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The Sino-Soviet Split as an Accelerator of the Collapse of Eastern Communist Alliance

Xinyu Zheng

History 334: History of International Relations, 1945 Present

August 6, 2017
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After World War II, the world entered the Cold War, a period of heightened political

tension between the two superpowers of the United States (US) and Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR). During this period, the majority of countries were forced to side with one or

the other. The Cold War ultimately ended with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. The

breakdown of formal relations between the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)

might be the most important accelerator of the dissolution of the USSR. In effect, this breakup

revealed the conflicts inside the Communist world, showed the Western Bloc that the

Communist alliance was not unbreakable, resulted in the eventual collapse of the Eastern Bloc,

and forced the PRC to adopt new development strategies as it still wanted to avoid relying on the

US. In Mao Zedong on Soviet Intentions,1 published in July 1958, Mao discussed his

conference with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin. This clearly exemplified how the conflict

between the USSR and the PRC did not erupt suddenly, but was a result of long-term factors.

The breakdown in relations was not caused by any single political, economic, or ideological

dispute between the two, but rather by a combination of many factors, which eventually led to

the breakup of the two allies.

After World War II, China was consumed by civil war between the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP) and Nationalist government. The war ended in 1949, when the CCP drove the

government from mainland China to Taiwan. Following this, the CCP officially established the

PRC on Oct. 1, 1949. Since its establishment, under Maos guidance, the PRC established a one-

1. Zedong Mao, Mao Zedong on Soviet Intentions, in The Cold War: A History in

Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, ed. Jussi M. Hanhimaki and Odd Arne Westad

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 200.

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sided policy of diplomatic relations, 2 and established close formal relations with the USSR

(referred to as an older brother in the Communist family). During this early stage of the Cold

War, the close relations between the PRC and USSR created a powerful bloc to contend with the

US and other capitalist nations. The PRCs participation helped the USSR establish political

dominance in the Far East as it was a Communist state comprising a quarter of the worlds

population that promptly became a military ally and economic beneficiary of the USSR.3

However, in 1958, the relationship between the PRC and the USSR rapidly worsened because of

a disagreement about the PRCs military goals. In effect, the USSR refused to grant the PRC

nuclear-powered submarines that they had previously promised to the PRC, and instead proposed

building joint military radio stations and navy, with joint ownership and operation position 4 by

both USSR and PRC. This condition greatly angered Mao because of the USSRs unilateral

abrogation and intention to interfere in the PRCs domestic politics. According to Mao Zedong

on Soviet Intentions,5 Mao expressed the PRCs refusal and fury about the USSR breaking their

former agreement, and stated that the PRC would take this initiative as a move to share

2. Michael Holm, Out of World War IIs Ashes: China, Japan, and Korea (lecture,

History 334: History of International Relations, 1945 present, Boston, MA, July 7,

2017).

3. William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World and Beyond: An International

History Since 1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 353.

4. Zedong Mao, Mao Zedong on Soviet Intentions, in The Cold War: A History in

Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, ed. Jussi M. Hanhimaki and Odd Arne Westad

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 200.

5. Ibid., 200.
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sovereignty. Mao directly addressed some hidden problems which he thought as the symbol of

possible chauvinist restoration and political differences between the two countries that had

existed since the beginning of their alliance.

The problems that Mao identified were present not only in the SinoSoviet relationship

but also between the USSR and other communist countries. In the postwar period after 1945, the

USSR offered financial support and exerted political pressure to further its communist ideology.

In this way, the Soviet Union rapidly built up a bloc of satellite states against the US and the

capitalist Western Bloc. As Mao noted, the USSR sent Soviet advisers to all communist nations

to offer instructions on military development, politics, economic policies, education, agriculture,

industry, and even communication and culture management. Because most communist nations

were at that time developing nations, these Soviet technical talents soon occupied leadership

positions in these countries because they enjoyed economic and political support from the USSR.

Indeed, the USSRs unshakeable leadership inside the Eastern Bloc was established gradually as

the Soviets occupied the upper levels of society in every satellite state in Eastern Europe. When

Mao argued that you [the USSR] never trust the Chinese! You only trust the Russians! [To you]

the Russians are the first-class [people],6 he also revealed the tensions within the Communist

alliance the formation of a class system of which the USSR had already assumed leadership,

which are obviously violated the Communist ideology of equality. Maos statement illustrates his

argument that the USSR positioned the PRC and other communist nations as subordinates. This

statement was a warning to the Communist world about possible restoration of great-power

chauvinism since the USSR was taking steps to exert control over neighboring nations. The

6. Ibid., 200.
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USSR frequently interfered in its allies internal affairs, almost like a parent of the huge

Communist family, showing little respect to those countries sovereignties.

However, for Khrushchev and the Soviet government, Maos reaction was an

incomprehensible, hysterical overreaction, but Khrushchev still planned a further conference to

maintain relations with the PRC. However, after Khrushchev left Beijing, the PRC government

opened fire on Jinmen, belonging to the Republic of China (ROC; Taiwan).7 This attack, known

as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, and unauthorized by the USSR, shocked the international

community. From a US perspective, Soviet involvement was likely because of the ostensible link

between the conference and the attack. Even if the USSR maintained an official Russian silence

instead of the customary expressions of support [for the PRC government],8 the US still

assumed that this attack was taken under the USSRs solicitation or acquiescence. The PRCs

unexpected move put the USSR in an awkward position as it was trying to find a way to coexist

with the US. This attack on Jinmen was seemingly as another phase of the Chinese Civil War,

but in fact the PRCs target was the USSR. In the late 1950s, the USSR considered establishing a

more neutral and positive relationship with the US and the Western Bloc.9 According to Keylor,

the PRC feared closer USSoviet relations because the PRC government firmly believed that this

would leave them isolated and geographically surrounded by enemies.10 Even if Mao argued that

7. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World and Beyond: An International History Since

1900, 366.

8. Ibid., 367.

9. Ibid., 366.

10. Ibid., 366.

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we have held no secrets from you [Soviet Union] . . . We trust your people,11 the conflict of

interest, leadership, and further developments in the Communist world had already begun to

strain relations, while Mao was planning a revolution to achieve the ideal Communist society

before the USSR, which is the later Great Leap Forward.

In effect, this attack had no long-term effect on the reunification of China, but largely

disrupted the USSRs plan to establish a compromise between the two countries following Maos

outburst. Also, the disagreements between the PRC and USSR inevitably grew not only because

of these continuous disputes, but also unreachable agreement between these two countries on

politics, military, and ideology. The growing dispute between the two most powerful communist

countries showed the Western world that the communist alliance was not unbreakable and that

the discord between the USSR and PRCs partnership was growing.

Maos dissatisfaction was understandable in the context of Chinese history: when he

argued that . . . [the Chinese people] were considered as a backward nation . . . I believe that

some Russians look down upon the Chinese people. 12 In Maos vision, the PRC had already

successfully transitioned from a backward country to a powerful nation under his guidance. As

the most powerful leader and representative of the PRC, Mao was confident that he had found an

appropriate way for the PRC to practice Communism since the USSRs Communist policy based

on the interests of the working class had been repeatedly questioned by various nations in the

postwar years.13 Because Mao aimed for the PRC to take the place of the USSR both inside and

11. Mao, Mao Zedong on Soviet Intentions, 202.

12. Ibid., 200.

13. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World and Beyond: An International History Since

1900, 354.
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outside the Communist Bloc, he led the PRC into an ultimately costly revolution the Great

Leap Forward. Unfortunately, this led to the disaster of mass starvation. Maos Great Leap

Forward aimed to accelerate the progress of modernization and industrialization, and greatly

increase agricultural production. 14 Even though Khrushchev officially disagreed with Maos

plan, he pressed ahead with it regardless. However, this unpractical plan eventually ended with

over 20 million deaths from famines in three years. After the Great Leap Forward began, the

SinoSoviet relationship became increasingly strained, as mentioned above. Further

disagreements between those two large communist nations arose. During these disputes, the two

countries clashed over the USSRs then-current policy of de-Stalinization. The USSR argued that

the PRC was becoming increasingly reliant on an overcentralized economy and cult of

personality as had the USSR under Stalin, whereas the PRC interpreted de-Stalinization as a

symbol that the USSR was becoming increasingly revisionist.15 As a result, Khrushchev recalled

almost all the Russian technicians he had sent to the PRC, and stopped aid and cancelled treaties

with the PRC in August 1960, which indicates the official beginning of the breakup with the

PRC.16

Since the Sino-Soviet relationship grew increasingly worse, the PRC government was

forced to find a new way to develop economically because it still had no interest in relying on the

US because the PRC condemned the Soviet government for becoming closer to the US. As Mao

14. Michael Holm, Collapse of Unity in the Socialist World (lecture, History 334:

History of International Relations, 1945 present, Boston, MA, July 20, 2017).

15. Ibid.

16. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World and Beyond: An International History Since

1900, 367.
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stated on March 15, 1969, we [Chinese] are now isolated. No one wants to make friends with

us.17 Under pressure from both the US and the USSR, the PRC adopted a much more positive

approach to diplomacy. During the 1960s, the PRC attempted rapprochement with various

nations from both the Communist and the Capitalist blocs. As a newly emerged power, the PRC

eventually appeared on the international stage after its split with the USSR.

Before the end of World War II, the Soviet Union was considered invulnerable and

unbreakable. Many US politicians saw the highly centralized union as an enemy who was

extremely difficult to overcome. However, rather than the US, the PRC became the most

influential accelerator of the USSRs dissolution. Because the PRC became influential in leading

Asian Communist nations, the SinoSoviet split caused other communist nations to consider

which side to take inside the Communist alliance. This eventually resulted in the collapse of the

Eastern Communist alliance because the divided alliance largely weakened not only the USSRs

influence on the Communist world, but also the USSPs international trade, economic growth,

and security. Also, their split informed the US that there is no monolithic Soviet bloc, and

stimulated the other communist nations to consider their own futures rather than mechanically

following the USSRs instruction.

17. Michael Holm, The End of Cold War in Asia (lecture, History 334: History of

International Relations, 1945 present, Boston, MA, July 27, 2017).

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Bibliography

Holm, Michael. Out of World War IIs Ashes: China, Japan, and Korea. Lecture at the History

334: History of International Relations, 1945 present, Boston, MA, July 7, 2017.

Collapse of Unity in the Socialist World. Lecture at the History 334: History

of International Relations, 1945 present, Boston, MA, July 20, 2017.

The End of Cold War in Asia, Lecture at the History 334: History of International

Relations, 1945 present, Boston, MA, July 27, 2017.

Keylor, William R. The Twentieth Century World and Beyond: An International History Since

1900. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Mao, Zedong. Mao Zedong on Soviet Intentions. in The Cold War: A History in Documents

and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Jussi M. Hanhimaki and Odd Arne Westad, 199

202. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.