(Page 1)

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
Gentlemen
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is at resolution of the Court En Banc dated SEP 13
1988:
G.R. NO. 84642 (Peoples Movement for Press Freedom, et al., v. Hon. Raul Manglapus, et
al.)
The petitioners, invoking the constitutional provisions on freedom of speech and the press
(Constitution, Article III, section 4) and on the right to information on matters of public concern
(Constitution, Article III, section 7) seek to compel the respondents who are representatives of
the President of the Philippines in the on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement to: (1) open to petitioners their negotiations/sessions with the U.S. counterparts on
the RP-US Military Agreement; (2) reveal and/or give petitioners access to the items which they
(respondents) have already agreed upon with their American counterparts relative to the review
of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, and (3) reveal and/or make accessible to petitioners the
respective positions of respondents and their US counterparts on items they have not agreed
upon, particularly the compensation package for the continued use, by the U.S. of their military
bases and facilities in the Philippines.
The petitioners argue that the closed-door negotiations held by the two countries
negotiating panels amount to the denial of the petitioners right to press freedom as well as their
right to information on matters of public concern. They specifically mention (Page 2) the fact
that their organizations should be given access to information on the negotiations so that they can
pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and
aspirations thru peaceful and lawful means and can affectively and reasonably participate at this
level of political decision as mandated by the Constitution.
Under the Constitution, the conduct of foreign relations of our Government especially the
sensitive matter of negotiating a treaty with a foreign government is lodged with the political
Departments of the Government. It has been ruled that the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. (Otejen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 US 297, 306, 62 2ed. 726, 732, 38 S.Ct. 309, See also Baker v. Carr, 369 US
186, 7L ed 2nd 663, 82 S.Ct. 691). The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of Jurisdiction which would warrant the exercise of judicial power.
As regards the President's power to conclude treaties, the Constitution limits the role of the
Supreme Court "to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari x x x the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement. x x x (Article
VIII, Section 5, number 2 paragraph (a), 1987 Constitution. (Page 3)
Undoubtedly, this Court has no jurisdiction over a case until the treaty or agreement has
been, concluded and its terms questioned in an appropriate case. The Court stresses that secrecy
of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom
of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition
of decision which are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic
of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Although much has been said about open
and secret diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State
Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In the words
of Mr. Stimson:
A complicated negotiation.... cannot be carried through
without many, many private talks and discussions, man to man;
many tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other
countries come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home
and of their differences with other countries and with other
delegates: they tell you of what they would do under certain
circumstances and would not do under other circumstances.... If
these reports .... should become public .... who would ever trust
American Delegations in another conference? (United States
Department of State Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284.).
xxx xxx xxx
There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign
powers on nearly all subjects is concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible
with the substance of democracy. As expressed by one writer, 'It can be said that
there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere in the world.' (E.O. Young,
Looking behind the [Page 4] Censorship, J.B. Lippincott Co., 1938) President
Wilson in starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War declared that we
must have open covenants, openly arrived at. He quickly abandoned his thought.
No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of
publicity is possible. In the moment that negotiations are started, pressure groups
attempt to 'muscle in.' An ill-timed, speech by one of the parties or a frank
declaration of the concessions which are exacted or offered on both sides would
quickly lead to widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty
has been drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for
 discussion before it is approved. (The New American Government and Its
Works, James T, Young, 4th Edition, p. 194)

The negotiation of treaties calls for a class of expertise, experience, and sensitivity to
national interest of an extremely high order, It would be a sad day indeed if in the negotiations
leading to a treaty, the Philippine panel and the President would be hampered or embarrassed by
criticisms or comments from persons with inadequate knowledge of the nuances of treaty
negotiations or worse by publicity seekers or idle kibitzers.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (299 U.S. 304, 1936) and notwithstanding
the power of the American Senate to give advice and consent to the President in the making of
a treaty, it was emphasized that the President alone negotiates. Not even the Senate or the House
of Representatives, unless they are asked, may intrude. The pertinent portions of the decision
read: (page 5)
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great
argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, 'The President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations. Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613. . .
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such
an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations
a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress,
but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent
that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment
perhaps serious embarrassment is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through
negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not
Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in
foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and
other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly
necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.
Indeed, so clearly is this true that the first President refused to accede to a request
 to lay before the House of Representatives the instructions, correspondence and
documents (Page 6) relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty - a refusal the
wisdom of which was recognized by the House itself and has never since been
doubted. In his reply to the request, President Washington said:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must
often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure
of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been
proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a
pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate
inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The
necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the
power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, the principle on which that body was formed confining it to a small
number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to
demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation
with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent. 1 Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, p. 194. (at pp. 297-298)

We have the same doctrine of separation of powers in the Constitution and the same grant of
authority over foreign affairs to the President as in the American System. The same reasoning
applies to treaty negotiations by our Government.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for manifest lack of merit.

Very truly yours,