Dimagiba v.
Fernandez The issue of revocation is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil
G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
Facts:
Ismaela Dimagiba, filed a petition for the probate of the purported will of the
late Benedicta de los Reyes.
The alleged intestate heirs of the decedent filed oppositions to the probate on
the grounds of forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the
proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major
portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent, Dimagiba,
in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme
Court in a decision promulgated on August 3, 1954, in cases G.R. Nos. L-5618
and L-5620 (unpublished).
The trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to
probate, had become final for lack of appeal; that the same was appealable
independently of the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of
oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the execution of
the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of
the legatee, Dimagiba.
Issue: Whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been
impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the
proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.
Ruling: No.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in
favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the
question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not
entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become
superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to
revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not
an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix
allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or
devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the
will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament
(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or
any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise
shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the
alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason
of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid,
unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the
right of repurchase;
The existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the
testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the
circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed
in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court
of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances "no consideration
whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers,
thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to
her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she
had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure
therefrom. Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below,
that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not
necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, since the findings made in
the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds
of sale were also that it was the moral influence, originating from their
confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of the
1943 and 1944 conveyances. (Decision, L-5618 and L-5620). If the annulment
was due to undue influence then the transferor was not expressing her own free
will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it cannot be concluded, either,
that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the
original legacy.
Certainly, it could not be maintained, for example, that if a testator's subsequent
alienation were avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at the
time, the revocatory effect ordained by the article should still ensue. And the
same thing could be said if the subsequent alienation were avoided on account
of physical or mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue influence in no
way differs from one made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the
transferor is not expressing his real intent, and it cannot be held that there was
in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest.