DEPARTMENTAL SYLLABUS

I. PRACTICE OF LAW

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

Ponente: CASTRO, C.J.:

Violation:
Penalty: Disbarment
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its
Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of
Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Can the court compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP?

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are
subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable
annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and
it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated
Bar to pay their annual dues.
 A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO
vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON

PER CURIAM
Violation: frustrated homicide
Penalty: disbarment
Doctrine:
The purpose for a proceeding of disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable lawyers in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
FACTS
Complainant was a taxi driver who overtook the accuseds car on his way home after gassing up.
Accused was drunk at that time and tailed the taxi until it rounded by the Chugum and Carino streets. The
accused stopped his car and berated Soriano. There resulted an altercation, but Soriano merely tried to
stop Dizon from attacking him, because he was the older guy and he smelled of liquor. Dizon dropped his
eyeglasses, and Soriano picked them up. However, when Soriano attempted to return the eyeglasses,
Dizon had gotten a gun and wrapped its handle with a handkerchief and fired a shot at Soriano. The
bullet got Sorianos carotid artery, but he survived due to prompt medical treatment. Dizon was convicted
of frustrated homicide and applied for probation, which was granted. However, he obstinately refused to
satisfy civil liabilities with Soriano. He also tried to settle with Sorianos family with the vice mayors help,
but that got nowhere. He also fabricated stories that Soriano with two others beat him up. Also, he was
found to be in possession of an unlicensed firearm.
ISSUE
Whether or noy Manuel Dizons disbarment was proper.
HELD
Yes. Accused displayed dishonestly and moral turpitude by his behavior. Among others, the
following facts prove that he lacks good moral character:
He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter,
driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back
to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant, who
was unarmed;
When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he
had shot Complainant;
Apart from his denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled
by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has, to date, not yet satisfied his
civil liabilities to Complainant.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to
have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good
moral character.
 A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ

Ponente: BENGZON, C.J.:

Doctrine: A bar exam-taker must have successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education previous to the study of law.
Dispositive: The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Facts:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter
was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later
he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of
Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom
which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination,
and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he
claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army,
passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service
as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination
represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his
A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own
making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester
of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have
been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education,".

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he
hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential.
 A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL
MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee
Ponente:MAKASIAR, J.
Violation: unauthorized re-evaluation of bar exam answers;g uilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding
from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and
1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no
pending criminal case in court.
Penalty: revocation of his license to practice law
Doctrine:
Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964, candidates for admission to the bar must be of
good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he committed
perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him
to revoked his license.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles The determination of whether a bar
candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion. In the exercise of
this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the
Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8)
bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court
and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is
the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must
always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose
position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the
conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly
adhered to.

FACTS

Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the court about the startling fact that the grade in one examination
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were
released this year and that there are grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects that underwent
alterations to raise the grades prior to release of results. The Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954, Ramon
Galang, underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner
concerned. Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-
checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that
he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was
on the borderline of passing.
The investigation showed that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective
examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to
him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of
Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile,
Criminal & Remedial).
An investigation conducted by the NBI also showed that Ramon Galang, was charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries committed on certain de Vera, of the same university. Confronted with this information,
respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case.
 It must also be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Lanuevo
gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of
assets and liabilities. But Lanuevos statement of assets and liabilities were not taken up during the investigation but were
examined as parts of the records of the court.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the examiners into re-evaluating Galangs exam notebooks.Yes.
2. Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the court his pending case. Yes.

HELD

1. Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to convince the examiners to individually re-examine the grades of Galang
to help him pass even without the authority of the Court.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in
question upon the misrepresentation of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they
re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said
notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly that indeed
the examiners made the re-evaluation in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever. But the favorable re-
evaluations made by the examiners were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo.
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same
cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. The Bar Confidant has absolutely
nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or
after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the
examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the
over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner.
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to
pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration. There are, however, acquisitions made by
Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out
of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

2. Yes. Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his
pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and
1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely
representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to
take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged
with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled. Furthermore,
respondents persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation
of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen
years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty,
probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
 In Re: Cunanan

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the
law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-195170%

1952 .71%

1953..72%

1954..73%

1955..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of
the general average in subsequent bar examinations.

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.
Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules
of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme
Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within
the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
 G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA

Ponente: PAREDES, J.
Violation: None
Penalty: None

FACTS
Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with crime of Malicious
Mischied, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was
representedy by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as
private-prosecutor, having securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice.

Counsel for the accused presented a Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private
Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

ISSUE
Whether of not City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging
in private practice.
HELD
No. The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private
practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate
supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
 June 30, 2008
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, RTC, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY

Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Doctrine: An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and is
REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.

Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the CourtAdministrator (OCA)
charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of demeaning, humilating, and berating him
during a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue Malabanan, et al. where Mane was counsel for
the plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen asked Mane about the latters law school. When Mane
answered that he came from Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him: Then youre not
from UP. Then you cannot equateyourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all
law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal
despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance.

Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latters person, seemingly disregarding the case at
hand. Subsequently, the OCA, upon evaluation, found that Belens insulting remarks were unwarranted
and inexcusable and recommended a reprimand of Belen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute
conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct

HELD: The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the
law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which the Court administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and
signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and
duties as, inter alia an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to
determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on his alma mater is clearly an engagement in
an argumentum ad hominem.

A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of the counsel. If Judge Belen felt that
his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he engaged on a
supercilious legal and personal discourse.

The Court reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they
deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of
the court.
II. Canon 1
 A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

FACTS
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D.
Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to
fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of
their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a medical
technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. The
two then went to Arcigas hometown to tell the latters parent about the pregnancy. They also made
Arcigas parents believe that they were already married but they would have to have the church wedding
in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams. Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in
preparation of securing a marriage license.
In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with
Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another woman.
Arciga confronted Maniwangs wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries upon Arciga.
Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct.
Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arcigas child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many times;
that he broke those promises because of Arcigas shady past because apparently Arciga had an
illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

ISSUE
Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.
HELD
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwangs case is different from the cases of Mortel vs
Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwangs refusal to marry Arciga was not
so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to
state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the
bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.
 A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Violation:
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more
prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction
will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

Facts:
The case is a disbarment case against respondent on the ground of gross immorality. It was
alleged that sometime in December 2004, complainant seek for legal advice from peitioner regarding her
collectibles from a travel company. Respondent sent Demand Letter and sometime in February 2005,
they met at Zensho Restaurant to discuss the possibility of filing complaint against the travel company
because the latter failed to settle the accounts. That after that said meeting, the respondent "held her arm
and kissed her on the cheek while embracing her very tightly."

The two met again to finalize the draft for the complaint and while on their way home after the
said meeting, the respondent suddenly stopped the car and things went out of hand. Thus she decided to
refer the case to another lawyer.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral which would warrant the
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law

Ruling:

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
- Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the
Bar but all throughtout their legal career as lawyers belong to an exclusive and honored fraternity.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession and should adhere to the
unwaveringly to the highest standard of morality. The respondent admitted to the act of kissing the
complainant on the lips as evidenced as well of his asking for apology from complainant in his text
message. Regardless of the fact that the respondent admitted that he kissed the complainant but the
Court held that this was not accompanied by malice because the respondent immediately asked for
forgiveness after sensing the annoyance of the respondent after texting him. Thus the Court held that this
is not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible which will warrant disbarment or suspension. But the
Court reprimanded respondent to be more prudent and cautious.
 A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO

Ponente: REGALA, J.
Violation: gross immorality and misconduct
Penalty: disbarment

FACTS

Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of
the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material
allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not
constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years.
She testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register
as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that
hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to
Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a
telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter
in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she
requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in
November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry
her.1wph1.t

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant
met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters
was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958, which was duly
identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's
Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital
issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

HELD

Yes. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of
the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics,
by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity,
which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon
Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show
where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking
for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform
that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly
indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily
gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he
not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it
may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it
is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not
to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent
powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held
that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of
the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral
act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
 A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

Ponente: BARRERA, J.:

Violation:
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena,
from the roll of attorneys.

FACTS:Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the latter. In her complaint,
Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the
incident because Oblena threatened to kill her family. As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a
child.

Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship and Royong consented to have
intercourse with him.

The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll of attorney even though the
acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident showed that she is more of a sweetheart than a victim because
of the circumstances behind the incident. The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately
alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral character while having an illicit and
adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also has a legal husband in the province.

Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from those originally charged in the
complaint but the court overruled his petition

After the hearing, the investigators concluded that

A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring any criminal liability;
B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after
he became a lawyer and
C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his application to take the bar.

ISSUE: W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a married woman, are
sufficient grounds to cause Oblenas disbarment

RULING: YES
Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he is not guilty of any of
the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive
and the power of the court to exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the
proper administration of justice and can be exercised even without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly
prohibited by statutes.

American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires suspension or disbarment eventhough
the statues do not explicitly specify that as a ground of disbarment.

Oblenas argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character when he filed his
application to take the bar examination is wrong. Ones own approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral
character. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is
what the person really is and not what he other people thinks he is.
His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge with her shows the scheming
mind of Oblena and his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law. Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law
wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royongs trust on him.

Oblenas contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complain which is
entirely different from the original complaint filed is untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor
General to charge in his complaint the same offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is that
if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation.
 [G.R. No. 137378. October 12, 2000]
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. vs. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC.
Ponente: VITUG, J.:

Facts:

In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
California, USA, entered into a contract with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a Philippine
corporation, whereby the latter agrees to deliver 8,594 wheels to FASGI. FASGI received the wheels and
so it paid PAWI $216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that the wheels are defective and did not
comply with certain US standards. So in 1979, FASGI sued PAWI in a California court. In 1980, a
settlement was reached but PAWI failed to comply with the terms of the agreement.

A second agreement was made but PAWI was again remiss in its obligation. The agreement
basically provides that PAWI shall return the purchase price in installment and conversely, FASGI shall
return the wheel in installment. PAWI was only able to make two installments (which were actually made
beyond the scheduled date). FASGI also returned the corresponding number of wheels. Eventually in
1982, FASGI sought the enforcement of the agreement and it received a favorable judgment from
the California court. PAWI is then ordered to pay an equivalent of P252k plus damages but FASGI was
not ordered to return the remaining wheels. PAWI was not able to comply with the court order in the US.
So in 1983, FASGI filed a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment with RTC-Makati.
Hearings were made and in 1990, the trial judge ruled against FASGI on the ground that the
foreign judgment is tainted with fraud because FASGI was not ordered to return the remaining
wheels (unjust enrichment) and that PAWIs American lawyer entered into the agreements without
the consent of PAWI. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced here in the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. The judgment is valid. A valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized
insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of
competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system
of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be
valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.
In this case, PAWI was very well represented in the California court. PAWIs insistence that
its American lawyer colluded with FASGI; that he entered into the compromise agreement without
PAWIs authority is belied by the fact that PAWI initially complied with the agreement. It did not
disclaim the agreement. It sent two installments (though belatedly) but failed to comply on the
rest. It cannot now aver that the agreement is without its authority. Further, it is just but fair for the
California court not to order FASGI to return the remaining wheels because of PAWIs arrears.
 A.C. No. 9881 June 4, 2014
(Formerly CBD 10-2607)
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner vs. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, Respondent.

Ponente: SERENO, CJ:

Violation:
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the
Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.

Facts:
For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors of the administrative Complaint for DISHONESTY against respondent, Atty. Manuel Molina.
Atty. Molina allegedly advised his clients to enforce a contract on the complainant's client who had never
been a party to the agreement.

The facts are as follows:

The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound named "Times Square" at Times
Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu, clients of Atty.
Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr.
Belinda San Juan.

The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr. Abreu. The
agreement, covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for
the neighbors on matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of
parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the
contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements.

On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty1 with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline against Atty. Molina2 for allegedly giving legal advice to the latters clients to the effect that the
Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.

In his Answer,3 Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He maintained
that the Times Square Preamble4 was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in the residential
compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.5

Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed two cases against his
clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times Square
Preamble. The first case, was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which
was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit was an action for
declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent, were dismissed.6

Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time by his client, the Lims.
They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own hands by
placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latters egress to Times
Street. The Lims filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a Complaint for Injunction
and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579. According to
respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12 December 2008.7

Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as his answer to the Complaint.

On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and

Recommendation. He recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the
complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent Molina gave an
erroneous legal advice, he could not be held accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith.8

On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-210, adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.9

Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 August 2011, but was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors on 29 December 2012.10 Notices of the denial were received by the parties on 21 March
2013.11

No petition for review has been filed with this Court.

It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the complainant does not file a petition with the
Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution. This rule is derived from
Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, which states:

(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than
suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating
respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)

In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Boards resolution on 21 March 2013, as evidenced by a
registry return receipt. To this date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for review from Atty. Paguia.
Thus, for his failure to file a petition for review with the Court within 15 days, this case is deemed
terminated pursuant to the above mentioned Section 12(c).

Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no reason to deviate from the findings of the
IBP Board of Governors.

When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of
proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant.12

In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia charges
Atty. Molina with providing legal advice to the latters clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble
is binding on complainants client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory to the agreement. The allegation of
giving legal advice, however, was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the
corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving the legal
advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not proof.13

Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held
administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The rule on
mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows:

An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an attorney is not
liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be
imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law. x x x.14

The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never presumed. It is a
conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact and is evidentiary.15 There
is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with
bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith, therefore, stands in this case.

The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance of evidence.
 A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN

Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Violation: filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC); GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Penalty: we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision

Facts:
Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly
listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had
already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been
President of LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as
Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of
LCI.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the
Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC
requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary
dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that
her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Held:

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that
there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to
hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and
certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same
in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the
statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is
inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which
would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that
contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a
lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of
having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the
rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has
transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpins action in submitting a false document we
see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law.
 A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015
MELVYN G. GARCIA vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO
PER CURIAM
Violation: Homicide
Penalty: DISBARRED

Facts:

A.C. No. 7973

Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his
profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of
their marriage, which was eventually granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreo, representing Maria Margarita
and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At
the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years
old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreo and Garcias
children learned abouthis return, Sesbreo filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia
alleged that he learned that Sesbreo was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo is only on
parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreo
should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.

In his Comment, Sesbreo alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint
against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline. Sesbreo alleged
that Garcias complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as pro
bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.

A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)

A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for
disbarment against Sesbreo before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreo is practicing law
despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the
facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreo violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the
practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the
IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreo alleging basically the same facts he
alleged in A.C. No. 7973.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with
the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreo argued that even if the
accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence.
Sesbreo further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreo claimed that
Garcias complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him
for representing Garcias daughters in court.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude.

Held: Yes. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude.1wphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x
x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are
mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or
exclusion as the cases are reached.

In People v. Sesbreo, the Court found Sesbreo guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE,
the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-
31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and
hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.

We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the
circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude.

The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion
Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreos house when the
latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at
them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreo
when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw Sesbreo
aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness,
Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw
Yapchangco and Amparado running away while Sesbreo was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes
house in the process. Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then
saw Sesbreo in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of
his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place
and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreo that eventually
led to the death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreos argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and
political rights. There was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and
restored Sesbreo to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In
this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years
and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a
mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty
for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which
reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge stated that "[i]t is
understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein
shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted
pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition,
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral
character. A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.
 A.C. No. 6760 January 30, 2013
ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III vs. ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES, Respondent.

DECISION
BRION, J.:

Facts:
Anastacio Teodoro filed a complaint against Gonzales for allegedly intentionally committing forum
shopping. Gonzales is the counsel of Araceli in two civil cases filed against Anastacio. The first involved
the settlement of the estate of Manuela Teodoro and while the case was pending, Gonzales assisted in
filing the subsequent case for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages without indicating
the special proceeding earlier filed. According to Anastacio, this was a deliberate act of forum shopping
made by Gonzales.

Initially, the commissioner found that Gonzales was indeed guilty of forum shopping for the ruling
in either case would result in res judicata over the other and that he instituted the subsequent case
without indicating the pending case. The commissioner ruled that Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the code
for he disregarded the SC circular prohibiting forum shopping.Hence, suspending him for 1 month.
However, the board of Governors of the IBP reversed the Commissioners recommendation and
dismissed the case.

Issue: Whether Gonzales committed forum shopping and thereby violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

Ruling: Yes. The court held that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Lawyers should be
reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that
tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation. The Court has
repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets
and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable
either as direct or indirect contempt of court. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated
Canon 1 of the CPR which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes.
However, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in the light of all the circumstances of
this case.
 A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA

A.C. NO. 4728

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Violation: breach of the Lawyers Oath; unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the
Court and causing undue delay of these cases

Penalty: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, reckoned from receipt of this
Decision

Facts:

Accused representing himself as the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 7661 of the
Baybay Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing fully well that the possessor and owner at that time was
private complainant Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale which accused executed in
favor of private complainant on 2nd December, 1981, without first redeeming/repurchasing the same.
[P]rivate complainant knowing of accused[s] unlawful act only on or about the last week of February,
1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him of the property, the mortgage having been foreclosed,
private complainant thereby suffered damages and was prejudiced by accused[s] unlawful transaction
and misrepresentation.

Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases against respondent by filing
before this Court an Affidavit-Complaint dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental Complaintdated
February 27, 1997, which were docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728, respectively. In both
complaints, complainant sought the disbarment of respondent.

Respondent denied that his agreement with complainant was a pacto de retro sale. He claimed
that it was an equitable mortgage and that, if only complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits
from the produce of the land, the total amount would have exceeded P15,000.00.

Held:
Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one
of sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage, respondents actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest
standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for
which respondent should be held administratively liable.

When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to obey the
laws, do no falsehood, and conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
discretion.18 He gravely violated his oath.

The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that
respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase as
he was the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument. Respondent could have simply
denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as
mortgagor and mortgagee, respectively, rather than as vendor a retro and vendee a retro. If only
respondent had been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed,
then the controversy between him and complainant could have been avoided or, at the very least,
easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack
of legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to conduct [him]self as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion.

Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the Deed
of Sale with Right to Repurchase dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it appear that the
property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the owners copy of
the said certificate of title, when the truth is that the said TCT had already been cancelled some nine
years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong
statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4,
1982, or barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an
act of gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant.

Respondents infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has already been imposed a disciplinary
sanction before. In Nuez v. Atty. Astorga,respondent was held liable for conduct unbecoming an
attorney for which he was fined P2,000.00.
III. Canon 2

G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014

THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-
CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs of
FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and ARMANDO, all surnamed
CADAVEDO
vs.
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados

BRION, J.:

The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses
Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415
(subject lot) located in Gumay, Pian, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued Homestead Patent No. V-
15414 on March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the
spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses
Ames) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses
Ames.

The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action 5 before the RTC(then
Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of
contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses
Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew
from the case; he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya.

On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and
the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land
law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee
basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:

10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent
basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum
of P2,000.00 for attorneys fees.6

In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses Ames.
The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA.

On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil Case No. 1721was pending,
the spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The spouses Ames TCT No. T-4792 was
subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was issued in their childrens names. On October 11, 1976,
the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the
names of their children.

On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No. 1721,reversing the decision of
the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses Ames null
and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and ordered the Register
of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue another title in the name of the
spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via the spouses Ames petition for review on
certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.
 Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused
the publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-25984(under the
name of the spouses Ames children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo of the
foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on
September 14, 1981.

With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21, 1981
a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTCs resolution of the motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint 7 before the RTC against the spouses Cadavedo for
Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames children).

On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981. Atty.
Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorneys fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject
lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for himself;
and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.

Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the
respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No. 215. This incident
occurred while Civil Case No. 3352was pending.

On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise
agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by
each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the
compromise agreementin a decision dated June 10, 1982.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the
DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC subsequently
denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the CAvia a petition for
certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition in its decision of January 31, 1984.

The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case
No. 3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was issued in the name of the spouses
Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.

On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action9 against the
respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the
respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an
accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that the RTC fix the attorneys fees on a
quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling
the civil cases.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of Partition
of Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled and TCT No. 41690
was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the proceedings and status of Civil
Case No. 3352.

Issues/Held:
 We resolve to GRANT the petition.

The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior to the present controversy. In
three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses Cadavedos counsel. For ease of discussion, we
summarize these cases (including the dates and proceedings pertinent to each) as follows:

Civil Case No. 1721 Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of
homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on October 16, 1981.

Civil Case No. 3352 Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights due
Planters in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23, 1981.

Civil Case No. 3443 Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed on May
21, 1982.

Civil Case No. 215 Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between the latter
part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the compromise agreement on May 13, 1982.

Civil Case No. 4038 petitioners v. respondents (the present case).

The agreement on attorneys fee

consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
to recover possession

The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorneys fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is
valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the NEGATIVE for the reasons discussed
below.

A. The written agreement providing for

a contingent fee of P2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one-
half of the subject lot

The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of P2,000.00 and not, as asserted
by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty.
Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses
Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer P2,000.00 as attorneys fees should the case be decided in their
favor.

Contrary to the respondents contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the court
would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a representation to the
court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latters
compensation for his services in the case; it is not the attorneys fees in the nature of damages which the
former prays from the court as an incident to the main action.

At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed as well by both
parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not reduced to
writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacayas engagement as the spouses Cadavedos counsel
in Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement between the lawyer and his client, providing for the formers
compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the rules stand,
controversies involving written and oral agreements on attorneys fees shall be resolved in favor
of the former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of P2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint
prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot.

B. The contingent fee agreement between

the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject
lot, is champertous

Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent
fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void.

In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo in
Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for reimbursement, in
exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous
and is contrary to public policy.18

Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law
doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was directed "against
wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest
whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the
other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the
intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions, however, add a second factor in determining
champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the
risks of, the litigation."22

The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of assigning
doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that such individuals
would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for which they would
receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In order to safeguard the administration of justice,
instances of champerty and maintenance were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a
common law rule was developed, striking down champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance
as being unenforceable on the grounds of public policy."24

In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for public
policy considerations.25 As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation in
his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a
portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law."26 The rule of the profession that forbids
a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the
case at the lawyers expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him
and his client. To permit these arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the
outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to
accept a settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client
in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his clients cause."27

In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between therein
respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy. There, the Court
held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is against public policy, especially if
the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in consideration of some bargain to have a
part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client. 29

In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly
transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree
with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.31 The same reasons discussed
above underlie this rule.

C. The attorneys fee consisting of

one-half of the subject lot is excessive
and unconscionable

We likewise strike down the questioned attorneys fee and declare it void for being excessive and
unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the
services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it was intended for only one action as the two
other civil cases had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years to
be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large
fee in the absence of any showing that special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue
involved in that case, as observed by the RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did not require
of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the
sale of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.

That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedos counsel in the two subsequent cases did not
and could not otherwise justify an attorneys fee of one-half of the subject lot. As assertedby the
petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and
expenses foreach of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been
considered and taken cared of Based on these considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject
lot as attorneys fee excessive and unreasonable.

D. Atty. Lacayas acquisition of

the one-half portion contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code

Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property
that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession. 32 The
same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. 33

A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the judicial
action.34Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya
acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following established facts:(1)on
September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses
Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on
October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions,
and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente
and Atty. Lacaya executed the compromise agreement.

From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an agreement
subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion (which was after October
24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case
No. 1721were already pending before the lower courts. Similarly, the compromise agreement, including
the subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of
these, the relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses
Cadavedo.

Thus, whether we consider these transactions the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and the
compromise agreement independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find them to be
prohibited and void35by reason of public policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
contrary to public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are considered in existent
and void from the beginning.37

What did not escape this Courts attention is the CAs failure to note that the transfer violated the
provisions of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the concurrence of the transfer and
the execution of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil cases subsequent to Civil
Case No. 1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to the compromise agreement and in
so doing, found justification in the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.

While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the
prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,39 contrary to the CAs position, however, this
recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing where
the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the
success of the litigation.40 The payment of the contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the
litigation involving the clients property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled
by the lawyer.41

In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion to Atty.
Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still
existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article
1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously
erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of the unproved oral contingent fee
agreement.

Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedos cause pursuant to the terms of the alleged
oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not more, stake as
the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it undermines the fiduciary
relationship between him and his clients.42

E.The compromise agreement could not

validate the void oral contingent fee
agreement; neither did it supersede the
written contingent fee agreement

The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215
(ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacayas acquisition and possession of the
disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As earlier
discussed, such acquisition is void; the compromise agreement, which had for its object a void
transaction, should be void.

A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy is in existent and void from the beginning. 43 It can never be ratified44 nor the action or
defense for the declaration of the in existence of the contract prescribe; 45 and any contract directly
resulting from such illegal contract is likewise void and in existent. 46

Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent fee agreement
providing for attorneys fee of P2,000.00; neither did it preclude the petitioners from questioning its validity
even though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although the MTC
approved it in its June 10, 1982 decision in the ejectment case. The MTC could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void compromise agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case
could not have attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case
concerns itself only with the issue of possession de facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action
for recovery of possession founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CAs position, the petitionersin
filing the present action and praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-
half portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services were
not barred by the compromise agreement.

Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis

In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any express
stipulation on the attorneys fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the reasonableness
of such fees to the courts discretion. We thus have to fix the attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis.

"Quantum meruitmeaning as much as he deservesis used as basis for determining a lawyers

professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount
of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for
the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the
task was expecting to be paid compensation"48 for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to
prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit
without paying for it.49

Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,51factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time spent
and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services, the amount involved
in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are considered
in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled.

In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty. Lacayas
fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not novel and did not
require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive research;
(2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969
until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames)
lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven
years; and the third (Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4)
the property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765
hectares.

All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTCs considerations in appreciating the
character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification on
valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately
one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion,
as attorneys fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.

The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of the
client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and express protection
to the rights of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in other
words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped the owner protect his rights.
Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a property
right over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be
on the fruits of the disputed property, which in this case, the Court properly accords.
 IV. Canon 3

EN BANC
[A.M. No. P-03-1690. April 4, 2003]

JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner, vs. EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363. April 4, 2003

EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, petitioner, vs. Judge ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, respondent.

[A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC. April 4, 2003]

[In Re: Use by Atty. Renerio G. Paas as an Office in His Private Practice of His Profession the
Office of His Wife, Pasay City MeTC Judge Estrellita M. Paas.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas
administratively charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with discourtesy, disrespect,
insubordination, neglect in performing his duties, disloyalty, solicitation of monetary consideration and
gross violation of the Civil Service Law. The case was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P.

In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his co-employees, lawyers and
party litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises despite order to do
so, thus amounting to insubordination; was, and on several instances, habitually absent from work or
made it appear that he reported for work by signing the logbook in the morning, only to stay out of the
office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their
Release Orders; asked for amounts in excess of what was necessary for the purchase of stamps and
pocketed the difference; once failed to mail printed matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use the
amount given to him for the purpose; and divulged confidential information to litigants in advance of its
authorized release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying
party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). [1]

Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by his Affidavit,[2] and members of
the court staff,[3] by a Joint Affidavit, attested that Almarvez failed to maintain the cleanliness in and
around the court premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing with Judge Paas and his co-employees.
Doctoleros affidavit also corroborated Judge Paas allegation that Almarvez would merely sign the
logbook in the morning and thereafter stay out of the office.

Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August 2, 2000,[4] attested that the
alleged printed matter intended to be mailed on July 11, 2000 was not included in the list of registered
mails posted in the Pasay City Post Office on said date.

Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo Macabasag, both assigned to the Pasay City
Jail, by their respective affidavits,[5] attested that on several occasions, they saw Almarvez receive from
detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 in consideration of the release of their Release Orders.

Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000,[6] denied Judge Paas charges, and alleged that the real
reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because she suspected him of helping her
husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit any information
from him, she resorted to calling him names and other forms of harassment; on September 6, 2000, she
hurled at him the following invectives before the other employees of the court: Walang kuwenta, ahas ka,
driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong; and
she insisted that he sign a prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep.

Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the following incidents of oppression and
abuse of authority: On July 28, 2000, he was called by the Judge to her chambers where she berated him
as follows: Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi ka nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga,
pirmahan mo itong resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan kita ng estafa at falsification; the next day, the
Judge, on seeing him, told him Bakit ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka sa Lunes; and on July 31, 2000, the
Judge called him again to her chambers and told him Ang kapal ng mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito,
gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito dahil driver kita.

Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the foregoing incidents to Pasay City
MeTC Executive Judge Maria Cancino Erum who advised him to report the same to the Office of the
Clerk of Court; and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn statement-complaint[7] against Judge Paas
and went to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file it, but he was advised to try to talk the
matter over with her who then told him that they should forget all about it.

On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for money in exchange for the release of
court orders and alleged that both Hernandez and Macabasag executed their respective affidavits
because Judge Paas was a principal sponsor at their respective weddings; Hernandez was in fact
indebted to the Judge for helping him cover-up the escape of a detainee under his charge; the courts mail
matters were always sealed whenever he received them for mailing and he never tampered with their
contents; the alleged unmailed printed matter was actually posted on June 28, 2000, not on July 11,
2000, via ordinary instead of registered mail, because the money given to him for the purpose was
insufficient; and on the days when he was out of the office, he was actually performing personal errands
for the judge and her husband, Atty. Paas, who treated him as their personal driver and messenger.

As further proof of Judge Paas oppressive behavior towards him, Almarvez claimed that she ordered him
to undergo a drug test per Memorandum dated September 7, 2000,[8] even if he had no history of drug
abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results of his examination.[9]

The Court treated respondents Answer as a counter-complaint against Judge Paas and docketed it as
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363.

The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the OCA, which assigned
them to Executive Judge Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch 114 for investigation.

In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was revealed that Judge Paas
husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wifes office as his office address in his law
practice, in support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices
from Pasay City RTC Branch 109 and from the Supreme Court with respect to the case of People vs.
Louie Manabat, et al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas address to be Room 203, Hall of
Justice, Pasay City,[10] the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44.

Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B[11] of the Rules of Court which allows the Supreme Court to motu
proprio initiate proceedings for the discipline of attorneys, this Court resolved to docket the matter as A.M.
No. 01-12-02-SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and AM No. MTJ-01-1363.

In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution[12] of the Court en banc, Judge and Atty. Paas
submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit[13] wherein they vehemently denied the charge that the
latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address, they claiming that Atty.
Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio
Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only when he has a hearing before the Pasay City
courts or Prosecutors Office, or when he lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special
occasions such as Christmas party and her birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would
never consent nor tolerate the use of the court for any personal activities. Attached to the Joint Affidavit
were the separate sworn statements of Atty. Paas law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez[14] and secretary
Nilda L. Gatdula[15] attesting that he is holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint
Affidavit of the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 court personnel[16] attesting that Atty. Paas visits to the court
are neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never used the court in the practice of his profession.
On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit[17] wherein she admitted that Atty.
Paas did use her office as his return address for notices and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to 98-
1198, People vs. Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz y Salita, (now docketed in this Court
as G.R. Nos. 140536-37), lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure and facilitate
delivery of those notices, but after the cases were terminated, all notices were sent to his office address
in Escolta.

By Resolution of February 12, 2002,[18] the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation, report
and recommendation.

After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, Judge
Yap submitted his Report/Recommendation dated February 28, 2002.[19]

On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC dated March 1, 2002.[20]

I. OCA Findings and Recommendations

A. On the charges against Almarvez:

The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Almarvez of exacting
money from detainees, violating confidentiality of official communication, absence without official leave,
discourtesy and insubordination. Given Almarvez unsatisfactory performance ratings for three rating
periods covering January to June 2000,[21] July to December 2000,[22] and January to April 2001,[23]
however, the OCA recommended that he be duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his
official duties with One (1) Month suspension without pay, instead of dismissal as warranted under
Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his supervisor having failed to observe the procedure thereunder
for dropping of employees from the rolls, which procedure is quoted at the later portion of this decision.

B. On the charges against Judge Paas:

With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA, for lack of supporting evidence,
recommended the dismissal of the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse. It found,
however, that Judge Paas had used her administrative power of supervision and control over court
personnel for her personal pride, prejudice and pettiness[24] when she issued her September 7, 2000
Memorandum ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had already filed an administrative case
against him. It thus concluded that, in all probability, the purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to
undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed
against him.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty of simple misconduct in office, and
be penalized with reprimand with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.

II. This Courts Findings:

A. On the charges against Almarvez:

Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation of
confidentiality of official communication against Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in Judge Paas
complaint-affidavit which reads:

That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged informations which is confidential in
nature to party litigants in advance of its authorized release date before the release of Court Order and
Decision for consideration of a sum of money thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party
detrimental to the due administration of justice,[25]
in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable Almarvez to intelligently meet the same.

As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and insubordination which were echoed in the affidavits
of court personnel, they are also too general to support a conviction and are contrary to what is reflected
in his performance rating that he cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly, with his fellow employees.

On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act): Absent any
evidence to support the charge, the affiants-jail officers who claimed to have witnessed Almarvez receive
money from detention prisoners in exchange for the release of their Release Orders not having been
presented, hence, their claim remains hearsay, Almarvez categorical denial and counter-allegation that
these affiants executed their affidavits only out of fear of or favor to Judge Paas gain light.

As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and would thereafter leave the office,
again Judge Paas failed to present the affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr. While she
submitted in evidence a copy of her October 6, 2000 memorandum[26] requiring Almarvez to explain why
he was not in the office on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5, 2000, despite his affixing of his
signature in the logbook on those dates indicating that he reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily
explained that on September 8, 11, and 13, 2000, he submitted himself to drug testing as required by her
in her September 7, 2000[27] memorandum, which explanation is supported by the September 14, 2000
letter of Dr. Rosendo P. Saulog, Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous Drug Board.[28] As to his
whereabouts on October 5, 2000, Almarvez explanation that he was actually present in the morning but
left in the afternoon for the Supreme Court[29] was not controverted.

On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following findings of the OCA that he should be
faulted therefor:

The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating periods covering January to June
2000, July to December 2000 and January to April 2001 evidently shows that he failed to perform his
official duties. The fact that respondent Almarvez never disputed the performance ratings given him is
tantamount to an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX Book V of Executive Order No.
292, quoted as follows:

Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may appeal through the
established Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency within fifteen (15) days after receipt of his
copy of his performance rating. Failure to file an appeal within the prescribed period shall be deemed a
waiver of such right.

The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid grounds to drop him from the Rolls.
However, considering that his superior/supervisor failed to comply with the requirements set forth in
Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service Commission, which is hereunder
quoted, and that he was able to make up and cure his inefficiency after he was given the opportunity to
improve his performance in his detail to Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, as shown by his performance rating for
the period April to June 2001 with a very satisfactory rating, dropping him from the roll will no longer be
appropriate[30] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in the above-quoted findings of the
OCA reads:

2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.

(a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory ratings may be dropped from
the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee concerned is informed in writing
of his unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding
unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall be given not
later than 30 days from the end of the semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall enable
the employee to prepare an explanation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as recommended by the OCA, is thus in
order.

B. On the charges against Judge Paas:

Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez failed to
substantiate the same.

Judge Paas order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful order. Per Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. 1997, public employees are required to undergo a drug test
prior to employment to determine if they are drug-free. To be drug-free is not merely a pre-employment
prerequisite but is a continuing requirement to ensure the highest degree of productivity of the civil
service. However, considering that the order was issued after Judge Paas filed the administrative case
against Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion that it was only a fishing expedition against him. This is conduct
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.

C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:

By Judge Paas own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit,[31] she was aware that
her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court notices and orders in a case lodged in a
Pasay court. As the OCA puts it, [w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it could be interpreted as a
subtle way of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and
should be given special treatment by other judges or court personnel.[32]

The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against the judge and her spouse, Atty.
Paas:

SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples of Justice and
Promoting Respect for their Officials and Employers reads:

As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times be preserved and enhanced.
In inspiring public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees must:

1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute grounds for disciplinary action under,
as the case may be, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Judicial Conduct; and Section 46, Chapter 7,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and (b) faithfully
comply with the norms of conduct and perform the duties prescribed in the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713);

2. Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices;

xxx

6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose than for court or judicial functions.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that:

Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge. (Emphasis supplied.)

SC Circular No. 3-92,[33] dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL OR
COMMERCIAL PURPOSES

All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for
purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted
to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on
therein any trade or profession.

Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly Austria vs. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case
involving unauthorized and improper use of the courts premises for dwelling purposes by respondent and
his family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of
irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of
the service, and imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of
the courts premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial
records to danger of loss or damage. (Underscoring supplied.)

By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other courts, Judge Paas
indeed allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct[34] and of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which violation is
classified as a less serious charge under the Rules of Court[35] and is punishable under the same
Rule.[36]

A judges official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his behavior not
only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This is
premised on the truism that a Judges official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence and that upon a Judges attributes depend the public perception of the Judiciary.[37]

On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that had no
purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that he
has close ties to a member of the judiciary, in violation of the following rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

Canon 3A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Canon 10A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Canon 13a LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPERITY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING
THE COURT.

Canon 15A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.

The need for relying on the merits of a lawyers case, instead of banking on his relationship with a
member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court, cannot be
overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to
enhance a lawyers prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible
and improper conduct.

This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a desire to ensure receipt of
court orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have his court notices sent
to office of Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases, Atty. Paas used his office
address but there is no showing that he failed to receive the notices sent to that address. While a lawyer
should make the necessary arrangements to ensure that he is properly informed of any court action,
these should not violate his lawyers oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility, nor provide an
opportunity for a member of the judiciary to breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme Court
circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds:

(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby
SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without pay;

(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent Judge Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a
member of the judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely;

(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,

(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, SC Circular No. 3-92 and
Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TWELVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely; and

(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and appended to respondents personal record.
 Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES,
RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J.
CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR.

AQUINO, J.

Facts:

In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented by Atty.
Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres client. The letterhead contained the
name Baker & McKenzie. Dacanay denied Clurmans liability and at the same time he asked why is
Torres using the letterhead Baker & McKenzie, a foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No
reply was received so Dacanay filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using Baker &
McKenzie.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law firm is a
member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities all over the world; that
they associated with them in order to make a representation that they can render legal services of the
highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.

Issue:

Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.

Held:

No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines. Such use
of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law firm are enjoined from using Baker &
McKenzie in their practice of law.

V. Canon 4
VI. Canon 5
 VII. Canon 6

[G.R. No. 125440. January 31, 2000]

GENERAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (GBTC); WORLDWIDE INSURANCE AND SURETY
COMPANY (WORLDWIDE); MIDLAND INSURANCE CORPORATION (MIDLAND); and STANDARD
INSURANCE CO., INC. (STANDARD), petitioners, vs. THE OMBUDSMAN; OMB-GIO RAUL E.
TOTANES and ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL MAGDANGAL M. DE LEON, respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.: olanski

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that seeks to annul and set aside the
Ombudsman Resolution dated May 15, 1995 in OMB-CRIM-0-93-1597 which dismissed the complaint
filed by petitioners against respondent Assistant Solicitor General (ASG) Magdangal M. de Leon, and the
Ombudsman Order dated March 13, 1996 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners.

Petitioners General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), Worldwide Insurance and Surety Company
(Worldwide), Midland Insurance Corporation (Midland) and Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard) filed
a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon on July 5, 1993. Docketed as OMB-CRIM-093-1597, the
complaint accused respondent ASG de Leon of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), for allegedly

x x x causing undue injury to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the GBTC
Stockholders in giving Lucio Tan unwarranted benefit or advantage in the discharge of his official
functions by protecting and defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank relative to (sic)
verbatim adoption of the Lucio Tan Bid as the Liquidation Plan of GBTC under Monetary Board
Resolution No. 677, March 29, 1977.[1]

and charged respondent administratively with malfeasance in office, for his alleged Sdaadsc

x x x deliberate and adamant refusal to comply with his statutory duty to protect and defend the interest of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as against the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central
Bank relative to the verbatim adoption of the Lucio Tan Bid as the Liquidation Plan of GBTC under
Monetary Board Resolution No. 677, March 29, 1977.[2]

OMB-CRIM-093-1597 was assigned to respondent Raul E. Totanes, Ombudsman Graft Investigation

Office II, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB). Respondent Totanes dismissed the
criminal case against respondent ASG de Leon in the assailed Resolution dated May 15, 1995, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned investigator respectfully recommends that the
above-entitled case be forthwith DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence to hold respondent
CRIMINALLY liable for the acts complained of in the instant complaint.

SO RESOLVED.[3]

Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 10, 1995 that was denied in an Order dated
March 13, 1996. Hence, this petition.

The relevant facts as summarized by the Office of the Ombudsman are:

On March 27, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank passed Resolution No. 677 to the effect that
GBTC is insolvent and therefore has to stop its banking business operations. It designated a Liquidator
and approved a Liquidation Plan whereby (sic) Lucio Tan Group shall purchase all the assets and
assume all the liabilities of GBTC; Slxmis

On April 07, 1977, the Central Bank of the Philippines and Arnulfo B. Aurellano in his capacity as the
Monetary Board of the Central Bank Liquidator of GBTC filed through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) a Petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking the court's assistance in the
liquidation of GBTC. The Court docketed the said petition as Spec. Proc. No. 107812, entitled "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of GBTC";

On May 05, 1982, three minority stockholders of GBTC, namely, Worldwide, Midland and Standard
through their counsel, ATTY. ANGEL C. CRUZ, filed an intervention in the said case, praying for the
annulment of the closure and liquidation of GBTC by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank as these
were allegedly done arbitrarily and in bad faith. Later, GBTC itself joined and adopted the intervention of
its aforesaid three minority stockholders;

Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo, to whose Team the said case was assigned by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza, re-assigned the said case from Solicitor Juan C. Nabong to the herein
respondent in view of Juan C. Nabong's appointment as RTC Judge;

From that time on, all the pleadings, filed with the Liquidation Court RTC of Manila, were signed by
Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and the herein respondent in behalf of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).

What prompted petitioners to file a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon with the Ombudsman is
the alleged "inconsistent position" of said respondent in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and in Civil Case No.
0005 filed with Sandiganbayan.

Civil Case No. 0005 is an ill-gotten wealth case filed by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) through the OSG on July 17, 1987. This case was instituted against Lucio Tan,
former President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et. al.

Petitioners point out that in Civil Case No. 0005, the first of the causes of actions therein as stated in Par.
14 (a)-(1) to (3) alleges that:

(A) The Marcos-dominated Central Bank Closure of GBTC under MB Resolution, March 25, 1977;

(B) The LUCIO TAN'S (sic) takeover of GBTC under MB Resolution, March 29, 1977;

are illegal, fraudulent and arbitrary, made thru conspiracy with and taking advantage of the close
relationship between the LUCIO TAN Group and the deposed President and Wife, other CB officials, with
the help and manipulation of then CB Governor Gregorio S. Licaros and former PNB President Panfilo O.
Domingo xxx.[4] Kortex

The charge that respondent ASG de Leon espoused conflicting interests rests on the contention of
petitioners that said respondent's act of defending the legality of the Central Bank closure of GBTC
amounts to defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank.[5] Petitioners maintain that the
position taken by the OSG represented by respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 is
"against the 'interest of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines' as contained in the statement
of ultimate facts set forth in Par. 14 (a)-(1) to (3) of EDSA-SDB Civil Case No. 0005, ANNEX "C".[6]

On December 16, 1992, counsel of petitioners wrote respondent ASG de Leon that he inhibit himself from
appearing in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and to defend the interest of the Government of the Philippines as
against the interest of Lucio Tan in Civil Case No. 0005.[7]

When respondent ASG de Leon for OSG continued to represent the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No.
107812, petitioners then filed the complaint against respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman.
In dismissing the case, the Office of the Ombudsman held:

Thus, the records of this case convincingly show that, whenever the herein respondent Assistant Solicitor
General appears in court or signs any pleading in the aforesaid case, he is doing so not in his personal
capacity but in his official capacity as one of the lawyers in the OSG, which is headed by the Solicitor
General.

Everything stated in the pleadings filed by the OSG in the aforesaid case is not the personal stand or
opinion of the herein respondent but the official stand or opinion of the OSG. Hence, OSG as counsel of
the Central Bank of the Philippines in the aforesaid case is defending its client, the Central Bank. It is not
defending the interest of Lucio Tan. The fact that, under the Liquidation Plan approved by the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank, the Lucio Tan Group purchased the assets and assumed the liabilities of
GBTC, is merely incidental. What is at issue in the aforesaid case, which is now before the Court of
Appeals, is whether or not the Monetary Board of the Central Bank acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in its
actions, leading to the closure and liquidation of GBTC. Sclaw

As regards the complaint in the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0005, which is an action for
the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth against Lucio Tan, et. al., the same was signed by
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Chairman Ramon Diaz and Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez. While it is true that, the said case is in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, yet
it was filed by the PCGG which is the only agency involved in that case. The said PCGG case has
nothing to do with Spec. Proc. No. 107812 (CA-G.R. CV No. 39939) which involves the issue of validity of
the closure and liquidation of GBTC. Neither the Central Bank nor GBTC Liquidator Arnulfo B. Aurellano
of the Central Bank, petitioners-appellants in the said CA G.R. CV No. 39938, are parties in the said
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005.

With the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution having been denied, petitioners filed this petition
raising the following issues:

I.

THAT RESPONDENT OMB AND RESPONDENT INVESTIGATION OFFICER RAUL E. TOTANES

COMMITTED OUTRAGEOUSLY WRONG FINDINGS (A) THAT THE OSG "IS NOT DEFENDING THE
INTEREST OF LUCIO TAN" IN SPEC. PROC. NO. 107812, NOW CA-G.R. NO. 39939, AND (B) THAT
THE EDSA CASE SANDIGANBAYAN CIVIL CASE NO. 0005 HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH SPEC.
PROC. NO. 107812, NOW CA-G.R. NO. 39939, ARE DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED BY THE FACTS ON
RECORD.

II.

THAT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMPLETELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS

NO CONSTITUTIONAL NOR ANY LEGAL PROVISION NOR ANY DECISIONAL AUTHORITY NOR ANY
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY VESTING UPON OSG THE RIGHT AND OR DUTY TO REPRESENT
INTEREST "IN CONFLICT OR OPPOSED" TO THE INTEREST OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, OF WHICH OSG IS THE CHIEF COUNSEL, IN ANY ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH CASE SUCH
AS THAT ARISING FROM THE ILLEGAL AND FRAUDULENT CB CLOSURE AND LUCIO TAN'S
TAKEOVER OF GBTC, AS SET FORTH IN PAR. 14 (a)-(1) TO (3), EDSA-SDB CIVIL CASE NO. 0005,
ANNEX "C". Sclex

III.

THAT RESPONDENT OMB IS TOTALLY WRONG IN NOT FINDING THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE
EXISTS AGAINST RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e), RA No. 3019, AS AMENDED
CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, BEING DOCUMENTARY, IS SO CLEAR AND SO
PLAIN.[8]
The petition must be dismissed. Not only are the charges against respondent ASG de Leon baseless,
they are also misplaced.

In accusing respondent ASG de Leon of malfeasance and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
petitioners would like this Court to believe that respondent ASG de Leon, in representing the Central
Bank in Spec. Proc. 107812 (now CA-GR CV No. 39939) is also defending the interest of Lucio Tan.
Considering that Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005 is a complaint against Lucio Tan filed by the PCGG
through the OSG and includes averments pertaining to the alleged illegal and arbitrary closure of GBTC,
petitioners are convinced that respondent ASG de Leon must be held personally liable for the alleged
inconsistent interest or position taken by the OSG in these two cases.

To be criminally liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, these elements must be present: (1) That the
accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public
officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their
public positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;
(4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties;
and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.[9]

Respondent ASG de Leon, in representing the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No.
39939 was acting in his official capacity as Assistant Solicitor General.[10] As Assistant Solicitor General,
respondent was a member of the legal staff of the OSG tasked to represent the Central Bank, an agency
of the Government, in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-GR CV No. 39939. Based on the records, the case
was originally assigned to Solicitor Nabong, but was re-assigned to respondent who at the time was a
Solicitor, in view of the appointment of Nabong as RTC judge. Xlaw

In defending the validity of the closure of GBTC, respondent ASG de Leon was merely acting in the
interest of the Central Bank, which is the client of OSG. It may be true that a successful defense of the
interest of the Central Bank in said case would also inure to the benefit of the Lucio Tan group. However,
such benefit would just be an incidental result of the position that the government has taken in justifying
the closure of said bank because the approved Liquidation Plan for GBTC provided that the Lucio Tan
group shall purchase all the assets and assume all the liabilities of GBTC and such Liquidation Plan
would be in force upon a judgment upholding the legality of the closure of GBTC. [11] Whatever benefit
the Lucio Tan group would reap upon a favorable judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No.
39939 is but a natural consequence of a successful defense of the actions of the Central Bank in closing
GBTC. Certainly, it cannot be deemed as an act of causing undue injury to a party by giving it
unwarranted benefits or advantage.

We affirm the finding that respondent ASG de Leon cannot be held criminally liable for violating Section 3
(e) of RA 3019. In defending the Central Bank, respondent was performing his legal duty to defend the
interest of the Government and was merely pursuing the position taken by it. Whatever legal services
respondent ASG de Leon rendered in favor of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV
No. 39939 were made in his official capacity as a member of the legal staff of the OSG. We note that in
all of the pleadings filed by the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, the signature of
respondent ASG de Leon appeared therein as Solicitor and later on as Assistant Solicitor General.
However, it must be noted that these pleadings also bore the signatures of the Solicitor General and other
members of the legal staff of the Office of the Solicitor General.[12]

Hence, the acts of respondent ASG de Leon had the imprimatur of the OSG which had consistently
defended the interest of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939. Four
Solicitor Generals, Estelito Mendoza, Sedfrey Ordoez, Frank Chavez and Raul I. Goco have maintained
the policy of defending the closure of GBTC by the Central Bank and respondent ASG de Leon merely
acted with the other officials of the OSG in representing the State.
To be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the five aforementioned elements must concur. In the
absence of proof that respondent ASG de Leon acted with manifest partiality in pursuing the official stand
of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, respondent ASG de Leon cannot be liable
under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Thus, the failure of petitioners to prove the fifth element is fatal to their
cause.

Petitioners harp on the alleged conflicting positions of respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc. No.
107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 and in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. However, the records fail to
disclose the nature and extent of respondent ASG de Leons participation in Sandiganbayan Civil Case
No. 0005. What has been set in detail is the participation of respondent ASG de Leon in Spec Proc. No.
107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939. Assuming arguendo that respondent ASG de Leon participated in these
two cases, this Court cannot hold him personally liable. The perceived inconsistent positions are the
official positions taken by his office as the principal law office and legal defender of the Government.[13]

Petitioners have already raised the issue of "inconsistent positions" of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No.
107812 and Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005 with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 033642
(Appeal of the Central Bank from the decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch IV in Spec. Proc. No.
107812).

In CA-G.R. CV No. 033642, petitioners sought to have then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez cited in
contempt and subjected to disciplinary action for said inconsistency. In upholding the position of Solicitor
General Chavez, the Court of Appeals stated in its Resolution dated July 19, 1988: Sc

The second ground in support of the motion for contempt may have some basis per se, that is, appellants
counsel espouses two inconsistent positions or interests: the first, in favor of Central Bank and Lucio Tan,
which is the position taken in the case at bar, and the second, in favor of the Republic but against Lucio
Tan and his cohorts in the Civil Case before the Sandiganbayan. The situation of the appellants counsel
may therefore be likened to one whose choice is between the devil and the deep blue sea.

Still and all, we are not ready to condemn appellants counsel because of the fix in which he found
himself. On the contrary, we might commiserate with him. He is under the payroll of the State and he
represents the State sometimes through its instrumentality like the Central Bank and its officials, as in the
instant case. In other words, the State in both cases has knowingly allowed counsel to represent it, and
for this reason, the latter may not be held in contempt and subjected to any disciplinary action.[14]

This Court agrees that even the Solicitor General cannot be personally liable for the predicament he
found himself in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. Basic to a prosecution
under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is that public officers must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence in performing his legal duty. We find no reason to disturb the ruling
of respondent Totanes that there was no prima facie case against respondent ASG de Leon. The
perceived conflict of interest or position undertaken by the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV
No. 39939 and in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005 should be addressed to the OSG or the Solicitor
General in particular.

Furthermore, in Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, we ruled that the "courts cannot interfere with the discretion
of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense
charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if
he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if the
complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form."[15] Scmis

The power of the Ombudsman to determine the merits of a complaint is mandated by the Constitution and
courts should not interfere in the exercise thereof. There is also a practical reason behind this rule, to wit:

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the
courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitioners assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much
the same was that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[16]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED.