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#1 Medalla vs. Sayo December 1988 at 3 pm.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro


103 Phil. 587 submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm of 2 December 1988 while
petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were
FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr, is the chief of
not allowed to participate in the bidding because their
clinics of the Caloocan City general Hospital, Caloocan city.
documents were considered late, having been submitted after
Private respondent Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident
Physician thereat. When the position of assistant, hospital the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December,
administrator of the Caloocan City general hospital became petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman
vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan and PBAC members, claiming that although they submitted their
city mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept
appointed, as assistant hospital administrator private respondent them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a
Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr.
restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding
Medalla, Jr, Protested Dr. Mackay designation and subsequent
appointment alleging among others that, chief of clinics, he and awarding the project. On 16 December, defendants filed a
(Medalla) was next-in-rank, the then acting city Mayor Virgililo P. motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court
Robles, who succeeded former mayor, now Assemblyman was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary
Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th endorsement dated September injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by PD No.
20,1978, sustained Mackay appointment state that as of April 18, 1818, which provides: Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall
1978 when Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to assistant
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order in any case,
hospital administrator from his previous position of Resident
dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project of
Physician, he was next in rank to the said higher position by
reason of his having completed all academic requirements for the government to prohibit any person or persons, entity or
the certificate in Hospital administration contrary to the claim of government official from proceeding with, or continuing the
Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978. execution or implementation of any such project Plaintiffs
argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that
ISSUE: Whether or not that appointment of Dr. Honorato G. while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and
Mackay as assistant hospital Administrator is valid
separate existence and was not part of the national government
or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818
HELD: when a presidential act is challenged before the court of
justice, it is not to be implied there from that the executive is were applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal
being made subject and subordinate to courts the legality of his government project, not one tainted with anomalies like the
acts are under judicial review, not because the executive is project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining
inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the chief order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It
executive himself, and the court seek only to interpret, apply or declared that the building sought to be constructed was an
implement it a judicial review of the President decision of a case
infrastructure project of the government falling within the
of an employee decided by the civil service board of appeals
should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the coverage of PD 1818.
courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the
judicial review of all administrative act of all administrative ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government
officer. The court may always examine into the exercise of power instrumentality such that it would necessarily fall under the
by a ministerial officer to the extent of determining whether it is prohibition in PD 1818.
a legal power that could have been granted to him and whether
it has been exercised in a legal manner. And under the civil
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
service section 19 (3) of the civil service PD no. 807 the
recruitment of selection of employees for promotion is drawn instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of
from the nix-in-rank. the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
#2 Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
et al. through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered
GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992 institutions, and GOCCs. The same Code describes a chartered
institution thus: Chartered Institutionrefers to any agency
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by
Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a objectives. This includes state universities and colleges, and the
Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above
day for submission of pre-qualification requirements (PRE-C1) definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened on 12 covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent that the present

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controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of
administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San
What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural Pedro, Laguna. In her complaint, private respondent Almeida
rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed properties,
not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-
committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies in adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other
the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was heirs were disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera
not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the
preliminary injunction should not have been denied. decision of the Office of the President was already final and
executory. The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June
#3 National Housing Authority vs Almeida 525 SCRA 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of
383 Adjudicatory Powers Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that
the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the
FACTS: On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA)
case involving "title and possession to real property within its
awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are
jurisdiction." The case was then remanded for further
part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna.The records
proceedings on the merits. On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial
show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-
Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the
Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca
NHA and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the
Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and
subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of
left heirs. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27,
sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void.
1971.On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-
was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property
Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative,
which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said
being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also
document must first be submitted to probate before it can
claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita
transfer property. Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca
Herrera. The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a
Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration which
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed
were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both
by Margarita Herrera. The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 28, 2003, the Court
Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
On December 29, 1980, a decision on the case questioning the
Deed of Self-Adjudication was rendered and the deed was ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of the NHA and the
declared null and void. During trial on the merits of the case decision of the Office of the President have attained finality, and
assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an if so, whether or not the principle of administrative res judicata
application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting bars the court from further determining who between the parties
therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her has preferential rights for award over the subject lots
mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado, protested the application. In a Resolution dated RULING: Yes. Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower
February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But
Francisca Herrera. Private respondent Almeida appealed to the jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res
Office of the President. The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once
Office of the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987. On judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to
February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or
extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction
NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. The NHA as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . It
executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
Herrera and titles were issued in their favor. Thereafter, the heirs invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the
of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error
the premises that she was occupying. Feeling aggrieved by the or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res
decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the judicata. To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful
NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply
cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood

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as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof must be adhered to by the parties by reason of policy. RATIO: A
and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it
defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have renders decisions or awards that determine the rights of
been conferred. the rule prescribing that "administrative orders adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same
cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an express binding effect as a judgment of a court of law, such that when
statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of they attain finality, they have the effect of res judicata that even
quasi-judicial agencies. In fine, it should be remembered that the courts of justice have to respect.
quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial
power that which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is #4 SPS Vicente and Gloria Manalo V Roldan Confessor
defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative
FACTS: Petitioners sued private respondents for illegal exaction,
agency for the "formulation of a final order." This function false advertisement and violation of other pertinent labor laws,
applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public rules and regulations. In its May 7, 1990 Order, POEA suspended
administrative officers or bodies who are required to investigate the authority of Career Planners Specialists International, Inc.
facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw (CAREER), for four months for illegal exaction or in lieu thereof, a
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to fine of P 40,000.00 was imposed plus restitution of P 28,714.00 to
petitioner spouses, meted on respondent therein Filipino
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However, administrative
Manpower Services Inc. (FILMAN), also a fine of P 40,000.00 for
agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The
misrepresentation, and reiterated its perpetual disqualification
doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers from recruitment activities. However the POEA reversed itself on
into its three (3) branchesthe legislative, the executive, and the the penalty imposed on illegal exaction reasoning that clear and
judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and convincing evidence was necessary to justify the suspension of
supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive the authority/license of CPSI. On appeal, Undersecretary
department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of Confessor sustained POEA in reversing itself and held that the
charge of illegal exaction should be supported by other
one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the
corroborative circumstantial evidence and denied the motion for
expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to
reconsideration of the petitioners as well.
"determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of ISSUES: 1. What evidence is necessary to establish administrative
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part findings of fact?
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Courts 2. Whether or not the failure of the petitioners to state
have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the in their testimonies the exact date of payment of the recruitment
resolution of societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of fee is to be considered?
3. Whether or not POEA committed grave abuse of
Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other
discretion in reversing its decision?
branches of government committed an act that falls under the RULINGS: 1. Only substantial evidence is required to establish
category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or administrative findings of fact. This holds true even if the
excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or determination may result in the suspension of authority or
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 where it is therein license to operate a particular line of business and will not justify
provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of requiring a higher degree of proof.
2. NO. What is important is that peso bills were
Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
delivered to and received by respondent-spouses. Further stated,
all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of
with the payment of a check for P10, 000.00, charge of unlawful
the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies, exaction was clearly established since according to the POEA
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling only P 3,000.00 was legally chargeable.
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with 3. YES. In this case, public respondent reversed the
the Constitution." and contends that the Regional Trial Court has penalty, not on the basis that one version is more believable than
no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA. Well-within the other, but that the testimonies of complainants, after
describing them to be more convincing that respondents
its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28,
stand and which inspired belief, were not clear and convincing.
2003, already ruled that the issue of the trial court's authority to
Thus, to that extent, public respondents committed grave abuse
hear and decide the instant case has already been settled in the of discretion correctable by certiorari.
decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has
become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of
judgment dated October 10, 1989). We find no reason to disturb
this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies.
The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused
to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment. The
appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which

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#5 Republic v Malabanan question of fact. Republic of the Philippines vs. Angelo B.
Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010
WAY LAIN

#6 Industrial Enterprises Inc V CA


Appeal; modes of appeal from decisions of regional
trial court. In Murillo v. Consul, we had the opportunity to clarify Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit:
(1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, Facts:
where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating
RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) by petition for
contract by the Bureau of Energy Development (BED), for the
review under Rule 42, where judgment was rendered by the RTC
exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the
in the exercise ofappellate jurisdiction; and (3) by petition for
Ministry of Energy for another to contract for the additional three
review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first
coal blocks.
mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque
to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed
and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its
Supreme Court only on questions of law. rights and interests to MMIC.

XXX XXX XXX IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against
the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before
Here, petitioners appeal does not only involve a question of law.
the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the
Aside from the trial courts ruling that it has no jurisdiction over
coal blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed
the complaint, petitioner likewise questioned the other basis for
for that the rights for the operation be granted back.
the trial courts ruling, which refers to previously decided cases
allegedly upholding with finality the ownership of
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant
Malabanans over the disputed property. As correctly argued by because they have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed
petitioner, the question of whether the ownership of the
Malabanans has in fact been sustained with finality is factual in Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and
nature as it requires the presentation of evidence. Since the MMIC.
appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be
RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the
imputed on petitioner for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of
reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.
the CA through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no


jurisdiction over the matter.
Question of law distinguished from question of fact. And in
Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?
Leoncio v. De Vera, this Court has differentiated a question of law
from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands
on the given set ofcircumstances. Once it is clear that the issue and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would
one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or be in line with the integrated national program for coal-
of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party development and with the objective of rationalizing the country's
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 4 of 27


Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial September 24, 1913. On October 16, 2002, the petitioner filed a
Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal- complaint for Quieting of title against respondent Sitio Sto. Nio
operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due Residents Association Inc. (SSNRAI), Nilda Devilleres and the
lands management Bureau (LMB)
course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks.
These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the fraud had been committed in
securing such title.
2. Whether or not the ground of litis pendentia and
forum shopping insofar as SP
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the
Civil No. 02-237 is concerned are applicable
doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters
that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. HELD: The director of lands original certificate of title over the
It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of same authority of the director of lands to investigate conflicts
a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also over public and is derived from section 91 of the Public land act.
judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its In fact, it is not merely his right but his specific duties to conduct
investigations of alleged fraud in securing patents and the
determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
corresponding title. While title issued on the basis of a patent is
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical
as indefeasible as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility is
matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief not a bar to an investigation by the director of lands as to how
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is investigations to determine whether or not fraud had been
within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of committed in securing such title, in order that the appropriate
primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally action for reversion may be filed by the government. As a rule
then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
properly falling within the powers of the LMB. The court ruled
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, that the petitioner action was barred by the pendency of the
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special proceedings before the LMB for litis pendentia to lie; the
competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial following requisites must be satisfied 1.) Identity of parties or
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the representation in both cases; 2.) Identity of rights asserted and
administrative body for its view" relief prayed for; 3.) The relief must be founded on the same
facts and the same basis and identity of the two preceding
Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be
rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
this case since the question of what coal areas should be
successful, amount to res judicata on the action under
exploited and developed and which entity should be granted
consideration. To determine whether a party violated the rule
coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements
determination by the BED as the administrative agency in of litis pendentia are present or whether final judgment in one
possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The case will amount to res judicata in pendentia barred the filing of
Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters SP Civil Action No. 02-237, the RTC correctly dismissed the same
concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, on the additional ground of forum sopping.
development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These
#8 Villaflor v CA
issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the
courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory
FACTS: The case is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an
reversal of the CAs order affirming the dismissal by the lower
administrative agency. court of petitioners complaint against Private Respondent
Nasipit Lumber Co., Incorporated.
#7 Sherwill Development V Sitio Sto. Nino
The synopsis of the case is as follows:

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the


order of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa city, Branch 205 The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one
dismissing civil action no. 02-237 on the ground of litis pendentia hundred forty (140) hectares to four (4) different owners in 1940.
any forum shopping. The petitioner Sherwill development The land was part of the public domain, but the petitioners
corporation is the registered owner of two farce of land in predecessor in interest over which he acquired the property,
Muntinlupa, Rizal. Lot 88 is covered by transfer of certificate of have been in open, exclusive and notorious possession of the
title no. 131918 consisting of 8,774 square meters while lot 86, same for sometime. After acquisition, petitioner asserts exclusive
with an area of 16,766 square meters, is covered by TCT no. rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.
131919 both lots form part of the Muntinlupa estate, while the
title thereon were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on
ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 5 of 27
In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with thereof was merely based on speculations, surmises and
respondent Nasipit Lumber Co. Inc. However, an Agreement for conjectures. The petitioners claim of ownership and rights over
the Relinquishment of Rights was entered into by both parties in the property was negated by proof that he ceded the same to
1950. The respondent having complied all the requirements the respondent by virtue of an Agreement on the
agreed upon, assumed ownership and possession of the Relinquishment of Rights which they have executed. The
property since then. Respondent corporation likewise filed a petitioner insistence that the court erred in affirming his cause is
sales application in 1950 over the property to bolster his claim misplaced. The finding of the court and the agency which acquire
which the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the same year as primary jurisdiction over the petition, was accorded great weight
proof of an Order of Award issued. by the court.

In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, As to the prohibition that xxxx corporation or association may
questioned and made several collateral and extraneous claims not hold alienable land of public domain except for lease not to
against the respondent. However, the Bureau of Lands dismissed exceed one thousand hectares, that court declared that xxx
the claim, arguing that petitioner no longer has any substantial where the applicant had, before the Constitution took effect, fully
rights to question the validity of acquisition of the respondent complied with all this obligations under the Public Land Act in
and the subsequent issuance of free patent by the Bureau of order to entitle him to a Sales patent, there would be no legal or
Lands. equitable justification for refusing to issue or release the sales
patent. The requirements for a sales application under the Public
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at the Land Act for a corporation to acquire ownership of public
Ministry of Natural Resources which likewise dismissed the domain, was essentially complied upon by the respondent, hence
petition. On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint in the trial no disqualification exist not to extend and validly issued the
court for "Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed of confirmation of title over the land in question to the respondent
Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two corporation.
parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages" at about
the same time that he appealed the decision of the Minister of All told, the only disqualification that can be imputed to private
Natural Resources to the Office of the President. respondent is the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against
the holding of alienable lands of the public domain by
On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioners heir substituted corporations. However, this Court settled the matter, declaring
in his behalf to pursue the claim. The trial court in Butuan City
that said constitutional prohibition had no retroactive effect and
who initially take cognizance of the case ordered the case
could not prevail over a vested right to the land. Application for
dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted the due
execution and genuineness of the contract and was estopped patent for and in behalf of Nasipit has clearly no impediment, for
from proving its nullity, (2) the verbal lease agreements were they have proven satisfactory compliance of the requirements of
unenforceable under Article 1403 (2) (e) of the Civil Code, and (3) the law. Petition is DISMISSED.
his causes of action were barred by extinctive prescription and/or
laches. The heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered #9 Machete V CA
judgment of dismissal by uphelding the lower courts ruling.
Facts:
Not satisfied, petitioner's heirs filed the instant petition for
review which the court granted, hence this petition. Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of back
rentals and damages before the RTC of Tagbilaran City
Issues against herein petitioners. The alleged facts are:

1) That parties entered into a leasehold agreement regarding


Whether or not the petitioner still has cause of action to
private respondents landholdings and herein petitioners shall
pursue claim of ownership over the property since his
pay a certain amount or percentage of their harvest.
rights thereon was already transferred and relinquished
to the respondent by virtue of the Deed executed
2) That herein petitioners failed to pay their respective rental
thereon; and
despite repeated demands of private respondent.

Whether or not the private respondent corporation is 3) That petitioner moved to the dismissal of the case on the
qualified to acquire ownership over the land of public ground, of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
domain. arguing that the instance case is an agrarian dispute and
therefore within the jurisdiction of Department of Agrarian
Ruling and Reform Adjudication Board.

The petition is bereft of merit. The court ruled that the petitioner Issue:
no longer has a cause of action to demand declaration of nullity
over the rights conferred to respondents since his claimed

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 6 of 27


1 Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over cases for collection Lanuza, Jr., who was the Assistant Fiber Regional Administrator,
of back rentals from leasehold tenants. was designated Office-In-Charge of FIDA Region I.

Ruling: On December 9, 1987, Agda prepared an Urgent Petition to Stop


Implementation and Nullify Special Order No. 219 in order to file
1 The court held that collection of back rentals from leasehold
it with the offices of the Civil Service Commission, the Secretary
tenants is within the jurisdiction of DARAB and the SC defined
of the Department of Agriculture, and the Commission on Audit.
agrarian dispute as any controversy relating to tenural
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or The petition alleged that:
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farm workers associations or 1) Special Order No. 219 is devoid of legal basis as it does
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, not preserve and maintain a status quo before the
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such controversy.
tenurial agreements. However, Sec. 56 of RA 6657 confers 2) It is against the interest of public service considering
special jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts which are RTC that Epitacio Lanuza has been cited for two cases both
designated by the SC, regarding petitions for the involving dishonest, abuse of privileges, and character
determination of just compensation and prosecution of unbecoming a government official.
criminal offense under Act. 16. 3) It is improper, inappropriate, and devoid of moral
justification.
4) It is a violation of Civil Service rules and regulation,
The SC furthered averred that failure to pay back rentals
considering that it violates the rule on nepotism since
pursuant to leasehold contract is an issue which is clearly
Epitacio Lanuza and Administrator Lanuza are cousins.
beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to Within the period starting December 14, 1987 up to January 21,
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve controversy the
1988, Agda personally indorsed his petition to the Civil Service
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. Commission and the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture.

On January 7, 1988, petitioner Teotico, as Acting Administrator of


#10 JOAQUIN M. TEOTICO (Petitioner) Vs. DEMOCRITO FIDA issued a Memorandum to Agda, directing him to
O. AGDA, SR. and HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG immediately submit his development programs for Region 1 for
(Respondents) the years 1988 to 1993 and his proposals concerning the
potentials for sericulture and the maguey industry in the Region.
THE CASE:
On January 12, 1988, Agda returned the Memorandum to
The case is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition, Teotico, with the comment that the submission of the required
which assails the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, proposals be deferred since Special Order No. 219 had re-
Metro Manila. assigned him to FIDA Central Office. He suggested, however,
that if compliance is imperative, Special Order No. 219 should be
reconsidered and set aside.

THE FACTS:
On March 2, 1988, Teotico issued another Memorandum to
Agda, informing him that although Special Order No. 219
On January 2, 1984, Honorable Cesar Lanuza, then Administrator
instructed him to report to the Office of the Administrator, he
of the Fiber Development Authority (FIDA), an agency of the
has neither been seen nor officially heard from during the past
Department of Agriculture, appointed private respondent
several weeks. Agda was directed to submit an official
Democrito Agda as Chief Fiber Development Officer of the FIDA
clarification on his whereabouts and accomplishments for the
effective upon assumption of office. However, this appointment
past three weeks.
did not indicate any specific station or place of assignment.

Agda replied by reminding Teotico that his urgent Petition to


On January 2, 1984, Administrator Lanuza designated Agda as
stop the implementation of Special Order No. 219 is still
Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II.
unresolved, and that this should be held in abeyance. He also
On November 13, 1987, through Special Order No. 219, informed Teotico that the former was always present at the
Administrator Lanuza temporarily re-assigned Agda at the main office, as evidence by the office logbook.
office of the Administrator to perform special functions which
On March 9, 1988, FIDA Region I OIC, Mr. Seguritan, requested
may be assigned to him. The Administrators cousin, Mr. Epitacio
Teotico to require Agda to turn over to the former, the keys of

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 7 of 27


the vault in FIDA Region I, for the safekeeping of checks, receipts, THE ISSUES:
and other vital official documents of the Region. However, Agda
asserted that he will not yield the key of the safety vault to 1) Whether or not the respondent RTC Judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered
anybody, since the implementation of Special Order No. 219 s
petitioner to reinstate respondent Agda to his
still unresolved, on the contention that he may be re-assigned to
previous position as Fiber Regional Administrator of
Region I.
FIDA Region I with full back-wages, and allowances
Due to the failure of Agda to surrender the key of the safety notwithstanding that such fact was not mandated or
even mentioned in the prohibitory injunctive writ.
vault, Teotico formally charged Agda for insubordination and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and his
2) Whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave
failure to comply with the memorandum. Teotico also placed
abuse of discretion when he refused to dismiss
Agda under preventive suspension and administrative
respondents petition in the civil case, despite his
investigation. The latters salary was withheld.
finding that respondent has already availed of an
administrative remedy which is pending resolution
Thus, Agda filed with the RTC his Amended Petition for
by the Civil Service Commission.
Certiorary, Prohibition and injunction.

3) Whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave


abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of
THE CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT AGDA: preliminary injunction dated May 11, 1988 without
hearing on the merits.
1) Special Order No. 219 should be declared null and void
for having been issued in violation of the Civil Service
Decree.
THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
2) The act of re-assigning Agda is prohibited since it was
done within three months before an election, and The Supreme Court granted the petition. It set aside the
therefore, a violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Writ of Injunction of the RTC and dismissed the Civil Case
THE CONTENTION OF PETITIONER TEOTICO: filed by Agda.

Teotico filed a motion to dismiss, through the office of the


Solicitor General, alleging the following:
THE BASIS OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING:
1) The petition filed by Agda is premature for failure to
REGARDING THE FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the
exhaust administrative remedies.
2) The said petition patently lacks merit and is merely respondent RTC Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
intended to derail the administrative investigation when he ordered petitioner to reinstate respondent Agda to
against Agda. his previous position as Fiber Regional Administrator of FIDA
Region I with full back-wages, and allowances
notwithstanding that such fact was not mandated or even
mentioned in the prohibitory injunctive writ.
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT:

HELD: Yes. The respondent RTC Judge acted with grave


The RTC issued an Order, which ruled in favor of Agda. It
abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioner to reinstate
ruled that:
Agda to his previous position as Fiber Regional
1) Agda was denied due process of law. Administrator of FIDA Region I.
2) Teotico committed grave abuse of discretion by
whimsical and capricious acts. 1) Agda was not appointed as fiber Regional Administrator
3) Agda be reinstated as Fiber Regional Administrator of FIDA Region I, but as Chief Fiber Development
of FIDA Region I. Officer. He was not appointed to any specific station.
He was merely designated as Acting Regional
Hence, Teotico and his co-respondent filed a motion, which was Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II.
denied by the trial court. It ordered him to comply with its order. 2) Not having been appointed to any specific station, he
Since his motion for preliminary injunction was denied by the could be transferred or assigned to any other place by
trial court, Teotico filed the present petition before the Supreme the head of office where in the opinion of the latter, his
Court. services may be utilized more effectively.

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 8 of 27


3) Temporary appointments or appointments in an acting
capacity are terminable at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. Hence, Agda can neither claim a THE FACTS:
vested right to the station to which he was assigned nor
to security of tenure thereat. On February 14, 1995, Republic Act No. 7875, otherwise known
as An Act Instituting a National Health Insurance Program for all
REGARDING THE SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not Filipinos and Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when Corporation For the Purpose, was approved and signed into law.
he refused to dismiss respondents petition in the civil case,
despite his finding that respondent has already availed of an Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7875, the Chinese General
administrative remedy which is pending resolution by the Hospital had been an accredited health care provider under the
Civil Service Commission. Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC), more popularly
known as Medicare. As defined by R.A. No. 7875, a health care
HELD: Yes. The respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of provider refers to a health care institution, which is duly licensed
discretion when it refused to dismiss respondents petition in and accredited devoted primarily to the maintenance and
the civil case. operation of facilities for health promotion, prevention,
diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from
1) Respondent Judge was fully aware of Agdas urgent
illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of
petition before the Civil Service Commission to suspend
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care.
its implementation of Special Order No. 219 and to
nullify the same. He had, therefore no other business to
Chinese General Hospital (CGH) filed its Medicare claims with the
do except to grant the motion to dismiss. He should
Social Security System (SSS), which, together with the
have, forthwith, stayed his hands until the administrative
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), administered the
processes had been completed.
Health Insurance Fund of the PMMC. Thus, CGH filed its claim
from 1989 to 1992 with the SSS, amounting to P8,102,782.10. Its
REGARDING THE THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not respondent application for the payment of its claim with the SSS was
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a overtaken by the passage of R.A. No. 7875.
writ of preliminary injunction dated May 11, 1988 without
Republic Act No. 7875 provided the following:
hearing on the merits.

1) In Section 51 of the law, it states that all functions and


HELD: Yes. The respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
assets of the Philippine Medical Care Commission shall
discretion when he issued the said writ or preliminary
be merged with those of PHILHEALTH within 60 days
injunction.
from the promulgation to the implementing rules and
regulations, without need for conveyance, transfer or
1) Since the administrative proceedings in the Civil Service
assignment. This includes the liabilities of PMCC.
Commission is still pending, the Judge should not have
2) In Section 52 of the law, it states that Health Insurance
issued an order.
funds being administered by the SSS and GSIS shall be
2) For reasons only known to respondent Judge, he did
transferred to PHILHEALTH within 60 days from the
not prevent himself from taking action. Instead, he
promulgation of the implementing rules and
granted the application for a writ of preliminary
regulations.
injunction and issued it on May 17, 1988.
3) Section 52 also provides rules for payment of claims. It
3) The amended petition filed by Agda should have been
states that all claims for payment of services shall be
dismissed outright because he prematurely invoked the
filed within 60 calendar days from the date of discharge
jurisdiction of the court in view of his appeal to the Civil
of the patient. Failure to do so will bar payment of the
Service Commission.
claim, with the exception of delays in filing the claim
#11 PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION due to natural calamities and other fortuitous events.
(Petitioners) Vs. CHINESE GENERAL HOSPITAL AND
Instead of giving due course to CGHs claims totaling
MEDICAL CENTER (Respondents)
P8,102,782.32, only P1,365,556.32 was paid to it, representing its
THE CASE: claims from 1989 to 1992.

The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the CGH again filed its claims representing services rendered to its
Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. patients from 1998 to 1999, amounting to P7,554,342.93.

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 9 of 27


THE RULING OF PHILHEALTH: HELD: No. The law itself does not provide for any specific
period within which to file PHILHEALTH claims.
Since the filing of these claims was done beyond the 60 day
period allowed by the implementing rules and regulations 1) The period for filing was not per se the principal
under Section 52 of R.A. No. 7875, CGHs claims were denied concern of the legislature.
by the Claims Review Unit of PHILHEALTH on January 12, 2) More important than mere technicalities is the
2000. Such claim was denied with finality by PHIC on June 6, realization of the state policy to provide PHILHEALTH
2000. members with the requisite medical care at the least
possible cost. The fact is that it was not R.A. No. 7875
CGH filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of itself but Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and
Court, with the Court of Appeals. Regulations which established the 60-day cut-off for the
filing of claims.

THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:


REGARDING THE SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the strict
The CA rendered a decision, ordering PHILHEALTH to pay implementation of the 60-day rule on PHILHEALTH claims
the claims in the amount of P14,291,568.71. It ruled that the should be applied.
60-day rule under Section 52 of R.A. No. 7875s
HELD: No. The strict implementation of the 60-day rule on
Implementing Rules and Regulations should be construed
PHILHEALTH claims should not be applied.
liberally in favor of its claimants. Such social services must
be available to all people at affordable costs, pursuant to the 1) While it is doctrinal in administrative law that the rules
policy of a national health program as provided in Section and regulations of administrative bodies interpreting
11, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. the law they are entrusted to enforce have the force of
law, these issuances are by no means iron-clad norms.
Hence, PHILHEALTH filed the present petition before the Administrative bodies themselves can and have in fact
Supreme Court. bent the rules for reasons of public interest.

2) In PHILHEALTH Circular No. 31-A, it is provided that In


THE ISSUES: order to allow members of the National Health
Insurance Program (NHIP) sufficient time to complete
1) Whether or not the law itself provides for any all documents to support their medical care claims,
specific period within which to file PHILHEALTH PHILHEALTH is temporarily suspending the sixty (60)
claims. day reglementary period for filing claims.
2) Whether or not the strict implementation of the 60-
day rules on PHILHEALTH claims should be applied. 3) In PHILHEALTH Circular No. 50, it is provided that To
3) Whether respondent Chinese General Hospital minimize the incidence of late filing of claims due to
(CGH) failed to exhaust administrative remedies members personal difficulties in preparing the needed
before resorting to judicial intervention. documents, PHILHEALTH is extending the period for
filing of claims.

THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: REGARDING THE THIRD ISSUE: Whether respondent Chinese
General Hospital (CGH) failed to exhaust administrative
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
remedies before resorting to judicial intervention.
Appeals. It ordered petitioner PHILHEALTH to pay
respondent Chinese General Hospitals claims representing HELD: No. Respondent Chinese General Hospital (CGH) did
services rendered to its members from 1989 to 1992. not fail to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting
to judicial intervention.
THE BASIS OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING:
1) Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
REGARDING THE FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the law itself
remedies, an administrative decision must first be
provides for any specific period within which to file
appealed to the administrative superiors at the highest
PHILHEALTH claims.
level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for
review.

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 10 of 27


The same charges were subsequently made, also by the said
2) However, this doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages
is conditioned on the peculiar circumstances of a case. against the petitioner, in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
One of the exceptions is when strong public interest is City.
involved. The instant case falls as one of the
exceptions, concerning as it does public interest.
Although they were not made parties to the instant
case, the rights of millions of Filipinos who are members THE CONTENTION OF PETITIONER:
of PHILHEALTH and who obviously rely on it for their
health care, are considered, nonetheless, parties to the Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on three grounds:
present case.
1) The court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
2) The plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative
3) The Supreme Court is mandated herein to take
remedies.
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
3) The injunction sought was expressly prohibited by
the interests of the state, the health care giver and the
Section 1 of PD 605.
members. With these in mind, the Supreme Court held
that the greater interest of the greater number of
people, mostly members of PHILHEALTH, is paramount.
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT:
4) Furthermore, when PHILHEALTHs President and Chief
Executive Officer, Dr. Enrique Zalamea, met with The RTC rendered a decision, which denied the motion to
representatives of Chinese General Hospital, he dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
instructed them to pursue a remedy not sanctioned by subsequently denied. Hence, petitioner filed an appeal before
the rules and not in accord with the rule of exhaustion the Court of Appeals.
of administrative remedies. Hence, PHILHEALTH is
deemed estopped from assailing the instant petition for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies when
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
PHILHEALTH itself, through its President, does not
subscribe to it.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that:
#12 SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. (Petitioner)
1) The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
Vs. HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, ET. AL. (Respondents) not applicable in the present case. Such doctrine could
be dispensed with, when public interest is concerned.
THE CASE: The irregularities that marked the approval of the
concession area that was greater than that of the TLA,
The case is a petition, which assails the decision of the Court of as well as the adverse effects such as erosion, flooding,
Appeals. The CA affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court and silting caused by the logging operations of
of Pagadian City, which decided against petitioner. petitioner, require judicial action on the part of private
respondents.

2) Section 1 of P.D. 605 be declared invalid. The said


THE FACTS: decree provided that no Philippine court shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or preliminary
In 1982, petitioner Sunville Timber Products, Inc., was granted a
injunction in any case growing out of the issuance of
Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove,
permits and other grants in connection with the
and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500
disposition of natural resources of the Philippines.
hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten
(10) year expiring of September 31, 1992. Hence, petitioner filed the present petition before the Supreme
Court.
On July 31, 1987, private respondents Isidro Gilbolingo and
Robustiano Bugtai, filed a petition with the Department of THE ISSUES:
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for the cancellation
1) Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of
of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions
administrative remedies was not correctly applied.
and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 11 of 27


2) Whether or not the declaration by the RTC of HELD: Yes. The declaration by the RTC that Section 1 of P.D.
Section 1 of P.D. 605 as unconstitutional, was 605 as unconstitutional, was improper.
improper.
1) There was no need for the respondent court (RTC) to
declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of P.D. 605.
The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be
THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
avoided where the case can be decided on some other
available ground.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. It reversed and set
2) The resolution of the same question must await another
aside the decision and the resolutions of the RTC.
case, where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial
THE BASIS OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING: inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily
established.
REGARDING THE FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly
applied. #13 Hazel Ma. C. Antolin v. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose
A. Gangan, and Violeta J. Josef
HELD: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not correctly applied in the present case. Facts:

1) The private respondents contended that due to the Petitioner Hazel Antolin took the 1997 CPA Board Exams but
adverse effects of logging, they are exempted from failed, receiving failing grades from four out of seven subjects.
complying with the said doctrine. They also submit that Convinced that she deserved to pass, she wrote to respondent
forestry laws do not required observance of the
Abelardo Domondon, Acting Chairman of the Board of
doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action
Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-
since the issue involves public interest. However, even
corrected. Her answer sheets were shown but these consisted
it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly
merely of shaded marks. She requested for copies of the
require prior resort to administrative remedies, the
questionnaire, their respective answer keys, and an explanation
reasons would suffice to still require its observance.
2) It is in the explicit language of the laws vesting in the of the grading system used in each subject. Respondent denied
DENR the power and function to regulate the the request.
development, disposition, extraction, exploration and
Issue:
use of the countrys forests and to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction in the management and disposition of all
WON Antolin has a right to obtain copies of the examination
lands of the public domain, and in the Forest
papers.
Management Bureau for the enforcement of the
forestry laws and regulations. This clearly implies that
Petitioner:
the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance
on any controversy coming under its express powers Primarily, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with damages
before the courts of justice may intervene. against the Board of Accountancy and its members before the
3) The administrative case against petitioner before the Manila RTC, praying that the court would order the board to
DENR involves factual issues calling for the presentation
furnish her with copies of the examination papers and other
of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best
documents and materials.
evaluated first by the administrative authorities by
employing their specialized knowledge of the TLA and She later amended her petition, pleading a cause of action for
the rues allegedly violated, before the courts may step
the access of the documents requested for. However, the RTC
in to exercise their powers of review.
dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition had
4) The necessity for judicial action cannot be supported
already become moot and academic since she already passed
since petitioner has already stopped its logging
the 1998 CPA Board Exams.
operations since 1988 by reason of the order
suspension of such operations by the DENR.
However, an omnibus order of the trial court reconsidered her
case. The CA, however, ruled that

REGARDING THE SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the (i) the PRC regulation preventing her from gaining access
declaration by the RTC of Section 1 of P.D. 605 as to said documents were valid limitations on petitioners right
unconstitutional, was improper. to information and access to government documents; (ii) that the

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 12 of 27


examination documents were not of public concern; (iii) information on matters of public interest. It is clear that the
it was not the function of the respondents to review and peoples right to information is limited to matters of public
reassess the answers to exam questions of a failing examinee; (iv) concern and subject to such limitations as may be provided by
the case was moot and academic as petitioner already passed law. The Court, nonetheless, conceded that the CPA Board
the 1998 CPA Board Exams; (v) that petitioner failed to exhaust Exams are matters of public concern. The examinees in
administrative remedies, having not elevated the matter to the particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and
PRC before seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner insists she has competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that
the Constitutional right to gain access to said examination only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession.
documents, that she did not need to exhaust administrative
remedies since no recourse to the PRC was available as only a Furthermore, on the issue of mootness, the Court held that the
pure question of law is involved in the case and that her petition petitioners belated passing of the Board Exams does not
was not rendered moot and academic when she passed the 1998 automatically mean that her interest in the examination papers
CPA Board Exams. has become mere superfluity.

Respondents: Lastly, CA erred in ruling that petitioner should have exhausted


administrative Remedies before seeking judicial intervention
Respondent primarily denied the request of petitioner on two because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by an
grounds: first, the PRC rules only permitted access to the administrative officer.
petitioners answer sheet and that reconsideration of rating shall
be effected only on grounds of mechanical error in #14 Merida Waterworks District V. Bacarro (2008)
grading the answer sheets or malfeasance; secondly, he
Lessons Applicable: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, Doctrine of
clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the exam
exhaustion
papers as such act were considered unprofessional by the PRC
resolution. The Board did not find any mechanical error in the
Laws Applicable:
grading of petitioners test papers. Nonetheless, the petitioner
elevated the case to the RTC wherein respondents argue that
FACTS:
petitioner was not entitled for the relief sought, among others.
They also filed to dismiss the petition on damages since (1)
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) the Merida Water District, a government-owned and controlled
petition stated no cause of action as there was no ministerial corporation4 that operates the water utility services in the
duty to release the information demanded, (3) and the municipality of Merida, Leyte conducted a public hearing for the
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern purpose of increasing the water rate
is subject to the limitation set forth by the PRC Resolution No.
338. Also, they added that the petition had become moot and March 7, 2002: Merida Water District received a letter from the
academic since petitioner already passed the 1998 CPA Board Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) that on March 5,
Exams. 2002, the LWUA Board of Trustees, per Board Resolution No. 63,
series of 2002, confirmed Merida Water Districts proposed water
Dispositive Portion: rates.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. September 3, 2002: Merida implemented a water rate increase of
The December 11, 2006 and February 16, 2004 Decisions of the P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption.
Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 76546 and CA-GR SP No.
76498, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. The November February 13, 2003: consumers of Merida Water District, filed a
11, 2002 and January 30, 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Petition for Injunction, etc. because the rates are contrary to the
Court of Manila, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. 98-86881 rate increase agreed upon during the public hearing
are AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court
Merida filed a motion to dismiss (then later motion for
for further proceedings.
reconsideration) with the RTC due to failure to exhaust
Court: administrative remedies under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198,
the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended by P.D.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Section 28, Article 2 of Nos. 768 and 1479 - denied
the Constitution provides that the State may adopt policies in the
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest while Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CA (then later motion
Section 7, Article 3 provides the right of the people to for reconsideration) - denied
ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 13 of 27
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC illegality; and (2) a denial of due process. However, respondents
fail to show that the instant case merits the application of these
ISSUE: W/N there is lack of jurisdiction with the RTC since the exceptions.
primary jurisdiction should belong to the NWRB under P.D. No.
1067. (The NWRB does not exercise exclusive jurisdiction) Jurisprudence affirming the failure to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion due to a denial of due process involves instances
HELD: YES. petition is GRANTED when the party seeking outright judicial intervention was denied
the opportunity to be heard. Here, respondents admit that
Merida Water District conducted a public hearing. . The existence
petitioners failed to cite any law which impliedly grants the of a hearing for this purpose renders the allegation of a denial of
NWRB original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve a dispute due process without merit. The failure of the respondents to
regarding the increase of water rates. A grant of exclusive show that the instant case falls within the exceptions to the
jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of a statute in doctrine of exhaustion necessitates in the due observance of
the absence of a clear legislative intent to that effect. An exhausting the proper administrative remedies before seeking
administrative agency with quasi-judicial power is a tribunal of judicial intervention.
limited jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction should be interpreted in
strictissimi juris." #15 SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP v CEMENT
MANUFACTURERS
The doctrine of exhaustion does not apply when jurisdiction is
exclusive. An administrative agencys exclusive jurisdiction over a Facts: The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
certain dispute renders the courts without jurisdiction to whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure
adjudicate the same at that stage. The doctrine of exhaustion notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission.
After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so
applies "where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an
under the SMA, the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision
administrative agency alone; judicial intervention is withheld until
wherein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the
the administrative process has run its course. To cite Abe-Abe v. conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time,
Manta as the authority to support the allegation that the NWRB ultimately denying Philcemcors application for safeguard
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light
water rate increase is a strained construction of this Courts of the Tariff Commissions negative findings. Philcemcor
pronouncements. Thus, petitioners contention that the RTC has challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
no jurisdiction because the NWRB has original and exclusive
Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the
jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the increase of water rates Tariff Commissions Report. It prayed that the Court of Appeals
is clearly without merit. direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render
judgment independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued that
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff
becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous
methodology. The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in
other departments. The theory is that the administrative
a Decision penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Elvi
authorities are in a better position to resolve questions
John Asuncion, partially granted Philcemcors petition. The
addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for
by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. While it
superiors if given a chance to do so It may be added that strict refused to annul the findings of the Tariff Commission, it also
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings
considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would of the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely
recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretarys
burden their heavily loaded dockets.
discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is
to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on
Although the doctrine of exhaustion does not preclude in all
the Tariff Commissions recommendation. On 23 June 2003,
cases a party from seeking judicial relief, cases where its
Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court
observance has been disregarded require a strong showing of of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the
the inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably
harm. Respondents justify their failure to observe the with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff
administrative process on the following exceptions to the Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: (1) patent warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are
binding upon the DTI Secretary. Despite the fact that the Court
ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 14 of 27
of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
was cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the appellate have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his
deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued
measures. He made a determination that, contrary to the
findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
suffered serious injury as a result of the import constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
surges. Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
definitive safeguard duty in the amount ofP20.60/40 kg. bag for agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
three years on imported gray Portland Cement.
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.

Issue: Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction in the said case.


This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
Held: The petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals has no authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a validity of the acts of the political departments.
petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and;
that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the
DTI Secretary. demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
#16 SMART COMMUNICATIONS VS NTC G.R. NO.
151908 12 AUGUST 2003
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making
Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or
Telephone Corporation filed against the National administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and
Telecommunications Commission, an action for declaration of determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to b the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to
due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab
#17 Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science &
initio.
Technology

Facts: PCST held a fund raising campaign where each student


Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The
project was allegedly implemented by recompensing
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of students who purchased tickets with additional points in their
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the
dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or opportunity to take the final examinations. Financially strapped
rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and
the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics,
What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 15 of 27
her teachers Respondents. Gamurot and Baladad allegedly FACTS: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations
disallowed her from taking the tests. According to petitioner, Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was
Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by
were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only
announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of
petitioner and another student to take their statistics P5,807,392.30.
examinations for failing to pay for their tickets ,allegedly ejected
them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly went CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM
unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended on the ground of their no report, no release policy. Hence,
their positions as compliance with PCST's policy. Petitioner filed, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM
as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the
Gamurot and Baladad. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of
the ground of petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
remedies. According to respondents, the question raised
ISSUE: Whether or not DBMs policy, no report, no release is
involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative
constitutional
policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated
before the proper administrative body, the Commission of HELD: DBMs act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due
Higher Education (CHED).The RTC dismissed the Complaint for to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional.
lack of cause of action. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present
Petition on pure questions of law. The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed.
Issue: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices
remedies is applicable possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A),
Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the
Held: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved
has no application where a student is not asking for the reversal
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
of the policies of an educational institution nor demanding that
she be allowed to take the final examinations that she was
prevented from taking (she was already enrolled in another
educational institution) but is praying for damages. A reversal of The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, automatic
the acts complained of would not adequately redress her release in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as
grievances. Under the circumstances, the consequences of an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention.
respondents acts could no longer be undone or rectified. Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical,
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required
competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to them
the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not from the national coffers.
courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they
By parity of construction, automatic release of approved
deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have
annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission
the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have
which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed
commenced her case before the Commission. One of the
to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine is when the issue is purely
This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court
legal & wellwithin the jurisdiction of the trial court --- an action
which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no
for damages inevitably calls for the application & interpretation
release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted
of the Civil Code
fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.
#18 CSC vs DBM Case Digest
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal
482 SCRA 233 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
Automatic release of approved annual appropriations to of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the
Civil Service Commission, a constitutional commission which CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in
is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC
mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal
imposed. footing with all others which are not granted the same

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 16 of 27


autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction #20 Leonardo Paat vs. Court of Appeals, et. Al.
established by the Constitution.

#19 CALUB V. CA FACTS

Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was
virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law. seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan
A replevin case against the State, without its consent, cannot because the driver could not produce the required documents
prosper. for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and
FACTS: required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to
submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive
Petitioner from DENR apprehended two vehicles carrying illegally
Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for
sourced lumber and thereafter confiscated them. The owners of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private
the vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover the vehicles.
respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending
They won in the trial court on the ground that petitioner did not
appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC
act in accordance with the law. So petitioner appeals on the
against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same.
ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that
and is therefore valid.
private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to

ISSUE: exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their


motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners
1) Whether or not a replevin may be instituted for recovery of aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
property under custodia legis. replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure
2) Whether or not replevin in this case is a suit against the State proceedings.

RULING: ISSUE- Whether or not the instant case falls within the
exception of the doctrine.
1) No! Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of HELD
the law.
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently
2) Yes! This suit is not valid because the State may not be sued held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
without its consent or when the public official acted in bad faith court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
in the discharge of his duties. It has been established that the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a
DENR acted within its authority. Hence, its action is the action of remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted
the State. to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
Calub v. CA jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
G.R. No. 115634 (April 27, 2000)
of court intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
FACTS: Petitioners, who were officers of the Department of
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called
Environment and Natural Resources seized two motor vehicles
upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
for transporting illegally cut lumber. The owner and the driver
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1)
filed a case against them for the recovery of the possession of
when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue
the motor vehicle.
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative
HELD: The acts for which petitioners are being called to account action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
were performed by them in the discharge of their official jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the
duties. A suit against them is a suit against the state. It cannot administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
prosper without the consent of the state. injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it
would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject
ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 17 of 27
matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the Commission that the petitioner should have first exhausted her
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of Philippines, and that her failure to do so is a bar to her action in
judicial intervention. court.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for ISSUE: WON petitioners failure to exhaust her administrative
the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative remedies bars subsequent action in courts
forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705,
as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of HELD: ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; RULE OF EXHAUSTION NOT
action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust TO BE INVOKED IF PARTY IS IN ESTOPPEL. The respondent
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of Commission is in estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhaustion
action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over of administrative remedies, considering that in its resolution, it
the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of declared that the opinions of the Secretary of Justice were
the truck. advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by
the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the
#21 Natividad vs. Veterans [G.R. No. L-12944. March 30, court for recourse, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude
1959.] that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by
the Commission.
FACTS:
1. That the petitioner is of legal age, a widow and a #22 Republic vs Lacap GR. No. L-158253
resident of the Philippines and that the respondent is a
government instrumentality or agency, duly vested with authority FACTS:
to implement the provisions of Backpay Law, otherwise known as
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly
Republic Act No. 897, further amending Republic Act No. 304; published an Invitation To Bid dated January 27,
2. That the petitioner is the widow of the late Lt. Tan Chiat 1992. Respondent, doing business under the name and
Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national, and bonafide member style CarwinConstruction and Construction Supply
the 1st Regiment, United State-Chinese Volunteers in the (Carwin Construction), was pre-qualified together with two other
Philippines; died in a battle at Rizal Province; and certified by the contractors. Since respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was
awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.On
Armed Forces of the Philippines as having rendered aritorious
November 4, 1992, a Contract Agreement was executed by
military services during the Japanese occupation;
respondent and petitioner. On September 25, 1992, District
3. That petitioner as widow of the said recognized Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the
deceased veteran, filed an application for back pay concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. Accordingly, respondent
4. The Secretary and Chief of Office Staff the Veterans undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of the
Back Pay Commission sent a letter to General Vicente Lopez of materials and payment for labor costs.
the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines apprising
On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the
the latter that the Commission has reaffirmed its solution
District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final
granting the back pay to alien members; the AFP certified
inspection of the project and found it 100% completed in
certified that deceased veteran has rendered service as a accordance with the approved plans and specifications.
recognized guerrilla Accordingly, the Office of the District Engineer issued Certificates
5. That after due deliberation respondent revoked its of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance.
previous stands and ruled that aliens are not entitled to back
pay; Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for
the completed project. The DPWH prepared the Disbursement
6. That on February 13, 1957, the respondent Veterans
Voucher in favor of petitioner. However, the DPWH withheld
Back Pay Commission, through its Secretary & Chief of Office payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the
Staff, made a formal reply to the aforesaid claim of the herein Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of
petitioner denying her request on the ground that aliens are not funds on the ground that the contractors license of respondent
entitled to backpay; had expired at the time of the execution of the contract. The
7. That upon refusal of the Veterans Back Pay Commission District Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal
the petitioner brought the case direct to this Honorable Court by Department on whether the contracts of Carwin Construction for
various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were valid and
way of mandamus;
effective although its contractors license had already expired
The trial court ordered respondent Commission to give due when the projects were contracted.
course to the claim of herein petitioner. Against the decision, the
respondent instituted this appeal and it further contended by the

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 18 of 27


In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D. to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal,
Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal Department opined that where the question demands the exercise of sound
since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
the Contractors License Law, does not provide that a contract experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
entered into after the license has expired is void and there is no determine technical and intricate matters of fact.[31]
law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the
contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, without Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of
prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability action that administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
may be imposed on the contractor and the government officials jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical
or employees concerned. considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted
exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the
In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
requested clarification from the DPWH Legal Department on administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
whether Carwin Construction should be paid for works jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official
accomplished despite an expired contractors license at the time inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d)
the contracts were executed. where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar D. involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department, recommended that decided by the courts of justice;[32] (f) where judicial
payment should be made to Carwin Construction, reiterating his intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great
earlier legal opinion. Despite such recommendation for payment, and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate
no payment was made to respondent. due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot;[33] (j) when
Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when
Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
RTC. warranto proceedings.[34] Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to
the present case.
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a
action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the contractor with an expired contractors license is proper,
action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision respondent remained unpaid for the completed work despite
of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim. repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay and
official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent.
Following the submission of respondents Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order dated March 11, Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired
1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for license at the time of the execution of its contract is entitled to
Reconsideration but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of
Order dated May 23, 1996. Moreover, the Court of Appeals law. It does not involve an examination of the probative value of
sustained the lower courts decision. the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
ISSUE: certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of
Whether or not the respondent failed to exhaust the alleged facts. Said question at best could be resolved
administrative remedies. only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final
decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of
HELD: justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply,
The present petition is bereft of merit. because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be
done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and
The general rule is that before a party may seek the experience but one that would involve the interpretation and
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means application of law.
afforded him by administrative processes.[29] The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
#23 Indiana Aerospace vs CHED GR. No. 133971
summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without
first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to
FACTS:
dispose of the same after due deliberation.[30]
Sometime in 1996, petitioner misrepresented themselves as a
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts university in their advertisement in a local newspaper.
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior
ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 19 of 27
Director Gaduyon talked with the school president It was Held:
explained that there was a violation committed by his institution
when it used the term university unless the school had complied Petition for certiorari is seasonably filed because the date to be
with the basic requirement of being a university as prescribed in reckoned with is the date respondent received the order of
CHED Memorandum Order No. 48, s. 1996.' default and not the date of order. However, the order was not
a proper subject of certiorari or appeal since it was merely an
As a consequence of said Report, [respondent's] Legal Affairs interlocutory order.
Service was requested to take legal action against [petitioner].
Respondent ordered the petitioner to desist from using the term
university in any branch.
Ratio and Doctrine:
Prevent the petitioners SEC registration in amending their
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the
articles of incorporation.
proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has
Petitioner appealed to respondent with a promise to follow the been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct
provisions of CMO 48. Respondent rejected pets. appeal and every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to
ordered the latter to cease and desist from using the word correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of
university. judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited
to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve
However, prior to that, petitioner filed a Complaint for Damages persons from arbitrary actsacts which courts or judges have no
with prayer for Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction and power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct
Temporary Restraining Order against respondent, erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.

Respondent files for a motion to dismiss: improper venue; lack of In the case at bar, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the
authority of the person instituting the action; and lack of cause RTC's denial of the Motion to Dismiss, as contained in the August
of action. 14, 1998 Order. The CA erred in ruling otherwise. The trial court
stated in its Decision that petitioner was an educational
Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss and at the same institution, originally registered with the Securities and Exchange
time ordered a Writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Commission as the "Indiana School of Aeronautics, Inc." That
petitioner. In addition, respondent is ordered to answer within 15 name was subsequently changed to "Indiana Aerospace
days. However, respondent failed to answer within reasonable University" after the Department of Education, Culture and
time and hence declared in default. Sports had interposed no objection to such change.

Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Respondent issued a formal Cease and Desist Order directing
Appeals: in denying the former's Motion to Dismiss, in issuing a petitioner to stop using the word "university" in its corporate
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and in declaring respondent in name. The former also published an announcement in the March
default despite its filing an Answer. 21, 1998 issue of Freeman, a local newspaper in Cebu City, that
there was no institution of learning by that name. The counsel of
CA: petitioner had no cause of action and failed to show any
respondent was quoted as saying in the March 28, 1998 issue of
evidence that it had been granted university status by
the newspaper Today that petitioner had been ordered closed by
respondent as required under existing law and CHED rules and
the respondent for illegal advertisement, fraud and
regulations.
misrepresentation of itself as a university. Such acts, according to
A certificate of incorporation under an unauthorized name does the RTC undermined the public's confidence in petitioner as an
not confer upon petitioner the right to use the word "university" educational institution. This was a clear statement of a sufficient
in its name. cause of action.

By: KeirCares

Issue: Whether or not in giving due course to respondent CHED's


Petition for Certiorari filed way beyond the 60-day reglementary
period prescribed by Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 20 of 27


#24 Laguna CATV vs Maraan GR. No. 139492 Laguna CATV was of the view that an appeal to the Secretary of

FACTS: Labor would be an exercise in futility considering that the said


appeal will be filed with the Regional Office and it will surely be
Private respondents filed with the DOLE Region IV separate disapproved.
complaints for underpayment of wages and non-payment of
other employee benefits against their employer, Laguna CATV. The CA denied Laguna CATVs motion for extension and
dismissing the case. The Appellate Court found, among others,
Private respondents filed their separate complaints pursuant to that it failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Laguna CATV
Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of
7730. Appeals in its Resolution dated July 22, 1999. Hence, it filed a
petition for review on certiorari to the SC.
DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection within the premises of
Laguna CATV and found that the latter violated the laws on
ISSUE:
payment of wages and other benefits. Thereupon, DOLE Region
Whether or not Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all administrative
IV requested Laguna CATV to correct its violations but the latter
remedies.
refused, prompting the Regional Director to set the case for
summary investigation.

RULING:
Thereafter, he issued an Order directing Laguna CATV to pay the
The SC ruled that Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all
concerned employees the sum of
administrative remedies.
P261,009.19 representing their unpaid claims.

As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, an


Forthwith, Laguna CATV filed a motion for reconsideration.
order issued by the duly authorized representative of the
In view of Laguna CATVs failure to comply with the Order
Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter.
directing it to pay the unpaid claims of its employees, DOLE
Regional Director Maraan issued a writ of execution ordering the
Thus, petitioner should have first appealed to the Secretary of
Sheriff to collect in cash from Laguna CATV the amount specified
Labor instead of filing with the Court of Appeals a motion for
in the writ or, in lieu thereof, to attach its goods and chattels or
extension of time to file a petition for review.
those of its owner, Dr. Bernardino Bailon.

Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not


Laguna CATV and Dr. Bailon filed a motion to quash the writ of
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have
execution, notice of levy and sale on execution and garnishment
first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given
of bank deposits.
an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged
errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.
Regional Director Maraan issued an Order denying the motion to
quash the writ of execution, stating that Laguna CATV failed to
The SC, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that if a
perfect its appeal because it did not comply with the mandatory
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted
requirement of posting a bond equivalent to the monetary award to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
of P261,009.19; and that the writ of execution should be opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
considered as an overt denial of Laguna CATVs motion for
the courts judicial power can be sought. Although this Court has
reconsideration. allowed certain exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor, Laguna CATV filed administrative remedies, such as:
with the CA a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review.
1) when there is a violation of due process;

2) when the issue involved is a purely legal question;


ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 21 of 27
3) when the administrative action is patently illegal #25 Francisco Chavez vs Public Estates Authority (July
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
2002)
4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
384 SCRA 152 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the
administrative agency concerned;
Public Domain
5) when there is irreparable injury; The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing
6) when the respondent is a Department Secretary agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as
reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are
7) when to require exhaustion of administrative concerned.
remedies would be unreasonable;
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and
8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also
9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
case proceedings;
Bay to Amari.
10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
adequate remedy;
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
11) when there are circumstances indicating the domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a
urgency of judicial intervention; gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
12) when no administrative review is provided by law;
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of
13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies;
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
and
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
remedies has been rendered moot, Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture
agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
Petitioner fails to show that the instant case falls under any of the hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to
exceptions. Its contention that an appeal to the Secretary of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
Labor would be futile as it will surely be disapproved, is purely private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
conjectural and definitely misplaced. the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also
seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
The party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial agricultural lands of the public domain.
intervention in order to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
#26 CIPRIANO v MARCELINO
unnecessary and premature resort to the court.
SUMMARY: Cipriano resigned as a record clerk in the office of
The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption the municipal treasurer. The latter (Marcelino), refused to pay her
that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to the salary due her as well as other commutations. Thus, Cipriano
filed a petition for mandamus. Marcelino claims that she had not
pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly.
exhausted all the administrative remedies yet thus, the petition
should be dismissed. The court held that this principle does not
Therefore, petitioner should have completed the administrative apply in the present case because it is obviously ridiculous to
process by appealing the questioned Orders to the Secretary of require that the case for P949 go all the way up to the Office of
Labor. the President before going to courts.

DOCTRINE: The principle of exhaustion of administrative


remedies is not without exception, not is it a condition precedent
to judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded when it does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 22 of 27


should be relaxed when its application may cause great and the President of the Philippines on such an
irreparable damage. inconsequential matter as the collection of the sum
of P949, would be oppressive and expensive not
FACTS: only to the employee but also to her dependents
as well.
Leticia Cipriano served as record clerk in the office of Marcelino:
municipal treasurer Gregorio P. Marcelino of Calabanga, o petition for mandamus below states no cause of
Camarines Sur, from January 1, 1963 to January 15, 1966 action as the petitioner Cipriano has not exhausted
(she resigned), at a monthly salary of eighty pesos (P80). all administrative remedies available to her;
Because the respondent municipal treasurer, upon her o she has not acquired any right to be paid her salary
severance from the service, refused to pay her salary and accumulated vacation and sick leave pay by
corresponding to the period from September 1, 1965 to reason of her failure to comply with the
January 15, 1966, inclusive (P349), as well as the requirements prescribed in the 1966 Manual on
commutation equivalent of her accumulated vacation and Pre-audit of Government Disbursements; and
sick leaves (P600), Cipriano filed on May 5, 1966 with the o she still has outstanding accountability in the sense
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur an action for she has not accounted for the missing triplicate
mandamus to compel the said municipal treasurer to pay copies of three official receipts which were in her
her the total amount of P949. custody.
Marcelino: MTD because she had not "exhausted all The documents required to be
administrative remedies before filing the present action" accomplished before Cipriano can be paid
o exhaustion of all administrative remedies is a her salary and her accumulated vacation
condition precedent before an aggrieved party may and sick leave pay are (a) a letter of
have judicial recourse. resignation duly accepted, (b) a certificate
Lower courts: granted motion and ordered the dismissal of of clearance from money and property
the case. accountability, and (c) a certificate of
Hence, the present petition for certiorari clearance from the Government Service
Insurance System
SC: The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
RULING: ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is granted, and the not without exception, not is it a condition precedent to
judicial relief.
orders a quo of April 14 and May 14, 1967 are set aside. The
o The principle may be disregarded when it does not
municipal treasurer of the Municipality of Calabanga, Camarines
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Sur, is hereby ordered to pay to the petitioner, Leticia Cipriano, o It may and should be relaxed when its application
without further delay, the total sum of nine hundred forty-nine may cause great and irreparable damage.
(P949) pesos. No pronouncement as to costs. To require the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way to
the President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter
Whether or not Cipriano needed to exhaust all of the collection of the small total of nine hundred
administrative remedies firstNO forty-nine (P949) pesos, would not only be oppressive
but would be patently unreasonable.
ARGUMENTS By the time her appeal shall have been decided by the
President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the
Cipriano total sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been
o There is no law that requires an appeal to the spent.
Provincial Treasurer, Secretary of Finance, Auditor In De Leon vs. Libay, this Court, with considerable emphasis,
General and then the President of the Philippines, made this statement which is apropos of the case at bar:
from the refusal by a municipal treasurer to pay the o The theory that a party must first exhaust his
salary and money value of the unused vacation and remedies in the administrative branch before
sick leaves of a municipal employee; seeking the aid of the strong arm of equity must give
o Assuming that an appeal all the way up to the way to the reality that a government employee must
President of the Philippines is an administrative depend for the support of himself and his family
remedy authorized by law, the same is not plain, upon his salary, and were he to be deprived of that
speedy and adequate; even alone for a few months, possibly even less, that
o The doctrine of exhaustion is not applicable when must mean starvation because more often than not,
the questions to be resolved are purely of law; that a government employee lives hand-to-mouth
the payment of her claim being a ministerial duty existence and he awaits with eager hands the arrival
of the municipal treasurer, mandamus is the proper of the forthnightly envelope because upon it must
remedy to compel such payment; and hinge the supply of rice and fish and clothing of his
o To require a small government employee such as spouse and children and himself and with it only can
the petitioner Cipriano to appeal all the way up to be maintained, and therefore were the dogmatic rule
of exhaustion of administrative remedies be made to
ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 23 of 27
mean that he should wait for the most final delegating to administrative officers the authority to revise
administrative decision in his case, the only logical fees and charges expressly required cabinet approval for
result must be vital disaster to his dependents and to the proper exercise of said power. Petitioners should not
himself, so that this is the reason why the rule of have wasted the opportunity to utilize this built-in
exhaustion of administrative remedies has always remedy. The grant (or denial) of a writ of prohibition is
been understood to mean that the same have ordinarily within the sound discretion of the court to be
furnished a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. exercised with caution and forbearance, according to the
All the documents required to support payment of circumstances of the particular case, and only where the
Cipriano's salary and the cash commutation of her unused right to seek relief is clear. Prohibition is granted only in
vacation and sick leaves have been accomplished. Cipriano cases where no other remedy is available which is sufficient
having thus earned the right to the said payment, it has to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and
become the corresponding duty of the respondent treasurer complete remedy at law either by appeal or otherwise, is
to recognize such right and effect payment. generally a sufficient reason for dismissing the writ. Hence,
in Chua Huat v. CA, we ruled that: Where the enabling
statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and
#27 PAREDES v CA provides a system of administrative appeal, or
reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and
FACTS: On 9 November 1992, public respondents promulgated convenience, will not entertain a case unless the available
Administrative Order Nos. 1 and 2, Series of 1992, revising the administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
rules of practice before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act
and correct the errors committed in the administrative
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) in patent and trademark cases, to
forum.
take effect on 15 March 1993. Among the provisions of said
administrative orders are Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 and Rule 15 of
A.O. No. 2, which increased the fees payable to the BPTTT for
YES. THE RESPONDENT COURT (COURT OF APPEALS) COULD
registration of patents and trademarks and Rule 59 of A.O. No. 2
NOT BE FAULTED FOR NOT RULING ON THE VALIDITY OF
which prohibited the filing of multi-class applications, that is, one
RULE 59 OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 1 BECAUSE
application covering several classes of goods.[1]
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CHALLENGED ADMINISTRATIVE
On 11 March 1993, petitioners, who are registered patent ORDERS AT THIS TIME IS YET PREMATURE. - Finally, as to the
agents, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition third issue, we concur with the findings of the Court of Appeals
with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to as follows: At this point in time, since the challenged
stop public respondents from enforcing the aforementioned administrative orders have not yet been submitted to the
administrative orders[2] and to declare Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 and
Cabinet for its consideration and approval, this Court finds it
Rules 15 and 59 of A.O. No. 2, series of 1992 of the BPTTT null
untimely to discuss and resolve the merits of the questions of
and void.
whether or not the rate increases and charges are just and
On 27 October 1993, the Court of Appeals dismissed the reasonable sufficient to cover administrative costs, and/or that
petition for prohibition and on 10 January 1994, denied the
the same are practicable and uniform for similar or comparable
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners on 18 November
services and functions, and/or that those rates conform with the
1993.[3]
rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance. Certainly, the
questions raised in this petition are not yet ripe for judicial
ISSUES: 1.) IS PROHIBITION A PROPER REMEDY? NO. determination, in the light of Matienzo vs. Abellera (162 SCRA 1,
9), that courts should be reluctant to interfere with administrative
2.) IS THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS action prior to its completion or finality, the reason being that
CORRECT FOR NOT RULING ON THE VALIDITY OF RULE absence of a final order or decision, the power of the
59 OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ? YES. administrative agency concerned has not been fully exercised
and there can be no irreparable harm. The rule of finality of
administrative action for purposes of judicial review also finds

HELD: substance in Rochester Telephone Co. vs. U.S. (307 U.S. 125)
and Federal Power Commission vs. Metropolitan Edison
1. NO. Prohibition is not the proper remedy. The enabling law Co. (304 U.S. 375). The principle of exhaustion of administrative
itself, which is B.P. Blg. 325, has specifically tasked the remedies which mandates that relief should first be sought from
Cabinet to review and approve any proposed revisions of the highest or most superior administrative agency, the likes of
rates of fees and charges. Petitioners should have availed
the Cabinet, may prove that a resort to the courts would be
of this easy and accessible remedy instead of immediately
unnecessary (Wee Poco vs. Posadas, 65 Phil. 648), prevent the
resorting to the judicial process. Our legislature in
courts from being swamped by a resort to them in the first
ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 24 of 27
instance (U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161), strengthened by the Upon motion of petitioners before the Supreme Court, the latter
rule on comity and convenience which requires Us to raise our issued a Temporary Restraining Order, ordering the respondent
hands until the administrative process has been finally COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing its questioned
completed (Matienzo vs. Abellera, supra; Railroad and Resolution No. 2879. It directed COMELEC to comment on the
Warehouse Commission vs. Duluth, St., R.. Co., 273 U.S. 625), and petition within a period of ten (10) days.
thus it is after judicial review is no longer premature that the
courts may ascertain, in proper cases, whether the administrative
action or findings are not in violation of law, whether they are
THE CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT COMELEC:
free from fraud or imposition and whether they find substantial
support from the evidence In its Comment, respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, contended that:
#28 JESUS A. JARIOL, ET. AL. (Petitioners)
1) According to the report of the Election Officer of
Vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL. (Respondents)
Basilisa, Surigao del Norte, the PRA meeting was
attended by 109 members, a number sufficient to
G.R. No. 127456, March 20, 1997
constitute a quorum since Basilisa is composed of 27
THE CASE: barangays with eight officers for each unit. All of the
109 members signed the minutes of the meeting and
The case is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the affixed their signatures and thumb marks, which were
Rules of Court. It assails the resolution of the Commission on verified by the COMELEC.
Elections, which adversely ruled against petitioners.

2) The petitioners act of filing the present petition is


premature, because:
THE FACTS: a) They had not asked the COMELEC to reconsider
Resolution No. 2879.
On December 12, 1996, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
b) It raises factual issues which are not proper subjects
issued Resolution No. 2879, adopting the calendar of activities of a petition for certiorari.
for the recall election of the Mayor, Vice Mayor and six (6) c) The barangay election on May 12, 1997 will not bar
members of Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Basilisa, the recall election in question.
Province of Surigao del Norte, and scheduled said recall election
on January 25, 1997. 3) There was compliance with the requirements of due
process, as all members of the PRA were duly notified of
THE CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS: the date and place of meeting for the purpose of recall.
a) All 243 members of Basilisa were all furnished and
1) Not all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly
served with notice of said meeting.
were notified of the meeting for the recall of said
b) The meetings venue was the Sering High School
municipal officials.
Building in Barangay Sering, which is definitely a
a) Seven (7) of the twenty-seven (27) Barangay
public place.
Captains of the Municipality of Basilisa and fifty-five
c) The meeting was attended by a majority of
(55) members of the different Sangguniang
barangay officials constituting the PRA, as well as
Barangays (SB) thereof did not receive notice of the
various residents of different barangays.
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) Meeting held on
August 24, 1996 and which passed the resolution of
4) The instant petition is part of a continuing scheme to
recall.
unjustly prevent a recall process.
2) The notice of the meeting did not state the purpose
a) There were instances where petitioner Mayor Jariol
thereof, much less, that it was for the recall of the
called meetings of barangay officials to prevent
Mayor, Vice Mayor and six Sangguniang Bayan
them from convening a Municipal PRA.
members.
3) The meeting was not open to the public, but behind
closed doors.
4) The recall election is scheduled on January 25, 1997, THE ISSUES:
within one year immediately preceding a regular
election of barangay officials in May 1997. This was 1) Whether or not petitioners failed to comply with the
done in violation of Section 74 (b) of R.A. No. 7160. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 25 of 27


when instead of contesting the factual findings of REGARDING THE SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the
the PRA before the COMELEC, they directly filed the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
present petition before the Supreme Court. in giving due course to the recall petition and in
2) Whether or not the respondent COMELEC promulgating Resolution No. 2879.
committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the recall petition and in promulgating HELD: No. The respondent COMELEC did not commit grave
Resolution No. 2879. abuse of discretion in giving due course to the recall petition
and in promulgating Resolution No. 2879.

1) Petitioners failed to sufficiently show that respondent


THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. They
The Supreme Court dismissed the instant petition for lack of did not even assail the Report nor impute any improper
motive on the Election Officer as to create doubt as to
merit. It also lifted the Temporary Restraining Order. It
the integrity of his Report.
directed the COMELEC to set anew and hold the recall
election not later than April 15, 1997, and ordered
2) Respondent COMELEC has in its favor the presumption
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
of regularity in the performance of his duty. Petitioners
had the burden to disprove that presumption, which
they miserably failed to do.
THE BASIS OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING:
3) The act of COMELEC in scheduling the barangay
REGARDING THE FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners election on May 12, 1997 is not invalid. The regular
failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of election contemplated in Section 74 (b) if the Local
administrative remedies, when instead of contesting the Government Code of 1991, whose conduct is the basis
factual findings of the PRA before the COMELEC, they for computing the one-year prohibited period. Holding
directly filed the present petition before the Supreme Court. the recall election in question can be validly done at any
time before the commencement of the one (1) year
HELD: Yes. Petitioners failed to comply with the doctrine of period immediately preceding the next general election
exhaustion of administrative remedies, when instead of for municipal elective officials in May of 1998.
contesting the factual findings of the PRA before the
COMELEC, they directly filed the present petition before the
Supreme Court. #29 MATIENZO v ABELLERA

1) Since COMELEC performed a purely administrative FACTS:


function when it promulgated Resolution No. 2879, a
party aggrieve thereby must not merely initiate the The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized
prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents, however,
also must pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before admittedly operate colorum or kabit taxicab units. On or
seeking judicial intervention. about the second week of February, 1977, private respondents
a) The purpose of the rule is in order to give that filed their petitions with the respondent Board of Transportation
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the (BOT) for the legalization of their unauthorized excess taxicab
matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary
units citing PD 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, to
and premature resort to the court.
eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine
2) The only reason why the petitioners filed the present
operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate
petition was lack of opportunity to do so. It did not
and responsible operators. Within a matter of days, the
fall under the following exceptions to the rule:
respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the application
a) The question is purely legal.
b) Judicial intervention is urgent. for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to
c) Its application may cause great and irreparable operate their excess taxicab units for which legalization was
damage. sought.
d) The controverted acts violate due process.
e) Failure of a high government official from whom
relief is sought to act on the matter.
Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of
f) The issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
provisional permits or authority, as well as the annulment of
remedies has been rendered moot.

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 26 of 27


permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that
the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the
private respondents. Citing Section 4 of PD 101, the petitioners
argue that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof
had the power, at the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977),
to legitimize the clandestine operations under PD 101 as such
power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and
after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They
state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus
officio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful


taxicab operations under Section 1 of PD 101 despite the lapse
of six (6) months after the promulgation of the Decree.

RULING:

Yes.

A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the


respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards
the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the
alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the
petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6)
months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely
provides for the withdrawal of the States waiver of its right to
punish said colorum operators for their illegal acts. In other
words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium
suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators
shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Boards exercise
of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service
Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the
avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7,
1936).

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a


board or commission has a certain power, the authority given
should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for
which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a
full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as
germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required,
the appropriate means are deemed given.

ADMIN DIGESTs 1st SET Page 27 of 27

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