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The origins of Al Qaeda as an organisation are borne out of the defensive Jihad, orchestrated
by the United States and other Western stakeholders in response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1980 (Kepel, G. 2003). It was during this time that Osama Bin Laden, who
many believe to be the founder of Al Qaeda, first came under the influence of Dr. Abdullah
Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian Scholar and leader of the anti-Soviet Jihad. Osama Bin Laden
himself, is the son of wealthy Saudi Arabia based construction family. Following his
upbringing and education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden became involved in
funding and recruitment activities for the Jihad campaign. It was as part of these activities
that Bin Laden was introduced to, and adopted Dr. Azzam as a mentor (START, 2013).
Bin Laden subsequently established what is referred to today as Al Qaeda, (but at the time
was more commonly known as the Afghan Arab Mujahideen), in the late 1980s in support
of the Jihad. However, following the Soviet withdrawal, Bin Laden used his knowledge,
contacts and funds to reorganise Al Qaeda, and turn its attentions to Islams perceived
enemies in the Western World.
According to its Twitter account, Al Qaeda is working to expel the infidels from the lands of
the Faithful, unite Muslims and create a new Islamic Caliphate (Twitter 2013). Whether this
social media account is genuine or not remains to be seen. However, there is no question that
this statement summarises its aims and objectives. According to the National
Counterterrorism Centre (2013), the aim of Al Qaeda is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate,
meaning a theocracy founded on absolute with Quranic Law (University of St. Andrews
Terrorism Glossary, 2010). A further aim of the group is to unite Muslims globally in violent
opposition to the United States and Israel, as well as overthrowing existing Islamic regimes
that in the view of Al-Qaeda are subservient to the needs and values of the Western World.
When in 1998, Al Qaeda announced its World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and
Crusaders, the Group made a rallying call to all Muslims to kill US citizens, whether military
or civilian, as well as their allies everywhere.
The Global Security Organisation, in its overview of Al Qaeda (Al-Qaida / Al-Qaeda (The
Base) (2013), notes that following the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon
Buildings on 11th September 2011, the United States of America established the US Patriot
Act and declared a Global war on Terror. The aim of this campaign was to destroy Al Qaeda
strongholds in Afghanistan, who were resident and operating in the country as guests of the
Taliban Regime. During the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan, New York Times
Reports discovered a statement in an Al Qaeda safe house. The statement was entitled Goals
and Objectives of Jihad and set out three main objectives, being: a) Establishing the rule of
God on Earth, b) Attaining Martyrdom in the cause of God, and c) Purification of the
ranks of Islam from the elements of depravity. The same article also refers to a 1998
statement made by Al Qaeda Leaders urging Muslims to kill Americans (including civilians),
and their allies (and helpers). In fact the statement uses the term helpers of Satan.
The BBC (2013) summarises the aims and Objectives of Al Qaeda as the 'vengeance for
wrongs against Islam by the West', the reshaping of the Muslim World, and the
vanquishing of Americans and non-Muslims from Saudi Arabia. The BBC further notes
that Al Qaeda has drawn increased support and sympathy for these aims and objectives as a
result of US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as it's continued support of the
Israel States perceived illegal occupation of Palestinian lands.
According to Gunaratna (2005), prior to the death of Osama Bin Laden, the ideology of Al
Qaeda was driven by Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri, who was also regarded as the movements
principle strategist. Of course, Dr. Al Zawahiri is now recognised as the overall leader of the
movement since the death of Osama Bin Laden and continues to steer the groups ideology.
Influenced by this and similar teachings, Zawahiri shaped the Al Qaeda ideological view that
the United States and Israel are leading a Global conspiracy against Islam and Muslims,
including fury at the American military, political and economic presence in the Arabian
Peninsula, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, home to the Holy sites.
As part of the Fatwa that Zawahiri made in 1998, he declared war on Infidels and Muslim
apostates. This was underlined by Bin Laden who mentioned as specific targets the US,
Jews, Christians and their agents. Of particular concern to Bin Laden was the US Military
presence in Saudi Arabia at the ruling families invitation. This compelled Bin Laden to
again call a defensive Jihad in reaction to this perceived invasion of these Holy lands
(Gunaratna, 2005).
In this regard there are also accusations by Al Qaeda against what they call false Muslim
Regimes, (Weinburg, L.) particularly Saudi Arabia as referenced above, but also Egypt under
previous ruler Hosni Mubarak, among others in the GCC Region. Al Qaeda sees these
Regimes as vehicles for the spread of American and Western influence in the Muslim World,
and as such its ideology is that of returning to a straight path of Religious adherence and
Sharia Law as thrived during and after the lifetime of the Prophet Mohammed.
Weinburg goes on to note that in the early days of its formation, ideological disagreement
had occurred between Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda cofounder Abdullah Yusuf Azzam,
with the latter unsupportive of Bin Ladans shift to the use of terror to advance its cause.
This dispute ended in November 1989 with Azzams assassination.
According to Mohammed Bin Hassan (2012), ideology is absolutely critical to the success
and progress of Al Qaeda as an organisation or even a brand. Al Qaeda presents its image and
ideology to Muslims around the World as representing true Islam and a return to Islams
true values as communicated in the Quran. To this end, promotion of the organisations
Leadership of Al Qaeda
Following the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, within weeks Al Qaeda had announced a
new leader in the form of Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahari, and at the same time renewed its vow to
continue Jihad against America, Israel and their allies. Of Egyptian origin, Al-Zawahari
(originally an eye surgeon by profession) had previously been involved in the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad movement (BBC, 2013).
According to the UKs MI5 (Military Intelligence) Service (2013), whilst there remains in
place a core of Al Qaedas Pre-9/11 Leadership, this core has been negatively effected by the
Global campaign against terror. Nevertheless, the organisation continues to recruit and plan
terrorist attacks.
Structure of Al Qaeda
Little may be truly known about the true structure of Al Qaeda. Some believe that it is a
highly sophisticated organisation with a clear command and control structure from the top
down, whilst others assert that it is not an organisation at all, but rather a brand umbrella
under which a plethora of smaller but ideologically related terrorist organisations are grouped
(MI5, 2013).
MI5 however takes the view that Al Qaeda is actually a movement rather than an
organisation, and operates more as a network of networks, comprising a Leadership Core,
officially linked networks with shared ideologies, and inspired unofficially linked networks or
cells.
Strategies of Al Qaeda
The Impact of the Ideology of Al Qaeda on its structure, strategy, targets and tactics
What impact has Al Qaedas ideology had upon its structure? Jason Burke, in his (2004)
article Think Again: Al Qaeda, states that Al Qaeda is in fact NOT an organisation and is in
fact purely an ideological movement. Burke goes on to say that Al Qaeda is more lethal in
this sense than an overly structured organisation, as whether or not Bin Laden is around; it
will continue to attract supporters for many years to come. Though written in 2004, Burkes
thinking has possibly been validated since the killing of Bin Laden, whose vacuum was
quickly filled.
Al Qaeda claims of its structure, that it is not based on individuals (Hassan, M, 2012), but
rather upon the ideas that its followers believe. Also, as this ideology embraces the Islamic
concept of Martyrdom, Al Qaeda takes the view that the struggle will continue in perpetuity
until its aims are reached, meaning that for every leader or follower that is killed there are
many others who are willing to follow and embrace this struggle. Also, as mentioned earlier
(MI5, 2013), Al Qaedas structure (both since evolving from the Afghan-Soviet campaign,
and the commencement of the Global War on Terror) has shifted significantly into numerous
cells and networks of cells that are not always under the direct control and commend of Al
Qaeda, but do however fully or partially share its ideologies. This in turn creates a complex
web of terrorist cells and supporting operations that give Al Qaeda an unprecedented Global
reach, with increasingly unpredictable strategies and tactics. Effectively, Al Qaeda acts as a
franchise providing monetary and logistical support to likeminded organisations, as well as
Hassan (2012), goes on to say that this concept of ideology rather individuals is also crucial to
its recruitment campaigns and training regimes, using the defensive Jihad as a call to arms for
Muslims across the World and the subsequent ideological indoctrination as part of training.
In terms of Al Qaedas targets and tactics selection, its ideology makes it clear that whilst the
Military assets of the Americans and their allies are to be targeted, that civilians are also to be
targeted. As such, and in tandem with an increasing Global Counterterrorism capability
around military installation and assets, as well as critical infrastructure, this may drive Al
Qaeda toward softer and available targets to continue its campaign (Hoffman, B. (2011)).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) claims that Al Qaedas tactics have grown steadily
more complex since 9/11 and may continue to so. Whilst this is primarily the result of the
destruction of the organisations base in Afghanistan, its ideology remains consistent and
lends itself to the changing tactics we have seen in terms of small cells, using suicide
bombings, lone wolf attacks Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and vehicle borne IEDs
(VBIEDs) targeting soft objectives that strike at the heart of the economies of its enemies and
create optimum terror.
Considering the future of Al Qaedas ideology, Burke is less clear. He reiterates the point that
Al Qaedas greatest success by far is the spread far and wide of the organisations radical
Islamic message and the Global call to defensive-Jihad.
However, we should also not forget that many of the underlying issues between Islam and the
West remain, despite the events of recent years (Burke, 2011). In this regard Burke argues
that the future is as much in the hands of the Untied States and its allies reaction to the
changing Arab World, as it does with the Al Qaeda network. Burke (2012) predicts that the
most likely future threat scenario (from Al Qaeda) is the continuation of low level violence,
and a shifting threat playing out across the fringes of the Islamic World and Islamic
Communities globally.
Following the destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York City, and the Pentagon in
Washington DC in September 2001, Bin Laden is credited with stating my life or death does
not matter. The awakening has started. Burke notes (2011) that it may in fact be another 10
years before we can analyse if he was correct.
Given the above, how does the United States respond to the evolving threat? Hassan (2012)
suggests that given that Al Qaeda is based on ideology rather than individuals, then the best
way to combat the threat is by combating the ideology itself through a focussed counter-
ideological strategy.
Terrorist Organization Profile Al Qaida (2013), National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism [WWW]. Available from
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp
?id=6 [Accessed 14/03/2013]
Hoffman, B., (2012) Current and future trends in terrorism - Terrorism Studies, A
Reader (page 392) - New York and London: Routledge
Hoffman, B., Global ECCO Al Qaidas Strategies (2011) [WWW]. Available from
https://globalecco.org/en_GB/ctx-v1n1/alqaeda-strategy#All [Accessed 14/03/2013]
Burke, J., Foreign Policy - Think Again: Al Qaeda (2004) [WWW]. Available from
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/05/01/think_again_al_qaeda [Accessed
14/03/2013]
OBrien, L., Federal Bureau of Investigation - The Evolution of Terrorism Since 9/11
[WWW]. Available from http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-
enforcement-bulletin/september-2011/the-evolution-of-terrorism-since-9-11
[Accessed 14/03/2013]
Burke, J., Osama bin Laden's death: What now for al-Qaida? - The Guardian (2011)
[WWW]. Available from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/02/osama-bin-laden-future-of-al-
qaida [Accessed 14/03/2013]