derivation of Aristotles Categories (Predicaments), Journal of the
History of Philosophy 25 (1987), 1823; P. Symington, Thomas Aquinas on Establishing the
Identity of Aristotles Categories, in L. A. Newton (ed.), Medieval Commentaries on Aristo-
tles Categories (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 11944.
19John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 4.12, q. 1, n. 6 (ed. L. Wadding, Opera Omnia 8 (Lyon:
Durand, 1639), p. 711).
20Pini, Scotus Realist Conception of the Categories, 9096.
21See S. Knuuttila, The Question of the Validity of Logic in Late Medieval Thought, in
R. Friedman and L. Nielsen (eds.), The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and
Modal Logic 14001800 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), pp. 12142.
22G. Klima, Aquinas Theory of the Copula and Analogy of Being, Logical Analysis and
History of Philosophy 5 (2002), 15976.
23Ebbesen, Concrete Accidental Terms, p. 149.
Peri hermeneias, Scotus argues that the copula signifies the actual identity
between the subjects of the terms.24 In later works he prefers to treat the
copula as a syncategorematic sign which refers to the act of combining
the terms.25
Scotuss remarks on the levels of abstraction mentioned above are in
fact part of his discussion of Trinitarian predication. Referring to Avicenna,
he argues that when the terms of a predication represent finite things in
their ultimate abstraction, which means formalities, such propositions
are always false because such things are not identical to anything but to
themselves. Because of this independence, it is not possible to predicate
these terms of each other by a reference to a third which would serve
as a joint subject. Scotus says that the distinction between identical and
formal predication is not applicable here, by which he means to explain
that in Trinitarian matters there are cases of sameness between ultimate
abstractions without formal identity. These are expressed by praedicatio
per identitatem, which is taken to state that the terms stand for the same
even though they are formally non-identical. This is meant to be possi-
ble because many Trinitarian terms stand for infinite realities and the
divine infinity serves as the basis of sameness even when there is formal
non-identity between the realities.26
The notion of praedicatio identica was used in various ways after
Scotus by fourteenth-century authors, and it was not restricted to divine
terms. Some took it to mean that there is no kind of difference between
the subject and the predicate, as in A = A. It was also taken to stand for
what the historians call the identity theory of predication in logic, A is
B meaning that something is A and the same thing is also B.27 It seems
that the modist discussion of whether inherence is part of the meaning of
concrete or abstract accidental terms added to the interest in the question
of how predication should be understood, but there were other factors
which led to reconsideration of the structure of syllogistic premises as
well. Many logicians wrote about Trinitarian logic in which the doctrine of
24Scotus, Quaestiones in duos libros Perihermenias 1.5 (pp. 17374).

25G. Pini, Scotus on Assertion and the Copula: A comparison with Aquinas, in
A. Maier and L. Valente (eds.), Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language
(Florence: Olschki, 2004), pp. 32031.
26Scotus, Ordinatio 1, d. 8, p. 1, q. 4, n. 219 (pp. 27475).
27See S. Knuuttila, Praedicatio identica in Scotus Theological Metaphysics, in L. Hon-
nefelder et al. (eds.), Johannes Duns Scotus 13082008: Die philosophischen Perspektiven
seines Werkes/Investigations into his Philosophy; Proceedings of The Quadruple Congress
on John Duns Scotus, part 3 (Mnster: Aschendorff, 2010), pp. 26576.
280 simo knuuttila
divine simplicity supported the idea of explicating the truth conditions of

a predication with the help of the notion of identity instead of inherence
or other theoretical postulations of metaphysical structures. Ockham,
Buridan and their followers treated predication in logic in terms of exten-
sional identity which went well together with the supposition theory of
generality, a second hallmark of late medieval logic. One of the influential
innovations was the new formulation of the quantified terms as All/some
of those which are A are B instead of All/some As are B. This is also
found in Leibniz, who refers to medieval Trinitarian examples.28 These
reformulations were natural from the point of view of the supposition the-
ory and very useful for eliminating ambiguities in Trinitarian arguments.
The question of whether the terms are substantial or accidental lost much
of its significance in this approach.
Boethius of Dacia on Socrates is whiteness
In his analysis of Boethius of Dacias view of concrete and abstract acci-

dental terms, Ebbesen assumes that in Boethius of Dacias theory white
and whiteness have the same denotata and he makes some suggestions
on why according to Boethius
(1) Socrates est albus
is true and
(2) Socrates est albedo
is false, when these are put forward at a moment when Socrates exists and
is white. Ebbesen thinks that the necessary condition of the truth of all
affirmative categorical propositions (S est P) is:
(i) that there is now (at the time of utterance) an existing denotatum of
S, that there now exists a denotatum of P, and that at least one of the
present denotata of P is now extensionally identical with one of the present
denotata of S.
28S. Knuuttila, Generality and Identity in Late Medieval Discussions of the Prior
Analytics, Vivarium 48 (2010), 21527; S. Knuuttila, Philosophy and Theology in Seven-
teenth-Century Lutheranism, in S. Knuuttila and R. Saarinen (eds.), Theology and Early
Modern Philosophy (15501750) (Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 2010),
pp. 4154.
Since propositions (1) and (2) fulfil criterion (i), something else is needed to
explain why (1) is true and (2) is false. Ebbesen suggests that in Boethiuss
view, if the predicate term is a substantive and refers to an independent
entity, then the truth of S is P requires, in addition to (i), also
(ii) that it is impossible for anything now denoted by both S and P to be
denoted at any time by S but not by P .
Socrates is a man fulfils condition (ii) but Socrates is whiteness does
not.29
What kinds of analysis of universal necessity propositions were avail-
able in Boethiuss time? How would he have understood (ii) if he had it
in his mind? Robert Kilwardbys commentary on Aristotles Prior Analytics
(ca. 1240), the most advanced treatise on modal matters in the second half
of the thirteenth century, claims that affirmative universal and particular
convertible syllogistic necessity propositions have essential subject terms,
which are per se connected to predicate terms, these being apparently
essential terms as well. These terms apply necessarily and not contin-
gently to the things to which they refer. This was also Averroess view.
When the predication itself is also regarded as essential, necessity propo-
sitions involve three necessary relations.30 This doctrine was taken to be
implied in Aristotelian conversion rules of syllogistic necessity premises.
While these metaphysical considerations greatly restricted the domain
of syllogistic necessity, there was also a tradition of more numerous hypo-
thetical and temporal necessitiesthe former referred to an invariability of
predication as long as the subject was actual, and the latter, which applied
to all true propositions, as long as the predicate was actual.31 Hypotheti-
cal necessities, such as All literate beings are necessarily humans, were
traditionally considered as counterexamples to Aristotelian conversion

30Robert Kilwardby [Giles of Rome], In libros Priorum Analyticorum expositio (Venice,
1516; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1968), ff. 7rab, 8va, 21ra, 25rb; Averroes, Quaesita octo in
librum Priorum Analyticorum q. 4, cap. 3 (Venice: apud Iunctas, 1562; repr. Frankfurt: Min-
erva, 1962, ff. 8384); P. Thom, Medieval Modal Systems: Problems and concepts (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2003), pp. 8185; P. Thom, Logic and Ontology in the Syllogistic of Robert Kilwardby
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 1821.
31See Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I com-
mentarium, ed. M. Wallies, CAG 2.1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1883), pp. 36:2532, 201:2124; John
Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica Priora commentaria, ed. M. Wallies, CAG 13.2 (Ber-
lin: Reimer, 1905), pp. 43:814, 126:729; Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis
, ed. C. Meiser, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 187780), vol. 1, pp. 121:20122:5; vol. 2,
pp. 241:1242:15; K. L. Flannery, Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias (Leiden:
Brill, 1995), pp. 6265 and 99106.
282 simo knuuttila
rules for necessity propositions, and were regarded as examples of non-

syllogistic necessity propositions. Hypothetical necessities with essential
predicate terms also fulfil (ii). However, it seems that the same holds of
hypothetical necessities having inseparable accidents as predicate terms.
According to William of Sherwood, an inseparable accident is one that a
subject cannot be without, as whiteness is an accident of a swan. In the
next sentence he says that if we suppose that a swan were to become
black, the swan would nevertheless remain a swan.32 One might wonder
how this is possible if a swan cannot be without whiteness. In any case,
it seems that Every swan is whiteness fulfils criterion (ii). Every human
is whiteness does not fulfil it, but essential predications such as Every
human is rationality do. Perhaps (ii) should be qualified in some way.
Necessities and Possibilities of White Socrates
In his commentary on the Prior Analytics, Kilwardby considers Aristo-

tles modal syllogistic as the correct theory of modalities, the full under-
standing of which demands various extra rules which are supported by
metaphysical considerations, such as restricting the modal conversion of
necessity propositions to those with necessary terms or applying various
readings of modalized and non-modalized premises on the basis of the
modality of other premises in a syllogism. From the logical point of view,
many of these rules have an ad hoc character.33 Some of the metaphysi-
cal assumptions are eliminated in Richard Campsalls commentary on
the Prior Analytics from the early fourteenth century, in which the syllo-
gisms with modalities de dicto and de re modals are discussed separately.
This became usual in late medieval logic as well as Campsalls taking the
possibility proper (not impossible) as the basic modal notion.34 Camp-
sall argued that de re necessity with respect to actual things equates to
unchanging predication, and contingency to changing predication.35 His
32William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam 2.1.5 (ed. C. H. Lohr with P. Kunze

and B. Mussler, Traditio 39 (1983), 240); William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, trans.
N. Kretzmann (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1966).
33See Thom, Logic and Ontology, chaps. 56.
34See S. Knuuttila, Medieval Modal Theories and Modal Logic, in D. M. Gabbay and
J. Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 2, Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008), pp. 54248.
35Richard of Campsall, Questiones super librum Priorum Analeticorum 5.38, 5.4345,
6.25, 9.19, 12.31 (ed. E. A. Synan, The Works of Richard of Campsall, vol. 1 (Toronto: Pontifi-
cal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968)).
discussion of modal syllogistic was largely influenced by the idiosyncratic

assumption that the terms stand for actual things. Without entering into
the details, let us have a look at some comments on concrete accidental
terms in Campsalls work, one of the most employed examples of which
is white Socrates.
One striking feature of Campsalls work is the use of the identity analy-
sis of predication: An A is B is taken to mean that at least one of the
things which are under A is the same as one of the things under B. In
explaining why This white thing is necessarily Socrates (hoc album de
necessitate est Socrates) is false Campsall writes:
An affirmative necessity proposition in the divided sense is true only if some-
thing contained under the predicate term is unchangeable with respect to
something contained under the subject term, as long as this exists. This holds
when the terms are common. When the terms are singular, it is required
that what is signified by one is not changeable with respect to what is signi-
fied by the other, as long as this exists.36
When Campsall writes that a thing under a term is invariable with respect
to something under another term, he means that the same thing is invari-
ably under these terms. A divided affirmative necessity proposition with
common terms means that all or some of the things which are now under
the subject term are invariably under the necessarily predicated term, the
common terms signifying substances, properties based on the nature of
things or inseparable accidents, as long as these things exist.37 Camp-
sall believes that this reading of divided necessity propositions explains
why they are regulated by the Aristotelian rules of conversion. A white
Socrates is necessarily Socrates is said to be false for the reason that what
the subject term signifies is not an invariable characterization of Socrates.
However, the proposition That which is a white Socrates is necessarily
Socrates is true.38 Campsall makes much use of white Socrates and
white man in discussing the logic of divided necessity and contingency
propositions because these composite terms have an accidental part and
an essential part. An example analogous to A white Socrates is neces-
sarily Socrates is A white Socrates is contingently Socrateswhile the
white Socrates, as distinct from Socrates, was not necessarily Socrates, the
36Campsall, Quaestiones super librum Priorum 6.25 (pp. 12223).

37Campsall, Quaestiones super librum Priorum 5.4345 (pp. 11213); 6.25 (pp. 12223);
9.19 (p. 157). For the actuality condition, see 5.40 (p. 111); divided negative propositions
mean that things under the terms are necessarily separated, see 5.38 (p. 110).
38Campsall, Quaestiones super librum Priorum 6.2531 (pp. 12225).
284 simo knuuttila
white Socrates was contingently Socrates, Socrates himself being neces-

sarily Socrates.39
A similar distinction between a thing as white and that which is white
was applied by Scotus, although his modal semantics differed from that of
Campsall because of the idea of contingency as being based on simultane-
ous alternatives. While Campsall says that all negative present tense de re
possibilities are also de re necessities, Scotus defines a present contingent
fact as something the opposite of which could be actual now instead.40
In explaining why an instantaneous act of the will as a free cause is not
necessary Scotus writes:
If we assume that the will exists at one instant of time only, it wills freely
and it does not will freely unless it can be not willing. For this reason the
proposition The will willing at a can be not willing at a is true in the divided
sense. Hence we must make the same distinction as regarding the proposi-
tion A human who is white is necessarily an animal, which is false in the
composite sense because it then means that animal necessarily belongs to
this whole: a human being who is white. It is true in the divided sense and
then it involves two propositions, meaning that a human being is white
which human being is necessarily an animal.41
This example is part of Scotuss explanation of what he calls logical
potency and its real application. The central idea is that the terms of A
white can be black are not taken to refer to different instants of time but
the same one. The truth of the proposition is then based on the principle
that the opposite of an accident, which does not belong to a subject per se,
is not repugnant to the subject at any instant of time.42
Many thirteenth-century writers influenced by the modist analysis
commented on divided possibility sentences with accidental terms, such
as sedens potest ambulare, aegrum potest esse sanum, or album potest esse
nigrum, which were regarded as true per accidens because the subject of an
accidental property had the opposite potency. The same point was applied
to examples in which the subject is homo sedens or homo albus.43 Scotus
participated in this discussion in his early works, and also argued that the
39Campsall, Quaestiones super librum Priorum 16.38 (p. 255).

40Campsall, Quaestiones super librum Priorum 5.50 (p. 114); John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio
1.2.1, qq. 12, n. 86 (ed. C. Bali, Opera Omnia 2 (Vatican City, Vatican Polyglot Press, 1950),
p. 178).
41John Duns Scotus, Lectura 1, 39, n. 52 (ed. C. Bali, Opera Omnia 17 (Vatican City,
Vatican Polyglot Press, 1966), p. 496).
42Scotus, Lectura 1, 39, n. 50 (p. 495).
opposite terms referred to different moments of timethis was one of

the traditional ways of explicating the truth of the de re reading in this
context.44 His more influential new ideas of modality were concentrated
on possibilities as the states of affairs the assumed actuality of which does
not imply anything impossible, although they may be incompossible with
what is actual.45 Possibilities are separated from potencies in logic; they
are what they are even if there were no potencies as executive powers.46
This conception of possibility was increasingly used as the basic modal
notion in late medieval modal logic, together with the extension of the
domain to merely possible beings. Metaphysical questions typical of Kil-
wardbys modal syllogistic or modist considerations about essential and
accidental potencies were replaced by the simpler vocabulary of demon-
strative pronouns, suppositional terms and the modalized copula.47
Ockham and Buridan argue that the truth of A white thing can be
black demands the truth of This can be black, and that This can be
black and This is black is possible mean the same. The latter proposi-
tion represents a compound reading and the former a divided reading.
These readings are treated as equivalent at the basic level with demon-
strative pronouns, but are separated in the discussion of quantified uni-
versal and particular statements.48 Ockham and Buridan thought, like
Scotus, that although merely possible beings have no kind of existence,
they can be spoken of as possible objects of demonstrative pronouns.
Buridan assumes that the possible truth of This A is B means that it is
true of a possible scenario in which the possible being referred to by this
44Knuuttila, Medieval Modal Theories, 51112; Simon of Faversham, whose works had
some influence on Scotus, repeats the traditional view in his Quaestiones novae super libro
Elenchorum q. 14 (ed. S. Ebbesen et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1984), p. 138:6364); John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum Aristotelis q.
26 (ed. R. Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute; Washington DC:
The Catholic University of America, 2004), p. 400:78).
45Scotus, Lectura 1, 39, n. 72 (p. 504).
46John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 1, d. 36, nn. 6061 (ed. C. Bali, Opera Omnia 6 (Vati-
can City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1963), p. 296): The human being is possible by logical
potency, because it is not repugnant to it to be a thing, and the chimera is impossible by
the opposed impossibility because it is repugnant to it to be a thing...this logical possibil-
ity, taken as such, could stand in its own right even though, per impossibile, there were no
omnipotence to regard it.
47See S. Knuuttila, Modality, in J. Marenbon (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Medieval Phi-
losophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 31241.
48William of Ockham, Summa logicae 2, c. 10; 3.1, c. 32; 3.3, c. 10 (ed. P. Boehner,
G. Gl and S. Brown (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1974), pp. 27679;
448; 63234); John Buridan, Tractatus de consequentiis 2, c. 7, concl. 16 (ed. H. Hubien
(Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Vander-Oyez, 1974), pp. 7576).
286 simo knuuttila
occurs; for example, in describing his identity view of the copula, Buridan
suggests that An A was B means that a past thing was a subject of (past)
A and B and An A is possibly B that a possible thing is the subject of
(possible) A and B.49
Conclusions
Thirteenth-century modist theories for their part contributed to what

could be called the peak of the medieval metaphysics of predication.
Among the popular objects of analysis were the differences between
white and whiteness said of Socrates and things said of Socrates and white
Socrates. White and whiteness were symbols for concrete and acciden-
tal terms in examples mostly derived from Aristotle. Scotus maintained
that his theory of formalities, which was historically related to modist phi-
losophy, represented metaphysical parsimony. This is true in the sense
that it undermined the categorical multiplicity of the is of predication.50
In late medieval logic, predication was analysed with the help of exten-
sional identity of the referents of terms. While thirteenth-century ideas of
predication became increasingly separated from logic and the substance/
accident distinction became superfluous, as Ebbesen puts it,51 new meta-
physical considerations were introduced in the discussions of supposition
in assertoric and modal propositions.
49John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, Sophismata 2, concl. 10 (trans. G. Klima (New

Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 85556).
50See S. Knuuttila, The Metaphysics of the Categories in John Duns Scotus, in
L. Haaparanta and H. Koskinen (eds.), Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 6277.
51Ebbesen, Concrete Accidental Terms, p. 157.
17.Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse:
Limit-decision problems in Peter of Auvergne
Paloma Prez-Ilzarbe
Among the many things that we owe to Sten Ebbesen are the hundreds
of manuscripts he has made available to us. A good way to honour him
is, perhaps, to show the interest of some of these pieces of work. Partly
because Sten has a particular affection for sophisms (and something close
to an obsession with Peter of Auvergne),1 but also because my own inter-
ests coincide with the metaphysical and logical problems connected with
the verbs incipit and desinit, for this celebration I have chosen a soph-
ism in which Peter of Auvergne deals with the metaphysics and the logic
of ceasing.2 In addition to Stens careful edition of the sophism in the
so valued Cahiers de lInstitut du Moyen ge Grec et Latin,3 the compre-
hensive catalogue of thirteenth-century sophisms co-edited by Ebbesen
and Goubier4 was also a source of invaluable help in locating other ver-
sions of the same sophism: when compared with other (generally shorter)
accounts, the originality and value of Peters text becomes apparent.
In the following pages I wish to highlight some interesting features of
Peters account of limit-decision problems: a non-standard interpretation
of the verbs with a non-standard treatment of their rules of exposition;
a characteristic solution to the problem of the instant of transition; and,
above all, a clear distinction between different levels of discourse that
sometimes get confused in standard accounts of limit-decision problems.
1S. Ebbesen, Questions and Sophismata: Tracking Peter of Auvergne, in H.A.G.Braak

huis and C. H. Kneepkens (eds.), Aristotles Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages:
Essays on the commentary tradition (Groningen: Ingenium, 2003), p. 31.
2A very useful web site on Peter of Auvergne has been prepared as part of the research
project Die politische Philosophie von Peter von Auvergne, http://www.paleography
.unifr.ch/petrus_de_alvernia/. Some bibliographical references on incipit and desinit can
be found in C. Trifogli, Thomas Wyltons Question An contingit dare ultimum rei perma-
nentis in esse, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 4 (1994), 91141, and in S. Brower-Toland,
Instantaneous Change and the Physics of Sanctification: Quasi-aristotelianism in Henry
of Ghents quodlibet XV q. 13, Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (2002), 1946.
3S. Ebbesen, Three 13th-Century Sophismata about Beginning and Ceasing, CIMAGL
59 (1989), 12180.
4S. Ebbesen and F. Goubier, A Catalogue of 13th-Century Sophismata, 2 vols. (Paris:
Vrin, 2010).
288 paloma prez-ilzarbe
The Sophism Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse
This long text combines discussions along three main lines. On the one
hand, Peter has received the old tradition that interprets the sophisms on
incipit and desinit in connection with Aristotles Sophistical Refutations,
concentrating on questions of ambiguity and scope.5 On the other hand,
he already belongs to the new tradition that interprets the sophisms on
incipit and desinit in the light of Aristotles Physics. A hybrid approach
is said to be characteristic of this new development, which combines a
metaphysical analysis of the temporal limits involved in beginning and
ceasing (this has been called the physical strand) with a logical analysis
of propositions containing the terms incipit and desinit (called the logi-
cal strand).6
In accordance with this tripartite division of labour, Peters text con-
tains, on the one hand, a logical analysis of the sophism from the point of
view of its ambiguous reading; on the other hand, a metaphysical discus-
sion of the nature of the instant and the possibility of designating a last
instant and a second-to-last instant in a situation of ceasing; and finally a
logical discussion of the meaning of the verbs incipit and desinit and the
pattern of exposition that corresponds to incipit/desinit propositions.
The Primitive Logical Analysis: Ambiguity and Distinction

The first paragraphs contain the standard elements that make up a soph-
ism. First, the sophismatic proposition is presented, Socrates desinit esse
non desinendo esse, followed by the statement of the particular situation
that makes it sophismatic (positio): that Socrates is in the second-to-last
instant of his life. Then, as usual, a proof and a disproof are offered, and
finally a solution is proposed, which involves a distinction between two
senses of the sophismatic proposition.7
This is a common analysis of the sophism, but in his final answer
Peter shows himself to be dissatisfied with it. Although he accepts the
5See N. Kretzmann, Incipit/Desinit, in P. K. Machamer and R. G. Turnbull (eds.),

Motion and Time, Space and Matter: Interrelations in the history of philosophy and science,
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), p. 104.
6Kretzmann, Incipit/Desinit, p. 109. See also A. de Libera, La problmatique de
linstant du changement au XIIIe sicle: Contribution a lhistoire des sophismata physi-
calia, in S. Caroti (ed.), Studies in Medieval Natural Philosophy (Florence: Olschki, 1989),
pp. 4393.
7Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma 7, ed. S. Ebbesen, Three 13th-Century Sophismata, 157.
limit-decision problems in peter of auvergne 289
d istinction, he does not find it useful: the sophismatic proposition is in

any case false. The reason is that the situation stipulated in the positio
cannot obtain: it is impossible for Socrates to be in the second-to-last
instant of his life.8
This dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to the sophism leads
him to engage in no further discussion about the ambiguity of the soph-
ismatic proposition or about the distinctions that can be made. Instead,
he goes directly to the questions that he takes an interest in: on the one
hand, the metaphysical issue of the nature of the instant and the ques-
tions whether or not a last instant and a second-to-last instant can be
distinguished in the ceasing of something; on the other hand, the logical
questions about the meaning of incipit and desinit and about the expo-
sition of propositions that contain them. Peters discussion takes the form
of a set of four elaborate quaestiones, before his brief determinatio about
the distinction and about the sophism itself.
The New Hybrid Analysis: Limits and Exposition

Peters approach to the sophism is an instance of the so-called hybrid
approach, and it is indeed a good example of the mixture of logic and
metaphysics that is characteristic of this tradition.9 But there is something
distinctive about this sophism if we compare it with the most typical
sophisms of the hybrid approach, with familiar examples such as desinit
esse albus, desinit esse albissimus hominum or incipit esse albior quam.
In Peters sophism the verb desinit is not determined by any such categ-
orematic term, and therefore the doctrine of supposition (which is usually
the focus of the logical strand) does not play any role in Peters discussion.
The logical side of his analyses is only devoted to the meaning of the verbs
and to the exposition of the propositions, connecting them only with the
metaphysical problems raised by Aristotles doctrine about motion and
time (and its medieval sequels).
8Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma 7, 180.

9About the fuzzy boundaries between logic and natural philosophy in this period,
see S. Ebbesen, The More the Less: Natural philosophy and sophismata in the thirteenth
century, in S. Caroti and P. Souffrin (eds.), La nouvelle physique du XIVe sicle (Florence:
Olschki, 1997), pp. 944. Compare, however, J. E. Murdoch, The Analytic Character of Late
Medieval Learning: Natural philosophy without nature, in L. D. Roberts (ed.), Approaches
to Nature in the Middle Ages (Bringhamton: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance
Studies, 1982), p. 189, where he distinguishes between the initial mere juxtaposition and
the final genuine integration of the logical and the physical.
These metaphysical problems have been generically referred to as limit-

decision problems. In my opinion, a finer distinction is useful between
two different kinds of limit-decision problems. On the one hand, there
is the problem of designating the temporal limits of a thing or state: its
beginning and end, when this state is considered as detached from any-
thing else (thus, regardless of what comes before or after these limits). The
problem is simply that of determining and describing the temporal end
points of the state. But on the other hand, a different problem arises when
one considers two consecutive states, and the focus is then put on the end
of the first one and the beginning of the second one. Here, what has to
be located and described is not the end points of a state, but the border
between two consecutive states, one that ends and one that begins.
I want to insist on the interest of distinguishing two different kinds
of problem, instead of just seeing two approaches to the limit-decision
problem. First, concerning the temporal limits of one being, the problem
is that of determining in which way the beginning and the end of a thing
involve respectively a first and a last. The fact that this is a problem is
connected with Aristotles discussions about the nature of motion (which
has a peculiar kind of being), but the logical correlate is a problem in
itself, namely, the problem of determining the rules of exposition for the
verbs incipit and desinit. Second, concerning the boundaries between
two beings, the problem is that of diagnosing possible failures of basic
metaphysical principles and of designing the strategy that has to be
adopted when faced with this possibility. This has, of course, its own logi-
cal correlate, concerning the compatibility between the logical analysis of
desinit and the logical analysis of incipit.
I will call the first kind of questions incipit-desinit questions, and the
second ones will be named desinit-incipit questions. Both have a logical
and a metaphysical side. In principle, the logician who is searching for the
rules of exposition that have to be applied to propositions with incipit
and desinit does not need to take into account the second, but only the
first kind of limit-decision problem. But some authors actually formulate
their rules with the second perspective in mind, designing the answer to
the incipit-desinit question not to clash with the desinit-incipit con-
straints.10 As for Peter, although he formulates his rules of exposition from
the perspective of the incipit-desinit problem, a metaphysical interest
10I take L. O. Nielsen to call the one-state approach the approach that focuses on the
first kind of problems, and the two-states approach the approach that takes into account
the second kind of problems in order to deal with the first one; see L. O. Nielsen, Thomas
Bradwardines Treatise on Incipit and Desinit, CIMAGL 42 (1982), 1920. Trifogli calls
takes him well into the desinit-incipit problem. I will summarise the
main points of both analyses. But before I go into Peters answer to the
limit-decision problems, I will briefly present some assumptions underly-
ing his approach.
Peters Assumptions
Metaphysical Assumptions: Kinds of Limits, Kinds of Things

Peter devotes a large part of his text to analysing the positio, the state-
ment of the particular situation in which the sophismatic proposition is
evaluated as true or false: that Socrates is in the second-to-last instant of
his life. Concerning this positio, Peter deals with two quaestiones about
the last and the second-to-last instant of Socratess life.11 Before offering
his determinatio, Peter develops, in a long preamble, his view about the
nature of the instant and about its connection with time and with the
thing that undergoes motion.12
A peculiar feature of this preface is that the reference to two different
kinds of limits adds a new perspective to the limit-decision discussion. In
addition to the Aristotelian notion of the instant as the indivisible limit
of time,13 equal attention is also paid to the notion of mutatum esse or
mutatio as the indivisible limit of motion.14
On the nature of the instant, Peter assumes the common analogy of
the instants of time as the points on a line. In contrast with the infinite
divisibility of time, an instant is (like a point is with respect to the infi-
nitely divisible line) the indivisible limit of a continuum. Instants are not
parts of time, but cuts in its continuous flow. This is the reason why Peter
rejects the positio: a second-to-last instant of Socratess life can neither
the compatibility rules the constraints which are applied by the followers of the two-
states approach; see Trifogli, Thomas Wyltons Question, 1046.
13A survey of Aristotles doctrine of time can be found in C. Trifogli, Oxford Physics in
the Thirteenth Century (ca. 12501270): Motion, infinity, place, and time (Leiden: Brill, 2000),
pp. 1822.
14On the Averroistic notion of transmutatum esse, see S. Knuuttila, Remarks on
the Background of the Fourteenth Century Limit Decision Controversies, in M. Asztalos
(ed.), The Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages (Stockholm:
Almquist and Wiksell International, 1986), pp. 25457. On a different notion of mutatio,
see for example A. de Libera, Linstant du changement selon Saint Thomas dAquin, in
G. Boss (ed.), Mtaphysique, histoire de la philosophie: recueil dtudes offert a Fernand
Brunner, (Neuchtel: Editions de la Baconnire, 1981), pp. 99109.
be given (dare) nor designated (signare), because of the very nature of

infinitely divisible things and their indivisible limits.
With respect to the second kind of indivisible limit, Peter uses a less
known analogy with line and points, by which he contrasts motion (motus)
as a line with mutation (mutatio) as a point. Mutation is thus understood
as an indivisible state, which acts as the limit of a continuous motion.
These two indivisibles are, however, connected in the following way: just
as time is for Aristotle the measure of motion, so the instant is said to be
the measure of mutation.15
This distinction is very interesting, since it allows a separation of two
different levels at which the discussion of limit-decision problems can
be carried out: the strictly temporal level and the ontic level. On the
one hand, one can ask about the limit of the time that measures a state
(the first and last instants of a temporal segment in the case of the incipit-
desinit problem, or the dividing instant between two temporal segments,
in the case of the desinit-incipit problem). On the other hand, one can
ask about the limit of the state itself (the end points of the state in the
case of the incipit-desinit problem, or the border between two sub-
sequent states in the case of the desinit-incipit problem). As we shall
see, the ontic perspective has priority in Peters account.
But in order to understand the kind of states whose limits Peter is try-
ing to determine (and whose measuring times he will be able to delimit),
we need to have a look at the distinction between two kinds of entities.
In addition to the notions of instant and mutation as indivisible limits,
the metaphysics underlying Peters analysis also contains the common
medieval distinction between permanent and successive beings, which is
one of the core elements in the physical strand of the hybrid approach:16
typically, the distinction is used to determine two sets of exposition rules
for incipit and desinit. We will see how, although Peter accepts the dis-
tinction, its effect on exposition is neutralised.
15On this use of measure in connection with unextended things, see R. Fox, Time and
Eternity in Mid-Thirteenth-Century Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 195.
Peter tells us about certain authors who identify the two kinds of limits. C. Trifogli reports
that a position close to this is present in Giles of Rome; see Giles of Rome on the Instant
of Change, Synthese 96 (1993), 96.
16Kretzmann, Incipit/Desinit, p. 110. According to Knuuttila, Remarks on the Back-
ground, p. 257, the distinction is influenced by Averroes comment on the Physics. Accord-
ing to de Libera, La problmatique, p. 63, it might also have Augustinian origins, and its
use in the thirteenth century was first connected with the semantic distinction between
esse actu and esse actu sub termino.
Successive beings are those that can be divided into non-simultaneous

parts: their being is extended, in a non-spatial sense. Motion is the para-
digm of a successive thing, but time and rest are also considered by Peter
to be successive, insofar as they are related to motion. Following Aristotle,
Peter states and proves that successive things (in particular, motion) do
not have being at the beginning of the time that measures them, which
will be the main ground for Peters limit-decisions. Permanent things, in
contrast, can be divided into simultaneous parts, but they are indivisible
with respect to succession: their being is all at once. They are measured
by the instant (not by time), and thus they can be said to have being at
an instant.17
The common analysis of the verbs incipit and desinit gives them dif-
ferent patterns of exposition depending on whether they are applied to
permanent or successive things. But Peters solution to the sophism is
based on some unorthodox logical assumptions.
Logical Assumptions: Meaning and Range of Application of incipit

and desinit
In the literature on incipit and desinit, it is usual to see them being
treated as syncategorematic terms, which involve an implicit negation
and a covert reference to times different from the present. The opinion is
also usual that the meaning of incipit and desinit varies depending on
the kind of things they are applied to. Peter, in contrast, treats these verbs
as categorematic terms, having a significatum, and as having only one, no
matter what kind of things they are applied to.18
Peter devotes a whole quaestio to the significatum of incipit and
desinit.19 Against an alternative categorematic interpretation (the
opinion that these verbs signify motion), he assumes a different mean-
ing (although these verbs of course signify per modum motus, that is, as
verbs). Incipit and desinit signify, respectively, the first and the last of
a divisible thing: that is, its beginning (inceptio) and its end (desitio), with
respect to the dimension in which the thing is divisible. Peter emphasises
that a first and a last only belong to quantitative and continuous things,
which are always divisible things.

18According to Knuuttila, Remarks on the Background, p. 256, this categorematic
sense of incipit and desinit is typical of Averroess approach.
More specifically, when the divisible thing that is being considered is

a successive state (divisible with respect to before and after), the verbs
incipit and desinit signify the temporal limits of this state. This temporal
sense of beginning and ending is the only relevant sense for Peters dis-
cussion of the sophismatic proposition. A crucial point is that, in Peters
account, only successive beings can properly be said to have a first and a
last in this temporal sense. Permanent things, since they are indivisible
with respect to before and after (they are all at once), do not properly
have a beginning or an end in the temporal sense. They can only improp-
erly be said to have a temporal beginning or a temporal end, always in
connection with a related motion or rest: insofar as they are the terminus
of a motion or the form under which a thing is resting.20
This has the important consequence that the verbs incipit and desinit,
when taken in the temporal sense, should be applied only to successive
beings, and therefore that a question about the exposition of these verbs
will only make sense in connection with such beings. This means that the
common accounts of the exposition of incipit and desinit are mistaken
in Peters opinion. The problem with the traditional accounts is that a
time line is always assumed (for both permanent and successive things):
they neglect the fact that the being of a permanent thing is not extended
along time, and so they keep asking about a temporal first and a temporal
last, just as they correctly do in the case of temporally extended things.21
This is how Peter restricts to successive beings both the metaphysical
question about the limits and the logical question about the exposition of
the verbs. Since the being of permanent things is not measured by time, in
the case of permanent things no limit-decision problems arise.
In the following sections I will present Peters proposal for two of the
limit-decision problems I have distinguished: one, I will offer his solu-
tion to the logical side of the incipit-desinit problem (whose metaphysi-
cal side was satisfactorily solved by Aristotle); second, I will summarise
his position about the metaphysical side of the desinit-incipit problem.
In addition, I will try to justify Peters neglect of the logical side of the
desinit-incipit problem.

21The reader is surely familiar with the drawings used by contemporary scholars to
visually reproduce the medieval analyses of limit decision: they show the time line that is
assumed in both cases, and they use a visual device to represent the limiting instants and
whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic to the delimited segment.
The Logic of Beginning and the Logic of Ending:

The Exposition of the Verbs incipit and desinit
I will first deal with what I called the incipit-desinit problem, that is,
the problem concerning the temporal limits of a single being. The meta-
physical side of the problem (for successive beings) has been satisfactorily
solved by Aristotle, so Peter can concentrate on the logical side: he deals
with a quaestio about the correct way of expounding propositions in which
incipit or desinit occur.22 As has been said, the peculiarity of Peters
account is that the distinction between permanent and successive things
is not used to further distinguish between two patterns of exposition for
the verbs incipit and desinit. It is used instead to demarcate in the first
place the kind of propositions to which the logical analysis can be prop-
erly applied: propositions about successive states.23
Given this constraint, and with the meaning set out above, the rules
of exposition for the verbs incipit and desinit will be straightforward,
once Peter has added a last clarification: he explicitly rejects the typical
formulae positio de preterito, remotio de futuro, etc. He reminds us that
the significatum of incipit and desinit does not involve time, but only
the ontic limits (first and last) of the successive being.24 The exponent
propositions, thus, will not make explicit the limits of the time measur-
ing the successive state, but the (temporal) limits of the being of the suc-
cessive state itself. I call these limits temporal because they are the first
and the last of a being insofar as it is measured by time (in contrast, for
example, with the limits of a being insofar as it is spatially extended), not
because they are the first and the last of the measuring time. In other
words, Peter is explicitly adopting the ontic perspective in his approach
to the limit-decision problem. Accordingly, the rules of exposition must
not contain in principle any positing or removing of time. Peters rules of
exposition only make use of the expressions to be at the beginning and
to be at the end of the corresponding successive state:

23This type of unorthodox account is reported by Nicholas of Paris; see de Libera, La
problmatique, p. 66.
24Contrast with the syncategorematic reading of the verbs and the explicit mention of
positio and privatio temporis in the early thirteenth-century treatments of incipit and des-
init reported by A. Tabarroni, Incipit and Desinit in a Thirteenth-Century Sophismata-
Collection, CIMAGL 59 (1989), 7477.
Socrates incipit moveri = Socrates est in principio motus

Socrates desinit moveri = Socrates est in fine motus
As for permanent states (for example, being human), although they do
not properly have a temporal beginning or a temporal end, Peter admits
that they can be said to begin in a derived sense, insofar as they are
related to a motion or a rest: a permanent thing can be either considered
as the terminus of a motion or as simultaneous with a rest. Thus, the same
pattern of exposition can be applied, for example, to incipit esse homo
in an improper way.25 Peter remains silent as to whether the same can be
done with desinit esse homo, but there seems to be no problem in apply-
ing the corresponding pattern. Eventually, a single pattern of exposition is
proposed for incipit and a single pattern for desinit, whatever the kind
of things these verbs are applied to.
This is Peters solution to the first limit-decision problem (in its logical
side), the problem of determining the rules of exposition for propositions
containing incipit and desinit. But, since these exponent propositions do
not offer a sufficiently explicit set of truth conditions, at this point Peter
turns to the metaphysical side of the incipit-desinit problem, already
solved by Aristotle. The fact is that successive things relate peculiarly to
their limits: the boundaries of a successive condition do not belong to the
condition itself, they are extrinsic limits.
Thus, Peter reformulates the truth conditions of incipit and desinit
propositions by constructing more complex propositions that make
explicit the extrinsic character of the limits. Since the limits of a succes-
sive being are temporal limits, this extrinsic character can be explicated
by affirming or denying the being of the successive state with respect to
the time line that measures this being. This is how, indirectly, the time line
comes into play. More specifically, paralleling the being of the successive
thing and its extrinsic boundaries, the relevant elements are a segment of
this time line and the instants extrinsically limiting it. For example, at the
beginning-instant of the time which measures his motion Socrates is not
yet in motion, and similarly, at the ending-instant of the time that meas-
ures his motion Socrates is not in motion any more, although, of course,
he was in motion during the whole measuring time.
Consequently, as far as incipit is concerned, est in principio implies
a removing (not of time but) of the being of the successive state at the
25A question remains as to in what sense a permanent thing can be simultaneous

with a successive one, since the being of a permanent thing is not measured by time.
present moment, and a positing of the being of the successive state dur-
ing the subsequent time. For example, from Socrates incipit moveri one
can infer Socrates non movetur sed post hoc movebitur. That is, a cop-
ulative statement can be made about the state, involving two different
temporal determinations: on the one hand, the being of the successive
state is affirmed during the time which measures the motion that begins,
and, on the other hand, the being of the successive state is denied at the
beginning-instant of this time.
Similarly for desinit, est in fine implies a removing of the being of
the successive state at the present moment, and a positing of the being of
the successive state during the previous time. For example, from Socrates
desinit moveri one can infer Socrates non movetur sed prius movebatur.
That is, a copulative statement can be made about the state, involving
two different temporal determinations: on the one hand, the being of the
successive state is affirmed during the time that measures the motion that
ends, and, on the other hand, the being of the successive state is denied
at the ending-instant of this time.
This is how time and instants eventually get involved in the exposition
of incipit and desinit: because successive states are measured by time,
and their limits are measured by instants. By virtue of this connection
between the ontic succession and the time line, the technical result for
the incipit-desinit problem seems to be identical to the standard account
for successive states. But, to my mind, Peters solution is more faithful
to Aristotle, since he takes into account the fact that Aristotelian time
is ontologically secondary with respect to motion: time is just the meas-
ure of motion. The modern eye tends to see first the temporal line along
which the successive being seems to develop. Peter, with Aristotle, is
able to see the development of the successive state without the temporal
line, and this is why he can speak about the ontic first and last, inde-
pendently of the first and last instants in the time line. Only at a second
moment does the time line appear.
In sum, the non-standard assumptions from which Peters account is
derived are highly significant. His option for a categorematic treatment of
the verbs and his acceptance of a single significatum (which gives prior-
ity to the ontic sense of temporal limit over the time-line one) lead him
to a natural understanding of the first and the last, in which the des-
init-incipit problem does not interfere. Peters solution to the first limit-
decision problem, that of assigning temporal limits to the being of one
state (and of giving rules for the exposition of propositions about these
temporal limits), is, naturally (on Aristotelian grounds), that the limits of
any successive thing are extrinsic at both ends (not yet, not any more),
and the rules of exposition simply reflect this fact.
So far I have concentrated on the incipit-desinit problem, the only one
that Peter takes into account when he tries to set the rules of exposition
for incipit and desinit. But what about the desinit-incipit problem, the
one which arises when a chain of two consecutive states (one state A
that ends and a different state B that subsequently begins) is considered?
Peter does not pay attenton to the logical question about the compatibil-
ity between the exposition rules for A desinit and the exposition rules
for B incipit. He deals, instead, with the metaphysical question about the
transition between A and B.
The Logic of Ending-and-Beginning: The Compatibility Problem
As I said, some authors formulate the rules of exposition with a concern

about the compatibility between the assignment of a temporal end-limit
and the assignment of a temporal beginning-limit when two consecutive
processes are considered. Since Peter does not pay attention to this com-
patibility problem, it might be asked whether this is due to negligence on
his part.
Taking into account the fact that successive things are for Peter the
only things for which the question about temporal limits makes sense, and
that he considers that both the first and the last of any successive being
are extrinsic limits, the compatibility question takes the following form:
is the assignment of an extrinsic end-limit to an initial successive state
compatible with the assignment of an extrinsic beginning-limit to the
subsequent successive state?
The orthodox position is that an extrinsic end-limit would imply an
intrinsic beginning-limit (or vice versa, that an extrinsic beginning-limit
would imply an intrinsic end-limit), and therefore Peters rules of exposi-
tion, which assign extrinsic limits both in the case of incipit and in the
case of desinit, seem to be inconsistent. Although two different senses
of temporal limit have been distinguished in Peters text (the time line
and the ontic), the discussion is usually carried out at the time line level.
Let us, then, rewrite the orthodox claim in the following way: If a given
instant extrinsically marks the end of the first temporal segment, this
implies (given that two consecutive instants are not allowed within the
Aristotelian conception of time) that the same instant will instrinsically
mark the beginning of the second temporal segment. If the instant does
not belong to the first segment, it has to belong to the second one.
From the point of view of the Aristotelian account of time which Peter
assumes, this implication is not necessary. Strictly speaking, for Aristotle,
the actual existence of a point is only that of a cut, but a point is not a
part; therefore, when a line is divided into two segments, the limiting
point belongs to neither of them (it is the limit of both, but it is part
of none). Analogously, when Socrates changes from motion to rest, the
time during which Socrates is in motion is separated from the time during
which Socrates is at rest, but the cut between them neither belongs to the
time of motion nor to the time of rest. Peters rules of exposition are not
inconsistent if the limit is not made salient as a distinct part of the line.26
In the following diagram a time line t is represented, in which two tem-
poral segments can be distinguished (the time measuring the being of the
ending state A and the time measuring the being of the beginning state B),
but no point along the line t is made salient:27
A
t
The exposition of the verbs is not affected by the compatibility problem

when the two extrinsic limits are understood as a mere separating cut.
A problem only arises when an instant of transition appears as a distinct
part of the time line. This actually happens in Peters text, when he moves
from asking whether a last instant of Socrates life can be given to asking
whether Socrates is living at this last instant. But this discussion belongs
to the metaphysical side of the desinit-incipit problem.
26According to Nielsen,Thomas Bradwardines Treatise, 15 n. 25, the perception of an

inconsistency arises from a faulty understanding of Aristotles teaching on time.
27The reader might be biased towards the Cantorean notion of continuity. I take this
diagram, showing a cut without a point, to be closer to a Peircean notion of continu-
ity. See M. Annonni, Implications of Synechism: Continuity and second-order vagueness,
Cognitio-Estudos: Revista Eletrnica de Filosofia 3 (2006), 96108.
The Metaphysics of Ending-and-Beginning:

The Problem of the Instant of Transition
In fact, Peter starts by asking utrum sit dare ultimum instans vitae Socra-
tis but ends up replying to the question utrum sit dare ultimum instans
in quo Socrates vivit.28 When the cut between the time measuring an ini-
tial state A and the time measuring the subsequent state B is seen as the
instant at which some or other thing is happening, the instant ceases to
be a mere cut, and acquires some ontological weight.
In the following diagram a time line t is represented, in which two tem-
poral segments are distinguished (the time measuring the being of the
ending state A and the time measuring the being of the beginning state B),
but also a particular point is made salient, the instant of transition:
It is only when the cut is considered as a separate instant of transition that

a metaphysical issue can be raised: once the question about how things
are at this particular instant arises, the possibility of a clash between the
metaphysics of desitio and the metaphysics of inceptio appears. Perhaps, it
could be argued, at this limiting instant the ending state A and the begin-
ning state B coexisted. Aristotle had considered (and rejected) this pos-
sibility in Physics 8.8, and he had stipulated a solution (for permanent
states).29 Or perhaps at this instant neither A nor B obtain, as seems to
follow from Peters rules of exposition (for successive states). The prob-
lem of the instant of transition is that the question about how things are
at this particular instant can put some basic metaphysical principles at
risk: when A and B are contradictory states, either the principle of non-
contradiction or the principle of excluded middle might be in danger.

29A non-Aristotelian alternative was first examined in S. Knuuttila and A. I. Lehtinen,
Change and Contradiction: A fourteenth-century controversy, Synthese 40 (1979), 189207.
A different non-Aristotelian alternative is discussed in S. Brower-Toland, Instantaneous
Change.
Peters determinatio to the quaestio utrum sit dare ultimum instans

vitae Socratis in quo Socrates vivit starts from a distinction between the
question about the cut in the time line on the one hand, and the ques-
tion about what happens at the instant of transition on the other hand:
he clearly distinguishes between the last instant of and the last instant
at which. This is no doubt a response to the defective way in which the
limit-decision problems are usually treated, with a complete confusion
about the subject matter of the discussion. The extrinsic character of the
limits of successive things is often translated as a denial of a first instant
of being and a last instant of being. This involves a confusion between
the discourse about the limits of a thing and the discourse about the lim-
ited thing itself.
In contrast, two different questions are carefully distinguished in
Peters determinatio: the question about the end-limit in the time line of
the motion vivere, on the one hand, and the question about the being
of this motion at the end-limit, on the other. It is for this second limit-
problem that Peter has to make a decision. For him there are in fact (and
unproblematically) a first instant and a last instant of the time measuring
any non-everlasting successive being (as there are in fact two ontic end
points of the being, its inceptio and its desitio). What would be problem-
atic indeed (and will be denied) is that at these instants the successive
being was actual.
In Peters text the metaphysical side of the desinit-incipit problem
takes the following form: at the moment of transition between Socrates
life and Socrates not-life (which is both the last instant of Socrates life
and the first instant of Socrates not-life), is Socrates still living or already
not-living?
Peter seems to give two different solutions to this problem. On the
one hand, he simply adopts the solution of Physics 8.8 as also valid for
the domain of successive things: at the instant of transition between
vivere and non vivere, Socrates does not live, because the dividing instant
should be assigned, according to Aristotle, to the latter state. This solu-
tion, nevertheless, is in fact a response to the incipit-desinit problem,
since Peter is not considering the successive state that begins after Socra-
tes life, but only the successive state that ends: the motion vivere. Thus,
he can simply appeal to the Aristotelian orthodoxy according to which
in instanti non contingit moveri, to conclude that at the last instant of
Socrates vivere, Socrates does not live.
But, on the other hand, a peculiarity of Peters solution to the problem
of the instant of transition is that, after having taken permanent things off
the scene with respect to limit-decision problems, he lets them reappear

as problem solvers in the case of the metaphysical side of the desinit-
incipit problem. Since every successive state is connected with a perma-
nent being, Peter brings into play the permanent entities associated with
the successive states that end and begin. In particular, he speaks in terms
of the forms which are acquired or left behind in the transition from one
successive state to another. The limit-decision problem is accordingly
formulated in terms of a transition between motion and rest: motion-
towards-a-form, motion-out-of-a-form, rest-under-a-form.30
The metaphysical side of the desinit-incipit problem takes, then, the
following alternative form: at the moment of transition between Socrates
rest-under-life and Socrates motion-out-of-life, is Socrates at rest or in
motion? This new formulation allows Peter on the one hand to depart
from the Aristotelian doctrine (by stating that at the moment of transi-
tion Socrates is neither at rest nor in motion), and on the other hand to
avoid a metaphysical gap (by stating that nevertheless at this very instant
Socrates is under the permanent form).31 The search for a solution to the
metaphysical side of the desinit-incipit problem, given Peters assump-
tions about inceptio and desitio, has brought him very far from the initial
simple question in terms of ceasing to be.
Conclusion
I would like to briefly summarise three peculiarities of the treatment of

limit-decision problems in the text examined. First, the restriction of the
scope of the verbs incipit and desinit to successive states, which allows
Peter to offer an analysis of beginning and ending that is as faithful to
Aristotle as possible. Second, the distinction between the different lev-
els of discourse involved in the limit-decision discussions (the discourse
about the limits of the time line that measures a successive state, the dis-
course about the ontic edges of the state, the discourse about the lim-
ited state itself), which allow Peter a clear understanding of the different
problems involved. Finally, and as a consequence, the separate treatment
30Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma 7, 167, 170. Under this new perspective, transitions
between permanent states are seen as processes that take some time.
31The same appeal to the permanent form operates in the case of the beginning-limit
of Socartes life. The distinction between being under a form and resting under a form is
of great importance.
of the logical side of the incipit-desinit problem on the one hand, and of
the metaphysical side of the desinit-incipit problem on the other, which
allows Peter to solve the first problem by exclusive appeal to the Aristote-
lian doctrine about motion and instants, whereas the second one requires
a more complicated appeal to permanent things.32
32The present work is a result of my participation in the research projects Change:

Semantics and Metaphysics (ref. FFI2009-13687) and Vagueness: Borderlineness and
Tolerance (ref. FFI2010-16984), funded by the Spanish Government. I also wish to thank
the participants in the symposium Logic and Language in the Middle Ages (Copenhagen,
2224 June 2011) and in the 2011 meeting of the research project Change: Semantics and
Metaphysics (Madrid, 22 October 2011), for their comments on my previous research on
this subject.
18.Does Loving Every Mean Loving Every Every, Even
Non-Existent Ones? Distribution and Universals
in the Opus puerorum
Laurent Cesalli, Alain de Libera and Frdric Goubier1
Sten Ebbesens favorite philosopher, Boethius of Dacia, has expressed his

love for omnis.2 A very exclusive love indeed, for Boethius is not ready to
embrace many of the various sorts of quantification offered by the late
medieval logic market. There is one he explicitly rejects, one which raises
challenging issues about semantics and ontology, namely, quantification
over actual non-existent supposita. We would like here to contribute to
the pulchra speculatio praised by Boethius himself by editing and com-
menting on a sophisma which offers an interesting take on this issue.
In August 1848, Victor Cousin published a paper in the prestigious Jour-
nal des savants, devoted to what he identified as a remarkable collection
of scientific treatises. He observed:
Ce manuscrit, indiqu par Montfaucon, navait pas pri; il a pass de Corbie
Amiens pendant la rvolution, et on le retrouve, sous le mme titre, au
catalogue de la bibliothque dAmiens, dans le Catalogus librorum manu-
scriptorum de M. Hnel, p. 24, no224.... Cest un in folio, en vlin, de 193
feuillets, dune criture du xive sicle, serre et charge dabrviations. Au
haut de la premire page, on lit le titre publi par Montfaucon: Philosophia
Baconis et la marge, cet autre titre plus ancien: Rogerius Bacon, ordinis
minorum, de rebus physicis, monasterii Sancti Petri Corbeiensis.3
1This contribution was prepared and realized in the frame of the project Smantique
formelle et langage naturel au XIIIe sicle: Outils thoriques et applications concrtes
funded by the Swiss National Fund (FNS, no.100011_129877), Geneva, 201013.
2S. Ebbesen, The Man Who Loved Every: Boethius of Dacia on logic and metaphysics,
The Modern Schoolman 82 (2005), pp.23550 (repr. in S. Ebbesen, Collected Essays, 2 vols.
(Aldershot/Farnham: Ashgate, 20089), vol. 2, pp.16377).
3V.Cousin, Description dun manuscrit indit de Roger Bacon qui se trouve dans la
bibliothque dAmiens, Journal des Savants (1848), 459. For the ancient descriptions, see
B. de Montfaucon, Bibliotheca bibliothecarum manuscriptorum nova (Paris: Briasson, 1739),
vol. 2, p. 1407; E. Coyecque, Catalogue gnral des manuscrits des bibliothques publiques
de France (Paris: Plon, 1893), pp.19698; G. F. Hnel, Catalogi Librorum Manuscriptorum,
qui in Bibliothecis Galliae, Helvetiae, Belgii, Britanniae Maioris, Hispaniae, Lusitaniae asser-
vantur (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1830; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976), p. 24.
306 laurent cesalli, alain de libera and frdric goubier
Indeed, most of the texts composing the codex are due to the Franciscan
master. However, as a glance at the contents of the manuscript imme-
diately reveals,4 not all the works preserved in the codex now known as
MS Amiens Bibliothque municipale 406 are works by Bacon. Besides two
anonymous tracts on optics and astronomy, the volume also comprises a
semi-anonymous logical treatise which came to be referred to as the Opus
puerorum by the historians of logic.5 In spite of the mention of a certain
m<agister>.p.h. at the beginning of each of the extant peciae (the tract
is incomplete), the massive predominance of the works of Bacon in the
codex led to the erroneous attribution to this author. Coyecque read p.h.
as Petri Bacun,6 and Glorieux for his part considered that the tract was a
work of Bacon, although he could not make sense of the peciaes titles.7
The attribution to Bacon has since then been rejected by scholars,8 and
Cousin himself was already cautious in saying that the initials p.h. did not
allow him to make any further conjecture concerning the authorship.9
The codex was copied in the fourteenth century, and the Opus itself is
most probably a work from the second half of the thirteenth century.10
4A table of contents of the codex reads: ff.128, Roger Bacon, Questiones libri Physico-
rum; ff. 2956, Roger Bacon, Questiones libri Physicorum; ff. 5763, Roger Bacon, Questiones
super librum De plantis; ff. 6373, Roger Bacon, Questiones super sextum Physicorum; ff.
74113, Roger Bacon, Questiones super Metaphysicam; ff.11429, Roger Bacon, Questiones
super librum De causis; ff.13054, Mag. Petrus H., Opus puerorum; ff.15565, Anon. (a tract
on optics); ff. 16690, Roger Bacon, Questiones super Metaphysicam; ff. 19193, Anon., Trac-
tatus de sphera.
5The first lines of the tract read (f. 130ra): Quoniam ignoratis communibus necesse est
artem ignorare <...> ideo nomine eius supposito et excellentissimae virginis mariae opus
puerorum agrediat inscipiens sic. (our italics).
6Coyecque, Catalogue, pp.19698.
7P.Glorieux, Rpertoire des matres en thologie de Paris au xiiie sicle (Paris: Vrin,
1933), p.74. Glorieux suggests Petrus Heliae or Petrus Hispanus.
8See H. A. G. Braakhuis, De 13de Eeuwse Tractaten over Syncategorematische Termen,
2 vols. (Diss., Leiden University, 1979), vol. 1, pp.41112; H. A. G. Braakhuis, English Tracts
on Syncategorematic Terms from Robert Bacon to Walter Burley, in H. A. G.Braakhuis,
C. H. Kneepkens and L. M. de Rijk (eds.), English Logic and Semantics from the End of the
Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh (Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1981), p.135;
S. Ebbesen and F.Goubier, A Catalogue of 13th-century Sophismata Literature, 2 vols. (Paris:
Vrin, 2010), vol. 1, pp. 5657. Note that in his introduction to Bacons Summa de sophisma-
tibus et distinctionibus, ed. R. Steele (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), pp.xviixviii, Steele
gives a table of contents of the Opus; furthermore, M.Grabmann (Die Sophismatalitteratur
des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts mit Textausgabe eines Sophisma des Boethius von Dacien (Mn-
ster: Aschendorff, 1940), pp.2829) suggests that our tract is a copy of a Sophistaria which
later turned out to be a work by Matthew of Orlans and which has now been edited as
Matthew of Orlans, Sophistaria, ed. J.Spruyt (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
9Cousin, Description, 468.
10Ebbesen and Goubier, Catalogue, vol. 1, pp.5657.
does loving every mean loving every every ? 307
As for its detailed contents, the work is divided into seven thematic
sections preserved in nine peciae of which the sixth is incomplete, the
seventh is lost, and the fifth is misplaced. Here is the resulting material
composition of our tract:
a. pecia 1 De veritate (130ra131vb)
De signis (131vb133vb)
b. pecia 2 De signis (134ra135vb)
c. pecia 5 De exclusione (136ra137ra)
De exceptione (137rb137vb)
d. pecia 3 De signis (138ra141vb)
e. pecia 4 De signis (142ra142vb)
De exclusione (142vb145vb)
f. pecia 6 De exceptione (146ra146vb)
g. pecia 8 De dictionibus modalibus (147ra147vb)
De incipit et desinit (147vb150vb)
h. pecia 9 De incipit et desinit (151ra151rb)
De coniunctione (151rb154va)
The excerpts edited belowthe general introduction to the section dedi-
cated to omnis,11 as well as the discussion of the sophisma omnis phoenix
est12stem from the quantitatively most important part of the Opus, the
De signis, where syncategoremes such as quodlibet, omnis, totus, and infi-
nitum are discussed. The section devoted to the universal quantifier omnis
is by far the most elaborate one. No less than seven sophismata (on a
total of forty-six in the whole Opus) are dealt with in greatest detail in
this connection.13 The one we shall concentrate onomnis phoenix est
11About the analysis of omnis in sophismata, see Ebbesen, The Man Who Loved Every;
A. de Libera, Rfrence et quantification: Sur la thorie de la distributio au XIIIe sicle,
in A. de Libera, A.Elamrani-Jamal, A. Galonnier (eds.), Langages et philosophie: Hommage
Jean Jolivet (Paris: Vrin, 1997), pp. 177200; A.de Libera, Faire de ncessit loi: Thories
de la modalit dans le sophisma Omnis homo de necessitate est animal du codex parisinus
16135, fo 11rb12rb, AHDLMA 76 (2009), 179233.
12On that topic, see S. Ebbesen, The Present King of France Wears Hypothetical Shoes
with Categorical Laces, Medioevo 7 (1981), 91113 (repr. in Ebbesen, Collected Essays, vol. 2,
pp.1530); A.deLibera, Csar et le phnix: Distinctiones et sophismata parisiens du XIIIe
sicle (Pisa: Centro di cultura medievale della Scuola Normale Superiore, 1991); A.Tabar-
roni, Omnis phoenix est: Quantification and existence in a new sophismata collection (MS
Clm 14522), in S. Read (ed.), Sophisms in Medieval Grammar and Logic (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1993), pp.185201.
13To be exact: omne animal fuit in archa Noe; omnis homo de necessitate est animal (lost,
but referred to on f. 147rb); omne non animal quod et Socrates sunt duo non est Socrates;
omnis homo est et quilibet videns illum est asinus; omnis homo et alius homo sunt; omnis
homo moritur quando unus solus homo moritur; omnis phoenix est; omnis propositio vel eius
contradictoria est vera.
deals with the borderline case of monadic species and the connected
problem of the so-called sufficientia appellatorum.
The Phoenix Complex
A sophisma generally exists as an occasion to test, discuss and sometimes

reject the attribution of a certain logical property to a given syncateg-
oremesuch as omnis, the Latin universal quantifier. The sophisma omnis
phoenix est offers an occasion to discuss one of the properties which,
according to some, should be attributed to omnis, namely, the require-
ment for at least three things to be quantified upon: in medieval terms,
the sufficientia appellatorum (SA)the sufficiency of actual referents. The
idea behind SA is easy to grasp: since in Latin there are quantifiers for
things that come pairwise (e.g., uterque), when you use omnis, it means
that you say something else: that there are several things, but not two
otherwise you would have used the right quantifier, therefore, at least
three. According to ancient and medieval literature,14 the phoenix offers
the peculiarity of belonging to what we would nowadays call a single-
ton: there is only one phoenix at a time; in addition, there is always one
phoenix aroundnot always the same one, though, which offers inter-
sting possibilities in terms of universal diachronical quantification. The
question, then, is rather straightforward: can one quantify over phoenixes,
that is, have quantification domains with only one element (at a time)? In
the medieval sophismatic way of doing logic, the question becomes: is the
proposition omnis phoenix est trueand at what conditions? As with
many sophismatic discussions, answering this particular question presup-
poses a stance on several others, broader ones, often both at a semantical
and a metaphysical level. Here, deciding whether there is a requirement
for a minimum of things to be within the domain of quantification when
one uses omnis in a given sentence implies a decision about what hap-
pens when the requirement is not fulfilled, that is, when there are less
than three things to be quantified upon. And that, in turn, is related to
the discussions about falsification, empty reference, quantification, and,
as we shall see, possibilia. On the ontological side, answering the phoenix-
question might also involve taking a position with respect to what there
14See S. Ebbesen, Le bestiaire de la logique, in B. Cassin and J.-L. Labarrire (eds.),

Lanimal dans lAntiquit (Paris: Vrin, 1997), pp.53344, esp. p. 534.
is, whether there are different sorts of natural kinds, universalia of differ-
ent types.
The context in which SA is introduced is the discussion of the so-called
Regula appellationum (RA) ruling the restriction (restrictio, coartatio) of
the subject terms supposition in a propositio de praesenti. According to
RA, a common term suppositing with a present tense verb supposits only
for presentsthat is, for presently existing things:
RAdef: terminus communis supponens verbo de praesenti non habenti vim
ampliandi ex se nec ex alio tantum supponit pro praesentibus.
RAdef: a common term suppositing with a verb in the present which does
not have any ampliative power, neither in itself nor from something
else, supposits for presently existing things only.
The words appellatio and appellata are important: the sufficientia appella-
torum seems connected to semantic distinctions between supposition and
appellation current in mid-thirteenth-century Parisian logic. A standard
version of the connection between RA and SA is mentioned for example
by Vincent of Beauvais,15 and a faithful indicator of the later evolution
of terminology is Albert of Saxony. In the fourteenth century, SA does
not seem to be linked with problems of temporal restriction anymore,
but rather with problems of distributio, that is, of universal quantification.
Hence, it basically has more to do with the semantic properties of the
syncategoreme omnis. In a nutshell: there is a double evolution: (1) of
the problem itself (restriction vs. quantification/distribution); (2) of the
vocabulary (appellata vs. supposita, appellation vs. supposition). Both are
clearly evidenced in Alberts Quaestiones circa logicam, where our soph-
isma is discussed at length.16 As Fitzgeralds critical apparatus shows,
15Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum doctrinale (Douai: Belieri, 1624; repr. Graz: Akademi
sche Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1965), p. 241: Notandum...quod dicta regula [that is: RA]
solet assignari de termino habenti sufficientiam appellationis, cuiusmodi terminus dicitur
habere tria appellata. Unde solet dici, quod terminus communis non habens sufficientiam
appellationum, retrahitur ad non entia, pro illis supponendo.
16Albert of Saxony, Quaestiones circa logicam 403 (ed. M.J.Fitzgerald, Albert of Sax-
onys Twenty-five Disputed Questions on Logic (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 284): sciendum est
quod quidam dixerunt de illo syncategoremate: omnis, quod exigit tria apellata, id est ad
hoc quod apte additur alicui termino communi requiritur quod ad minus ille terminus
communis habeat tria supposita et non distribuat aliquem terminum nisi ad minus pro tri-
bus suppositis. Isti allegant Aristotelem in I <de> Cael<o> ubi dicit quod: omnis, non dici-
tur de duobus, sed de tribus et de quattuor, etc. Breviter dico quod hoc est falsum. Unde
dico quod ly omnis, non exiget tria appellata <vel supposita>. Unde ad veritatem istius:
Omnis phoenix est, sufficit unam phoenicem esse. Patet, nam in qualibet demonstratione
omnes propositiones debent esse universales, sed de sole et luna fiunt demonstrationes.
Igitur, oportet dicere: Omnis sol, et Omnis luna, etc., tamen quilibet terminorum illorum
constant variations between appellata and supposita can be found in the

manuscripts. Moreover, SA is also mentioned in the Perutilis logica, the
Quaestiones in artem veterem, and the Sophismata.17 But there are many
other and much earlier testimonies of what could be called The Phoenix
Complex.
The phoenix is part of the reception of Aristotles Categories. It appears
in Simplicius commentary along with the sun and the moon as examples
of monadic species, that is, species constituted by a monadic matter.18
It is prima facie matter which is universal, general, monadic, or sin-
gular; certain states of matter are the basis for a species having only one
concrete instantiation. As we shall see below, the notion of matter plays
a crucial role in our sophisma.
In the thirteenth century, phoenix and phoenices are associated with
the discussion of Avicennas distinction between the three meanings of
the term universal referring either (1) to an actual multiplicity (as in the
case of men), or (2) to a possible one with no actual instance (the hep-
tagonal house), or (3) to a possible multiplicity with factually only one
instance (the sun, the earth). Among the Latini, Avicennas mysterious
house is replaced by the phoenix, which alters the meaning of the dis-
tinction formulated in The Metaphysics of The Healing. From now on, in
case (2), the existence of a particular is required, the new problem being
to decide whether it takes more than one, in act or in potency, to have a
genuine universal.19 This is one of the three main issues discussed in the
sophisma edited below.
non habet nisi unum suppositum. In the same paragraph (p. 285), Albert rejects SA: con-
cludo quod hoc signum: omnis, non exigit tria supposita, but he grants that this has been
disputed by some people: Verum est tamen quod aliqui dicunt quod si non esset nisi una
phoenix, haec esset falsa: Omnis phoenix est. Et dicunt ulterius quod contradictoria illius:
Omnis phoenix est, non est illa: Aliqua phoenix non est. And he mentions their rule:
Unde dicunt quod quando hoc signum: omnis, additur alicui termino non habente suf-
ficientiam appellatorum, tunc requirendum est ad supposita eius non existentia.
17Albert of Saxony, Perutilis logica 1776 (ed. A. Muoz Garca (Maracaibo: Universidad
del Zulia, 1988), p. 514); Quaestiones super artem veterem 668 (ed. A. Muoz Garca (Mara-
caibo: Universidad del Zulia, 1988), p.460); Sophismata 2 (Paris, 1502; repr. Hildesheim:
Olms, 1975) (f.3ra).
18Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, CAG 8 (Berlin:
Reimer, 1907), pp. 5556; for the Latin translation, see Simplicius, Commentaire sur les
Catgories dAristote, ed. A. Pattin (Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Batrice-
Nauwelaerts, 1971), pp. 7475. Of course, Porphyry also mentions the phoenix; see In Aris-
totelis Categorias Expositio, ed. A. Busse, CAG 4.1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1887), p. 82:35 (for an
English translation, see Porphyry, On Aristotles Categories, trans. S. K. Strange (Duckworth:
London, 1992), p. 68).
19On this topic, see A. de Libera, LArt des gnralits (Paris: Aubier, 1999), pp. 50915.
In twelfth and thirteenth-century logic, phoenixes and other monadic

species make their come back, flying directly from Athens to Paris, to
help in dealing with problems of mono-instantiated universals or terms
(or realities) which are universal by succession (as are the phoenix and
her twin sister, time). The Latini do not rely on Avicenna here, but rather
on Porphyry and Boethius, that is, on the Isagoge and the Categories. The
horizon is clearly Porphyrian: it is the question whether universality is
based on predicability, that is, on being predicable of many, or commonal-
ity, that is, on being common to many. Depending on the answer, one will
have a different position regarding the ontological status of the phoenix.
Usually, one would argue that it is a universal, a Greek monadic species.
But there are exceptions. One striking examplemagister Vasletus
is mentioned by Abelard in the Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum:
And magister Vasletus says <so> because neither the phoenix nor the sun,
the world, or the earth are species but individuals, for they are not predi-
cable of many, that is: they are not able to be joined to many in order to
make a statement true.20
The more common view is found in Odo of Cambrais treatment of the
original sin: without any direct acquaintance with Aristotles On the Heav-
ens, he draws a distinction between the phoenix and this phoenix,21 which
is strongly reminiscent of Aristotles distinction between the sky and this
sky, although it was still unknown at the time.22
In the logical context properthe discussion of RA and restrictio
(coartatio)Aristotles On the Heavens becomes the standard reference
20Peter Abelard, Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum, ed. B. Geyer, Peter Abaelards
philosophische Schriften, vol. 2 (Mnster: Aschendorff, 1933), p. 545: Et magister Vasletus
dicit, quia neque phoenix neque sol nec mundus nec terra sunt species, sed individua
eo quod non sunt praedicabilia de pluribus, idest non apta coniungi pluribus ad veram
enuntiationem reddendam.
21Odo of Cambrai, De peccato originali, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 160 (Paris: Migne, 1854), col.
1079b: Nam phoenix avis, quamvis individuum non habeat nisi unum, species est, quia
communis potest esse multorum, aliud enim est phoenix, aliud haec phoenix. Phoenix
est specialis natura, quae potest esse communis: haec phoenix vero natura, quae tantum
est individua, nec aliud esse potest quam singularis; phoenix genere differentiisque termi-
natur, haec phoenix accidentium proprietate discernitur. Individuum non nisi de uno dici
potest. Species etiamsi de uno solo dicitur, de pluribus dici potest {om. Migne}. Species
etiamsi de uno solo dicatur {om. Migne}, universalis est; individuum vero nonnisi singu-
lare est. On Odo and the phoenix, see C.Erismann, Lhomme commun (Paris: Vrin, 2011),
pp. 35253.
22Cf. Anon., Les Auctoritates Aristotelis 3.25 (ed. J. Hamesse (Louvain: Publications Uni-
versitaires; Paris: Batrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), p. 161): Differt dicere caelum et hoc caelum
quod habet formam in materia.
in the thirteenth century. Hence, SA is unequivocally attributed to Aris-

totle by Roger Bacon.23 The same text is alleged to plea for RA. Thus, one
could say that there are two distinct complexes of questions in the Latin
discussion of RA and SA: the first concerns the very formulation of RA;24
the second pertains to the question whether RA requires SA.25
In the mid-thirteenth century, SA has definitely become a part of RA.
The sophism omnis phoenix est in MS Paris BNF lat. 16135 mentions RA as
the rule in the appellationswhich could either refer to John Pagus work
(meaning: the rule found in the Appellationes) or to the domain where the
rule applies (meaning: in the case of appellations, the rule is that...):
There is a rule in the Appellations that a common term suppositing with a
verb in the present which does not have any ampliating power neither from
itself, nor from its principal meaning, nor from something else, provided it
has enough appellata, supposits only for presently existing things, <and>
if it doesnt have enough, resorts to non-existents. They say that the suffi-
ciency of appellata consists in their being three things. Since, therefore, this
term Phoenix does not have those three appellata, it resorts to non-beings,
which means that the predicate is in them. Therefore, it [sc. omnis phoenix
est] is false.26
23Roger Bacon, Summa de sophismatibus, p. 144 (based on On the Heavens 1.1.268a16

18): Et dicendum quod omnis exigit tria appellata, quia determinat ibi multitudinem in
ternarium sicut omne categorisma. Hoc patet manifeste per Aristotelem, in primo Celi et
mundi.
24The problem that gives rise to RA is stated in 1 of the section De appellatione of
John Pagus Appellationes, ed. A. de Libera, Les Appellationes de Jean le Page, AHDLMA 51
(1984), 224: Videtur quod terminus communis supponens verbo de presenti non coartetur
ad entia sed indifferenter supponitur pro entibus et non entibus. RA is introduced in 9
of the same section (228): Terminus communis non restrinctus aliunde supponens verbo
de presenti non habenti vim ampliandi restringitur ad presentes. In the sophismata Omnis
phoenix est and Omnis homo de necessitate est animal found in MS Paris BNF lat. 16135, RA
is still mentioned as the regula appellationum.
25This is also evidenced in John Pagus, Appellationes 38 (238): Post hoc queritur
utrum huic regule terminus communis, etc. debeat apponi habens sufficientiam appel-
latorum. The problem and the theory in its full-fledged form are evidenced as well in 39
of the same text (238): Et dicitur quod sic. Dicitur enim quod terminus communis non
habens sufficientiam appellatorum recurrit ad non existentia et non coartatur ad presen-
tia. Et dicitur esse sufficientia in ternario et insufficientia in paucioribus.
26Anon. Liberanus, MS Paris BNF lat. 16135, sophisma omnis phoenix est (ff. 14vb
16rb, at 15rb), ed. A. de Libera, Csar et le phnix, p. 92: Regula est in Appellationibus
quod terminus communis supponens verbo de praesenti non habenti vim ampliandi ex se
nec ex principali significatione nec ex alio, si habeat sufficientiam appellatorum, tantum
supponit pro praesentibus, <et> si non habeat, recurrit ad non existentes. Sufficientiam
appellatorum dicunt esse in ternario numero illorum. Cum igitur iste terminus Phoenix
non habeat illa tria appellata, recurrit ad non entia, et illis significat praedicatum inesse.
Ergo est falsa.
If connected to the Appellationes, RA and SA would originally refer to

Parisian circles. But RA and SA are probably too well evidenced in the
thirteenth century to be associated with Paris rather than Oxford.27 More
significant is the content of RAitself: the suppositio termini communis cum
verbo de presenti. The present tense explains the use of the term appel-
latio in the first stages of the theory. In the thirteenth century, appellatio
definitely refers to the present. See, for example, William of Sherwood (an
English text):
Appellation is the present fitting of a term, that is, the property according
to which the significate of a term can be said of something by means of the
verb is.28
The two complexes of questions dealt with in the frame of the sophism
omnis phoenix est, that is, quantification (distributio) on the one hand, and
restrictio on the other, are linked together. That is the reason why SA is
invoked in both fields. This connection is once more evidenced in Pagus
discussion of omnis homo est, uno solo homine existente. In the case at
issue, homo is considered as if it were (and once factually was) a monadic
species: it happened for the Latini with the biblical Noah, as it happened
for the ancients with Deucalion.29
27RA is mentioned in the Introductiones Parisienses, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Logica Moder-

norum: A contribution to the history of early terminist logic, 2 vols. (Assen: Van Gorcum,
196267), vol. 2.2, p. 372; the Tractatus de univocatione monacensis, ed. de Rijk, Logica
Modernorum, vol. 2.2, p. 337:2124; the Logica Cum sit nostra, ed. de Rijk Logica Moder-
norum, vol. 2.2, p. 450:2831; the Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum, ed. de Rijk, Log-
ica Modernorum, vol. 2.2, p. 723:2831; William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam,
ed.H.Brandt and C.Kann (Hamburg: Meiner, 1995), p. 156:32124; Roger Bacon, Summulae
dialectices, ed. A. de Libera, Les Summulae dialectices de Roger Bacon: I. De termino, II.
De enuntiatione, AHDLMA 53 (1987), 27778; Nicholas of Paris, Summe Metenses, ed. de
Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. 2.1, p. 459(see also Nicholas of Paris, Syncategoremata, ed.
H. A. G. Braakhuis, De 13de Eeuwse, vol. 1, p. 30). It is not merely mentioned, but discussed
by Pagus, Appellationes, 3846 (23841), and Peter of Spain, Tractatus, ed. L. M. de Rijk
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), pp.21516. SA is mentioned by the Tractatus de univocatione
monacensis, p. 339; the Introductiones Parisienses, ed. de Rijk, Logica modernorum, vol.2.2,
p. 372; the Dialectica Monacensis, ed. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. 2.2, p. 621:19;
William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam, p.156; Roger Bacon, Summa de sophisma-
tibus, p. 144; Bacon, Summulae dialectices, 27778. It is rejected by Peter of Spain, Tracta-
tus, p. 215:810; John Pagus, Appellationes 46 (241); Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones super
librum Topicorum, ed. N. J. Green-Pedersen and J.Pinborg, CPhD 6.1 (Copenhagen: GAD,
1976), p. 112.
28William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam, p. 134:1820: Appellatio autem est
praesens convenientia termini, i.e. proprietas, secundum quam significatum termini potest
dici de aliquo, mediante hoc verbo est.
29Cf. Themistius, Librorum De anima paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinze, CAG 5.3 (Berlin:
Reimer, 1899), pp. 34 (ad 402b5, 402b816). For the Latin translation, see Themistius,
In-existential Import
The two complexes of questions meet in the issue of the consequences

of the violation of SA, namely, whether a common term deprived of SA
recurrit ad non-existentia (utrum terminus communis non habens sufficien-
tiam appellatorum ad non existentia recurrit)a similar expression occurs
in the very first lines of the sophism edited below. With this addition to
SA, we have to do with something which belongs to a more general prin-
ciple of falsification (PF). For those who defend it, it intervenes when-
ever there are not enough supposita (or appellata) with respect to what
is required by the propositions truth conditions: when a proposition in
the present tense is universally quantified and only two supposita exist, or
when it is existentially quantified and no suppositum exists. Thus, some
authors, especially before the second half of the thirteenth century, add
to RA a clause which stipulates that if the supposition of the subject does
not include existent things (appellata), it shall take aboard non-existent
ones, that is, falsifiers.30 In other words, no empty supposition is allowed:
in order to make a proposition false, you need things that will make it
false.31 Two mechanisms are at play here. The first relies on the idea that
since supposition delimits the set of things among which you have to find
your truth-makers or your falsity-makers, it shall not be empty if you want
a truth-value. The second mechanism defines emptiness as the absence of
appellatawhich is not necessarily an absence of supposita, as the author
of our text will show.
It is in this context that the notion of appellatio, as a semantic rela-
tion distinct from suppositio, proves to be, within the thirteenth-century
theory of supposition, more than a mere left-over of twelfth-century
Commentaire sur le Trait de lme dAristote: Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, ed.

G. Verbeke (Leiden: Brill, 1973), p.9: Neque enim animalis conceptus substantia est animata
sensitiva neque magis hominis animal rationale mortale, sed singularia animalia substan-
tiae animatae sensitivae et singulares homines animalia rationalia mortalia. Palam autem
hinc: si enim relictus fuerit ad suppositum unus homo, qualem fabulae fingunt Decal-
ionem in diluvio, tunc hominis ratio in eam quae alicuius hominis circonscribetur.
30See, e.g., Lambert of Lagny, De appellatione (Summa Lamberti 8), ed. A. de Libera,
Le trait De appellatione de Lambert de Lagny (Lambert dAuxerre), AHDLMA 48 (1982),
25657: Terminus communis substantialis vel accidentalis, non restrinctus aliunde, sup-
ponens vel apponens verbo de presenti temporis, non habenti vim ampliandi ex se vel ex
alio, restringitur ad supponendum pro presentibus si habeat appellatum vel appellata. Si
vero non habet appellatum vel appellata recurrit ad non existentia.
31See F.Goubier, Influences prdicatives et consquences rfrentielles: un aspect de
lapproche terministe de la premire moiti du XIIIe sicle, CIMAGL 71 (2000), 3770.
semantics. Until the fourteenth century, appellatio handles the relation

between a term and those of the things it is the name of and which exist
at the moment it is used, namely, its appellata. It thus provides the theory
with a means to distinguish semantically between being actual and being
existent. As we have seen, SA includes a version of PF applied to universal
quantification: a universally quantified proposition in the present tense
(and devoided of trickeries such as modalities) whose subject term has
less than three appellata shall accept the intrusion of non-existentsup-
positaand therefore be falsified. What makes the proposition false is not
the incompleteness of its subject terms reference in itself, but the fact
that the void is filled with non-existent supposita; and the void is a void
of appellata, rather than supposita.
Just like we saw that two complexes of questions were involved, SA
presents two aspects, namely, a general principle of falsification triggered
by an empty reference, and a more specific principle of falsification dedi-
cated to incomplete quantifications. Both aspects involve appellata
the things you need, that is, existing suppositaas well as non-existent
suppositathe things you get if you dont have enough of the things
you need. Petrus H. ascribes the rule to his predecessors, or at least its
strict application to universal quantification. It does indeed seem that the
sufficientia, which was already in place in the twelfth century, phoenix
included, as Sten Ebbesen has shown,32 was especially popular during the
first decades of the thirteenth; however, from early on, it was discussed
and sometimes rejected. We have seen that John Pagus, an important logi-
cian of the period, refuses SA insofar as it applies to distribution: he does
not want to ascribe a minimum of three appellata to omnis; he neverthe-
less accepts PF, that is, falsification by injection of non-existent supposita
into the subjects supposition.33 He reckons that a common noun sup-
posits differently when it actually has some suppositum or some supposita
and when it does not have any, for when it does not have any, it is filled
with non-actual supposita.34
Another option is, of course, to reject SA and PF altogether: no falsi-
fication principle by injection of non-existent supposita, whatever the
numberor the absenceof appellata. Boethius of Dacia favours such a
position, which becomes dominant in the fourteenth century.35 The last
32Ebbesen, The Present King, 91113, esp. 94ff.

33See n. 24 above.
34Pagus, Appellationes 27 (23435).
35Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones super librum Topicorum, pp. 117:27118:28.
option, namely, rejecting PF and keeping the three-things-requirement for

universal quantifications, seems more difficult to defend provided one con-
siders SA a special case of the broader PF (that is, PF as indissociable from
insufficientia in general). That would mean requiring three actual things
for omnis while refusing to consider the lack of existing things as falsify-
ing. As can be guessed, the solution will rely on the distinction between
existing and being actual. This is where having a notion of appellatio as a
theoretical device distinct from suppositio comes in handy. Petrus H. and
his analysis of omnis phoenix est will show us how that can be done.
In order for the sophisma to be true, and for a sufficientia to apply never
theless, you need quantification in the present tense to be freed from RA.
In other words, you need to find a way for omnis to quantify at a given
time over things which do not really exist at that time. You need to find
things of which esse can be predicated although they do not truly exist.
This is not what happens with the antiquis solution, the first proposed by
Petrus H., which amounts to the standard sufficientia appellatorum and
requires at least three phoenices to exist at the time the sophisma is con-
sidered. That makes the proposition false. However, his own solution lies
in an approach to distributio which consists in quantifying not only over
existing things but potential ones as well. Potential things, or possibilia,
have the wonderful ability to be actual without having to exist; they can-
not be appellata, but they are present supposita: they fulfil the require-
ment. Provided, of course, that the rule is no longer appellationum but
suppositionumsomething which, rather puzzlingly, depends upon the
ontological properties of certain species, as we shall see. The interest of
having both an appellation and a supposition is apparent here, sinceas
was often said in the first half of the thirteenth centurylimiting a sup-
position to actual things does not necessarily mean limiting it to existing
things: appellatio is not always equipollent to a restricted suppositio.
Such a solution presupposes, as Petrus H. immediately reckons, that the
domain of quantification is, so to speak, equivocal, since the actual phoe-
nix and the potential ones, while they pertain to the same universal, do so
insofar as it is differently informed. It is an equivocation per prius and per
posterius, that is, an equivocation of the second modehere, an analogy.36
36See I. Rosier-Catach volution des notions dequivocatio et dunivocatio au XIIe

s icle, in I. Rosier-Catach (ed.), Lambiguit: Cinq tudes historiques (Lille: Presses Universi-
taires de Lille, 1988), pp. 10362; J. Lonfat, Archologie de la notion danalogie dAristote
Saint Thomas dAquin, AHDLMA 71 (2004), 35107; E. J.Ashworth, Les thories de lanalogie
du XIIe au XVIe sicle (Paris: Vrin, 2008); E. J.Ashworth, Medieval Theories of Analogy, in
The relation of the word phoenix to its supposita is, originally and by
default, a relation to existing phoenixes (when the verb is in the present
tense), while the relation to potential phoenixes is secondary, derived and
triggered by the context (the lack of existing phoenixes). The equivoca-
tion between existent and potential phoenixes recalls that between actual
and past things: in both cases it relies on an analogyit is by analogy that
a man who does not exist anymore can be called a man: as a dead man he
is a member of the human species no longer.37 As Walter Burley explains,
the essence of man which is saved in actual men cannot be saved in dead
ones, for they simply do not have any essence.38 The same holds for actual
and potential phoenixes: it is only by analogy that a potential phoenix can
be deemed a phoenix.
That is exactly the reason why Boethius of Dacia rejects the mere idea
of supposita in potentia: there cannot be a domain of quantification which
would be equivocal. That which is quantified upon must be united in
the significate of the quantified term; equivocal things, whether strictly
or analogically equivocal, can no more be united in a words significate
than Socrates and a stone can be united in the significate of Socrates.39 A
similar idea can be found in the Oxonian Roger Bacon, who aggressively
rejected the idea of a signification encompassing actual and non-existent
things.40 Indeed, the hypothesis of supposita in potentia was intensely dis-
cussed in the thirteenth century. Besides being the object of one of the
questions that Boethius of Dacia, the man who loved every, devotes to
omnis in his commentary on the Topics, it is mentioned as a problema to
be tackled by several analyses of omnis phoenix est.41 Some authors, such
E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), URL = <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/analogy-medieval/>.
37See S. Ebbesen, The Dead Man is Alive, Synthese 40 (1979), 4370.
38Walter Burley, Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias 5.31 (ed. S. F. Brown, Franciscan
Studies 34 (1974), 290).
39Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones super librum Topicorum, pp. 117:27118:28.
40See S.Ebbesen and J.Pinborg, Studies in the Logical Writings Attributed to Boethius
de Dacia, CIMAGL 3 (1970), 154; A. de Libera, Roger Bacon et le problme de lappellatio
univoca, in Braakhuis, Kneepkens and de Rijk, English Logic, pp. 193234; H. A. G.Braakhuis,
Kilwardby versus Bacon? The contribution to the discussion of univocal signification of
beings and non-beings found in a sophisma attributed to Robert Kilwardby, in E. P. Bos
(ed.), Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics: Studies dedicated to L.M. de Rijk, Ph.D., on the
occasion of his 60th Birthday (Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1985), pp.11142.
41Cf. Anon., Distinctiones 2.22, MS Mainz 616, ff.5rb9va; Anon., Sophismata de signis
universalibus, MS Erfurt CA 4o276, f. 2va; Anon., Sophismata determinata a maioribus
magistris Parisius tam Gallicis quam Anglicis, MS Vatican Vat. lat. 7678, ff. 2ra4va; Anon.,
Sophismata Parisina 16618, MS Paris BNF lat. 16618, ff. 145vb46vb; Anon. Alani, Soph-
ismata, MS Paris BNF lat. 16135, ff. 62vb67vb (extracts edited in A. de Libera, Csar et
as the Anonymus Erfordensis, defend potential supposita;42 others, like the

Anonymus Liberanus, weigh the distinction between actual and potential
supposita, and eventually decide that, although it is an acceptable distinc-
tion, it does not apply to the sophism.43
Petrus H.s position involves more than mere (opportune) recourse to
non-existent-but-actual supposita. His solution proposes to ground in the
phoenixs ontological properties this possibility of quantifying over both
actual and possible things. Words like rose or man do not benefit from
such an extension of the domain of quantification: the full power of the
traditional sufficientia appellatorum applies to them; universally quanti-
fied within a present tensed proposition, they require at least three exist-
ing things for the proposition to be true. The difference is rooted in an
ontological difference: both the rose and the phoenix are universals, but
of a different sort. Petrus H., indeed, devotes a large chunk of his analysis
of the sophisma to explain how universals are diversified.
The Metaphysics of Distribution
Petrus H. develops a fine grained ontology and an accordingly subtle typo

logy of universals. To make a long story short, one can say that PetrusH.s
classification yields four types of universals:
permanent singletons CAELUM
singletons
successive singletons PHOENIX
UNIVERSALS
cyclically intermittent populations ROSA
populations
possibly intermittent populations HOMO
le phnix, pp. 21117); Anon. Erfordensis, Sophismata, MS Erfurt CA 4o328, ff. 19ra24rb;
Peter of Auvergne, Sophismata Florentino-Brugensia, MS Florence Laur. St. Croce 12 sin.
3, f. 67vb; MS Bruges 509, ff. 99vb102va (f. 104ra). Some texts tackle the issue of poten-
tial things through a question about potential esse; see, e.g., Anon., Sophismata GC611, MS
Cambridge Gonville and Caius 611/341, ff.54rb55rb; Anon., Sophismata Veneta Prima, MS
Venice Z.302, ff. 94ra99va; Sophismata Veneta Altera, MS Venice Z.302, ff. 174ra176va;
Anon. Tabarroneus, Sophismata, MS Munich Clm 14522, ff. 44ra48rb. For more details
about the texts, see Ebbesen and Goubier, Catalogue, vol. 2, pp. 36371.
42MS Erfurt 4o328, ff. 19ra24rb.
43Sophismata, Collectio prima, ed. de Libera, Csar et le phnix, pp. 8586. For more
about this collection, see de Libera, Faire de ncessit loi.
The underlying metaphysics looks as follows. Every universal consists of

two elements: a nature (multipliable form, essence), which is that in virtue
of which a universal is a universal; and a suppositum in which the nature
gets multiplied and which is not that in virtue of which a universal is such.
These two elements together make up the matter of the universal, so that
an individual X of a given species can be described as a universal matter
existing under the form of X.
Now Petrus H.s different categories of universals are distinguished
according to what happens to universal matter. In the case of the heaven,
the whole matter exists in just one individual. Such a matter is said to be
resistant to further multiplication, to the effect that there can be only
one single individual form under which it exists. Nonetheless, such a per-
manent singleton possesses a universal essence, and is thus a universal in
the fullest sense of the term. Its nature is actually multipliable, although
it never gets actually multiplied beyond the unique member of the spe-
cies. The case of the phoenix is similar to the one of the heaven, with one
significant difference: contrary to the heavens matter, the matter of the
phoenix does not display a resistance to multiplication tout court, but only
to synchronic multiplication. In that respect, the phoenix and time belong
to the same category, namely, that of successive singletons.
Leaving the sui generis realm of singletons, the other two categories of
universals identified by our author are populations, that is to say, plurali-
ties of individuals. Beyond this particularity, and contrary to the phoenix
and the heaven which continuously exist through time, populations are
principally intermittent: there are times where there is (or can be) no indi-
vidual of a given population, for example no rose or no man. Nonetheless,
this kind of universal continuously exists, even in the absence of actually
existing supposita. As long as supposita of a given species exist, the totality
of its matter gets divided into each of them; when no suppositum exists,
the universal matter subsists nonetheless, but under another form which
is in a state of potentiality with respect to the forms of the possible single
supposita. Men and roses are such things, and the only difference between
them consists in that the intermittence of roses is a cyclic and regular
one, whereas that of men is merely possible and independent of any sea-
sonal change. In the case of roses, the species survives sub alia forma in
the plants sap; Petrus H. does not say here how this works in the case of
men: under which form does the human species subsist when there are
no longer any men around?
In order to answer this question, one has to look at the first part of the
Opus puerorum (De propositione), and more precisely at Petrus H.s theory
of truth. There (f. 130rbva), one finds the following discussion of the truth
of a past tense proposition such as Caesar fuit homo or of a future tense one
such as Antechristus erit. The principle holds: the truth of a proposition is
in it qua sign, and in the signified reality (in re significata) as in a subject.
However, one has to distinguish two cases: either the predication-subject
(subiectum enuntiandi) coincides with the substratum-subject (subiectum
essendi) or it does not. The former is the case in a proposition like Sor
currit, given that Socrates exists: running is predicated of Socrates, and
Socrates is that in which the running is rooted (radicatur). By contrast, in
propositions like Caesar fuit homo or Antechristus erit, there is (and can
be) no coincidence of the predication- with the substratum-subject. How
can they be true, then? Here is the explanation:
I therefore say that something of Caesar exists now upon which the truth of
this [sc. the proposition Caesar fuit homo] is rooted, namely, Caesars mat-
ter which remains <and> into which Caesar was resolved as into the four
elements...And that into which Caesar was resolved still exists; a matter
which, however, <now> exists under another form. And although this <mat-
ter> exists under another form, it nevertheless possesses by itself, insofar
as it exists, an inclination towards Caesars form. I say, moreover, that this
part of the elements which is Caesars matter and which exists now under
another form still possesses in a certain way <and> by itself a potentiality
with respect to that form in virtue of which Caesar was what he was. The
proof is that if Caesar were to resurrectper impossible, I meanhe would
assume numerically the same matter as he had in the past. And I say the
same about Antechristus erit.44
In this passage, one nicely sees how a similar conceptual apparatus is
used to account for the truth of Caesar fuit homo and for the one of omnis
rosa est. For sure, the two cases present a major difference, since the first
proposition is singular, whereas the second one is universal. However, one
can legitimately think that something happens to the universal matter of
the human species which is analogous to what happens to the individual
matter of Caesar, but at a higher level.
44De propositione, f.130va: Dico ergo quod aliquid est nunc de Caesare super quod
radicatur huius veritas ut materia Caesaris quae remansit, in qua resolvebatur Caesar ut
in quatuor elementis...Et hoc in quod resolvebatur Caesar, quod est materia Caesaris,
adhuc est; quae tamen materia est sub alia forma. Et licet haec sit sub alia forma, adhuc
tamen in quantum est, de se inclinationem habet ad formam Caesaris. Et dico plus: quod
illa pars elementorum quae est materia Caesaris et quae modo est sub alia forma, adhuc
aliquo modo, <in> quantum est, de se habet possibilitatem ad illam formam per quam
Caesar erat id quod erat. Signum est quod si Caesar modo resurgeret, dico per impossibile,
illam materiam eandam in numero assumeret quam prius habuit iam praeteritum. Eodem
modo dico de hac Antechristus erit.
In virtue of a simple argumentdici de omni est propria passio univer-

salis, ergo convenit omni universaliPetrus H. is committed to the truth
of most of the propositions of the form omne X est where X stands for
a universal. What are the truth-values of such propositions for the four
categories of universals acknowledged by our author? And, when those
propositions are true, what makes them true? Omne caelum est is true and
is made so by the fact that the matter of the heaven is actually multiplied
according to its full potentialno ontological extravagance here; omnis
phoenix est is true as well and its truth-maker is the fact that even if there
actually exists only one phoenix, there actually is an in habitu plurality of
phoenixesas a consequence: possible phoenixes exist now, and thus,
Petrus H. accepts something like actual possibilia; as for omnis rosa est and
omnis homo est, one has to distinguish three different situations: (1) no
suppositum existsin which case the propositions at stake are false, for
no part of the universal matter exists under the expected form; (2) one or
two supposita existin which case the propositions are false as well, for
here the sufficientia rule applies and one stays below the minimal number
of supposita required; (3)more than two supposita existin which case
the propositions are true and are made such by an actual plurality of actu-
ally existing supposita.
***
Fortunately, what follows is a provisional edition. For since m.s.e. likes
nothing more than hunting for unnecessary amendments, idiosyncratic
punctuation and hazardous conjectures by ignorant (and hence presump-
tuous) editors, our genuine tribute consists in the imperfect character of
the following text, and not in the analysis of its content or in our sketchy
and preliminary observations.
OMNIS PHOENIX EST
(Opus puerorum, MS Amiens Bibliothque municipale

406, ff.138ra139ra)
Structure of the sophisma
[ 19: general introduction to the treatment of omnis]
0. Corpus
0.1. Probatio 10
0.2. Improbatio 10
0.3. Problemata 11
0.3.1. Utrum exigatur tria appellata 11
0.3.2. Utrum propositio sit vera 11
0.3.3.Problemata annexa 11
0.3.3.1. Qualiter phoenix et tempus possunt esse universale 11
0.3.3.2. Qualiter potest probari per inductionem 11
0.3.3.3. Qualiter diversificatur universale 11 [hoc problema tangitur
in solutione 4344]
1. Utrum exigat tria appellata
1.1. Quod sic 1216
1.2. Quod non 1718
2. De veritate et falsitate
2.1. Quod sit vera 1920
2.2. Quod sit falsa 21
3. Problemata annexa
3.1. Qualiter possunt phoenix et tempus esse univeralia
3.1.1. Quod non sunt universalia:
3.1.1.1. 2223
3.1.1.1.1.24: ad 23 [in fine]
3.1.1.2. 2526
3.1.1.2.1. 27: contra 26
3.1.1.2.2. 28: queritur utrum hec sit vera omnis rosa est
3.1.1.2.3. 2930: contra (?) 2728
3.1.1.3. 31
3.2. Qualiter potest probari per inductionem
3.2.1. Quod non potest 32
4. Solutiones et responsiones
4.1. Solutio ad primum (ad 0.3.1.) 33
4.1.1. Solutio antiquorum 33
4.1.2. Solutio auctoris 34
4.1.3. Confirmatio et contra improbationem (ad 0.2.) 35
4.1.4. Responsiones ad argumenta in contrarium (ad 1.1.) 36
4.1.4.1. 3740: ad 1216
4.2. Solutio ad secundum (ad 0.3.2.) 41
4.2.1. Responsio ad argumentum in contrarium (ad 2.2.) 42
4.2.1.1. 42: ad 21
4.3. Solutio ad tertium (ad 0.3.1. & 0.3.3.) 43
4.3.1. Responsiones ad argumenta in contrarium (ad 3.1.1.)4345: ad
2326
4.4. Solutio ad tertium (0.3.2.) 46: ad 32
<De hoc signo omnis>

1. /135ra/ Post hoc quaeritur de hoc signo omnis. Quid significet, utrum
rem vel modum rei nolumus inquirere, licet antiqui circa hoc innodaren-
tur multum. Scimus enim quod omnis significat quoniam universaliter,45

id est quod subiectum universaliter subiciatur praedicato, id est pro qual-
ibet parte, et non significet rem, quia neque universale neque particulare,
sed modum rei,46 et est dispositio propria ipsius universalis, quia solum
universale sumitur universaliter. Et non valet argumentum quod fit quod
cum veriori modo sit universale a parte praedicati quam a parte subiecti,
tunc magis erat dispositio praedicati quam subiecti. Universale enim
aliam dicit essentiam universalis in suo communi esse non [non] com-
paratum per se ad singularia, sed per aliud cum quo est; et hoc modo est
universale a parte praedicati, et sic dici de omni non est propria passio
ipsius. Vel potest sumi universale prout dicit essentiam ad sua individua
in quantum <eis> inest secundum se et non per aliud, et sic erat intel-
ligibile et [haec] postea reducitur ad actum per adiunctum signum;47 et
hoc modo universale est a parte [[signi]] subiecti, et sic dici de omni est
propria passio universalis. Haec autem diversitas causatur ex illo verbo
scripto in quinto Metaphysicae48 omne quod subicitur stat pro supposito,
sive subicitur ratione suppositi. Sed quod praedicatur praedicatur ratione
formae sive essentiae.
2. Sed contra: propria passio adaequatur49 proprio subiecto. Tunc dici
de omni non erit dispositio termini singularis cum non deberet quoniam
universaliter excedere universale. Sed in contrarium est sententia Aristo-
telis in primo Priorum50 in illo capitulo: accidit autem etc., ubi dicit quod
iste syllogismus est sophisticus Aristomenes intelligibilis semper est; sed
Aristomenes est intelligibilis; ergo Aristomenes semper est, omne enim
[omne] addito ad ipsum, scilicet dicere: omnis Aristomenes intelligibilis
semper est; sed haec est falsa, sicut dicitur similiter Miccalus corrum-
petur cras; sed Miccalus musicus est musicus; ergo Miccalus musicus cor-
rumpetur51 cras similiter non sequitur, sed oportet addere <omnis> ad
primam: omnis Miccalus corrumpetur52 cras, quae falsa est. Unde dicit
quod decipiuntur in eo [quod] pene, quia [cum] dicamus hoc huic inesse
45Aristotle, De interpretatione 7.17b1112.

46Cf. Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones super librum Topicorum 2, q. 1.
47signum] signi ms.
48Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.9.
49adaequatur] adaequatvit ms.
50Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.33.
51corrumpetur] corrumpitur ms.
et hoc non inesse sicut iidem53 qui partialiter differunt. Quare secundum
hoc, terminus distributus poterit distribui per hoc signum omne.
3. Et item cum dicitur omnis Miccalus corrumpetur54 cras, hic acci-
dentia in subiecto multiplicantur, et est sensus: Miccalus in quantum
musicus corrumpetur55 cras, similiter Miccalus in quantum grammati-
cus; sed hoc idem facit signum accidentis; quare non videtur quod sit
alia differentia.
4. Ad quod respondemus quod dici de omni est propria passio universa-
lis et non disponit terminum singularem nisi in quantum habet naturam
universalis et in quantum est multiplicabile.Et ad hoc intelligendum [est]
debetis scire quod quoddam est praedicatum quod convenit termino sin-
gulari ratione sui sicut Sor currit, et respectu talis non est multiplicabilis;
alio modo ei atribuitur praedicatum respectu formarum accidentalium
existentium in Sorte, et licet in se non sit multiplicabilis, est tamen multi-
plicabile respectu praedicati secundum suas formas accidentales. Et quo-
tienscumque terminus discretus sumitur sub aliqua illarum formarum,
totiens ei praedicatum convenit ratione illarum, et secundum quod multi-
plicantur formae in subiecto existentes, et multiplicatur praedicatum quod
ei attribuitur per illas formas, sicut universalia per sua singularia. Sicut
haec omnis Aristomenes intelligibilis semper est; est enim sensus: Aris-
tomenes in eo quod musicus intelligibilis semper est, in eo quod logicus
intelligibilis semper est, in eo quod grammaticus intelligibilis semper est
et sic de aliis qualitatibus per quas praedicatum aptum est multiplicari. Et
tali modo potest addi dici de omni termino discreto, prior<i> autem modo
non, sicut <hic>: omnis Sor currit. Non enim currit potest multiplicari in
Sorte per albedinem <nec> per nigredinem quia non convenit ei ratione
istarum qualitatum. Et quia primo modo terminus discretus erat, multi-
plicatur per suas /135rb/ formas accidentales respectu praedicati ita quod
praedicatum subiecto conveniebat ratione uniuscuiusque formae. Et ideo
hoc modo habet rationem universalis.
5. Sed obviabit modo aliquis quod tunc haec propositio erit vera omnis
Aristomenes intelligibilis semper est quia intelligibilis in quantum tale
semper est; unde Aristomenes in quantum musicus intelligibilis semper
est; et tamen Aristoteles ponit eam <esse> falsam.
53iidem] idem ms.

6. Respondeo quod haec est duplex quia potest distributio cadere

super hunc terminum Aristomenes in quantum erat dispositus per suum
adiunctum, et hoc modo, quia non fit distributio nisi secundum permis-
sionem restrictionis, sic non fit distributio hic nisi per formas per quas
erat intelligibile Aristomenes in quantum tale semper est, et sic haec est
vera. Vel potest cadere distributio supra hunc terminum Aristomenes, et
sic est sensus: quicquid est Aristomenes intelligibilis semper est; et hoc
modo est Aristomenes intelligibilis, et hoc modo fieri est sub medio; sed
prima fuit falsa; et sic intelligit Aristoteles.
7. <Ad> quod post quaeritur, respondeo quod aliud est multiplicare
subiectum respectu praedicati per suas formas accidentales, et hoc facit
hoc signum in exemplo posito; aliud est intelligere formas accidentales
in subiecto cui attribuitur praedicatum et, hoc facit hoc signum <quale-
libet in ista>: qualelibet [homo] currit; est enim sensus: res habens
omnem qualitatem currit. De differentia eius apparebit ad unumquodque
inferius.
8. Item haec dictio omnis aliquando adiungitur termino simplici, ali-
quando composito; et simplici duobus modis: aliquando in obliquo, ali-
quando in recto; et in recto aliquando accidit difficultas ex additione eius
ad terminum generalem, aliquando ad specialem.
9. Primo modo datur talis regula: quandocumque signum universale
adiungitur termino generali, hoc est duplex ex eo quod potest fieri dis-
tributio pro generibus singulorum, id est pro speciebus, vel pro singulis
generum, id est pro individuis contentis sub speciebus. Et secundum
hanc56 procedit haec oratio: Omne animal fuit in archa Noe,57 quae pro-
batur per genera singulorum et improbatur per singularia generum.58
(...)
<Sophisma: omnis phoenix est>

10. /138ra/ Item. Secundo modo datur regula talis quod quandocumque
hoc signum <omnis> non habeat sufficientiam appellatorum in termino
cui adiungitur, recurret ad non existens.59 Et dicebant antiqui sufficientia
56hanc] haec ms.

57See A. de Libera, Rfrence et quantification, pp. 177200.
58Cf. Roger Bacon, Summa de sophismatibus, pp. 15758; Lambert of Lagny (of Aux-
erre), Logica 8 (ed. F. Alessio (Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1971), p. 232).
59existens] existentiam ms.
appellatorum ad minus tria appellata sicut hic.60 Et ideo ponebant antiqui

hanc esse falsam: Omnis phoenix est;61 quae probatur per suam contradic-
toriam quae falsa est. Improbatur ergo plures phoenices sunt.
11. Circa hanc orationem tria principaliter quaeruntur. Primum est
de prima propositione, utrum hoc signum omnis exigat tria appellata.62
Secundum est de veritate et falsitate praedictae propositionis. Tertium
est de hiis quae sunt annexa huic orationi, scilicet qualiter phoenix pos-
sit esse universale, et qualiter possit probari per inductionem, et qualiter
diversificatur universale.
12. Circa primum proceditur hoc modo: primo ostendendo quod qua-
erit tria appellata et primo per auctoritatem. In principio Caeli et mundi63
ubi ostendit <Aristoteles> quod perfectio consistit in tribus. Dicimus enim
quod omne totum in tribus ponimus. Et ut magis hoc exprimeret dicimus
per auctoritatem. Non enim dicimus de duobus viris quod sunt omnes,
sed de tribus. Tria sunt omnes viri et toti similiter. Quare omnis requirit
tria appellata. Et si dicatur quod non accipit illa tria pro suppositis tribus
sed pro istis tribus: virtus, operatio et substantia64in istis enim tribus
est substantia naturalis in esse completoista solutio nulla est. Quod
exemplum contradicit: duo viri non dicuntur omnes viri; sed tres dicun-
tur omnes viri. Constat quod [licet] tres non dicit praedicatum ternarium
quae era<n>t in substantia virtute et operatione sed in tribus suppositis,
quia tres viri dicunt tria supposita per quae numerantur viri et ita de sup-
positis ibi loquitur et non de praedicatis. Quare non erit sic solvere.
13. Ad idem: universale est quod est aptum natum praedicari vel dici de
pluribus vel esse in pluribus. Huiusmodi habitudo sive potentia reducibi-
lis est in actum respectu cuius est65 in potentia. Et hoc fit mediante signo
quod est nota divisionis; sed omne quod reducitur in actum non reducitur
in actum nisi respectu cuius [e[st]] fuit prius in potentia [prius], sicut
60Cf. Anon. Liberanus, omnis phoenix est, 10 (p.92); Anon., Introductiones Parisienses,
p.372; William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam, p.156:32124; Roger Bacon, Summa
de sophismatibus, p.144; Roger Bacon, Summulae dialectices 53740 (27778). Against
the rule, see John Pagus, Appellationes 3846 (23841); Peter of Spain, Tractatus 12.89
(pp.21516).
61Sophisma no. 678 in Ebbesen and Goubier, Catalogue. From the beginning of the
thirteenth century until the middle of the fourteenth, it is discussed in (at least) thirty-one
different texts.
62Cf.Anon. Liberanus, omnis phoenix est, 45 (pp.9091).
63Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.1.268a713.
64Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, De coelesti hierarchia11.2.
65est] sunt ms.
apparet in motu naturali; ergo [cum] sic erit in motu rationis. Quare si
ibi addatur nota divisionis, iam reducta est in actum aptitudo universalis;
sed reductio non erat nisi respectu eorum ad quae erat haec aptitudo sive
potentia; sed haec aptitudo potentia erat respectu plurium, quod apparet
per diffinitionem universalis prius positam; ergo necesse est quod divi-
datur actu pro multis, cum aptitudo erat prius respectu plurium.
14. Ad idem: sicut dicit Boethius66 aliquis trahit partem alicuius totius
in quo erat multitudo,67 ergo si<c> in hac aliqua phoenix est, iste termi-
nus aliquis trahit partem respectu alicuius totius; sed hic erit [[totum]]
totum omnis phoenix; sed omne totum continet plus quam suam partem;68
ergo necesse est quod ibi fiat distributio pro pluribus.
15. Item ad idem: differunt universale universaliter sumptum et non
universaliter; sed cum dicitur omnis phoenix est, hic potest sumi pro
uno; ergo si aliud addit<ur> signum superveniens, tenebitur.
16. Si aliqua passio est unica in duabus69 substantiis [est], inest eis
per eandem causam; sed cum dicitur omnis homo, hic additur quoniam
universaliter gratia suppositorum; ergo cum dici de omni sit unica passio
cuiuslibet universalis, semper gratia suppositorum additur cuilibet uni-
versali. Et quod sit unica patet per propositionem Caeli et mundi70 quod
principia sunt unica in eis quorum sunt principia etc. <Et cum> dici de
omni sit71 principium formale et non nisi quia est dispositio subiecti uni-
versalis, univoce erit dispositio cuiuslibet universalis.
17. Sed contra: contingit facere demonstrationem de sole et luna sicut
apparet in primo Posteriorum72 in illo capitulo: eorum quae saepe fiunt
<etc.>; et demonstratio non fit sine universali; et in illa ponantur pro sub-
iecta sol et luna; [quoniam] ergo potest addi quoniam universaliter hui-
usmodi universalibus; quare sufficiet ei etc.
18. Ad idem: ad diversitatem causarum proximae cause sequitur diversi-
tas effectus. Ergo si propria passio est effectus sui subiecti et dici de omni est
propria passio universalis, dici de omni sequitur diversitatem universalis;
66Not found. Perhaps Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis 1 (ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 64 (Paris:
Migne, 1860), cols. 167d168a.
67Cf. Matthew of Orlans, Sophistaria 3.45 (p.231).
68suam partem] sua pars ms.
69duabus] duobus ms.
71sit] fit ms.
72Perhaps Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.31.
ergo si quod est universale [quod] non habet nisi unum suppositum actu,
dici de omni aliud non requirit nisi unicum suppositum actu.
19. Post hoc quaeritur de veritate et falsitate praedictae propositionis.
Et videtur quod sit vera in hunc modum: impossibile est duas contradic-
torias simul esse falsas in naturali materia; ergo si haec est falsa nulla
phoenix est, [quia] sua contradictoria est vera aliqua phoenix est; ergo
haec erit vera omnis phoenix est.
20. Ad idem: terminus circa quem fit restrictio non potest distribui ultra
permissionem suae restrictionis,73 sicut <hic> homo albus est, omnis
homo est albus; sed cum dicitur phoenix est, iste terminus phoenix
restringitur solum ad praesentes per regulam positam in appellationibus;74
ergo si adveniat distributio, non distribuet nisi pro existentibus, et talibus
vere convenit praedicatum; ergo propositio simpliciter est vera.
21. Sed contra: universaliter est aliqua propositio falsa vel quia praedi-
catum non convenit subiecto, vel propter oppositam dispositionem sub-
iecti, vel propter [in] implicationem quae ei non convenit ut Sor currens
disputat, posito quod non currat sed disputat. Sed hic denotetur disposi-
tio circa subiectum quae ei non convenit. Probatio: omnis /138rb/ forma
quae secundum actum existendi solum [si] unum suppositum determinat
actu [naturam] non potest multiplicari nisi per multa supposita; quare
si multiplicatur, tunc false75 multiplicatur, cum non respondeat ei aliud
individuum respectu cuius denotatur multiplicari; ergo [non] phoenix
<non> huius<modi> est forma quod omne superius est in forma sui infe-
rioris; non poterit vere multiplicari cum non habeat nisi unum supposi-
tum. Quare false76 denotatur multiplicari. Quare propositio est falsa.
22. Circa tertium sic: quaeritur qualiter phoenix sit universale et tem-
pus et consimilia. Et videtur quod non sit quia, sicut dicit Averroes77
commento super Metaphysicam78 in principio nihil est frustra in rerum
natura, et in secundo, quod natura [[natura]] nihil facit frustra; sed frustra
est potentia ad quam non consequitur actus suus, et hoc apparet per diffi-
nitionem de frustra posita ab Aristotele primo Physicorum79 et in capitulo
de fortuna quod frustra est quod est aptum natum inducere aliud et non
73Cf.Anon. Liberanus, omnis phoenix est, 8 (p. 89).

74Perhaps: in Appellationibus, and if so, cf. possibly John Pagus, Appellationes.
75false] falso ms.
76false] falso ms.
77Averroes] Averois ms.
78Averroes, Commentarium in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis 2, comm. 1 (Venice:
apud Iunctas, 1562; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962, f.28k).
79Aristotle, Physics 2.6.197b2627.
inducit id quod est natum inducere; ergo si omnis potentia ordinata est
ad unum actum, si non inducit ipsum, erit frustra. Sed non est universale
nisi quia [[habet]] dispositionem habet et potentiam ad hoc quod habet
plura singularia. Si ergo haec potentia nunquam potest reduci in actum, et
haec potentia non est frustra, ut probatum est, tunc huiusmodi aptitudo
nec lunae nec soli nec caelo nec tempori nec phoenici inest; ergo non
erunt universalia.
23. Item ad idem: omne <universale est> illud cuius tota materia secun-
dum omnem sui partem existit; sed una forma non habet inclinationem
respectu alterius formae, sive aptitudinem, quae sit forma eius complexa,
quia si haberet, tunc totum corporale praeter naturam <esset> et sic esset
ex materia generali, quia non esset ex tota materia; sed caelum et luna
huiusmodi sunt; ergo etc.; quare non erunt universalia. Et hoc argumen-
tum non se extendit nisi ad ea quae consistant ex materia tota. Et ex hoc
ulterius sequitur quod omnia alia superiora sunt diversarum specierum
quia unumquodque consistit ex sua tota materia sicut dicit Aristoteles in
principio Caeli et mundi,80 sed individua alicuius speciei communicant in
materia et in forma communi quae multiplicatur per partes illius mate-
riae; quare etc.
24. Sed contra hoc dicit Aristoteles in principio Caeli et Mundi:81 omnis
stel<l>a est eiusdem naturae cum corpore in quo sita est; sed natura dici-
tur materia [est] vel forma vel compositum, ut in principio secundi Physi-
corum82 habetur; non est natura forma neque compositum, quod satis
patet; ergo erit materia, quare corpora superiora erunt in primo mobili ex
eadem materia. Et cum principium mobile non sit nisi ex una materia et
tota, tunc alia erunt ex eadem materia et ita videtur quod sunt eiusdem
speciei.
25. Item quod tempus non sit universale neque phoenix videtur, quia in
istis aut est materia tota sub tota forma, aut non. Verbi gratia: tota materia
temporis est sub ipso nunc quo modo instat; si sic, ergo non est possibile
ut sit sub alia forma eiusdem speciei; et sic erit perpetuum ut corpora
superiora. Et patet ista consequentia hoc modo, sicut dicit Aristoteles in
primo Caeli et mundi:83 causa quare caelum non habet nisi unicum indi-
viduum est [et] quia tota materia caeli est respondens huic speciei <et>
fuit sub hac forma huius individui. A simili: si tota materia temporis est

81Perhaps Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.9.278b15.
82Aristotle, Physics 2.1.193a29b8.
83Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.8.277b12.
sub isto nunc quod materia instat, neque est possibile quod sit sub alio
nunc. Si modo pars materiae non est sub hac forma nunc, quaeritur: aut
alia pars eiusdem materiae est sub alia forma, aut non. Si sic, tunc erit
in esse completo et erit sub alia specie; quare illi eidem parti non inerit
postea [[ru]] respectu illius formae quae nunc est; quare nec unius spe-
ciei, prout est sub uno individuo, non est in potentia84 ad aliam speciem,
cum non fit transmutatio in speciebus; vel sic: si pars quaedam materiae
inest nunc sub alia forma alterius individui, hoc individuum non est istius
speciei, quia de tempore nichil est nisi nunc quod modo instat; ergo erit
sub alia specie illud individuum; quare materia temporis respondet indi-
viduis plurium specierum; <et> sic, tempus erit genus sub quo sunt indi-
vidua plurium specierum, et alia inconvenientia sequerentur. Si non sit
sub una forma neque sub ista, tunc erit aliqua pars materiae sine forma,
quod est impossibile.
26. Item videtur quod tempus non habeat aliquod suppositum quia
sicut punctus non est de substantia lineae, sic videtur quod nunc, cum sit
tempus continuum praeteritum et futurum, non erit de substantia tem-
poris. Quare non erit eius suppositum, et ita non habebit aliquod sup-
positum actu existens.
27. Item: multa sunt universalia quae nullum habeant actu, ut rosa; ali-
quod tempus est in quo nulla est rosa, quare nec85 ergo continuabitur
inesse suis individuis.
28. Item queritur utrum haec sit vera omnis rosa est.86 Et videtur quod
sit falsa, quia eius contradictoria est vera in naturali materia; ergo ipsa est
falsa.
29. Sed contra: aut deperit tota materia istius speciei aut non; si deperit,
ergo deperit ipsa species, quia omne universale aut continuatur inesse
suis individuis, aut in suo principio materiali. Et loquitur hic de universali
prout dependet a singularibus secundum <actum> existendi.
30. Item ad idem: si deperit tota materia rosae, ergo si post tempus haec
erit vera aliqua rosa est87 aliqua rosa erit et ex aliqua materia88 alterius
speciei, aut de novo creabitur aliqua pars materiae, quorum utrumque
est inconveniens. Si non de/138va/perit tota materia, remanet ergo aliqua
pars; ergo aut sub hac forma aut sub alia; non sub hac, ergo sub alia; <et>
84non est in potentia] non inest potentia ms.

85nec] qualiter(?) quaesitum(?) ms.
86Cf. Anon., Tractatus Anagnini, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. 2.2, p.299.
87est] erit ms.
88aliqua rosa erit et ex aliqua] ex aliqua rosa erit et aliqua ms.
sequuntur89 praedicta inconvenientia. Et primo [[quod]] quia [nunc]

quando erit, erit iam sub alia forma, et ita sub alia specie, et sic dep-
erit species prior <quae> sub alia forma erat prius, et sic esset possibilis
regressus ab una specie in aliam, quod non videtur esse verum. [Multum
enim est quod tota materia quae respondet uni speciei in aliis.] Impos-
sibile enim est quod tota materia quae respondet uni speciei sit tota sub
alia specie secundum naturam.
31. Item videtur quod caelum et luna et consimilia non sunt universa-
lia, quia maior est potentia vel potestas in materia respectu multiplicatio-
nis et divisionis quam in forma, quia forma per se est indivisibilis. Et si
est multiplicabilis, hoc <est> per divisionem quae fit iam in materia; sed
materia non habet dici de se; ergo si in aliis universalibus tota materia
adaequatur formae et in materia non est potestas respectu alterius for-
mae, ergo multo fortius in forma non erit possibilitas respectu alterius
materiae; quare adaequata sunt priori materiae. Non erit ergo aptitudo
formae caeli respectu alterius suppositi; ergo non erit universale cum non
habeat nisi unum suppositum, licet <plura> possit habere.
32. Ultimo queritur qualiter huiusmodi propositiones possunt probari
per inductionem. Et videtur quod non per diffinitionem inductionis posi-
tam in primo Topicorum:90 inductio est progressio a pluribus singulari-
bus ad universale [progressio]; ergo si in istis non potest esse progressio
a pluribus singularibus ad universale, cum non habeant ea, non erit ibi
inductio. Et sic ulterius non erunt universales. Cum [[omnis universale]]
omnis universalis possit probari per inductionem, queritur ergo qualiter
fiat inductionem in hiis.
33. Solutio. Ad primum dicendum quod duplici via possumus respon-
dere praedictae orationi <sc. omnis phoenix est>. Si vellemus concedere
quod dici de omni est eiusdem rationis prout consequitur universale sicut
proprium accidens proprium subiectum et secundum eandem rationem
et non equivocescilicet per prius et posteriusest dispositio eius, tunc
dicemus quod per eandem causam consequitur quidlibet universale et
sic, quia in aliquo universali exigitur multitudinem suppositorum et in
omne exigitur, tunc dicemus quod prima propositio simpliciter falsa est.
Et hoc fuit quod movit antiquos, quia crediderunt quod penitus est eius-
dem rationis dici de omni prout est dispositio cuiuslibet universalis, et
89sequuntur] sequitur ms.

non per prius et posterius. Ideo opinati91 sunt quod semper exigit multi-
tudinem suppositorum. Et ideo posuerunt pro regula quod terminus cui
additur distributio, si non habeat sufficientiam appellatorum, recurrit ad
non existens. Et dixerunt sufficientiam appellatorum ad minus tria. Et
<isto> modo est simpliciter falsa omnis phoenix est. Hac autem via satis
convenienter potest sustineri quod obicitur quod sua contradictoria est
simpliciter falsa. Respondeo quod non est sua contradictoria. Contradictio
enim [[est]] ad idem tempus habet reduci; sed cum dicitur omnis phoe-
nix est, iste terminus phoenix supponit pro eis qui sunt et qui non sunt;
sed cum dicitur aliqua phoenix non est, iste terminus phoenix supponit
pro existente solum; unde sic[ut] negatur de phoenice qui est et affirma-
tur de eodem qui non est, et ideo non est ibi contradictio. Et quia solutio
eorum deficiatur per illam regulam appellationum: terminus communis
etc., ideo precaventes restringunt regulam hoc modo: terminus communis
habens sufficientiam appellatorum supponens verbo de praesenti etc.
34. Si autem voluerimus concedere quod dici de omni est eiusdem
rationis prout est dispositio universalis, sed per prius consequitur ea
quae habent sufficientiam appellatorum actualiter, et per posterius alia
universalia,92 quae <habent sufficientiam suppositorum potentialiter...>93
quod in similibus94 est cum diversificatur universale, diversificatur passio
consequens ipsum, sic dicetur quod dici de omni consequitur naturam
universalis; et prout diversificabitur universale, diversificabitur dici de
omni; et cum multiplicatur, tunc universale per sua singularia existentia
actu, sive fuerint unum, sive multa, poterit ei addi dici de omni.
35. Dicimus ergo secundum hanc viam quod prima propositio vera est
simpliciter omnis phoenix est. Et non valeat improbatio quae sole<t>
fieri: supponit falsum cum dicitur omnis exigit tria appellata, cum hoc
non sit verum circa huiusmodi universalia. Si obiciatur quod plures phoe-
nices sunt, non valet, quia omnis non requirit multitudinem actu sed
habitu; <sed> cum dicitur plures phoenices etc., ibidem signatur multi-
tudo actu; unde ex multitudine quae erat in aptitudine sive in potentia,
quae erat secundum <quid>, concludit multitudinem existere actu, quae
simpliciter est multitudo; unde ex quo infert simpliciter.
91opinati] oppinata ms.

92Cf. Boethius of Dacia, Quaestiones super librum Topicorum q. 3 (pp. 11619).
93This conjecture covers only part of a missing line; the rest, namely, a segment of a
length corresponding to et per posterius alia universalia que, is still missing.
94quod infinitus] quod in filius(?) ms.
36. Concedimus ergo argumenta quae ostendunt quod omnis non

requirat multitudinem actu sed solum potentia. Et respondeo ad opposita.
Sed dicimus quod dici de omni diversificatur secundum quod diversifica-
tur universale, et qualiter hoc fit dicetur iam in tertio problemate.
37. Ad primum argumentum respondeo, scilicet de auctoritate Caeli et
mundi quod universale dupliciter potest considerari. Vel ratione /138vb/
essentiae suae, et hoc modo semper dicibile est de pluribus, vel secundum
esse quod trahit a singularibus. Unde dico quod si habet plura singularia
actu, nunquam dicetur de duobus, sed ad minus de tribus; et de talibus ibi
loquitur et non de aliis quae non habent nisi unum suppositum vel indi-
viduum. Unde de95 talibus loquitur quibus potest respondere multitudo
secundum actum et non solum secundum aptitudinem. Cuius signum est
quod dicitur non duo sed tres dicuntur omnes viri, et hoc significat mul-
titudinem actu, sed primo modo. Unde potest dici de omni addi universali
prout sua essentia erat multiplicabilis, licet non actu potest sic multi-
plicari. Vel potest dici quod loquitur de dici de omni secundum suam
primam rationem quam habet per prius, cum additur universali habenti
multitudinem suppositorum actu, circa quam querit multitudinem
actualem.
38. Quod postea obicitur quod omnis phoenix est totum et phoenix
aliquis est pars, et plus continet secundum aptitudinem quam pars licet
secundum actum equalia sunt, [per] plus significatur per primam quam
per secundam, et diffinit cum sumitur universaliter.Et non universaliter
comparatur universale ad individua per quae totaliter actu potest multi-
plicari, sed cum sumitur non universaliter, comparatur ad individua.Non
tamen actualiter denotatur multiplicari per indiviua per quorum multi-
tudinem erat multiplicabile. Utrobique sumitur ergo: si non actu, tamen
potentia. Et per hoc solvitur tertium argumentum.
39. Ad quartum iam apparet solutio quod dici de omni non est eiusdem
rationis hic et ibi.
40. Et quod obicitur quod principia sunt unica respectu quorum sunt
principia, dico quod in libro Caeli et mundi loquitur de unione in illa com-
paratione quae est in natura. Unde dicitur unio96 cum principio97 quando
agens imprimit formam in suo passo ut homo hominem et planta plan-
tam. Et sic intelligitur propositio praedicta ut intelligatur de priori modo
95de] in ms.
96unio] uniuo(?) ms.
97principio] principium ms.
immediate sufficiente. Et [[nos]] nos <non> loquimur de alia unione quae

dicitur esse in voce respectu significati.
41. Ad secundum, scilicet de veritate et falsitate concedo,98 scilicet
argumenta per quae probantur eam esse veram.
42. <Et ad> quod obicitur in contrarium, dicendum quod non exigitur
ibi multitudo secundum actum sed secundum habitum solum et ideo non
procedit.
43. Ad tertium intelligendum est quod universale quidlibet habet duo
in se, scilicet esse secundum naturam sive formam quae multiplicabilis
estet ab hac dicitur universale quoniam huiusmodi forma quam habet
de se apta nata <est> esse in pluribus, et habet in se quod est suum
suppositum per quod multiplicatur huiusmodi essentia, prout illud quod
est trahitur ad esse individuumet ab hoc non dicitur universale. Dico
ergo quod unicuique universali respondet suum commune quod est sci-
licet materia, ut tam largo modo loquamur quam stricto modo. Quando
ergo quod est totum est sub hac forma huiusmodi individui et impossibile
est ipsum esse sub alia forma alterius individui, nec in hoc praedicatur
nec in alio, tunc illud universale salvatur in unico suo individuo[s]. Et tale
est sol et luna et consimilia. Et forte sic est in intelligentiis ut unicuique
speciei respondeat proprium individuum, et omnia individua differunt
secundum speciem. Quia tamen hoc est dubium, relinquamus. Intelligas
tamen quod universale ibi differt a singulari ut non intelligentia ab hac
intelligentia[m]. Licet enim ibi utrumque [[be]] sit reperire quod est et
quo est, differunt tamen quia quo est universale simplicius est, [illud] et
[est] quo <est> haec intelligentia iam magis compositum est, quia iam
addita est ei propria forma per quam est haec intelligentia. Sed in quan-
tum est quo est ipsius universalis erat simplicius et commune. Et non dico
prout dixerunt antiqui quod solum differebat singulare ab universali situ
et loco, quia universale non determinat sibi locum99 aliquem, sed singu-
lare hic determinat sibi. Sed dico quod ibi est aliqua differentia a parte
eius quo est prout prius dixi. Dico ergo quod caelum est universale quod
dicit essentiam vel formam in quantum est de se participabilis a pluribus.
Sed cum dico hoc caelum, iam dico materiam sive suppositum commune
respondens illi essentiae communi esse sub hac forma individui. Et hoc
est quod dicit Aristoteles in libro Caeli et mundi,100 quod differt dicere
98concedo] respondeo(?) ms.

99locum] locus ms.
<hoc> caelum quia prius dixerit communem essentiam quae erat univer-
sale, nunc individuum contentum sub eo. Huiusmodi autem universalia
determinant sibi unicum suppositum et non possunt habere plura, neque
successive, neque simul.Quare ergo dicuntur universalia? Respondeo
quod essentia <in> quantum est de se <est> multiplicabilis; et quod
non possit multiplicari, hoc est propter resistentiam materiae quae non
patitur esse sub alia forma; et quod sit universale, hoc ei debetur a parte
suae essentiae. Unde inest ei potentia [[a parte]] respectu individuorum
a parte essentiae cuius signum est quod si aliud caelum esset, diceretur
caelum de eo. Sed quia materia caeli non potest esse sub alia /139ra/ forma
individui, ideo non poterat caelum habere nisi unum individuum. Erit
autem aliud universale cui communis materia respondens tota est sub hac
forma individuali. Potentiam tamen habet in se ad aliam formam indivi-
dui, sed non simul sed successive, et hoc quando corrumpetur forma non
existens in ea et inducetur alia, et tale est tempus et phoenix. Unde tota
materia respondens tempori, scilicet [quod] prout est universale, est mate-
ria sub ips[[a]]o nunc quando instat, sed habet inclinationem ad formam
[ad formam] futuri, cum continuatur tempore101 nunc, et tale universale
habet plura potentia, sed unum actu; et plura successive, id est unum post
aliud. Et similiter phoenix cuius generatio mirabilis est in natura. [[de]]
Dicitur enim quod haec avis quando est senex iam in arbore alta facit
nidum suum de speciebus calidissimis ut de ginginbrio et consimilibus.
Et post excitatur102 calor naturalis illarum specierum per beneficium solis
et incenditur nidus et combustitur illa[[m]] avis et postea in pulveribus
eius excitatur per beneficium solis virtus vegetativa [[sive]] et sensitiva.
Sive detur ab intelligentia movente caelum anima sensitiva sive non, ad
praesens vim non facio, et postea illa virtus sive sit anima ut artifex, sive
sit alia virtus organi et corporis.103 Et sic generatur altera phoenix.
44. Item: aliud est universale cuius materia secundum sui partem est
modo sub hac forma et potentiam habet ad aliam formam, et illa <est>
pars materiae, et sic de aliis partibus eiusdem. Et tale habet multa singu-
laria actu et potentia ut homo. Sed tale universale adhuc est duplex, quia
quoddam est quod est modo secundum omnem partem sui sub huius-
modi formis individuorum uno tempore ita quod non in alio, ut rosa et
consimilia, quia aliquod tempus est in quo non est aliquod individuum.
101tempore] tempori ms.

102excitatur] et citatur ms.
103corporis] corpus ms.
Continuatur tamen universale in sua causa materiali, et haec materia

quae est potentialis ad formam rosae [non] est sub alia forma quia in
arbore est succus sive humor ex quo fiet rosa, in qua causa quantum in
causa continuatur universale. Et tale universale continuatur in suis causis
materialibus. Et potest dici quod huiusmodi universalis rosae non cor-
rumpitur aliqua species, quia illa forma potentialis est ad hanc formam.
Vel potest dici quod non est inconveniens ut sit modo sub una forma et
destruatur illa, et sit modo sub forma rosae. Nec est ibi permutatio unius
speciei in aliam, sed magis <r>osae transmutatio prout est sub diversis
formis. Neque deperit [[aliqua]] aliqua species, quia adhuc remanet aliud
in quo possit salvari illa alia species in esse et continuari. Est aliud univer-
sale cuius materia secundum omnem partem sui existens sub huiusmodi
forma, potentiam habens ad alias formas, et non magis sibi determinat
unam differentiam temporis quam aliam, et tale continuetur104 inesse
individuis.
45. Item: quaestio de nunc. Intelligendum quod duplex est nunc: quod-
dam est indivisibile et illud est sicut tempus vel instans; et aliud quod
componitur ex priori et posteriori, et haec est pars temporis. Per iam dicta
apparet solutio ad alia.
46. <Ad> quod ultimo de inductione <obicitur> respondeo quod sic est
facienda: ista phoenix est, et si essent plura supposita sub phoenice, con-
veniret eiisdem praedicatum; ergo omnis phoenix est, et sic de aliis. Et
haec105 ad praesens de hoc sufficiant.
104continuetur] continetur ms.

105haec] hoc ms.
19.Apparentia and modi essendi in Radulphus Britos
Doctrine of the Concepts: The concept of being
Silvia Donati
Introduction
The doctrine of the pros hen homonymy of being is a cornerstone of Aris-

totelian metaphysics: being is said in many senses (pollachos legomenon),
but not in a purely homonymous way, since all these senses are related to
a primary one (pros hen).1 Aristotles standard example for this semantic
structure are the adjectives healthy and medical: both are applied to
different things in many senses, but all are connected to a primary one,
which they focus on. In the case of healthy it is the quality of health, in
the case of medical the medical art: the diet, the urine and the animal, for
instance, are all said to be healthy because they are related in different
ways to the quality of health, respectively being the cause, the sign and
the substrate of health. Likewise, being is said of different things in differ-
ent senses, but each is connected to a focus, namely, ousia or substance,
which is the primary sense of being: as Aristotle puts it at the beginning
of book seven of the Metaphysics,2 all other categories are called beings
because they are related to ousia, respectively as its quantities, its quali-
ties, its affections, etc. How the notion of pros hen homonymy as described
in the Metaphysics precisely squares with Aristotles distinction between
homonymous and synonymous items at the beginning of the Categories3
has been the matter of debate within Aristotelian scholarship since late
antiquity. The thirteenth-century reception of Aristotles doctrine is char-
acterized by a variety of interpretations ranging from those that almost
reduce pros hen homonymy to pure homonymy to those that reduce it
to synonymy. In my paper, I intend to examine the interpretation devel-
oped by an author who has been receiving increasing attention in the last
decadesespecially thanks to Sten Ebbesens scholarly worknamely,
1Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2.1003a33b12.

2Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a1820.
3Aristotle, Categories 1.1a112.
338 silvia donati
the late thirteenth-century Parisian arts master Radulphus Brito.4 As we

shall see, Britos position belongs to the second line of interpretation.
Within his philosophical works, Brito addresses the issue of the unity of
being in three places: the commentary on Porphyry, the commentary on
the Physics and the commentary on the Metaphysics, an anonymous work
that has recently been ascribed to Brito by Ebbesen.5 In those works Brito,
like Aristotle, deals with being in its categorial dimension, that is, as com-
mon to the different categories, not as common to God and creatures. The
position that emerges from the commentary on Porphyry and the com-
mentary on the Physics is the same, whereas the commentary on the Meta
physics possibly testifies to an earlier stage of Britos doctrinal evolution,
in which he had not yet taken a firm stance on this issue. Britos position,
which he conceives as the correct interpretation of Aristotles doctrine
of the pros hen homonymy of being, can be classified as a version of the
doctrine of the analogy of being in the medievalnot Aristotelian
sense of the word analogy,6 that is, as the relationship occurring among
a plurality of things ordered in some respect to something primary. Spe-
cifically, Brito understands the unity of being in terms of what has been
labelled synonymic analogy by scholars:7 in his view, on the one hand,
the term being is predicated of the ten categories according to a single
concept; on the other hand, since this concept is shared by the categories
according to the prior and the posterior, being considered as common to
4On Radulphus Britos literary production and for bibliographical information, see
O. Weijers and M. B. Calma, Le travail intellectuel la Facult des arts de Paris: textes et
matres (ca. 12001500), vol. 8, Rpertoire des noms commenant par R (Turnhout: Brepols,
2010), pp. 4364.
5Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Porphyrium, MS Brussels BR 354047, ff. 3360
at ff. 59v61r and, in a slightly different version, MS Paris Arsenal 697, ff. 130 at ff. 10vb
11rb (note that unless otherwise explicitly noted, I quote from and refer to the Brussels
manuscript); Quaestiones super Physicam, MS Florence BNC Conv. Soppr. E.1.252, ff. 160
at ff. 6rb7ra; Quaestiones super Metaphysicam, MS Florence BNC Conv. Soppr. E.1.252, ff.
265310 at ff. 275rava. On the commentary on the Metaphysics, see S. Ebbesen, Radul-
phus Brito on the Metaphysics, in J. A. Aertsen, K. Emery, and A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Ver
urteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie and der Universitt von Paris im letzten Viertel
des 13. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), pp. 45692, which also contains an edition
of the question on the unity of being (at pp. 47375). On Britos position, see Ebbesen,
Brito on the Metaphysics, pp. 45758; S. Donati, La discussione sullunit del concetto di
ente nella tradizione di commento della Fisica: commenti parigini degli anni 12701315 ca.,
in M. Pickav (ed.), Die Logik des Transzendentalen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), pp. 98124.
6As is well known, following the paradigm of mathematical proportion, Aristotle reserves
the term analogy for the case of an equality of ratios involving at least four terms.
7M. Di Giovanni, Averroes on the Species of Celestial Bodies, in A. Speer and L. Wege-
ner (eds.), Wissen ber Grenzen: Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2006), p. 451.
the concept of being 339
the categories is not an instance of univocal, but of analogical predication.

Besides subscribing to the idea of the conceptual unity of being, Britos
position is also characterized by a strongly anti-reductionistic attitude
with respect to the categories, which leads him to conceive of the cat-
egories as distinct and irreducible essences. Thus, the core of Britos solu-
tion consists in the attempt to provide an answer to the question of how
ten irreducibly different essences can be accommodated under a single
notion of being.
Antecedents of Britos Doctrine of a Single Notion of Being
By claiming that being is predicated of substance and accidental catego-

ries according to a single concept, Brito departs from the standard version
of the medieval theory of the analogy of being (via communis), which
truer to Aristotles notion of pros hen homonymyholds that being is
predicated of the categories according to concepts that are different, but
all related to the same focus. In this vein, Aquinas, for instance, in his
commentary on the Metaphysics defines the analogical predication of
being as a kind of predication in which the same name is applied to dif-
ferent things according to definitions that are partly different and partly
identical: different insofar as they express the different relationships of
secondary analogates to the primary one, identical insofar as the focus
of these different relationships is the same, namely, the primary analo-
gate, substance.8 The remote ancestor of Britos position, to which Brito
explicitly refers in his treatment of being, is obviously Avicennas view.
At the beginning of his Metaphysics,9 Avicenna describes being as a pri-
mary notion (intentio) of the intellect, different from the notions corre-
sponding to the single categories and prior to them. Although positing a
single notion of being prior to the categories, Avicenna denies that being
is related to the categories as a genus to its inferiors, since it is shared by
them according to the prior and the posterior. Moreover, in Avicennas
doctrine the idea of a single notion of being is associated with the idea
of the irreducible diversity of the categories, which he takes to be ten
different essences. The ontological presupposition of Avicennas doctrine
8Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio 4, lect. 1, nn.

53536 (ed. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1950), pp. 15152).
9Avicenna Latinus, Liber De Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina tr. 1, c. 5 (ed. S. Van
Riet, 3 vols. (Louvain: Peeters; Leiden: Brill, 197783), vol. 1, pp. 3142).
340 silvia donati
is the distinction between essence and existence. The possibility of a sin-

gle concept of being common to the categories is accounted for by the
fact that existence, to which, according to Avicenna, the notion of being
ultimately refers, is something different from the essence of the catego-
ries and is related to them as a mere concomitant; thus, the categories
are ten radically different modes of being according to their essence, but
they fall under a common concept of being insofar as they all participate
in existence.10
The immediate ancestor of Britos theory is a version of the doctrine
of a single notion of being that enjoyed a certain success within the Pari
sian philosophical milieu in the last quarter of the thirteenth century; it is
found in several anonymous commentaries originating from the Parisian
Faculty of Arts in the 1270s and 1280s.11 Like Britos theory, this doctrine
claims that being is predicated of substance and accidental categories
according to one and the same concept, yet, since this concept is shared
by the categories according to the prior and the posterior, being is not
predicated univocally, but analogically. Besides endorsing the idea of a
single notion of being, this view also rejects the traditional assimilation
between the analogy of being and the analogy of the adjective healthy,
a feature which we will also find in Britos theory. For these commen-
tators, being and healthy are instances of essentially different kinds
of analogy: whereas the analogy of being is characterized by conceptual
unity, the adjective healthy is predicated of its analogates according to
different notions; accordingly, unlike the analogy of being, the predica-
tion of the adjective healthy is an analogical predication verging on pure
equivocation.
While subscribing to the theory of a single concept of being, these
authors do not engage in the investigation of the extramental basis of
this conceptual unity: they assume that there must be an absolute notion
of being, common and prior to the notions of being qua substance
(ens per se) and of being qua accident (ens in alio), but they do not explain
10Avicenna Latinus, Liber De Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina tr. 5, c. 6 (vol. 2,
pp. 28081); A. Treiger, Avicennas Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence
(takk al-wud, analogia entis) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources, Documenti e studi sulla
tradizione filosofica medievale 21 (2010), 19698; S. Donati, English Commentaries before
Scotus: A case study; The discussion on the unity of being, in F. Amerini and G. Galluzzo
(eds.), Medieval Latin Commentaries on the Metaphysics (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
11See, e.g., Incertorum Auctorum Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, ed. S. Ebbesen,
CPhD 7 (Copenhagen: GAD, 1977), pp. 13334; 31517; cf. also Donati, La discussione,
pp. 9899.
how it can be so. This is a point on which Britos treatment essentially

diverges from that of the earlier commentators. He is primarily interested
in providing an extramental foundation for the conceptual unity of being.
In the following, I will first analyse those aspects of Britos ontology that
are relevant for the present discussion, then I will turn to his doctrine of
the concepts and to the notion of apparens or modus essendi, which is
the keystone in Britos attempt to secure an objective foundation to the
conceptual unity of being without endangering its essential diversity.
Britos Criticism of the Analogy of Attribution: The Paradigm

of the Healthy
Central to Britos treatment of the unity of being is his understanding of

the relationship between substance and accidental categories as expressed
by his rejection of the analogy of the healthy as a paradigmatic model for
the analogy of being. In a well-known passage of his commentary on book
one of the Sentences,12 Thomas Aquinas provides an analysis of the anal-
ogy of the healthy, which will be influential on the later philosophical
tradition. According to Thomas, in the case of the healthy there is no
ontological unity corresponding to the conceptual unityThomas talks
of a single concept shared by the different healthy things according to
the prior and the posterior heresince the entity signified by the name,
the quality of health, only exists in the primary analogate, the healthy
animal, but not in the secondary analogates, the healthy diet and the
healthy urine. Unlike the animal, they are said to be healthy not because
of something existing in them, but only because of their relationship
in the medieval technical terminology, attributionto something else,
namely, the quality of health, which only exists in the animal. Among
thirteenth-century commentators, the question of whether the case of
being can be accommodated by the pattern just described was highly
debated. The English master Richard Rufus of Cornwall and Albert the
Great, for instance, are early supporters of a strongly reductionistic inter-
pretation: they maintain that accidental categories have no entity of their
own, so that they are called beings only in virtue of their attribution to
substance; indeed, properly speaking, they are not beings, but, as Albert
12Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum 1, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1um (ed.
P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), p. 492).
342 silvia donati
puts it, only modalities (modi) of being, that is to say, of substance.13

Thomass position in the above-mentioned passage from the commen-
tary on the Sentences is an instance of a more moderate interpretation,
since he contrasts the analogy of being, having both a conceptual and an
ontological foundation (secundum intentionem et esse), with the analogy
of the healthy, in which nothing corresponds in reality to the conceptual
unity (secundum intentionem). Closer to Britos time, a further instance of
a moderately substantialistic interpretation is provided by the Augustin-
ian master Giles of Rome.14 On the one hand, Giles denies that the anal-
ogy of being is completely reducible to the paradigm of the healthy, since
accidental categories do possess some entity of their own independently
of substance. On the other, he claims that the entity of accidental catego-
ries is too weak to account for their classification as beings, to the effect
that, in the end, the analogy of being is not structurally different from the
analogy of the healthy: like the latter, the former is based on the attribu-
tion of the secondary analogates to the primary one, namely, in the case
of being, substance.
Britos position differs both from Rufuss and Alberts strongly reduc-
tionistic approach and from Thomass and Giless more moderate attitude.
He not only maintains that accidental categories do have an entity of
their own, he also claims that they are called beings in virtue of their own
entity. In other words, Brito denies that the analogy of being can be classi-
fied as an analogy of attribution. In his view, the analogy of being is struc-
turally different from the analogy of the adjective healthy: whereas the
analogical predication of the adjective healthy is based on the attribution
of the secondary analogates, diet and urine, to the primary one, namely,
the quality of health in the animal, the analogical predication of being is
not based on the attribution of the secondary analogates to the primary
one: accidental categories, just like substance, are called beings in virtue
of a principle formally inhering in them, their own entity.15 Although
Brito maintains that all categories possess some entity, it is important
considering the matter at handto stress that in his opinion, this claim
does not entail that the different categories participate in one and the
same entity, as, for instance, all human beings participate in one and the
same essencehumanhooddue to which they all belong to the human
13See Donati, English Commentaries Before Scotus.

14See Donati, La discussione, pp. 1079.
15Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Physicam, f. 6vb; Quaestiones super Porphyrium,
f. 61r.
species. On the contrary, in Britos view, although all categories agree in

the fact that they are beings in virtue of their own entity, the entity in
virtue of which they are beings is in each case different. What is identical
in all cases is only the relationship between a category and its own entity
with respect to being.
A consequence of Britos account of the analogy of being is that, in
his understanding, from the formal point of view, being is predicated
of substance and accidental categories in an equally primary way, since
in both cases the predication is based on a principle formally inhering
in the subject.16 This is a major difference with respect to the standard
view, according to which, compared to substance, accidental categories
are beings only in a secondary and derivative way. In this respect, Britos
position obviously conflicts with the Aristotelian tenet of the ontological
primacy of substance as summarized in the already mentioned passage of
book seven of the Metaphysics. Brito is fully aware of this difficulty. His
strategy consists in distinguishing a double level of causality, namely, the
level of formal causality and the level of efficient causality. If from the
viewpoint of formal causality accidental categories are beings in them-
selves and independent from their relation to substance, they depend
effectively on substance, since their entity is caused by substance. Thus,
in Britos analysis, the traditional tenet of the primacy of substance is
retained, but confined to the extrinsic sphere of efficient causality.17
Interestingly enough, with its rejection of the paradigm of the healthy
Britos analysis of the analogy of being shows strong similarities with the
account developed by his more famous contemporary John Duns Scotus.18
Scotus agrees with Brito in ascribing to accidental categories an entity
of their own, in virtue of which they are beings. Accordingly, Scotus too
maintains that, from the viewpoint of formal causality, accidental catego-
ries are beings through themselves, although, from the standpoint of effi-
cient causality, they depend upon an extrinsic cause, namely, substance.
It is worth noting, however, that Scotuss vindication of the ontological
dignity of accidental categories comes along with his progressive rejection
of the traditional notion of accidental categories as essentially relative
16Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Porphyrium, MS Paris Arsenal 697, quoted in

Ebbesen, Brito on the Metaphysics, p. 458, n. 11; Quaestiones super Physicam, f. 6vb.
17See preceding note, and Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Porphyrium, f. 60v: Quam-
vis enim effective accidens habet esse per substantiam, tamen formaliter habet esse per se.
18See G. Pini, Scoto e lanalogia: Logica e metafisica nei commenti aristotelici (Pisa:
Scuola Normale Superiore, 2002), pp. 17690.
344 silvia donati
beings, intrinsically dependent on substance. The culmination of this pro-

gression will be the radical thesis that the most fundamental accidental
categoriesquantity and qualityare basically absolute entities, whose
inherence in substance, far from being constitutive of their essence, is
itself related to them as a predicamental accident, belonging either to the
category of action or of passion.19 Compared to Scotuss innovative inter-
pretation of Aristotelian ontology, Britos analysis still seems to hesitate
between different models. If, on the one hand, he stresses the ontologi-
cal dignity of accidents by holding that they are beings through them-
selves, on the other, he seems yet to hang on to the traditional notion of
accidental categories as essentially relative entities, insofar as he regards
their inherence in substance as a constitutive element of their essence.20
In conclusion, Britos position seems to be that accidental categories do
possess an essence and consequently are beings on their own account;
yet, they are, in a sense, intrinsically dependent on substance, since the
dependence on substance is constitutive of their essence.
The esse formaliter as Extramental Foundation for the Conceptual

Unity of Being
The doctrine of the apparentia was developed within the Parisian philo-
sophical milieu in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, one of the
earliest witnesses to this theory being Siger of Brabants questions on the
Metaphysics from the 1270s.21 The basic idea underlying this doctrine is
that, although the essence of material substances is the proper object
of the human intellect, the essence is grasped not in itself, but through
its perceptible properties and operations, which are the way in which
the essence manifests itself to the intellectin technical terminology,
its apparentia. By its supporters, this theory is traced back to Aristotles
adage in De anima, saying that the knowledge of accidents contributes to
19G. Pini, Substance, Accident, and Inherence: Scotus and the Paris debate on the
metaphysics of the Eucharist, in O. Boulnois, E. Karger, J. L. Solre, and G. Sondag (eds.),
Duns Scot Paris 13022002 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 304310; G. Pini, Scotuss Real-
ist Conception of the Categories: His legacy to late medieval debates, Vivarium 43 (2005),
9297.
20Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Porphyrium, ff. 68vb69ra. On Britos position,
see also Ebbesen, Brito on the Metaphysics, pp. 46465.
21See Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, ed. A. Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve:
ditions de lInstitut Suprieur de Philosophie, 1983), p. 377.
our knowledge of the quiddity.22 It rests on the general assumption that

mans intellectual knowledge is based on sense perception; because of this
structural limitation, it cannot have direct access to the essence, which in
itself is not perceptible, but can only grasp the essence via its perceptible
manifestations.
Although the doctrine of the apparentia is presented as a more general
epistemological theory by its supporters, its original purpose seems to be
to account for the universals of the Porphyrian tree without positing a
corresponding plurality of substantial forms. In fact, the specific context
in which the theory of the apparentia is normally introduced by its early
supporters is the discussion of the unity of generic concepts in the cat-
egory of substance: how can we account for the unity of generic concepts
ifas late thirteenth-century Parisian arts masters normally didwe
subscribe to the Thomistic doctrine of a single substantial form in mate-
rial substances? Indeed, if we deny the existence of a plurality of forms
corresponding to the generic concepts and really different from the spe-
cific form, then the conceptual unity of the genus will not be based on
the real unity of a single form common to all the members of the genus,
but will have as its ontological correlate only the different forms of the
species falling under the genus. Thomas himself had addressed this prob-
lem in his commentary on the Physics. He had solved it by distinguishing
logical and real univocity: the genus is logically univocal, since it is predi-
cated according to the same definition, but it is not univocalin fact, as
we shall see, it is predicated analogicallyaccording to the real philoso-
pher, since its conceptual unity is not based on the real unity of a single
form shared by all its members; in this respect, the concept of the genus
is essentially different from the concept of the species, whose conceptual
unity is based on the real unity of a single form common to all individu-
als falling under the species.23 Late thirteenth-century Parisian commen-
tators accepted Thomass distinction between logical and real univocity.
Still, they felt that some sort of extramental foundation was required to
explain the logical unity of generic concepts; to provide this foundation,
they introduced the doctrine of the apparentia.
Briefly put, their solution goes as follows. Provided that the essence is
grasped by the intellect via its sensible properties and operations, we must
22Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1.402b2122.

23See Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio 7, lect. 8, n. 947
(ed. P. M. Maggiolo (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1954), p. 487).
346 silvia donati
distinguish different kinds of properties and operations from which our

concepts are derived. Some properties or operations are necessarily linked
with a certain substantial form or essence, as for example the activity of
discursive knowledge, which is an activity exclusively belonging to human
beings. Specific concepts are derived from the consideration of this kind
of features. Other properties or operations can be caused by different sub-
stantial forms or essences, so that they are common to different species,
as, for example, sense perception or local motion, which are shared by all
animal species. Generic concepts are derived from the consideration of
this second kind of features. If we compare the two kinds of concepts, it
is obvious that the conceptual unity of the species has a stronger ontologi-
cal foundation, since it is based on one and the same substantial form. By
contrast, the conceptual unity of the genus has a weaker ontological foun-
dation, since it rests on essentially different forms considered from the
viewpoint of a single property or operation flowing from them. Although
resting on a weaker ontological foundation than that of the species, for
these authors the conceptual unity of the genus is by no means a fiction.
Assuming the existence of a natural order in the genesis of our knowledge,
they maintain that different operations or properties in the extramental
things necessarily produce different images and concepts in the knowing
subject, whereas a single operation or property necessarily produces one
image and one concept. Thus, although not based on the unity of a single
form shared by all the members of the genus, for these commentators
the conceptual unity of the genus does have an extramental foundation,
namely, the operation or the property shared by all its members.24
24See, for instance, the following passage from a late thirteenth-century Parisian
commentary on the Physics. Anon., Quaestiones super Physicam, MS Kassel UB 2 11,
f. 31vab: Dicendum ad primum quod genus est unum secundum rationem. Iuxta quod
intelligendum quod genus sic est unum ratione, quia unum intellectum et conceptum
importat. Ad quod intelligendum quod conceptus et intellectus seu rationes intelligendi
sumuntur ex speciebus sensatis et imaginatis virtute intellectus agentis. Et ideo, quia natu-
rali ordine accipiuntur ex illis, ideo ex una specie phantasmatis accipitur una ratio intelli-
gendi et a diversis diversae. Nunc autem ratio intelligendi animalis accipitur ex una specie
phantasiata et sensata. Quod apparet, quia diversae species contentae sub ipso animali
conveniunt in aliqua una operatione, ut in sentire, et ex ista operatione accipitur unum
phantasma et ex hoc phantasmate uno accipitur una ratio intelligendi et conceptus huius
generis. Unde licet non sit penitus unum in rerum natura a quo accipitur istud phantasma
et, per consequens, ista ratio intelligendi, tamen(?), quia plura in natura possunt commu-
nicare in aliquo accidente uno, ideo fundamentum huius conceptus et rationis intelligendi
ipsius generis est unum aliquo modo in rerum natura. Ad primum: est unum secundum
rationem et intellectum, ut dictum est, sed non est unum secundum naturam. Et tu dicis
quod ideo illa unitas sit ficta. Solutum est iam, quia diversae naturae sibi subiacentes
As is clear from the preceding discussion, late thirteenth-century Pari

sian masters normally introduce the doctrine of the apparentia in the con-
text of the discussion of ordinary first-order concepts like man or animal.
Brito is known for considerably widening the field of application of this
doctrine by extending it to other contexts.25 Indeed, when one considers
Britos investigation of the extramental basis of our concepts at the differ-
ent levels of conceptualization, it is easy to see that what he is trying to
do is to provide a unified account based on the notion of apparens or, in
his own terminology, of modus essendi.26 His complex hierarchy of prop-
erties or modi essendi supervening on the essences, with their increasing
degree of generality and abstraction, is, in fact, meant precisely to pro-
vide an extramental foundation for the different conceptual orders. Thus,
as is well known, one of Britos specific applications of the doctrine of
the apparentia or modi essendi concerns second-order concepts such as
universal, species, and genus, the so-called intentiones secundae. We
will briefly come back to Britos doctrine of the intentiones secundae later.
The discussion of the unity of the transcendental concept being, ana-
lysed in this paper, provides a further significant example of Britos wide
application of the notion of apparens or modus essendi.
To fully appreciate the philosophical import of Britos position, it is
important to note that, for him, the case of being confronts us with a
problem that is structurally similar to that provided by generic concepts.
Just as in the case of the genus the extramental correlate of a single con-
cept is a plurality of different essences, the different specific forms, so
in the case of being a single concept corresponds to whatas we have
conveniunt in aliquo uno accidente, et ex illo uno accidente accipitur unum phantasma,
ut dictum est, et una ratio intelligendi. Unde licet non penitus habeat unum fundamentum
in rerum natura, ut unam formam a qua procedat una operatio, a qua accipiatur unum
phantasma et una ratio intelligendi, tamen eius fundamentum est aliquo modo unum in
rerum natura, quia illae diversae formae naturales conveniunt in una operatione in rerum
natura a qua accipitur ista ratio intelligendi ipsius generis. Et ita fundamentum in re aliquo
modo est unum, et ideo non est ficta unitas secundum rationem.
25On Britos position, see Ebbesen, Brito on the Metaphysics, pp. 46061 and the texts
mentioned there.
26For the equivalence of the two concepts, see, e.g., Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super
Physicam, f. 53vb: Ad secundam partem quaestionis, cum quaeritur utrum genus sit ali-
quid unum secundum rationem, dico quod sic, quia ubi potest reperiri unum apparens a
quo habet sumi una ratio, illud est unum secundum rationem; sed in diversis speciebus est
unum apparens sive unus modus essendi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia unitas rationis intel-
ligendi sumitur ab unitate modi essendi sive apparentis, quia ratio intelligendi immediate
non sumitur ab essentia, sed a modo essendi sive apparenti. Minor patet, quia in omnibus
speciebus animalis reperitur unum apparens, sicut sentire et moveri secundum locum.
348 silvia donati
seen aboveis a plurality of essentially different entities, namely, the ten

categories. In other words, just as in the case of the genus, the unity of
the concept of being cannot be traced back to the unity of a common
naturebeingnessshared by all things falling under the concept. Britos
solution consists in applying the explanation devised for generic concepts
to the case of being. As he puts it, conceptual unity can be regarded as
having an extramental foundation and not merely fictitious, when all
things falling under a concept share the same modus essendi. Along these
lines, he thus traces the conceptual unity of being back to a single modus
essendi common to all categories, something thatnot belonging to the
essences of the categories, but being related to them as a sort of extrinsic
propertycan be one, although the categories are irreducibly different.
The question is, what is this common modus essendi shared by all cat-
egories despite their irreducible diversity? Obviously, no ordinary prop-
erty belonging to a category can play this role; what we need is some
sort of transcategorial property. Brito provides a solution to this problem
while contrasting the analogy of being with the analogy of the healthy. As
was stressed above, according to Brito, although essentially different enti-
ties correspond to the ten categories, there is indeed a common feature
shared by them. This common feature is precisely the fact that since each
category has an entity of its own, each is a being in virtue of a principle
its own entitywhich formally exists in it. In Britos view, this completely
abstract propertythe esse formaliterwhich is shared by all categories,
is the common modus essendi which provides the extramental foundation
for the unity of the transcendental concept of being.27
27Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Physicam, f. 6vb: In quibuscumque reperitur unus

modus essendi communis, ibi reperitur una ratio communis; sed in substantia et accidente
reperitur unus modus essendi communis ipsius entis; ergo in substantia et accidente erit
una ratio communis secundum se. Maior patet. Probatio minoris, quia substantia est ens
formaliter per entitatem quae est in ipsa et accidens est ens formaliter per entitatem quae
est in ipso, ita quod non est simile de sano et de ente, quia animal est sanum formaliter
per sanitatem quae est in ipso, sed cibus formaliter non est sanus, sed est ibi sanitas sicut
in efficiente, quia cibus efficit sanitatem in animali, et {sed ms.} in urina est sanitas sicut
in signo. Sic autem non est de ente respectu substantiae et accidentis; immo substantia
est ens formaliter per entitatem quae est in ipsa {ipso ms.} et accidens est ens per enti-
tatem quae est in ipso formaliter; ergo ens utrobique habet esse formaliter. Modo esse in
aliquibus formaliter est quidam modus essendi entis; ergo in substantia et accidente est
unus modus essendi entis communis; ergo ab illo uno modo essendi communi poterit
sumi una ratio ipsius entis in substantia et accidente. Cf. Quaestiones super Porphyrium,
ff. 60v61r.
The Unity of Being as an Analogical Unity
As we have seen, Britos theory of a single notion of being common to the

categories rests on the idea of a basic similarity between the case of being
and the case of the genus. However, in his view, these two cases are not
identical. Subscribing to the Aristotelian tenet, according to which being
is not a genus,28 Brito wants to draw a distinction between the case of
being and the case of the genus. His solution is that whereas the genus is
predicated of its species univocally, being is predicated of the categories
analogically.
It is worth noting that, endorsing the univocity of the genus, Brito
departs from a position widely accepted among his contemporaries,
which ascribed an analogical unity also to the genus. Indeed, due to the
fact that the ontological correlate of the conceptual unity of the genus is
a plurality of species, each of them differing from the other in perfection,
many thirteenth-century Aristotelians reckoned the case of the genus as
an instance of predication according to the prior and the posterior and,
consequently, as an instance of analogical predication. Britos point, in
regarding the genus as a case of straightforwardly univocal predication,
seems to be that, although the species of a genus are hierarchically ordered
according to their different degree of perfection, they are all on the same
level with respect to the genus (coaequaevae), since they all participate in
the genus through themselves and, consequently, in an equally primary
way. This is the point in which being differs from the genus. Unlike the
different species of the genus, the ten categories are notat least in a
senseall on the same level with respect to being. The general principle
underlying Britos argument is that when a property is shared by differ-
ent things that are related to each other as cause and effect, this property
belongs to them according to the prior and the posterior. In his view, this
is what occurs in the case of substance and accidental categories. As we
have seen above, although the categories are beings in an equally primary
way from the viewpoint of formal causality (since they are all beings in
virtue of their own entity), accidental categories depend on substance as
the efficient cause of their being. Thus, from the viewpoint of efficient
causality, there is indeed a hierarchy among the categories with respect
28See Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.3.998b2227.

350 silvia donati
to their participation in being. In Britos view, this entails that being is not
predicated of the categories univocally, but analogically.29
If being is predicated according to the prior and the posterior of the
categories (as we have seen above), in Britos view, it is also predicated of
them according to a single notion. That these two claims are not incom-
patible is shown by him by referring to a concrete example. As he points
out, fire and iron are hot according to one and the same notion; more
precisely, heat (caliditas) in fire and iron belongs to one and the same
species. Despite the homogeneity of heat in fire and iron, heat neverthe-
less belongs to fire and iron according to the prior and the posterior, since
fire is hot in virtue of its own essence, whereas iron becomes hot by being
heated by fire.30 Similarly, although the notion of being common to the
categories is in itself one and the same, since, as we have seen, it is derived
from a single modus essendi shared by all categories, it is nevertheless par-
ticipated in by them according to the prior and the posterior because of
the fact that accidental categories are caused by substance.
If Brito still holds on to the traditional doctrine of the analogy of being,
which he understands as a difference in the mode of participation in one
and the same notion of being, he is aware that this understanding of ana
logy is fairly different from the traditional notion of analogy as represented
by the case of the healthy. He contrasts the two kinds of analogy as verg-
ing on pure univocation and pure equivocation respectively. The analogy
of being, in which a single notion is participated in by the different analo-
gates according to the prior and the posterior, is regarded as a kind of
analogy close to straightforward univocation. In fact, it is an instance of
what at the beginning this paper I have called synonymic analogy. By
contrast, the analogy of the adjective healthy, in whichdue to the lack
of a common modus essendi shared by the different analogatesthere is
29Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Physicam, f. 6vb: Secundum declaratur, scilicet

quod ratio entis sit secundum prius et posterius a substantia et ab accidente participata, quia
quando aliqua sic se habent quod unum illorum est sicut causa et alterum est effectus quod
dependet ex illa causa, quando aliquid convenit istis, per prius inest causae quam causato,
et maxime quando causatum dependet totaliter ex causa. Modo accidens se habet ut cau-
satum respectu substantiae; ergo quidquid inerit istis per prius inerit substantiae quam
accidenti. Ratio ergo entis per prius participatur a substantia quam ab accidente, sicut
caliditas per prius participatur ab igne quam a ferro. Et ex hoc sequitur quod ens non
est pure univocum, quia omne pure univocum aequaliter participatur a suis inferioribus.
Modo ratio entis non participatur aequaliter a substantia et ab accidente, et ideo non est
univocum. Cf. Quaestiones super Porphyrium, f. 61r.
30See Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Physicam, f. 6va.
no common notion corresponding to the common name, is regarded as a

kind of analogy close to straightforward equivocation.31
Britos Doctrine Criticized by His Contemporaries
Britos original theory of a single notion of being based on a single modus

essendithe esse formalitershared by all categories aroused a strong
criticism in the Parisian philosophical milieu of the following generation;
in the first decades of the fourteenth century, renowned arts masters such
as Bartholomew of Bruges and John of Jandun rejected Britos doctrine in
favor of a more orthodox interpretation of Aristotles notion of the pros
hen homonymy of being. Their criticism concerns different aspects of
Britos theory; in the following, I will concentrate on their criticism of the
esse formaliter as the extramental foundation of the notion of being.
Bartholomews and Johns critiquesexpressed in the formers com-
mentary on the Physics and in the latters commentaries on the Physics
and the Metaphysics32agree on several points. Johns discussion in the
commentary on the Metaphysics is particularly interesting because it clar-
ifies some general assumptions of Britos theory of the apparentia. John
points out that according to this theory,33 the modi essendi or apparentia
underlying our concepts must be real properties, essentially different from
the things to which they belong. Perceptive activity, for instance, from
which the concept animal is derived, is a real property of the animal,
essentially different from it. That they are something real explains the fact
that they serve as extramental counterparts for our concepts; that they are
31Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Physicam, f. 6vb: Neque etiam est analogum ita
quod sit analogum per diversas rationes. Unde pono duplicem analogiam, unam talem
quae {q. t. ms.} accedit ad aequivocationem, quando aliquid habet diversas rationes in
multis quorum unum habet attributionem ad aliud. Sicut est in sano, quia sanum non
habet eundem modum praedicandi de animali, urina et cibo; immo praedicatur secundum
diversas rationes. Alia est analogia quae magis accedit ad univocationem, scilicet quando
ratio alicuius secundum se est una, tamen illa ratio per prius participatur ab uno quam
ab alio, sicut calor per prius participatur ab igne quam ab aliis calidis. Et talis analogia
reperitur in ente. Cf. Quaestiones super Porphyrium, f. 61r.
32Bartholomew of Bruges, Quaestiones super Physicam, MS Leipzig UB 1426, f. 10ravb;
John of Jandun, Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae 4, q. 1 (Venice, 1553; repr.
Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966, f. 45rab); John of Jandun, Quaestiones super octo libros Physi
corum Aristotelis 1, q. 8 (Venice, 1551; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1969, ff. 8vb9ra). For a
more detailed discussion of the two commentators view, see Donati, La discussione,
pp. 12436.
33Elsewhere, Jandun rejects the theory of the apparentia also in its application to the
case of the genus; see Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae, ff. 41va43rb.
352 silvia donati
essentially different from their subjects explains the fact that one and the
same apparens can belong to different subjects, as for example, perceptive
activity belongs to different animal species. Against Britos application of
this theory to the case of being, Jandun argues that it does not fulfill the
abovementioned condition, since, by Britos own admission, the esse for
maliter is notand, as John stresses, cannot possibly bea real property,
really different from its subject;34 indeed, for Jandun, to conceive it as
being a being itself would involve untenable consequences, such as an
infinite regress.35 But since the esse formaliter is not something different
from the beings to which it belongs and if such beings are different from
each other, their respective esse formaliter must also be different from
each other, so that ultimately no extramental foundation of any kind will
be left for a single concept of being.
Evaluating Johns criticism, it should be noted that it seems to rest
partially on a misunderstanding of Britos position. In claiming that in
Britos view the esse formaliter is not something different from the being
to which it belongs, he possibly understands the esse formaliter in the
sense of existence, which in Britos ontology is indeed not a metaphysical
principle really distinct from the essence.36 But such an identification of
the esse formaliter with existence seems to be explicitly rejected by Brito
himself, for in an admittedly rather obscure passage of his commentary on
Porphyry he claims that the esse formaliter is not to be understood in the
sense of the esse absolutewhich, for its part, is not something different
from the being to which it belongs.37 In fact, in Britos doctrine, the notion
34John of Jandun, Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae, f. 45rab: Quod esse

formaliter sit modus essendi a quo sumitur conceptus simpliciter, hoc est impossibile. Et
hoc probatur, quia modus essendi a quo accipitur conceptus debet differre essentialiter a
subiecto eius et a quolibet supposito, ut sentire, a quo accipitur conceptus animalis secun-
dum eos differt ab animali essentialiter et a quolibet supposito eius. Et sic modus essendi
a quo accipitur conceptus debet differre a significato termini et a quolibet supposito eius.
Sed esse formaliter est idem cum ente essentialiter, quod patet, quia esse formaliter subs-
tantiae est idem formaliter cum ipsa substantia et similiter esse formaliter accidentis est
idem essentialiter cum accidente, ut istimet concedunt. Nihil autem est modus essendi
suiipsius; unde sicut substantiae et accidentis non est unus modus essendi communis et
unus substantiae et accidentis, sic esse formaliter non est modus essendi communis et
unus substantiae et accidentis.
35See John of Jandun, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, ff. 8vb9ra.
36See Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Praedicamenta, MS Brussels BR 354047,
f. 78rv; Ebbesen, Brito on the Metaphysics, p. 457.
37Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Porphyrium, ff. 60v61r: Cum dicitur: ratio intel-
ligendi una sumpta ex uno modo essendi est, concedo. Et cum dicitur: substantiae et acci-
denti non est unus modus essendi, falsum est. Unde non dico quod esse in substantia et
accidente sit unus modus essendi ipsius entis quod est esse absolute, quod est idem {idem
esse formaliter does not seem to indicate the existence of a thing but, as
was shown above, the modality according to which a thing is a being
more specifically, the fact that something has an entity in virtue of which
it is a being. Contrary to Janduns interpretation, Brito does seem to con-
ceive this modality of being as something real, a real feature belonging to
extramental things, although obviously not enjoying the same ontological
status as beings belonging to the categorieswhich probably explains
why, in his view, the notion of the esse formaliter does not involve the
kind of absurdities pointed out by John of Jandun.
We can gain some insight into Britos ontology of the modi essendi
by looking at his doctrine of the second-order conceptsthe so-called
intentiones secundae.38 As is well known, unlike some of his contemporar-
ies, Brito maintains that the referents of second-order concepts such as
universal, genus, and species are not first-order concepts, such as the
concepts man, dog, and animal. They are extramental essences like,
for example, the essence of man or dog, which are also the referents of
first-order concepts. Those different concepts signify the same essence
considered under different apparentia or modi essendi. For instance, the
first-order concept man signifies the essence of man considered under
the mode of being capable of discursive activity, whereas the second-
order concept universal signifies the same essence considered under
the mode of being capable of being shared by a plurality of things. Brito
contrasts the two modi essendi as, respectively, a proper and a common
mode of being of the essence of man, the former pertaining to the essence
considered in itself, the latter pertaining to the same essence considered
as related to other things. However, in Britos view, both of them are real
features belonging to the extramental thing manthe former as an ordi-
nary predicamental property, the latter as a property obviously transcend-
ing the distinction of the categories. In the same vein, the esse formaliter,
the fact that something has an essence of its own in virtue of which it is
a being, is a real feature of extramental things, according to Brito. In his
complex construction of increasingly abstract modi essendi, the mode of
being being a being in virtue of its own essence seems to be something
e quod ms.} cum ente, sed esse formaliter in utroque est modus essendi ipsius entis ex quo
sumitur una ratio intelligendi entis.
38On Britos theory of intentiones secundae, see J. Pinborg, Zum Begriff der Intentio
Secunda, Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion, CIMAGL
13 (1974), 4959; J. Pinborg, Radulphus Britos Sophism on Second Intentions, Vivarium 13
(1975), 11952; G. Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An interpretation of Aristotles
Categories in the late thirteenth century (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 8398.
354 silvia donati
falling between the predicamental mode of being being capable of dis-

cursive activity and the transcategorial, common mode of being being
capable of being shared by a plurality of things.
Conclusion
In this study, I have examined Radulphus Britos doctrine of a single notion

of being common to the categories, its most significant feature being the
idea of ten irreducibly different essencesthe categoriesaccommo-
dated by one and the same concept of being. As we have seen, Britos
account of the conceptual unity of being is but an instance of a more
general theory that the Parisian master applies to all levels of conceptuali-
zation. It is based on the assumption that, in order to have a real ground-
ing, conceptual unity does not necessarily require the unity of a single
essence shared by all the items falling under the concept as its ontologi-
cal correlate. Conceptual unity can also be based on some non-essential
feature, namely, one and the same property shared by different essences,
as, for instance, the unity of the generic concept animal is grounded in
the unity of the property capable of perceptive activity, under which the
different essences of the various animal species are considered. By shifting
the question of the ontological foundation of the unity of being from the
sphere of the essence to the extrinsic sphere of the properties belonging
to the essence, Brito appropriates a strategy which was earlier adopted
by Avicenna. However, whereas for Avicenna the unity of the concept
of being was based on existence, which he conceived as a metaphysical
principle external to the essence, Brito grounds the conceptual unity of
being on a much more elusive kind of reality, namely, the esse formaliter,
which he relates to the items of the different categories as their common
mode of being.
Britos doctrine of a single notion of being common to the categories
also bears evident similarities to Scotuss doctrine of the univocity of being,
which agrees with Britos position in positing ten irreducibly different
essencesthe categoriesand a single concept of being. Scotus, however,
does not seem to look for some real grounding for the conceptual unity
of being as common to the categories. In fact, his point seems to be that
it is simply impossible to single out some real features differentiating the
items that fall under the concept of being from those that do not, and this
precisely because being is a transcendental concept, encompassing, as
such, the entire reality.39 Unlike Scotus, Brito does look for some extra-
mental foundation for the conceptual unity of being, which, as we have
seen, he finds in some mode of being common to the categoriesthe esse
formaliter. The price he has to pay in order to obtain this result is to allow
for a complex ontology which besides basic entities corresponding to the
categories also includes some sort of weaker realities that he describes
as the modi essendi.
39Pini, Scotuss Realist Conception, 98104.

20.Radulphus Brito on Common Names,
Concepts and Things1
Sten Ebbesen is undoubtedly one of the scholars who has contributed the
most to the little we know about Radulphus Britos thought. He followed
in the footsteps of his teacher and friend Jan Pinborg, who did the pioneer
research on modism and notably on Radulphus Brito. Both Sten and Jan
Pinborg produced editions of some of the questions that are essential to
the article that I am contributing to this volume in Stens honour.2 The
results of this article would not have been possible without Stens valuable
work and advice.
In what follows I intend to reconstruct what would have been Radul-
phus Britos account of signification of common names, had he written
one. My reconstruction aims at highlighting two main features of his
account: first, the elements of pragmatics that Britos account of significa-
tion involves; second, the way he articulates those elements of pragmatics
1A first draft of this article was part of my PhD dissertation from Paris 1 University,
but a major part of the work was carried out in Copenhagen thanks to a personal grant
from the Carlsberg Foundation. I owe thanks to Claude Panaccio for inviting me to the
Workshop on Nominalism in Montreal (May 2012) where I had the opportunity to discuss
an earlier draft of this article. I would also like to thank my colleagues from the Centre for
the Aristotelian Tradition (SAXO institute, University of Copenhagen) for their valuable
remarks and suggestions.
2The pioneer study on modism is Pinborgs Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mit-
telalter (Mnster: Aschendorff, 1967). A large part of Stens work has been devoted to the
development of the study of modism. For some of his most representative studies, see
Concrete Accidental Terms: Late thirteenth-century debates about problems relating to
such terms as album , in N. Kretzmann (ed.), Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philoso-
phy: Studies in memory of Jan Pinborg (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 10774; Boethius of
Dacia: Science is a serious game, Theoria 66 (2000), 14558; The Man who Loved Every:
Boethius of Dacia on logic and metaphysics, The Modern Schoolman 82 (2005), 23550;
Radulphus Brito: The last of the great arts masters, or Philosophy and Freedom, in
J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer (eds.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000),
pp. 23151; The Chimeras Diaryedited by Sten Ebbesen, in S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka
(eds.), The Logic of Being (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), pp. 11543; Radulphus Brito on the
Metaphysics, in J. A. Aertsen, K. Emery, and A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), pp. 45692; Theories of Language in the Hellenistic Age and in
the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, in D. Frede and B. Inwood (eds.), Language and
Learning: Philosophy of language in the Hellenistic age (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), pp. 299319. These articles have all been reprinted in S. Ebbesen, Collected
Essays, vols. 12 (Aldershot/Farnham: Ashgate, 20089).
358 ana mara mora-mrquez
with his logic of intentions and with his modistic semiotics. This will offer
a highly sophisticated account of signification of common names, one
that articulates these different tools, when dealing with the well-known
problem of how the predicability of many things of common names, the
universality of concepts and the ontological status of external essences
relate to each other.
I shall proceed in four steps. In part 1, I give a short account of the
modistic semiotics that Brito develops; in part 2, I introduce the prag-
matic account of signification, which results from Britos interpretation
of the Aristotelian passage Perihermeneias 1.16a38. After having shown
in part 2 that concepts are not a semantic condition for the signification
of external things by names, in part 3 I reconstruct Britos account of
concept formation. This in order to introduce, in part 4, the sort of role
that concepts play in his account of signification of common names. I
conclude by showing that in this account both the predicability of many
things of common names and the universality of concepts are ultimately
grounded in a moderate realism of common natures.
Radulphus Britos Semiotics
Costantino Marmo places Radulphus Brito within the third generation of

modists, together with Siger of Courtrai and Thomas of Erfurt.3 The dif-
ference between this generation and the ones that came before is their
definition of a sign. The initial difference lies in the fact that for the third
generation the sign is something essentially relational. That is, the sign is a
composition of matter and form, where the form, the ratio significandi, is
a relation that is in the sign as in a subject, and not in the thing signified,4
and it is given to an utterance (the matter of the sign) by means of an arbi-
trary act of imposition by the intellect.5 This establishes a gap between
3C. Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 12701330; La
semiotica dei modisti (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, 1994).
4Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Priscianum minorem, ed. H. W. Enders and J. Pin-
borg (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), p. 160: Illud quod formaliter
refertur ad alterum, in se habet principium suae relationis; sed vox formaliter est signum
rei et consignum suae proprietatis; ergo in voce <sicut in subiecto> est ratio significandi
per quam vox refertur ad rem significatam et ratio consignificandi per quam refertur ad
rei proprietatem.
5Radulphus Brito, Super Priscianum minorem, p. 161: Unde ibi est operatio intellectus
speculativi requisita, quia ille est qui primo cognoscit rem et eius proprietatem et postea
radulphus brito on common names 359
this generation and earlier modists such as Martin of Dacia and John of
Dacia, for whom a sign is the result of the composition of an utterance
and the thing signified.
A further difference is the fact that the third generation of modists
considers a double dimension of the relation of signification (ratio signifi-
candi): an active dimension from the part of the ratio and a passive one
from the part of the thing signified. This double dimension of the ratio
significandi was already present in Peter of Auvergne, but for Peter the
active ratio and the passive ratio are entirely different things, both in mat-
ter and in form, so that the first is in the sign as in a subject whereas the
second is in the thing signified as in a subject. On the contrary, the later
modists claim that both rationes, the active and the passive, are different
dimensions of one and the same relation of signification, which, as I just
said, is in the sign as in a subject, and whose term is the thing signified:
Some modes of signifying are active and some are passive. The passive mode
of signifying is the feature of the thing insofar as it is co-signified by the
utterance. The active mode of signifying is the relation of co-signifying by
means of which the utterance co-signifies the feature of the thing.6
Therefore, it is possible to consider both terms of these relations either
as absolute objects (that is, the ratio as a relation and the thing and its
properties as a material object), or as terms of the relation (that is, the
ratio as the active term of the relation and the thing as the passive term
of the same relation).
With this semiotic background, Radulphus Brito defines the name, in
his question-commentary on the Perihermeneias, as the composition of an
utterance (vox) with a relation of signifying (ratio significandi).7
informatus cognitione rei et suae proprietatis extendit se ad praxim et operationem et hoc

ad imponendum voces ad significandum et consignificandum; et ideo dicitur quod voces
significant ad placitum et a voluntate.
6Radulphus Brito, Super Priscianum minorem, p. 160: quidam sunt modi significandi
activi quidam passivi. Modus significandi passivus est proprietas rei ut consignificata est
per vocem. Modus significandi activus est ratio consignificandi per quam vox consignifi-
cat proprietatem rei. Note that the passage talks about the modes of signifying instead
of the ratio significandi as such, but since these modes are based on the ratio, their pos-
sibility of being considered as active and passive entails the same possibility for the ratio
significandi.
7Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones subtilissimae Magistri Rodulphi Britonis super arte veteri
(Venice: 1499), j4vD (146): Ideo logicus dicit quod est vox significativa, tunc ergo vox est
de essentia nominis ut pertinet ad logicum et ratio significandi.
Perihermeneias 16a38 and Signification of Common Names

in Radulphus Brito
In his question-commentary on the Perihermeneias, Radulphus raises the

question of whether names signify things or concepts of things.8 This
question was commonly raised in the question-commentaries on the
Perihermeneias from the second half of the thirteenth century, and the
responses to it provide us with important elements of an authors account
of signification.
The question is closely related to the interpretation of Perihermenenias
1.16a38:
Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks
symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all
men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs
ofaffections of the soulare the same for all; and what these affections
are likenesses ofactual thingsare also the same (Aristotle, De Interpre-
tatione 1.16a38, trans. Ackrill).
And it aims to clarify the sufficiency and the order of the semantic rela-
tions between voces (utterances), intellectus (thoughts) and res (things).
Some authors narrow this question to the more complicated case of com-
mon names, so that the question becomes whether common names sig-
nify concepts or things. This line of questioning begs the clarification of
how common names, concepts and things relate to each other.
Radulphus introduces the question by putting forth two arguments in
favor of the immediate signification of concepts: (a) an authoritative argu-
ment from Perihermeneias 1.16a38; (b) a second argument that we find
in, for instance, Aquinas treatment of this problem, which states that a
common name must signify concepts because it is only possible to signify
what it is possible to know, but since external things are ineluctably sin-
gular they cannot be known and therefore cannot be signified.9
8Quaeritur quare Philosophus dicit quod voces sunt notae passionum quae sunt in
anima, utrum voces significant res vel conceptus rerum. A partial edition of this ques-
tion is Radulphus Brito, In Perih. Quaestio 3, ed. J. Pinborg, Bezeichnung in der Logik des
XIII. Jahrhunderts, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), Der Begriff der repraesentatio im Mittelalter
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1971), pp. 27581. See also Ebbesen, Brito: The last of the great arts
masters, pp. 23151; and Brito on the Metaphysics, pp. 197208, for other descriptions of
Radulphus Britos theory of language.
9Although Aquinas did not write a question-commentary but an expositio, he provides
us with a comment on this passage, see Thomas Aquinas, Expositio libri Peryermenias: Edi-
tio altera retractata, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Vrin, 1989). For a
He goes on to introduce the arguments in favor of the immediate sig-

nification of things: (a) a semantic argument, which is found in Peter of
Auvergne and states that if the common name signified a concept then
contradictory assertions such as the man is sitting and the man is not sit-
ting would be false at the same time, since the concept of man is neither
sitting nor not sitting; (b) an argument, which appeals to the Aristotelian
theory of categories and argues that if the common name signified a con-
cept, every name would belong to the category of quality; (c) finally, an
authoritative argument from a passage in the Sophistical Refutations, in
which Aristotle claims that names stand for things (see Sophistical Refuta-
tions 1.165a68).
Radulphus solution to the question begins by introducing a division of
names into names of first imposition and names of second imposition.10
He claims that names of second imposition such as genus and spe-
cies signify concepts.11 This is not to say that names of second imposi-
tion signify a concept properly speaking, but that they signify a reflexive
knowledge of concepts such as [man] or [animal]. And it is by means of
this reflexive knowledge that it is possible to impose names of second
imposition.12
In the case of names of first imposition, Brito claims that they signify
external things and not their concepts.13 In his argument in favor of this
more thorough exposition of Aquinas position, see A. M. Mora-Mrquez, Peri hermeneias

16a38: histoire dune rupture de la tradition interprtative dans le bas moyen ge, Revue
Philosophique de la France et de ltranger 201 (2011), 6784.
10Radulphus Brito, In Perih. Quaestio 3, p. 275: Voces sunt duplices, quia quedam sunt
voces prime impositionis sicut homo, animal, lapis et consimilia, et quedam sunt
voces secunde impositionis sicut genus, numerus, species et similia. Note that this
division is at least as old as Porphyry.
11Radulphus Brito, In Perih. Quaestio 3, p. 276: Sed in vocibus secunde impositionis,
cuiusmodi sunt genus et species et casus et consimilia, ille voces significant conceptus
rerum. Significant enim quasdam intellectiones rerum vel res ut sunt sub intellectione vel
sub ratione intellectionum.
12Radulphus Brito, In Perih. Quaestio 3, pp. 27677: Sed notandum est, quod ille
voces secunde impositionis non significant conceptus suos, sed conceptus aliarum
rerum...Modo iste conceptus potest esse aliqua res secundum se intellecta, et ideo potest
sibi imponi aliqua vox ad significandum, quia quidquid contingit intelligere, contingit et
significare per vocem.... Eodem modo per genus et species significantur quidam con-
ceptus aliarum rerum; tamen significant istos rerum conceptus ut sunt quedam res et non
ut sunt conceptus generis et speciei; quare etc.
13Radulphus takes the same position as Peter of Auvergne, Roger Bacon, Peter John
Olivi and Simon of Faversham, among others, although the arguments to defend his posi-
tion differ from the ones given by most of these authors. On the other hand, he is against
the position taken by arts masters of the first half of the century, such as Nicholas of
Paris, as well as against the one taken by the Dominican theologians Albert the Great
position, he appeals to a notion of signification involving a pragmatic ele-

ment, which is frequent in the fourth quarter of the thirteenth century
and whose source is Perihermeneias 3.16b1921.14 This notion, in which
signification amounts to the formation of the concept of a thing in the
mind of a listener, focuses both on the role of the listener who interprets
a name and on the role of the names utterer. Furthermore, this notion is
in opposition to the idea that signification amounts to the expression of a
thought, which was common in the first three quarters of the century.
Britos argument is as follows:
1. A name of first imposition x signifies x if and only if x leads to the

formation of the concept [x] of x in the mind of the listener (De
Interpretatione 3.16b1921).
2. But x, when it reaches the listener, leads to the formation of the
concept of the thing x, which is the first object of the intellect.
3. Now, the first object of the intellect is the essence of the external
thing and not the concept of this essence (De anima 2.5.417b2223).
4. Therefore, x ought to be the essence of the external thing and not its
concept.15
Let us note that claim 2 is introduced without any development or sup-

port. Nevertheless, there are at least two possible ways of elucidating it.
On the one hand, and from a purely epistemological point of view, there
is evidence that Radulphus Brito took part in a debate, at the end of the
and Thomas Aquinas. For a more thorough description of the positions involved in this
debate, see G. Pini, Species, Concept and Thing: Theories of signification in the second
half of the thirteenth century, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (1997), 2152; and A. M.
Mora-Mrquez, Some 13th Century Masters of Artss Notion of Signification in their Com-
mentaries on Aristotles Perihermeneias: A new perspective on the origin of the debate on
signification at the end of the century, in C. T. Thrqnvist and B. Bydn (eds.), The Recep-
tion of Aristotles Works during the Middle Ages: Collected essays (forthcoming).
14Aristotle, De Interpretatione 3.16b1921: When uttered by itself a verb is a name
and signifies somethingthe speaker arrests his thought and the hearer pauses. (trans.
Ackrill).
15Radulphus Brito, In Perih. Quaestio 3, p. 276: Modo in nominibus prime impositio-
nis voces significant res et non conceptus rerum...Maior patet, quia sicut dicit Phyloso-
phus primo huius, capitulo de verbo, significare est intellectum constituere; ubi probatur
quod verbum aliquid significat, quia verbum prolatum constituit intellectum, et qui audit
quiescit.... Item probatur, essentia rei est quod intelligitur quia illud quod est primum
obiectum intellectus est illud quod intelligitur per vocem. Modo conceptus non est pri-
mum obiectum intellectus, immo rei essentia et ipsum quod quid est est primum obiec-
tum intellectus, sicut apparet II. De anima. Ergo essentia rei est quod intelligitur, et per
consequens est illud quod significatur per vocem prime impositionis.
thirteenth century, concerning the first object of the intellect. This debate
was placed between two overlapping quarrels, one of a theological nature
and the other of a metaphysical nature. The first quarrel concerns the sep-
arability of accidents and it stems from the theological discussions of the
Eucharist. The second quarrel concerns the possibility and the mechanisms
of the knowledge of substances. In both quarrels, the central conundrum
is the possibility of an immediate cognitive access to substancesthe pos-
sibility of knowing a substance without knowing its accidents. Most arts
masters defend the possibility of an immediate knowledge of substances
and of their essential features. By contrast, Franciscan theologians reject
any possibility of an immediate cognitive access to substances, and claim
that these can only be known by means of their accidents. Britos position
in this debate (see Quaestiones in De anima 1, q. 8) proposes a third way:
the intellect has immediate cognitive access to substances after having
separated them from the accidents with which they are represented by
phantasmata in the sensitive faculty of the soul. Therefore, it is possible
to have an immediate cognitive access to external essences, so that an
external essence can be the first object of the intellect.16
On the other hand, Radulphus gives us a further hint of support for
claim 2 in his treatment of the question about the immediate signification
of names in his question-commentary on the Metaphysics; and this time
the support involves a semantic dimension.17 In this commentary, he tells
16Radulphus Brito, In De anima 1, q. 8 (ed. A. Robert, unpublished): modo virtus

intellectiva superior est ad virtutem fantasticam et ideo quando virtus fantastica est in
fantasiando aliquod proprium accidens fantasiat, tunc in intellectus agentis abstrahentis
aliquam rationem intelligendi a fantasmatibus, tunc intellectus possibilis intelligit ipsum
quod quid est sine hoc quod intelligat aliquod accidens prius et hoc est quod dicit Philoso-
phus in littera sic: cum enim habeamus tradere secundum fantasiam de accidentibus aut
omnibus aut pluribus, tunc de substantia habebimus dicere optime. Unde non vult quod
fantasia cognoscat ipsum quod quid est, nec quod intellectus cognoscat ipsum accidens,
sed quando fantasia fantasiatur ipsa fantasmata, tunc intellectus fertur in ipsum quod quid
est virtute intellectus agentis abstrahentis aliquam rationem intelligendi ab ipsis fantas-
matibus. I would like to thank Aurlien Robert for having given me access to his unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Penser la substance: tude dune question mdivale (XIIIeXIVe
sicles) (PhD diss., University of Nantes, 2005).
17This question from the Quaestiones super Metaphysicam is edited in S. Ebbesen,
Words and Signification in 13th-century Questions on Aristotles Metaphysics, CIMAGL 71
(2000), 107114. For the attribution of this commentary on the Metaphysics to Radulphus
Brito, see Ebbesen, Brito on the Metaphysics. In this article, Ebbesen establishes a doc-
trinal closeness between this text and other works by Brito, a closeness based on agree-
ments about metaphysical, logical and ethical matters. Of these, the most important is the
metaphysical notion of apparens, that is, a partial manifestation of a mode of being of the
thing or of its form. See also Silvia Donatis contribution to this volume.
us that names of first imposition signify a thing because they lead to the
formation of the concept of the thing towards which the listeners atten-
tion is directed when he listens to the name. When an utterer talks about
an apple, the listener moves his attention to the content of the concept,
that is to [ apple ], and does not stay stuck in the concept itself.18
Thus, the act of signification amounts to the listeners directing his
attention to the thing the utterer intends to speak about. Therefore, in
Britos argument claim 2 suggests the pragmatic idea that there cannot
be signification unless both the utterer and the listener direct their atten-
tion to the content that the utterer intends to transmit by means of a
name. Since the utterance of a name of first imposition directs the lis-
teners attention to a thing rather than to its concept, the concept is not
the immediate significate of the name, but the thing itself.
Although there were other attempts to integrate a similar pragmatic
approach to signification in some arts masters before Radulphus, he is,
to the best of my knowledge, the first master to have wholly introduced
this element into the question of the immediate signification of external
things by common names.19
Radulphus Britos Account of Concept Formation
Even though concepts are not the immediate significates of names of first
imposition, they still play an important role in the signification of things
by names. In order to elucidate how concepts contribute to the significa-
tion of external things, we need first to give a short account of Radulphus
Britos theory of concept formation.
According to Brito, the rational faculty of the soul has two potencies
that complement each other and whose operations take place at the same
time: the agent intellect and the possible intellect. The possible intellect is
a passive potency, which can be affected by the forms of sensible things,
18Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Metaphysicam, 111: Et quod ita sit quod consti-
tuitur intellectus rei probatio, quia illius constituit intellectum nomen primo prolatum ad
quod postea ipso prolato movetur audiens vel proferens; nunc autem si proferatur pomum
vel aliquo delectabile, tunc aliquis movetur ad rem pomi et non ad intellectum, quia iam
habet intellectum pomi; ideo etc.
19Pragmatic approaches to signification are at least as old as Augustine. Following
Augustine, some Franciscan theologians of the thirteenth century, such as Roger Bacon
and Peter John Olivi, present us with accounts of signification with strong elements of
pragmatics. For the case of Olivi, see A. M. Mora-Mrquez, Pragmatics in Peter John Olivis
Account of Signification of Common Names, Vivarium 49 (2011), 15064.
without this implying that it is passive in the same way as matter is pas-
sive. That is, the possible intellect is capable of receiving forms, but it is
not a subject of change when it receives forms.20
The agent intellect, in its turn, is an active potency, which enables the
reception of forms by the possible intellect by means of its action on sen-
sitive representations (phantasmata).21 Nevertheless, the agent intellect
is not a cognitive potency, since it does not receive forms, but rather it
makes sensitive representations capable of being received by the possi-
ble intellect, as well as making the possible intellect capable of receiving
these forms.22
The process of concept formation follows the simultaneous operation
of the agent intellect and the possible intellect. It takes as its starting
point the phantasma of the thing, which was formed by the sensitive fac-
ulty of the soul. Radulphus raises the question of the nature of this coop-
eration between both intellects, focusing on the question of the nature of
the operation of the agent intellect over the phantasma. This is the same
as asking how the process of abstraction of intelligible species from phan-
tasmata is effectuated. He introduces two possible answers: (a) the agent
intellect prints a disposition in the phantasma, so that the latter becomes
capable of starting the reception of a form in the possible intellect; and
(b) the agent intellect really removes the accidental features of the phan-
tasma, which are an obstacle to the reception of a form in the possible
intellect. Brito rejects possibility (b) by means of the following argument:
if the agent intellect really removes something from the phantasma, the
result either stays in the sensitive faculty or it moves on to the rational
20Radulphus Brito, In De anima 3, ed. W. Fauser, Der kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu
Buch III De anima (Mnster: Aschendorff, 1974), p. 122: Ideo dicendum est ad quaestionem
sic: quod duplex est passio, sicut Philosophus distinguit, quia quaedam est passio prop-
rie dicta...Alia est passio largo modo dicta, quae est receptio perfectionis ab altero actu
ente. Tunc dico duo ad quaestionem: Primo quod intellectus non patitur ab intelligibili
primo modo. Secundo dico quod patitur secundo modo. Primum probatur sic: Quia illa
quae patiuntur primo modo et agunt, communicant in materia. Sed intellectus et intelligi-
bile non communicant in materia...Secundum declaratur: Quia illud quod habet poten-
tiam receptivam alicuius formae seu perfectionis est passivum passione quae est receptio
perfectionis.
21Radulphus Brito, In De anima 3, p. 212: Et quia agens assimilat sibi passum in fine,
cum anima sit immaterialis, habebit potentiam activam, per quam poterit facere phan-
tasma quod est materiale, esse immateriale.
22Radulphus Brito, In De anima 3, p. 219: Et non solum non cognoscit phantasmata,
immo etiam nihil cognoscit, cum non sit potentia receptiva et passiva sed magis activa.
Neque potest dici quod cognoscit per suam essentiam et non per receptionem, quia non
est causa phantasmatum neque causatum ab eis.
faculty (that is, to the possible intellect). The first case does not work,
because whatever is in the sensitive faculty is material and individuated,
and therefore it is not capable of starting the operation of the rational fac-
ulty. The second case is not possible either, because it involves the trans-
fer of an accident of the soul from one subject to another (that is, from the
sensitive faculty to the rational faculty), but transfers of accidents are not
allowed in the Aristotelian physics to which Brito is committed.23 Possi-
bility (a), which is attributed by Brito to Avicenna, is also rejected because
whatever is printed on the phantasma by the agent intellect will become
material and individuated, so that the phantasma with this material dis-
position will not be capable of starting the process of abstraction.24
He proceeds to the introduction of a third possibility: (c) the agent
intellect neither prints on nor removes anything real from the phantasma.
Rather, the agent intellect functions as an intellectual light that illumi-
nates the form of the phantasma, so that the possible intellect can assimi-
late this form through its cognitive operation:
Another way is that the agent intellect prints nothing on the phantasma,
that is, it does not give any disposition or any form to the phantasma; but
because of the contact of facultiesof the light of the agent intellect with
the phantasmataand because of the co-operation of this light with the
phantasmata, the form (quiditas) which was in the phantasmata under the
notion of accidents can in itself move or alter the intellect, so that the acci-
dents and the particular conditions under which it was in the phantasia are
not known.25
23Radulphus Brito, In De anima 3, p. 230: Sed hoc non videtur ut verba sonant val-
ere. Quia si intellectus agens sic ageret sequestrando speciem quidditatis a conditionibus
individuantibus, aut remaneret illa species in phantasia aut transiret ad intellectum pos-
sibilem et in ipso reciperetur. Non potest esse quod remaneat in phantasia, quia tunc esset
materialis sicut ante et cum conditionibus individuantibus, quia quod recipitur in aliquo,
recipitur per modum recipientis. Et sic, cum phantasia sit virtus particulata et materialis,
illa species in phantasia remanens esset particulata et materialis. Si autem dicatur quod
illa species transeat a phantasia ad intellectum possibilem, tunc idem accidens numero
transiret de subiecto in subiectum; quod est falsum, quia accidens videtur numerari secun-
dum numerationem subiecti saltem in accidentibus eiusdem speciei.
24Radulphus Brito, In De anima 3, p. 228: Oppositum arguitur: Quia si intellectus agens
aliquid imprimeret in phantasmate vel in phantasia, reciperetur ibi particulariter et mate-
rialiter, quia quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur per modum recipientis. Sed nullum mate-
riale agit in immateriale. Ergo post actionem intellectus agentis phantasma non posset
movere intellectum possibilem.
25Radulphus Brito, In De anima 3, p. 236: Alia via est quod intellectus agens nihil impri-
mat phantasmati sive nullam dispositionem vel formam dat phantasmati; sed ex contactu
virtuali luminis intellectus agentis ad phantasmata et ex coassistentia istius luminis cum
phantasmatibus quidditas quae erat in phantasmatibus sub ratione accidentium, potest
Therefore, the agent intellect allows contact between the sensitive and
the rational faculties, so that by means of this contact the form in the
phantasma can be assimilated by the possible intellect without assimilat-
ing its individuating conditions at the same time.
Brito explains the mechanisms of this contact of faculties by means of
an example that we also find in the Quodlibetal Question 5, q. 10 of God-
frey of Fontaines. The abstraction of the intelligible species by the agent
intellect resembles the action of light over milk, an action that allows
the vision of the milks whiteness. The vision of the milks whiteness is
possible thanks to the light, which allows the white color in the milk to
affect the eye, as well as it allows the eye to be affected by the white color
in the milk. Nevertheless, the action of light does not really separate the
milks whiteness from its other qualities, such as its sweetness. The milks
sweetness remains, even though it does not become visible by the action
of light.26 Thus, light allows us to see certain features of milk, but not all
of its features, and it also allows the white color to affect the eye, but not
the sweetness. The abstraction of the concept from the phantasma works
in a similar way: regarding the phantasma, the agent intellect makes only
its form visible; regarding the possible intellect, the agent intellect makes
it capable of assimilating the illuminated form in the phantasma.27 There-
fore, the agent intellect effectuates a double operation: first, it highlights
the essential features of the phantasma; second, it makes the possible
intellect capable of cognitively assimilating these essential features. The
act of abstraction, then, culminates through the reception of a form in the
possible intellectthe intelligible species or the concept of the thing.
movere seu immutare intellectum secundum se praeter hoc quod accidentia et condi-
tiones particulares, sub quibus erat in phantasia, cognoscantur.
26Radulphus Brito, In De anima 3, p. 237: Et poni potest simile multum conveniens
ad hoc: in lacte in quo est dulcedo et albedo. Modo si sine lumine non posset lac ratione
albedinis immutare visum vel aliquem sensum, quin immutaret secundum dulcedinem,
tamen ex contactu luminis solis super lac potest immutare medium et organum quantum
ad albedinem sine eo quod immutaret aliquem sensum quantum ad dulcedinem. Neque
tamen realiter removetur per contactum luminis ad lac dulcedo ab albedine, sed solum fit
separatio eorum quantum ad modum immutandi sensum, quia albedo immutat sensum
et non dulcedo.
27Radulphus Brito, In De anima 3, p. 239: quidam dicunt quod intellectus agens
actionem habet illuminando intellectum possibilem et illuminando et abstrahendo phan-
tasmata. Sicut lumen solis illuminat colores et medium, sed circa colores nihil positive
facit sed circa medium, sic intellectus agens circa phantasmata nihil positive facit impri-
mendo ibi aliquam formam vel dispositionem sed circa intellectum possibilem. Et est via
bene probabilis...
Signification, Intentions and Modes of Being in Radulphus Brito
Just as in the case of the sign, the concept can be considered either as an
absolute object (namely, an accident of the soul), or as a representation
of the thing.28 According to the second consideration, the concept has a
relation with the essence of the thing, which is in it as in a subject, and
according to this relation the concept is considered as an active ratio intel-
ligendi. The thing can in its turn be considered as the passive term of the
same relation.29
Brito tells us that the concept as an active ratio is not what is signi-
fied by the name of first imposition; what is signified by the name of first
imposition is the thing insofar as it is the passive term of the relation
linking it to the concept, that is, the thing understood:
To the first, when it is said: The Philosopher says that the utterances are
marks of the passions in the soul, I reply just as it was said in the exposition
of the text: that passion is said in two ways: in one way [it stands] for the
thing understood, in another way [it stands] for the concept of the thing. As
the Philosopher understands it, utterances are signs of the passions, that is,
of the things understood, and not of the passions, that is, of the concepts.
Or utterances are signs of the passions, that is, of the things by means of the
passions, so that the passion is not that which is signified, but that under
which the thing is signified.30
That is to say that the concept is not what is signified, but without it the
signification of the thing could not take place, because it is a cognitive
link to the thingit is an epistemological condition for the signification
of the thing.
28Radulphus Brito, De universalibus, ed. J. Pinborg, Radulphus Brito on Universals,

CIMAGL 35 (1980), 111: Sed illa ratio intelligendi si consideratur uno modo secundum se
et absolute, sic est accidens animae et in prima specie qualitatis. Si autem accipiatur alio
modo in habitudine ad rem hoc est dupliciter: vel ad aliquam rem quae est similitudo rei
intellectae, sic est species quaedam. [Addition in manuscript N].
29Radulphus Brito, Super Priscianum minorem, p. 170: Tunc accipio istam proposi-
tionem quod eadem est ratio intelligendi per quam res est intellecta et per quam intellec-
tus est intelligens et eadem est cognitio qua res cognita et qua intellectus est cognoscens
ita quod ista ratio passiva per quam res est intellecta est eadem cum ista ratione intel-
ligendi per quam intellectus est intelligens.
30Radulphus Brito, In Perih. Quaestio 3, p. 277: Ad primam cum dicitur Phylosophus
dicit quod voces sunt note passionum quae sunt in anima, dico sicut dicebatur in expo-
sitione littere: quod passio dicitur dupliciter: uno modo pro re intellecta, alio modo pro
intellectione rei. Modo voces sunt signa passionum, id est, rerum intellectarum et non
passionum, id est, conceptuum, ut intelligit Phylosophus. Vel aliter, quod voces sunt signa
passionum, id est rerum mediantibus passionibus, ita quod passio non est illud quod sig-
nificatur sed est illud sub quo res significatur.
Within the logic of intentions to which Brito adheres, it is also pos-

sible to analyze concepts and their relation to things and to each other
in terms of intentiones. The cognitive access to the thing involves several
considerations depending on the intentio that is at stake. An intentio can
be considered in four different ways:31
(a) As the thing as the passive term of a relation of knowledge, that is, a
concrete first intention:
[ apple ]
(b) As the species or concept itself of this thing, that is, an abstract first
intention:
[ apple ]
(c) As the species or concept of the thing insofar as it falls under a reflex-
ive knowledge, that is, a concrete second intention:
[ [ apple ] ]m
And (d) as the reflexive knowledge of a concept itself, that is, an abstract
second intention: 32
[ [ apple ] ]m
It is because the thing is a concrete first intention that it is possible to
impose a name on it. But it is because it falls under a second intention
that the intellect can impose a common name on it. For it is under a reflex-
ive knowledge of the sort (c) that a thing understood can be considered
a universal. Hence, the first intention entails a neutral cognitive access to
the thing, whereas the second intention entails an access under a certain
31In my notation, the intention in question is equal to what is underlined. The simple
square brackets mean that what is inside them is an object of an immediate knowledge.
The double square brackets mean that what is inside them is an object of a reflexive
knowledge that involves some mode of understanding m.
32Radulphus Brito, De universalibus, 105 (manuscripts SN): Verbi gratia sic oportet
quod intellectus primo intelligat hominem absolute ut ratiocinantem vel quod intelligat
animal ut sentiens, et iste intellectus primus et essentialis de re sive primus conceptus
de re dicitur prima intentio in abstracto, et res sic intellecta dicitur prima intentio in
concreto. Et tunc cum intellectus intellexit rem absolute potest postea ipsam intelligere
secundario intellectu ut est sub aliquo modo essendi sive sub aliquo respectu ut scilicet
est praedicabilis de pluribus. Verbi gratia, sicut intellectus intelligit hominem, quem prius
secundum se intellexit, ut est dicibilis de pluribus differentibus numero, et res sic intel-
lecta est species in concreto, et talis intellectio rei est species in abstracto...Et sic intel-
ligendum est de aliis intentionibus.
mode of understanding, such as universality, which determines a certain

mode of signifying, such as commonness, in the sense of predicability
of many things. Therefore, while the concept allows the imposition of a
name on a thing, the mode of understanding this thing, which amounts
to the thing being under a second intention, makes the name a common
one, so that the possibility of being predicated of many things is explained
mainly on the grounds of intentions of the sort (c).
Nonetheless, the intellectual and universal approach to the thing does
not result from an active operation of the intellect. Since the possible
intellect is not an active, but a passive/receptive potency, the universality
of the concept must be determined by the external thing itself, or rather
by some of its ontological features, namely, its modes of being:
The things themselves so understood are the concrete universal. In a way, all
these relations of understanding are taken from some modes of being in the
thing. For instance, the relation of understanding the thing, insofar as it is in
many things different in number or different in species, is taken from this
mode of being which is being in many things formally different or different
because of the quantity.33
Therefore, the commonness of the name of first imposition is grounded
on the ontological structure of the external thing, because it is this struc-
ture that ultimately allows a universal approach to the thing by the intel-
lect. Therefore, the commonness of the name does not depend on the
thing having an intellectual and universal mode of being (as it would
be the case in Aquinas account, for instance), but on a universal intel-
lectual approach to the thing, which is allowed by its ontological proper-
ties. In fact, Brito rejects the argument that states that the common name
immediately signifies a concept, since the external thing, because of its
singularity, cannot be the cause of the commonness of names of genera
and of species.34 In Britos account it is not the concept as an abstract
first intention that is universal, but rather the thing as a concrete first
33Radulphus Brito, De universalibus, 70 (manuscripts BLV): Universale autem in con-

creto sunt ipsae res sic intellectae. Modo omnes istae rationes intelligendi sumuntur ab
aliquibus modis essendi in re, sicut ista ratio quae est ratio intelligendi rem ut est in pluri-
bus differentibus numero vel specie sumitur ab isto modo essendi qui est esse in pluribus
differentibus formaliter vel per quantitatem.
34Radulphus Brito, In Perih. Quaestio 3, p. 277: Et cum dicitur conceptus rei est uni-
versalis et non e converso, falsum est. Unde in universali sunt duo, scilicet res quae est
universalis, et ratio universalitatis. Modo res quae est universalis non est conceptus, sed
ratio universalitatis est conceptus. Cum dicitur res ut existit extra animam verum est.
Modo res ut existit extra non est universalis, immo ut est sub aliqua ratione intelligendi.
intentionor the thing insofar as it is understood by means of a concept

is universal. Therefore, even though the external thing is not universal in
act, it is potentially capable of producing its universal cognition by means
of its modes of being, so that it can also be signified by a common name,
which can be predicated of many things.
Conclusion
Radulphus Britos account of signification presents us with two notewor-

thy features. On the one hand, his account involves an important element
of pragmatics that plays an essential role in his argument in favor of an
immediate signification of things by common names. This pragmatic
approach to signification is also present in his treatment of some prob-
lems related to equivocal names. As to this last problem, Brito adopts
an account where the interpreter of the name plays an active role in the
determination of its signification, so that even if different significations
of the name come from different acts of imposition, it is finally up to the
listener in a communication context to determine the signification of the
name. In the case of resolution of equivocation, for instance, Brito pro-
poses that the listener of a name, thanks to his charitable understanding
(bonitas intelligentiae), will grant the name the content that seems to be
more consistent with the communication in which he is taking part.35
On the other hand, this pragmatic approach to signification is articu-
lated with Britos logic of intentions and theory of modes of signifying,
so that the possibility of the predication of many things of the common
name can be explained in terms of first and second intentions and through
modes of understanding and of signifying. These theories also allow him
to open up for an immediate cognitive access to the essence of external
things, so that they can be an immediate object of understanding, and
therefore an immediate object of signification. Finally, these linguistic
and epistemological commitments come together with a consideration
of the essences of external things as having in themselves the causes of
their knowledge and of their signification as universals. Therefore, the
35Cf. S. Ebbesen, Is canis currit ungrammatical? Grammar in Elenchi Commentaries,

Historiographia Linguistica 7 (1980), 5368; S. Ebbesen, Can Equivocation be Eliminated?
Studia Mediewistyczne 18 (1977), 10524; C. Marmo, A Pragmatic Approach to Language
in Modism, in S. Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachtheorien in Sptantike und Mittelalter (Tbingen:
Gunter Narr Verlag, 1995), pp. 16983.
external thing itself is the efficient cause of its universal mode of under-
standing and of its signification by a common name. Radulphus inno-
vation as regards his predecessors lies, therefore, in this sophisticated
articulation of a pragmatic approach to signification with his logic of
intentions and his modistic theory.
21.Radulphus Brito on Relations in his Questions
on the Sentences
Costantino Marmo
Introduction
As is well known, Radulphus Brito, after a brilliant career as a master of

arts in Paris in the 1290s, started a new career as a theologian around the
beginning of the new century.1 He commented on the Sentences during
the years 13089 (as indicated by the only manuscript witness), discussed
some quodlibetal questions,2 and finally some questions on the Psalms
(ascribed to him by Stegmller) that, together with the questions on the
Sentences, are preserved in a Pavia manuscript.3
The questions on book 1, 2 and 3 of Peter Lombards Sentences, surviv-
ing only in MS Pavia Biblioteca Universitaria Aldini 244, ff. 1554 (copied
by a Parisian scribe), are in greater part unpublished. As far as I know,
only three questions have been edited: qq. 6667 on book 1 in an article
by Marco Rossini and Chris Schabel published in 2005,4 and q. 31 on book
3 in the introduction to Iacopo Costas edition of Britos questions on the
1On Radulphus life and works, see G. A. Wilson, Radulphus Brito, in J. J. E. Gracia
and T. Noone (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Blackwell,
2003), pp. 55051; W. Courtenay, Radulphus Brito: Master of Arts and Theology, CIMAGL
76 (2005), 13158; see also S. Ebbesen, Radulphus Brito: The last of the great arts masters,
in J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer (eds.), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De Gruyter,
2000), pp. 23151 (repr. in S. Ebbesen, Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Aldershot/Farnham: Ash-
gate, 20089), vol. 2, pp. 17996). I heartily thank Mary Sirridge and Heine Hansen for
having carefully read and revised this paper, allowing me to avoid some terrible misprints
and linguistic errors. I remain fully responsible for all other types of mistake.
2Some Questiones in vesperis and a series of Questiones de quolibet are witnessed by
Prosper of Reggio Emilia and preserved in MS Vatican lat. 1086 (see I. Costa, Le questiones
di Radulfo Brito sullEtica Nicomachea (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), p. 103, n. 17). In my tran-
scriptions, I always keep the orthography of the manuscripts.
3F. Stegmller, Repertorium biblicum medii aevi, vol. 5 (Madrid: Instituto Francisco
Suarez, 1955), p. 37.
4M. Rossini and C. Schabel, Time and Eternity among the Early Scotists: Texts on
future contingents by Alexander of Alessandria, Radulphus Brito, and Hugh of Novocastro,
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 16 (2005), 299304.
374 costantino marmo
Ethics.5 In addition, a long quotation from q. 28 on book 2 can be found in

Sten Ebbesens article on Britos questions on the Metaphysics.6
The manuscript is not in good condition and consequently it is often
hard to read. The very first folio of the commentary (f. 15 in the modern
numbering) is partly damaged by time and misuse. Furthermore, an entire
folio appears to be missing: in the original numbering of the work there is
a gap between f. 12 and f. 14 (corresponding to f. 26 and f. 27 in the modern
numbering), so that the commentary jumps from q. 39 to q. 44 on book 1.
All in all, I counted 76 questions on book 1 (ff. 15ra36ra), 43 on book 2 (ff.
36rb45vb), and 34 on book 3 (ff. 46ra54va).
In this paper, I will look at Britos theory of relations as discussed in
various questions on the three books of the Sentences.
Natural and Divine Relations
Nine questions in Britos commentary (five on the first book, two on the
second, and one on the third) are devoted to relations, since, according
to a traditional account that stems from Augustine and Boethius, they
have the function of distinguishing the persons of the Trinity. I will focus
especially on five questions here: q. 50: utrum relatio habeat constituere et
distinguere personas (ff. 28vb29rb) and q. 51: utrum circumscriptis rela-
tionibus remaneant tres persone (f. 29rbvb) on book 1; q. 3: utrum relatio
creaturarum ad creatoris sit de essentia creature (f. 37rab) and q. 4: utrum
relatio creaturae {creatoris ms.}7 ad creaturam differat a fundamento suo
(f. 37rbva) on book 2; and finally, q. 8: utrum filiatio qua Christus est filius
dei et filiatio qua est filius virginis sint due relationes reales (f. 47rb47va)
on book 3. Throughout, Scotus Reportata Parisiensia will serve as a useful
point of comparison.8
5Costa, Le questiones di Radulfo Brito, pp. 13437.

6S. Ebbesen, Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, and
A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universitt
von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 461, n. 20 (repr.
in Ebbesen, Collected Essays, vol. 2, p. 202, n. 20).
7Comparing Britos questions on book 2 to Scotus, I think this is a better reading of
the title (for more on this, see below).
8As Rossini and Schabel underline in their article (Time and Eternity, 279), Brito prob-
ably knew Scotus ideas from a Parisian Reportatio, if not directly from Scotus Parisian
lectures on the Sentences.
radulphus brito on relations 375
Relations and Divine Persons

First, it is necessary to define what a divine person is, or better, what the
word persona actually means. In q. 47 on book 1, Brito rejects the position
of those who maintain that the word persona means only a second inten-
tion, and concludes that persona means something real and not something
merely intentional.9 Relying on his previous consideration of intentions,10
he makes clear that an intentio is a cognition: it is a first intention when it
makes a thing known in itself and in its constitutive parts (metaphysical
components), e.g., a man and his components animal and rationality; it
is a second intention when it makes the same thing known insofar as it is
multipliable (as a thing) and predicable in various ways (as a noun), e.g.,
man as a species. Even though persona is something multipliable insofar
asaccording to a common definition11it is a communicabilis substan-
tia, it is nevertheless something real, a first rather than a second inten-
tion. The problem, however, remains: what kind of thing is it?12
9Cf. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia 1, d. 23, q. 1; q. 25, q. 1, n. 5 (ed. L. Wadding,
Opera Omnia 11.1 (Lyon: Durand, 1639; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1969), pp. 124a25a; 131b).
10See, for instance, his sophismata on universals, in J. Pinborg, Zum Begriff der Intentio
Secunda: Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion, CIMAGL 13
(1974), 4959; and J. Pinborg, Radulphus Brito on Universals, CIMAGL 35 (1980), 56142.
11Radulphus Brito, Scriptum super I Sententiarum q. 47 (MS Pavia Biblioteca Universi-
taria Aldini 244, f. 27vb): secundum Richardum persona non est indiuidua substantia, sed
est substantia communicabilis, et ideo persone competit multiplicari. Actually, the refer-
ence to Richard of Saint Victor is only partially correct. While in his De trinitate 4.21 (ed.
J.-P. Migne, PL 196 (Paris: Migne, 1855), col. 945), Richard affirms that some divine person
is not an individual substance, in 4.22 (col. 945) he says that non inconvenienter itaque
dicere possumus, ut credimus, de divina persona, quod sit naturae divinae incommuni-
cabilis existentia. The reference to Richard that Duns Scotus gives appears to be more
correct, if not direct; see Reportata Parisiensia 1, d. 23, q. 1, (p. 124b); d. 25, q. 1, (p. 131a);
d. 26, q. 1 (p. 135a) (incommunicabilis subsistentia instead of communicabilis susbtantia was
probably the usual way to report Richards text).
12Brito, Super I Sententiarum q. 47 (f. 27vb): Sed primo est intelligendum quod intentio
nihil aliud est quam cognitio intellectus, sed duplex est: cognitio de re que {quod ms.} est
cognitio qua res cognoscitur in se et ista vocatur prima rei cognitio uel intellectio; alia
est cognitio qua res cognoscitur in suis partibus et ista vocatur secunda rei cognitio, quia
primo aliquis cognoscitur in se quam in suis partibus. Et sicut est duplex cognitio ita est
duplex intentio: quedam est que vocatur prima rei cognitio; alia est intentio que dicitur
secunda rei cognitio et ista dicitur secunda intentio et dicitur in habitudine ad primam
intentionem secundum quod aliquis primo cognoscitur in se quam in suis partibus, verbi
gratia prima cognitio quam habeo de homine est quod sit animal et quod sit rationale, et
istud est cognoscere hominem in se et dicitur esse prima intentio quam habeo de homine;
sed secunda cognitio quam habeo de homine est quod sit in pluribus et quod predicetur in
quid et ex hoc accipio quod sit species, et istud vocatur secunda intentio.
Brito, as usual, examines various answers before giving his own.

According to a first group of theologians (that I could not identify), per-
sona means a relation; according to a second group, it means the divine
essence; according to a third group, it signifies both. Brito rejects them
all, and maintains that persona signifies the unity between essence and
property that is common to absolute and relative beings in a way similar
to how the adjective white (album) refers to both the subject and the
accidental form.13 This explanation is essential for understanding Britos
position on the role of relations and properties in constituting and distin-
guishing the divine persons as he presents it in q. 50 on book 1: utrum rela-
tio habeat constituere et distinguere personas (ff. 28vb29rb). Here, after
presenting the arguments pro and contra, Brito examines three notanda.
The first one lists the six conditions that a relation must meet in order to
be real, the second discusses how divine relations relate to divine persons,
and the third defines how the divine persons are distinguished from each
other and how they are constituted. The implicit assumption is that real
relations are actual beings or even things.14
The first notandum seems to be very important, since it completes the
picture of Britos theory of relations that can be gathered from his com-
mentaries on the Categories and on the Metaphysics, making explicit all
the requirements that a real relation has to meet. Brito analyses these
six conditions in pairs. The first pair concerns the subject or foundation
( fundamentum), that is, the substratum of inherence of the relation as
accident (its inesse according to the traditional terminology) or what we
would call the first term of the relation, and says that (1) the foundation
must be real, and (2) the relation has to posit something real in this foun-
dation (a property or accident). (2) rules out the possibility that the rela-
tion between intellect and its intelligible object might be considered a
real relation, since it does not posit anything in the intellect; it is there-
fore a mind-dependent relation (relatio rationis). The second pair con-
cerns the (second) term (terminus) of the relation, and says that (3) the
term must be a real thing since a relation between two non-existent terms
13Brito, Super I Sententiarum q. 47 (f. 28ra). The implicit reference is to the discussion
on concrete accidental terms; see S. Ebbesen, Concrete Accidental Terms: Late thirteenth-
century debates about problems relating to such terms as album, in N. Kretzmann (ed.),
Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in memory of Jan Pinborg (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1988), pp. 10774 (repr. in Ebbesen, Collected Essays, vol. 2, pp. 10951); on Britos
position, see pp. 12021 and 13335 (repr. pp. 121 and 13132).
14See Brito, Questiones super Metaphysicam 5, q. 22 (edited in Ebbesen, Brito on the
Metaphysics, pp. 48182).
(or between one existing thing and a non-existing one) is not real, and
(4) the second term has to be really distinct from the first. (4) excludes
identity, since identity concerns the same term taken twice. The last pair
of conditions concerns both terms, and states that (5) they must require
each other, and (6) they must belong to the same order or genus. (5) is an
adaptation of the simultaneity condition that Aristotle assigns to correla-
tives in Categories 7.7b158a12, and according to Brito eliminates know
ledge as it is considered in reference to the knowable from among the
real relations (or relatives).15 (6) excludes the kind of relations that Scotus
called transcendental,16 such as the relation between creator and crea-
tures, which belong to different orders.17 By contrast, all of these require-
ments are fulfilled in the case of the divine persons, so that divine relations
are real.18
Dealing with the second notandum, Brito discusses, as it was usual to
do, the positions of two famous twelfth-century theologians, Gilbert of
Poitiers and Prepositinus, on relations and the divine persons. According
to the former, relations are something extrinsically affixed (or attached) to
the divine essence, since, as Richard Cross explains, positing some kind
of identity between essence and property would...amount to a version
of modalism or Sabellianism.19 The view of Prepositinus aimed at avoid-
ing the opposite risk of ascribing too much reality to the divine rela-
tions, thus putting in danger the divine simplicity, and thus he held that
15Cf. Aristotles discussion in Categories 7.7b1535, which purports to show that the
knowable is prior to knowledge.
16See M. G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval theories 12501325 (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1989), pp. 6971, 7885.
17More on this below.
18Brito, Super I Sententiarum q. 50 (f. 28vb): Ad euidentiam huius questionis tria sunt
notanda. Primum est quid sit de ratione relationis, et circa hoc est a<d>uertendum quod
ad hoc quod relatio sit realis vi {vii ms.} sunt consideranda: primum est quod suum funda-
mentum sit reale; secundo quod ipsa relatio ponat aliquid in eo quod refertur, et per hoc
excluditur relatio que est inter intellectus et intelligibile, que relatio est relatio rationis ex
eo quod nihil ponitur in intellectu (or: in intelligibili?) per relationem [relationem]; item,
due conditiones ponuntur ex parte termini: prima quod terminus sit ens, quia non entis ad
non ens non est relatio realis; item quod termini sint distincti, et per hoc excluditur relatio
ydemptitatis; item, ex parte relatorum alie due: prima, quod relatiua se coexigant, ideo
excluditur relatio inter scientiam et scibile, et si dicatur <quod> scientia refertur da scibile
et econuerso, dicendum est quod non est scibile, sed est actu(?) scitum; item, requiritur
quod sint eiusdem generis uel ordinis, ita quod si vnum sit in genere quod alius non sit
extra genus et per hoc excluditur relatio que est inter creatorem et creaturam ratione
diuini(?). Sed omnia ista uel omnes iste conditiones reperiuntur in diuinis, que condi-
tiones requiruntur ad relationem realem; ergo ibi erit relatio realis.
19R. Cross, Relations and the Trinity: The case of Henry of Ghent and John Duns Sco-
tus, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 16 (2005), 2.
relations have no independent reality at all but are simply the divine
persons.20 Brito rejects both alternatives but keeps the best of each of
them: divine relations are really existent in the divine persons, since
their foundation (namely, the divine essence) is real; they are also iden-
tical with the divine persons, and so do not affect the divine simplicity,
since in divine matters abstract and concrete are simply identical, just
as abstract and concrete terms have the same meaning and differ only
in their modi significandi (which derive from our modi intelligendi): God
(deus) and deity (deitas) are identical, so that deity is in God and is itself
God...Nonetheless, according to our way of understanding, which the
way of signifying follows, deity is divine nature and God is what has deity
and nature; in a similar way, property (or relation) and person are iden-
tical, so that fatherhood not only is in the father, but also is the father
himself.21
As for the third notandum, Brito holds the traditional view that rela-
tions distinguish the divine persons qua relations, but constitute them
qua properties. In the following question (book 1, q. 51, f. 29rbvb), he
makes clear the distinction between the five notions (innascibilitas, pater-
nitas, filiatio, spiratio, processio), the four relations (paternitas, filiatio, spi-
ratio, processio), and the three properties (paternitas, filiatio, processio),
as well as their respective roles in making known, distinguishing from
one another, and constituting the divine persons. Without going into the
details of his discussion, one thing is very clear and often repeated: all
these ways of conceiving divinity are deeply affected by our way of under-
standing and talking about them. For instance, we say that father adds to
the divine essence the relation (or property) of fatherhood, whereby it is
established as a being (pater addit supra omnia ista determinate paterni-
tatem qua in esse constituitur). As a consequence, one first understands
the divine essence, and then the relation added to that essence, but this
20On the Trinitarian debate in the second half of the twelfth century, see G. Angelini,
Lortodossia e la grammatica: Analisi di struttura e deduzione storica della Teologia Trini-
taria di Prepositino (Rome: Universit Gregoriana Editrice, 1972), pp. 60102.
21Brito, Super I Sententiarum q. 50 (f. 29ra): Nec valet similiter dictum Prepositini, quia
istud non impedit simplicitatem diuinam, quia ista relatio realis idem est quod persona,
sicut in diuinis est idem abstractum et concretum, sicut deus et deitas idem sunt, vnde dei-
tas est in deo et ipsa est deus, non obstante diuina simplicitate, ymo hoc est propter eius
simplicitatem, quia deus est deitas que est in ipso. Tamen secundum modum intelligendi
quomodo sequitur modus significandi deitas est natura diuina et deus est habens deitatem
et naturam; ita similiter proprietas seu relatio et persona sunt idem, vnde paternitas non
solum est in patre, sed est etiam ipse pater.
addition takes place, he adds, according to our way of understanding,

because in God there is really no addition at all.22
Relations between Creator and Creatures

At the beginning of book 2, Brito faces some questions about the so-called
transcendental relations, namely, creation as a relation that has the cre-
ator and the creatures as its terms. First, he discusses whether creation
is identical with creature (q. 2); second, whether the relation between
creator and creature is essential to the creature (q. 3); finally, he adds a
question about real relations, also discussed by Scotus in his Reportata
Parisiensia, namely, whether relations between creatures are different
from their foundations (q. 4).
As seen above, a real relation must obtain between real things and
these things must belong to the same order or genus. As Brito explains in
q. 50, the latter condition excludes the relation between creator and crea-
tures. This conclusion should hold in both directions, in the sense that
neither in God nor in creatures can there exist any real relation that has as
its terms creature on the one hand and God on the other. Considering his
discussions at the beginning of book 2, however, I am not sure that Brito
would unquestioningly subscribe to the second part of this conclusion.
In q. 2: utrum creatio sit idem cum creatura, he distinguishes a double
relation in creation as in every transformation or change (mutatio): the
first one takes the original state of affairs (that is, nihil) as its term, the
other one takes the (first) cause as its term. Together with the verbs dare
(to give) and significare (to signify), where a subject is at once related
to two terms,23 this is probably another example of how the medievals
reduced triadic relations to couples of simple or dyadic relations.24 This
22Brito, Super I Sententiarum q. 51 (f. 29rb): prius intelligitur essentia et postea relatio
in se accepta, que additur essentie secundum nostrum modum intelligendi, quia realiter
in deo nulla fit additio.
23See Richard Fishacre, Commentarium super IV Sententiarum d. 1, cited in I. Rosier-
Catach, La parole efficace: signe, rituel, sacr (Paris: Seuil, 2004), p. 94; see also C. Marmo,
La semiotica del XIII secolo tra teologia e arti liberali (Milan: Bompiani, 2010), pp. 1418.
24Brito discusses the basic requirements for real relations in his questions on the Meta-
physics; among them he lists the fact that it requires two terms, that is, the term a quo
and the term ad quem; he never takes into consideration the possibility that more than
two terms might be involved in a real relation. See Questiones super Metaphysicam 5, q. 24
(MS Florence BNC Conv. Soppr. E.1.252, f. 287rb-va): relatio de ratione sua est habitudo;
habitudo autem requirit aliquid quod refertur et aliud ad quod illud relatum refertur; et
ideo ex diffinitione relationis patet quod requirit duo extrema, unum sicut subiectum et
move allows him to apply the conditions discussed above: since the first
term of the former relation does not exist, Brito concludes that the rela-
tion that has nihil as a term is no real relation; therefore, taken in this
sense, creation can not be identical with the creature.25 In the latter case,
by contrast, the relation of (passive) creation appears to be real, perma-
nent and identical with the creature: it cannot be an accident, distinct
from the creature as its subject, since in that case the substratum-subject
would come first, and this would lead to the absurd conclusion that every
creature would be prior to its own creation.26 Here, even if he mentions
neither transcendental relations nor formal distinction, Brito seems to
adopt Scotus point of view, according to which creationlike every tran-
scendental relationis really identical with its foundation but formally
distinct from it.
The third question on book 2 follows immediately upon this conclu-
sion: is this relation to their creator (passive creation) essential to crea-
tures? Britos answer appears to waver between two alternative solutions.
Following his usual procedure, he first presents and discusses two oppo-
aliud / sicut terminum. John Duns Scotus, in his Reportata Parisiensia 2, d. 1, q. 5 (p. 259a),
basically agrees with Brito in analyzing creatio as a double (or multiple) relation.
25Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 2 (f. 37ra): Circa istam questionem primo est viden-
dum quod in qualibet mutatione sunt plures respectus: est quidem respectus ad termi-
num, et est alius respectus ad agens uel ad causam eficientem. Ita est in creatione: quia
est quidem respectus {terminus ms.} ad terminum a quo, scilicet ad ipsum non ens; et est
alia habitudo ad causam eficientem. Modo dico quod prima habitudo ad ipsum terminum
non est eadem cum ipsa creatura, quia habitudo uel respectus non potest esse idem cum
aliquo reali, sed illa habitudo ad terminum dicit habitudinem ad non ens, quia terminus
a quo est non ens, et creatura est aliquod ens, ergo non sunt eadem. Et confirmatur, quia
non <ens> realiter non est idem cum aliquo reali, sed talis habitudo ad [[ens reale]] ter-
minum a quo est habitudo ad non reale {add. in marg. ms.}, quia in creatione terminus
a quo est nihil uel se habet ad modum termini a quo; ergo non est idem cum creatura
talis habitudo. Cf. Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia 2, d. 1, q. 5, n. 17 (p. 259a): Si loquimur de
respectu ad non esse...dico quod non est idem realiter cum creatura, quia illud non esse
praecedens nihil est, et ad nihil non est relatio realis...Secundo probo idem, scilicet quod
respectus ad non esse praecedens non est idem creaturae, quia termino non existente, non
est ad ipsum relatio realis.
26Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 2 (f. 37ra): Secundo dico quod creatio ut dicit habi-
tudinem ad causam eficientem non differt a creatura, vnde causa eficiens creationis est
voluntas ipsius dei, quod tale sit ullo presupposito; creatio autem passiua est habere esse
non ex materia et isto modo dico quod non differt creatio {lac. 5 litt. ms.} ab ipsa creatura,
quia creare est aliquid reale uel habere esse ab alio est aliquid reale; aut ergo est idem
cum illo quod habet esse ab alio aut non est idem; si est idem habeo propositum; si non
est idem, ergo est accidens; sed omne accidens habet esse posterius suo subiecto, et ita
creatio esset posterior ipsa creatura, cuius oppositum est verum; ergo creatio isto modo
non est accidens et per consequens [[non]] erit eadem cum creatura. Cf. Scotus, Reportata
Parisiensia 2, d. 1, q. 6, n. 10 (p. 257b).
site views and then argues in support of his own position. According to the
first view, creatures depend essentially upon their creator since otherwise
they could exist even if the creator were to be destroyed (a hypothesis
that is considered highly inconvenient);27 the main argument, however,
is an infinite regress:
adhuc probant aliter, quia // aut illa dependentia est de essentia creature
aut est diuersa; si sit de essentia, habeo propositum; si autem sit diuersa,
cum sit quedam res ergo dependet ab ipso deo; ergo dependet per aliquam
dependentiam, oportet tunc querere de illa dependentia aut est de essentia
prime dependentie aut non; si sit, habeo propositum; si sit diuersa, cum sit
quedam res dependet ab ipso deo; et tunc <oportet> querere sicut prius, et
ideo oportet dare quod aliqua dependentia sit de essentia creature uel erit
procedere in infinitum, quod est impossibile. Et isti dicunt quod sunt idem
realiter, tamen differunt secundum rationem.28
The last solution is actually reminiscent of the position of Aquinas, who
used the non-mutual relation model of knowledge and knowable to
explain why the relation of God to creature is not real, in the sense that it
does not affect the divine essence as a standard accident.29 Other theolo-
gians, according to Brito, think that this relation is a mind-dependent one
and therefore cannot be identical or essential to any absolute real thing.30
Britos own solution, significantly, does not mention the distinction
27Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 3 (f. 37ra): De ista questione sunt due opiniones. Qui-
dam dicunt quod illa dependentia qua creatura dependet ab ipso deo est de essentia crea-
ture et rationes ipsorum tacte sunt in arguendo. A few lines before his determinatio, Brito
gives some arguments in support of the positive answer (f. 37ra): In oppositum arguitur
sic: quia illud quod dependet essentialiter ab ipso deo illa dependentia est de sua essentia;
sed omnes res dependent essentialiter ab ipso deo; ergo ista dependentia uel ista relatio
est de eorum essentia. Prima patet de se; minor declaratur, quia da quod contingenter et
non essentialiter dependeant ab ipso deo, tunc possent esse dato quod deus non \sit(?)/,
quod est inconueniens dicere.
28Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 3 (f. 37rarb). The same argument can be found in
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia 2, d. 1, q. 6, n. 13 (p. 258a) (but there is no question about
their essential identity).
29See T. M. Ward, Relations Without Forms: Some consequences of Thomas Aquinass
metaphysics of relations, Vivarium 48 (2010), 290, 297.
30Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 3 (f. 37rb): Alii autem dicunt quod istud non potest
stare et, primo quantum ad relatum, quia ens rationis non potest esse idem cum ente reali,
et ideo cum illa sit solum \ens/ secundum rationem, ergo non potest esse eadem cum
ipsa creatura que est aliquid reale. \Nam(?)/ ad rationem ipsorum quando dicunt aut illa
dependentia etc., dico quod non est eadem. Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia 2, d. 1, q. 6, n. 11
(pp. 257b58a), presents an objection against his own position that considers this relation
as a relation of reason identical with the divine essence.
between per se and per accidens relations,31 but distinguishes two mean-
ings of dependentia: in its first meaning, it is identical to the dependent
thing, and thus it is obviously essential to creatures; in its second mean-
ing, it includes a relation, and as such, since every creature is an absolute
thing, it is not essential to them.32 It is not clear whether this relation is
a real or just a mind-dependent one, or whether it falls in the category of
transcendental relations (a kind of relations he does not mention). His
replies to the arguments in support of the first position and to the argu-
ments quod sic do not give much of a clue as to how to resolve the uncer-
tainty, nor is the following question of any help in this regard.
Real Relations in Creatures and in Christ

As mentioned above, the title of the fourth question on book 2 as it is
found in the Pavia manuscript seems to refer to the relationship between
creator and creature. The discussion is actually more general, dealing
with the relationship between relations and their foundations, and leaves
completely aside all theological problems. Comparing this question to
the analogous question discussed by Scotus in his Reportata Parisiensia,
I therefore propose to emend the title: utrum relatio creaturae {creatoris
ms.} ad creaturam differat a fundamento suo.33 Even if there is no explicit
31If, as suggested above, Brito adopts Scotus view, he has no need to appeal to this
distinction; furthermore, he probably had second thoughts on the distinction between
per se and per accidens relations, since he accepts and uses it in his commentary on the
Categories as well as in his commentary on the Metaphysics (5, q. 25, f. 287vab), where
he accepts the position of those grammarians who understand the syntactical construc-
tion between two terms as a non-mutual relation, that is, as a unilateral dependence of
one term on the otherthe per se stans, but he rejects it in his commentary on Priscianus
minor and in an addition to his commentary on the Categories (see C. Marmo, Semiotica e
linguaggio nella Scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 12701330; La semiotica dei modisti (Rome:
Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, 1994), pp. 37686: Britos change of mind appears
to be strictly linked to the question of how to explain syntactical constructions). It will be
necessary to examine this probable evolution in a future article.
32Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 3 (f. 37rb): Et ideo dico ad questionem quod nos pos-
sumus intelligere per istam dependentiam rem dependentem uel quendam respectum
ipsius creature ad ipsum deum; si intelligamus primo modo, sic non differt ab ipsa crea-
tura, quia ista dependentia est aliquid reale, quod causatur ab ipso primo, et istud non
differt a creatura; si autem accipiatur secundo modo, sic non est [[d]] idem cum ipsa
creatura, quia iste respectus includit relationem; modo creatura vnde creatura \est/ non
includit relationem, quia sunt alique absolute, ergo non est de sua essentia quia compe-
teret cuilibet; ideo {item ms.} ista dependentia non ponitur in sua diffinitione.
33Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 4 (f. 37rb). Cf. Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia 2, d. 1, q. 7
(p. 260b): Utrum relatio creaturae ad creaturam sit eadem fundamento? As will become
clear below, the content of Britos question also corresponds to Scotus.
determinatio on Britos side, so that at first sight it may seem that he does
not want to take a position in this debate, one can easily get a clear idea
of his position by analyzing the arguments rejected at the end of the ques-
tion and comparing this text to the parallel discussion in Britos commen-
tary on the fifth book of the Metaphysics (q. 26).
The structure of the question in Britos commentary on the Sentences is
far more complex than in his questions on the Metaphysics. After present-
ing the arguments against and in favor of the distinction between a rela-
tion and its foundation, Brito says that there are two opinions: one holds
that a (real) relation does not add anything real to its foundation; the
other, on the contrary, maintains that a relation adds something real to
its foundation. While in his questions on the Metaphysics the first option
is given very limited space (actually, the space of a concessive subordi-
nate proposition), here Brito fully develops arguments for both options.
The first opinion maintains that, even admitting that a (real) relation and
its foundation belong to different categories, they are actually identical
(tamen sunt vna res) since the subject that becomes related to something
else does so without any real change (mutatio): a white man becomes
similar to another man simply because the other man comes to be white,
and does not himself undergo any change. As an authority in favor of this
position its supporters refer to Aristotle, who in his Physics (5.2.225b1113)
says that there is no motion (including accidental change) in respect of
relations.34 The second opinion is in agreement with the one upheld by
Brito in his commentary on the Metaphysics and is supported by the
same basic argument advanced there: two things, such as a relation and
its foundation, that belong to different categories are essentially different
34Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 4 (f. 37rb): Quidam dicunt quod fundamentum et

ipsa relatio faciunt diuersa predicamenta, quia ibi est alius et alius modus predicandi a
quo sumitur ratio predicamenti, tamen sunt vna res, quia illud quod aduenit alicui, nulla
mutatione facta in ipsum cui aduenit, non addit aliquid reale supra ipsum, quia omne
reale adueniens alicui de nouo aquiritur per mutationem, sed relatio non aquiritur per
mutationem; ergo quia moueri est se habere aliter nunc quam prius; modo si aliquis sit
modo(?) albus et cras nascatur alius albus, nulla mutatio fit in illo qui prius erat albus et
tamen [[q]] aquiritur similitudo que est relatio, et istud dicit Philosophus vo Phisicorum
quod ad relationem non est motus uel si ad ipsum sit motus hoc solum est per accidens,
et ideo non differt a termino aquisito per illum motum. Cf. Brito, Questiones super Meta-
physicam 5, q. 26 (f. 287vb): Sine dubio, licet aliqui dicant quod relatio non differat essen-
tialiter a suo fundamento, et dicant quod non faciat aliquam compositionem realem cum
subiecto cui aduenit, sicut quod ego albus et similis alteri quam si solum sim albus et non
similis, Simplicius tamen super Predicamenta uult oppositum. This argument is advanced
by Thomas Aquinas in his analysis of relations (see Henninger, Relations, pp. 19ff.; Ward,
Relations Without Forms, 28485); cf. Scotus, Reportata Parisiensis 2, d. 1, q. 7, n. 2 (p. 261a).
from each other.35 Against it, Brito reports an objection that recalls Aqui-
nas position: someone might say that they are really identical (sunt idem
realiter) but different only according to reason (differunt tamen secundum
rationem), so that one of them can be destroyed (potest corrumpi) without
the destruction of the other (dato quod alterum non corrumpatur). Brito
rejects this argument, saying that the process of destruction (corruptio)
has no application to a mind-dependent being (it cannot be the terminal
point of any transformation process, as it would happen if the distinc-
tion between them were only one of reason).36 Thus, after listing other
arguments in support of the second opinion, he rejects all the arguments
in favor of the first one and finally answers the principal arguments for
the general negative solution. In particular, rebutting the first counterar-
gument, Brito repeats a joke or double entendre that Ebbesen has found
in his previous commentaries on the Categories and on the Metaphys-
ics: something added to something else makes the latter more compos-
ite (compositius) in two ways: (i) in one sense, more composite means
thicker or heavier (grossius), and in this sense a relation does not make
anything more composite; (ii) in another sense, it refers to a plurality of
entities, and in this sense a relation added to an absolute thing does make
it more composite, since a real entity is added to it.37
35Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 4 (f. 37rb): Est tamen alia opinio quod relatio addit
aliquid reale supra suum fundamentum, quia plus differunt duo predicamenta quam due
species vnius predicamenti; sed due species vnius predicamenti differunt essentialiter et
formaliter; ergo duo predicamenta differunt {-ent ms.} essentialiter et formaliter, sed illum
quod differt essentialiter et formaliter ab altero addit supra ipsum; ergo relatio addit aliquid
supra suum fundamentum. Cf. Brito, Questiones super Metaphysicam 5, q. 26 (f. 287vb):
Dicit enim quod non est idem quale et simile; et hoc patet sic, quia quando aliquid per se
est absolutum, si fiat relatum hoc est per additionem noue essentie, quia da quod sibi non
addatur aliqua noua essentia, semper erit per se et secundum se absolutum; sed funda-
mentum ipsius relationis est aliquid, sicut quale, quantum, et alia super que fundatur; ergo
si fiat respectiuum, hoc est per additionem noue essentie; sed per relationem fit aliquid
respectiuum; ergo relatio aliquam nouam essentiam realem addit super illud cui aduenit,
specialiter in illis in quibus utrumque per se refertur ad alterum, quia oportet quod illud
quod refertur ad alterum per se referatur per aliquid quod est in eo, et hoc bene declarant
rationes facte in oppositum. Notice that in his questions on the Metaphysics there is room
for the distinction between per se and per accidens relations.
36Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 4 (f. 37rb): Aliquis posset dicere ad istam rationem
quod sunt idem realiter, differunt tamen secundum rationem, [[non valet q]] et ideo vnum
potest corumpi, dato quod alterum non corumpatur; non valet quia corumpi non termi-
natur ad ens rationis, et ideo licet differant secundum rationem, si vnum corumpatur et
alterum corumpetur.
37Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 4 (f. 37va): Ad alias que sunt in oppositum, quando
dicitur quod fundamentum non fit compositius, dico quod hoc potest intelligi quod
aduenit alicui et non facit ipsum compositius dupliciter uel compositius id est grossius,
In conclusion, not only does Brito not discuss the problem referred to in
the title of the question,38 but he considers precisely the same problem as
Scotus after the questions on the identity of creation to creatures.39 More-
over, his position on the distinction between a relation and its foundation
clearly repeats what he had previously expressed in his questions on the
Metaphysics. Finally, his conclusion is applied to a christological problem
in his questions on book 3. Here, Brito discusses a question about the
relation of sonship that Christ bears to both his father and his mother: are
these two relations distinct or are they one and the same? Britos answer
is again very close to Scotus and maintains that these relations are quite
different, not only because one is eternal and the other temporal, but also
because they have different foundations in Christ: the first one has his
divine nature as its foundation, the other one his human nature.40
uel compositius id est plures realitates habet nunc quam prius; modo si intelligatur primo
modo, sic maior est falsa, quia forma adueniens materie non facit ipsam compositius, et
tamen forma non est de essentia materie; et tunc minor est vera, quia relatio adueniens
fundamento non facit ipsum compositius, tamen bene est compositius, id est plures reali-
tates habet nunc quam prius haberet. In Britos Questiones super Metaphysicam 5, q. 26
(f. 288ra), it occurs as a kind of digression: Quod autem aliqui dicunt quod per aduentum
relationis non fit aliquid compositius, concedo bene quod per similitudinem que est que-
dam relatio non fiat aliquid grossior, sed si intelligant per compositionem quod nunc {non
ms.} habea[n]t aliam rem que prius non habeba[n]t ante aduentum relationis, falsum est.
Cf. Brito, Questiones super Predicamenta q. 23 (quoted by Ebbesen, Brito on the Metaphys-
ics, p. 459, n. 15). Cf. also Scotus, Reportata Parisiensis 2, d. 1, q. 7, n. 2, (p. 261a), and n. 14
(p. 263a), where he holds that album simile is more composite than album, because habet
in se rem aliam et aliam.
38If he had, he would have answered in the negative; see also Brito, Quodlibet, MS
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana lat. 1086, f. 200ra: Item, dei ad creaturam non est relatio
realis.
39This is another reason why I think that the reading of the Pavia manuscript should
be corrected.
40Brito, Super III Sententiarum q. 8 (f. 47rb): Probo quod sunt diuerse relationes: quia
ille relationes sunt diuerse que habent diuersa fundamenta; modo, filiatio realis qua refer-
tur ad matrem habet aliud fundamentum a fundamento filiationis patris, quia natura
humana est fundamentum vnius et natura diuina alterius filiationis. Item, vna filiatio est
ab eterno et alia est in tempore; ergo etc. Item, illa non sunt idem realiter quorum vnum
potest corrumpi et alterum non potest corrumpi; modo sic est in proposito, quia filiatio
qua refertur ad matrem potest corrumpi et aliud non potest corrumpi; ergo etc. Cf. Brito,
Quodlibet, f. 200rab (in a very reduced form). Cf. also Scotus, Reportata Parisiensis 3, d. 8,
qq. 12 (pp. 452a54b); the questions examined by Scotus are utrum in Christo sit filiatio
realis ad Matrem, alia a filiatione ad Patrem (determinatio at n. 8, p. 453b) and utrum
relatio Christi ad Matrem sit relatio accidentalis (determinatio at n. 11, p. 454a).
Conclusions
I now offer some concluding considerations and final remarks. First,

unsurprisingly, in his questions on the Sentences, Radulphus Brito clearly
appeals to theories that he has developed or adopted during his career as
master of arts.
Second, as regards the theory of relations, he takes some steps towards
a clearer and more complete presentation of the requirements for real
relations. Even when he faces problems he has already discussed, such as
the relationship between a real relation and its foundation, he brings in
new arguments and counterarguments that give a more complex picture
of the actual debate. This is probably due to a wider knowledge of ancient
and medieval theologians, and maybe to the influence of younger fellows,
such as Scotus.
Third, even if I am not able to draw any substantial conclusions about
Britos connections to Scotus at this pointand it would be extremely
interesting to investigate the relationships between these two great
masters41one thing may be said about it: Britos knowledge of the intri-
cacies of Scotus theology and metaphysics seems to be quite superficial;
even if he appears to adopt some conclusions from Scotus discussions, he
never mentions his magisterial theory, the theory of formal distinction.
There is, as far as I know, only one place where Brito uses the adverb for-
maliter (together with essentialiter) to characterize the difference between
categories (and things belonging to different categories),42 but he never
uses it to specify the identity between creation and creature as Scotus
does. His first solution to this question is clearly, and surprisingly, reduc-
tionist: it seems that, for him, transcendental relations, far from displaying
the feature they have for Scotus (real identity to and formal distinction
from their foundations), might simply be reduced to their foundation or
terms in a sort of Ockhamism avant la lettre. Discussing the relation of
dependence between God and created beings, he does not seem inclined
to admit it as a real relation, really or formally distinct from its foundation,
nor does he appear prompted to dismiss it as a mere relation of reason;
his wavering seems to underline the fact that it is something objective
41If Brito-the-theologian was really influenced by Scotus-the-theologian, it is also

true that Scotus-the-logician was influenced by Brito-the-logician (see Marmo, Semiotica
e linguaggio, chaps. 5 and 6). A complete investigation should take both aspects into
consideration.
42Brito, Super II Sententiarum q. 4 (f. 37rb) (see n. 34 above).
and not just subjective. As far as I understand his discussions, Brito does
not seem to know which way to turn in order to keep both Gods simplic-
ity and the objective dependence of creatures on creator, showing maybe
the limitations of a realist account of relations, and opening the way to
further elaborations: some decades later, for Ockham and his followers,
every relation (as connotative term or concept) will signify primarily its
(first) term and connote its second term and/or its foundation, a solution
not far from the one considered by Brito when dealing with the depen-
dence of creature on creator.
A few final remarks. I confess that when I started my enquiry on Britos
commentary on the Sentences, I expected that his former career as a gram-
marian and logician would have led him to theorise about theological
language, and maybe even about analogy and metaphor. As it turns out,
however, the questions explicitly devoted to these topics in his commen-
tary are rare and seem to confirm what Sten Ebbesen had to say about
them, namely, that they do not appear terribly exciting.43 (Actually, they
are really disappointing.)
I then went on to consider other issues, such as the theory of relations,
just to see which connections exist between Britos two careers. As I have
shown, when he is addressing these topics, the problems of theological
language and of its roots always emerge, even if they are not in the fore-
front but rather lie in the background, and many traditional problems are
dealt with exactly as linguistic problems. In line with his position, worked
out in his previous questions on Priscian,44 Britos solutions often suggest
that in order to do theology we have to use our language; our language,
however, whatever meanings it may carry around, has certain objective
features, and these features reflect our ways of understanding the world
and its properties (the modi essendi). Doing theology, therefore, we can-
not just get rid of these linguistic structures. When we talk about God
and his properties, for instance, we might be inclined to think that we are
43Ebbesen, Brito: The last of the great arts masters, p. 233. See especially, Brito, Super
I Sententiarum q. 45 (f. 27rbva) on Gods names; q. 46 (f. 27vavb) on tantum as dictio
exclusiva; and q. 61 (f. 32ra) on nomina transumptiva.
44See Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones super Priscianum minorem 1, q. 34 (ed. H. W. Enders
and J. Pinborg (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), p. 208): Et si dicas quomodo dicitur
deus est, deus intelligit, cum esse dei non sit in successione temporis, dico quod hoc
verbum sum, es significat essentiam ut est in successione temporis vel aeternitatis, et
licet aeternitas sit tota simul tamen secundum nostrum modum intelligendi intelligimus
ibi aliquam successionem et intelligimus ibi parvam vel magnam durationem esse per
diversa spatia temporis. Cf. Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio, p. 178.
talking about real properties and relations that are distinct from the divine
essence and added to it, but this is not so. In reality, as he says, there is no
addition in God; all depends on our way of understanding the situation
and expressing it through language. In my view, it is exactly this side of
Britos theology that makes it very exciting.
22.Buridanian Possibilities
Calvin G. Normore
The fourteenth-century nominalist tradition is closely connected with

developments in theory about the relations among time, truth, and modal-
ity. Common ground at the beginning of the fourteenth century was the
view that the past is necessary and that some, at least, of the future is
contingent. What quickly became controversial was whether the present
is necessary in the same sense as the past. At the beginning of the century,
Duns Scotus argued that freedom of the will required that the present be
contingent so that what is in fact the case can be otherwise without ever
becoming otherwise.1 A little later, Peter Auriol argued that if one takes
seriously the thought that truth is a real quality of the true proposition
and one also accepts that if x is not P and can be P then it can become P,
then one is committed to the conclusion that every truth is a necessary
truth. Auriol drew the conclusion that contingent claims about the future
are neither true nor false.2 Slightly later yet, William Ockham argued that
rejecting the connection between possibility and becoming, as Scotus had
done, entailed rejecting the necessity of the past as well as that of the
present. Ockham defended the necessity of the past and concluded, as
Auriol had, that if it really is the case that x is not P and that x can be P,
then x can become P.3 Unlike Auriol, however, Ockham was unwilling
1Cf. John Duns Scotus, Lectura 1, d. 39, nn. 5051 (ed. C. Bali, Opera Omnia 17 (Vatican
City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1964), p. 495): Ut si ponitur quod voluntas tantum habeat esse
per unum instans et quod in illo instanti velit aliquid, tunc successive non potest velle et
nolle, et tamen pro illo instanti et in illo instanti in quo vult a, potest nolle a, nam velle
pro illo instanti et in illo instanti non est de essentia ipsius voluntatis nec est eius passio
naturalis, igitur consequitur ipsam per accidens. Sed oppositum accidentis per accidens
non repugnat subiecto pro aliquo instanti, et ideo voluntas volens a in hoc instanti et pro
hoc instanti potest nolle a in eodem et pro eodem. Et est haec possibilitas logica respectu
extremorum non repugnantium. Et huic possibilitati logicae correspondet potentia rea-
lis, nam omnis causa praeintelligitur suo effectui et ita voluntas in illo instanti in quo
elicit actum volendi, praecedit natura volitionem suam et libere se habet ad eam; unde in
illo instanti in quo elicit volitionem, contingenter se habet ad volendum et contingentem
habet habitudinem ad nolendum...ita quod volens in a potest nolle in a.
2Peter Auriol, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum 1, d. 38, art. 3 (ed. C. Schabel,
Peter Aureol on Divine Knowledge and Future Contingents, CIMAGL 65 (1995), 125ff.).
3William of Ockham, De Praedestinatione et de Praescientia divina q. 3 (ed. P. Boehner
and S. Brown (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1978), pp. 53536).
390 calvin g. normore
to abandon bivalence and so was committed to rejecting the view that

truth was a real quality of true sentences. He concluded instead that
verum was a connotative term which in typical contexts supposited for
the true sentences and connoted that things were, are, or will be as those
sentences signify.4 Ockham emphasized a distinction between sentences
whose grammar suggests they are about a time and sentences which are
really about that time. The syntax of Peter is predestinate suggests it is
about the present (and so it is secundum vocem), but it is, Ockham argues,
equivalent to Peter will be saved on the last day and so is really (secun-
dum rem) about the future.
At this level of analysis Ockham does not have an argument for
the conclusion that the past and present are necessary while (some of) the
future is contingent. What he has, rather, is a coherent response to those
who claim that one cannot make this distinction. The response involves
privileging sentences about the future by claiming that any sentence
equivalent to one that is prima facie about the future really is about the
future, and insisting that sentences really about the future are not neces-
sary for the reasons those really about the past and present are. His aim is
to defend the intuitive distinction between the modal status of past and
present and that of the future, not to prove it from first principles.
The fourteenth-century nominalist movement is a shaggy beast. It is not
until the beginning of the fifteenth century that we find such a movement
being identified and find thinkers self-identifying or identifying others
with it. When such identifications appear, Ockham and John Buridan are
the two thinkers nearly universally positioned as its founders while Adam
Wodeham, Marsilius of Inghen, Albert of Saxony and Gregory of Rimini
are typically located in the next generation. That there is considerable
commonality among these thinkers is clearfor one thing their attitude
to and employment of semantic theories is similar. What is unclear, how-
ever, is exactly how far this commonality extends. From the perspective
of the fourth quarter of the fifteenth century when the Wegestreit was in
full swing, the battle lines between nominalists and realists range very
widely indeed. In particular, the earliest reactions to Ockham, by Thomas
Bradwardine for example, included attacks labelling his position about
free will and the contingency of the future as pelagian. On the other
hand, Auriol, Bradwardine and, most devastatingly, John Wycliff, became
4Cf. M. M. Adams, Ockham on Truth, Medioevo 15 (1989), 14372; P. Boehner,

Ockhams Theory of Truth, Franciscan Studies 5 (1945), 13861.
buridanian possibilities 391
identified as thinkers whose positions on time and modality revealed, to

nominalist eyes at least, the determinist consequences of realism. Thus,
theories of time and modality became markers of school allegiance.
As far as I have been able to tell, all of the central fourteenth-century
figures later identified as nominalists are pure divisibilists in physics and
metaphysicsthat is, they maintain that the only indivisibles are God,
angels and human intellectual souls, and that everything else is divisible
ad infinitum. There are for them, consequently, no points of space or
instants of time and no lines or surfaces. Anything spatial or temporal is
divisible. Ockham certainly shares this view. For example, he writes:
I say that no part of a line is indivisible nor is any part of any continuum
indivisible.5
For Ockham:
It is not impossible for there to be indivisibles since the mind is indivis-
ible...but that there be an indivisible in quantitative things includes a con-
tradiction.6
It is not clear, however, whether Ockham was fully aware of the conse-
quences of his view. For that we have to turn to Buridan, who first, and
perhaps almost uniquely, draws its consequences for the logic of time.
In this context Buridan is a puzzling and somewhat enigmatic figure. A
nominalist if anyone is, his views about time and modality nonetheless
raise serious issues for positions like Ockhams.
Whereas Ockham largely ignores the divisibility of time in considering
the truth conditions of present-tensed sentences, Buridan reasons that
if there are no instants it cannot be instants at which sentences are true so
they must be true at divisible intervals. Moreover if sentences are only true
at divisible intervalsintervals through which change is possiblethen
it seems that contraries and even contradictories could be true at the
same interval, and since same interval is all we can make of simul, that
contraries and contradictories can be true together. Buridans approach to
this issue is to admit that contraries can be true together while denying
that contradictories can be true together by introducing a novel account
of what it is to be true at an interval. He claims that for an affirmative
sentence to be true at an interval it need only be true at some part of
5William of Ockham, Quodlibeta septem 1, q. 9 (ed. J. C. Wey (St. Bonaventure, NY:

Franciscan Institute, 1980), p. 51).
6Ockham, Quodlibeta septem 1, q. 9 (p. 58).
that interval (and so some part of that part and so on), while for a nega-
tive sentence to be true at an interval it must be true at every part of that
interval (and so at every part of every part and so on). Thus, bivalence and
classical logic are preserved. Let us see how this works in detail.
For Buridan, as for most medieval authors, sentences are true at a
time and the same sentence can have different truth-values at different
times. For him same sentence means same sentence token, and tokens
of the same sentence type can, he argues, have different truth-values too.
His denial that there are times without duration leaves Buridan with the
problem of explaining how the present tense works. There are really two
problems here: one, that of determining what duration the present has,
given that it has duration; the other, that of the logic of the present tense.
Buridan dissolves the first problem by arguing that the duration of the
present varies with context. Properly speaking, no time is privileged as the
duration of the present, there are only different stretches of time which
we take to be the present in different contexts. On Buridans view, we
can sometimes read off the utterance itself something about which time
is being taken as the present. For example, when we utter the present-
tensed sentence Summer days are longer than winter days and take it to
be true, we must be taking as our present at least a duration long enough
to include some summer days and some winter days, and so at least a bit
more than three months. If we took a smaller time as present, one of the
terms of the comparison summer days or winter days would not stand
for anything actually existing. Since the sentence is assertoric and affirma-
tive, and since according to Buridan and almost all of his contemporaries
such sentences are true only if their terms actually stand for things, we
would not have spoken truly if one of the terms lacked existing supposita.
Buridan apparently believed that there were no limits which could be set
to the range of the times which might be taken as present in some context
or other. In particular, he thought that the whole of time could be taken
as present in some contexts. For example, Aristotles claim The world is
eternal is present-tensed and explicitly makes the claim that the dura-
tion of the world is greater than any finite duration. For it to be true we
would have to take as our present a duration which is greater than any
finite duration. So if the sentence is to be true, we must take as present an
unbounded time. If there is no such time, then the sentence is false.
A consequence of pure divisibilism and the view that sentences are
true at intervals is that if sentences are to be true at the present then the
present must be an interval. Which interval then is it to be? Buridan sug-
gests that is completely context dependent and that if one choice rather
than another would make a sentence token true, it is natural to take it

as the one the context demands. Thus, when one says Summer days are
longer than winter days one should be understood to be taking as present
an interval that includes some of each, and when one claims The world is
eternal to be taking as present the whole of time. Consider a context in
which we take as present the whole of time! In such a context there was
no past and will be no future. Consider another context in which we take
2012 as present. Thenunless we suppose that past and future overlap!
in such a context the future is not taken to begin until 2013. Thus, the
context dependence of the present induces a similar context dependence
of the past and the future.
Buridans proposal is more radical than it might at first seem. Many
modern writers have been interested in the specious present but they
have all supposed that if two true present-tensed sentences were uttered
together by two different speakers, the times they require as present would
at least overlap. Buridans proposal, however, seems to be that we may
literally take any time as presentthat we could, for example, take the
principate of Augustus Caesar as present, as we might do when recount-
ing his gestae. Relative to such a choice of present, the nineteenth century
AD is future and the reign of Cleopatra V of Egypt is past.7 As Marsilius of
Inghen was later to point out, Aristotle did not share this view and that
is why, as Buridan notes, he claims that it is not possible that the now be
a past year. Given that any time may be taken as present, and so any as
past or as future, it would seem that there cannot be absolute modal dif-
ferences among times.
Buridans view of tenses raises immediate problems for an Ockhamist
picture of modality. Ockhams modal theory is tensed in the very strong
sense that what is necessary and possible according to his basic under-
standing of necessity and possibility varies with time. We should expect,
then, that his understanding of the present would affect his account of the
modalities. Puzzlingly, however, in his modal theory Ockham does not
take into account the divisibility of the present. Since the divisibility of the
present is so much more on Buridans mind, we would expect Buridan to
differ with Ockham on modal matters. What then is Buridans view?
7That Buridans view is this radical lies at the core of Marsilius of Inghens critique
of it in the text discussed by Bert Bos in this volume. Marsilius proposal seems to be to
introduce an imaginary point-like present and then proceed as Ockham does.
First we should note that just as he is unconcerned to pick out a single

time as present, so Buridan is unconcerned to pick out a single sense of
necessity. In the Tractatus de demonstratione in his Summulae de dialec-
tica, he writes:
The first grade of necessity is that in which the sentence, its signification
standing, can be falsified through no power nor related otherwise than as
it signifies. Another grade is that which is impossible to be falsified or to
be related otherwise through a natural power although it may be possible
supernaturally and miraculously like The heaven is moved, The world is
spherical, Every place is full. A third grade is supposing the constantia of
the subject like An eclipse of the moon is through the interposition of the
earth between the sun and moon, Socrates is a human, Socrates is capable
of laughter. For these are called necessary because it is necessary whenever
Socrates exists for him to be a human and capable of laughter, and it is
necessary whenever there is an eclipse of the moon for it to be through an
interposition...etc. Now there is a fourth grade according to restriction. For
just as possible is said sometimes widely in connection with every time,
present, past and future, and sometimes restrictedly in connection with the
present or future, granting that which is said in the end of the first book
of On the Heavens that there is no ability (virtus) or power (potestas) with
respect to the past.8
Of these grades the first appears to be the strongest. Of it Buridan says
that a sentence is necessary in this sense if no power whatever can make it
false given that its terms signify what they in fact do signify. Simo Knuut-
tila has studied how Buridan understands the relation between this first
8John Buridan, Summulae 8.6.3 (ed. H. Hubien): Et adhuc possent poni alii gradus, ex
eo quod oportet propositionem per se esse necessariam, quia sunt diuersi gradus neces-
sitatis et, secundum hoc, etiam perseitatis. Est enim primus gradus necessitatis quia per
nullam potentiam est possibile propositionem falsificari stante significatione, uel aliter
habere quam significat. Alius gradus est quia impossibile est falsificari uel aliter habere
per naturalem potentiam, licet sit possibile supernaturaliter et miraculose, ut caelum
mouetur, mundus est sphaericus, omnis locus est plenus. Tertius gradus est ex sup-
positione constantiae subiecti, ut eclipsis lunae est per interpositionem terrae inter solem
et lunam, Socrates est homo, Socrates est risibilis. Haec enim dicuntur necessariae sic
quia necesse est quandocumque est Socrates ipsum esse hominem et risibilem, et necesse
est quandocumque est eclipsis lunae ipsam esse per interpositionem...et caetera. Adhuc
est quartus gradus, secundum restrictionem. Nam sicut possibile dicitur aliquando
ample, in ordine ad omne tempus praesens, praeteritum et futurum, et aliquando restricte,
in ordine ad praesens uel futurum, iuxta illud quod dicitur in fine primi de Caelo quod
non est uirtus siue potestas ad praeteritum... (trans. Klima, p. 733). All translations from
Buridans Summulae de Dialectica are my usually slight modifications of those in Gyula
Klima, John Buridans Summulae de dialectica: An annotated translation, with a philosophi-
cal introduction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). Latin texts are from the unpub-
lished preliminary edition prepared by H. Hubien and circulated in 1987.
sense and the second. As Knuuttila has shown, Buridans response in book
7, q. 3 of his commentary on the Physics to a criticism of an argument of
Aristotles depends upon taking the second grade of necessity as weaker
than the first.9 The third grade, in turn, is most naturally taken as a restric-
tion of the second but could be understood to be a restriction of each of
the first two, a restriction to those cases for which issues of existential
import do not arise.10 What of the fourth?
The issue here concerns the nature of powers. The traditional view was
that they were future directed. The Scotist view was that there could be
power over the present but not over the past. As I understand the view
later proposed by, for example, Gregory of Rimini, it allows power over
the past as well. The force of the difference between these views is that
if one thinks there are powers only with respect to the future, then one
will think that all truths about the past and present are necessary. If one
thinks there are powers only with respect to present and future, one will
think that all truths about the past are necessary.
Buridan had raised the relation between the fourth grade of necessity
and one or both of the first two in an earlier section of his Summulae.
There he wrote:
We should note, however, lest someone should object, that possible is
sometimes taken broadly, namely, indifferently in relation to the past and
the future, and so is necessary; as when we say everything to be possible
which either is, was, or will be, or even when it just does not imply a con-
tradiction [to say] that it is, was or will be. In this sense we would concede
Aristotle can be (Aristotiles potest esse), or Aristotle is able to run, and
we would deny Aristotle necessarily does not run. In another sense it is
taken to be restricted to the future, so that nothing is said to be possible
to be, unless it either will be or at least it does not imply a contradiction
[when we say] that it is or will be, in the sense in which it is said, in book
one of On the Heavens, that there is no power (potestas) over the past.11 For
in this sense we would say that a horse which perished cannot be, and that
it cannot walk, and that it is necessary that it is not, and in this sense we
would also say that the proposition Aristotle walks is impossible, whereas
it, or a proposition similar to it, was true, and we would also say that the
9S. Knuuttila, Necessities in Buridans Natural Philosophy, in J. M. M. H. Thijssen and

J. Zupko (eds.), The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan (Leiden: Brill,
2001), pp. 6576.
10The issues here are akin to those involved in some understandings of the sophism
Omnis homo de necessitate est animal. Cf. S. Ebbesen, By Necessity, in V. Hirvonen, T. J.
Halopainen, and M. Tuominen (eds.), Mind and Modality (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 14152.
proposition Aristotle does not walk is necessary, even if at some time it was
false. Whence in this sense what was once possible becomes impossible and
what was contingent becomes necessary. But in the present context I speak
about necessity and impossibility broadly, for this is how we speak in the
demonstrative sciences, although we speak differently in narrative stories.12
Buridan here distinguishes as he does in the passage quoted earlier between
what he calls broad (ample) possibility and restricted (restricte) possibility.
A claim is possible in the broad sense if it was, is or will be possible. A
claim is possible in the restricted sense only if it is or will be possible. From
the way Buridan distinguishes these two senses it is pretty clear that some-
thing is necessary per accidens (in the terminology of others) just in case
it is possible in the broad sense but not possible in the restricted sense (in
his terminology). Buridan makes it clear that he thinks it is the broad sense
which is required for demonstration.
One helpful thing Buridan says just before our second passage is that
necessary taken ample or broadly is a term which distributes the time
consignified by the verb to all times, so that if something is necessarily
the case it is always the case. Buridan adds that possible dimmitit illud
tempus non distributum, so that if S is P at some time then in the unre-
stricted sense S is possibly P.13
Buridan is aware that this begs the question against the partisans of
accidental or restricted necessity and hastens to make the distinction
between the two to satisfy them. But he also makes it clear that he does
not think that restricted necessity has a place in the demonstrative sci-
ences though it does, he adds, in narrative stories.
12Buridan, Summulae 1.8.5: Notandum est tamen, ne aliquis instet, quod aliquando
possibile accipitur ample, scilicet indifferenter ad praeteritum et futurum, et similiter
necesse, scilicet prout diceremus omne illud possibile esse quod est vel fuit vel erit, vel
etiam quod non repugnat ipsum esse, fuisse vel fore. Unde si concederemus istam Aris-
totiles potest esse, vel Aristotilem possibile est currere, et negaremus istam Aristotiles
necesse est non currere. Alio modo capitur restricte ad futurum, ita quod nihil dicatur
possibile esse nisi quod est vel erit, vel saltem quod non repugnat ipsum esse vel fore,
sicut dicitur, primo Caeli, quod potestas non est ad praeteritum. Sic enim diceremus quod
equus qui corruptus est non potest esse, et quod ipsum impossibile est ambulare, et quod
ipsum necesse est non esse, et sic etiam diceremus hanc propositionem esse impossibilem
Aristotiles ambulat, quae tamen, vel sibi similis, fuit vera, et istam necessariam Aristo-
tiles non ambulat, quae tamen aliquando fuit falsa. Unde sic possibile fit impossibile et
contingens necessarium. Et ego in proposito loquor de necessario et impossibili ample,
quia sic loquuntur demonstrativae scientiae, licet historiae narrativae aliter loquantur.
(trans. Klima, pp. 7576).
13Buridan, Summulae 8.5: Sed iste terminus possibile dimittit illud tempus non dis-
tributum; ideo sequitur si B aliquando est, fuit vel erit A quod illud B potest esse A.
This discussion seems to be part of a complex debate Buridan is con-

ducting with the text of Aristotle. In the passage just quoted he refers us to
Aristotles discussion of powers at the end of book one of On the Heavens,
and there, in the context of discussing whether everything generable is
corruptible, he writes:
In this treatise generable and corruptible are said according to powers
namely, generable because it is able to be generated and corruptible
because it is able to be corrupted. For these are the proper significations
of these names. And with this Aristotle says that there is not a power with
respect to the past for it is not possible, as he says, that the now may be a
past year. And according to these dicta it seems to follow that this donkey
which is already generated is not generable, just as was argued previously,
and yet it is corruptible, therefore not every generable thing is corruptible.14
Here Buridan attributes to Aristotle employment of the restricted sense
of the modalities in his discussion of (what Buridan takes to be) natu-
ral necessities. If he does not himself think the restricted modalities the
appropriate ones in Physics as well as in narrative stories, then why not?
To what part of Aristotles reasoning would he object? The answer, I think,
brings us back to Buridans discussion of the present.
In his discussion of Aristotles dictum omne quod est quando est,
necesse est esse, after arguing that there is a perfectly good sense in
which it is necessary that what is is when it is and, indeed, that what will
be will be when it will be, Buridan suggests that there is a real difference
between the past and present on the one hand and the future on the other
that grounds the use of the restricted modalities. The context is discussion
of the claims that everything corruptible is generable and that everything
corruptible at some time will be and at some time will not be. Buridan
understands Aristotle to endorse these claims but Buridan himself both
thinks they are false and thinks that Aristotle himself should have thought
them false.
14John Buridan, Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo 1, q. 26 (ed. E. A.

Moody (Cambridge, MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1942), p. 127): Dicit Aris-
toteles in isto tractatu quod generabile et corruptibile dicuntur secundum potentias:
scilicet generabile quia potest generari, et corruptibile quia potest corrumpi. Istae enim
sunt propriae significationes illorum nominum. Et cum hoc dicit Aristoteles quod non est
potentia ad praeteritum; non enim est possibile quod nunc sit annus praeteritus, ut ipse
dicit. Et secundum ista dicta, videtur sequi quod iste asinus qui iam est genitus non sit
generabilis, sicut prius arguebatur; et tamen ipse est corruptibilis; ergo non omne genera-
bile est corruptibile.
The two claims are connected. Aristotle and Buridan agree that gener-
able and corruptible are modal terms best unpacked as able to be gen-
erated and able to be corrupted. As Buridan understands him, however,
Aristotle also claims that both generable and corruptible are convertible
with sometimes are and sometimes are not (aliquando esse et aliquando
non esse) and so are convertible with one another.15 In response, Buri-
dan points out that Aristotle himself claims that there is no power with
respect to the past, and so that an ass which has already been generated
is corruptible but not generable, and hence not everything corruptible is
generable.16
Buridan concludes (with some irritation it would seem) that the only
way we can save Aristotles position is to use the terms generable and
corruptible in such a way as to collapse possibility and contingency, by
claiming something is generable or corruptible only if at some time it can
be and at some time it can not be, and to use to be at some time and to
not be at some time to mean is able to be at some time and is able to not
be at some time. Buridan clearly thinks this is a confusion.
What, though, of Buridans own view? Does he endorse Aristotles claim
that there is no power over the past, and if so, does he mean no natural
power or does he include Gods power as well?
There is some evidence in his Commentary on De Interpretatione 1.9
that Buridan is sympathetic to Aristotles position, for in the last ques-
tion of his commentary on book one, after arguing that strictly speaking
Omne quod est/fuit/erit necesse est/fuit/erit esse and Omne quod est/
15Buridan, Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo 1, q. 26 (p. 127): Opposi-
tum determinat Aristoteles per ista media, quia tam ingenerabile quam incorruptibile
convertuntur cum semper ente; ex quo sequitur quod convertuntur ad invicem. Similiter
generabile et corruptibile convertuntur cum aliquando ente et aliquando non ente;
ideo convertuntur ad invicem. Buridan thus understands Aristotle here in the famous
passage at On the Heavens 1.12 to be endorsing what Hintikka called the statistical theory
of modality.
16Buridan, Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo 1, q. 26 (pp. 12728): Et
cum hoc dicit Aristoteles quod non est potentia ad praeteritum; non enim est possibile
quod nunc sit annus praeteritus, ut ipse dicit. Et secundum ista dicta, videtur sequi quod
iste asinus qui iam est genitus non sit generabilis, sicut prius arguebatur; et tamen ipse est
corruptibilis; ergo non omne generabile est corruptibile. Et sic illi termini, simpliciter loqu-
endo et proprie, non convertuntur; immo corruptibile est in plus, quia omne generabile
est corruptibile sed non omne corruptibile est generabile. Et sic etiam isti termini genera-
tum et corruptum non convertuntur, imo generatum est in plus, quia omne corruptum
est generatum sed non omne generatum est corruptum. Ita etiam ingenerabile et incor-
ruptibile non convertuntur, imo ingenerabile est in plus, quia omne incorruptibile est
ingenerabile sed non omne ingenerabile est incorruptibile.
fuit/erit necesse est/fuit/erit esse, quando est/fuit/erit are convertible, he

first argues that Aristotle added the quando est to mark the difference
between the past and present, which have acquired a determinatio, and
the future, which has not.17 He then goes on, moreover, to draw some
conclusions as if the view were his.18
Whatever doubt may remain can be removed I think by appeal to Buri-
dans Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione. There in book
1, q. 4 he draws the same distinction we saw above between the first and
second grade of necessity, that is, between a conception of necessity indif-
ferent to time and one which distinguishes between present and future on
the one hand and past on the other. He continues:
17John Buridan, Questiones longe super Perihermenias 1, q. 12 (ed. R. van der Lecq
(Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1983), p. 55): Sed tunc dubito si non differt in proposito cum illa
additione et sine ea, quare posuit eam Aristoteles superflue. Potest responderi quod licet
non differant quantum ad veritatem vel falsitatem dictarum conclusionum tamen voluit
notare per hoc magnam differentiam inter praeterita et praesentia vel etiam propositiones
de praeterito et de praesenti ex parte una et futura et propositionum de futuro ex alia
parte, scilicet quod res quod fuit in tempore in quo fuit, acquisivit sibi quandam deter-
minationem propter quam propositio erat necessaria sic quod in posterius non poterat
esse falsa, dicens quod ista res fuit. Ita enim res quando ipsa est acquirit vel acquisivit
sibi determinationem propter quam propositio sic est necessaria quod in posterius non
potest esse falsa quae dicit quod est res est vel fuit...Sed res quae erit ex eo quod ipsa
erit non acquisivit sibi aliquam determinationem propter quam oporteat propositionem
esse veram et quod impossibile sit eam esse falsam quae dicit sub disiunctione quod illa
res est vel fuit vel erit. Immo licet Antichristus erit, tamen adhuc possibile est quod ista est
falsa Antichristus fuit vel erit. Et hoc intendebat Aristoteles cum dixit ille singularibus
vero et futuris non similiter.
18Buridan, Questiones longe super Perihermenias 1, q. 12 (pp. 5556): Et tunc exponetur
propositio omne quod est necesse est esse quando est, id est omnis res quae de novo
est, acquirit sibi quando ipsa est aliquam determinationem etc. Postea etiam quantum
ad propositionem divisas dicendum est de praeterito et futuro. Sed propter istas de futuro
et praeterito notandum est quod uno modo propositio simpliciter secundum respectum
ad omne tempus indifferenter potest <esse?> necessaria, possibilis vel impossibiis. (Dico
necessaria quia semper est, fuit et erit vera, si proponatur, et non potest nec potuit nec
poterit esse falsa ut Deus est et propositionem dicimus impossibilem quae non potest
nec potuit nec poterit esse vera, et possibilem dicimus quae potest, potuit vel poterit esse
vera). Alio modo, quia quod transivit et est corruptum non potest de cetero reverti dici-
mus potentiam non esse ad praeteritum. Et sic dicimus propositionem esse necessariam
possibilem vel impossibilem restringendo respectus ad praesens vel futurum ita quod ista
dicatur necessaria quae est et semper erit vera et quod non poterit esse falsa, licet ante
fuit falsa et dicitur impossibilis quae nec est nec poterit esse vera, licet potuit esse vera
et dicitur possibilis quia est vel de cetero poterit esse vera. Et manifestum est quod primo
modo numquam vera potest fieri impossibilis nec falsa necessaria sed secundo modo hoc
est possibile. Verbi gratia, antequam Aristotiles generaretur illa est falsa Aristotiles fuit
et post nativitatem eius ipsa erat necessaria. Similiter de equo quid etiam generabitur,
si nomino proprio vocetur b, haec est vera b erit. Et tamen post mortem eius talia erit
impossibilis, si corruptum non potest reverti.
Note that in as much as the second mode of possibility or impossibility [is

concerned], a sentence which as a matter of fact is true and consequently
possible is able to become impossible and a false sentence is able to become
necessary. For example, at some time Aristotle is speaking was true, and
yet now it is impossible, naturally speaking (dico naturaliter), because it is
impossible for Aristotle to speak. Moreover, at some time Aristotle does
not speak was false, and yet now it is necessary. But in as much as the first
mode of possibility or impossibility [is concerned], a possible sentence is
never able to become impossible.19
Note the dico naturaliter. Buridan grants that there is no natural power
over the past. It seems, then, that the issue can be reduced to this: Does
Buridan think there is a supernatural power over the past, a power cor-
responding to the temporally indifferent sense of the modalities? If there
is such a power, then, of course, God has it. So the question can be asked
about God: Can God recreate a horse that has been destroyedor now
bring it about that that horse never was? How far does supernatural power
extend?
In book 1, q. 24, of his Quaestiones super libros De generatione et cor-
ruptione Aristotelis, Buridan clearly asserts that God can recreate what
has been and is no longer. Having asserted that he agrees with Aristo-
tle that there is no natural power to recreate the same thing once it has
been destroyed, he claims that, nonetheless, there is a supernatural power
which can do this. He argues:
Another conclusion: I hold it probable to me that nothing prevents what has
been completely corrupted (simpliciter corruptum) from being returned the
same in number supernaturally, namely, through the absolute power of God,
because just as was said before, if all things besides God were now annihi-
lated, it would be totally as it was before the creation of the world and in
no way different, and whatever God then understood he would now under-
stand and in every way just like he [then] understood it or them. Hence, just
as the faithful maintain, God does not understand what is past otherwise
than what is future. Therefore, since God acts through understanding and
will, and neither the one nor the other is related otherwise than it was then
related, nothing seems to prevent him being able to do all that he didand
19John Buridan, Questiones super libros De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis 1, q. 24

(ed. M. Streijger et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 5758): Nota quod quantum ad secundum
modum possibilitatis aut impossibilitatis, propositio quae de facto est vera et per conse-
quens possibilis, potest fieri impossibilis; et propositio etiam falsa potest fieri necessaria.
Verbi gratia, aliquando illa erat vera Aristoteles loquitur, et tamen nunc est impossibilis
(dico naturaliter), quia impossibile est Aristotelem loqui. Illa etiam aliquando fuit falsa
Aristoteles non loquitur, et tamen modo est necessaria. Sed quantum ad primum modum
possibilitatis vel impossibilitatis, numquam propositio possibilis potest fieri impossibilis.
not only similar things but the same ones, because all are in his power just
as [they were] then, since they are not otherwise related, as has been said,
and since he understands all things in the same way as then and his power
is just intellect and will.20
In this passage Buridan makes clear that he thinks God can in a sense
recreate the past and so recreate a horse that has been destroyed. He can
do again whatever he has done. This leaves open, however, the question
whether even God can now bring it about that something he has in fact
done never was done. It is precisely this that Ockham denies. Exploration
of this issue, one closely tied to questions about in virtue of what the past
is past, requires another, one hopes no less happy, occasion.
We can, however, conclude this much. Buridan agrees with Ockham
that the present is as determined as the past and that both differ in this
respect from the future.21 Unlike Ockham, who, although a divisibilist
about time, treats the present as though it were pointlike and so is able
to generate a tensed modal logic in which there is a fundamental differ-
ence between past and present on the one hand and future on the other,
Buridan, taking the divisibility of every time, including the present, seri-
ously, commits himself to the modal symmetry of past and future when
we take the modalities in his most basic sense. He maintains in several
works that in the temporally indifferent sense of possible a possible sen-
tence can never become impossible. This, he maintains, is the sense of the
20Buridan, Questiones super libros De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis 1, q. 24 (pp.

18283): Aliam conclusionem pono mihi probabilem quod nihil prohibet quod simpliciter
corruptum possit reverti idem numero supernaturaliter, scilicet per absolutam Dei poten-
tiam, quia, sicut prius dictum est, si omnia essent nunc annihilata praeter Deum, totali-
ter esset ita sicut erat ante creationem mundi et nullo modo aliter; et quaecumque Deus
tunc intelligebat, ista omnia nunc ipse intelligeret et omnino similiter sicut ipsa vel ea
ante intelligebat. Unde, sicut ponunt fideles, non aliter intelligit Deus praeteritum quam
futurum. Cum igitur agat Deus per intellectum et voluntatem et nec ipse nec alia aliter se
habent quam se tunc habebant, nihil videtur prohibere quin potest omnia facere ea quae
fecit, et non solum similia, sed eadem, sic quia omnia sunt in potestate sua sicut tunc, cum
non aliter se habeant, ut dictum est, et cum eodem modo intelligit omnia sicut tunc, et
potestas sua non est nisi intellectus et voluntas.
21Thus, in Questiones longe super Perihermenias 1, q. 12 (p. 57), he writes: Ad hoc enim
quod dicebatur quod non est maior determinatio, vel fuit in eo quod praeteriit quam in
eo quod est de praesenti, dicendum est quod est verum. Sed differentia est propter fluxum
temporis, quia praesens transiit in praeteritum et praeteritum semper manet praeteritum.
Ideo quod fuit, necesse est fuisse; sed quod est, non necesse est esse, sed omne quod est,
esse vel fuisse etc. Buridan seems to think that one cannot prove that what will be does
not yet have this determinatio but is clear that the faith at least requires supposing that
it does not. In the same question (p. 52), he writes: Secunda conclusio est quod multa
eveniant quae non est necesse evenire et multa eveniant que possunt evenire. Et hec con-
clusio est theologica et ex fide credenda.
modalities at work in demonstration and in valid argument, and while it

is also true that for man and the rest of nature (though not for God) pos-
sibilities disappear as the future becomes the past, this is not because of
some peculiar modal feature of the past but simply because our power
to do things once (or not) does not extend to doing the very same things
twice (or not). That we cannot live our lives over again is merely the con-
sequence of our finitude. Nonetheless, it may be that that we have lived
as we have and made the difference we have is something now not even
a god could undo. Happy Birthday, Sten!
23.Marsilius of Inghen on the Principle
of Non-Contradiction
Egbert P. Bos1
Introduction
The principle of non-contradiction is one of the most discussed subjects

in the history of philosophy. Though the principle looks simple and does
not seem to invite comments, in the history of philosophy it is analysed
by many in different ways.
Philosophers and theologians of the fourteenth century showed great
interest in it. It was qualified as a primum principium or first principle.
They posed many questions: How should it be formulated? What is its
ontological status? etc. They discussed these problems primarily in their
commentaries on Aristotles Metaphysics, which was part of the curricu-
lum for advanced students.
Marsilius of Inghen and John Buridan
In the present paper I shall discuss questions of this kind as they are found
in commentaries by the theologian and philosopher Marsilius of Inghen,
who lived from ca. 1340 to 1396. He is interesting, first because both he and
his master, the philosopher John Buridan (ca. 1298ca. 1360), challenge
Aristotelian schemes of the relation between substance and accident
with the help of this principle; second, because Marsilius challenges even
the principle itself in virtue of his subjectivistic conception of the time in
which contradictory propositions can be uttered.2 Marsilius criticises the
conception of time held by Buridan.
Marsilius is a pupil of Buridans, as is well known and as he himself
repeatedly says (he often calls Buridan magister meus my master). How-
ever, on some noticeable points he does not follow his master. This is
1Thanks are due to Dr. J. W. McAllister (Leiden) for the corrections of my English.
2A recent work on medieval conceptions of time is P. Porro (ed.), The Medieval Con-
cept of Time: The scholastic debate and its reception in early modern philosophy (Leiden:
Brill, 2001).
404 egbert p. bos
seen, for instance, in his commentary on Aristotles Metaphysics on the

problem of time. Another example is that Marsilius, unlike Buridan, dis-
tinguishes five aspects of time: three in a strict sense, namely, present,
past and future, and two in a broad sense, namely, possibility and imagin-
ability. The latter time distinction, that is, imaginability, will play a part
in this contribution.
The best place to find Marsilius conception of the principle of non-
contradiction expressed is his question commentary on Aristotles Meta-
physics, notably in the last five questions on book four. There are other
places in Marsilius works where he presents his notion of time, for
instance, in his commentary on the Physics.3 In the latter work, however,
in answering the question whether time is movement, he is interested in
the property of succession of time and the way in which time is measur-
able, not in the subjective nature of the unity of time.4
Buridan also wrote a commentary on the Metaphysics. Different ver-
sions of this commentary have come down to us. He seems to have com-
mented on the text four times.5 The final version (ultima lectura) was also
printed in 1509, and has therefore been widely accessible for a long time.
De Rijk has recently published Buridans Lectura Erfordiensis on the
first six books of the Metaphysics. This commentary was written before
the Lectura ultima and shows, de Rijk says, considerable doctrinal
differences.6
For this study, I consulted Marsilius question commentary. He seems
to have composed it at the end of his life, between 1386 and 1390.7 It has
been preserved, as far as I know, in nine manuscripts,8 two of which are
3Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones subtilissime super octo libros Physicorum secundum

nominalium viam 4, qq. 1518 (London, 1518; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1964).
4Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones Physicorum, f. lvi vb.
5John Buridan, Lectura Erfordiensis in IVI Metaphysicam together with the 15th-century
Abbreviatio Caminensis, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), p. xiv.
6See de Rijks Buridan, Lectura Erfordiensis in IVI Metaphysicam, p. lxxxi.
7See P. J. J. M. Bakker, Inhrence, univocit et sparabilit des accidents eucharis-
tiques: Observations sur les rapports entre mtaphysique et thologie au XIVe sicle, in
J.-L. Solre and Z. Kaluza (eds.), La servante et la consolatrice: La philosophie dans ses rap-
ports avec la thologie au Moyen ge (Paris: Vrin, 2002), p. 210.
8MS Cracow Biblioteka Jagiellonika 708; MS Cracow Biblioteka Jagiellonika 709; MS
Cracow Biblioteka Jagiellonika 710; MS Leipzig Universittsbibliothek 1387; MS Leipzig
Universittsbibliothek 1434; MS Uppsala University Library C 596; MS Vienna ster
reichische Nationalbibliothek 5297; MS Vienna sterreichische Nationalbibliothek 5376;
MS Wolffenbttel Herzog-Augustbibliothek 2747. I have chosen MS Cracow 709 (K) as
basis manuscript and collated it with MS Vienna 5297 (V), because MS Cracow 709 is also
marsilius on the principle of non-contradiction 405
explicitly dated 1390,9 which serves as the terminus ante quem of the actual
composition of the work.
In his questions 1014 Marsilius discusses the principle of non-contra-
diction. I shall pay special attention to the fourteenth question which
bears the title: Queritur quartodecimo utrum duo contradictoria possint
simul esse vera (The fourteenth problem is whether two contradictory
propositions can be simultaneously true).
The ideas of Buridan and Marsilius on this subject have not been inves-
tigated so far in all details.
Aristotle
In book four of the Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses the nature of the first
principle. His search is for certainty. Plato found this certainty in the tran-
scendent Ideas. Aristotle disagrees, as is well known. His focus is on the
natural world.
According to Aristotle the principle is the first principle. He discusses
its various aspects. He calls it first, something about which one cannot
err (if only one thinks carefully), for it is the firmest principle;10 it is most
intelligible, a necessary instrument for any scientist, not having a hypo-
thetical character.11
In book four, chapter three, Aristotle formulates the principle as fol-
lows: For the same thing to hold good and not to hold good simultane-
ously of the same thing and in the same respect is impossible.12 Note that
in the seventh chapter Aristotle gives an alternative formulation of the
first principle as the law of the excluded third. There, he remarks, to say
that that which is is not or that which is not, is, is a falsehood. It is impos-
sible that the same thing is and is not.13 Aristotle adds that everybody
uses the formulas, but never investigates them.
taken by Bakker in his edition of Marsilius sixth question of his commentary on book four
of Aristotles Metaphysics. See Bakker, Inhrence, univocit et sparabilit, pp. 23545.
9MS Uppsala University Library C 596, f. 143vb; MS Wolffenbttel Herzog-Augustbib-
liothek 2747, f. 50va.
12Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3.1005b1834 (trans. by C. Kirwan, Aristotles Metaphysics:
Books Gamma, Delta and Epsilon; Translated with notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971),
p. 7).
13Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.7.1011b2627 (trans. Kirwan, p. 23).
406 egbert p. bos
The Fourteenth Century
In the fourteenth century the principle of non-contradiction played a cen-

tral part in the notions of evidence and of Gods omnipotence. Empirical
knowledge depends on evidence, but this evidence is relative, because
one assumes that the common course of nature holds.14 It is always pos-
sible that God intervenes, or suspends this common course, as they say,
without any contradiction being involved.
Buridan and Marsilius interpret the principle according to an epistemo-
logical and metaphysical point of view. They ask such questions as: Is it
possible to err about the principle? Is there only one first principle? What
linguistic form does it have? What is the relation between contradictory
statements and time? And, in order to solve this latter question, What
is time?15
Marsilius Commentary on the Metaphysics
I shall now concentrate on Marsilius commentary. With regard to Aristo-

tles Metaphysics 4, he raises fourteen questions:
Queritur completis questionibus secundi, et prima questio sit utrum meta-
physica considerans de omnibus rebus est una scientia.
Queritur secundo circa quartum Metaphysice utrum scientie demonstra-
tive conclusionis habeant unitatem et distinctionem a conclusione vel a
premissis.
Queritur tertio circa quartum Metaphysice utrum totali Metaphysice debeat
assignari aliquod unum subiectum proprium.
Queritur quarto circa quartum, utrum ens sit subiectum proprium totius
metaphysice.
Queritur quinto circa quartum Metaphysice, utrum ens univoce significet
substantias et accidentia.
Queritur sexto circa eundem, utrum ens et unum convertantur.
14See, e.g., J. Zupko, John Buridan: Portrait of a fourteenth-century arts master (Notre
Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2003), p. 191.
15In his Disputata Metaphysicae, Thuo of Viborg (d. 1472), a follower of Marsilius, raises
some of the same questions, but not all. See E. P. Bos, Thuo of Viborg and Marsilius of
Inghen, in S. Ebbesen and R. L. Friedman (eds.), Medieval Analyses in Language and Cogni-
tion (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999), pp. 52339.
Henry of Runen (Henricus Ruyn) is another witness of Marsilius influence at the Univer-
sity of Erfurt in the early fifteenth century. See Henricus Ruyn, Disputata Metaphysica, ed.
A. Tabbaroni, in CIMAGL 61 (1991), 285428; for book 4, see 24888.
Queritur septimo circa quartum, utrum in qualibet re differat esse ab

essentia.
Queritur octavo circa quartum utrum negationes sint entia.
Queritur nono utrum omnis habitus intellectuales sunt eiusdem specialis-
sime.
Queritur decimo utrum contradictio sit maxima oppositio.
Queritur undecimo utrum circa primum principium contingat errare.
Queritur duodecimo utrum hec propositio idem simul et semel eidem inesse
et non inesse secundum idem et similiter sit impossibile sit primum
principium.
Queritur tredecimo utrum non ens possit intelligi.
Queritur quarto decimo utrum duo contradictoria possint simul esse vera.
In Buridans commentary we find fifteen questions. Marsilius questions
bear the same titles as those of his master, with the exception, however,
that Marsilius does not discuss Buridans ninth question: utrum esse et
essentia different secundum rationem (whether there is a logical difference
between being and essence).
The Formulation of the Principle of Non-Contradiction
In the twelfth question of his commentary Marsilius notes that Aristo-

tle has chosen to formulate the law of non-contradiction as follows:
idem simul et semel eidem inesse et non inesse secundum idem et similiter
est impossibile (for the same thing to hold good and not to hold good
simultaneously of the same thing, at one time, in the same respect and in
the same manner, is impossible). Is this really a first principle? Marsilius
asks. It looks composite. Anyway, it is not the simplest formula, he says.
Marsilius thinks that Aristotle chose this one because it is often used in
science.16
Marsilius further notes, following Aristotle, that the principle of non-
contradiction applies not only to propositions, but also to terms, by
which he means separate terms, not terms that are part of a proposition,
e.g., finite/infinite, white/non-white.17 The basis of this distinction
16Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 12 (K, f. 37rb; V, f. 42rb): Et

si petatur quare ergo Philosophus ponit eam primam? respondetur quod hoc fecit vel
quia scientie demonstrative frequentius ea utuntur, vel volens innuere quod omnes prece
dentes essent prime et prima principia, posuit istam que posterior est omnibus eis, et
ostendit eam esse primam propter carentiam medii, ut dictum est.
17Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 10 (K, f. 33vb; V, f. 39ra): Ad pri-
mum primo est notandum quod oppositio contradictoria quandoque terminis, quandoque
408 egbert p. bos
as regards terms and propositions is the twofold mental operation. This

operation is either simple, the simple conception of a term, or it is com-
posite, and is about a proposition.
Marsilius defines the characteristics according to which something can
be first. As to its origin in the human mind a propositio singularis (singu-
lar proposition) is first, for instance, Sortes est sedens (Sortes is sitting).
Secondly, as to simplicity ens est or aliquid est (being is or something is)
is first. The third way of being first, distinguished by Marsilius, is that of
evidence, which is the most important sense of being first. Thus, the first
principle is: quodlibet est vel non est (everything is or is not) or nichil est
vel aliquid est (nothing is or something is) or nullum ens est vel aliquod
ens est (no being is or some being is). It is a first principle, Marsilius says,
because, of course, there is no middle (medium) with which to prove it.18
He considers this third formula more evident than that used by Aristo-
tle, because an assertoric proposition is more evident than a modal one.
Further, Aristotles formula is less evident because it does not use terms
referring directly to real things.
Marsilius acknowledges that there are more first principles, in
which respect, as M. E. Reina says, Marsilius is more liberal than his
contemporaries.19
The Properties of the Principle of Non-Contradiction
What are the properties (conditiones) of the principle of non-contra-

diction? Marsilius asks. He enumerates a number of properties, which
are the same as in Buridans tract. These characteristics find their basis
in Aristotles Posterior Analytics: The principle of non-contradiction is
(1) a categorical proposition, not a hypothetical, and it is unconditionally
true; (2) it is proper; (3) necessary; (4) primary; (5) immediate; (6) prior;
(7) evident; (8) a cause of simplicity and evidence; and (9) it has the
widest extension.
propositionibus, sed numquam rebus attribuitur. Termini contradictorii dicuntur termi-

nus finitus et ipse infinitus, ut album, non-album.
18It is synonymous with the formula contradictoria sibi invicem nequiunt esse vera
(contradictories cannot be true with regard to each other).
19Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 10 (K, f. 38rb; V, f. 43rb): Nec
est inconveniens quod sint plura principia prima per carentiam medii demonstrativi. Quid
dicendum est ad Philosophum, patet ex tertio articulo. Cf. M. E. Reina, Comprehensio
veritatis: Una questione di Marsilio di Inghen sulla Metafisica, in L. Bianchi (ed.), Filoso-
fia e teologia nel trecento: Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fdration
internationale des instituts dtudes mdivales, 1994), p. 332.
Marsilius Questions 1014
Let us now investigate Marsilius solutions to the five questions that

he raises. As to the first, that is, question 10: Does the principle of non-
contradiction characterise the greatest opposition, namely, of contradic-
tories rather than of contraries? According to Marsilius, this is the case in
many respects.20 It has this quality because of its commonness, simplicity,
priority, opposition and evidence. So it is generally applicable, most simple,
first, contradictories are most in opposition to each other, and it is evi-
dent. Buridan enumerates the same qualifications in his question 11.
Marsilius question 11 runs: Is it possible to err about the principle?
Marsilius firstly approaches this problem from a purely philosophical
point of view. Of course one can err about the first principle, but not if
one thinks about it properly. However, secondly, one can approach the
problem in view of Gods omnipotence. Marsilius then presents three
problems (dubia). In the first, the question is whether God can cause a
belief in contradictory propositions supernaturally. The other two prob-
lems inquire about the nature of assent and its object, which I cannot
discuss in this paper.
Marsilius judges the first problem to be very difficult. He presents sev-
eral opinions. Some say that God cannot be the immediate cause of this
same assent, because he would deceive us. Others think that, absolutely
speaking, it is possible. God deceiving us cannot be considered as a sin
on his part.
Marsilius reacts to this latter suggestion. The solution is possible, he
thinks, but indeed improper to God. However, Marsilius is not particularly
happy with this and so takes another line, without explicitly saying that
he adheres to it. His solution is not the same as Buridans in the Lectura
Erfordiensis,21 but comes closer to Buridans in his Lectura ultima.
Marsilius clearly approaches the question primarily as a philosopher,
and gives the impression of just interpreting Aristotle.22 He draws a
distinction between an assent as such and an assent as signifying the
20Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 10 (K, f. 34va; V, f. 38ra): Con-

tradictio est maxima oppositio ex parte communitatis, simplicitatis, primitatis, repugnan-
tie et evidentie in non posse simul esse vera neque simul esse falsa. Patent prime quattuor
partes per primas quattuor conclusiones articuli precedentis, et quinta pars per sextam
eiusdem.
21There Buridan is at pains to defend the separability of accidents for theological rea-
sons. Marsilius does not bring this separability into play at all costs.
22Cf. Bakker, Inhrence, univocit et sparabilit, p. 212.
410 egbert p. bos
truth.23 These can exist separately without contradiction. Assent to con-

tradictory propositions as such can exist in the mind. By this consider-
ation he resolves his second and third doubts.
Of course, Marsilius recognises a supernatural order, in which God can
cause an assent in a stone without any proposition to which it assents.24
Presented with both parts of a contradictionboth presumably equally
compellingthe mind should respond by doubting both of them.25
As I said, Marsilius does not solve the question along the same lines as
Buridan. He arrives at the same result, however, and thereby challenges
the Aristotelian substance/accident model in which in the common course
of nature an accident necessarily inheres in a substance.
In his question 12, on the same matter, Buridan too considers this a dif-
ficult problem.26 In his answer a vetula (old lady) plays a part. She is a rep-
resentative of common sense, as Grellard points out.27 Buridans twelfth
question is about the possibility of erring. We find an opponent, or more
opponents, saying that an old lady was said to be in doubt when asked if
it was possible for her to run and not to run. She answered that this was
impossible. Next, the opponent asked here, if God could cause it. Then the
old woman was in doubt, and whoever is in doubt, can err, and therefore,
it is possible to err about the first principle.
Buridan gives a very short answer: the old woman did not err, but she
had hesitation and feared God.28 Scholars have discussed this answer.29 It
23Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K, f. 35ra; V, f. 40va): Et

ideo, quia assensus non sunt propositiones neque termini, non dicuntur contradictorii, sed
forme contrarie, quia successive et non simul possunt esse in eadem anima, nisi quis forte
obiective diceret eas contradictiones quia sunt de contradictoriis.
24Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K, f. 35vb; V, f. 40rb): Item,
staret Deum rem que est assensus, ponere in lapide.
25Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K, f. 35rb; V, f. 40vb): Ter-
tio, quod intellectus in hoc casu utramque partem contradictionis de qua sunt iste res,
dubitaret.
26John Buridan, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis 4, q. 12 (Paris: Iodocus
Badius Ascensius, 1518; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1964), f. 21va: Item, sicut dicebatur alias,
vetula erravit cum peterem ab ea, utrum possibile esset quod ipsa curreret et non curreret.
Et bene respondit quod hoc non poterat esse, Et quando querebam, nonne Deus bene
posset facere hoc, nescio, et sic dubitavit de primo principio. Modo, de quo dubitamus,
possumus errare.
27Referred to in C. Panaccio, Ockham and Buridan on Simple Supposition, in E. P. Bos
(ed.), Supposition Theory Revisited (Turnhout: Brepols, forthcoming).
28Buridan, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis 4, q. 12, (f. 22ra): Ad ulti-
mam dicitur quod vetula non erravit, sed solum formidinem habuit.
29L. M. de Rijk, Jean Buridan (c. 1292c. 1360): Eerbiedig ondermijner van het aristotelisch
substantie-denken (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Academie van Wetenschappen, 1994), p. 41.
is difficult to understand. Should we conceive the passage as irony? Or is

it indeed his view that God can produce contradictions?
Next, Marsilius question 12. He discusses the form of the first principle.
We have seen his solution above. The usual form in the Middle Ages is the
one we also find in Marsilius commentary: logici ponunt de quolibet esse
vel non esse et de nullo ambo simul (logicians assume of anything being
or not-being and of nothing both at the same time).30
Now question 13: Can not-being be understood? This question teaches
how to interpret negative propositions. This is the case in contradictions,
in which non-being is a part of the formula.
Here Marsilius finds an opportunity to discuss intentional verbs, such
as to know and to believe, when they are construed with empty terms
such as chymera or vacuum, expressions having no referent in the outside
world, and false propositions, such as a chymera is imagined, or under-
stood, if the terms have personal supposition, Marsilius says. His main
thesis is that such verbs cannot be truly affirmed of a term that does not
have supposition, that is, which does not refer to anything, for proposi-
tions like a chymera is imagined, or understood are simply false, in line
with his semantics.31
Now question 14, on which I shall concentrate here: Can two contradic-
tory propositions be true at the same time? This leads Marsilius to discuss
the nature of time, especially the present time. Is it divisible, as his master
Buridan says, or not? Is there a moment of time (instans temporis), or not?
If so, how should it be conceived? Is it divisible or not?
Marsilius first describes the view of his master, John Buridan. Accord-
ing to Marsilius, Buridan suggests that time is divisible, like a successive
thing. It is an objectivistic view.32
He divides question 14 into three main parts.33 In the first part which is
about the subject matter of the question itself (the quesitum), he analyses
30Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 12 (K, f. 38ra; V, f. 43ra).

31Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 13 (K, f. 38va; V, f. 43va): Ad
secundum est conclusio responsalis hec, quod hec verba intelligo, ymaginor, credo,
opinor et consimilia de nullo termino non supponente pro aliquo vere possunt predicari.
Patet quia affirmative non sunt vere nisi termini supponunt pro eisdem. Et ideo omnes
tales false sunt: chymera ymaginatur, chymera intelligitur, chymeram esse potest
ymaginari.
32Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 14 (K, f. 41rba; V, f. 46vb). Pro-
bat hoc, quia aliquid mutatur successive in tempore presenti, ergo habet se aliter et aliter
secundum prius et posterius, vel prius aliqualiter et posterius non taliter, vel econtra.
33Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 14 (K, f. 40va; V, f. 46ra): In hac
questione primo videbitur de quesito. Secundo iuxta materiam sexti argumenti videbitur
412 egbert p. bos
its meaning. It is important to have a proper understanding of how it is

formulated. First of all, it is important to know to which word at the same
time (simul) belongs. If we conceive it as belonging to can, we are speak-
ing about logical possibility.34 If we conceive it as belonging to true,35 we
are speaking about truth and things. In this respect Marsilius view is not
different from that of Buridan.
In the second part he investigates the part played by word order. We
cannot add not or all just like that, in order to make a contradiction.
The supposition of terms may vary, according to the word order and the
scope of not or all.
In the third part the problem is whether one can accept literally (de
virtute sermonis) the propositions Sortes is sitting and Sortes is not sit-
ting simultaneously as true. So Marsilius speaks about individuals, and
brings the problem of time into play.36 Here we hit upon an interesting
difference of view between him and Buridan.
Marsilius on Time
Marsilius has what we might call a subjectivistic conception of the present

time. In other words, and more precisely: a conception according to which
the present time is something in function of the human imagination. As
I said, Marsilius distinguishes imaginabilitas (along with possibilitas) as
one of the five aspects of time in a larger sense.37 Indeed, not everything
that can be imagined is naturally possible, but it may be possible super-
quomodo in singularibus ubi subiecto additur terminus aliter supponens quam totum sub-
iectum, debet sumi contradictio. Et in tertio iuxta materiam septimi argumenti videbitur
an hec sint concedende de virtute sermonis Sortes est sedens et Sortes non est sedens
et consimiles. Et de materia octavi argumenti videbitur in sexto, videlicet de solutione
insolubilium.
34Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 14 (K, f. 40va; V, f. 46ra): Con-
tradictoria sibi invicem contradicentia possunt simul esse vera prout ly simul determinat
hoc verbum possunt.
35Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K. f. 40va; V: f. 46rb): Iste
due propositiones contradictorie ad invicem possunt esse vere simul, neque etiam possunt
esse false simul, prout ly simul determinat esse verum vel esse falsum.
36Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K, f. 40va; V, f. 46rb): Item,
ex hoc patet quod respectu istius termini animam refert preponere vel postponere nega-
tionem, et tamen non refert si semper eodem modo supponeret quoad totum subiectum
singulare, cum in singularibus non refert preponere vel postponere negationem, secundo
Perihermeneias.
37See also E. P. Bos, Marsilius of Inghen: Treatises of the Properties of Terms; A first criti-
cal edition of the Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, Restrictiones and Alienationes
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), p. 102:78.
naturally. The aspect of time in a large sense (here: imaginability) can be

applied to the notion of time itself. Time is imaginable.
Buridan, however, has what might be called an objectivistic concep-
tion. He says that time is something successive just like motion with which
it is connected.38 In his logic, Buridan does not accept the time distinction
(in a large sense) of imaginabilitas.39 It would be worthwhile, I think, to
study Marsilius and Buridans views on time more closely. Their different
views on time arise from the fact, I think, that Aristotle was not very clear
about time in all respects.40 To what extent does he link time to move-
ment in his Physics,41 and to what extent is it mind-dependent?
Time Between Mind and Reality
In the first section of the third part of his question 14, Marsilius sketches
Buridans position. Note that the discussion is about the nature of the
present time, not about time as such. Marsilius does not do Buridan full
justice, as we shall see.
According to Marsilius, Buridans point of departure is that time is
divisible. There is no indivisible moment, Buridan says. Here he agrees
with Aristotle,42 but not every one in the Middle Ages does so.
Buridan, however, so Marsilius says, explains that one can say about,
e.g., the year 1380, that it is 1380, and that for that present time one can
accept Sortes is sitting and Sortes is not sitting as true, both in 1380.43
38Buridan, Subtilissime questiones super octo libros Phisicorum 4, q. 4 (Paris 1509; repr.
Frankfurt: Minerva, 1964, f. 98ra): Et sic vult Aristoteles dicere quod nichil in tempore est
secundum se totum simul nisi nunc si ponatur nunc indivisibile, et cum non ponatur, tunc
simpliciter verum est quod nichil est accipere de tempore, supple: quod fit totum simul, et
hoc est quia tempus est pure successivum.
39A recent and concise overview of the positions, including the Arabic one, can be
found in P. Adamson and C. Trifogli, Time, in H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval
Philosophy, 2 vols. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), vol. 2, pp. 131115.
40Although A. Maier in her Metaphysische Hintergrnde der Sptscholastischen Natur-
philosophie (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1935), chap. 2: Das Zeitproblem, pp.
47140, at pp. 63 and 132, made valuable observations on Buridan and Marsilius, she had
not all texts by these masters available, not, in any case, Marsilius commentary on the
Metaphysics.
41Aristotle, Physics 4.14.
42Buridan, Super octo libros Phisicorum 4, q. 4: Et ideo potest dici quod Aristoteles
intelligat istas conclusiones sub conditione et non categorematice, scilicet quod idem est
nunc in preterito et futuro, et quod illud est divisibile.
43Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K, f. 41rb; V, f. 47ra): Quam
fundat supponendo primo quod tempus presens est divisibile. Probat hoc, quia aliquid
mutatur successive in tempore presenti, ergo habet se aliter et aliter secundum prius et
posterius, vel prius aliqualiter et posterius non taliter, vel econtra.
414 egbert p. bos
So, according to Buridan, the present is divisible, in Marsilius words. One

may compare the present time with a whole which exists in the present
and that has many parts which also exist in the present. Time is some-
thing successive.44
One could ask, Marsilius says (just like Buridan), how much time one
should accept as being present. This depends on who are talking with
each other, Buridan says.
Like we saw in the text quoted and translated above, Marsilius disagrees
with his master. However, he gives him a helping hand. In the second
paragraph of his third section, Marsilius says that Buridans view is useful
when it comes to explaining the Eucharist. During the celebration of the
sacrament the priest has to pronounce the compulsory words: this is my
body or this is my blood. When he starts pronouncing it, the this refers
to the bread, when he finishes the formula, the word this refers to the
body of Christ. The same applies to the wine. This happens in the same
present time, indicated by is, which therefore is divisible.45
Marsilius holds another opinion. He notes that Aristotle correctly
teaches that whatever changes did not actually have the nature that it
has later. Further, Marsilius says, Buridans view runs counter to common
usage. For when one says It is 1380, this includes the present. Indeed, a
whole of time may exist, but that does not imply that the parts are present
to us for the alleged reason that the whole year is present. It depends on
how one conceives time: as a short or as a long time.46
Next, Marsilius notes that according to Buridan, one cannot contradict
one another, for one never knows whether one has a conception of a long
time or of a short time. Further, he says, according to Buridan it would
only be possible to contradict each other if two opponents were factually
present together. Then they exist within the same time.
44Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K, f. 41rb; V, f. 47ra): Secundo

supponit quod omne totum habens partes non est nisi cum partes sue sunt quia totum est
sue partes, ut dicitur.
45Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K. f. 41va; V, f. 48rb):
Secundo notandum quod hanc opinionem non recito quia eam intendo simpliciter rep-
robare, cum sit probabilis. Ymmo, oportet quod quandoque in verbis Sacre Scripture ali-
quam partem temporis concedamus esse que tamen pro instanti ymaginario presenti non
est, nec instans presens in se includit. Quod patet quia dicunt doctores Sacre Scripture
communiter quod in consecratione sacramenti altaris ante completam prolationem ver-
borum ibi non sit corpus dominicum, sed solum panis.
46Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K, f. 41vb; V, f. 47vb): Nam
forte unus qui dicit Sortem sedere, loquitur de tempore presenti longo et alius, qui dicit
eum non sedere, loquitur de brevi, et sic staret ambas veras esse, quia potest non sedere
hora prima et sedere hora vesperorum, quam sic loquentes concedunt esse veram.
Buridan seems to have what can be called objectivistic being in mind

when speaking about time, especially about the present time. In Meta-
physische Hintergrnde Maier says in a note that Buridan came close to a
definition of absolute time (and of absolute space), although he did not
formulate it explicitly.47 So he suggests that time is a kind of container,
really distinct from the substances and accidents contained in it. Perhaps
he could not complete this line of thought because he was too attached
to Aristotles scheme of substances and accidents, existing in a certain
moment.
In the third paragraph of the third part of the fourteenth question Mar-
silius presents his own view. It is that, though an indivisible moment may
not be some particular thing in time itself, it can be imagined to be one.
Time is not endlessly divisible.
Marsilius gives two interesting grounds for his assumption. First, when
studying the planets astronomers use imaginary circles and draw them
wherever a planet happens to be. So imagination is in this sense useful for
science.48 Further, medicine is helped by imagination, for we imagine a
well-tempered complexion of the body, which according to Marsilius, can
exist only by divine intervention, that is, miraculously.49 So what is imag-
inable is possible, though not naturally. In his commentary on Aristotles
De caelo et mundo, Marsilius remarkably often uses the word imaginor and
does appeal to the imagination to understand the celestial motions.50 In
his commentary on the same work, Buridan does not.
47A. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergrnde, p. 133. For absolute space, see p. 350, n. 10,
with quotation from Buridans Super octo libros Phisicorum 4, q. 1.
48Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 11 (K. f. 41rb; V, f. 47ra): Secundo
quia astronomi in celo ymaginantur circulos indivisibiles ut <h>orizontem et consimiles;
similiter centra indivisibilia, ut centrum solis. Dicunt enim quod dies artificialis proprie
dictus incipit a contactu centri solis cum <h>orisonte ex parte orientis. Modo, mensura
correspondens huiusmodi contactui ymaginatur esse instans sive nunc.
49Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 14 (K, f. 42ra; V, f. 47vb): Quem
admodum enim in medicina complexiones corporum iudicantur in ordine ad complex-
ionem temperatam que nec est nec potest esse sine miraculo.
50E.g. Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in De caelo et mundo 1, q. 5 (MS Cuyk en St.
Agatha C. 12, f. 129va): Primum: eccentricus in celo movetur motu simplici: unde eccen-
tricus est unus circulus imaginativus in celo qui movetur cum celo et est in una parte
propinquior ad centrum quam in alia. Patet: quia licet alique partes sint magis elongate a
centro, tamen totalis circulus est eque propinquus. Many more examples from that text
could be given. See my contribution Cuijk en St. Agantha, Kruisherenklooster MS C no. 12,
pars 2, ff. 14171 (fin XIVe s. 1397), in L. M. de Rijk and O. Weijers (eds.), Repertorium com-
mentariorum medii aevi in Aristotelem latinorum quae in bibliothecis publicis Neerlandicis
asservantur (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Academie van Wetenschappen, 1981), pp. 717.
416 egbert p. bos
So far for Marsilius opposition to Buridan. However, there is an anony-

mous objection to Marsilius view in his commentary, namely, that
according to this view one can never contradict another, because every
conception of time exists in the imagination.51 The opponent concludes
that if we follow Marsilius, contradiction is impossible, because the dispu-
tants refer to different time distinctions.
Marsilius replies that with the help of the intellect (per iuvamen intel-
lectus) the contradictory propositions are referred to the same moment,
just as in the game of obligations.52 According to him, when speaking
about time, man imagines an indivisible present. This present moment
has no counterpart in reality, though it can be imagined.53 The past and
the future are in function of this imaginary present moment. The present
now continues the future and the past. In the case of contradictory state-
ments, they can be true at the same time according to the imaginations of
the persons speaking with one another.54 Marsilius view indeed sounds
like that of Augustine.55 Augustine defends a subjectivistic view of time in
the famous passage of Confessiones 11.5.
I conclude that Buridan has a more objectivistic view of time compared
to Marsilius. Marsilius does not do Buridan full justice. It should in fact
be remarked that also for Buridan, time does not exist without the intel-
lect. In his Physica 4, q. 16, Buridan asks whether there can be time even
though an intellective soul does not exist. He concludes: si non posset esse
51Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 14 (K, f. 42rbva; V, f. 47rb):

Tertio, secundum hunc modum michi loquenti nullus postea posset contradicere, cum
mea locutio feratur ad instans continuativum temporis locutionis mee, et locutio sequen-
tis referatur ad tempus presens continuatum per instans coexistens locutioni postea
loquentis, et sic ista propositio non referretur ad idem tempus cum mea, ergo nec michi
contradiceret.
tertium quod contradictio loquentis fit per iuvamen intellectus referentis propositionem
postea dictam ad idem instans, pro quo prima formabatur, quemadmodum in arte obliga-
toria vel in disputatione omnes actus intelliguntur referri ad idem instans.
53Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 12 (K, f. 37va, V, f. 41vb): Nullus
enim posset ymaginari ens esse non ens, tamen, cum nihil esset, bene videtur ymaginabile
ad bonum intellectum. Et ideo tertio pro alia opinione est notandum quod, licet instans
indivisibile abstractive dictum nichil sit in tempore, tamen ipsum est ymaginabile, et eius
ymaginatio utilis est.
54He explains the case of inception. On the relation between instans and incipere,
see C. Wilson, William of Heytesbury: Medieval logic and the rise of mathematical physics
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), chap. 2.
55Thanks to Dr. Mary Sirridge (Louisiana) for this suggestion. Recently, J. W. Carter has
argued that Augustine also upheld a cosmologically and mathematically structured notion
of time, see his St. Augustine on Time, Time Numbers and Enduring Objects, Vivarium
49 (2011), 30123.
intellectus, non posset esse tempus (if there cannot be an intellect, there
cannot be time). Buridan indeed links time to an intellect and he also
presents a mind-dependent conception in this respect.
Nevertheless, he conceives the present as divisible, and does not men-
tion any part played by the imagination. He interprets time as something
successive, and denies the existence of an indivisible moment in any
sense. Marsilius, by contrast, is subjectivistic.
One might expect Marsilius to present Buridans views as they can be
found in his commentary on the Metaphysics. However, the words that
Marsilius attributes to Buridan can be found almost literally in Buridans
Longer questions on the Perihermeneias.56 Indeed, Marsilius also refers in
his commentary to that work of Buridans.57
As I said, Marsilius is not altogether fair to Buridan. Buridans fifth the-
sis of the ninth question to book 1 of the Perihermeneias has it that two
mutually contradictory propositions are true at the same time. This can
be proved, Buridan says, because there are no indivisible moments, and
therefore we must understand by present divisible time. It is possible
that in one part of that time one proposition is true and in another the
contradictory proposition is true as well.58
In his commentary, Buridan adds a modification, namely, that our
propositions in the case mentioned are not really contradictory. For to
have a contradiction it is essential to reduce the intention of the speaker
to the same time. However, they are only accidentally contradictory,
for only as regards their words.59 Marsilius does not report Buridans
qualification.
56Buridan, Questiones longe super librum Perihermeneias 1, q. 9 (ed. R. van der Lecq
(Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1983), pp. 4145).
57Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 14 (K, f. 41rb; V, f. 47ra): Et
ad Philosophum in secundo Perihermeneias, dicit, quod intelligitur distribuendo tempus
antecedentis vel addendo in consequente pro eodem tempore adequate, ut Sortes pro
quolibet tempore presenti est non sedens, ergo non est sedens, vel Sortes est non sedens,
ergo pro isto tempore adequate non est sedens.
58Buridan, Questiones longe super librum Perihermeneias 1, q. 9 (p. 43:2933): Quinta
conclusio est quod due invicem contradictorie sunt vere in eodem tempore. Probatur, quia
ex quo non est dare instantia indivisibilia, oportet per presens intelligere tempus divisibile.
Et possibile est quod in una eius parte una est vera et in alia parte alia. Ideo in isto tempore
utraque est vera et utraque falsa.
59Buridan, Questiones longe super librum Perihermeneias 1, q. 9 (p. 44:2529): Sed tunc
manifestum est quod nostre propositiones non sunt secundum veritatem contradictorie,
quia ad contradicendum oportet reducere intentionem totaliter ad idem tempus, sed
dicuntur contradictorie secundum quid, quia sunt secundum vocem totaliter similes con-
tradictoriis.
418 egbert p. bos
According to Marsilius, a contradiction can take place in the same time;

the intellect helps us just as in an actual conversation two opponents can
refer to the same moment.60 His view on time as imaginary stands in oppo-
sition to that of Buridan. Marsilius thinks that his own view comes closer
to the rules of logic and philosophy, and usage of people in general.61 As
to Marsilius view, Maier has suggested that he follows Albert of Saxony in
this respect. She quotes Marsilius: quivis motus qui animae humanae potest
fieri notus sub sua ratione propria potest esse tempus (any motion that may
be known to the human soul under its proper essence, may be a time).
Marsilius seems to mean that the soul conceives of the motion properly
as a particular kind of motion and in that sense it may function as time.
This, Maier concludes, is the forerunner to a subjectivistic and relativistic
conception. In Averroes words we find the early beginnings of this con-
ception, she notes, in Marsilius we find the radical consequence.62
Conclusion
Like his master, Marsilius challenges, with the help of the principle of
non-contradiction, the Aristotelian scheme of the inseparability of sub-
stance and accident. He does so in a more philosophical way than Buri-
dan, at least than Buridan did in his earlier works.
Second, when solving the problem whether two contradictory state-
ments can be true at the same time, Marsilius conception of time appears
to be different in principle from that of his master. Buridans idea is in a
sense objectivistic; Marsilius defines time in a subjectivistic way, namely,
in function of the human imagination. Opponents raise problems about
the possibility of contradiction, if one holds a view like Marsilius. This
may, indeed, be a problem to Marsilius.
Marsilius explicitly makes clear how imagination plays a fundamental
role in his astronomy and medicine and helps to understand space, both
in the cosmos and in the human body.

tertium quod contradictio loquentis fit per iuvamen intellectus referentis propositionem
postea dictam ad idem instans, pro quo prima formabatur, quemadmodum in arte obliga-
toria vel in disputatione omnes actus intelliguntur referri ad idem instans.
61Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Metaphysicam 4, q. 14 (K, f. 41va; V, f. 47vb): Sed
ideo recitavi eam, quia valde differt a modo loquendi communi, et a modo Philosophi.
62Maier, Metaphysische Hintergrnde, pp. 13233.
24.Logic, Language and Medieval Political Thought
Roberto Lambertini
In the prologue to his literal commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian

Oeconomica, Bartholomew of Bruges reminds the reader that the parts of
logic that are instrumental to practical philosophy are Rhetoric and Poet-
ics.1 Not everybody in his times would have agreed with this claim of the
Flemish master. Still, there was a wide-spread agreement on the peculiar
nature of practical philosophy, which does not allow for the same degree
of certainty as other parts of philosophy. This point had already been
emphasized by Aristotle himself in book one of his Nicomachean Ethics,
where he writes that demanding logical demonstrations from a teacher of
rhetoric is clearly about as reasonable as accepting mere plausibility from
a mathematician.2 From Thomas Aquinas to Giles of Rome, and to Dante
Alighieri, medieval authors approaching practical and, more specifically,
political matters underline that they will proceed figuraliter et typo.3
A lesser-known theologian, Henry of Carretto, writes explicitly, around
1One can find excerpts from this text in P. Blaek, Die mittelalterliche Rezeption der
aristotelischen Philosophie der Ehe: Von Robert Grosseteste bis Bartholomus von Brgge
(1246/12471309) (Leiden: Brill, 2007), esp. p. 224.
2Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.3.1094b2527. I have used the following English
translation: Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J. A. K. Thomson, revised by
H. Tredennick, introduction by J. Barnes, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 5. For the
Latin translation used by most of the authors mentioned, see Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea:
Translatio Roberti Grosseteste Lincolnienis sive Liber Ethicorum; Recensio recognita, ed.
R.-A. Gauthier, AL 16.13, fasc. 4 (Leiden: Brill; Brussels: Descle de Brouwer, 1973), p. 376:
Proximum enim videtur et mathematicum persuadentem acceptare, et rethoricum
demonstraciones expetere.
3Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum 2.2 (ed. R.-A. Gauthier, 2 vols. (Rome: ad
Sanctae Sabinae, 1969), vol. 1, p. 80): omnis sermo qui est de operabilibus, sicut est iste,
debet tradi tipo, id est exemplariter vel similitudinarie, et non secundum certitudinem;
Giles of Rome, De regimine principum libri tres 1.1.1 (ed. H. Samaritanius (Rome: apud Bar-
tolomaeum Zannettum, 1607; repr. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1967), p. 2): oportet enim in
talibus typo et figuraliter pertransire; on rhetoric as the logic of practical philosophy in
Giles of Rome, see the long, although not always persuasive, article by U. Staico, Retorica
e politica in Egidio Romano, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 3 (1992),
175; Dante, Monarchia 1.2 (ed. B. Nardi (Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi Editore, 1979), p. 284).
Although I prefer Bruno Nardis commented edition and refer to it in this paper, I am
aware of the existence of many other good commentaries, among which one should not
forget R. Imbach and C. Fleler (eds.), Dante Alighieri, Monarchia: Studienausgabe; Einlei-
tung, bersetzung und Kommentar (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1989).
420 roberto lambertini
1323, that one should not expect, in practical philosophy, the degree of
certainty and exactness found in Euclids demonstrations.4
This widespread opinion notwithstanding, I shall here provide some
examples of the use of logicalnot rhetoricalarguments in political
treatises. The reason for my stubbornness is twofold. First, it rests on
an institutional fact: most of the political thinkers I deal with are more
likely to have been exposed to an intensive training in logic than in rheto-
ric. The second consideration is of a more autobiographical nature: the
present contribution should also show how a stay in Copenhagen under
Sten Ebbesens supervision could be extremely important for a student,
like myself, devoted to intellectual history and the field of medieval politi-
cal thought.5
Syncategoremata
And whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and
whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.6 These
words from Matthews Gospel (Mt 16:19, quoted from King James version)
were not surprisingly the object of different interpretations in the debates
about the extension and limits of papal power in the Middle Ages. Pope
Innocent III himself had remarked that, in uttering these words, Jesus did
not allow for any exceptions: nihil excipiens qui dixit Quodcumque.
Innocents words were, in turn, inserted in corpore iuris, more precisely in
4Henry of Caretto (Henricus de Carecto), Tractatus de statu dispensativo Christi c. 103

(MS Vatican Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Borghes. 294, f. 50v): Verum, quia in ordine
rerum per se ordinatarum ad vivere et bene vivere...non est tanta connexio quanta in
dogmatibus et conclusionibus Euclidis, ideo secundum diversas voluntates et vota, vel
secundum diversas leges, ex diversis causis, aliter accidere potest in hoc ordine in multis.
About this Franciscan author, see A. Emili, R. Martorelli Vico and R. Lambertini, Un pro-
getto di edizione del Tractatus de statu dispensativo Christi di Enrico del Carretto, Picenum
Seraphicum n.s. 2223 (20032004), 34752; A. Emili, Un teologo francescano tra Bologna
e Avignone: profilo culturale di Enrico del Carretto, Memorie domenicane n.s. 39 (2008),
15773.
5What follows is far from being the result of a comprehensive, let alone exhaustive
investigation. It resembles rather the summary of a future book. Also, footnotes are limited
to the very essential references.
6Translation taken from the site: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/k/kjv/ (last visited:
29/02/2012). For the critical edition of the Vulgate: Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem,
ed. R. Weber (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994), p. 1551: quodcumque ligaveris
super terram erit ligatum in caelis et quodcumque solveris in terra erit solutum in caelis.
logic, language and medieval political thought 421
the Liber Extra.7 In the same Liber Extra, however, one could find herme-
neutical principles suggesting that a verbum generale should not always
be understood as having a universal meaning. The Glossa ordinaria to the
Liber Extra also contained the following statement: verbum generale sepe
restringitur.8 Matthew 16:19 remained understandably a favourite aucto-
ritas for curialist authors. Giles of Rome refers to it at least four times in
his De ecclesiastica potestate, without even mentioning the possibility of
narrowing the scope of the expression.9 A similar attitude can be found
in James of Viterbo.10 Arguing for a substantial limitation of papal powers,
Ockham will return to a ratio ad absurdum, showing that if quodcumque
is taken literally, Jesus sentence will lead to consequences that nobody
is ready to accept, such as that Peter was granted a divine omnipotence.
While, however, even William of Ockham contented himself with a vague
opposition between generaliter proferre on one hand and excipere on
the other,11 Dante Alighieri argued along the lines of a more technical
logical terminology. First of all, the Italian poet casts the standard papist
argument from Matthew 16 in syllogistic form, as if his adversaries were
arguing in the following way:
Peter was able to bind and loose all things;
Peters successor is able to do whatever Peter was able to do;
therefore Peters successor is able to loose and bind all things.12
Dantes confutation focuses on the major premise. He remarks that
the universal sign omne, which is implied in quodcumque, is never
7Liber Extra 1.33.6 (ed. E. Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Tauchnitz,
1881; repr. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1959), vol. 2, col. 198).
8Glossa ordinaria to Liber Extra 2.28.65 (in Decretales Gregorii Papae IX suae integritati
una cum glossis restitutae (Rome: In aedibus Populi Romani, 1582), col. 972).
9See, for example, Giles of Rome, De ecclesiastica potestate 2.12 (ed. R. Scholz (Weimar:
H. Bhlaus Nachfolger, 1929; repr. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1961), p. 103): Non enim dixit
Dominus Petro: Si hunc vel illum ligaveris super terram, erit ligatus et in celis, sed univer-
saliter protulit.
10James of Viterbo, De regimine christiano, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Leiden: Brill,
2009); for an example, see pp. 18688.
1 1 William of Ockham, Breviloquium 2.14 (ed. H. S. Offler (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), pp. 13739.
12Dante, Monarchia 3.8.3 (p. 462): Petrus potuit solvere omnia et ligare; successor
Petri potest quicquid Petrus potuit; ergo successor Petri potest omnia solvere et ligare.
The text is identical in Dante Alighieri, Monarchia, ed. P. Shaw (Florence: Societ Dan
tesca Italiana, Edizione Nazionale, Le Lettere, 2009), p. 417. I am using R. Kays translation:
Dantes Monarchia: Translated with a commentary (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediae-
val Studies, 1998), p. 249; one should not forget another important English translation by
P. Shaw, Dante: Monarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
distributed beyond the scope of the distributed term. The examples he

offers are rather obvious: all animals run, all men run, all grammarians
run.13 To determine, however, the scope of quodcumque in this context
is not that easy, but it is the real issue at stake in the whole discussion. In
his first move, Dante has recourse to a reductio ad absurdum of the abso-
lute understanding of whatsoever in this context.14 Secondly, he looks
to the evangelical passage itself for a criterion according to which the dis-
tribution can be narrowed. The solution is found in the first part of Jesus
promise: I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven.15 From
this Dante draws the inference that Peter was made the doorkeeper of
the kingdom of heaven, and therefore the scope of whatever can be nar-
rowed accordingly to Everything which pertains to that office thou shalt
have power to bind and loose.16 At first sight, the pope suffers a degrada-
tion to the successor of an humble doorkeeper. As a matter of fact, since
he is, after all, the doorkeeper of a kingdom, and not of the least important
of kingdoms, in the following chapters Dante struggles to show that the
rights of the empire (this is what matters for him the most) do not belong
to this very special kind of door-keeping.
13Dante, Monarchia 3.8.45 (pp. 46264): Et ideo dico quod hoc signum universale
omne, quod includitur in quodcumque nunquam distribuit extra ambitum termini dis-
tributi. Nam si dico omne animal currit, omne distribuit pro omni eo quod sub genere
animalis comprehenditur. Cf. Monarchia, ed. Shaw, p. 417.
14Dante, Monarchia 3.8.7 (p. 464): Unde cum dicitur quodcunque ligaveris, si illud
quodcunque summeretur absolute, verum esset quod dicunt; et non solum hoc facere
posset, quin etiam solvere uxorem a viro et ligare ipsam alteri vivente primo: quod nullo
modo potest. Posset etiam solvere me non penitentem: quod etiam facere ipse Deus non
posset. Cf. Monarchia, ed. Shaw, pp. 41718. The only difference is ly instead of illud.
On this problem see O. Capitani, Spigolature minime sul III della Monarchia, now in
O. Capitani, Chiose minime dantesche (Bologna: Ptron, 1983), pp. 5782, esp. pp. 7177.
15Mt 16:19 (Biblia sacra Vulgata, p. 1551): tibi dabo claves regni caelorum.
16Dante, Monarchia 3.8.7 (p. 464): Cum ergo ita sit, manifestum est quod non absolute
summenda est illa distributio, sed respective ad aliquid. Quod autem illa respiciat satis est
evidens considerato illo quod sibi conceditur, circa quod illa distributio subiungitur. Dicit
enim Cristus Petro: Tibi dabo claves regni celorum, hoc est Faciam te hostiarium regni
celorum. Deinde subdit et quodcunque: quod est omne quod, id est et omne quod
ad istud offitium spectabit solvere poteris et ligare. Et sic signum universale quod inclu-
ditur in quodcunque contrahitur in sua distributione ab offitio clavium regni celorum:
et sic assummendo, vera est illa propositio; absolute vero non, ut patet. Cf. Monarchia, ed.
Shaw, p. 418.
Syllogisms
Skimming Dantes Monarchia, one realizes that for him it is extremely

important to make explicit also the logicalespecially syllogisticstruc-
ture of his arguments, not only when confuting his adversaries, but also
in the pars construens of his work. An emblematic example can be taken
from book one, where Dante argues in favour of a universal monarchy. In
chapter eleven, he claims that only a universal sovereign can be just to the
highest degree and therefore ensure that the whole world is ruled accord-
ing to justice in the highest degree. He begins his treatment of the issue
with the following argument, where Monarch means, as often in Dantes
work, universal emperor:
Justice is at its highest degree in the world when present in the most willing
and powerful subject;
only a Monarch is such a subject;
therefore Justice subsisting in a sole Monarch is at its highest degree in the
world.17
To this argument Dante adds a rather technical remark: This prosyllogism
runs through the second figure with intrinsic negation, and is like this:
All B is A; only C is A; therefore only C is B. That is, All B is A; nothing
except C is A; therefore nothing except C is B.18 In the second structure
one can recognize a sort of modified Camestres, with the addition of the
preter C clause. In Dantes analysis, this is most probably called a prosyl-
logism because its conclusion coincides with the minor premise of the
syllogismso to speakwhich he has phrased at the beginning of the
chapter, namely:
The world is disposed for the best when Justice is at its highest degree in it;
Justice is at its highest degree only under a Monarch;
therefore, in order that the world may be disposed for the best, there is
needed a Monarchy, or Empire.19
17Dante, Monarchia 1.9.8 (pp. 33436): Ex hac itaque declaratione sic arguatur: iustitia
potissima est in mundo quando volentissimo et potentissimo subiecto inest; huiusmodi
solus Monarcha est; ergo soli Monarche insistens iustitia in mundo potissima est. Cf.
Monarchia, ed. Shaw, p. 351. I am using again Kays translation (p. 55), with some minor
modification.
18Dante, Monarchia 1.11.9 (p. 336): Iste prosillogismus currit per secundam figuram
cum negatione intrinseca, et est similis huic: omne B est A; solum C est A: ergo solum
C est B. Quod est: omne B est A; nullum preter C est A: ergo nullum preter C est B. Cf.
Monarchia, ed. Shaw, p. 351.
19Dante, Monarchia 1.11.9:12 (pp. 32628): mundus optime dispositus est cum iusti-
tia in eo potissima est...Iustitia potissima est solum sub Monarcha, ergo ad optimam
One could wonder whether Dantes argument gains in strength and con-
clusiveness through this transposition into syllogistic terms. From the
viewpoint of the historian, one should recall, perhaps, that in his refuta-
tion of Dantes Monarchy, the Dominican lector Guido Vernani from Rim-
ini avoids any reference to logic, and concentrates his attacks on other
features of the work.20 At first glance, one has the impression that Dante,
taking the floor in a debate that was unusual to him, felt the need to show
that he had a strong command of logic too. One should remember that
Dante had an intellectual background that was quite different from that
of his adversaries and most probably insisted on these aspects to make
sure, in front of his audience, that he could compete with theologians
at the same level.21 This attitude of the Poet strongly reminds us of the
devil Dante himself portrays in Inferno, canto 27. This devil, after snatch-
ing the soul of the evil counsellor Guido da Montefeltro from the hands
of Francis of Assisi, says to him in a mocking tone: Forse tu non pensavi
chio loico fossi!
chassolver non si pu chi non si pente,
n pentere e volere insieme puossi
per la contradizion che nol consente.
Oh me dolente! come mi riscossi
quando mi prese dicendomi: Forse
tu non pensavi chio loico fossi!22.
In my opinion, that Dante wanted to show his logical skill because he
was facing a certain audience does not imply that we need not take
Dante seriously when he has recourse to logic.23 On the contrary, Andrea
mundi dispositionem requiritur esse Monarchiam sive Imperium. Cf Monarchia, ed. Shaw,
p. 350.
20On this topic Chenevals contribution remains extremely important; see F. Chene
val, Die Rezeption der Monarchia Dantes bis zur Editio Princeps im Jahre 1599: Metamor-
phosen eines philosophischen Werkes (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1995), pp. 11750. See also
A. K. Cassell, The Monarchia Controversy: An historical study with accompanying transla-
tions of Dante Alighieris Monarchia, Guido Vernanis Refutation of the Monarchia Composed
by Dante and Pope John XXIIs Bull, Si Fratrum (Washington: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2004).
21In his commentary on the Monarchia, R. Kay (p. 56) suggests that Dantes choice for
such an intensive use of logical terminology could depend on his intended audience, who
would need a detailed and explicit explanation of the logical structure of his arguments. I
do not think that Kays opinion necessarily contradicts my opinion.
22Dante, Divina Commedia, Inferno, c. 27, vv. 11823.
23Scholars such as Bruno Nardi, Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, and Alfonso Maier showed,
on the contrary, that deeper insight into Dantes work is possible thanks to a better know
ledge of the philosophical practice with which he was acquainted.
Tabarronis ground-breaking article on Monarchia 3.2.6,24 but also recent

contributions by other scholars show that one can even make persuasive
suggestions for several textual emendations of the modern critical edi-
tions of the Monarchia based on a better awareness of Dantes acquain-
tance with the logical traditions of his time. The difficult task of editing
Dantes political masterpiece has usually been accepted by excellent phi-
lologists who had little interest in medieval logic. Luckily, the situation
is changing: new projects aiming at a critical edition of the Monarchia
are under way. Diego Quaglionis work is about to be published,25 while
Paolo Chiesa and Andrea Tabarroni have embarked on a similar enter-
prise.26 This allows us to hope for a substantial improvement both of the
text and its interpretation.27
Relations
As a matter of fact, Dante does not limit himself to casting some of his
arguments in logical form, but also shows awareness of problems that
might be relevant to semantics. The most striking example occurs in
book three, chapter eleven, where Dante fights a version of the notorious
papist argument of reductio ad unum, which aims to show the necessity
of reducing the whole of Christendom to unity under the leadership of the
pope. Once we concede that one principle is necessary for securing the
unity, in this case of mankind, we seem compelled to choose between
the pope and the emperor, with rather obvious results.28 To counter this
move, Dante remarks that, while the pope and the emperor, insofar as
24A. Tabarroni, Non velle o non nolle? Una proposta di emendazione rivalutata per
Mon. III, II, 6, Pensiero politico medievale 1 (2003), 2740.
25For an anticipation of his results, see D. Quaglioni, Un nuovo testimone per ledizione
della Monarchia di Dante: il Ms. Add. 6891 della British Library,Laboratoire italien 11
(2011), 23180, http://laboratoireitalien.revues.org/595.
26The project is available at http://www.centropiorajna.it/NECOD/OPERE%20DANTE_
progetto%20ed%206.pdf.
27Also the discussion about the controversial chronology of the work is lively again.
See C. Dolcini, Per la cronologia del trattato politico dantesco: Risposta a Enrico Fenzi,
Pensiero politico medievale 5 (2007), 14550 (with reference to previous contributions on
the issue); and more recently, O. Capitani, La questione della datazione della Monarchia:
Il senso concettuale e istituzionale della polemica di Dante contro la funzione costituzi-
nale degli electores del re dei Romani, Studi medievali, 3 serie, 51 (2010), 92153.
28Dante, Monarchia 3.11.12 (pp. 48082), renders the argument of his adversaries in
the following way: Omnia que sunt unius generis reducuntur ad unum, quod est mensura
omnium que sub illo genere sunt; sed omnes homines sunt unius generis: ergo debent
reduci ad unum, tamquam ad mensuram omnium rerum. Et cum summus Antistes et
they are human beings, belong to the same genus, pope and emperor
do not designate a substance, but a substance insofar as an accidental
form inheres in it. In this case, the accidental form is a relation. One of
these two accidental forms is called papatum, and the other imperiatum.29
To put it briefly, while pope and emperor as human beings belong to the
category of substance, and among substances to the same species, namely,
man, pope and emperor designate relations that, although both belong-
ing to the same category, are essentially different and cannot be reduced
to unity.30
The idea that the category of relation is fundamental for understanding
the world of politics and for the semantics of the language we use to speak
about it, is, of course, not an idea that is original to Dante. On the con-
trary, one could mention several examples of this idea. In his famous text
Quid ponat ius vel dominium, Peter John Olivi raises the question whether
the right (ius) that a king possesses over his kingdom adds anything to
him and to his subjects.31 Olivi argues at length that such a right, which
should be understood as a respectus or a habitudo, does not add any new
Imperator sint homines, si conclusio illa est vera, oportet quod reducantur ad unum homi
nem. Et cum Papa non sit reducendus ad alium... Cf. Monarchia, ed. Shaw, p. 426.
29Dante, Monarchia 3.11.4 (p. 484): Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod aliud est
esse hominem, aliud est esse Papam, et eodem modo aliud est esse hominem, aliud esse
Imperatorem, sicut aliud est esse hominem, alius est esse patrem et dominum. Homo enim
est id quod est per formam substantialem, per quam sortitur spetiem et genus, et per
quam reponitur sub predicamento substantie; pater vero est id quod est per formam acci-
dentalem, que est relatio per quam sortitur spetiem quandam et genus, et reponitur sub
genere ad aliquid, sive relationis. Cf. Monarchia, ed. Shaw, p. 428.
30Dante, Monarchia 3.11.4 (pp. 48486): Si ergo Papatus et Imperiatus, cum sint rela-
tiones superpositionis, habeant reduci ad respectum superpositionis, a quo respectu cum
suis differentialibus descendunt, Papa et Imperator, cum sint relativa, reduci habebunt
ad aliquod unum in quo reperiatur ipse respectus superpositionis... Cf. Monarchia, ed.
Shaw, p. 428; Capitani has already pointed to Dantes use of these terms, cf. Capitani,
Spigolature minime, p. 59, n. 4.
31The text is edited in F. Delorme, Question de P. J. Olivi quid ponat ius vel domi
nium ou encore De signis voluntariis, Antonianum 20 (1945), 30930. A. Tabarroni,
Francescanesimo e riflessione politica sino ad Ockham, in Etica e politica: le teorie dei
Frati mendicanti nel Due e Trecento; atti del XXVI Convegno Internazionale, Assisi 1517
ottobre 1998 (Spoleto: CISAM, 1999), pp. 20330 marked a real progress with respect to
the preceding discussions influenced by P. Grossi, Usus facti La nozione di propriet
nellinaugurazione dellet nuova, Quaderni Fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico
moderno 1 (1972), 287355 (earlier repr. in O. Capitani (ed.), Una economia politica nel
Medioevo (Bologna: Patrn, 1987), pp. 158; now in P. Grossi, Il dominio e le cose: Percezioni
medievali e moderne dei diritti reali (Milano: Giuffr, 1992), pp. 12389).
form to the subjects bound under it32 but still posits something real.33 I
cannot on this occasion reconstruct the subtle arguments used by Olivi
to balance between understanding the power relation as implying an
essence and the risk of denying any degree of reality whatsoever to the
habitudines connecting individuals in a political reality. I limit myself to
pointing out that some decades later another Franciscan theologian, Peter
Auriol, discussed this issue again, reaching the conclusion that respectus
dominii et servitutis...est in sola apprehensione et non existens in re.34
Auriol argues that in order to establish a relation such as that existing
between a servant and his master, the qualities inherent in them are not
sufficient. Here, the Franciscan theologian is clearly referring to Aristotles
doctrine of slavery and its medieval reception, in which Aristotles claims
concerning slavery were in fact applied also to other relations of social
subordination.35 As is well known, the Stagirite traces back the relation-
ship between master and slave to different natural features of the indi-
vidual: some human beings are physically strong but intellectually weak,
so that they need to be guided by other human beings who, on the con-
trary, are physically weaker but intellectually more gifted. Auriol objects
that in addition to such qualities, and sometimes in spite of such predis-
positions, the power relation is put into being by a mutual obligation,
be it spontaneous or forced.36 From the paramount role played by such
32Peter John Olivi, Quid ponat ius, p. 323: Ad quorum intelligentiam absque preiudicio
sententie melioris videtur probabiliter dici posse quod predicte habitudines vere ponunt
aliquid reale, non tamen addunt aliquam diversam essentiam informantem illa subiecta,
quorum et in quibus esse dicuntur.
33Peter John Olivi, Quid ponat ius, p. 329: Ad cuius pleniorem evidentiam sciendum
primo quod potestas regia vel quecumque alia consimilis vocatur potestas non quia ad
modum potentiarum activarum ex se influat et imprimat actiones in aliquod patiens, set
potius quia ex ordine divine et humane voluntatis et iustitie preceptum datum a rege
habet talem vim quod homines sui regni tenentur obedire...
34Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in primum librum sententiarum pars prima et secunda
d. 30 (Rome: ex Typographia Vaticana, 1596, p. 671).
35See C. Fleler, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im spten Mit-
telalter, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Grner, 1992), esp. vol. 1, pp. 2985; C. Fleler, Ontologie
und Politik: Quod racio principantis et subiecti sumitur ex racione actus et potencie,
Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie 41 (1994), 44562.
36Peter Auriol, Commentarium in Primum librum Sententiarum d. 30 (p. 671): Sed mani-
festum est, quod non sufficit primum ad fundandum dominium et servitutem; licet enim
intellectu pollentes, et corpore deficientes sint apti nati naturaliter dominari hiis, qui e
contrario sunt corpore pollentes, et intellectu deficientes, ut Philosophus dicit I Polit., nihi-
lominus ultra hoc requiritur mutua obligatio. Non enim omnes qui tales sunt naturaliter
de facto servi et domini sunt. Patet ergo quod dominium mutuam exigit obligationem.
Talis autem obligatio vel est voluntaria, vel violenta.
obligation in establishing the relationship between master and servant,

Auriol infers that such habitudines exist only in apprehension, not in the
things themselves.37
Fallacies
Syncategoremata, syllogisms, relations. The concluding discussion in

this overview is devoted to fallacies. It is definitely not surprising that in
polemical texts (and medieval political treatises are very often written for
polemical purposes) the terminology connected to the tradition of falla-
cies surfaces time and again. Detecting a mistake in the inference of the
adversary can always be a smart move. Ockhams Opus Nonaginta Dierum
is definitely polemical, and, although centred around the debate on the
Franciscan poverty, also a political work. As is well known, Ockhams work
is structured as a typical scholastic literal commentary on John 22s Quia
vir reprobus, comparing the arguments of the pope (called the attacked)
and of his adversaries, that is, Michael of Cesena and his followers (called
the attackers). Ockham himself belongs to this latter group, but in this
treatise he speaks of them in the third person, in the vain hope of bring-
ing back to a more sober discussion what had developed into a violent
exchange of accusations and charges of heresy. As a matter of fact, Ock-
ham depicts the attackers as struggling against an adversary who tries to
bring in errors and destroy truth under the ambiguity of words.38 Briefly,
the papal constitution is presented as an enormous fallacia aequivocatio-
nis, while the attackers arein realitydefenders of the truth menaced
by the errors of the attacked, errors that derive both from his malicious
intent on confusing the issue and from his ignorance. Speaking of the
attacked (that is, the pope), Ockham does not conceal his contempt for
the former lawyer (causidicus) who had never been properly schooled for
theological debates. As he writes in the first part of the Dialogus: Those
who wrote the sacred canons were men very learned in rational science,
37Peter Auriol, Commentarium in secundum, tertium et quartum libros Sententiarum

d. 44, q. 1, a. 3 (Rome: ex Typographia Aloysii Zannetti, 1605, p. 328): Quantum ad primum
pono propositionem istam, scilicet, quod potestas, dominium et servitus non dicunt
relationem realem, sed relationem rationis.
38William of Ockham, Opus Nonaginta Dierum, ed. H. S. Offler (Manchester: Man-
chester University Press, 1974), p. 309: qualiter sub multiplicitate vocum iste impugnatus
errores conatur inducere. The English translation is taken from William of Ockham, A Let-
ter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. A. S. McGrade and J. Kilcullen (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 33.
moral science and theology, and they would not in any way have written
canons of such sure and profound truth just naturally without the above-
mentioned sciences. Since modern canonists are ignorant of those sci-
ences, therefore, even if they can retain the memory of the sacred canons,
they are nevertheless unable to arrive at the meaning of them.39
One should not of course fall victim to Ockhams pose, because diver-
gences between the two fronts were understandably much deeper, and
could surely not be reduced to some logical errors on the part of the pope.
And, if one compares Ockhams bold statements at the beginning of the
Work of Ninety Days, his first political work, with what follows during the
long years of his exile, it seems that also the English logician sometimes
has some doubts about the efficacy of logical arguments. In the fourth
book of the first part of the Dialogus, which is writtenas all the authen-
tic books of this workin the form of a dialogue between a magister
and a discipulus, the student says rather roughly and maybe not with the
respect that is due to a master: Do not expatiate on matters that pertain
to rational science, but say how reply is made to the argument to the
contrary.40
Nonetheless, in some passages Ockham simply cannot help making
recourse to the ars artium. For my present purpose I limit myself to the
mention of a passage from the same book four of the first part of the Dia-
logus, where Ockham discusses whether it is correct to hold that one can
be judged a heretic for the assertion that the universal church errs, as it is
the case for someone who maintains that the Christian faith is erroneous.
Now, the magister in the dialogue argues that although the faith of the
universal church and Christian faith are the same (if the church is not led
astray), still passing from one proposition to the other would be a fallacia
figurae dictionis, since, as the master says, speaking as usual in the third
person: they say, universal church consignifies or signifies Christians
primarily, and Christian faith does not signify them in this way. And
39William of Ockham, Dialogus 1.1.3: Sacrorum canonum dictatores viri eruditissimi in

scientia rationali morali et theologia fuerunt, nec per naturam absque predictis scientiis
canones tam certe tamque profunde veritatis aliqualiter conscripsissent. Cum ergo canon-
iste moderni scientias ante dictas ignorent, quamvis valeant canonum sacrorum retinere
memoriam, ad intellectum tamen eorum nequeunt pervenire. I use the text and transla-
tion made available on the website of the online critical edition of Ockhams Dialogus,
edited by J. Kilcullen, J. Scott, G. Knysh, V. Leppin, and J. Ballweg: http://www.britac.ac.uk/
pubs/dialogus/ (Last visited 29/02/2012).
40William of Ockham, Dialogus 1.4.10 Non diffundas te circa illa quae ad rationalem
spectant scientiam, sed dic quomodo ad rationem in contrarium respondetur. (trans.
J. Kilcullen et al., see n. 39).
therefore, they say, that this [argument] does not follow: Every Christian
is bound explicitly to believe that the Christian faith is true; therefore,
he is bound explicitly to believe that the universal church does not err
and has not erred.41
More or less half a century ago, some influential scholars were per-
suaded that in the late Middle Ages there existed a strong connection
between some basic attitudes in the philosophy of logic and the adhesion
to specific positions in ecclesiology. According to such interpretations,
defending a realist ontology was linked to being conservative and a sup-
porter of papal claims, while nominalists fought on the opposite side.
Needless to say, as soon as more sources and more refined interpretative
tools became available to scholars, such constructions were doomed to
collapse. My present concern is not to repeat once again how untenable
the positions of Georges de Lagarde or Michael Wilks are today.42 Unfor-
tunately, on the other side, I am unable to offer an alternative, compre-
hensive account of the relationship between logic and political theory in
the late medieval debate. Some provisional remarks, however, are pos-
sible. Medieval political thought never enjoyed the status of an indepen-
dent discipline. It was nourished rather by contributions from theology,
philosophy, law, and, to a certain extent, also medicine.43 Logic too can be
considered among the disciplines of the Arts Faculty that played a role in
the formation of political discourse in late medieval times, and this hap-
pened at different levels. At a first level, authors can have recourse to logic
to check the correctness of an argument or to detect its flaws. This obvi-
ous utility of the logical training to which almost all medieval thinkers
were exposed can be expressed in more or less technical terms, depending
among other things on the intended audience of a given political work.
41William of Ockham, Dialogus 1.1.10: Respondetur quod peccat per fallaciam figurae
dictionis, quia licet eadem sit fides Christiana et fides universalis ecclesiae, quando eccle-
sia non errat, tamen secundum istos universalis ecclesia consignat vel significat Chris-
tianos in recto, quos taliter non signat fides Christiana. Et ideo, ut dicunt, non sequitur:
quilibet Christianus tenetur explicite credere fidem Christianam esse veram, ergo tenetur
credere explicite ecclesiam universalem non errare nec errasse. (trans. J. Kilcullen et al.,
see n. 39; slightly modified).
42G. De Lagarde, La naissance de lesprit laque au dclin du moyen age, 2nd ed. (Lou-
vain: B. Nauwalaerts, 19561963); M. Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle
Ages: The papal monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the publicists (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1963; repr. 2008).
43For this idea, see J. Miethke, De potestate papae: Die ppstliche Amtskompetenz
im Widerstreit der politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham
(Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), esp. pp. 124.
At another, deeper level, concepts developed in theories of semantics

could be applied in the analysis of some basic tenets in a given political
doctrine,44 such as the ontological nature of power relations or the con-
nections between parts and whole in a community.45 As ars artium logic
is therefore essential also for political theory, although this does not imply
that political discussions in the late Middle Ages should be interpreted as
debates among supporters of different philosophies of logic carried out
so to speakin disguise on another battlefield. It does imply, however,
that historians of medieval political thought owe a lot to the Copenhagen
School and to Sten Ebbesen in particular.
44For a different aspect of the influence of Ockhams philosophy of language on his

Dialogus, see R. Lambertini, C. Marmo and A. Tabarroni, Virtus verborum: linguaggio ed
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45See, for example, A. S. McGrade, Ockham and the Birth of Individual Rights, in
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Abbreviations
AHDLMA Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du moyen ge

AL Aristoteles Latinus
BGPTM Beitrge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters
CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
CCCM Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis
CCSG Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca
CCSL Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
CIMAGL Cahiers de lInstitute du Moyen-ge Grec et Latin
CLCAG Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum
CPhD Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi
PL Patrologia Latina
PG Patrologia Graeca
STGM Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters
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238. What Did the Scholastics Know about Greek History and Culture?, in M. Hinterberger
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Index of Names
Ackrill, John154, 154n44 Anonymus Erfordensis318, 317n41

Adam of Balsham (also Adam Anonymus Liberanus312n26, 318,
Parvipontanus)27, 72n33, 82 326n62, 328n73
Adam Wodeham390 Anonymus Parisiensis46
Adams, M. M.390n Anonymus Tabarroneus317n41
Adamson, P.413n39 Anonymus Zimmermanni251n30, 251n32
Agostino Nifo181184, 182n3134, Anselm of Laon50n4
183n3537 Antonius Andreae243n13, 251, 251n33
Alberic of Paris32, 3435, 38, 4041, 43 Antonius Rubius260n10
Albert of Saxony309, 309n16, 310n17, Aristotle23, 7, 13, 13n3, 14n56, 23n7,
390, 418 30, 30n5, 32n9, 37n20, 49, 58, 6578,
Albert the Great6, 7, 155156, 155n1, 156, 66n2, 67n814, 68n1619, 69n22, 72n30,
157n4, 162n, 163169, 163n1618, 73n3436, 74n3739, 75n40, 76n4243,
164n1921, 165n2223, 166n2429, 81, 81n57, 8599, 88n9, 92n22, 94n29,
167n3134, 168n36, 176, 176n1617, 96n36, 99n46, 100n47, 101102, 122,
177n1820, 178, 178n21, 181182, 184, 246, 123n30, 133134, 135n2526, 136137,
246n19, 341342, 361n13 141146, 143n1516, 144n18, 145n20,
Alcuin23 145n22, 148, 154n45, 155156, 155n2,
Alexander of Alessandria251n32, 373n4 156n3, 167169, 171172, 171n24, 175183,
Alexander of Aphrodisias3, 69n21, 135, 175n14, 185n2, 187, 188n14, 189, 190n23,
135n27, 137, 186, 189, 192194, 193n36, 191194, 191n29, 198, 217n83, 227n26,
193n40, 196, 281n31 239243, 240n25, 241n9, 245253,
Al-Farabi177, 178n21 246n20, 250n29, 252n34, 255, 257260,
Al-Ghazali196 262, 264, 264n23, 267, 273, 278, 278n18,
Amerini, Fabrizio2, 340n10 281282, 286, 288290, 291n13, 292297,
Ammonius186, 189, 189n2122 299302, 299n26, 310312, 323n45,
Andrews, R.276n7 323n48, 323n50, 326n63, 327n70,
Angelini, G.378n20 327n72, 328n79, 329n8083, 331n90,
Angold, M.127n8 334n100, 337339, 337n13, 338n6, 344,
Annonni, M.299n27 345n22, 349n28, 351, 360361, 362n14,
Anonymus Alani317n41 377, 377n15, 383, 392393, 395, 395n11,
Anonymus Aurelianensis I86n4, 186, 397400, 398n15, 403405, 405n1013,
186n4, 186n7, 188189, 195 407409, 413415, 413n41, 419, 419n2, 427
Anonymus Aurelianensis II186. 186n57, Armstrong, D.152n41
188, 195 Arnoldus232n44, 233, 233n46, 236
Anonymus Aurelianensis III185, 187198, Ashworth, Jennifer2, 181, 182n30, 204n18,
187n11, 188n15, 188n18, 189n21, 190n26, 207n25, 210n30, 268n38, 269n45,
191n29, 192n32, 193n3738, 195n50, 316n36
198n58 Augustine60, 113n15, 155, 186, 222, 223n8,
Anonymus Cantabrigiensis45, 7781, 261, 268, 268n4041, 364n19, 374, 416,
77n4548, 78n4950, 79n51, 81n56, 416n55
81n58, 8384, 83n62, 86101, 86n4, Augustine of Ancona 251n32
88n11, 89n1213, 89n15, 90n1617, 90n19, Averroes246, 246n19, 281, 281n30,
91n2021, 92n2325, 93n26, 94n30, 292n16, 293n18, 328n78, 418
95n3134, 96n35, 97n3840, 98n4143, Avicenna139140, 139n2, 142, 161, 166n30,
99n45, 100n48, 101n49, 102, 186n7, 276, 276n8, 279, 310311, 339340, 339n9,
194195 340n10, 354, 366
470 index of names
Bakker, P. J. J. M.404n78, 409n22 Cuissard, C.185n1

Bartholomew Des Bosses139, 154
Bartholomew of Bruges351, 351n32, 419 Dahan, G.257n3
Bell, I.253n38 Dal Pra, M.117n22
Benakis, L.125n4 Dante Alighieri2, 419, 419n3, 421426,
Bernard of Clairvaux50, 113n15 421n12, 422n1314, 422n16, 423n1719,
Blazek, P.419n1 424n2023, 425n25, 425n2528,
Boehner, P.390n 426n2930
Boethius24, 7, 1314, 13n1, 14n4, 1819, De Lagarde, Georges430, 430n42
2324, 3637, 36n16, 37n19, 39n24, Delhaye, P.117n22
4042, 41n25, 41n2728, 44, 49n, 50, De Libera, Alain8, 155n1, 200n6, 288n6,
51n7, 5254, 53n10, 5658, 60, 62, 65, 291n14, 292n16, 295n23, 307n11, 310n19,
6667, 66n2, 70, 7375, 95n34, 96, 120n, 317n40, 318n43, 325n57
141, 143, 156, 156n3, 168169, 171, 188, Demetrios Karykes127132, 137
188n17, 189, 191194, 191n30, 194n43, 196, De Montfaucon, B.305n3
198, 209n28, 222, 223n8, 259, 281n31, 311, De Rijk, L. M.3, 2829, 28n, 29n34,
327n66, 374 4447, 44n37, 68, 69n21, 404, 404n6,
Boethius of Dacia3, 89, 105, 122, 122n29, 410n29
221, 221n3, 236, 237n54, 273275, 274n3, Di Giovanni, M.338n7
280, 305, 313n27, 315, 315n35, 317, 317n39, Dolcini, C.425n27
323n46, 332n92 Domanski, J.118n24
Bolton, Robert86n5, 88n10, 89n14, Domingo de Soto260n10
98n45, 101, 102n52 Domitian264
Bonitz, Hermann242n10, 246247 Donat230
Bos, E. P.11, 45, 393n, 406n15, 412n37 Donati, Silvia9, 338n5, 340n10,
Bouhot, J.-P,185n1 342n1314, 351n32, 363n17
Boulnois, Olivier269n42 DOnofrio, G.120n
Braakhuis, H. A. G.141n89, 226n23, 306n8 Dorion, L.-A.87n8, 102n51
Brower, J.139n4, 147n27 Dotto, G.117n22, 119n25
Brower-Toland, S.287n2, 300n29 Dutton, P. E.113n14
Brunschwig, J.72n32, 86n5
Burnett, Charles117n22, 123n30 Ebbesen, Sten27, 27n, 44, 44n36, 46,
Bck, Allan178n22 65n, 68n15, 77, 77n45, 81, 85n1, 85n3,
99n46, 101n50, 122n, 125, 125n3, 136,
Calcidius113, 113n14 140n6, 152n41, 154n45, 156n3, 176, 176n16,
Calma, Monica338n4 178, 179n23, 185187, 185n1, 185n3,
Cantaber Guarinus28 186n48, 187n10, 188n15, 188n1819,
Capitani, O.423n14, 425n27, 426n30 189n21, 194, 194n4547, 198, 198n59,
Carter, J. W.416n55 206n21, 226n21, 228n31, 235n52, 240n,
Cassell, A. K.424n20 273, 273n, 274n3, 275, 275n45, 276n6,
Catalani, L.50n3, 51n6 278n23, 280281, 281n29, 284n43, 286,
Cesalli, Laurent8 286n50, 287, 287n1, 287n34, 289n9,
Charles, David252253, 252n35 305n2, 306n8, 306n10, 307n1112, 308n14,
Cheneval, F.424n20 315, 315n32, 317n37, 317n40, 317n41,
Chiesa, Paolo425 326n61, 338, 338n5, 343n16, 347n25,
Cicero74, 105, 109, 109n7, 115, 120n 352n36, 357n2, 360n8, 363n17, 371n35,
Conti, Alessandro7, 11, 155n2, 156n3, 373n1, 374, 374n6, 376n13, 384, 385n37,
168n37 387, 387n43, 395n10
Cope, E. M.76n43 Egidius Romanussee Giles of Rome
Costa, Iacopo374n5 Emili, A.420n4
Courtenay, W.373n1 Erismann, C.311n21
Cousin, Victor305306, 305n3, 306n9 Euclid420
Coyecque, E.305n3, 306n6
Crisippus119 Fait, Paolo85n2, 87n6, 87n8, 88n10,
Cross, Richard377, 377n19 98n44, 101, 102n51
index of names 471
Fine, K.152n41 Hilary of Poitiers55, 55n1617, 56, 62

Fink, Jakob4 Hintikka, J.398n15
Fitzgerald, M. J.309 Hoenen, M.155n1
Flannery, K. L.281n31 Honnefelder, L.276n9, 276n11, 277n12
Fleler, C.419n3, 427n35 Hubien, H.10, 394n
Folliet, G.113n15 Hnel, G. F.305n3
Fox, R.292n15 Hring, N.51n7, 52n9
Fredborg, K. M.5, 7, 200n7, 211n31
Frede, Michael242n11 Ierodiakonou, Katerina4, 127n10
Imbach, Ruedi419n3
Galluzo, G.240n3 Iwakuma, Yukio56, 27n, 31n7, 32n8,
Gauthier, R.-A.141n7 33n14, 36n18, 38n22, 41n26, 44, 46, 65n,
George Akropolites126, 126n6 77, 77n4445, 79, 81
George of Cyprus126, 126n7
Gerardus Crassus29 Jaeger, Werner243
Gilbert of Poitiers5, 4964, 49n, 50n4, Jakobi, Klaus58n25, 61, 61n3536, 63n39
51n7, 52n9, 53n1112, 54n1314, 55n16, James of Venice34, 27, 186
56n1819, 57n2124, 59n26, 60n2831, James of Viterbo421, 421n10
61n3234, 62n37, 63n, 64n4041, 377 Jeauneau, E.118n24
Giles of Rome (also Egidius Romanus) John Buridan2, 10, 105, 285286, 286n49,
182, 243n13, 281n30, 292n15, 342, 419n3, 390401, 393n, 394n, 396n1213, 397n,
421, 421n9 398n1516, 399n1718, 400n, 401n2021,
Gilson, Etienne109n7 403418, 404n5, 410n26, 410n28, 413n38,
Glorieux, P.306, 306n7 413n40, 413n42, 417n56, 417n5859
Godfrey of Fontaines 367 John Duns Scotus2, 150n36, 243n13,
Godfrey of St. Victor32 257258, 257n1, 257n56, 258n79,
Gosvin of Marbais230n37, 233 265266, 265n27, 266n2930, 268272,
Goubier, Frdric8, 288, 288n4, 306n8, 268n4142, 269n4349, 270n, 271n5153,
314n31, 317n41, 326n61 275279, 276n67, 276n911, 277n1216,
Grabmann, Martin36n17, 141n12, 306n8 279n24, 279n26, 284286, 284n4142,
Gracia, J. J. E.63n 285n4446, 343344, 354355, 374375,
Green-Pedersen, N. J.7, 7n3, 44, 44n34, 374n78, 375n9, 375n11, 377, 379380,
94n28, 95n34, 96n3637, 97n38 379n24, 380n2526, 381n28, 381n30,
Gregory of Rimini390, 395 382383, 382n31, 382n33, 383n, 384n37,
Gregory, T.109n7 385386, 385n40, 386n41, 389, 389n1
Gregory the Great113n15 John of Dacia222, 263n19, 264n2021,
Grellard, Christophe117n22, 410, 410n27 359
Grimaldi, W.76n43 John of Jandun351353, 351n3233,
Grondeux, Anne234n49 352n3435
Gross-Diaz, T.50n4, 52n9 John of Salisbury2829, 105, 117120,
Grossi, P.426n31 117n, 118n2324, 119n2526, 120n, 121n,
Guido Vernani424 122123, 123n30
John Pagus7, 7n4, 141, 312, 312n2425,
Hadot, Pierre111 313, 313n27, 315, 315n34, 326n60, 328n74
Hansen, Heine7, 7n4, 141n9, 141n11, John Pointlasne141
150n34 John Scottus Eriugena50n5
Henninger, Mark139, 140n5, 147n27, John Wiclif168169, 169n, 390
377n16, 383n34 Jolivet, Jean54n1415, 110n7, 115n18
Henry dAndeli141n8 Juan de Celaya264n22
Henry of Carretto419
Henry of Ghent2, 179n26, 257, 257n12, Kay, R.424n21
257n4, 261264, 261n, 262n13, 262n16, Kelly, L. G.201n11, 204n16, 206n22,
266268, 266n29, 268n38 222223, 222n57, 223n8, 224n13, 233n45
Henry of Runen406n15 King, Peter49n, 277n14
Herminus135 Kirchhoff, Rania179n26
472 index of names
Klima, Gyula278n22 Michael of Ephesus (also Ps.-Alexander)

Kneepkens, C. H.7, 200n6, 211n31, 34, 6, 68, 68n15, 189n20
214n44, 224n11, 226n23, 228n32 Michaud-Quantin, P.115n19
Knuuttila, Simo9, 278n21, 279n27, Miethke, J.114n16, 430n43
280n28, 282n34, 285n44, 285n47, 291n14, Migne, J.-P.4
292n16, 293n18, 300n29, 394395, 395n9 Mignucci, M.136n29
Kretzmann, Norman288n56, 292n16 Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo3, 5, 2324, 72,
185, 424n23
Lagerlund, H.155n1 Misch, G.127n8, 129
Lambert of Auxerre (also of Lagny)258, Mora-Mrquez, A. M.10, 141n9, 360n9,
314n30, 325n58 361n13, 364n19
Lambertini, Roberto2, 420n4, 431n44 Munitiz, Joseph126, 127n8, 128, 129,
Leclercq, J.114n16 131n20, 132, 133
Lehtinen, I.300n29 Murdoch, J. E.289n9
Leibniz, G. W.139, 139n1, 140, 140n5, 142,
153154, 280 Nardi, Bruno419n3, 424n23
Lemoine, M.115n19 Nederman, C.118n24
Lewis, F. A.255n41 Nicholas of Paris7, 140146, 141n9,
Lewry, P. O.6, 142n14, 155n1, 234n50 143n17, 144n18, 145n19, 146n2326,
Liebeschtz, H.117n22 148154, 148n2930, 149n3133, 150n37,
Lonfat, J.316n 151n, 152n42, 153n, 154n45, 179n26,
Lucretius222 224n11, 226, 226n23, 230, 231n38, 295n23,
ukasiewicz, Jan136, 136n29 313n27, 361n13
Nielsen, O. L.5, 50n4, 55n16, 56n20, 63n,
Macrobius105, 106n1, 107n4, 108109, 290n10, 299n26
109n56, 114115, 120121 Nikephoros Blemmydes125134, 125n2,
Magee, John4, 13n2 126n5, 128n12, 129n, 130n1419,
Maier, A.413n40, 415, 415n47, 418, 131n2022, 132n, 134n, 136137, 136n30
418n62 Nikitas, D. A.4
Maier, Alfonso424n23 Noone, T. B.276n8, 276n10, 277n12
Maimonides262 Normore, Calvin10, 109n7, 111n9
Maioli, B.54n1415, 60n31, 63n39
Marenbon, John5, 44, 44n35, 46, 50n5, Obertello, Luca4
51n6, 52n8, 56n20, 58n, 59n27, 63n39, Odo of Cambrai311, 311n21
109n7, 112n13, 116n21 Oexle, O. G.113n14
Mariani, M.240n3
Marmo, Costantino7, 10, 237n53, 274n2, Panaccio, Claude410n27
276n6, 358, 358n3, 371n35, 379n23, Patzig, G.136, 136n29, 242n11
382n31, 387n44, 431n44 Paul of Venice168
Marsilius of Inghen11, 390, 393, 393n7, Pellegrin, Pierre185n1
403412, 404n34, 405n8, 406n15, Penner, S.140n5
407n1617, 408n19, 409n2021, Prez-Ilzarbe, P.8
410n2325, 411n3033, 412n3436, Peter Abelard2, 2729, 3133, 33n12,
413n40, 413n43, 414418, 414n4446, 3536, 35n, 3843, 38n21, 49, 49n, 52,
415n4850, 416n5153, 417n57, 63, 6667, 66n46, 67n7, 7071, 70n24,
418n6061 71n28, 80, 105, 109117, 109n7, 110n,
Martin, Christopher5, 31n7, 49n, 99n46 111n10, 112n1112, 113n15, 114n16, 115n17,
Martin of Dacia359 116n20, 118n24, 119n25, 120122, 185,
Martorelli Vico, R.420n4 188n17, 189, 189n2021, 278, 311, 311n20
Matthew of Orlans306n8, 327n67 Peter Auriol389390, 389n2, 427428,
McGrade, A. S.431n45 427n34, 427n36, 428n37
McInerny, R.155n1 Peter Helias199n4, 206n20, 211n31, 214n44,
McTaggart, J. M. E.145, 145n21 216n70, 223226, 224n1214, 225n1617,
Meiser, K.4, 13, 17 225n20, 228, 228n30, 228n32, 235
index of names 473
Peter John Olivi257, 257n3, 263264, 348n, 350n2930, 351n31, 352n3637,

263n18, 264n2425, 266, 361n13, 364n19, 353n38, 357366, 358n45, 359n67,
426427, 427n3233 360n8, 361n1013, 362n15, 363n1617,
Peter Lombard373 364n18, 365n2022, 366n2325,
Peter of Auvergne8, 243n13, 287303, 367n2627, 368372, 368n2830,
287n2, 288n7, 289n8, 291n1112, 292n15, 369n32, 370n3334, 373381, 373n1,
293n17, 293n19, 294n20, 295n22, 300n28, 374n78, 375n1112, 376n1314, 377n18,
302n30, 317n41, 359, 361, 361n13 378n21, 379n22, 379n24, 380n2526,
Peter of Spain8, 151n, 152n40, 179n26, 381n2728, 381n30, 382n3133, 383388,
214n44, 226, 313n27, 326n60 383n, 384n3537, 385n3840, 386n4142,
Peter the Mangeur28 387n4344
Petrus H.315316, 318319, 321 Rand, E. K.50n5
Philoponus3, 136, 136n28, 186, 188n15, Reina, M. E.10, 408, 408n19
188n17, 189, 191192, 191n29, 193n40, 194, Remigius of Auxerre50n5
194n43, 281n31 Richard Fishacre379n23
Pinborg, Jan7, 910, 200n5, 221222, Richard of Campsall282284, 282n35,
224n12, 237n54, 273, 274n2, 317n40, 283n3638, 284n3940
353n38, 357, 357n2, 375n10 Richard of Clive255n41
Pini, Giorgio258n9, 269n42, 277n15, Richard of St. Victor375n11
278n18, 278n20, 279n25, 343n18, 344n19, Richard Rufus of Cornwall341342
353n38, 355n39, 361n13 Robert, Aurlien363n16
Piron, Sylvain263n17 Robert Bacon179n26
Plato49n, 112114, 182, 405 Robert Blund226
Plotinus106, 114 Robert Grosseteste6
Porphyry35, 36, 44, 141, 310n18, 311, 338, Robert Kilwardby2, 67, 155162,
352, 361n10 155n12, 157n, 158n, 159n67, 160n89,
Porro, P.403n2 161n1012, 162n, 163n1415, 164166,
Poste, E.67n9, 98n44 168169, 168n35, 171179, 172n78,
Prepositinus377 173n911, 174n1213, 175n1415, 179n23,
Priscian2, 57, 172, 172n6, 199206, 182184, 187198, 187n11, 188n16,
199n14, 201n810, 201n12, 202n1314, 191n2829, 192n33, 193n41, 194n47,
205n19, 206n2021, 208n26, 209, 209n29, 196n53, 197n55, 200, 203, 206211,
214n45, 222225, 223n89, 224n15, 206n20, 207n24, 209n27, 211n3435,
225n19, 227228, 228n30, 231233, 212n3639, 226236, 226n22, 227n2628,
235236, 260, 260n11, 263n19, 387 228n29, 228n3233, 229n3435,
Prosper of Reggio Emilia373n2 230n3637, 281282, 281n30
Ps.-Alexandersee Michael of Ephesus Robert of Melun2829, 33
Ps.-Boethius Dacus179n23 Robert of Paris226
Ps.-Dionysius326n64 Robertus Anglicus234, 234n49
Ps.-Jordan7, 200, 203, 204n17, 206207, Roger Bacon8, 179n26, 226, 264, 264n20,
206n22, 207n23, 211, 211n3233, 305n3, 306, 306n4, 306n8, 312, 312n23,
212n3740, 213, 219n103, 222, 232, 314n27, 317, 325n58, 326n60, 361n13,
232n44, 233, 233n45 364n19,
Ps.-Kilwardby235, 235n51, 236237, Roos, Heinrich3, 9
264n21 Roscelinus of Compigne28
Ps.-Philoponus190n27, 193n39, 195n51 Rosier-Catach, I. (also Rosier, I.)7,
Ps.-Priscian230 200n6, 203n15, 209n27, 223n10, 224n11,
226n21, 227n25, 231n40, 232n44,
Quaglioni, Diego425, 425n25 234n4849, 237n53, 257n4, 258n9, 266,
Quinto, R.113n15 266n28, 268, 268n37, 274n2, 316n36,
379n23
Radulphus Brito2, 910, 105, 179n23, Rossini, M.373, 373n4, 374n8
243n13, 275, 338344, 338n45, 342n15, Ross, W. D.75n41, 178, 178n22, 190n25,
343n1617, 344n20, 347355, 347n2526, 242, 242n10, 242n12, 247, 247n21, 248, 250
474 index of names
Saccenti, R.106n3, 115n18 Thomsen Thrnqvist, C.4, 6, 186n9,

Salamandra, Silvia117n22 188n18
Schabel, C.373, 373n4, 374n8 Thomson, S. H.234n50
Schoenberger, R.115n19 Thuo of Viborg11, 406n15
Schramm, M.97n38 Thurot, C.221n3
Schrimpf, G.115n19 Treiger, A.340n10
Seneca109n7, 110 Tremblay, B.155n1
Shiel, J.156n3 Trifogli, Cecilia150n38, 287n2, 290n,
Siger of Brabant344, 344n21 291n13, 292n15, 413n39
Siger of Courtrai358
Silva, J. F.226n22 Valente, Luisa9, 54n14, 60n28, 63n,
Simon of Faversham285n44, 361n13 109n7, 111n9
Simplicius310, 310n18 Van Elswijk, H. C.50n4, 51n7
Sirridge, Mary8, 221n2, 416n55 Vasletus of Angers33
Smith, Robin68n18, 171n1, 178n22 Vincent of Beauvais222223, 224n13,
Sorabji, Richard12 309, 309n15
Spruyt, Joke45 Virgil206
Staico, U.419n3
Stefanini, J.203n15, 209n27 Walter Burley317, 317n38
Stegmller, F.373, 373n3 Ward, T. M.382n29, 383n
Striker, Gisella171, 171n5, 190, 190n24 Wedin, M.144n18
Symington, P.278n18 Weijers, Olga141n1011, 338n4
Sevcenko, I.127n9 Weinberg, J. R.139n4
Wilks, Michael430, 430n42
Tabarroni, Andrea11, 295n24, 425, William of Bonkys251n32
425n24, 426n31, 431n44 William of Champeaux28, 38, 4142
Themistius313n29 William of Conches206n20, 210, 216n70,
Thomas Aquinas2, 139, 139n3, 142, 223n10
239242, 240n67, 241n8, 243246, William of Moerbeke250
243n14, 244n1516, 245n17, 246n18, William of Ockham2, 11, 280, 285,
247255, 247n22, 248n2327, 249n28, 285n48, 387, 389391, 389n3, 391n56,
251n31, 253n3637, 254n39, 255n40, 393, 393n, 401, 421, 421n11, 428430,
257258, 260, 260n10, 262264, 428n38, 429n3940, 430n41, 431n44
262n1415, 266268, 266n3031, William of Sabris28
267n3336, 277278, 277n16, 278n1718, William of Sherwood8, 179180, 179n26,
339, 339n8, 341342, 341n12, 345, 345n23, 282, 282n32, 313, 313n2728, 326n60
360, 360n9, 362n13, 370, 381, 383n, 419, Williamson, T.152n41
419n3 Wilson, C.416n54
Thomas Bradwardine290n, 299n26, 390 Wilson, G. A.257n2, 373n1
Thomas of Erfurt358 Wippel, J. F.278n18
Thom, Paul67, 125n1, 155n1, 187188,
187n1113, 188n15, 194n47, 196197, Zerbi, P.110n7
196n54, 197n57, 281n30, 282n33 Zupko, Jack406n14
Index of Manuscripts
Amiens 97n3840,
Bibliothque municipale 98n4143, 99n45,
406 306, 321 100n48, 101n49, 102,
Arras 186n7
Bibliothque de la Ville Cracow
967 51n7 Biblioteka Jagiellonska
708 404n8
Basel 709 404n8, 407n1617,
Universittsbibliothek 408n19, 409n20,
O II 24 51n7 410n2325,
Berlin 411n3033,
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin 412n3436, 413n43,
lat. fol. 624 39, 44 414n4446,
Bruges 415n4850,
Stedelijke Bibliotheek 416n5153
509 318n41 710 404n8
Brussels Cuyk en St. Agatha
Bibliothque Royale Kruisherenklooster
354047 338n5, 342n15, C. 12 415n50
343n17, 344n20,
348n27, 350n29, Darmstadt
351n31, 352n3637 Landesbibliothek
2282 45
Cambridge Dresden
Gonville and Caius Landesbibliothek
611/341 317n41 Dc. 171A 45
344 251n32
Peterhouse Erfurt
119II 207n24, 209n27, Universittsbibliothek
211n3435, 212n36, CA 4o276 317n41
213, 219n102 CA 4o328 317n41, 317n42
152 251n30
206 157n4, 158n5, 159n7, Florence
160n89, 161n1012, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana
162n13, 163n1415, Santa Croce 317n41
168n35, 178, 12 sin. 3
178n21, 179n2425, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale
180n279 Conv. Soppr. 172n78,
St. Johns J.10.48 173n911, 174n1213,
D12 77n4548, 175n15
78n4950, 79n51, Conv. Soppr. 338n5, 342n15,
81n56, 81n58, E.1.252 343n16, 347n26,
83n62, 86n4, 88n11, 348n27, 350n2030,
89n1213, 89n15, 351n31
90n1617, 90n19, Conv. Soppr. 234n49
91n2021, 92n2325, D.2.45
93n26, 94n30, Biblioteca San Marco
95n3134, 96n35, 125 45
476 index of manuscripts
Innsbruck Nrnberg
Universittsbibliothek Germanisches National-Museum
192 251n32 27773 45
Kassel Orlans
Universittsbibliothek Bibliothque Municipale
2 11 346n24 266 39n24
283 33, 185
Leipzig Oxford
Universittsbibliothek Boldelian Library
1291 121n3740 Laud. lat. 49 14
1387 404n8 Laud. lat. 67 45
1426 351n32 Lat. misc. f.34 231n38
1434 404n8 Library Digby 174 30, 36
London Corpus Christi College
British Library 191 207n24, 209n27,
Harleian 2535 233n46 211n3435,
Longboat Key 212n36, 213,
Bibl. Schoenbergiensis 219n102, 220n103
101 14
Lunel Padova
Bibliothque Municipale Biblioteca Universitaria
6 33n1213, 38n21, 2087 29, 37, 45
39 Paris
Bibliothque de lArsenale
Madrid 697 338n5, 343n16
Biblioteca Universitaria 910 28, 32n9, 33,
73 157n4, 158n5, 39n24, 41, 45
159n7, 160n89, 1117B 51n7
161n1012, 162n13, Bibliothque Nationale de France
163n1415, lat. 2904 45
168n35 lat. 3237 39n24, 40
Mainz lat. 4720A 30, 45, 46
Stadtbibliothek lat. 6288 14
616 317n41 lat. 6400F 14
Milan lat. 11412 141n8
Biblioteca Ambrosiana lat. 12949 23
M63 sup. 33n11, 38n21 lat. 12960 14
Munich lat. 13368 39
Bayerische Staatsbibliothek lat. 13956 14
clm 4652 45 lat. 15015 34, 45
clm 6374 14 lat. 15035 234n48
clm 14401 13 lat. 15130 216n70
clm 14377 14 lat. 15141 29, 45
clm 14460 142n13, 143n17, lat. 16135 307n11, 312,
145n19, 312n24, 312n26,
146n2326, 317n41
148n29, 149n33, lat. 16618 139, 140n6, 152,
150n37, 151n39, 154n45, 317n41
152n42, 153n43 Pavia
clm 14522 318n41 Biblioteca Universitaria
clm 18479 13 Aldini 244 373, 375n1112,
clm 29520 45 376n13, 377n18,
index of manuscripts 477
378n21, 379n22, Vat. lat. 3011 142n13, 148n30,

380n2526, 149n3132
381n2728, Vat. lat. 7678 317n41
381n30, Venice
382n3233, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana
383n34, Z lat. 302 317n41
384n3537, Vienna
385n40, 386n42 sterreichische Nationalbibliothek
2237 28
Rome 2459 46
Casa dei Padri Maristi 2486 29, 36n17, 39,
s.n. (A.II.1) 14 4647
5297 404n8,
St. Gall 407n1617,
Stiftsbibliothek 408n19, 409n20,
817 13 410n2325,
820 14 411n3033,
412n3436,
Uppsala 413n43,
Universitetsbibliotek 414n4446,
C596 404n8 415n4850,
C924 45 416n5153
5376 404n8
Vatican
Biblioteca Apostolica Wolfenbttel
Borghes. 294 420n4 HerzogAugustbibliothek
Chigi L.V.159 227n28, 228n29, 2747 404n8
228n33, 56.20 Aug. 8 46
229n3435, Worcester
230n36 Cathedral Library
Vat. lat. 1086 376n2 Q13 255n41

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Logic and Language in the Middle Ages

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/imp

A Volume in Honour of Sten Ebbesen

Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

1. Preliminary Observations on the Textual Tradition of Boethius

2. Alberic of Paris on Mont Ste Genevive against

3. Gilbert of Poitierss Contextual Theory of Meaning and the

4. Instantiae and the Parisian Schools..................................................... 65

5. Tempting Moves: Anonymus Cantabrigiensis on Peirastic

6. Philosophers and Other Kinds of Human Beings according to

7. A Logical Joust in Nikephoros Blemmydes Autobiography......... 125

8. Strange Finds, or Nicholas of Paris on Relations............................. 139

9. Robert Kilwardby and Albert the Great on Praedicamenta

10. Culuerbinus somnians............................................................................ 171

11. The Anonymus Aurelianensis III and Robert Kilwardby

12. Demonstratio ad oculum and Demonstratio ad intellectum:

13. A Note on articulatio and University Grammar............................. 221

14. Explanation and Definition in Thomas Aquinas Commentary

15. Aquinas, Scotus and Others on Naming, Knowing, and the

16. Concrete Accidental Terms.................................................................. 273

17. Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse: Limit-decision

18. Does Loving Every Mean Loving Every Every,

19. Apparentia and modi essendi in Radulphus Britos Doctrine

20. Radulphus Brito on Common Names, Concepts and Things..... 357

21. Radulphus Brito on Relations in his Questions on the

22. Buridanian Possibilities.......................................................................... 389

23. Marsilius of Inghen on the Principle of Non-Contradiction...... 403

24. Logic, Language and Medieval Political Thought.......................... 419

Index of Names................................................................................................. 469

Fabrizio Amerini, Dipartimento di Antichistica, Lingue, Educazione, Filo-

E. Jennifer Ashworth, Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo

Egbert P. Bos, Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, Universiteit Leiden.

Laurent Cesalli, CNRS, Universit de Lille 3 (UMR 8163, Savoirs, Textes,

Alessandro D. Conti, Dipartimento di Scienze Umane, Universit dell

Alain de Libera, Dpartement de philosophie, Universit de Genve and

Silvia Donati, Albertus-Magnus-Institut, Bonn.

Jakob L. Fink, SAXO-Instituttet, Kbenhavns Universitet.

Karin Margareta Fredborg, SAXO-Instituttet, Kbenhavns Universitet.

Frdric Goubier, Dpartement de philosophie, Universit de Genve.

Heine Hansen, SAXO-Instituttet, Kbenhavns Universitet.

Katerina Ierodiakonou, Department of History and Philosophy of Sciences

Yukio Iwakuma, Fukui Prefectural University.

C. H. Kneepkens, Faculty of Arts, University of Groningen.

Simo Knuuttila, Department of Systematic Theology, University of Helsinki.

Roberto Lambertini, Dipartimento di scienze storiche, documentarie, artis-

John Magee, Department of Classics, University of Toronto.

John Marenbon, Trinity College, Cambridge.

Costantino Marmo, Dipartimento di Discipline della Comunicazione, Uni-

Christopher J. Martin, Department of Philosophy, The University of

Ana Mara Mora-Mrquez, SAXO-Instituttet, Kbenhavns Universitet.

Calvin G. Normore, Department of Philosophy, University of California,

Paloma Prez-Ilzarbe, Departamento de Filosofa, Universidad de Navarra.

Mary Sirridge, Philosophy & Religious Studies, Louisiana State University.

Paul Thom, School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry, The University

Christina Thomsen Thrnqvist, Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and

Luisa Valente, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sapienza Universit di Roma.

The present volume seeks to honour the work of an outstanding scholar,

For efficient and enjoyable collaboration on more practical matters,

Jakob L. Fink, Heine Hansen, Ana Mara Mora-Mrquez

(1) logic and linguistics

In what follows I shall try to sketch some aspects of the development of

whether by an artista or by a theologian like Aquinas, there will be dis-