(1)PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JOEL DE GUZMAN

G.R. No.132071 (October 16, 2000)

Facts:
Corazon Deliso y Reyes (Private complainant) alleged that she was rape by her
husband cousin Joel De Guzman, which the latter poked a knife on her neck and
warned private complainant not to report the incident to anyone.
Defendant-Appellant In his defense said, he and private complainant were lovers
and they have engaged in sexual intercourse many times during their six-month
affair. The night of the alleged rape, private complainant told appellant that she
was ready to leave her husband to go with him. But, appellant rebuffed her as he
informed private complainant of his plan to go to Manila. At this juncture, private
complainant allegedly told him that if he left she would charge him with rape.
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court rendered judgment against
the appellant founding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape.
Appellant avers that the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony
of the victim?
RULING:
To begin with, appellant's claim that their sexual intercourse was consensual is
concoction born out of desperation. It is true that this Court has sustained the
defense of consensual sex in a number of rape cases. It is to be noted, however,
that in these cases, evidence like love notes, mementos and witnesses attesting
to a consensual relationship were presented. Here, other than appellant's story he
only had a fellow detainee to corroborate his tale. Ironically, his fellow detainee,
Barro, contradicted him on major details.
We also note that the records show that private complainant cried during her direct
examination. The cry of the victim during her testimony bolsters the credibility of
the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience.
What is significant is that she was clear and consistent in asserting that appellant
had threatened and raped her. Thus, we see no reason to doubt private
complainant's story. There is nothing to show that private complainant was
actuated by ill motive to implicate appellant in the commission of the crime. The
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and the testimony of
private complainant is worthy of full faith and credit.

(2)PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DELA TORRE

G.R No. 121213 and 121216-23 (January 13, 2004)

FACTS:
Appellant-spouses Butchoy and Fe de la Torre employed Baby Jane Dagot as
housemaid, That on or about the 2nd week of September, 1992 At around 12:00
oclock midnight, appellant Fe de la Torre woke Baby Jane and her husband
Butchoy , Fe then ordered Butchoy to have sex with Baby Jane. The accused
Butchoy de la Torre, in conspiracy and confederating with his wife, Fe de la Torre,
by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with BABY JANE DAGOT, a girl of 16 years
of age against her will and consent.
The rape was repeated once a week from the second week of September 1992 on
to the fourth week of October 1992 and repeated again in the second week of
December.
Appellant-spouses Butchoy and Fe de la Torre were charged in nine (9)
separate Amended Complaints with rape.
The appellant-spouses denied the allegations of rape; the appellants profess that
the imputations of rape against them may have been instigated by Baby Janes
father, Rafael Dagot, who was also an employee of the spouse appellants. She
allegedly caught him stealing. The appellants also insist that Baby Jane was
already married to one Eddie Tabi when they took her as their maid. This explains
why, according to them, Baby Jane was no longer a virgin.
The nine criminal cases were consolidated and joint trial conducted before the
Regional Trial Court, the Court found the appellants guilty of all nine (9) counts of
rape charged in the nine Amended Complaints and sentenced them to reclusion
perpetua for each count.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in believing the private offended party
accounts of the supposed rape?

RULING:
From the outset it should be noted that while the appellants assail the credibility of
the complainants testimony, they actually do not point to specific inconsistencies
or contradictions in her testimony. True, the trial court relied solely on the
testimony of the complainant regarding the rape incidents, but the determinative
question before the trial court was whether the complainants testimony is credible.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in
conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of
mankind. Further, the credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the basis
of the substance of their testimony and the surrounding circumstances.
The greatest weight is accorded to the findings and conclusions reached by the
lower court regarding the credibility of witnesses and their testimony, owing to the
courts unique position to see, hear and observe the witnesses testify. Unless it is
shown that the court overlooked or misunderstood some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which would affect the outcome of the case, or that its
findings of fact and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are not supported
by the evidence on record, its determination is left undisturbed. In the present case,
we see no need to overturn this well-settled principle.
But then, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the appellants
may be convicted only of the rape committed in the first week of September
1992. The evidence for the prosecution proves only the first charge of rape. Baby
Janes testimony on the commission of the eight other charges does not satisfy the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to justify the appellants conviction.
Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime; hence, each of the
eight other rape charges should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED. In Criminal
Case No. 11199, the appellants are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
rape.

(3)PEOPLE VS. GODOY

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 (December 6, 1995)

FACTS:
Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum
penalty of death in both cases by the Regional Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny
Codoy(Appellant) by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and
by means of deceit, have carnal Knowledge with her and kidnap or detained her,
for a period of five (5).
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the
complainant (Mia Taha) to the accused and the same was corroborated by the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.
ISSUES:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape and kidnapping with illegal detention?

RULING:
No. They were in fact lovers.
This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions
without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the
burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any
material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence,
the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the
evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1)while rape is a
most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be
borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to
be defended by the party accused, though innocent;(2) that in view of the intrinsic nature
of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably
convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and
that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful
plaint for redress of an actual wrong.
The challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no
serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for
the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony
of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the
crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the
testimony of complainant regarding the incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken
singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to
consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events which transpired
thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined
to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual
intent of the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the present
charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution.
Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which
they themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the
prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines,
young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great
caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of
scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families.80
It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face in the
community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal
her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural
community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.

(4)PEOPLE VS LIWAG
G.R. No. 89112 (August 3, 1993)

FACTS:
In the morning of September 9, 1979, Ely A. Lee was been murdered. Before the said
killing took place, the prosecution witnesses Emilio Cerillo about five (5) meters away,
saw appellant Mario Bolaos hand a gun to accused Liwag while talking to each other.
Moments later, they heard gunshots. Cerillo stood up from the dug-out of the machine
where he had been and saw accused Liwag with a gun, shooting at someone, whom he
later on identified as the deceased Ely A. Lee.
Purita Lee, wife of the deceased, rushed to the ricemill and there she saw the victim lying
on his own blood. Purita cradled her husband and asked: "Daddy, who shot you?" In his
dying words, the victim uttered: "Si Mario" The victim was taken to the hospital, but was
pronounced dead on arrival.
The Police arrived at the area and cordoned the same knowing that the gunman was still
inside, but appellant Bolaos met with the police officers and denied that the gunman
was still inside the building. However an hour after Bolanos informed the police that the
gunman liwag will surrender.
Accused Liwag refused to give any statements to the police. Sworn statements obtained
from several witnesses, including Emilio Cerillo, Domingo Hallare, Roger Castaeda, and
Dionisio Orbon, implicated accused Liwag. Thereafter, the police conduct a search where
Bolaos and his family lived and where the gunman had sought refuge after the shooting
but Bolaos refused to allow the search, this time invoking the absence of a warrant
therefore.
One day after, the police searched the Bolaos residence after having obtained the proper
search warrant. In the course thereof, the lethal weapon was found inside and it was fully
loaded .22 caliber licensed in the name of, and admittedly owned by appellant Bolaos.
A ballistic examination was then conducted by the PC Crime Laboratory on the
said firearm. It was confirmed that the specimen slugs as well as the test slugs
were fired from the gun recovered from the Bolaos residence. In other words, the
specimen and test slugs were all fired from the same .22 caliber owned by Bolaos.
Accused Liwag made a confession before the Station Commander of Iriga City,
claiming that it was appellant Bolaos who had ordered the killing of Lee, it was
made with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Rudito Espiritu, whom the police asked
to assist the said accused.
The trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused Andres Liwag and
appellant Mario Bolaos of the crime of murder attended by the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation and cruelty. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
A.WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND
GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF
ACCUSED ANDRES LIWAG?
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT BOLANOS ALL HIS
ACTS?

RULINGS:
A. Well-settled is the rule that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding
only upon himself and is not admissible against his co-accused. It is merely
hearsay evidence as far as other accused are concerned. However, this rule is not
without exceptions, one of which provides that the extrajudicial confession of an
accused is admissible against his co-accused where the confession is used as
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of the co-accused
in the killing of the victim.
More importantly, the extra-judicial confession of accused Liwag was made with the
assistance of counsel, Atty. Rudito Espiritu, under the circumstances, Liwag's earlier
affidavit with the assistance of counsel implicating appellant Bolaos cannot easily be set
aside. More, Liwag's confession contained details which were corroborated on material
points by the witnesses for the prosecution in establishing the link of circumstantial
evidence which, among others, warrant the conviction of herein appellant.

B. Circumstantial evidence is the evidence of collateral facts or circumstances from which

an inference may be drawn as to the probability or improbability of the facts in dispute.
Not only the prior and coetaneous actuations of the accused in relation to the crime, but
also his acts or conduct subsequent thereto can be considered as circumstantial evidence
of guilt. To warrant conviction in criminal cases upon circumstantial evidence, such
evidence must be more than one, derived from facts duly proven, and the combination
of all of them must be such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The confession of accused Liwag with respect to the fact that accused-appellant was the
one who handed him the murder weapon was corroborated by the testimony of witness
Cerillo that he saw accuse-appellant give accused Liwag a gun immediately before the
shooting.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
appellant.

(5)People of the Philippines vs. Honesto Manuel y Padilla

G.R. No. 121539 (October 21, 1998)

FACTS:
The Private offended party Nestcel Marso y Gorospe,eleven (11) years of age,
a minor was left in the care of spouses HONESTO MANUEL and ANNABELLE
MANUEL. On the night of May 23, 1993, when only the accused and the private
offended party are left in the house, Honesto by mean of violence and intimidation
have carnal knowledge with Nestcel.
On arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution presented a Medico-
legal Officer of the PNP crime Laboratory as an expert witness, the father of the
victim and the victim itself was presented as witness for the prosecution.
The victim was subjected to a medical examination with the following finding:
Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. There are no external signs
of recent application of any form of violence.
The victim Nestcel testified that she was awakened from sleep to see accused-
appellant by her side looking down at her. The latter the undressed and embraced
her. Thereafter, accused-appellant played with his organ and tried to penetrate her
from behind. Before Nestcel could close her legs, she felt accused-appellant penis
touch her vagina and thereafter felt a fluid-like sticky substance flowing thereon.
The accused appellant denied the allegations, saying that he managed to relieve
himself of his urge by means of masturbation.
The trial court gave credence to the version of the victim.
Accused-appellant Honesto Manuel was found to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal of the crime of Statutory Rape, defined and penalized in Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of
the minor witness Nestcel Marzo (VICTIM)?

RULING:
Time and again, this Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility
of the witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial courts observation and
conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there
appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight which the lower court
may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly
considered, would alter the results of the case. The trial judge enjoys the
advantage of observing the witness deportment and manner of testifying, her
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh or the scant or full realization of an oath.all of which are useful
aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity.
It is settled that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an
accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.
It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full
weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all the is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is
herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
(6)PEOPLE VS. PILONES
G.R. No. L-32754-5 (July 21, 1978)

FACTS:
Manuel Pilones was convicted by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for the crime of
murder, for the killing of Antonio G. Renolia (A.K.A Tony), and frustrated murder against
Nicanor Ilagan.

Ilagan was shot in the knee. Tony went to assist and tried to lift llagan but was shot buy
the same assailant. Llagan saw his assailants face, because of the light of the electric lamp
on the street. The assailant and his companions, Danny Banlag, Milo and others, who
were armed with arrows and carried stones, ran away.

Tony died on the way to the hospital. Ilagan was also brought to the hospital where he
was treated for two weeks.

Pilones refused to give any statement or comment upon investigation.

At the trial Pilones relied on an alibi, but the same was not corroborated by testimonies
of possible witnesses.

ISSUE:
Whether Pilones was sufficiently identified by the prosecution's sole eyewitness, Ilagan?

RULING:
Pilones conspired with his companion in shooting llagan and killing Renolia.
The decisive fact is that Pilones was not only Identified by Ilagan but at the confrontation
in the police precinct between accuser and accused, Pilones, as the accused, just kept
silent and did not deny Ilagan's accusation and the Identification made by Renolia's
mother. "He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when
he should be silent". Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 23. Admission by silence. Any act or declaration made in the presence and within
the observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such
as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against
him.
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of
crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-confession. An innocent
person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter
of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A
person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify an inference that
he is not innocent.
The trial court erred in holding that the crime as to Ilagan is frustrated murder. The wound
in his knee was not sufficient to cause his death. The crime is only attempted murder.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is affirmed with the modification.

(7)PEOPLE VS. RAQUEL

G.R. No. 119005 (December 2, 1996)

FACTS:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and
Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the
person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily
armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.

Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husbands lifeless
while a man took her husbands gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for help at
their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men
ran away but she did not seen their faces. The police came and found one of the
perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victims
house. He was identified as Amado Ponce.

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and
Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in
progress, however, and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce
escaped from jail. Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense
and presented witnesses to support their alibi.

The trial court rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them
accordingly.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of the crime
charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the
perpetrators of the crime?

RULING:
A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the
perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime
charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of
her husband as base from his testimonies.
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification
of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement
of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As
earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court
and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be
utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused
never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latters
extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said
accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants,
in the case at bar.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding
only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The
reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
mans own acts are binding upon him, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
This extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was
made in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce.Extrajudicial
statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel
are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While
the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance
of counsel. These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and
foundation, were never observed.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and
accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED
of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

(8)People of the Philippines VS. Solito Tena

G.R. No.100909 (October 21, 1992)

FACTS:
Alfredo Altamarino Sr was found dead in his own residence, bore eight (8) Stab
wounds and his personal properties are missing. The Daughter of the victim
sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

The NBI conducted their investigation. Mauban Police Station Commander

informed the NBI that suspicion as to the authorship of the crime had shifted to a
syndicate. This syndicate was reportedly involved in the robbery at nearby
Municipalities and a member thereof was in detention named Adelberto Camota.
The NBI agents interrogated Camota.

Sensing that Camota knew of the incident, the NBI agents conducted polygraph
examination on Camota, allegedly with his consent. Alberto Camota executed an
extrajudicial confession in the presence of a lawyer, admitting participation in the
robbery-killing of Alfredo Almarino and pointing to Solito Tena and three others as
his companions in the crime. Solito Tena pleaded not guilty.

Solito Tena with other accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to a prison term of
20 years of Reclusion Perpetua.

Only Solito Tena appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confession of Camota is binding against other co-
accused?

RULING:
The judgment of conviction was based chiefly on the extrajudicial confession of
accused Adelberto Camota which repudiated by Camota in open court. Used of
Camotas extrajudicial confession is precluded by section28, of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, viz:

Section 28. Admission by third Party.the rights of a party cannot be

prejudiced by the act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided.

This rule admits of certain exceptions, to be sure, one of which is found in section
30 of rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 30. Admission by conspirator.The act or declaration of a

conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.

This exception does not however apply. In order that the admission of a conspirator
may be received against his co-conspirator, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy
be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission
relates to the common object; (c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
Several factors bar the application of said Section 30 to the case at bar. More
importantly, camota , instead of conforming his extrajudicial confession in court,
repudiated the same, denied knowledge of the crime charged and denied knowing
accused-appellant Tena.

The extrajudicial confession of Camota thus being inadmissible against his co-
accused and being no evidence independently of said confession,linking accused
appellant Tena to the crime, this Court declares Tena not guilty of the complex
crime of Robbery with homicide with which he is charged.

(9)PRIME WHITE CEMENT VS IAC

G.R. No. L-68555 (March 19, 1993)

FACTS:
Zosimo Falcon and Justo Trazo entered into an agreement with Alejandro Te
whereby it was agreed that, Te shall be the sole dealer of 20,000 bags Prime White
cement in Mindanao. Falcon was the president of Prime White Cement Corporation
(PWCC) and Trazo was a board member thereof. Te was likewise a board member
of PWCC. It was agreed that the selling price for a bag of cement shall be P9.70.
Before the bags of cement can be delivered, Te already made known to the public
that he is the sole dealer of cements in Mindanao. Various hardwares then
approached him to be his sub-dealers, hence, Te entered into various contracts
with them.
But then apparently, Falcon and Trazo were not authorized by the Board of PWCC
to enter into such contract. Nevertheless, the Board wished to retainthe
contract but they wanted some amendment which includes the increase of the
selling price per bag to P13.30 and the decrease of the total amount of cement bags
from 20k to 8k only plus the contract shall only be effective for a period of three
months and not 6 years.
Te refused the counter-offer. PWCC then awarded the contract to someone else.
Te then sued PWCC for damages. PWCC filed a counterclaim and in said
counterclaim, it is claiming for moral damages the basis of which is the claim that
Tes filing of a civil case against PWCC destroyed the companys goodwill. The lower
court ruled in favor Te.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "dealership agreement" referred by the President and Chairman of
the Board of petitioner corporation is a valid and enforceable contract?
HELD:
No. Te is what can be called as a self-dealing director he deals business with the
same corporation in which he is a director. There is nothing wrong per se with that.
However, Sec. 32 provides that:
SEC. 32. Dealings of directors, trustees or officers with the corporation. - A
contract of the corporation with one or more of its directors or trustees or officers
is voidable, at the option of such corporation, unless all the following conditions
are present:
1. That the presence of such director or trustee in the board meeting in which the
contract was approved was not necessary to constitute a quorum for such meeting;
2. That the vote of such director or trustee was not necessary for the approval of
the contract;
3. That the contract is fair and reasonable under the circumstances; and
4. That in the case of an officer, the contract with the officer has been previously
authorized by the Board of Directors.

In this particular case, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that the contract
between PWCC and Te through Falcon and Trazo was not reasonable. Hence, PWCC
has all the rights to void the contract and look for someone else, which it did. The
contract is unreasonable because of the very low selling price. The Price at
that time was at least P13.00 per bag and the original contract only stipulates
P9.70. Also, the original contract was for 6 years and theres no clause in the
contract which protects PWCC from inflation. As a director, Te in this transaction
should protect the corporations interest more than his personal interest. His
failure to do so is disloyalty to the corporation.

(10)Soriano v. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas

G.R. No. L-17392 (18 SCRA 999)

FACTS:
Defendant was the creditor of the plaintiff appellant; they executed a deed of
mortgage in favor of defendant, entitled "Credito Sobre Azucar Renovacion De
hipoteca Con Garnatia Adicional" granting the defendant authority to export or sell
the sugar of the plaintiff delivered to it by the latter and mortgaging to the defendant
the properties specified and described therein, that to guarantee the payment of
this crop loans plus the interest that would be due thereon as well as the payment
of the outstanding balance under the previous crop loans, plaintiff mortgaged in
favor of defendant the same sugar plantations formerly mortgaged under the
previous deed; that as additional security therefore, plaintiff likewise mortgaged
the sugar cane crops that would be planted and harvested during the 1941-42 crop
year, the proceeds of which sale to be credited to plaintiff's account.
Plaintiff was informed by the defendant that said sugar was destroyed during the
war.
Plaintiff investigated as to what really happened to the export sugar he delivered
to defendant and discovered that, instead of having been burned and destroyed
during the last war as falsely represented by the defendant to plaintiff, had actually
been shipped to and sold by the defendant in the United States on different dates
in 1941, months before the outbreak of the war; that the proceeds of such sale
were kept and retained by defendant for its own use without crediting the same for
the account of plaintiff.
Defendant alleged that the totality of the export sugar produced by plaintiff and
delivered to it for the 1940-41 crop year; that in accordance with the agreement,
plaintiff irrevocably authorized defendant to receive the former's export sugar in
the latter's own name and for the latter's sale and disposition under the obligation
to sell the same for the account of the plaintiff, whenever ordered to do so; that it
was and has been the long established practice known to plaintiff for defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the long established practice is controlling over the written
agreement?

RULING:
This contention is untenable. Although defendant presented evidence to show its
alleged practice of first securing its client's permission to sell sugar, the evidence
is inadmissible. The agreement between the parties had been reduced to writing,
and under its terms defendant could sell and was so authorized to sell plaintiff's
sugar in any manner it deemed convenient, provided that the proceeds thereof be
credited to plaintiff's account. Defendant now cannot be permitted to adduce
evidence to prove its alleged practice, which to all purposes, would alter the terms
of the written agreement.
Section 22, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides: "When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all
those terms, and therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of
the writing, except in the following cases: ...." Whatever therefore is not found in
the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.
Inasmuch as the case at bar does not fall under any of the exceptions mentioned
in the Rule cited, defendant may not adduce evidence to show a practice other
than that permitted by the terms of the agreement.
The lower court therefore correctly ruled against the admissibility of such
evidence.

(11)PEOPLE VS. ADOFINA

 G.R. No. 109778 (December 8, 1994)
FACTS:
Diomedes Adofina y Alcantara was convicted by the RTC for the crime of
MURDER, committed against the deceased Julio San Marcos y Pontipedra. Both
parties are security guard of same school.
The court based its judgment of conviction on what it considered as circumstantial
evidence, after conceding that there was no eyewitness to the incident.
The Prosecution presents the testimonies of witnesses to string the circumstances.
Accused was seen roaming around the compound where the shooting incident
happened, before the shooting incident.
Accused had threatened the deceased because the latter is testifying on a case against
the accused.
Accused was subjected to a paraffin test. His both hands were found positive of gun
powder.
One Alicia Urrera saw Accused run towards the house of Sgt. Raymundo and that he fled
afterwards, but the same failed to testify.
While dependant Adofina base his defense on ALIBI. This was supported by the
testimony of his Brother.
Accused said that when the killing happened, he was already off duty and was
sleeping in his house.
Accused said that he fired a toy gun three or four times. This toy gun, is filled with powder
called "perminante" .
ISSUE:
Whether the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to overcome
the constitutional right of appellant to be presumed innocent?
RULING:
NO. We are convinced that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt with the moral
certitude mandated by reglementary standards derived from a constitutional foundation.
We do not believe that the judicial conscience can rest easy upon a conviction anchored
upon intrinsically flawed evidence collated through a labored correlation.
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
We are reasonably persuaded that the People's so-called string of circumstances
presented in evidence is insufficient to produce that total moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind which can overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in
appellant's favor. Moreover, much of the prosecution's evidence presented in court were
either hearsay or based on speculations and were consequently inadmissible in evidence.
It is elementary law that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
own knowledge, 28 save in certain instances which, however, do not obtain or are
inapplicable in the instant case. Furthermore, the testimonies of some prosecution
witnesses, far from bearing down on appellant's putative guilt, even bolster his
innocence.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and another one is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused-appellant.

(12)Bagajo v. Hon. Marave and People

86 SCRA 389 (G.R. No. L-33345)

FACTS:
MARCELA M. BAGAJO (petitioner) was convicted by the Municipal Trial Court for
the crime of slight physical injuries committed against her pupil Wilma Alcantara.
There was an accident happen in the petitioners classroom which causes one
pupil to be hurt and fainted, allegedly cause by the complainant Wilma Alcantara.
The petitioner asked Wilma about what happen but the later denied having to do
with what had just taken place. Petitioner thereupon became angry and with a
piece of bamboo stick whipped Wilma, which causes injuries to the latter.
Petitioner on her defense said that, she was just trying to discipline her pupil and
she was not actuated by any criminal intent.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence rendered constitute criminally liability against the
petitioner?

RULING:
NO, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, in
the circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or administrative
responsibility for such act she might be found to have incurred by the proper
authorities, we are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal
intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such
punishment may be true, but we are convinced that the means she actually used
was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent
intent. The nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises
and the fact that petitioner whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to
Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to discipline her. And it cannot be said,
that Wilma did not deserve to be discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the
thought of petitioner to commit any criminal offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea.
There is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial
court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered
by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is that
petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a teacher exercising authority over her
pupil in loco parentis; she was within her rights to punish her moderately for
purposes of discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the degree of moderation
permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not
for us, at this moment and in this case, to determine.