Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Modern Logic and the Synthetic A Priori

Author(s): Irving M. Copi
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, No. 8 (Apr. 14, 1949), pp. 243-245
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2019891 .
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 MODERN LOGIC AND THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI 243

course,hardlyconceivedthat the few remarkshere in Part 2 begin

to settlethe problemsof knowledgeand probability. They do indi-
cate, howeverscantily,what knowledgeand evidence are like for
human beings: a process withoutbeginningor end, constantlyin
media re, withits truthvalues and evidentialvalues sanctionednot
by ideas in the mind of God or of man, but by the exigenciesof
action.
MORTIMER R. KADISH
WESTERNRESERVEUNIVERSITY

MODERN LOGIC AND THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI

pHE view that all a priori truthsare analytic has been very
widelyaccepted in recentyears. Proposed long ago by Leib-
niz, this theoryhas derived much of its strengthfromthe modern
developmentof logic,and has been adopted by positivistsand some
naturalists. In this note I want to suggestthat far fromstrength-
ening this view,recentdevelopmentsin logical theoryhave refuted
it, and necessitateeitherits careful reformulationor its abandon-
ment altogether.
The notionof analyticityhas undergonesome changesince Kant
describedit in termsapplicable only to subject-predicateproposi-
tions. Accordingto currentdefinition, a statementis analyticwhen
its truth or validity follows from the syntacticalor grammatical
rules governingthelanguage in whichit is expressed. Here syntax
is conceivedquite generously,of course,as dealing not merelywith
splittinginfinitivesor the like, but with definitionsand rules of in-
ferenceas well. Those who accept the analytic theoryof a priori
knowledgeare committedto the view that any propositionthat is
a priori true followsfromthe rules of the language in whichit is
expressed. They need not hold that theycan actually prove or de-
rive any given a priori propositionfromthe rules of the language
in whichit is expressed; but theymusthold that any a prioriprop-
osition is derivable from those rules, in principle. Hence if the
analytictheoryof a priori knowledgeis true, any non-empiricalor
non-inductivegeneral propositionis decidable on the basis of the
syntacticalrules of the language in whichit is expressed. We may
express this contrapositivelyas follows: if thereis any non-empir-
ical or non-inductivegeneral propositionwhichis not decidable on
the basis of the syntacticalrules of the language in whichit is ex-
pressed,thenthe analytictheoryof a priori knowledgeis false. If
there are a priori truthsnot derivable fromthe rules of the lan-
guage, then thereare synthetica priori propositions.
244 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Since the publicationof Principia Mathematicaby Russell and

Whitehead,considerableprogresshas been made in logic. Subse-
quent developmentshave centeredabout two closely related ques-
tions. The firstquestion dealt with the completenessof formal
systems. Given a formal deductive system (like Principia) in
whichall propositionsof mathematicscan be expressed,the ques-
tion arises: can all mathematicsbe provedin it? A systemis com-
plete if every mathematical(i.e., non-inductiveor non-empirical)
sentencestatable withinit is decidable (provable or refutable) on
the basis of the rules of the system. The second questionhas to do
with consistency. Is there any systemadequate for mathematics
that is consistent? Known contradictionsmay not have appeared
in it, but what is desired is some kind of guarantee that no con-
tradictioncan ever be derived in it, that is, that it is consistent.
For a while encouragingprogresswas made in these matters.
Certain limited systems,which could account for only parts of
logic,were shownto be completewithintheirlimiteddomains,and
consistentin themselves. Investigatorsworkedhard to extendsuch
resultsto systemsdesigned to compass the whole of mathematics.
Finally, in 1931, a youngAustrian mathematicallogician answered
both questions-but in the negative. Godel proved that no known
systemat all adequate for mathematicswas complete,and that no
such knownsystemcould be proved consistent. These came out as
closelyrelated: fortheessentialincompleteness of any knownsystem
was shown by proving that there was a certain propositionthat
could not be decided in the system,and that certainpropositionsas-
serted that the systemwas consistent! Moreover,the method of
Gddel's proofindicatedthat it could moreor less easily be applied
to any systemin whichmathematicscould be stated,so that in any
such system,no matterhow manyaxiomsor rules were given or as-
sumedin its structure,if it were consistent,an undecidableproposi-
tioncould be formulatedwithinit. The Godel incompleteness result
is this. Given any reasonablyrich language, thereis a non-empir-
ical, non-inductivepropositionexpressible within it which is not
decidable on the basis of the syntacticalrules of that language.
The implicationof this result for the philosophicalproblemof
a prioriknowledgeis clear. We have seen that if thereis any non-
empiricalor non-inductivegeneral propositionwhich is not decid-
able on the basis of the syntacticalrules of the language in which
it is expressed,then the analytic theoryof a priori knowledgeis
false. The inferenceis obvious. The analytic theoryof a priori
knowledgeis false. And this amountsto sayingthat thereare syn-
thetica prioripropositions. This is a philosophicalconsequenceof
considerableimportance.
 MODERN LOGIC AND THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI 245

There may be somewho considerthe questionof a prioriknowl-

edge settled. There may be some who feel the analytic view to be
the definitiveanswer. To the argumentof thisnote theymay be in-
clined to make any of a numberof replies. They may be inclined
to reject the Godel result. But this would be literallyto abandon
logic in favor of prejudice. Or they may hold the "error" to lie
in the received definitionof "analytic." They might attemptto
define"analytic" in such a way as not to involveany referenceto
language rules. Of course such a redefinitionwould make the
G6del result irrelevantto the issue. But such a view, whatever
it mightbe, would be completelydifferent fromthe analytic view
discussed here. Or it mightbe argued that the undecidable sen-
tence,shownnot to be analytic in the sense here understood,is not
a priori. Yet the consistencyof a set of postulatesis clearly not
somethingthat could be establishedinductivelyor empirically. It
is hard to see any possibilityof success along this line. Or finally
it mightbe claimed that the undecidable formulais not really a
proposition. Were it to be decided,it mightbe said, it would then
becomemeaningful,but until a decisionhas been reachedit is with-
out significance. This would be like saying,though,that no ques-
tion can be understooduntil it has been answered. This would be
a very curious view indeed. Moreoverit would seem to preclude
the possibilityof error. For if the answerdeterminesthe meaning
of the question,would it not determinethe questionto mean some-
thingto whichit is the correctanswer? And if thereis to be some
elementof significanceto a question whichwould enable us to de-
terminewhethera proposed answer is correct,or even relevant,
thenit is a mistaketo say thatthe question'smeaningis determined
by the answer. To make this last suggestionat all plausible would
requirea completeand thoroughre-examination of thewholenature
of meaningand significance. Perhaps an intelligiblesystemcould
be workedout in whichsignificancewould depend upon decidabil-
ity,and in which"analytic" was plausibly definedwithinthat con-
text. If and whenit is, it will have to be judged upon its merits.
In conclusion,I shouldmakeone thingclear. It is not my claim
to have answered the question: "How is a priori knowledgepos-
sible?" I have attemptedonly to show that as conceived today,
the analyticview is untenable. Reformulationsmay possiblyren-
der it more nearly acceptable. But until this is done, or until a
more satisfactorytheoryis devised to explain synthetica priori
knowledge,the question of how a priori knowledgeis possible re-
mains one of the most urgent problems confrontingphilosophers
today.
IRVINGM. COPI (COPILOWISH)
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAAN