Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
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DIGEST
Constitutional Law 2
Course: LLB I
ID No. 12-000593
3/1/2013
01- ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS V. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, G.R. NO. L-24693 OCTOBER 23, 1967 ...................................................... 3
02- TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTAION GR L-59234, 30 SEPTEMBER 1982, EN BANC, MELENCIO .................................................... 3
03- REPUBLIC VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY G.R. NO. 141314. NOVEMBER 15, 2002 ...................................................................................................... 4
04- LIM VS. PACQUING G.R. 115044, JANUARY 27, 1995 ...................................................................................................................................................... 5
05- LUTZ VS. ARANETA G.R. NO. L-7859, 22 DECEMBER 1955 ................................................................................................................................................. 6
06- MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION G.R. NO. 111097 ................................................................................................... 7
07- VALENTIN TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD G.R. NO. L-75697 ......................................................................................................................... 7
08- RESTITUTO YNOT VS.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. NO. 74457 ......................................................................................................................... 8
09- CRISTINA DE KNECHT VS.HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA G.R. NO. L-51078............................................................................................................................. 9
10- PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. L-119694 ................................................................................................ 9
11- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION G.R. NO. 137569............................................................................................ 10
12- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 146587. JULY 2, 2002 ................................................................... 11
13- THE CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL G.R. NO. L-14355 OCTOBER 31, 1919 ..................................................... 12
14- LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE CASE DIGEST G.R. NO. L-19201 JUNE 16, 1965 ................................................................ 13
15- PHILEX MINING CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. G.R. NO. 125704 AUGUST 28, 1998...................................................... 13
16- G.R. NO. 130716 CHAVEZ VS.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) ...................................................................................... 14
17- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION G.R. NO. 139465 JANUARY 18, 2000 .............................................................................................................. 15
18- SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 25,
AND MARK B. JIMENEZ, RESPONDENTS. G.R. NO. 139465 JANUARY 18, 2000 ............................................................................................................... 16
19- GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VS. HON. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, MORALES, AND MARK . JIMENEZ A.K.A .
MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, [G.R .NO. 148571. SEPTEMBER 24, 2002] ............................................................................................................................. 17
20- ESRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 148560, NOVEMBER 19, 2001............................................................................................................................. 18
21- PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. L-52245 ............................................................................................. 19
22- ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GR NO. 46496, FEBRUARY 27, 19450/ 69 PHIL. 635 ........................................................................ 20
23- PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. VS. PETE PRADO GR NO. 105371, NOVEMBER 11, 1993/ 227 SCRA 703 ....................................................... 20
24- GONZALES VS . COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. NO. L-28196; 9 NOV 1967] ...................................................................................................................... 21
25- ORMOC SUGAR VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY GR L-23794, 17 FEBRUARY 1968 ........................................................................................................ 21
26- PEOPLE V. CAYAT G.R. NO. L-45987 MAY 5, 1939 ................................................................................................................................................. 22
27- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS G.R. NOS. 132875-76. FEBRUARY 3, 2000 .................................................................................. 22
28- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JIMMY MIJANO Y TAMORA G.R. NO. 129112. JULY 23, 1999 .................................................................................... 23
29- SOLIVEN V. MAKASAIR G.R. NO. 82585 NOVEMBER 14, 1988 ......................................................................................................................................... 23
30- ALLADO V. DIOCNO G.R. NO. 113630 MAY 5, 1994 ......................................................................................................................................................... 24
31- BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. NO. L-64261 DECEMBER 26, 1984 ............................................................................................................................... 25
32- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FLORENCIO B. DORIA G.R. NO. 125299 JANUARY 22, 1999......................................................................................... 26
33- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO MENGOTE Y TEJAS, G.R. NO. 87059 JUNE 22, 1992 .............................................................................. 28
34- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, G.R. NO. 91107 JUNE 19, 1991 ........................................................................................ 29
35- SAMMY M. MALACAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 123595 DECEMBER 12, 1997 .................................................................................................. 30
36- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN AND ROBERTO DELOS REYES, G.R. NO. 125754 DECEMBER 22,1999. ...................... 31
37- COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ET AL. VS. ALFREDO C. FLORES G.R. NO. 78631 JUNE 29, 1993 .......................................................................................... 33
38- RICARDO C. VALMONTE VS. RENATO DE VILLA G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEMBER 29, 1989................................................................................................... 34
39- HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PEDRO PACIS, AND MARTIN ALAGAO, VS. REMEDIOS MAGO AND HILARION U.
JARENCIO39 G.R. NO. L-27360 FEBRUARY 28, 1968............................................................................................................................................. 35
40- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI G.R. NO. 81561 JANUARY 18, 1991 ...................................................................................................... 37
41- GENEROSO ESMEA VS. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY G.R. NO. L-54110 FEBRUARY 20, 1981 ............................................................................................. 38
42- ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, ET AL. VS. APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ET AL, G.R. NO. 117565 NOVEMBER 18, 1997 ..................................................................... 39
43- CLEMENTE MAGTOTO VS.MIGUEL M. MANGUERA G.R. NOS. L-37201-02 MARCH 3, 1975 ........................................................................................... 40
44- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOHN GABRIEL GAMBOA G.R. NO. 91374 FEBRUARY 25, 1991 ................................................................................... 40
45- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAIME AGUSTIN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 110290 JANUARY 25, 1995 ...................................................................................... 41
46- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERNESTO BASE G.R. NO. 109773 MARCH 30, 2000 .......................................................................................... 41
47- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. EDWARD ENDINO&GERRY GALGARIN G.R. NO. 133026 FEBRUARY 20, 2001....................................................... 42
48- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DAVID S. LOVERIA G.R. NO. 79138 JULY 2, 1990 ......................................................................................................... 43
49- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, G.R. NO. 122485 FEBRUARY 1, 1999....................................................................... 44
50- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT G.R. NO. 109775 NOVEMBER 14, 1996 ...................................................................... 47
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51- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DINDO MOJELLO G.R. NO. 145566 MARCH 9, 2004.......................................................................................... 48
52- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANACLETO Q. OLVIS G.R. NO. 71092 SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 ........................................................................................ 49
53- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RONILO L. PINLAC G.R. NOS. 74123-24 SEPTEMBER 26, 1988...................................................................................... 51
54- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. WILFREDO ROJAS, TEODORO VILLARIN, SOLOMON TOTOY, GREGORIO TUNDAG AND SINFROSO
MASONG, DEFENDANTS G.R. NOS. L-46960-62 JANUARY 8, 1987 ................................................................................................................................... 52
55- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA. G.R. NO. 122142 MAY 17, 2000 .................................................................................. 53
56- GENEROSO ESMEA VS. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY G.R. NO. L-54110 FEBRUARY 20, 1981 ............................................................................................. 54
57- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AURELIO BALISACAN G.R. NO. L-26376 AUGUST 31, 1966 ............................................................................... 55
58- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEO P. ECHEGARAY G.R. NO. 117472 FEBRUARY 7, 1997 ............................................................................................. 56
59- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN RELOVA G.R. NO. L-45129 MARCH 6, 1987................................................................................................ 57
60- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH VI, ET AL. G.R. NO. L-36528 SEPTEMBER 24, 1987 ............................................... 59
61- JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR VS. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, ETC. AND EVANGELINE PONCE CARPIO, G.R. NO.
172716 NOVEMBER 17, 2010 .............................................................................................................................................................................. 60
62- VALERIO TACAS VS. FLORENTINO C. CARIASO G.R. NO. L-37406 AUGUST 31, 1976 ....................................................................................................... 61
63- GARCES VS. ESTENZO GR. NO. L-53487, MAY 25, 1981 ................................................................................................................................................... 62
64- ERNESTO G. GONZALES VS.CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION G.R. NO. L-38178 OCTOBER 3, 1985........................................................ 62
65- MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989 .................................................................................................................................. 63
66- YAP VS. CA GR. NO. 141529 JUNE 6, 2001............................................................................................................................................................. 64
67- IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.)VS.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 119673 JULY 26, 1996 ............................................................................. 64
68- PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA VS.HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS G.R. NO. 124382............................................................................................... 65
69- PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.VS. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON G.R. NO. 81958 ...................................................................... 66
70- RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., VS.THE COURT OF APPEALS FERNAN G.R. NO. L-62100 ...................................................................................................... 67
71- BLO UMPAR ADIONG VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 103956 ....................................................................................................................... 68
72- AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG AND JUAN PONCE ENRILE G.R. NO. 82380 ............................................................................... 69
73- CHAVEZ VS.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) G.R. NO. 130716 ....................................................................................... 70
74- MANUEL LAGUNZAD VS. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-32066 AUGUST 6, 1979 .................................... 71
75- AMELITO R. MUTUC VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS75 G.R. NO. L-32717 NOVEMBER 26, 1970 ................................................................................ 72
76- NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 102653 MARCH 5, 1992 ......................................................................................... 73
77- CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS VS.VALERIANO E. FUGOSO G.R. NO. L-1800............................................................................................................................... 73
78- JOSE B.L. REYES VS. RAMON BAGATSING, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA G.R. NO. L-65366 .................................................................................. 74
79- ABELARDO SUBIDO, VS.ROMAN OZAETA G.R. NO. L-1631 FEBRUARY 27, 1948 .................................................................................................. 75
80- LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ GR L-63419, 18 DECEMBER 1986 ............................................................................................................................................... 76
81- ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS.FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., G.R. NO. L-24670 DECEMBER 14, 1979. ........................................................ 76
82- ENEDINA PRESLEY VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 86774 AUGUST 21, 1991 .......................... 77
83- TERRY LYN MAGNO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 101148, AUGUST 05, 1992 .......................................................................................................... 78
84- LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AFP, MAJ. GENERAL ARTURO ENRILE VS.HON. COURT OF
APPEALS G.R. NO. 105597 ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 78
85- BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN .G.R. NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984 .............................................................................................................. 80
86- CRISTOPHER GAMBOA VS. J. ALFREDO CRUZ G.R. NO. L-56291 JUNE 27, 1988 ............................................................................................................. 80
87- ISABELA SUGAR VS. MACADAEG 98 PHIL. 995 ................................................................................................................................................................. 81
88- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MALIMIT GR NO. 190775, NOVEMBER 14, 1996 ......................................................................................................... 81
89- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GALLARDE GR NO. 13302, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 ............................................................................................................ 82
90- CATALINO N. SARMIENTO V.S THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R. TUICO G.R. NO. 75271-73 JUNE 27, 1988. ..................................................................... 82
91- THE UNITED STATES VS. J. VALENTINE KARELSEN, G.R. NO. 1376 JANUARY 21, 1904 .......................................................................................... 83
92- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSE LEGASPI Y RAMIREZ G.R. NOS. 92167-68 ............................................................................................................ 84
93- EFREN C. MONCUPAVS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE 93. G.R. NO. L-63345................................................................................................................................ 85
94- MANUEL Q. CABALLERO AND LELITA A. CABALLERO,-VERSUS- HON. FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR., HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, FERNANDO
ESCONDE, GREGORIO BAKEREL, CESAR NAVARRO, AND FRANK RODRIGUEZ, G.R. NO. L-45647 AUGUST 21, 1987 ....................................................... 86
95- EMETERIA VILLAFLOR VS. RICARDO SUMMERS G.R. NO. 16444 ...................................................................................................................................... 87
96- PEOPLE V. DUERO G.R. NO. L-52016 MAY 13, 1981 ....................................................................................................................................................... 87
97- STONEHILL V. DIOKNO, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) .................................................................................................................................................................... 88
98- ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 107383, 20 FEBRUARY 1996] ............................................................................................................................... 89
99- QUA CHEE GAN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD G.R. NO. L-10280 SEPTEMBER 30, 1963 ................................................................................................... 90
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01- ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS V. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,
G.R. NO. L-24693 OCTOBER 23, 1967
Facts:
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ordinance No. 4760 and the same was approved
by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into
1stclass (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2ndclass (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the
demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open
spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law
averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the
appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case
Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this
case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution.
The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The
due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution
in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the
said ordinance alleged to be vague.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public interest should prevail over private profits.
HELD:
In third world countries like the Philippines, equal justice will have a synthetic ring unless the economic
rights of the people, especially the poor, are protected with the same resoluteness as their right to liberty.
The cases at bar are of utmost significance for they concern the right of our people to electricity and to be
reasonably charged for their consumption. In configuring the contours of this economic right to a basic
necessity of life, the Court shall define the limits of the power of respondent MERALCO, a giant public
utility and a monopoly, to charge our people for their electric consumption.
Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the States police powers. The regulation of rates to be
charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules
for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used
for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes
subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be
withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same
is subject to public regulation.
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04- LIM VS. PACQUING G.R. 115044, JANUARY 27, 1995
Facts:
The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01 September 1994
based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on
the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier
issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which were assailed by
the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044:
a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue the permit/license to
operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC).
b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994.
c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately
issue the permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC).
The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final
judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC
the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065.
On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then
chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in abeyance the
grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated
Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, inter alia, resolve the legal
question,
1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20
August 1975 is unconstitutional.
Issue:
1. Whether or not PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State, as the
government contends, or
2. Whether or not PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being Violative of the equal protection and non-
impairment provisions of the Constitution, as ADC argues.
Held:
1. Police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. It is based
on the ancient doctrine salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.) In the early case ofRubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), this Court through Mr.
Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus:
The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly
termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing
power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great
principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the
individual.
In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly stated in the "whereas clause" as
follows:
WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of the current drive of our law enforcement
agencies against vices and illegal gambling, these social ills are still prevalent in many areas of the
country;
WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the efforts of the government to eradicate and
minimize vices and other forms of social ills in pursuance of the social and economic development
program under the new society;
WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and regulate wagers or betting by the public on horse
and dog races, jai-alai and other forms of gambling there is a necessity to transfer the issuance of
permit and/or franchise from local government to the National Government.
It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals
and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes
the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a
social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic
development.
In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097), this Court stated
thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:
In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit gambling altogether or
allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which
this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to
resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled
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that questions regarding wisdom, morality and practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary
but may be resolved only by the executive and legislative departments, to which the function belongs in
our scheme of government. (Emphasis supplied)
It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that the national government can subsequently
grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications of the applicant." ADC has not
alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the national government subsequent to the enactment
of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on
conjectures, speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169
revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-alai), she did not scrap
or repeal PD No. 771 which had revoked all franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local governments,
thereby re-affirming the government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national
government (not local governments) to consider and approve.
2. On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be
remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly, a
mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit
through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of
police power for the public welfare.
In RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450), we held that:
A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in
the hands of a subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by
every authority since . . . Today, a franchise being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign
power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue
of its police power through its administrative agencies.
There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere privilege because jai-alai, when played
for bets, is pure and simple gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a public utility,
such as public transportation company, is to trivialize the great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege.
As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771.
and yet, the purpose of PD No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national
government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus, all franchises then existing were
revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the applicant
with government-set qualifications and requirements.
There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree
revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege
violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as
correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked.
Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it
could have raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty 920) years ago.
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of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be
benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by
PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.
Held:
No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that
matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent
or suppress, among others, gambling and other prohibited games of chance.
Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the
national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as
the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be
valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
07- VALENTIN TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY B OARD G.R. NO. L-75697
Facts:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal
Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate,
as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any
motion picture or audiovisual program.
7|Page
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty
percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated
circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby
resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie
industry.
Issues:
1. Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
2. Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.
Held:
Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a
public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and
the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect
the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree
No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the
viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing
pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to
the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are
virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to
engage in business."
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09- CRISTINA DE KNECHT VS.HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA G.R. NO. L-51078
Facts:
The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project,
originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however,
the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and
Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human
Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route withh
save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of
Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner.
Issue:
Is the choice of Fernando Rein and del Pan Streets valid?
Held:
The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The
Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in
making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of
Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on
the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on
one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and
development are carried out for the benefit of the people.
10- PHILIPPINE PRESS INS TITUTE, INC. VS. COM MISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. L-119694
Facts:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. PPI,
a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by
the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of
Comelec requiring publishers to give free Comelec Space and at the same time process raw data to
make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of
Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of
expression.
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec
alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide
free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-
compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely
established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec space, the
procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for
the candidates utilization of the Comelec space procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor
General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed
as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of
print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.
Held:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its
present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and
void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in
part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995
letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to donate free print space to Comelec. As
such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. To the extent
it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be
dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
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11- REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL IPPINES VS. SALEM IN VESTMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 137569
Facts:
The De la Ramas and Guerrero entered into a contract to sell for an amount of P11,800,000.00 ,
Lot 834. This lot has an area of 4,075 square meters. This contract was executed on December 14, 1988,
after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380
square meters, of the De la Ramas. The De la Ramas received the sum of P2,200,000.00 as partial
payment of the purchase price, the balance thereof to be paid upon release of the title by the Philippine
Veterans Bank. Guerrero filed in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City a complaint for specific
performance to compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the sale. While this case for specific
performance was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present case for expropriation. Among
the defendants named in the complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of
Lot 834, a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated property. Upon the deposit of
P12,970,350.00 representing 10 percent of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of
possession was issued on August 29, 1990 in favor of the government. Guerrero filed a motion for
intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to sell to him the entire Lot 834 on December 14,
l988 and that a case for specific performance had been filed by him against the De la Ramas.
The trial court approved payment to the De la Ramas at the rate of P23,976.00 per square meter
for the taking of 920 square meters out of the 1,380 square meters to be expropriated Meanwhile, the
trial court upheld the validity of the contract to sell and ordering the De la Ramas to execute the
corresponding deed of sale covering the subject property in favor of Guerrero. Guerrero filed an Omnibus
Motions praying that the just compensation for the land be deposited in .As his motion for intervention
and omnibus motion had not yet been resolved, Guerrero filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
mandamus, certiorari, and injunction with temporary restraining order to enjoin the Republic from
releasing or paying to the De la Ramas any amount corresponding to the payment of the expropriated
property and to compel the trial court to resolve his two motions.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writ of mandamus. De la Ramas filed on
March 17, 1993 a Motion for Authority to withdraw the deposit made by the Republic in 1991.The trial
court denied the motion of the De la Ramas.
In its order dated October 7, 1993, the trial court clarified that the area of land covered by the
contract to sell included the portion expropriated by the Republic and that the Contract to Sell dated
December 14, 1988 executed by the parties is a valid document that authorizes the plaintiff to step into
the shoes of the defendants in relation to the property covered by TCT No. 16213; and that the transfer
shall be free from all liens and encumbrances except for the expropriated portion of 1,380 square meters.
As a result of which, a deed of absolute sale was executed by the Branch Clerk of Court in favor
of Guerrero upon payment by him of the sum of P8,808,000.00 on January 11, 1994 and the further sum
of P1,608,900.00 on February 1, 1994 as full payment for the balance of the purchase price under the
contract to sell of December 14, 1988. The entire amount was withdrawn and duly received by the De la
Ramas.
Pasay City Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, declared Guerrero the rightful owner of the 920-
square meter expropriated property and ordered payment to him of just compensation for the taking of
the land.This decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Who, between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are entitled to receive payment of just
compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question?
Held:
Guerrerois entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters
of the land in question.
The title to the expropriated portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to the government upon
the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just compensation was yet to be made before
ownership of the land was transferred to the government. As a result, petitioners still owned the entire
Lot 834 at the time they agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, since Guerrero obtained ownership of
Lot 834, including the 920 square meters expropriated by the government, he has the right to receive the
just compensation over the said property.
It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of land described
therein. However, it created an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas to convey the land, subject to
the fulfillment of the suspensive conditions therein stated. The declaration of this contract's validity,
which paved the way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994,
following the order of the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of Court, Branch 113, Pasay
City, effectively conveyed ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero. Stated in another way, Guerrero
was buying the entire property free from all claims of third persons except those of the
government.Evidently, Lot 834 was conveyed in 1994 to Guerrero by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
10 | P a g e
The fact that the De la Ramas have withdrawn and appropriated for themselves the amount paid
by Guerrero. This amount represented the purchase price of the entire 4,075 square meters of land,
including the expropriated portion, which was the subject of their agreement. The payment, therefore, to
them of the value of the expropriated portion would unjustly enrich them.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
12- REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL IPPINES, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 146587. JU LY 2, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M,
covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos,
Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the
Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over
the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of
the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation
proceedings, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said
property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00)
per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid.
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously
owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the
expropriated area.
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the
compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May
1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property.
On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of
P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed
a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount
of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation
proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July
1984, granted the motion.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20
hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities
and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The
remaining portion was retained by the PIA. Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on
their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the
deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated
property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court.
This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to
adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current
zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them
of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents ordering
the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs conformably with
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya.
Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a motion which
respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was made
within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to
enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial
compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of
petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule
39, of the Rules of Court.
In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within five
years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion for
payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55
by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period,
since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party, in this case
by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to them by the provincial treasurer of
Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner
when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial
payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the
property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be
finally settled.
11 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court of Bulacan erred in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000
Held:
The trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26
February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its
execution.
Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property,
deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final
judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon
at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until
the due amount shall have been fully paid.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power
to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose
. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
12 | P a g e
that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every
purpose of the plaintiff.
HELD:
Constitutional exemption for religious purpose refers only to property taxes.Section 22(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents,
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes.
The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property
taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes.
Imposition of gift tax on property used for religious purposes not violation of Constitution.A gift tax is
not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the
imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution.
15- PHILEX MINING CORPOR ATION VS. COMMISSION ER OF INTERNAL REVEN UE.
G.R. NO. 125704 AUGUST 28, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 8,
1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36975 affirming the Court of Tax Appeals decision in CTA Case No. 4872 dated
March 16, 1995 ordering it to pay the amount of P110,677,668.52 as excise tax liability for the period
from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from August 6, 1994
until fully paid pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977.
The facts show that on August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax
liabilities for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the total
amount of P123,821.982.52
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of Philex that In view of the grant of its VAT input credit/refund,
the same should, ipso jure, off-set its excise tax liabilities since both had already become "due and
demandable, as well as fully liquidated;" hence, legal compensation can properly take place.
Held:
We see no merit in this contention.
In several instances prior to the instant case, we have already made the pronouncement that
taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are
not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are
due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign
capacity. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the aforementioned distinction.
Prescinding from this premise, in Francia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we categorically held
that taxes cannot be subject to set-off or compensation, thus:
We have consistently ruled that there can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the
taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the
government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection of a tax
cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government.
The ruling in Francia has been applied to the subsequent case of Caltex Philippines, Inc. v.
Commission on Audit, which reiterated that:
. . . a taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims that he may have against the government.
Taxes cannot be the subject of compensation because the government and taxpayer are not mutually
13 | P a g e
creditors and debtors of each other and a claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand, contract or
judgment as is allowed to be set-off.
Further, Philex's reliance on our holding in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Itogon-Suyoc
Mines Inc., wherein we ruled that a pending refund may be set off against an existing tax liability even
though the refund has not yet been approved by the Commissioner, is no longer without any support in
statutory law.
It is important to note, that the premise of our ruling in the aforementioned case was anchored
on Section 51 (d) of the National Revenue Code of 1939. However, when the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1977 was enacted, the same provision upon which the Itogon-Suyoc pronouncement was based
was omitted. Accordingly, the doctrine enunciated in Itogon-Suyoc cannot be invoked by Philex.
Despite the foregoing rulings clearly adverse to Philex's position, it asserts that the imposition of
surcharge and interest for the non-payment of the excise taxes within the time prescribed was
unjustified. Philex posits the theory that it had no obligation to pay the excise tax liabilities within the
prescribed period since, after all, it still has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund with BIR.
We fail to see the logic of Philex's claim for this is an outright disregard of the basic principle in
tax law that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary
hindrance. Evidently, to countenance Philex's whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax
collection system. Too simplistic, it finds no support in law or in jurisprudence.
To be sure, we cannot allow Philex to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that
it has a pending tax claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. It
must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of
bargain. Hence, a tax does not depend upon the consent of the taxpayer. If any taxpayer can defer the
payment of taxes by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this would
adversely affect the government revenue system. A taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his taxes when they
fall due simply because he has a claim against the government or that the collection of the tax is
contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government. Moreover, Philex's theory that
would automatically apply its VAT input credit/refund against its tax liabilities can easily give rise to
confusion and abuse, depriving the government of authority over the manner by which taxpayers credit
and offset their tax liabilities.
Corollarily, the fact that Philex has pending claims for VAT input claim/refund with the
government is immaterial for the imposition of charges and penalties prescribed under Section 248 and
249 of the Tax Code of 1977. The payment of the surcharge is mandatory and the BIR is not vested with
any authority to waive the collection thereof. The same cannot be condoned for flimsy reasons, similar
to the one advanced by Philex in justifying its non-payment of its tax liabilities.
The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents, their agents and/or
representatives from "entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth."
14 | P a g e
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to bring the action.
2. Whether the General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG
entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution
Held:
On the first issue, petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the
legal personality to file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino
people and [is], in truth hand in fact, part of the public treasury," any compromise in relation to it would
constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a
full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets.
On the second issue, General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993,
which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution.In general, the law
encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following matters: (1) the civil status of
persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4)
future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitimate. And like any other contract, the
terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy
or public order. A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, unless the
consent of a party is vitiated such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence or
when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter
instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts.
Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the
Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. We believe that criminal immunity
under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-
gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandigan bayan. As stated earlier, the provision is
applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or
accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
The absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition
therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if
such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.
15 | P a g e
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land
and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of
the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should
be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The
doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty.
In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,
both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private
respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by
constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict
construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
19- GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AME RICA, VS. HON. GUILLERMO G.
PURGANAN, MORALES, AND MARK . JIMENEZ A.K.A . MARIO BATACAN CRESPO,
[G.R .NO. 148571. SEPTEMBER 24, 2002]
FACTS:
The United States Government sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No.0522 dated
June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez
sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing
with the RTC a petition for his extradition. Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez
filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an
arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing
on June 5, 2001.After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100, 000.The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also
set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million
pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued, and
2. Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings
are pending.
HELD:
1. No. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of
arrest. The case under consideration is an extradition and not acriminal action; therefore it is not
sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused.
No. The constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has beenarrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not applyto extradition proceedings, because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
17 | P a g e
20- ESRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 148560, NOVEMBER 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to
subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused
to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the president of the republic of the Philippines,
by himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue
advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did then and
therewillfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself directly or indirectly, ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred
four thousand one hundred seventy three and seventeen centavos (p4,097,804,173.17), more or less,
thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people
and the republic of Philippines through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means.
Respectively or a total of more or less one billion eight hundred forty seven million five hundred
seventy eight thousand fifty seven pesos and fifty centavos (p1,847,578,057.50); and by collecting or
receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with john does jane does, commissions r
percentages by reason of said purchases of shares of stock in the amount of one hundred eighty nine
million seven hundred thousand pesos (p189,700,000.00) more or less, from the Belle corporation which
became part of the deposit in the equitable bank under the account name 'jose velarde'.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity - Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of
its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from
the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to
penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the
petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein
arification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this
case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine
of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the
18 | P a g e
most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute
in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be nconstitutional.
On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that
the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
In view of due process - On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory
that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a
pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten
wealth.
In view of mens rea - As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is
a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion . . .
Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder
was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In view of estoppels - Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7080. The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved
herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner
himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to
question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law. Moreover,
estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is
estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage
would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute.
In view of plunder as a malum in se - The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder
is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral
or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special
law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
19 | P a g e
The petitioners have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate
interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. It is well settled that the validity of a
statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.
Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement
of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may
be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
HELD:
The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies
cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed
to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
20 | P a g e
- Violative of the Equal protection clause
Ruling:
The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's
adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an
index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.
However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
24- GONZALES VS . COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. NO. L-28196; 9 NOV 1967]
Facts:
The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. The main facts are not disputed.
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:1. R.
B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a
maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants,
although each province shall have, at least, one (1)member;2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to
propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates
from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second
Tuesday of November, 1971;" and3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same
Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective
seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June
17, 1967,became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in
the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue:
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates The Constitution.
Held:
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B.H. Nos.
1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby,
dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it
would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the
competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned."The judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."Article XV of the Constitution
provides:. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the
Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to
retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the
Convention.
21 | P a g e
2. Whether the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the EPC and uniformity of
taxation, were infringed.
Held:
Yes. The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc.
and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enacted, the company was the only sugar central in
Ormoc City. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as
well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as the present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it
is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied upon.
Yes, Equal Protection Clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesnt bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to
the same class.
HELD:
Equal protection not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification to be
reasonable (1) must rest on substantial distinctions (2) germane to the purpose of the law (3) not limited
to existing conditions only (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. In (1), not based on
accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. Non Christian refers not to
religious belief but to geographical area. In (2), unquestionable because it is designed to insure peace
and order in and among Non Christian tribes. In (3), it applies for all times as long as those conditions
exist. In (4), its not an argument here. The government raise their culture and civilization and secure for
them the benefits of their progress with the ultimate view of placing them with Christians on the basis of
true equality.
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
22 | P a g e
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.
28- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. JIMMY MIJ ANO Y TAMORA
G.R. NO. 129112. JU LY 23, 1999
FACTS:
That on or about the 10th day of May, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Jimmy Milano, by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
HAZEL RAMIREZ Y ABING, who is a child below seven (7) years old, against her will and consent. The
witnesses for the prosecution were Hazels mother, Dina Ramirez, Arnulfo Valiente and Hazel Ramirez
herself.
The accused-appellant denied the charges. The trial court did not accord credence to the
testimony of accused-appellant, pointing out that the defense of denial and accused-appellants alibi,
deserve no serious preoccupation of the mind. Nor yet can his claim that he was too drunk to know what
transpired at the time when the rape was committed, be given weight to disprove the charge against
him.
Hence, the instant review and appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the death penalty law violative of the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
because it punishes only people like him, the poor, the uneducated, and the jobless.
HELD:
The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of
all persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the
law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he
possesses. Republic Act No. 7659 specifically provides:
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
xxx
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
xxx
Apparently, as it should be, the death penalty law makes no distinction. It applies to all persons and to
all classes of persons rich or poor, educated or uneducated, religious or non-religious. No particular
person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be
exclusively imposed.
29- SOLIVEN V. MAKASAIR G.R. NO. 82585 NOVE MBER 14, 1988
Facts/Issue:
Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause
Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of
arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Held:
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant
of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the
23 | P a g e
judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this
resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard
to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
24 | P a g e
In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a)
The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or
prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The
preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the
determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him.
By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's
certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c)
Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether
the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of
one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment
of trial is a function of the prosecutor.
Cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he
has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test,
the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be "secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge. On the contrary, the probable
cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances
must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is
guilty of the crime which has just been committed. This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the
filing of the information in court the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the documents
attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must either call for the complainant and the
witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and
further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.
But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not
abused, their discretion. If they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they should have
armed themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is not enough.
They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable
cause. For the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of
a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one"
In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest
of the government cannot be ignored. From the gathering of evidence until the termination of the
preliminary investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and
secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal's
sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered
without giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered the evidence
appears to have had a hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the
undated resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for
approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in securing a
copy of the resolution and the information against them.
31- BURGOS V. CHIEF OF S TAFF G.R. NO. L-64261 DECEMBER 26, 1984
Facts:
Two [2] search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-
Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
Issue:
25 | P a g e
1. Whether or not the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground
that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City basing on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
2. Whether or not these search warrants are valid considering the fact that although the warrants were
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Held:
1. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would
be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and
the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed
the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is
more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. Obviously this is the same place that
respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer
is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who
issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the
warrant as to the place to be searched."
2. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure
of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
27 | P a g e
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the
same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the
plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer.
Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and
placed inside plastic bags white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-
examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know
exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not
immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana
was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law
and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never
considered by the trial court.
36- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN AND
ROBERTO DELOS REYES, G.R. NO. 125754 DECEMBER 22,1999.
Facts:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening
of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in
Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1
Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects and parked their car some three
hundred (300) meters away. They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their
unnamed informer. When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and . . .
saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana." They entered the house and introduced
themselves as police officers to the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug
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paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan
and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo
confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana.
Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, of RA
6425 otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Both however denied on the witness stand
ownership over the confiscated tea bags and drug implements.
The trial court upon finding the version of the prosecution to be more plausible convicted both
accused Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes of the crime charged and sentenced each of them not
only to reclusion perpetua but also to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Both accused appealed, although separately, each one represented by a separate counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not Zenaida Bolasas assertions that the search in her residence was illegal as her
arrest preceding it was illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized from her could not be properly used
as evidence against her correct.
Held:
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their
houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an
impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of
the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being
irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some
measure agreeable."
For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and
seizures as it obviously operates only against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable." Thus,
arrests and seizures in the following instances are not deemed "unreasonable" and are thus allowed even
in the absence of a warrant
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;.
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) when an offense
has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. A person charged
with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the
above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or
were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime
was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it.
Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid
intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the
tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers
intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-
appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving
vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under
exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a
surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already
ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for
arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest
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and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every
evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their
acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
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machines and equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video prints, flyers, production orders, and posters.
Inventories of these seized articles were then prepared and copies thereof were furnished Jess Ayson,
production manager of FGT. On May 18, 1987, the NBI agents filed a return of the search warrant with a
motion to retain custody of the seized items (p. 32, Rollo).
Issue:
Whether or not Search Warrant No. 45 is valid.
Held:
The right to security against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Thus, Sections 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites in the issuance of
search warrants:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The search warrant must contain a specific description of the place to be searched and the
articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity (Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA
429 [1990]).
The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing as to
include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in the
nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]).
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reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not
sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against
unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In
this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly consider,
at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times,
when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.
39- HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, HON. JUAN PONCE EN RILE, PEDRO PACIS, AND
MARTIN ALAGAO, VS. REMEDIOS MAGO AND HILARION U. JARENCIO 39
G.R. NO. L-27360 FEBRUARY 28, 1968
FACTS:
Petitioner Martin Alagao, acting upon a reliable information received to the effect that a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following
day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner
Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 elements of the counter-
intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The
load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions
of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the
policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo,
Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
"for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, alleging, among others, that Remedios
Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from
said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by
members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that
Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be
not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto
Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under
the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to
have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff
and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge
that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa
had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless
restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury.
Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte,
enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and
examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a
judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the
respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 now petitioners in the instant case before this Court from
opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary
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injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein
petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the
presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of
herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496,
including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin
Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24,
1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the
alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations,
and alleging special and affirmative defenses.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent
Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said
respondent filed the corresponding bond.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967
releasing the goods in question.
HELD:
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and
collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties,
accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds
upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. The goods in question were imported
from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". As long
as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and
other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be
in full.
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of
this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs,
that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the
goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected
on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and
inventory, shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of
duties thereon.The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture
under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court
has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to
forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the
customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods
were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police
Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally
deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and
custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of
Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges
have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in
question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the
petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise
jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of
the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued
by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case,
the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that
date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of
the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of
First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had
issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as
respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent
Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not
acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and
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so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it
follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of
March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
40- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. ANDRE MARTI G.R. NO. 81561
JANUARY 18, 1991
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to
Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The appellant and his common-law wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number,
the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr
II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland.
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by
two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box
was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, spouses
Reyes following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened
appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled
out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one
of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents.
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of
the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers
from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered
that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in
his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief
Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by
the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the
Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory
examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the
forensic chemist.
ISSUE:
The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized objects contained
in the four parcels.
HELD:
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked
against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with
appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as
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an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.
41- GENEROSO ESMEA VS. JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY G.R. NO. L-54110
FEBRUARY 20, 1981
Facts:
Petitioners Generoso Esmea and Alberto Alba and their co-accused, Genaro Alipio, Vicente
Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for having
allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro Cathedral, Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of
five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a
game of cards.
On the ground of invoking (sic) the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial of the
case particularly accused Alberto Alba and Generoso Esmea.
Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present
because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not
ready with his witness. The court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that the
complainant was really sick.
Twenty-seven days later, or on September 12, 1979, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of
the case. He attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father
Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16, 1979.
The fiscal cited the ruling that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks
the impress of finality and, therefore, the case could be revived without the filing of a new information
(Lauchengco vs. Alejandro, L-49034, January 31, 1979, 88 SCRA 175).
The accused did not oppose the motion. Respondent judge granted it in his order of October 8,
1979.
On October 24, 1979, Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
double jeopardy. They pointed out that they did not consent to the provisional dismissal of the case.
Hence, the provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal which placed them in jeopardy. Its revival
would place them in double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether the revival of a grave coercion case, which was provisionally dismissed after the
accused had been arraigned because of complainant's failure to appear at the trial, would place the
accused in double jeopardy, considering their constitutional right to have a speedy trial.
Held:
The rule on double jeopardy (non bis in Idem or not twice for the same) is found in section 22,
Article IV Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense." This is complemented by Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which
provides as follows:
SEC. 9. Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. When a defendant shall have been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.
In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b)
before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or information.
When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused or the
dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein (4 Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 240).
Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not
expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in
jeopardy.
Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the
case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the
word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil.
134; Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299).
If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for
the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is
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denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently,
fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such
dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980
Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, 307 and People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714-717).
The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not
prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal
equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense
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43- CLEMENTE MAGTOTO VS. MIGUEL M. MANGUERA
G.R. NOS. L-37201-02 MARCH 3, 1975
Facts:
Petitioner assailed the orders of the respondent Judges in G.R. No. L-37201-02 declaring
admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases although they have not been informed of their
right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before
the effectivity of the New Constitution.
Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And
the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right
shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right already existed and
had been violated.
Issue:
The present cases involve an interpretation of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution,
which reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence,
and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right to remain
silent and to counsel.
Held:
This specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and
not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right to silence and to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on
January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same
had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17,
1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the
right to be so informed before that date.
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person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be
taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
of his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of
his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the
accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he
just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.
45- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. JAIME AGUS TIN, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 110290 JANUARY 25, 1995
Facts:
In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-
R and 4651-R. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted in
the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen,
Dominic Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta.
While he was giving his statement at the fical's office, the armed men stayed with him and their
presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being threatened. He further
declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, to assist him, he, nevertheless,
asked for his uncle who is a lawyer, Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only
two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused has been informed of his rights.
Held:
The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle." It is not enough for the investigator to merely repeat to the person
under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article
III of the present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical
terms, e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do, and in language the subject fairly
understands. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the
investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject
understanding what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant
personal circumstances of the person undergoing the investigation.
In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such
right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he can ask for
counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain
counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to
counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That
counsel must be a lawyer.
The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Consequently,
even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance off counsel,
it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.
42 | P a g e
Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown
over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
Issue:
Whether or not the videotaped confession which the accused made over TV Patrol was constitutionally
infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.
Held:
Such admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does
not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an
attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into
confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been
symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision
Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis
Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of
accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements
therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in
all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of
the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.1wphi1.nt
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the
knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper
and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this
where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given under
coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions
described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and
therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly
a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in
separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective
of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
48- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. DAVID S. L OVERIA G.R. NO. 79138 JULY 2,
1990
Facts:
The accused-appellant David S. Loveria was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
CLIX (159) with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide under the following
information:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with three (3) John Does whose true name, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with a knife, with
intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, hold-up a passenger jeepney with Plate No. NXG-150-Pil. '84, one of the passengers,
Richard Bales y Andres of his Seiko Wrist Watch worth P300.00 and a colored brown wallet containing
P50.00, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of P350.00; that on the
occasion of said robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife one Ricardo Yamson y Malanon, thereby inflicting
upon him stab wounds which directly caused his death, and one Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion the driver of
the said passenger jeepney, on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which
ordinarily would have caused his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely and able medical attendance
rendered to the said Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion which prevented his death.
Contrary to law. (Rollo, p. 3).
Upon being arraigned on July 3, 1985, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty (Record, p. 18.)
After trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the
decision dated May 26, 1987 reads:
From this judgment of conviction, the appellant filed the present appeal.
43 | P a g e
Issue:
The appellant assails the manner in which he was identified by Manzanero at the headquarters of
the 225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal, claiming violation of his constitutional
right to counsel.
Held:
Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time the events under review
occurred reads:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in the evidence.
Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides similar guarantees by stating:
Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The court must emphasize that the so-called Miranda rights contained in the abovequoted
constitutional provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial investigation
[People v. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379]. which has been defined as the
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" [People v. Caguioa, G.R. No. L-38975,
January 17, 1980, 95 SCRA 2, 9 citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436]. Hence, for instance, these
constitutional rights may no longer be claimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court
[People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989] because he is no longer under custodial investigation.
The ruling enunciated in Gamboa v. Cruz, [G.R. No. 56291, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 642],
concerning the right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation finds application in the instant
case. In that case, the accused was arrested for vagrancy and taken to the police station. The following
day he was placed on a line-up and a female complainant pointed to him as one of the persons who
robbed her. While on trial, the accused filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence on the ground,
among others, that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel at the time the complainant was
in the process of accusing or identifying him for allegedly committing a crime. The motion having been
denied by the trial court, the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme
Court, which ruled that the right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation cannot be invoked
until such time that the police investigators start questioning, interrogating or exacting a confession from
the person under investigation. The Court held that in the police line-up conducted in that particular
case, it was the complainant who was being investigated and who gave a statement to the police while
the accused was not questioned at all. Thus, the Court concluded that the latter could not, during the
line-up, invoke his right to counsel because he was not under custodial interrogation. In the case at bar,
Manzanero, upon learning that certain hold-up men were being detained at the 225th PC Company,
Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal in connection with another robbery, went there to check. Having identified the
appellant among the detainees, he reported the matter to the Marikina police [See Exh. "B"]. Thereafter,
Pat. Bill Ayun accompanied Manzanero back to the PC headquarters in Antipolo where Manzanero
identified to Pat. Ayun the appellant as one of the persons involved in the incident. Pat. Ayun then took
the sworn statement of Manzanero which was presented in court as Exh. "B" [TSN, December 8, 1986, p.
3.] Since, as in the Gamboa case, the appellant was not investigated when Manzanero was in the process
of identifying him, he cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because at that stage, he was
not entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked.
But even assuming that the process of identification of the appellant by Manzanero at the PC
headquarters was attended by constitutional infirmities, only Manzanero's sworn statement (Exh. "B")
where he identified appellant and which was taken by Pat. Ayun, would be excluded for being
inadmissible in evidence. The testimony of Manzanero made in open court positively identifying the
appellant, as well as those of Richard Bales and Betty Apolinario, would not be affected. These
testimonies, taken together with the other evidence on record, would be sufficient to sustain the trial
court's judgment of conviction.
47 | P a g e
Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence pursuant to
the provision of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, viz:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him. (Emphasis ours.)
These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. However,
infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during
custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is
not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have
his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute
a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these
constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence
certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is
admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery.
The identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are
admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract from appellant's culpability
considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt
as perpetrator of the crime charged.
48 | P a g e
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec.
12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict
constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the
appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.
The appellant was undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the Constitution.18 The court
a quo observed that the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of
such rights.19 As further proof of the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a
Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant.20
Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter
categorically stating that before the investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken, he
advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the
questions he understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer. 21 Atty. Giduquio
represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case.
Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the contemplation
of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence in
representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the record
that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings.
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a
lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be
solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently
entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec.
12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos,
prior to conducting his investigation, explained to appellant his constitutional rights in the Visayan
dialect, notably Cebuano.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to
execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who
threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand
the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the
Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion
or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving claims
that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. 33 Bare assertions will certainly
not suffice to overturn the presumption.
49 | P a g e
relied, finally, on the retraction of the accused themselves, absolving Olvis of any liability. It was
satisfied, overall, that he had a "clean bill of health" in connection with the murder case.
With the acquittal of Olvis, we are left with the murder cases against the three accused-
appellants. The accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open court
alleging threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they refused to "cooperate" in the
solution of the case. They likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco police investigators
to implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. They insisted on their innocence. The acused Romulo Villarojo
averred, specifically, that it was the deceased who had sought to kill him, for which he acted in self-
defense.
The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The police of Polanco had
but the three accused-appellants' statements to support its claiming.
Issue:
whether or not these statements can stand up in court.
Held:
Based on the recorded evidence, the three accused-appellants' extrajudicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence.
It was on May 7, 1987 that we promulgated People v. Decierdo.11 In that decision, we laid
down the rule with respect to extrajudicial confessions:
... Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant, may waive effectuation of
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him The mere fact that he
may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of
the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has converted with an attorney and
thereafter consent to be questioned.
The confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. In their supposed
statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel
when they "waived" their rights to counsel. As we said in Decierdo, the lack of counsel "makes [those]
statement[s], in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,' even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically."
With reset to the confessions of September 18, 197 5, while it is stated therein that this Office
had just requested the services of Atty. NARVARO VELAR NAVARRO of the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office, Department of Justice, Dipolog District Office, are you wining to accept the legal assistance of
Atty. NAVARRO to handle your case, the same nonetheless call for a similar rejection. There is nothing
there that would show that Atty. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice (specifically, the
appellant Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein having been the bolo-wielder). On the contrary, it is
clear therefrom that Atty. Navarro was summoned by the NBI. He cannot therefore be said to have been
acting on behalf of the accused-appellants when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings.
What we said in People v. Galit, applies with like force here:
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by
the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
dead 16 trainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
We cast aside, for the same reason, the confessions of September 25, 1975.
But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, but twice. We refer to
the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their
apprehension.
Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against
self- incrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings below,
says:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion, but
this has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" acquired under circumstances of
duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of
the certainly inhuman procedure of competing a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the
missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the
inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt. Thus, an act, whether testimonial or passive, that
would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution.
This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to
execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by
simple observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body,
or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth or making her submit to a pregnancy test or
a footprinting test, or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases." In each case, the
accused does not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the guiding
hand of counsel.
But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely required to
exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his
will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession.
50 | P a g e
Accordingly, we hold that all evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the
Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.
It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody
when they took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the Constitution
holds a strict application. As for the accused Dominador Sorela, we cannot accept the trial judge's finding
that he acted "with unexpected spontaneity" when he allegedly "spilled the beans before the law
enforcers on September 9, 1975. What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was himself under custody.
Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional guaranty.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions, under the circumstances, were truly his voluntary statements
Chavez v. Court of Appeals tells us:
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will disable him from making a free and
rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral
coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.
In such a case, he should have been provided with counsel.
Indeed, the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for one year and two months before the
information was filed, and only after they had gone to court on an application for habeas corpus. For if
the authorities truly had a case in their hands, we are puzzled why they, the accused, had to be made to
suffer preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous length of time.
53- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. RONILO L. PINLAC G.R. NOS. 74123-24
SEPTEMBER 26, 1988
Facts:
Accused Ronilo Pinlac y Libao was charged in two (2) separate information, as follows:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10476
That on or about the 8th day of April, 1984, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused RONILO
PINLAC y LIBAO, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon things, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of KOJI SATO, by detaching the four (4) pieces of
window jalousies and destroying the aluminum screens of the servant's quarters and entered through the
same, an opening not intended for entrance or egress and once inside, took, robbed and carried away
the following articles, to wit:
Cash amount and/or cash money P180.00, Alba (Seiko) wrist watch. 300.00, Gold necklace with
pendant of undetermined value, to the damage and prejudice of the owner KOJI SATO, in the aforesaid
total amount of P480.00 and a necklace of undetermined value.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10477
That on or about the 8th day of April, 1984, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, RONILO
PINLAC y LIBAO, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon things, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of SAEKI OSAMU, by slashing the screen wall of his
house and entered through the same, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, and once inside,
took, robbed and carried away a Hitachi Casette tape recorder of undetermined value, belonging to the
said SAEKI OSAMU, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof, in the amount of undetermined
value.
That on the occasion of the said Robbery, the above named accused, RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO in
order to insure the commission of the said Robbery, with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable
cause, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one SAEKI
OSAMU, several times with a kitchen knife he was then provided with, thereby causing several mortal
wounds on the person of the said SAEKI OSAMU, which directly caused his death.
After said accused entered a plea of not guilty, the cases proceeded to trial. On March 18, 1986,
the trial court rendered its now assailed decision finding the accused guilty as charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction was proper under the circumstances that the accused (now
petitioner) contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his extra-judicial confession, which
was allegedly obtained thru force, torture, violence and intimidation, without having been apprised of his
constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.
The only evidence presented by the prosecution which could have been fatal, is the extra-judicial
confession of the accused, which is now being assailed as violative of the Constitution.
51 | P a g e
Held:
In the case of People vs. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770, promulgated on March 20, 1985, which cited
the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, this Court reiterated the correct procedure for peace
officers to follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation. Therein, We said
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. (pp. 19-20, 139
SCRA)
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to
remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person
under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the
rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, (See People vs.
Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2). In other words, the right of a person under
interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to
explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed.
Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed"
of his rights. (People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289).
The Fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance with the duties of an
interrogating officer. As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under
investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to
affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such
affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be
admitted in evidence.
Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the accused
during custodial investigation was inadmissible, although he had been apprised of his constitutional rights
to silence and to counsel, for the reason that the prosecution failed to show that those rights were
explained to him, such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was sufficiently manifested and
intelligently understood" by the accused. (People vs. Nicandro supra)
Going to the instant case, We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove
compliance with these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and
his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is also replete
with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated
and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.
54- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES, VS. WILFREDO ROJAS, TEOD ORO VILLARIN,
SOLOMON TOTOY, GREGO RIO TUNDAG AND SINFROSO MASONG, DEFENDANTS
G.R. NOS. L-46960-62 JANUARY 8, 1987
Facts:
On that tragic morning of May 23, 1973, when three girls were slain, the youngest only five years
old, under the most mystifying and shocking circumstances. Consider the carnage and the girls who fell
before the bloodied knife: Zenaida Nastae, 21 years old, stabbed once to death, ears severed; Canda
Carluman, 7 years old, stabbed once, hemorrhaging to death; and Mona Carluman, 5 years old, stabbed
twice to death, ears severed. These were Nature's creatures still on the threshold of their lives, and yet
they were cut down in the innocence of their youth without mercy and without reason.
The day following the massacre, prodded perhaps by a sense not only of duty but also of
outrage, a joint PC-police posse arrested seven persons in Barrio Talanusa, to wit: Teodoro Villarin,
Saturnino Totoy, Solomon Totoy, Gregorio Tundag, Sinfroso Masong, Mohamod Esmael and Balbino
Estrera, all suspected of the killings. Found in their possession and confiscated were two home-made
shotguns, one .38 caliber homemade pistol with two live bullets, five hunting knives with scabbards, an
undershirt with Latin words arranged in a mystic design, a pair of trousers, four bottles of oil and two
human ears. Wilfredo Rojas, their alleged leader, was arrested later in Malangas, also of Zamboanga del
Sur, and turned over to the Margosatubig police.
After investigation, all the suspects were charged with the murder of the above-named victims in
three separate informations to which they all pleaded not guilty. Later, on motion of the prosecution and
over the objection of the other defendmurdants, Esmael and Estrera were discharged so they could be
used as state witnesses. Every one of the remaining defendants was provided with counsel de oficio An
52 | P a g e
extended trial followed and decision was finally rendered on January 27, 1975, convicting all of them and
sentencing them to death. The lone exception was Saturnino Totoy, who, because of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, was meted out the lesser penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor
to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal . All the accused were also held
solidarily liable for the civil indemnity of P12,000.00, to be paid to the heirs of each of the three victims.
Issue:
Solomon Totoy challenges his supposed confession on the ground that it was taken in violation of the Bill
of Rights.
Held:
The requirements of Article IV, Section 20, of the 1973 Constitution. This statement was
obtained from him on May 28, 1973. It is therefore covered by Magtoto v. Manguera and other
subsequent cases holding that this section should be given only prospective operation from January 17,
1973, when the Constitution was ratified.
The said provision categorically states that "any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right." The
record does not show that this requirement was observed. On the contrary, there merely appears in the
opening paragraph of the said confession the vague statement that:
The affiant has been informed of his rights under the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, and under the state of Martial Law, and the nature of the investigation, and without violence,
intimidation, force nor reward the affiant declared as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This surely does not suggest compliance with the constitutional mandate. The rights which Totoy
was entitled to know were not specifically communicated to him. Being informed of his "rights under the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" did not mean he was informed particularly of his right to
remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation. He was not told he did not
have to answer if he did not feel like answering. He was not told he had a right to be assisted by counsel.
He was not given a chance to retain counsel de parte if he wanted to, and neither was he offered the
services of counsel de oficio. Not knowing about his right to counsel, he could not have waived it; and in
any case, the waiver, to be valid, would have needed the assistance of counsel under the ruling
announced in People v. Galit, which is still the prevailing doctrine notwithstanding the reservations of
some members of this Court.
In fine, what we see here is a superficial observance of the requirements of the Bill of Rights
through a mere recitation by rote of the sacramental advise, which was inadequate to begin with. There
was no sincere effort or desire to apply the guarantees of Section 20 that could have protected the
suspect from the rash and uncounseled statements he subsequently made, knowing no better. That
statement is, of course, not admissible against him.
53 | P a g e
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision:
(1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of 12, and (2) those which are given without the
benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same 12.
The accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution,
an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from which Art. III, 12(1) was
derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and
surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really
needs the guiding hand of counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial
interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent;
(2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told
that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
There was only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any
effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own
counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several
decisions of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful
information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the
police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only
finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Indeed, as stated in People v.
Januario: 17
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter
could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person
authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person
authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are
given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. 18
Moreover, Art. III, 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be
competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though
presumably competent, cannot be considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for
the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant.
As observed in People v. Bandula, 21 the independent counsel required by Art. III, 12(1) cannot
be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose
interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station
Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and
scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To
allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial
investigation. 22
For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence.
55 | P a g e
This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September 9,
1965. No appellee's brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief, the appeal
was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving questions purely of law (Sec.
17, Republic Act 296).
Issue:
whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of a
plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-
19860, December 23, 1964).
Held:
It is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in
the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense.
Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision had the effect of vacating his
plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least
direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there
having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can
be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving
the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant.
In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its
action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no
acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v.
Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
58- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. LEO P. ECHEGARAY G.R. NO. 117472
FEBRUARY 7, 1997
Facts:
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose the Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended,
Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect.
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A No. 7659 took effect, and the present time, criminal
offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein accused-appellant has been,
pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon
his conviction his case was elevated to us on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his
conviction and the death sentence.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death penalty is a severe and excessive
penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987
Constitution.
Held:
The detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of
this disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the following analysis.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-
impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed
in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that
Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by
death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death
can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the
crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3)
that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or
description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that:
. . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just civilized and ordered society.
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, traced the
etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning hateful and
56 | P a g e
abominable, which in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly
evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be
considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim,
the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences and effects on
the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his
discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No 7659 imposes not a mandatory
penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death:
All the crimes mentioned therein are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them being
not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is
premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in each of the foregoing crimes because
they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the
prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in
appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain circumstances in the
manner by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in relation to
the victim, or in any other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the
victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or
inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
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(22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available
where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or
prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of
acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the
constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under
an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made
clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of
the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge:
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity
of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the
two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different
sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation
where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute.
If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution,
conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition,
different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense
having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities though one be subordinate to the other
and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional
Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by
the first sentence.
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative
definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have
generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the
first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as
set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably
regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one
and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately
characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different
legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute).
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November
1974 to February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the
installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or
authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted such
unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus
present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect
of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without
the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current
was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute
literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes
the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt
to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be
available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical
definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by
multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later
Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it seems
elementary that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out
from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending
upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by
said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. Under the theory of appellant,
the crime of rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and
intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88 Phil. at 53; emphases
supplied)
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By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused
by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented
and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal
ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for
violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed,
amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code,
"prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules
of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense.
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this
case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by
stealing from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an
Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he
should have known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold
the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this case.
60- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH V I, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-36528 SEPTEMBER 24, 1987
Facts:
Respondent Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating
Section 7, in relation to Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code,
in two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972.
On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the two (2) cases, the City Fiscal amended the
information in Criminal Case No. F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11, Rep. Act
No. 3060), by alleging that the accused.
conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each other did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to be publicly exhibited ... completed
composite prints of motion film, of the 8 mm. size, in color forming visual moving images on the
projection screen through the mechanical application of the projection equipment, which motion pictures
have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview,
examination and partnership, nor duly passed by said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room 309, De
Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila].
On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case No. F-147348 (for violation of Article 201 (3)
of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that, on the same date, 16 July 1971, the same
accused,
conspiring and confederating together and actually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly exhibit, through the mechanical application of movie
projection equipment and the use of projection screen, indecent and immoral motion picture scenes, to
wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female
and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and obvious positions,
among other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view,
to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila].
On 31 May 1972, upon arraignment, accused Agapito Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both
charges. The other accused, Roberto Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large.
On 15 November 1972, the accused Gonzales moved for permission to withdraw his plea of "not
guilty" in Criminal Case No. F-147348, without however, substituting or entering another plea. The Court
granted the motion and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972.
On 27 December 1972, accused Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No.
F-147348 on the ground of double jeopardy, as there was according to him, also pending against him
Criminal Case No. F-147347, for violation of Rep. Act No. 3060, where the information allegedly contains
the same allegations as the information in Criminal Case No. F-147348.
Petitioner opposed the motion to quash but the respondent City Court, in an order, dated 20
January 1973, dismissed the case (Criminal Case No. F-147348) stating thus:
In one case (F-147347), the basis of the charge is a special law, Rep. Act No. 3060. In the other
case (F-147348), the basis of the same is the pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code. Considering
that the allegations in the information of said cases are Identical the plea entered in one case by the
accused herein can be reasonably seen as exposing him to double jeopardy in the other case, as said
allegations therein are not only similar but [sic] Identical facts.
After the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-147348, or on 7 February 1973, in Criminal Case No. F-
147347, the accused changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of Rep.
Act No. 3060. He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00.
59 | P a g e
Issue:
1. Whether or not conviction or acquittal in, or dismissal or termination of a first case is not necessary,
so long as he had been put in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in the first case of the same
offense.
2. Whether or not the conviction of respondent Gonzales in Criminal Case No. F-147347 by imposing
on him a fine of P600.00 can retroactively supply the ground for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
F-147348.
Held:
1. It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1)
a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof
All these requisites do not exist in this case.
The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense,
contrary to private respondent's allegations. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of Rep. Act
No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion
Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures.
The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the two (2) laws involved
would show that the two (2) offenses are different and distinct from each other.
2. But even if conviction in Criminal Case No. F-147347 preceded the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-
147348, still that conviction cannot bar the prosecution for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised
Penal Code, because, by pleading to the charge in Criminal Case No. F-147348 without moving to
quash the information, the accused (now the respondent) Gonzales must be taken to have waived
the defense of double jeopardy, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 117, section 10. (Barot v.
Villamor, 105 Phil. 263 [1959]) It is only in cases where, after pleading or moving to quash on some
other grounds, the accused learns for the first time that the offense of which he is charged is an
offense for which he has been in jeopardy that the court may in its discretion entertain at any time
before judgment a motion to quash on that ground. ... In the case at bar, however, the fact is that
the accused (now the respondent Gonzales) was arraigned in the same court. He, therefore, cannot
claim ignorance of the existence of another charge against him for supposedly the same offense.
61- JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR VS. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO,
ETC. AND EVANGELINE PONCE CARPIO, G.R. NO. 172716 NOVEMBER
17, 2010
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained
by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the
arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on
petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5
Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal
of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
Issues:
whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.
60 | P a g e
Held:
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to
Determine the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with
People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered
the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against
the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was
based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the
Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no
more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short,
there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the
same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied
the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly).
63- GARCES VS. ESTENZO GR. NO. L-53487, MAY 25, 1981
Facts:
The case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia,
Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the
celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish
priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council
adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of
the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".
Issue:
Is the holding of fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, valid and constitutional?
Held:
Yes. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of
the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church
when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and
display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a
socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the
monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
65- MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
FACTS:
In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power
revolution and was forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon Aquino was declared President of the
Republic. This, did not however, stop bloody challenges to the government. The armed threats to the
government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Marcos. There are
also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during
the rule of Marcos. The woes of the government are not purely political. The accumulated foreign debt
and the plunder of the nation attributed to Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines
(2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return
HELD:
Although the Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of the specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power.
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles service and protection of the people, the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic
principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution,
the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and
the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
Presidents residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is a power borne by the
Presidents duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the
Presidents duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. More particularly, this case calls for the
exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order.
Another question to determine is whether or no there exist factual bases for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. The
Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within
by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to
grab power, urban terrorism, and the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian
officials. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously
and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
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66- YAP VS. CA GR. NO. 141529 JUNE 6, 2001
Facts:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set
aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions
on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00,
petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for
each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He
filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed
earlier in the proceedings.
Issue:
Was the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of
abode and right to travel?
Held:
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision.23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely
required to inform the court in case he does so.
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Held:
On the first issue, PD No. 1986 section provides that the Board has the power toreview and
examine all "television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to "approve,
delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ."
The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine
those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency
to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime."
On the second issue, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule .There is
no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has
taken the life of a reality already on ground.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is
affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV
program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the action of
the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. What is involved here is
the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and
has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case,
petitioner was not ex-communicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated
from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is
different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.
Private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on
appeal. It is already too late in the day for private respondents to question the jurisdiction of the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter since the SDA had fully participated in the trials and hearings of the case from start
to finish. The Court has already ruled that the active participation of a party against whom the action war
brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the
action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction. The
active participation of private respondents in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
mooted the question on jurisdiction.
On the final issue, the petitioner was terminated from service without just or lawful cause.
Having been illegally dismissed, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss
of seniority right and the payment of full backwages without any deduction corresponding to the period
from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement.
Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code
and Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code further require the
employer to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices. Private respondent failed to comply with
the above requirements. The alleged grounds for the dismissal of petitioner from the service were only
revealed to him when the actual letter of dismissal was finally issued. For this reason, it cannot be said
that petitioner was given enough opportunity to properly prepare for his defense. We cannot sustain the
validity of dismissal based on the ground of breach of trust. Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c)
of the Labor Code, the breach of trust must be willful. In the absence of conspiracy and collusion, which
private respondents failed to demonstrate, between petitioner and his wife, petitioner cannot be made
accountable for the alleged infraction committed by his wife. After all, they still have separate and distinct
personalities. Indeed, he even labored hard for the SDA, but, in return, he was rewarded with a dismissal
from the service for a non-existent cause.
The petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
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Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is
subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but
it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible
mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and
welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas
workers.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety,"as may be provided
by law.
The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms.
In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The
interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
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Held:
Petitioner's contention is untenable. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of
a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. Its object is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put
the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may
require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has
the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the
principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. The constitutional right to travel being
invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 .The liberty of abode and
of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed.
71- BLO UMPAR ADIONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 103956
Facts:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers
granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other
election laws secretion 15 of which states that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the
COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars
and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with
the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on
cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the
date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire
country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."
Issue:
Whether Resolution No. 2347 Section 15a is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and is therefore unconstitutional.
Held:
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public
or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds.
First it infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Article III).
Second, it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
Third, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and
Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting
decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State
in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal
significance. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles,
pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the
preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources
of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to dole out more decals and
stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as
important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. The
owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down
this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties. When a person attaches a sticker
with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing
ideas.
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74- MANUEL LAGUNZAD VS. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-32066 AUGUST 6, 1979
Facts:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production
of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his own business outfit, the "MML
Productions."The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla. Padilla was
then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party (then the minority party) for the Municipality of
Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member
of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder in People vs.
Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political
history."Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions
which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria
Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. 4
On October 3, 1961, petitioner received a telephone call from one Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister
of Moises Padilla, objecting to the filming of the movie and the "exploitation" of his life.On October 5,
1961, Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain
changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. 5 Petitioner contends that he acceded to the demands
because he had already invested heavily in the picture. On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some
bargaining as to the amount to be paid, which was P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to
P20,000.00, 7 petitioner and private respondent, represented by her daughters and Atty. Ernesto
Rodriguez, at the law office of Jalandoni and Jamir, executed a "Licensing Agreement"
Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because of
private respondent's demand, through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the life story of
Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud
and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television and that they were going
to Court to stop the picture." On October 10, 1961, petitioner paid private respondent the amount of
P5,000.00 but contends that he did so not pursuant to their Agreement but just to placate private
respondent. 9Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on
December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in
her favor
Traversing the Complaint, petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of
Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about the
same time that the deceased became and was a public figure. By way of counterclaim, petitioner
demanded that the Licensing Agreement be declared null and void for being without any valid cause.
Private respondent duly filed her Answer to Counterclaim alleging that the transaction between her and
petitioner was entered into freely and voluntarily.
On June 30, 1964, the trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter Court affirmed the judgment. Reconsideration
having been denied by the Court, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Initially, or on June 16, 1970, this Court denied the Petition for lack of merit, but resolved
subsequently to give it due course after petitioner moved for reconsideration on the additional argument
that the movie production was in exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of expression, and that
the Licensing cement is a form of restraint on the freedom of speech and of the press.
Issues:
In his Brief, petitioner assigns the following errors to the appellate Court:
a. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXERCISING JURISDICTION IN THE CASE BECAUSE THE
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM WAS INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE AND CHARACTER;
b. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO MAKE COMPLETE FINDINGS OF FACTS ON ALL
ISSUES BEFORE IT;
c. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE LICENSING AGREEMENT, NULL AND
VOID FOR LACK OF, OR FOR HAVING AN ILLEGAL CAUSE OR CONSIDERATION OF CONTRACT,
d. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LICENSING AGREEMENT, IS NULL
AND VOID; RESPONDENT NOT HAVING HAD ANY PROPERTY NIGHTS OVER THE INCIDENTS IN
THE LIFE OF MOISES PADILLA WHO WAS A PUBLIC FIGURE.
e. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LICENSING AGREEMENT, WAS NULL
AND VOID, PETITIONER'S CONSENT HAVING BEEN PROCURED BY MEANS OF DURESS,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE INFLUENCE;
f. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN UPHOLDING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF RESPONDENT AS DEFINED
IN ART. 26 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OVER THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FILM THE PUBLIC LIFE
OF A PUBLIC FIGURE, INFRINGED UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FREE
SPEECH AND FREE PRESS.
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Held:
Petitioner's contention that respondent Court failed to make complete findings of fact on all
issues raised before it is without basis. respondent Court has substantially and sufficiently complied with
the injunction that a decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Neither do the court agree with petitioner's submission that the Licensing Agreement is null and void for
lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the
rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior
consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in
that of his mother and the members of his family.Petitioner's averment that private respondent did not
have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well
taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy.In
the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises
Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a
drab story of torture and brutality. Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioner's contention that the
Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that,
as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of
Moises Padilla without prior restraint.
It is not, however, without limitations.
Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered
into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of
freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is denied and the judgment appealed from hereby affirmed. Costs
against petitioner.
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76- NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. 102653 MARC H 5, 1992
Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for
office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and
taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship , because it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992.
It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further,
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,
Issue:
Validity of section 11 oof R.A. 6646.
Held:
The nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media, cannot be
totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the
right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in
the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political commercials when fed into the
electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It might be
supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television set. But it is
rarely that simple. For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many, if
not all, the major stations or channels. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or
channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real sense, listeners
and viewers constitute a "captive audience."
The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with mind-
deadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to
condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates'
qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive
audience. The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their
subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through
modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the
marketing of "packaged" candidates.
Issue:
Does section 1119 which was enacted through delegation of power confer right to the mayor to
refuse the permit sought by permit being sought by the petitioner?
Held:
The Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other
public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which
shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate
and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. We must adopt the second construction, that is
construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power
to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the
streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held.
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Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the
Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be
cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason that
said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring licenses
or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila.
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part
of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request
of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or
any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not
be given any consideration. As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public
meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the
reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration.
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted
78- JOSE B.L. REYES VS. RAMON BAGATSING, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA
G.R. NO. L-65366
Facts:
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from
the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two
blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be
held. During the course of the oral argument, it was stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches,
a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General
Disbarment, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be
presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be
delivered to the United States Ambassador. The march would be attended by the local and foreign
participants of such conference. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of
the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to
ensure a peaceful march and rally."
The petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the
organization to hold a rally. On October 25, 1983, the answer of respondent Mayor was filed on his
behalf by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo G. Montenegro. It turned out that on October 19, such
permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The
reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the
advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." To be more specific,
reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is
expected to attend." Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of
the police authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or
any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be
ensured."
Issue:
Is the denial of a permit to hold the rally, in consideration of Ordinance 7295, violative to
exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly?
Held:
The denial of a permit to hold the rally violates the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech
and peaceful assembly. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances." Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Neither can
there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two block-
away at the Roxas Article 22 reads, The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps
to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of
the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
Respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or
staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or
chancery and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation
as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights
74 | P a g e
of free speech and peaceable assembly that is why application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
This is a petition for mandamus. The petitioner, editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, prays
that an order issue "commanding the respondents to furnish (petitioner) the list of real estates sold to
aliens and registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of the Department of
Justice Circular No. 128 or to allow the petitioner or his duly accredited representatives (to) examine all
records in the respondents' custody relative to the (said) transactions."
Facts:
The first alternative of the petition was denied by the Register of Deeds and later, on appeal, by
the Secretary of Justice. No request to inspect the records seems to have ever been made, but the
Solicitor General, answering for the respondents, gives to understand that not even this would the
petitioner or his representatives be allowed to do if they tried. As the petitioner appears not to insist on
his request for a list of sales of real estate to aliens, we shall confine our discussion to the second part of
the prayer; namely, that the petitioner be allowed to examine all the records in the respondents' custody
to gather the material he wants. In this connection, the Solicitor General contends that "the examination
or inspection of the records in the office of the register of deeds may be made only by those having
special interest therein and subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of
the Land Registration Office, and that the Secretary of Justice has reasonably ruled, to safeguard the
public interest and the interest of those directly concerned in the records, that records may not be
disclosed for publication."
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner should not be allowed to examine all the records in the
respondents' custody to gather the material he wants on the ground of liberty of the press.
Is a petition for mandamus the proper remedy for the petitioner?
Held:
Newspapers have a better-established right of access to records of titles by reason of their
relations to the public than abstracters or insurers of title. Whether by design or otherwise, newspapers
perform a mission which does not enter into the calculation of the business of abstracting titles
conducted purely for private gain. Newspapers publish information for the benefit of the public while
abstracters do so for the benefit of a limited class of investors and purchasers of real estate only. It is
through the medium of newspapers that the public is informed of how public servants conduct their
business. The public through newspapers have the legitimate right to know the transaction in real estate
which they believe, correctly or erroneously, have been registered in violation of the constitution. The
publication of these matters is certainly not only legitimate and lawful but necessary in a country where,
under the constitution, the people should rule.
The newspaper proprietor can demand access to public records on the basis of his special pecuniary interest.
The interest of the newspaper man in public records is the interest of the manufacturer in his raw
materials. By being denied access to the records the newspaper is cut off from a source of income and
profit. That the newspaper's prospective business from the sale of copies containing information gathered
from the records was a sufficient pecuniary interest to entitle the proprietor or employee to access to the
documents was finally established in two cases.
Mandamus is the appropriate remedy, and the petition will be granted commanding the
respondents to allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives to examine, extract, abstract or
make memoranda of the records of sales of real properties to aliens subject to such restriction and
limitation as may be deemed necessary not incompatible with his decision. Independently of statutes the
petitioner, as editor of a newspaper, has the requisite interest in land records even under the common
law theory entitling him to the writ of mandamus.
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80- LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ GR L-63419, 18 DECEMBER 1986
FACTS:
Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions
arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge
Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge
Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge
Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano
[Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati,
Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR
75812-13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67,
and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789].
Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the
informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of
GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed
the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief.
ISSUE:
Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act.
HELD:
Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police
power. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious
and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may
not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that
it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. BP 22 is
aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that
end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
Further, a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its
constitutionality. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the
constitution, the Court should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily on the offending statute.
81- ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS.FEATI BANK AND TR UST CO., G.R.
NO. L-24670 DECEMBER 14, 1979.
Facts:
Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant
Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public,
particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as
vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known as
Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19,
1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma
Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding
deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez.
Restrictions were later annotated and issued in the name of Emma Chavez.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the
construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which defendant-
appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes. The following
day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the
commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the
building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations
On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, was submitted in the lower court for
decision.
The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint. It predicated its
conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said municipality, and stressed that private interest
should "bow down to general interest and welfare.
The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid,
considering that there is no issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and void.
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On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965.
On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the
complaint and from the order of March 26, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration.
On April 14, the appeal was given due course and the records of the case were elevated directly to this
Court, since only questions of law are raised. Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court
erred
1. When it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and
industrial zone, is valid because it did so in the exercise of its police power; and
2.
When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power to nullify the
contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it did not make a finding that the
building was erected along the property line, when it should have been erected two meters away from
said property line.
Issues:
(1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power
(2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by
defendant-appellee.
Held:
1. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise
of police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was never
questioned before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included in the
appellant's assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below, and are
within the issues framed by the parties.
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed
by the defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later
in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee it should be
stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people.
It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the
defendant-appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot
prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police
power through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6
as residential, cannot be enforced.
The decision appealed from, dismissing the complaint, is AFFIRMED. "without pronouncement as
to costs.
82- ENEDINA PRESLEY VS. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSO CIATION, INC., AND T HE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 86774 AUGUS T 21, 1991
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 28,
1988 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in toto.
A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction was filed by
plaintiff-appellee, Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short) against Teofilo Almendras and Rollo
Almendras (now both deceased and substituted by defendant-appellant Enedina Presley) for violation of
the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that the subject house and lot shall be used only for
residential and not for commercial purposes and for non-payment of association dues to plaintiff BAVA
amounting to P3,803.55.
The Almendrases were at the time of the filing of the action the registered owners of a house
and lot located at 102 Jupiter Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati, Metro Manila. As such registered owners,
they were members of plaintiff BAVA pursuant to the Deed Restrictions annotated in their title (TCT No.
73616) over the property in question and defendant Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and
operator of 'Hot Pan de Sal Store' located in the same address.
At the time the Almendrases bought their property in question from Makati Development
Corporation, the Deed Restrictions was already annotated in their title providing (among others) 'that the
lot must be used only for residential purpose' When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan de
sal' store, it sent a letter to the defendants asking them to desist from operating the store.
Under the existing Deed Restrictions aforesaid, the entire Bel-Air Subdivision is classified as a
purely residential area, particularly Jupiter Road which is owned by and registered in the name of BAVA.
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It has likewise been established that the Almendrases had not paid the BAVA membership dues
and assessments which amounted to P3,802.55 as of November 3, 1980. Teofilo Almendras contended
that there was no written contract between him and appellee BAVA. Only a consensual contract existed
between the parties whereby Almendras regularly pays his dues and assessments to BAVA for such
services as security, garbage collection and maintenance and repair of Jupiter Street. However, when the
services were withdrawn by appellee BAVA, there was no more reason for the latter to demand payment
of such dues and assessments. (Rollo, pp. 30-31)
After due hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision in favor of BAVA which was
affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
On January 20, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Issues:
1. THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECENT
CONSOLIDATED DECISION EN BANC OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT PROMULGATED
DECEMBER 22,1988 WHICH CONSOLIDATED DECISION APPLIES ON ALL FOURS IN THE CASE AT
BAR IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
2. THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING PETITIONER SOLIDARILY LIABLE
TOGETHER WITH THE ALMENDRASES TO PAY THE ALLEGED UNPAID ASSOCIATION DUES IS
PATENTLY CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND FACTS.
3. THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ADJUDGING PETITIONER SOLIDARILY LIABLE
TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS.
Held:
In accordance with the ruling in the Sangalang case, the respondent court's decision has to be
reversed.
With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in the sum of P3,803.55, the
records reveal that this issue is now moot and academic after petitioner Presley purchased the property
subject of lease from the Almendrases and settled all association dues.
Likewise, the demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal or factual basis.
83- TERRY LYN MAGNO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 101148, AUG UST 05, 1992
FACTS:
Appealed to this Court by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer
for issuance of a restraining or status quo order is the denial by the Court of Appeals of a petition for
habeas corpus (CA-G.R. SP. No. 25442) wherein petitioner challenged as illegal and violative
of constitutional due process her arrest without a warrant by agents of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation (CID) and her resultant detention at the CID Detention Center.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Writ for Habeas Corpus should be granted.
RULING:
Petitioner's release from detention has rendered this petition moot and academic insofar as it
questions the legality of her arrest and detention. A habeas corpus proceeding shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty." (Rule 102, Sec. 1,
Revised Rules of Court)Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue especially because a decision in
the deportation proceeding will not result in petitioner's permanent or prolonged detention but exclusion
or departure from this country. Her subsequent commitment to the custody of the CID, if, after the
proceedings before the proper forum, she is found to be an undesirable alien, will have no more
connection with the questioned warrantless arrest and subsequent detention on the night of 17 July
1991. Petitioner's claim to Filipino citizenship cannot be settled before this Court at this instance. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General's rejoinder to petitioner's reply, there are factual issues that
make petitioner's citizenship controversial. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; the factual
controversies must first be resolved before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
84- LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
AFP, MAJ. GENERAL ARTURO ENRILE VS.HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 105597
Facts:
Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested on April 27, 1990 in connection
with the December 1989 coup attempt. He was brought to the ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio,
Makati where he was detained for nine months without charges. On January 30, 1991, a charge sheet
was filed against private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate General alleging violations of the
67th, 94th and 97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman, respectively. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the private respondent with the Court
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of Appeals on March 7, 1991 which was, however, dismissed by the said court's Fourth Division in a
decision promulgated on June 28, 1991 on the ground that pre-trial investigation for the charges against
the respondent was already ongoing before a Pre-Trial and Investigative (PTI) Panel of the Judge
Advocate General's Office (JAGO). the Court of Appeals' decided that they cannot at this time order the
release of petitioner on a writ of habeas corpus without giving the military from here on a reasonable
time within which to finish the investigation of his case and determine whether he should be formally
charged before the court martial or released for insufficiency of evidence thus the instant petition was
DISMISSED.
On May 27, 1992 respondent filed a second petition for habeas corpus before the Court of
Appeals where he assailed his continued detention at the ISG Detention Center in spite of the dismissal
of all the charges against him. He contended that his continued confinement under the circumstances
amounted to an "illegal restraint of liberty" correctable only by the court's "issuance of the high
prerogative writ of habeas corpus." 6
In a Resolution dated May 29, 1992, the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners
Lt. General Lisandro Abadia, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Maj. General Arturo
Enrile, Commanding General of the Philippine Army "to produce the person of Lt. Col. Marcelino Q.
Malajacan" and to show lawful cause for the latter's continued detention.
Issues:
1. May the respondent court not impose a time frame for the Chief of Staff to act on the
respondent's case where the law itself provides none; and,
2 Does the Resolution of June 3, 1992 contravene a previous decision by a co-equal body, the
Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals which on September 27, 1991 dismissed
respondent's petition for habeas corpus.
Held:
In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals
particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, the court cannot accept petitioners' submission that the absence
of any specific provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should be
forwarded to the appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case
would deny private respondent or any military personnel facing charges before the General Courts
Martial, for that matter a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand
substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify
those rights.
Petitioner next contends that the Decision of the respondent court dated June 3, 1992, issuing a
writ of habeas corpus in favor of the private respondent contravenes a previous decision of a co-equal
body, the Court of Appeal's Fourth Division which earlier denied the same which the court found to be
untenable. The factual circumstances surrounding both decisions are different.
First, at the time of the first petition, the private respondent was being held in the detention
center for eleven months without charges being filed against him. The pre-trial investigative panel had
not yet been constituted. Because of his confinement without charges, a petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf on the basis of respondent's averment that his arrest and
continued detention without charges violated his constitutional rights. The Fourth Division found
adequate support upholding military jurisdiction over the case of the private respondent under the
Articles of War. It also noted that the case against the private respondent was ongoing and that it would
be difficult to order respondent's release on a writ of habeas corpuswithout giving military authorities
reasonable time within which to investigate and try the case. The Court nonetheless urged the Chief of
Staff to act on the petitioner's case "with all deliberate speed, consistent with his constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of his case."
Second, by the time the subsequent petition for habeas corpus was before the court's Twelfth
Division (herein respondent court), the JAGO's Pre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed all cases
against the petitioner and endorsed the filing of charges (under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code)
with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
These finding obviously militate against petitioners' contention that the appellate court's Twelfth
Division abused its discretion in issuing an order allegedly in contravention to the Fourth Division's earlier
orders. The factual circumstances are hardly similar. The respondent court, under these changed
circumstances could be hardly faulted for issuing the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the private
respondent.
The mantle of protection accorded by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus "extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." As we emphasized
hereinbefore, and we repeat it once more, petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence of specific rules
relating to review of cases dismissed by military tribunals in violating the right of the accused to a speedy
trial and in justifying his continued confinement. Were we to uphold the proposition that our courts
should decline to exercise jurisdiction because the law itself provides no time frame for the proper
military authorities to review the general court martial's dismissal of the respondent's case would mean
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that we would be sanctioning the suggestion implicit in petitioner's argument that the Constitution's
guarantees are guarantees available not to all of the people but only to most of them.
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying
a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly
states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or
property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The
use of the word office applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the
particular office under which he was charged.
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be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that,
while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
However, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been held
yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he
was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may
not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal Supreme
Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course of his Identification in the police line-up had not
yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted
by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated
petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not
begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any
statement to the police. He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge.
Far from what he professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him.
For it was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit
down in front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's
right to counsel had not accrued.
89- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES VS. GALLARDE GR NO. 13302, FEBRUA RY 17,
2000
FACTS:
On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide
of a minor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant was denied the right to due process.
RULING:
A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any
qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term homicide as used in special complex crime
of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight
physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape it is settled in this jurisdiction that
where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. In rape with homicide, in order to be
convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying
circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. It is fundamental
that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose
of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused
to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom
a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to
present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not
necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability.
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ground that they came under the primary jurisdiction of the NLRC. 14 As the judge had not ruled on these
motions, the petitioners came to this Court in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Then issued a
temporary restraining order to prevent Judge Tuico from enforcing the warrant of arrest and further
proceeding with the case. 15 This order was reiterated on September 21, 1987, "to relieve tensions that
might prevent an amicable settlement of the dispute between the parties in the compulsory arbitration
proceedings now going on in the Department of Labor," and made to apply to Judge Paterno Lustre, who
had succeeded Judge Tuico. 16
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the National Labor Relations
Commission pending determination of the legality of the strike;
2. Whether or not, pending such determination, the criminal prosecution of certain persons involved
in the said strike may be validly restrained.
HELD:
It must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pending the determination of
the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is
legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status
quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal
can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the
positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they win also claim payment
for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in
activities inimical to their employer's interest.
The Court holds that the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers who complied
therewith and, regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, are entitled to be
paid for work they have actually performed. Conversely, those workers who refused to obey the said
order and instead waged the restrained strike are not entitled to be paid for work not done or to
reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as ordered.
On the second issue, as a general rule the prosecution of criminal offenses is not subject to
injunction, the exception must apply in the case at bar. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal
complaints filed before the municipal court of Calamba, Laguna, is justified on the ground of prematurity
as there is no question that the acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration
proceedings still pending in the NLRC. The first two complaints, as expressly captioned, are for "violation
of Art. 265, par. 2, in relation to Art. 273, of the Labor Code of the Philippines," and the third complaint
relates to the alleged acts of coercion committed by the defendants in blocking access to the premises of
the ATC. Two of the criminal complaints were filed by the personnel administrative officer of the ATC
although he vigorously if not convincingly insists that he was acting in his personal capacity.
In view of this, the three criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the
compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC, conformably to the policy embodied in Circular No. 15,
series of 1982, and Circular No. 9, series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the
implementation of B.P. Blg. 227.These circulars, briefly stated, require fiscals and other government
prosecutors to first secure the clearance of the Ministry of Labor and/or the Office of the President
"before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and the filing in court of the
corresponding informations of cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute," including "allegations of
violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault upon a person in authority and other similar acts of
intimidation obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of operation of the
machines of such factory, or the employer's premises." It does not appear from the record that such
clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure laid down "to attain the industrial peace which is
the primordial objectives of this law," before the three criminal cases were filed.
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The bodies of Ronaldo Abales and Ariel Heloma were found that morning in Camarin, Kalookan
City. Abales had a single stab wound while Heloma suffered multiple stab wounds. Both their hands were
tied behind them.
The accused were charged with double murder charging and violation of R.A. No. 6539.Upon
arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. The cases were jointly tried and the court
rendered that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with double homicide as
defined and penalized under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and taking
into consideration [the] presence of one aggravating circumstance without the attendance of any
mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. Were the accused deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them?
2. Did the trial court err in finding a conspiracy to commit the complex crime of robbery with double
homicide and in convicting them merely on the basis of circumstantial evidence?
Held:
1. While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can render a
consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex crime constitutive of the
various crimes alleged in the two information. Thus, the accused were deprived of their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them (1987
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14[2]).
2. We see no reason to depart from the findings of fact of the trial court, whose evaluation of the
evidence is accorded respect. The circumstantial evidence found by the trial court is sufficient to
convict appellants. The requisites provided for in Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence regarding the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence have been complied with.
93- EFREN C. MONCUPA VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE 93. G.R. NO. L-63345
Facts:
Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50
P.M., at the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to
MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation
that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
was issued against him and eight (8) other persons.
After two separate investigations, it was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any
subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.
Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal
possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33.
During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have
not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court.
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
Issues:
whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of
competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense.
whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's
temporary release
Held:
The release of the petitioners being merely 'temporary', it follows that they can be re-arrested at
anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction.
A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one
which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more
of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are
not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid
has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying
in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
Temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and academic but that "it merely
shifted the inquiry from the legality of the actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by
the respondents.
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94- MANUEL Q. CABALLERO AND LELITA A. CABALL ERO, -VERSUS- HON. FEDERICO
B. ALFONSO, JR., HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, FERNANDO ESCONDE, GR EGORIO
BAKEREL, CESAR NAVARRO, AND FRANK RODRIG UEZ,
G.R. NO. L-45647 AUGUST 21, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioners claiming to be the absolute owners of several contiguous parcels of land planted with
coconut trees, situated in Salubsub, San Isidro, Gingoog City, filed a petition for injunction with
restraining order and damages against the herein private respondents for having allegedly entered the
aforementioned parcels of land and illegally harvested the fruits of the coconut trees planted therein
without petitioners knowledge and consent, to the prejudice of said petitioners.
Answering, the private respondents admitted that the petitioners are the lawful owners of the
parcels of land described in the petition. They claimed, however, that the respondents Fernando
Esconde, Cesar Navarro, and Gregorio Bakerel are the tenants on the land, while the rest, except
Francisco (Frank) Rodriguez who is allegedly an investigator designated by the Land Reform Farmers
Association to organize the tenants into an association to put up a solid front in a program to help the
New Society and to secure the success of the land reform program, are the harvesters of the coconut
lands. They also contended that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, which is purely agrarian in
nature and cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. After hearing, the respondent judge found that
the issuance of a temporary restraining order would be proper in the interest of justice and,
consequently, ordered the respondents to cease and desist from gathering fruits from the coconut trees
in the land until the petition for injunction shall have been heard and resolved.
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration,the respondent judge issued the controversial
order suspending hearings on the case pending the comment and/or certification thereon by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, in accordance with PD 1038. The petitioners moved for reconsideration of
this order, but their motion was denied. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction over the case
2. Whether or not PD 1038 violates the constitutional provision on the right to a speedy disposition of
cases.
HELD:
It is an erroneous assumption that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not an ejectment case (or a case designed to harass or remove a tenant) filed
against a tenant, may be tried by the courts. A close look at the law in question will show that no such
power has been granted the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. In the first paragraph of Section 2 of the law
in question, it is stated that a case which seeks the ejectment, harassment or ouster of a tenant from the
landholding should be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of
the relationship between the contending parties. However, the second paragraph of the same section
provides that the preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, is not binding upon the court, judge or
hearing officer to whom the case is certified, and that said court, judge or hearing officer may, after
due hearing, confirm, reverse or modify said preliminary determination as the evidence and substantial
merits of the case may warrant. Since the referral of ejectment and other cases against a tenant to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform is only for the preliminary determination of the relationship between the
contending parties and the findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform are not binding on the courts,
there is no diminution of judicial power involved in the operation of the law nor an encroachment on the
independence of the judiciary by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
This Court has categorically declared that there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize
the acts of agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative powers on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of judicial review is expressly given by statute.
In the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has been violated, certain
factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the
delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay.The same factors
may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the
administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition of cases guarantee.
To strike down a law on the ground that it violates the guarantee of speedy disposition of cases
requires more than a citation of what may be a misfeasance or malfeasance of a public officer whose
duty and responsibility it is to apply and administer the law. The challenge must be based on a clear
showing that it is the law, or its operation, and not merely its administration, which invades and impairs
constitutionally protected personal or property rights. In the case at bar, it is true that the referral of
cases to the Department of Agrarian Reform opens the door to more bureaucratic red tape and, perhaps,
more opportunities for corrupt practices. The defects in the bureaucratic system do not, however,
constitute valid arguments against the merits of legislative policy intended to protect the legitimate
tenant-tiller. Besides, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of PD 1038. This is a matter left for
Congress to re-examine in the exercise of its legislative authority.
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95- EMETERIA VILLAFLOR VS. RICARDO SUMMERS G.R. NO. 16444
Facts:
Petitioners, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery.
The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflorto submit her body to the examination of one or two
competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on
the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to
self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to
Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Counsel for
petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the
representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional
provision.Hence this petition.
Issue:
whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to
determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our
Code of Criminal Procedure
Held:
Compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians does not violate that
portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is
a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction
in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Unfortunately,
all too frequently the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without any mental
evasion, questions which are put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public
estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of
truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy,
law and justice cannot hesitate.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians
due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely
necessary
The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied.
The trouble is that at the trial Severino repudiated his alleged oral confession and even claimed
that he was maltreated by the police. Severino Dueros counsel DE OFICIO in this Court contends that
the trial court erred in admitting the oral testimony on Severino Dueros oral confession, in giving
credence to the testimonies of Lujan, Cenizal, Montao and Tranquilino Duero, in finding that robbery
with homicide was committed.
The Solicitor General agrees with the counsel DE OFICIOs contention that Severinos oral
confession is inadmissible in evidence by reason of Article IV of the Constitution which provides:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
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free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be admissible
in evidence.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of his oral confession during the
custodial interrogation when the accused was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
counsel, as required by Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution .
HELD:
Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his
alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because
there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in
evidence.
The new provisions in section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution were adopted from the
ruling in Miranda vs. Arizona which specifies the following procedural safeguards for in-custody
interrogation of accused persons:
The above procedure was not followed by the police in this case. Hence, Severino Dueros oral confession
is inadmissible in evidence. Without that confession, the prosecutions other evidence is not sufficient to
establish Dueros guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is acquitted.
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means ofcommitting the offense," which is described in
the applicationsadverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance
violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Petitioners
contentions are:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law
Respondents-prosecutors contentions
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless
of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
Petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig. action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus &
injunction. The writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents,
and things seized from the officers of the corporations; but the injunction was
maintained as regards those found & seized in the residences of petitioners.
ISSUES:
(1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations, whether or not petitioners
have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants.
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(2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners, whether or not search
warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are valid.
(3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence
against petitioners.
HELD:
(1) The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of
the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that
the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
(2) No. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti:
a. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth therein; &
b. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed
a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It
would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the
aforementionedapplications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
Issue:
Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.
Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
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confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Re: the extent of the Pres power to investigate does it include authority to arrest? May it be
delegated? Heres the history Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided for filing of a bond to secure
appearance of alien under investigation Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951 reorganized
the deportation board to issue the warrant of arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under
detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release <this is incompatible
with.>3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
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the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution). Justice Laurel said that this
constitutional provision is not among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same
is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens
and foreigners in this country. This requirement "to be determined by the judge" do not specify
who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer
may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of
arrest.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into
effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of
deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the
arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation. The extent of the curtailment of liberty
dependent upon conditions determined by the discretion of the person issuing a warrant.
In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the
one upon whom the authority devolves. Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers
the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or
aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared
illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared
null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
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