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World Borders, Political Borders

Author(s): Etienne Balibar and Erin M. Williams


Source: PMLA, Vol. 117, No. 1, Special Topic: Mobile Citizens, Media States (Jan., 2002), pp. 71-78

Published by: Modern Language Association


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I 1 7.1 EtienneBalibar 71

transnationalcitizenshipmeetthe politicsof inter- companiedby the simultaneousdestructionof the historical


nationalaestheticsin an era of technologicalliter- nationalcharacter.This picture,which in othercountrieslike .i

Germany,Italy,andeven Russia(?) is not visible for everyone _1.


acy, EtienneBalibar'swritingsassume increasing to see, shows itself here in full nakedness.... It is becoming
importancein the analysisof mobileand indiscrete increasinglyclearto me thatthe presentinternationalsituation
formsof nationalmodernityand culture. is nothingbuta ruseof providence,designedto lead us along a 3'
bloody andtortuouspathto an Internationalof trivialityanda
EmilyApter cultureof Esperanto.I havealreadysuspectedthis in Germany
Universityof California,Los Angeles and Italy in view of the dreadfulinauthenticityof the 'blood
T
andsoil' propaganda,butonly herehas the evidenceof such a
trendalmostreachedthepointof certainty"(82). E'
me
fa

NOTES WORKS
CITED
l See also Balibar,"Les frontieres,"and Balibaret al.
2 The Auerbach, Erich. Letter to Walter Benjamin. 3 Jan. 1937.
quotationin full reads as follows: "Buthe [Kemal Archiv der Akademie der Kunst, Berlin. "WalterBen-
Ataturk]hadto force througheverythinghe did in the struggle
jamin and Erich Auerbach:Fragmentsof a Correspon-
againstthe Europeandemocracieson the one handandthe old dence."Ed. KarlheinzBarck.Trans.AnthonyReynolds.
Mohammedan-Pan-Islamicsultan's economy on the other;
Diacritics 22.3-4 (1992): 81-83.
and the resultis a fanaticallyanti-traditionalnationalism:re-
Balibar, Etienne. Droit de cite: Cultureet politique en de-
jection of all existing Mohammedanculturalheritage,the es-
tablishmentof a fantasticrelationto a primalTurkishidentity, mocratie.Paris:L'aube, 1998.
technologicalmodernizationin the Europeansense, in orderto . "Les frontieres de l'Europe." La crainte des
triumphagainsta hatedandyet admiredEuropewith its own masses: Politique et philosophie avant et apres Marx.
weapons:hence, the preferencefor European-educatedemi- Paris:Galilee, 1997.
grantsas teachers,fromwhomone canlear withoutthe threat Balibar, Etienne, et al. Sans-papiers: L'archai'smefatal.
of foreignpropaganda.Result:nationalismin the extremeac- Paris:La D6couverte,1999.

WorldBorders,PoliticalBorders
I AM SPEAKINGOF THE"BORDERS OF EU-
rope" in Greece, one of the "peripheral"coun- profoundlychangingin meaning.The bordersof
tries of Europein its traditionalconfiguration-a new politico-economic entities, in which an at-
configurationthatreflects powerfulmyths and a tempt is being made to preservethe functions of
long-lived series of historical events. Thessa- the sovereignty of the state, are no longer at all
loniki is itself at the edge of this bordercountry, situated at the outer limit of territories:they are
one of those places where the dialectic between disperseda little everywhere,whereverthe move-
confrontation with the foreigner (transformed ment of information,people, and things is hap-
into a hereditaryenemy) andcommunicationbe- pening and is controlled-for example, in
tween civilizations (without which humanity cosmopolitancities. But it is also one of my the-
cannotprogress)is periodicallyplayedout. I thus ses thatthe zones called peripheral,where secu-
find myself, it seems, right in the middle of my lar and religious cultures confront each other,
objectof study,with all the resultantdifficulties. where differences in economic prosperity be-
The termborderis extremelyrich in signifi- come more pronouncedand more strained,con-
cations. One of my hypotheses will be that it is stitute the melting pot for the formation of a

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72 World Borders,PoliticalBorders IPMLA

c
people (dgmos),withoutwhichthereis no citizen- will not emerge from for quite some time. It is
tn4 ship (politeia) in the sense thatthis termhas ac- even probablethatwe have profoundlydivergent
quiredsince antiquityin the democratictradition. opinions on the subject. The fact that we do not
In this sense, border areas-zones, coun- use the samenamesforthe warthatjusttookplace
L
tries, and cities-are not marginalto the consti- is an unequivocalsign of this. It is possible-it is
.d tution of a public sphere but rather are at the probable-that some of you condemnedthe inter-
E center. If Europe is for us first of all the name ventionof NATOfor variousreasons,thatothers
of an unresolved political problem, Greece is supportedit for variousreasons,andthatstill oth-
._
one of its centers, not because of the mythical ers, also for variousreasons, found it impossible
origins of our civilization, symbolized by the to take sides. It is possible-it is probable-that
Acropolis of Athens, but because of the current certainof us saw strikingproof of the subordina-
problemsconcentratedthere. tion of Europeto the exterior,hegemonic power
Or,more exactly, the notion of a centercon- of theUnitedStatesof America,while otherssaw
frontsus with a choice. In connectionwith states, a mercenary instrumentalization of American
it meansthe concentrationof power,the localiza- power by the European states in the service of
tion of virtualor realgoverningauthorities.In this Continentalobjectives.And so on.
sense, the centerof Europeis in Brussels, Stras- I do not presumeto resolve these dilemmas.
bourg, or the City in London and the Frankfurt But I want to statehere my convictionthatthese
stockexchangeor soon will be in Berlin,the capi- events mercilessly reveal the fundamentalcon-
talof themostpowerfulof the statesthatdominate tradictionsplaguing Europeanunification. It is
the construction of Europe, and secondarily in not by chance that they occurred when Europe
Paris,London,and so on. But this notion has an- was set to cross an irreversiblethreshold,by in-
other,more essential and more elusive meaning, stitutinga unitarycurrencyand thus the commu-
which pointsto the sites wherea people is consti- nal controlof economic and social policy andby
tutedthroughthe creationof civic consciousness implementingformalelements of "Europeancit-
andthe collective resolutionof the contradictions izenship," whose military and police counter-
thatrunthroughit. Is therethen a "Europeanpeo- partsare quickly perceived.
ple,"even an emergentone? Nothing is less cer- In reality,what is at stake here is the defini-
tain. And if thereis not a Europeanpeople, a new tion of the modes of inclusion and exclusion in
type of people yet to be defined, then there is no the Europeansphere,as a "publicsphere"of bu-
public sphereor Europeanstate beyond techno- reaucracy and of relations of force but also of
cratic appearances.This is what I meant several communication and cooperation between peo-
years ago when I imitatedone of Hegel's famous ples. Consequently,in the strongestsense of the
phrases:Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa. But the term, it is the possibility or the impossibility of
questionmust remainopen, andin a particularly European unification. In the establishment of
"central"way at the borderpoints. a protectoratein Kosovo and, indirectly, other
Therearemoredifficultissues. We aremeet- regionsof the Balkans,as in the blockadeof Slo-
ing the aftermathof the war in Kosovo, the
in bodanMilosevic'sSerbia,the elementsof impos-
Balkans, or Yugoslavia, at a moment when the sibility prevailedobviously and lastingly-even
protectorateestablishedat Pristinaby theWestern if one thinks, as in my case, that an intervention
powersis being put into place with difficultyand one way or anotherto block the ongoing "ethnic
for dubiousends,while in Belgradeuncertainma- cleansing"could no longer be avoided and even
neuversareunfoldingfor or againstthe futureof if one is skeptical,as in my case, of self-righteous
thecurrentregime.Itis notcertainthatwe all have positions concerning a people's right to self-
the samejudgmentaboutthese events,which we determinationin the history of political institu-

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I 1 7 1 Etienne Balibar 73

tions. The unacceptable impasse that we had exteriorspace, in which, in the nameof a "princi-
"I.
M.

reachedon the eve of the war in the whole of ex- ple of intervention"that I will not discuss here f-l

Yugoslavia was fundamentallythe result of the but that clearly markeda reciprocal exteriority, r?

V)
powerlessness, inability,and refusal of the "Eu- an entity called Europe felt compelled to inter-
F
ropean community" to propose political solu- vene to block a crime againsthumanity,with the
F+
tions of association, to open possibilities of aid of its powerful Americanallies if necessary. rC
M
developmentfor the peoples of the Balkans(and In this sense, the Balkanswere outsideof Europe.
more generally of the East), and to assume JA
V,
On the otherhand,to takeup themesproposedby
114

everywhere its responsibilities in an effective the Albanian national writerIsmail Kadare,for F)

struggle against human rights violations. It is example, it was explained that this intervention
thus Europe,particularlythe primaryEuropean was occurringon Europe'ssoil, withinits histori-
powers, that is responsible for the catastrophic cal limits, and in defense of the principles of
developmentsthat subsequentlytook place and Westerncivilization.Thus, this time the Balkans
for the consequencesthatthey may now have. found themselves fully inscribedwithinthe bor-
But, on the other hand, if it is true that the ders of Europe.The idea was that Europecould
Balkan war manifests the impasse and the im- not accept genocidal population deportationon
possibility of Europeanunification, it is neces- its own soil, not only for moralreasonsbut above
sary to have the courage (or the madness)to ask all to preserveits politicalfuture.
in today's conditions: under what conditions However,this theme, which I do not by any
might it become possible again? where are the means consider purepropaganda,did not corre-
potentialitiesfor a differentfuture?and how can spondto any attemptto anticipateor to accelerate
they be released by assigning responsibility for the integrationof the Balkan regions referredto
the past but avoidingthe fruitlessexercise of re- in this way into the Europeanpublic sphere.The
peating it? An effort of this kind alone can give failureof the stillborn"Balkanconference"testi-
meaningto a projectof active Europeancitizen- fies eloquently to this. There was no economic
ship, disengagedfrom all mythsof identity,from planof reparationsanddevelopmentinvolvingall
all illusions about the necessary course of his- the countriesconcerned and the Europeancom-
tory, and a fortiori from all belief in the infal- munityas such. Nor was the notionof "European
libility of governments. It is this effort that I citizenship"adapted-for example, by the issu-
would like to call on and contributeto. We must ing of "Europeanidentity cards"to the Kosovo
privilegethe issue of the borderwhen discussing refugees whose identification papers had been
the questions of the Europeanpeople and of the destroyedby the Serbianarmyandmilitias,along
state in Europebecause it crystallizesthe stakes the lines of the excellentsuggestionby the French
of politico-economic power and the symbolic writer Jean Chesneaux. Nor were the steps and
stakes at work in the collective imagination:re- criteriafor entranceinto the "union"redefined.
lations of force and material interest on one Thus, on one hand,the Balkans are a partof
side, representationsof identityon the other. Europe, and on the other, they are not. Appar-
I see a striking indicator of this in the fact ently, we arenot readyto leave this contradiction
thatduringthe new BalkanWarthathasjust taken behind,for it has equivalentsin the easternpartof
place the name of Europefunctionedin two con- the continent,beginningwithTurkey,Russia,and
tradictoryways, which cruelly highlighted the the Caucasusregions, andeverywheretakes on a
ambiguityof the notions of interiorand exterior. more and more dramaticsignificance. This fact
On one hand, Yugoslavia (as well as to varying resultsin profoundlyparadoxicalsituations.First
degrees the whole Balkan area,including Alba- of all, the colonizationof Kosovo (if one wantsto
nia, Macedonia,Bulgaria...) was consideredan designate the currentregime this way, as Regis

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74 World Borders,PoliticalBorders
IPMLA

c
0 Debray,with whom I otherwisetotally disagree, gious, cultural, linguistic, and political affilia-
suggested by his comparisonswith the Algerian tions, numerousreadings of history, numerous
.(m

cr
War)is an "interiorcolonization" of Europe by modes of relations with the rest of the world,
Europe(with the help of a sort of Americanfor- whether it is Americanism or orientalism, the
eign legion). But I am also thinkingof othersitua- possessive individualismof "Nordic"legal sys-
tions, such as the fact thatGreece could wonder tems or the "tribalism"of Mediterraneanfamilial
E once again if it was interioror exteriorto the do- traditions.This is why I have suggested that in
main of European sovereignty, since its soil reality the Yugoslavian situation is not atypical
.W servedas an entryportfor land-occupationforces but ratherconstitutesa local projectionof forms
w thatit didnot wantto takepartin. I can evenimag- of confrontationand conflict characteristicof all
ine thatwhen Turkishparticipationin the opera- Europe,which I did not hesitateto call European
tions was discussed, certain Greek "patriots" race relations(see "Lesfrontieres"),with the im-
asked themselves which of the two "hereditary plicit understandingthat the notion of race has
enemies" was more interiorto political Europe, no othercontentthanthat of the historicalaccu-
on its way to becominga militaryEurope. mulationof religious, linguistic, and genealogi-
All this provesthatthe notions of interiority cal identityreferences.
andexteriority,which formthe basis of the repre- The fate of Europeanidentity as a whole is
sentationof the border,are undergoinga verita- being played out in Yugoslaviaand more gener-
ble earthquake.The representations of the border, ally in the Balkans (even if this is not the only
territory,and sovereignty,andthe verypossibility site of its trial). EitherEurope will recognize in
of representing the border and territory,have the Balkansituationnot a monstrositygraftedto
been the objectof an irreversiblehistorical"forc- its breast, a pathological "aftereffect"of under-
ing." At presentthese representationsconstitute development or of communism, but rather an
a certain conception of the political sphere as a image and an effect of its own history and will
sphere of sovereignty, both the imposition of undertaketo confront it and resolve it and thus
law and the distributionof land, datingfrom the to put itself into question and transformitself.
beginningof the Europeanmodem age and later Only then will Europeprobablybegin to become
exportedto the whole world:what Carl Schmitt possible again. Or else it will refuse to come
in his great book from 1950, Der Nomos der face-to-face with itself and will continueto treat
Erde, called the Jus PublicumEuropaeum. the problem as an exterior obstacle to be over-
But as we also know, this representationof come through exterior means, including colo-
the border,essential as it is for state institutions, nization.Thatis, it will impose in advanceon its
is nevertheless profoundlyinadequateto an ac- citizenshipan insurmountableinteriorborderfor
count of the complexity of real situations,of the its own populations, whom it will place indefi-
topology underlyingthe sometimespeaceful and nitely in the situation of outsiders [meteques],
sometimes violent mutualrelationsbetween the and it will reproduceits own impossibility.
identitiesconstitutiveof Europeanhistory.I sug-
gested in the past that (particularlyin Mitteleu- I would now like to broadenthis questionof
ropa but more generally in all Europe),without Europeancitizenshipas a "citizenshipof borders"
even consideringthe questionof "minorities,"we or confines, a condensationof impossibility and
are dealing with "triplepoints"or mobile "over- potentialsthatwe musttry to reactivate-without
lapping zones" of contradictory civilizations fearing to take things up again at a distance,
ratherthanwithjuxtapositionsof monolithicen- from the point of view of a plurisecularhistory.
tities. In all its points, Europe is multiple; it is Let us rememberhow the questionof sover-
always home to tensionsbetweennumerousreli- eignty is historicallyboundup with the questions

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I
17
1 Etienne Balibar 75
r

of borders,as muchpoliticalas culturaland"spir- closely tied to the hegemonic position of Eu- s


w.
itual" fromthe classical age to the crisis of impe- rope in the world between the seventeenth and _.
rialism in the mid-twentieth century,and which mid-twentieth centuries-the imperialist divi- m,

we have inheritedafterthe dissolutionof "sides." sion of the world by colonialist Europeanpow-


I3
We know that one of the origins of the political ers, including of course "small nations" like
significanceof the name of Europe,possibly the Holland or Belgium and peripheralnations like
most decisive, was the constitutionin the seven- Russia, later the USSR. This point has been in- T
teenth and eighteenth centuriesof the system of sisted on in various ways by Marxist and non-
.
a "balanceof powers"among nation-states, for Marxisttheoreticians,such as CarlSchmitt,who r._

the most partorganizedin monarchies(see Cha- saw in it the origin of the crisis of "European
bod). Contraryto what one often readsin history public law," but before him Lenin and Rosa
books, this did not occurexactly with the treaties Luxemburg,laterHannahArendt,and, closer to
of Westphalia(1648), signed to put an end to the us, the historiansBraudeland Wallerstein.
ThirtyYears'War,which had ravagedthe conti- Drawing "political" borders in the Euro-
nent by opposing Protestantand Catholicforces pean sphere, which considered itself and at-
againstthe backgroundof the "Turkishmenace." temptedto appointitself the center of the world,
Rather,it happeneda little later, when two con- was also originally and principallya way to di-
ceptions of this Europeanorderconfrontedeach vide up the earth; thus, it was a way at once to
other:the hegemonicconception,representedby organize the world's exploitation and to export
the Frenchmonarchy,andthe republicanconcep- the "borderform"to the periphery,in an attempt
tion, in the sense of a regime of formal equality to transformthe whole universe into an exten-
among the states, which coincided with the sion of Europe, later into "another Europe,"
recognition of certaincivil rights in the interior built on the same political model. This process
order,embodied by the coalition put in place by continued until decolonization and thus also
the Englishandthe Dutch(Schmidt). until the construction of the current interna-
It was then, in propagandisticwritingscom- tional order.But one could say that in a certain
missioned by William of Orange, that the term sense it was never completely achieved;that is,
EuropereplacedChristendomin diplomaticlan- the formation of independent, sovereign, uni-
guage as a designation of the entire relations of fied, or homogeneous nation-states at the same
force and trade among nations or sovereign timefailed in a very large partof the world, or it
states, whose balanceof power was materialized was throwninto question, not only outside Eu-
in the negotiated establishment of borders. We rope but in certainpartsof Europeitself.
also know thatthis notion neverceased fluctuat- This probably occurred for very profound
ing, sometimes toward a democratic and cos- reasons that we need to consider. It is possible
mopolitanideal (theorizedby Kant), sometimes thatthe formof "absolute"sovereigntyof nation-
towardsurveillanceof the movementof peoples states is not universalizable and that in some
and cultural minorities by the most powerful sense a "world of nations,"or even "united na-
states (which would triumphat the Congress of tions,"is a contradictionin terms.Above all, this
Vienna, after the defeat of Napoleon). But I connectionamong the constructionof European
would like ratherto directattentionto two evolv- nations, their stable or unstable "balance of
ing trends, which affect this system more and power,"theirinternaland externalconflicts, and
moredeeply as we approachthe presentmoment. the global history of imperialism resulted not
The first of these comes from the fact that only in the perpetuationof borderconflicts but
the European balance of power and the corre- also in the demographic and cultural structure
sponding popular national sovereignty are typicalof Europeanpopulationstoday,which are

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76 World Borders,PoliticalBorders PMLA

c all postcolonial communities, or, if you will, But this constructionalso closely associates
0
projections of global diversity within the Euro- the democraticuniversalityof humanrights-in-
pean sphere-as a result of immigrationbut for cludingtherightto education,therightto political
other causes as well, like the repatriationof dis- expressionandassembly,the rightto securityand
E
L.
placedpeoples. at least relativesocial protections-with particu-
The second development I would like to larnationalbelonging.Thisis why the democratic
discuss concernsthe evolutionof the notion of a composition of people in the form of the nation
*
._
people, and it goes in the opposite direction led inevitablyto systems of exclusion:the divide
*3 from thatof the precedingone, creatinga strong between"majorities"and"minorities"and,more
tension that may become very violent on occa- profoundlystill, betweenpopulationsconsidered
sion. The historicalinsertionof populationsand native and those considered foreign, heteroge-
peoples in the system of nation-states and of neous,who areraciallyor culturallystigmatized.
their permanentrivalry affects from the inside It is obvious that these divisions were rein-
the representation of these peoples, their con- forcedby the historyof colonizationanddecolo-
sciousness of their "identity." nizationandthatin this time of globalizationthey
In the work that I published in 1988 with become the seed of violenttensions.Alreadydra-
ImmanuelWallerstein,Race, Nation, Class:Am- maticwithineachnationality,they arereproduced
biguous Identities, I used the expression "con- and multiplied at the level of the postnational
structionof afictive ethnicity"to designate this
or supranationalcommunity that the European
characteristicnationalizationof societiesandpeo-
Union aspiresto be. Duringthe interminabledis-
ples andthusof cultures,languages,genealogies. cussion overthe situationof immigrantsand"un-
This process is the very site of the confrontation,
documented aliens" in France and in Europe, I
as well as of the reciprocalinteraction,between
evoked the specterof an apartheidbeing formed
the two notions of a people: thatwhich the Greek
at the same time as Europeancitizenship itself.
languageandfollowing it all politicalphilosophy This barelyhiddenapartheidconcernsthe popu-
calls ethnos,the"people"as an imaginedcommu-
lationsof the"South"as well as the"East."
nity of membershipand filiation,anddemos, the
Does Europeas a futurepolitical,economic,
"people"as the collective subjectof representa-
andculturalentity,possible andimpossible,need
tion, decision making,andrights.It is absolutely
a fictive ethnicity? Through this kind of con-
crucial to understandthe power of this double-
faced construction-its historical necessity, to struction,can Europegive meaningandrealityto
some degree-and to understandits contingency, its own citizenship-that is, to the new system of
its existencerelativeto certainconditions.l rights that it must confer on the individualsand
This constructionresultedin the subjective social groups that it includes? Probablyyes, in
interiorization of the idea of the border-the the sense that it must constructa representation
of its "identity"capableof becomingpartof both
way individuals represent their place in the
world to themselves (let us call it, with Hannah objective institutionsand individuals' imagina-
Arendt,theirright to be in the world) by tracing tions. Not, however (this is my conviction, at
in their imaginations impenetrablebordersbe- least), in the sense thatthe closure characteristic
tween groups to which they belong or by sub- of national identity or of the fictive ethnicity
jectively appropriatingbordersassigned to them whose origin I have just described is as pro-
from on high, peacefully or otherwise. That is, foundly incompatiblewith the social, economic,
they develop cultural or spiritual nationalism technological, and communicationalrealities of
(what is sometimes called "patriotism,"the globalization as it is with the idea of a "Euro-
"civic religion"). pean right to citizenship"understoodas a "right

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I 1 7 1 Etienne Balibar 77

to citizenship in Europe"-that is, an expansion patoryprojectsand strugglesfor citizenshipand 1.


of democracyby means of Europeanunification. have now become obstacles to their revival, to
The heart of the aporia seems to me to lie their permanentreinvention. Every identifica-
precisely in the necessity we face, and the im- tion is subject to the double constraint of the
possibility we struggle against, of collectively structuresof the capitalist world economy and 3

inventing a new image of a people, a new image of ideology (feelings of belonging to cultural _.
i,
5*
of the relationbetween membershipin historical and political units). What is currently at stake
communities(ethnos)andthe continuedcreation does not consist in a struggle for or against Eu- 3

of citizenship (demos) throughcollective action ropean identity in itself. After the end of "real
and the acquisition of fundamental rights to communism" and of the taking of sides, the
existence, work, and expression, as well as stakes revolve instead aroundthe invention of a
civic equalityandthe equaldignityof languages, citizenship that allows us to democratize the
classes, andsexes. Todayeverypossibilityof giv- bordersof Europe,to overcome its interiordivi-
ing a concretemeaningto the idea of a European sions, and to completely reconsider the role of
people andthusof giving contentto the projectof European nations in the world. The issue is
a democraticEuropeanstaterunsup againsttwo not principally to know whether the European
majorobstacles:the emptinessof everyEuropean Union, too, will become a military power,
social movementandof all social politics andthe chargedwith guaranteeinga "regionalorder"or
authoritarianestablishmentof a borderof exclu- with "projecting"itself outwardin humanitarian
sion for membershipin Europe.Unless these two or neocolonialinterventions;rather,it is whether
obstacles are confronted together and resolved a projectof democratizationand economic con-
one by the other,this projectwill neverhappen. structioncommon to the east and west, the north
and south, of the Euro-Mediterraneansphere
The persistenceof names is the conditionof will be elaborated and will gain the support of
every "identity."We fight for certainnames and its peoples-a projectthatdependsfirston them.
against others, to appropriatenames (Europe, Europeimpossible:Europepossible.
Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Macedonia ... but also
Translated
by ErinM. Williams
France, GreatBritain,Germany).All these bat-
tles leave traces, in the form of nostalgic long-
ings and bordersor utopiasand transformational
programs.Thus, the name of Europe-derived
from a distant antiquity and first designating a NOTE
little region of Asia or of Asia Minor-has been 1This
difficulty is not a purely speculative question. It
connectedto cosmopolitanprojects,to claims of
continuallyinterfereswith concretelegal and political prob-
imperialhegemony or to the resistancethatthey lems. An example of this occurredwhen the FrenchConseil
provoked, to programs dividing up the world Constitutionnelchallenged the "symbolic"phraseproposed
and expanding "civilization" that the colonial by the government as a resolution of the Corsican issue
("the Corsican people are a component of the French peo-
powers believed themselves the guardiansof, to ple") because of its apparentincompatibilitywith the idea of
the rivalry of "blocs" that disputed legitimate the nation as "one and indivisible"writtenin successive re-
possession of it, to the creation of a "zone of publicanconstitutions(decision of 9 May 1991).
prosperity" north of the Mediterranean, of a
"greatpower in the twenty-firstcentury."...
The difficulty for democratic politics is to WORKS
CITED
avoid becoming enclosed in representationsthat
Balibar, Etienne. "Les frontieres de l'Europe." La crainte
have historically been associated with emanci- des masses: Politique et philosophie avant et apres

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
78 World Borders,PoliticalBorders PMLA

r. Marx. Paris: Galil6e, 1997. Trans. as "The Borders of Chabod,Federico.Idea di Europae politica dell'equilibrio.
0 Europe."Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studieson Politics and Ed. Luisa Azzolini. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995.
*4
IzI Philosophy before and after Marx. Trans.James Swen- Chesneaux, Jean. "Quelle paix au Kosovo?" Le monde
VI' son. New York:Routledge, 1994. 3 June 1999.
c
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