MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from
1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 54
8 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by
the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issue:

Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Ruling:

No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption
by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in
our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor Leonardo Quisumbing and Meralco
Employees and Workers Association (MEWA), respondents.

Facts:

In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed of the case as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated August 19,
1996 and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth above. The parties are directed to execute a Collective
Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of
Labors orders of August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The retirement fund
issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and determination of the legal personality of the
Meralco retirement fund."

Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union (Union for brevity) filed a
motion for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. A separate intervention was likewise made
by the supervisors union of petitioner corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the outcome of the case.

Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would
simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity.

Based on the foregoing figures, the P2,000.00 increase for the two-year period awarded to the rank-and-file is
much higher than the highest increase granted to supervisory employees.

Issue: Whether or not matters of salary are part of management prerogative

Ruling:

YES. The management cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what
units are essential for its operation. It has the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its
personnel or contracted to outside agencies. While there should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid
to what management decides.[25] Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or management
prerogative.[26] Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with
the exercise of judgment by an employer.[27] As mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, the law already sufficiently
regulates this matter.[28] Jurisprudence also provides adequate limitations, such that the employer must be motivated by
good faith and the contracting out should not be resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the result of
malicious or arbitrary actions.[29] These are matters that may be categorically determined only when an actual suit on the
matter arises.
CMS ESTATE, INC.,vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

[ GR No. L-26298, Sep 28, 1984 ]

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation organized primarily for the purpose of engaging in the real estate business.
On December 1, 1952, it started doing business with only six (6) employees. It's Articles of Incorporation was amended on
June 4, 1956 in order to engage in the logging business. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the certificate
of filing of said amended articles on June 18, 1956. Petitioner likewise obtained an ordinary license from the Bureau of
Forestry to operate a forest concession of 13,000 hectares situated in the municipality of Baganga, Province of Davao.

On January 28, 1957, petitioner entered into a contract of management with one Eufracio D. Rojas for the operation and
exploitation of the forest concession The logging operation actually started on April 1, 1957 with four monthly salaried
employees. As of September 1, 1957, petitioner had 89 employees and laborers in the logging operation. On December
26, 1957, petitioner revoked its contract of management with Mr. Rojas.

On August 1, 1958, petitioner became a member of the Social Security System with respect to its real estate business. On
September 6, 1958, petitioner remitted to the System the sum of P203.13 representing the initial premium on the monthly
salaries of the employees in its logging business. However, on October 9, 1958, petitioner demanded the refund of the
said amount, claiming that it is not yet subject to compulsory coverage with respect to its logging business. The request
was denied by respondent System on the ground that the logging business was a mere expansion of petitioner's activities
and for purposes of the Social Security Act, petitioner should be considered a member of the System since December 1,
1952 when it commenced its real estate business.

On November 10, 1958, petitioner filed a petition with the Social Security Commission praying for the determination of the
effectivity date of the compulsory coverage of petitioner's logging business.

After both parties have submitted their respective memoranda, the Commission issued a resolution in favor of
respondents which petitioner subsequently appealed. However, such appeal was also denied by the commission.

Petitioner submits that respondent Commission erred in holding

(1) that the contributions required of employers and employees under our Social Security Act of 1954 are not in the nature
of excise taxes because the said Act was allegedly enacted by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State,
not of its taxing power;

Respondent, on the other hand, advances the following propositions, inter alia:

(1) that the Social Security Act speaks of compulsory coverage of employers and not of business;

Issue:

Whether or not the Social Security Act requires for acompulsory membership coverage.

Ruling:

YES. The Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government "to develop, establish
gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines, and shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death" (Sec. 2, RA 1161,
as amended). It is thus clear that said enactment implements the general welfare mandate of the Constitution and
constitutes a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. As held in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
et al. vs. SSS

Membership in the SSS is not a result of bilateral, concensual agreement where the rights and obligations of the parties
are defined by and subject to their will, RA 1161 requires compulsory coverage of employees and employers under the
System. It is actually a legal imposition on said employers and employees, designed to provide social security to the
workingmen. Membership in the SSS is therefore, in compliance with the lawful exercise of the police power of the State,
to which the principle of non-impairment of the obligation of contract is not a proper defense.

As we have previously mentioned, it is the intention of the law to cover as many persons as possible so as to promote the
constitutional objective of social justice. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute and moreover the
legislative intent must be given effect.
Petitioner further submits that Eufrancio Rojas is an independent contractor who engages in an independent business of
his own consisting of the operation of the timber concession of the former. Rojas was appointed as operations manager of
the logging consession; he has no power to appoint or hire employees; as the term implies, he only manages the
employees and it is petitioner who furnishes him the necessary equipment for use in the logging business; and he is not
free from the control and direction of his employer in matter connected with the performance of his work. These factors
clearly indicate that Rojas is not an independent contractor but merely an employee of petitioner; and should be entitled to
the compulsory coverage of the Act.

The records indubitably show that petitioner started its real estate business on December 1, 1952 while its logging
operation was actually commenced on April 1, 1957. Applying the provision of Sec. 10 of the Act, petitioner is subject to
compulsory coverage as of December 1, 1952 with respect to the real estate business and as of April 1, 1957 with respect
to its logging operation.
PLDT vs. NLRC G.R. No. 80609 August 23, 1988

Facts:

Abucay, a traffic operator of the PLDT, was accused by two complainants of having demanded and received from them
the total amount of P3,800.00 in consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone
installation. Investigated and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service. She
went to the Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally removed. After consideration of the
evidence and arguments of the parties, the company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
Nevertheless, the dispositive portion of labor arbiters decision declared:

WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is dismissed for lack of merit.

Considering that Dr. Bangayan and Mrs. Martinez are not totally blameless in the light of the fact that the deal happened
outhide the premises of respondent company and that their act of giving P3,800.00 without any receipt is tantamount to
corruption of public officers, complainant must be given one month pay for every year of service as financial assistance.

Both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Board, which upheld the said
decision in toto and dismissed the appeals. The private respondent took no further action, thereby impliedly accepting the
validity of her dismissal. The petitioner, however, is now before us to question the affirmance of the above- quoted award
as having been made with grave abuse of discretion.

The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is conceded that an employee illegally dismissed is entitled to
reinstatement and backwages as required by the labor laws. However, an employee dismissed for cause is entitled to
neither reinstatement nor backwages and is not allowed any relief at all because his dismissal is in accordance with law.
In the case of the private respondent, she has been awarded financial assistance equivalent to ten months pay
corresponding to her 10 year service in the company despite her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded
rather than punished for her dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or justification. The award is made on the
ground of equity and compassion, which cannot be a substitute for law. Moreover, such award puts a premium on
dishonesty and encourages instead of deterring corruption.

For its part, the public respondent claims that the employee is sufficiently punished with her dismissal. The grant of
financial assistance is not intended as a reward for her offense but merely to help her for the loss of her employment after
working faithfully with the company for ten years. In support of this position, the Solicitor General cites the cases of
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa and Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, where the
employees were dismissed for cause but were nevertheless allowed separation pay on grounds of social and
compassionate justice.

Issue: Whether or not separation pay is proper.

Ruling:

We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances
where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral
turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed
employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.

A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring
employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has
nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is
granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next
employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion
is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve
the protection and concern of the Constitution.

The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is
an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social
justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of
the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not
simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who
have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own
character.
Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified. The private
respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself
has impliedly admitted. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered at all,
should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of
betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of
dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts
of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.

Petition granted.
DOLE PHILS. VS PAWIS NG MAKABAYANG OBRERO 395 SCRA 112 (2003)

Facts: The petitioner and the respondent executed a CBA for the period starting February 1996 to February
2001. Under the bonuses and allowances section of the said CBA, a P10 meal allowance shall be given to
employees who render at least 2 hrs of overtime work and free meals shall be given after 3 hours of actual
overtime work.

Pursuant to this provision, some departments of granted free meals after exactly 3 hours of work. However,
other departments granted free meals only after more than 3 hours of overtime work.

The respondent filed a complaint against Dole, saying that free meals should be granted after exactly 3 hrs of
overtime work, not after more than 3 hrs. The parties agreed to settle the dispute to voluntary arbitration. It was
decided in favor of the respondent, directing the petitioner to grant free meals after exactly 3 hrs of overtime
work. CA affirmed.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not free meals should be granted after exactly 3 hours of work

(2) Whether or not the petitioner has the right to determine when to grant free meals and its conditions

Held:

(1) YES. The same meal allowance provision is found in their previous CBAs, the 1985-1988 CBA and the
1990-1995 CBA. However, it was amended in the 1993-1995 CBA, by changing the phrase after 3 hrs of
overtime work to after more than 3 hrs of overtime work. In the 1996-2001 CBA, the parties had to negotiate
the deletion of the said phrase in order to revert to the old provision. Clearly, both parties had intended that free
meals should be given after exactly 3 hrs of overtime work.

The disputed provision is clear and unambiguous, hence the literal meaning shall prevail. No amount of legal
semantics can convince the Court that after more than means the same as after.

(2) NO. The exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. It is subject to the limitations provided by
law. In this case, there was a CBA, and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
DAVAO FRUITS CORP. VS ASS. LABOR UNION 225 SCRA 562 (1993)

Facts:

On December 28, 1982 respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU), for and in behalf of all the rank-and-file
workers and employees of petitioner, filed a complaint (NLRC Case No. 1791-MC-XI-82) before the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, against petitioner, for "Payment of the Thirteenth-Month Pay
Differentials." Respondent ALU sought to recover from petitioner the thirteenth month pay differential for 1982 of its rank-
and-file employees, equivalent to their sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and
special holidays, and pay for regular holidays which petitioner, allegedly in disregard of company practice since 1975,
excluded from the computation of the thirteenth month pay for 1982.

In its answer, petitioner claimed that it erroneously included items subject of the complaint in the computation of the
thirteenth month pay for the years prior to 1982, upon a doubtful and difficult question of law. According to petitioner, this
mistake was discovered only in 1981 after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in the case of San Miguel
Corporation v. Inciong (103 SCRA 139).

A decision was rendered on March 7, 1984 by Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos, in favor of respondent ALU.

Issue:

Whether in the computation of the thirteenth month pay given by employers to their employees under P.D. No.
851, payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premiums for work done on rest days and special holidays, and
pay for regular holidays may be excluded in the computation and payment thereof, regardless of long-standing company
practice.

Ruling:

NO. Presidential Decree No. 851, promulgated on December 16, 1975, mandates all employers to pay their
employees a thirteenth month pay. How this pay shall be computed is set forth in Section 2 of the "Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851," thus:

SECTION 2. . . .

(a) "Thirteenth month pay" shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary of an employee within a calendar year.

(b) "Basic Salary" shall include all renumerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered
but may not include cost of living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 525 or Letter of Instructions No.
174, profit-sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of
the regular or basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975.

The Department of Labor and Employment issued on January 16, 1976 the "Supplementary Rules and
Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851" which in paragraph 4 thereof further defines the term "basic salary," thus:

4. Overtime pay, earnings and other renumerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in
the computation of the 13th month pay.

Clearly, the term "basic salary" includes renumerations or earnings paid by the employer to employee, but
excludes cost-of-living allowances, profit-sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary benefits which have not
been considered as part of the basic salary of the employee as of December 16, 1975.

In other words, whatever compensation an employee receives for an eight-hour work daily or the daily wage rate
in the basic salary. Any compensation or remuneration other than the daily wage rate is excluded. It follows therefore, that
payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days special holidays, as well as pay for
regular holidays, are likewise excluded in computing the basic salary for the purpose of determining the thirteen month
pay.

As pointed out in San Miguel Corporation v. Inciong, (supra):

While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations and Implementing Presidential Decree
851 which defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is
dissipated in the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and Regulations which categorically, exclude from the
definition of basic salary earnings and other remunerations paid by employer to an employee.

A company practice favorable to the employees had indeed been established and the payments made pursuant
thereto, ripened into benefits enjoyed by them. And any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot
be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer, by virtue of Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing P.D. No. 851, and Article 100 of the labor of the Philippines, which prohibit the diminution or elimination by
the employer of the employees' existing benefits (Tiangco v. Leogardo, Jr., 122 SCRA 267, [1983]).

Petitioner cannot invoke the principle of solutio indebiti which as a civil law concept that is not applicable in Labor
Law. Besides, in solutio indebiti, the obligee is required to return to the obligor whatever he received from the latter (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Arts. 2154 and 2155). Petitioner in the instant case, does not demand the return of what it paid
respondent ALU from 1975 until 1981; it merely wants to "rectify" the error it made over these years by excluding
unilaterally from the thirteenth month pay in 1982 the items subject of litigation. Solutio indebiti, therefore, is not applicable
to the instant case.
AMERICAN WIRE AND CABLE DAILY RATED EMPLOYEES UNION VS. AMERICAN WIRE AND CABLE CO., INC.
457 SCRA 684 (2005)

Facts:

American Wire and Cable Co., Inc., is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of wires and cables. There are
two unions in this company, the American Wire and Cable Monthly-Rated Employees Union (Monthly-Rated Union) and
the American Wire and Cable Daily-Rated Employees Union (Daily-Rated Union).

On 16 February 2001, an original action was filed before the NCMB of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) by the two unions for voluntary arbitration. They alleged that the private respondent, without valid cause, suddenly
and unilaterally withdrew and denied certain benefits and entitlements which they have long enjoyed. These are the
following:

a. Service Award;

b. 35% premium pay of an employees basic pay for the work rendered during Holy Monday, Holy Tuesday, Holy
Wednesday, December 23, 26, 27, 28 and 29;

c. Christmas Party; and

d. Promotional Increase.

A promotional increase was asked by the petitioner for fifteen (15) of its members who were given or assigned
new job classifications. According to petitioner, the new job classifications were in the nature of a promotion, necessitating
the grant of an increase in the salaries of the said 15 members.

On 21 June 2001, a Submission Agreement was filed by the parties before the Office for Voluntary Arbitration.
Assigned as Voluntary Arbitrator was Angel A. Ancheta.

On 04 July 2001, the parties simultaneously filed their respective position papers with the Office of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, NCMB, and DOLE.

On 25 September 2001, a Decision[5] was rendered by Voluntary Arbitrator Angel A. Ancheta in favor of the
private respondent. The dispositive portion of the said Decision is quoted hereunder:

MOTION[S] FOR RECONSIDERATION be, as they are hereby, denied for lack of merit. Our decision dated 25
September 2001 is affirmed en toto.[9]

An appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure was made by the Daily-Rated Union before the
Court of Appeals[10].

The petitioner averred that Voluntary Arbitrator Angel A. Ancheta erred in finding that the company did not violate
Article 100 of the Labor Code, as amended, when the subject benefits were unilaterally withdrawn.

On 06 March 2002, a Decision in favor of herein respondent company was promulgated by the Special Eighth
Division of the Court of Appeals.

A motion for reconsideration[13] was filed by the petitioner. The Court of Appeals denied the motion in its
Resolution.

ISSUE: whether or not private respondent is guilty of violating Article 100 of the Labor Code, as amended, when
the benefits/entitlements given to the members of petitioner union were withdrawn.

HELD: The Court ruled that respondent is not guilty of violating Art. 100 of the Labor Code.

ART. 100. PROHIBITION AGAINST ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS. Nothing in this Book shall
be construed to eliminate or in any way diminish supplements, or other employee benefits being enjoyed at the time of
promulgation of this Code.

The benefits and entitlements mentioned in the instant case are all considered bonuses which were given by the
private respondent out of its generosity and munificence. A bonus is an amount granted and paid to an employee for his
industry and loyalty which contributed to the success of the employers business and made possible the realization of
profits. The granting of a bonus is a management prerogative, something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by
or strictly due the recipient. Thus, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation, excep twhen it is made part of
the wage, salary or compensation of the employee.
 For a bonus to be enforceable, it must have been promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the
parties or it must have had a fixed amount and had been a long and regular practice on the part of the employer. The
assailed benefits were never subjects of any agreement between the union and the company. It was never incorporated in
the CBA. To be considered a regular practice, the giving of the bonus should have been done over a long period of time,
and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate. The downtrend in the grant of these two bonuses over the
years demonstrates that there is nothing consistent about it. To hold that an employer should be forced to distribute
bonuses which it granted out of kindness is to penalize him for his past generosity.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS BORROMEO 440 SCRA 621 (2004)

Facts:

Respondent Mariano Borromeo was Assistant Vice-President of the Branch Banking Group of China Banking
Corporation for the Mindanao Area.

Without authority from the Executive Committee or Board of Directors of the bank, he approved several DAUD/BP
(Drawn Against Uncollected Deposits/Bills Purhcased) accommodations amounting to P2,441,375 in favour of Joel
Maniwan. Such checks, which are not sufficiently funded by cash, are generally not honoured by banks. This came to the
knowledge of the bank authorities. A memorandum was issued to the Mariano seeking clarification relative to the matter.
The respondent accepted full responsibility for committing an error in judgment and abuse of discretion.

Mariano resigned from the Bank and apologized for all the trouble I have caused because of the Maniwan case.
The respondent, however, vehemently denied benefitting therefrom.

His acts having constituted violation of the Banks Code of Ethics, the respondent was directed to restitute the
amount of P1,507,736.79 representing 90% of the total loss of P1,675,263.10 incurred by the Bank. However, in view of
his resignation and considering the years of service in the Bank, the management earmarked only P836,637.08 from the
respondents total separation benefits or pay. The said amount would be released upon recovery of the sums demanded
from Maniwan in a civil case filed against him by the bank with the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City.

The respondent made a demand on the bank for the payment of his separation pay and other benefits, but the
bank maintained its position to withhold the sum of P836,637.08. Thus, Mariano filed with the NLRC a complaint for
payment of separation pay, mid-year bonus, profit share and damages against the bank.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the bank. Respondent appealed to the NLRC but it affirmed in toto the findings
of the Labor Arbiter. The CA, however, alleging that respondent was denied his right to due process, set aside the NLRC
decision and ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further hearings on the factual
issues involved.

The bank filed a motion for reconsidered but denied the same. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the bank has the prerogative/right to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate
penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations.

Held: The petition is meritorious.

The bank was left with no other course but to impose the ancillary penalty of restitution. It was certainly within the
banks prerogative to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances
pursuant to its company rules and regulations.

The petitioners bank business is essentially imbued with public interest and owes great fidelity to the public it
deals with. It is expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
As a corollary, and like all other business enterprises, its prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate
penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations must be respected. The law, in protecting the
rights of labor, authorized neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer company which itself is possessed of
rights that must be entitled to recognition and respect.

Significantly, the respondent is not wholly deprived of his separation benefits. As the Labor Arbiter stressed in his
decision, the separation benefits due the complainant were merely withheld. Even the petitioner bank itself gives the
assurance that as soon as the bank has satisfied a judgment in the civil case, the earmarked portion of his benefits will be
released without delay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. The Resolution of the
NLRC is reinstated.
SALINAS JR. NLRC 319 SCRA 54 (1999)

Facts:

The herein petitioners, Aurelio Salinas, Jr., Armando Samulde, Alejandro Alonzo and Avelino Cortez, assail the
Resolution[1] dated January 31, 1994 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which dismissed their
complaint, and affirming, in effect, the Decision[2] of the Labor Arbiter declaring them project employees and not regular
employees of respondent Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as AG & P).

Petitioner Alejandro Alonzo had been employed with AG & P in the several construction projects of the latter from
1982 to 1989, in the course of which he essentially performed the same job, initially as a laborer, and later as bulk cement
operator, bulk cement plant/carrier operator, and crane driver. Under similar circumstances, petitioner Avelino Cortez had
been employed with AG & P from 1979 to 1988 as carpenter/forklift operator; petitioner Armando Samulde served as
lubeman/stationary operator from 1982 to 1989; while petitioner Aurelio Salinas, Jr., used to work as carpenter/finishing
carpenter from 1983 to 1988.

On May 29, June 6, July 4 and July 5 of 1989, respectively, petitioners Salinas, Samulde, Alonzo and Cortez filed
against the respondent corporation separate complaints for illegal dismissal, which cases were consolidated and jointly
heard by Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion.

In his Order of dismissal, Labor Arbiter Asuncion found that petitioners are project employees whose work
contracts with AG & P indicate that they were employed in such category; that they have been assigned to different work
projects, not just to one and that their work relation with AG & P, relative to termination, is governed by Policy Instruction
No. 20.

On appeal, NLRC affirmed the said findings of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for want of merit.

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition below, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition
posing as the sole issue whether they are regular or project employee.

Petitioners emphatically stressed that no report even a single one, was ever submitted by the respondent
corporation to the nearest public employment office every time petitioners employment was terminated pursuant to Policy
Instruction No. 20.

AG & P staunchly claims that the petitioners are mere project employees; that the questioned resolution of public
respondent is supported by substantial evidence and therefore, conclusive and binding.

In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment,[5] the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the
contention of petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not herein petitioner are mere project employees of AG & P Company.

Ruling:

The mandate in Article 281 of the Labor Code, which pertinently prescribes that the provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer and that any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity
in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists, should apply in the case of
petitioner (Samson).[15]

In the case under consideration, the Court likewise rules that failure to report the termination to Public
Employment Office is a clear indication that petitioners were not and are not project employees.

It is significant to note that the notice of termination requirement has been retained under Section 6.1 of D.O. No.
19, viz:[17]

6.1. Requirements of labor and social legislations.--(a) The construction company and the general contractor
and/or subcontractor referred to in Sec. 2.5 shall be responsible for the workers in its employ on matters of compliance
with the requirements of existing laws and regulations on hours of work, wages, wage-related benefits, health, safety and
social welfare benefits, including submission to the DOLE-Regional Office of Work Accident/Illness Report, Monthly
Report on Employees Terminations/Dismissals/Suspensions and other reports.

Undoubtedly, periods in the present case have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by
petitioners, and must be struck down for being contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order.

Anent the issue that the petition should have been brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, this rule is not inflexible
 Reyes vs Court of Appeals 409 SCRA 267 (2003)

Facts:

The facts show that on August 24, 1989, respondent Leong Hup Poultry Farms SDN. BHD (Leung Hup) of
Malaysia, thru its Managing Director Francis T. Lau, appointed petitioner Pedrito F. Reyes as Technical/Sales Manager
with a net salary of US$4,500.00 a month. His duties consisted of selling parent stock day-old chicks and providing
technical assistance to clients of the company in Malaysia and other Asian countries.[4] Sometime in 1992, the company
formed Philippine Malay Poultry Breeders, Inc., (Philmalay) in the Philippines. Petitioner was appointed General Manager
thereof with a monthly salary of US$5,500.00.

In 1996-1997, respondents suffered losses which caused them to reduce production and retrench employees in
Philmalay. On June 30, 1997, petitioner gave verbal notice to respondent Francis T. Lau that he will serve as General
Manager of Philmalay until December 31, 1997 only.[5] In a letter dated January 12, 1998, petitioner confirmed his verbal
notice of resignation and requested that he be given the same benefits granted to retrenched and resigned employees of
the company, consisting of separation pay equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service and the monetary
equivalent of his sick leave and vacation leave.

In a letter dated January 19, 1998, respondent Philmalay retrenched petitioner effective January 20, 1998 and
promised to pay him separation benefits pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code.[7] He was, however, offered a
separation pay equivalent to four months only, or the total amount of P578,600.00 (P144,650 x 4). The offer was not
accepted by petitioner and efforts to settle the impasse proved futile.

Petitioner filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint[8] for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of separation pay, sick leave, vacation leave and other benefits against
respondents.

On December 22, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision[9] in favor of petitioner.

On appeal by respondents to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
was modified by deleting the awards.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied.[13] Undaunted, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed .

On February 21, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching thereto a copy of the Labor Arbiters
decision and the pleadings he failed to attach to the petition. The Court of Appeals, however, denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.Hence, the instant petition .

ISSUE: Whetjer or not the termination of petitioners employment caused by retrenchment or by voluntary resignation?

HELD: The Court finds that petitioners dismissal from service was due to retrenchment. This is evident from the
termination letter sent by Philmalay to petitioner.

While it is true that petitioner tendered his resignation letter to respondents requesting that he be given the same
benefits granted by the company to resigned/retrenched employees, there is no showing that respondents accepted his
resignation.Acceptance of a resignation tendered by an employee is necessary to make the resignation effective.[24] No
such acceptance, however, was shown in the instant case. What appears in the record is a letter terminating the services
of petitioner due to retrenchment effective January 20, 1998. Verily, said letter should be interpreted as a non-acceptance
of petitioners resignation effective December 31, 1997. As correctly pointed out by the Labor Arbiter, if respondents
considered petitioner resigned as of December 31, 1997, then there would be no need to retrench him.

As regards the award of unpaid salary, the NLRC was correct in holding that petitioner is not entitled to
compensation fromJanuary 1, 1998 to January 19, 1998, because he was not able to prove that he rendered services
during said period.

In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the employees
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to
the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that [a]ll doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor] Code including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor, and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that [i]n case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.[34]

In the case at bar, what was withheld from petitioner was not only his salary, vacation and sick leave pay, and
13th month pay differential, but also his separation pay. Hence, pursuant to current jurisprudence, separation pay must be
included in the basis for the computation of attorneys fees. Petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of his
total monetary award.
 G & M Philippines, Inc., vs. Romil V. Cuambot

G.R. No. 162308 November 22, 2006

Facts:

Respondent Romil V. Cuambot was deployed to Saudi Arabia as a car body builder with petitioner G & M
Philippines, Inc., a duly licensed placement and recruitment agency. On a two-year employment contract, he worked with
the Al Waha Workshop. However, respondent did not finish his contract and returned to the Philippines barely six months
later. Upon returning, he immediately filed before the NLRC a complaint for unpaid wages, withheld salaries, refund of
plane ticket and repatriation bond, which was later amended to include illegal dismissal, claim for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract, actual, exemplary and moral damages, and attorneys fees.

Respondent Cuambot alleged that at the Al Waha Workshop where he worked, he was subjected to inhumane
and unbearable working conditions. Except for a meal allowance of 100 Riyals a month, he was not paid his monthly
salary of 1,200 Riyals. And he was required to render six (6) hours of overtime work daily, except Friday, without overtime
pay; he was also seriously insulted by his employer every time he demanded for his salary, and some of the letters sent to
him by his family were withheld by his employer.

He thus filed a petition for payment of the unpaid salaries including interests, until the same will be fully paid.

Petitioner G & M insisted that respondent was religiously paid his salaries as they fell due. After working for a little
over seven months, respondent pleaded with his employer to be allowed to return home since there were family problems
he had to settle personally. Respondent even submitted a resignation letter. To support such claim, petitioner submitted in
evidence copies of seven payslips duly authenticated by the Philippine Labor Attach in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Respondent countered that his signatures in the purported payslips were forged. He also stated that he was never
given a copy of the contract of employment. To counter the allegation of forgery, petitioner claimed that there was a great
possibility that respondent had changed his signature while abroad so that he could file a complaint for illegal dismissal
upon his return. The argument that the stroke and handwriting on the payslips was written by one and the same person is
mere conjecture, as respondent could have requested someone, to prepare the resignation letter for him. Petitioner
further pointed out that respondent has different signatures, not only in the pleadings submitted before the Labor Arbiter,
but also in respondents personal documents.

On January 30, 1997, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent Cuambot, finding unreliable the G & M's
evidence of Cuambot's alleged signature in the payslips which was similar to the handwritings in the payslips and the
handwritings in the purported resignation letter of the Cuambot. In an appeal to the NLRC, the latter remanded the case to
its origin for referral to a government agency that can conduct calligraphy examination on the questioned documents.

The case was then re-raffled to another Labor Arbiter, and this time, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
The new Labor Arbiter said the respondent failed to substantiate his claim of poor working conditions and long hours of
employment. The fact that he executed a handwritten resignation letter was enough evidence of the fact that he voluntarily
resigned from work. Respondent also failed to submit any evidence to refute the payslips duly signed and authenticated
by the labor attach in Saudi Arabia, inasmuch as their probative value cannot be impugned by mere self-serving
allegations. The Labor Arbiter concluded that as between the oral allegations of workers that they were not paid monetary
benefits and the documentary evidence presented by employer, the latter should prevail.

Respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC, alleging that the Labor Arbiter failed to consider the genuineness
of the signature which appears in the purported resignation as well as those that appeared in the seven payslips. He
insisted that these documents should have been endorsed to the National Bureau of Investigation Questioned Documents
Division or the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for calligraphy examination.

The NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. It held that the questioned documents could not be endorsed to
the agency concerned since mere photocopies had been submitted in evidence. It also stressed that the parties had
earlier agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence on record; that if
respondent had wanted to have the documents endorsed to the NBI or the PNP, he should have insisted that the
documents be examined by a handwriting expert of the government. Thus, respondent was estopped from assailing the
Labor Arbiters ruling.

On a petition for certiorari before the CA, the latter reversed the ruling of the NLRC. According to the appellate
court, among others, a visual examination of the questioned signatures would instantly reveal significant differences in the
handwriting.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employee voluntarily resigned from employment or was illegally dismissed?

RULING:

We find in respondents favor. That the petitioner failed to submit the original copies of the payslips and the
resignation letter raises doubts as to the veracity of its claim that they were actually signed by the respondent.

As correctly noted by the CA, the opinions of handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of forged
documents because of the technical procedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the courts. A finding of
forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
No less than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of
the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered
or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

Even a cursory perusal of the resignation letter and the handwritten pay slips will readily show that they were
written by only one person.

Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved
in favor of labor, in order to give effect to the policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers, and to assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work.

The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
HUNTINGTON STELL PRODUCTS, INC. VS NLRC 442 SCRA 551 (2004)

Facts:

The instant petition stemmed from the illegal dismissal complaint with claim for damages initiated by respondent
Jaime Orbase and eleven others against petitioners Huntington Steel Products, Inc. and its President, Serafin Ng. Private
respondents filed an amended complaint to include Everson Metal Works as a party, being the original employer of private
respondents before it changed its business name to Huntington Steel Products, Inc. Thereafter, private respondents filed
their position paper.

Petitioners also filed their Position Paper with Motion to Dismiss assailing the private respondents failure to
comply with the requirements of Revised Circular No. 28-91[3] as implemented by Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 04-94.[4] They averred that the Complaint which private respondents filed in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
lacked a certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioners Motion to Dismiss was granted by the Labor Arbiter in his
Decision[5] dated June 13, 2001.

Private respondents appealed before the NLRC. On April 15, 2002, the NLRC promulgated an Order which
reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter as follows:

We are [of] the considered view therefore that defects should be corrected in the proceedings below, for which
reason, the instant case should be remanded to the Arbitration Branch of origin.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby remanded to the Labor Arbiter of origin for further appropriate
proceedings.

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but public respondent in its Resolution dated July
11, 2002, denied the motion.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

On January 22, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the petition.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the NLRC correctly applied Article 221 of the Labor Code.[8] The appellate
court said that decisions in labor cases must be supported by substantial evidence, and disregarding technical rules of
procedure, will not sacrifice the fundamental requisites of due process.[9]

Citing the landmark case of The New Valley Times Press v. NLRC,[10] the Court of Appeals held that technical
rules are not binding in labor cases and are not to be applied strictly if the result would be detrimental to the working-man.
The Court of Appeals declared that private respondents should not be faulted because in filing their complaint, they
merely filled up the blanks in the complaint form provided for them in the docket section of the Arbitration Branch. The
Court of Appeals added that private respondents should not be punished for whatever defects found in the form provided
by the Commission.[11]

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the case should be dismissed for failure to comply with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94
on certification of non-forum shopping.

Ruling:

No. As a rule, the certificate of non-forum shopping as provided by this Court Circular 04-94 is mandatory and
should accompany pleadings filed before the NLRC. Court Circular No. 04-94 is clear and needs no further interpretation.

However, in the case of Melo v. Court of Appeals, the court said that in those cases where it excused non-
compliance with the requirements of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94, there were special circumstances
or compelling reasons that made the strict application of said Circular clearly unjustified. The rule is crystal clear and
plainly unambiguous that the certification is a mandatory part of an initiatory pleading, i.e., the complaint, and its omission
may be excused only upon manifest equitable grounds proving substantial compliance therewith.

In the present case, the respondents reasoned that they failed to comply with the Circular because the complaint
form supplied by the Labor Arbiter did not contain the required undertaking. They simply filled up the blanks therein.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that respondents should not be faulted for not having the
certification of non-forum shopping in their complaint.

The strict application of the Circular in the instant case, in our view, would be contrary to the goals of the Rules of
Civil Procedure that is, just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Technical rules of
procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working-man.[24]Thus, the
NLRC did not err in ordering that the corrections be made at the Arbitration Branch, since the NLRC has also the power to
order corrections in case of irregularities in the proceedings before it.

CIRINEO BOWLING PLAZA, INC., vs. SENSING et al 448 SCRA 275 (2005)

Facts:

Eligio Paolo, Jr., an employee of petitioner, filed a letter complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE for short), Dagupan District Office, Dagupan City, requesting for the inspection/investigation of petitioner for
various labor law violations like underpayment of wages, 13th month pay, non-payment of rest day pay, overtime pay,
holiday pay and service incentive leave pay. Pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, his duly authorized representative under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, conducted
inspections on petitioners establishment the following day. In his inspection report, Labor and Employment Officer III,
Crisanto Rey Dingle, found that petitioner has thirteen5 employees and had committed the following violations:
underpayment of minimum wage, 13th month pay, holiday premiums, overtime premiums, and non-payment of rest day.
The findings in the inspection report were explained to petitioners officer-in-charge, Ma. Fe Boquiren, who signed the
same.

An Order was issued by the DOLE Regional Office, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and considering further that the amount computed constitutes part of the
lawful remunerations of thirteen affected employees, respondent is hereby ordered to pay them the total amount of
THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS AND 58/100. (P377,500.58), representing
their unpaid/underpaid wages, 13th month pay, holiday premiums, rest day pay and overtime premiums.

Respondent is further ORDERED to adjust the salaries of its employees to the applicable daily minimum wages
and to submit the proof thereof within the same period.

Petitioners representative, Carmen Zapata, appeared before the DOLE Regional Office and submitted the
quitclaims, waivers and releases of employees-awardees, Lamberto Solano, Jovelyn Quinto, Manuel Benitez, Edgar
Dizon, Ronillo Tandoc, Eligio Paolo, Jr., and Dario Benitez. Later, however, Benitez, Tandoc, Quinto and Dizon wrote
DOLE a letter denying having received any amount from petitioner. Thus, DOLEs inspector Dingle went to petitioners
establishment to confirm the authenticity of the quitclaims and releases and talked to the employees concerned who
stated that they signed the document without knowing its contents but they are willing to settle if they will be given the
amount computed by DOLE.

Luisito Cirineo and a certain Fe Cirineo Octaviano, owner of Esperanza Seafoods Kitchenette stationed in petitioners
establishment, wrote DOLE a letter requesting that the case be endorsed to the National Labor Relations Commission
since the resolution of the case required evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection.
They also submitted documents to show that petitioner and Esperanza Seafoods Kitchenette are separate and distinct
business entities and that some of the employees-awardees are actually employees of the Esperanza Seafoods
Kitchenette.

DOLE issued its Order stating among others:

Records show that respondent, Luisito Cirineo and his representative appeared before this Office during the summary
investigation of this instant case but they never once mentioned the issue of separate juridical personalities. Respondent
had always been bent on settling the respective claims of all thirteen (13) concerned employees. In the process, however,
he acknowledged being their employer. He cannot at this juncture therefore say, that some of the awardees in our ORDER
are employees of another business entity. This being the case, we cannot grant his request for indorsement to the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the case of employees Eligio Paolo, Jr. and Lamberto Solano whose respective
claims had been settled by respondent is hereby DISMISSED. The ORDER for the payment of the monetary claims of the
eleven (11) other cash awardees STANDS. Let execution follow immediately.

DOLE Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued a writ of execution. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of execution.

In an Order, DOLE Regional Director Lim denied petitioners motion to quash the writ of execution.

Petitioner filed its Memorandum of Appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who dismissed the appeal on the
ground that same was filed out of time. On motion for reconsideration, the appeal was granted and the appeal was given
due course.

DOLE Undersecretary Jose Espaol dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the DOLE Regional Director.

In support thereof, respondent alleges that it had only eight (8) employees as the other claimants of labor benefits . . . are
employees of Fe Esperanza Octaviano doing business under the name and style Esperanza Seafoods Kitchenette.
Thus, it points out that:
Hence, under the Labor Code, Article 94 thereof the employees of the appellant are not entitled to holiday pay and holiday
premium pay.

Under Republic Act 6727 and its Implementing Rules, Chapter 1, Section 1 thereof, establishments employing
less than ten (10) employees are exempted from compliance with minimum wage rates. Hence, the wages given to
respondents do not constitute under payments. As to their claims for overtime pay and rest day pay, there is no proof that
respondents rendered overtime or restday work, hence they are not entitled to the same.

We do not agree.

The records show that during the summary investigation respondent never refuted the findings of the labor
inspector particularly the identity of the thirteen (13) concerned employees nor raised the issue of separate juridical
personalities of respondent Cirineo and Esperanza Seafoods Kitchenette.

The documents submitted to this Office by respondent could be interpreted as a desperate attempt to mislead this
Office and to evade liability.

On the issue of jurisdiction, we rule that the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the instant case.

The old rule limiting the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives to money claims not exceeding P5,000.00 has been repealed by the passage of R.A. No. 7730, Section 1.

Pursuant to R.A. 7730, the jurisdictional limitations imposed by Article 129 on the visitorial and enforcement
powers of this Office under Article 128 of the Labor Code, have been repealed. The phrase notwithstanding the provision
of Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code to the contrary, erases all doubts as to the amendatory nature of R.A. No.
7730. The amendment, in effect, overturned the rulings in the Aboitiz and Servandos cases insofar as the restrictive effect
of Article 129 on the use of the power under Article 128 is concerned.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated April 18, 2000.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order with the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to (1) attach a copy of the letter complaint filed by
petitioners employees and the Order dated February 7, 1997 of the DOLE Regional Director and (2) state the material
date when the assailed Orders/Resolutions were received pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 65 and Section 3 of Rule 46 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied by the CA.

Issue:

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INSTANT PETITION AND OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DUE TO MERE TECHNICALITIES.

Ruling:

We dismiss the petition.

We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in issuing the assailed resolutions. The CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari for failure of petitioner to attach certain documents and to state the material date. Section 3.
Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements.-

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when the notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any,
was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.

It bears stressing that the timely perfection of an appeal is a mandatory requirement, which cannot be trifled with
as a mere technicality to suit the interest of a party.

Even if we disregard technicality, we find the arguments raised by petitioner without merit. As correctly held by the
DOLE Regional Director and sustained by the DOLE Undersecretary, records show that petitioner never refuted the
findings of the labor inspector as to the identity of the thirteen employees nor raised the issue of separate juridical
personalities of petitioner Cirineo and Esperanza Seafoods Kitchenette during the investigation and on the hearings
conducted.
 Likewise, we sustain the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director. The visitorial and enforcement powers of the
DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws can be exercised even where the
individual claim exceeds P5,000.00

(Art. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power is cited)

An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this article
may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involved a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from.

The aforequoted provision explicitly excludes from its coverage Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code by the
phrase (N)otwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary . . . thereby retaining and
further strengthening the power of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative to issue compliance orders
to give effect to the labor standards provisions of said Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor
employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection.

In the case at bar, the Office of respondent Regional Director conducted inspection visits at petitioners
establishment on February 9 and 14, 1995 in accordance with the above-mentioned provision of law. In the course of said
inspection, several violations of the labor standard provisions of the Labor Code were discovered and reported by Senior
Labor Enforcement Officer Eduvigis A. Acero in his Notice of Inspection Results. It was on the bases of the aforesaid
findings (which petitioner did not contest), that respondent Regional Director issued the assailed Order for petitioner to
pay private respondents the respective wage differentials due them.

Clearly, as the duly authorized representative of respondent Secretary of Labor, and in the lawful exercise of the
Secretarys visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code, respondent Regional Director had
jurisdiction to issue his impugned Order.

We dismiss the petition. Pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act 7730 [Approved on June 2, 1994] which amended
Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative, in the
exercise of their visitorial and enforcement powers, are now authorized to issue compliance orders to give effect to the
labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and
enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, sans any restriction with respect to
the jurisdictional amount of P5,000.00 provided under Article 129 and Article 217 of the Code.

The instant case therefore falls squarely within the coverage of the aforecited amendment as the assailed order
was issued to en nn orce compliance with the provisions of the Code with respect to the payment of proper wages.
Hence, petitioners claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent is bereft of merit.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC G.R. No. 147566, December 6, 2006

Facts:

San Miguel Corporation (SMC) seeks to reverse a Court of Appeals (CA) decision which affirmed an NLRC
declaration that private respondent Rafael Maliksi (Maliksi) is a regular employee of SMC and must be reinstated with
benefits.

Maliksi in October 16, 1990 sued SMC-Magnolia Division and Philippine Software Services and Education Center
(PHILSSEC) for them to recognize him as a regular employee. Later on the same case he included the charge of illegal
dismissal when petitioners terminated his services later that month. Maliksis employment record shows he served SMC
alternately as budget head, accounting clerk and acting clerk under Skillpower, Lipercon and PHILSSEC between 1981 up
to February 1985 for periods spread apart, or for at least three years and seven months.

Respondent Maliksi maintained that he is an employee of SMC-Magnolia and that Lipercon, Skillpower, Inc. and
PHILSSEC are labor-only contractors, none being his employer. PHILSSEC meanwhile disclaimed liability as it catered
only to computerized accounting needs of businesses like SMC-Magnolia, PHILSSECs principal function being that of
manual control of data needed during the computerization. PHILSSEC added that it controlled Maliksis work, paid his
salary and required him to report directly to it. Maliksi was terminated because the project was completed on October 31,
1990. SMC for its part basically asserted the same, contending that PHILSSEC exercised exclusive managerial
prerogative over the complainant as to hiring, payment of salary, dismissal and the control over his work. It was interested
only in the result of the work specified in the contract but not as to the means and methods of accomplishing the same.
Also, PHILSSEC has substantial capital of its own. What it markets to clients are computer programs and training systems
on computer technology and not the usual labor or manpower supply to establishment concerns. Further, SMC said,
Maliksis service has no relation to the principal business of SMC, which is food and beverage.

The Labor Arbiter declared Maliksi a regular employee of PHILSSEC and absolved SMC from liability. Maliksi
appealed to the NLRC which in turn reversed the Labor Arbiters decision, ordering SMC-Magnolia Division to reinstate
him without loss of seniority rights and with full benefits. When the case reached the CA, the latter affirmed in toto the
NLRCs decision, finding Lipercon and Skillpower as mere conduits to circumvent Article 280 of the Labor Code,
employing Maliksi as contractual or project employee through these entities, thereby undermining his right to gain regular
employment status under the law. The CA agreed with the NLRC that Maliksis work was necessary or desirable in the
business of SMC in its Magnolia Division, for more than the required one-year period, and that he became permanent and
regular with SMC after the statutory period of one year of service. The CA also concluded that on account of his past
employment contracts with SMC under Lipercon and Skillpower, Maliksi was already a regular employee of SMC when he
entered into SMCs computerization project as part of the PHILSSEC project complement.

Issue: Whether or not Maliksi was a regular employee of SMC?

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

Maliksi is a regular employee of SMC. Lipercon and Skillpower are labor-only contractors providing as they do
personnel services to the public for a fee. There is an employer-employee relationship and the Court gives due deference
to this factual findings of both the NLRC and the CA. Having served SMC for an aggregate period of more than three (3)
years through employment contracts with these Lipercon and Skillpower, Maliksi should be considered as SMCs regular
employee. The fact is that he was hired and re-hired by SMC to perform administrative and clerical work that was
necessary to SMCs business on a daily basis.

In Bustamante v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that petitioners were employees engaged
to perform activities necessary in the usual business of the employer. The contract for probationary employment was
utilized by respondent company as a chicanery to deny petitioners their status as regular employees and to evade paying
them the benefits attached to such status. They were hired and re-hired in a span of from two to four years to do the same
type of work which conclusively shows the necessity of petitioners service to the respondent companys business.

With respect to PHILSSEC, there was no need for Maliksi to be employed under the formers computerization
program to be considered a regular employee of SMC at the time. Moreover, SMC itself admits that Maliksis work under
the computerization program did not require the operation of a computer system, such as the software program being
developed by PHILSSEC. Maliksis work under the PHILSSEC project was mainly administrative in nature and necessary
to the development of SMCs business.

Maliksi was juggled from one employment contract to another in a continuous bid to circumvent labor laws. The
act of hiring and re-hiring workers over a period of time without considering them as regular employees evidences bad
faith on the part of the employer making it liable to pay damages. The contrivances may be many and the schemes
ingenious and imaginative. But this Court will not hesitate to put pen to a line and defend the workers right to be secure in
his (or her) proprietary right to regular employment and his right to a secure employment, viz, one that is free from fear
and doubt, that anytime he could be removed, retrenched, his contract not renewed or he might not be re-hired.
 Considering, however, the supervening event that SMCs Magnolia Division has been acquired by another entity,
respondent Maliksis reinstatement it appears is no longer feasible. Instead, he should be awarded separation, in addition
to the other monetary awards, pay as an alternative. Likewise, owing to petitioners bad faith in juggling the latter from one
labor contractor to another, it should be held liable to pay nominal damages for causing undue injury and inconvenience to
the private respondent in its contractual hiring-firing-rehiring scheme and for denying him his proprietary right to regular
employment.
LIKHA-PMPB V. BURLINGAME CORPORATION (G.R. NO. 162833)

Facts:

Petitioner LIKHA-PMPB filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE as it sought to represent all 70
rank-and-file promo employees of respondent Burlingame Corporation. Respondent opposed arguing that there exists no
employer-employee relationship between them since petitioners members are actually employees of F. Garil Manpower
Services, a duly licensed local employment agency. The Med-Arbiter found for respondent finding no employer-employee
relationship existed, but was reversed on appeal to the DOLE. CA reversed the decision holding F. Garil to be an
independent contractor.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not F. Garil is an independent contractor; and

(2) Whether or not petitioner are employees of Burlingame Corporation.

Ruling:

(1) NO. We agree with the Secretary that F. Garil is not an independent contractor. First, F. Garil does not have
substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials,
to qualify as an independent contractor. No proof was adduced to show F. Garils capitalization. Second, the work of the
promo-girls was directly related to the principal business or operation of Burlingame. Marketing and selling of products is
an essential activity to the main business of the principal. Lastly, F. Garil did not carry on an independent business or
undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and
supervision of its principal, Burlingame.

(2) YES. The four-fold test will show that respondent is the employer of petitioners members. The involvement
of F. Garil in the hiring process was only with respect to the recruitment aspect because the actual hiring itself was done
through the deployment of personnel to establishments by Burlingame. Burlingame would pay the workers through F. Garil
a certain sum per worker on the basis of eight-hour work every 15th and 30th of each calendar month which evinces the
fact that F. Garil merely served as conduit in the payment of wages to the deployed personnel. Burlingame upon request
to F. Garil may replace any personnel found to be inefficient, troublesome, uncooperative and not observing the rules and
regulations set forth by it.

There is no doubt that F. Garil was engaged in labor-only contracting, and as such, is considered merely an agent of
Burlingame. Since F. Garil is a labor-only contractor, the workers it supplied should be considered as employees of
Burlingame in the eyes of the law.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHIL., INC VS NLRC 307 SCRA 131 (1999)

Facts:

On 7 April 1986 COCA COLA entered into a contract of janitorial services with Bacolod Janitorial Services (BJS)
stipulating among others -

That the First Party (COCA COLA) desires to engage the services of the Second Party (BJS), as an Independent
Contractor, to perform and provide for the maintenance, sanitation and cleaning services for the areas herein below
mentioned, all located within the aforesaid building of the First Party.

Every year thereafter a service contract was entered into between the parties under similar terms and conditions
until about May 1994.

On 26 October 1989 COCA COLA hired private respondent Ramon Canonicato as a casual employee and
assigned him to the bottling crew as a substitute for absent employees. In April 1990 COCA COLA terminated
Canonicato's casual employment. Later that year COCA COLA availed of Canonicato's services, this time as a painter in
contractual projects which lasted from fifteen (15) to thirty (30) days.

On 1 April 1991 Canonicato was hired as a janitor by BJS[ which assigned him to COCA COLA considering his
familiarity with its premises. On 5 and 7 March 1992 Canonicato started painting the facilities of COCA COLA and
continued doing so several months thereafter or so for a few days every time until 6 to 25 June 1993.

Goaded by information that COCA COLA employed previous BJS employees who filed a complaint against the
company for regularization pursuant to a compromise agreement,[8] Canonicato submitted a similar complaint against
COCA COLA to the Labor Arbiter on 8 June 1993. The complaint was docketed as RAB Case No. 06-06-10337-93.
 Without notifying BJS, Canonicato no longer reported to his COCA COLA assignment starting 29 June 1993. On
15 July 1993 he sent his sister Rowena to collect his salary from BJS. BJS released his salary but advised Rowena to tell
Canonicato to report for work. Claiming that he was barred from entering the premises of COCA COLA on either 14 or 15
July 1993, Canonicato met with the proprietress of BJS, Gloria Lacson, who offered him assignments in other firms which
he however refused.

On 23 July 1993 Canonicato amended his complaint against COCA COLA by citing instead as grounds therefor
illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. He included BJS therein as a co-respondent. On 28 September 1993 BJS
sent him a letter advising him to report for work within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise, he would be considered to
have abandoned his job.

On 28 April 1994 the Labor Arbiter ruled that: (a) there was no employer-employee relationship between COCA
COLA and Ramon Canonicato because BJS was Canonicato's real employee. The Labor Arbiter also ordered that all
other claims by Canonicato against COCA COLA be dismissed for lack of employer-employee relationship.

The NLRC rejected on appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the janitorial services of Canonicato
were found to be necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of COCA COLA. The NLRC accepted Canonicato's
proposition that his work with the BJS was the same as what he did while still a casual employee of COCA COLA. In so
holding the NLRC applied Art. 280 of the Labor Code and declared that Canonicato was a regular employee of COCA
COLA and entitled to reinstatement and payment of P18,105.10 in back wages.[

On 26 May 1995 the NLRC denied COCA COLA's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[16] Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N CANONICATO IS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE OF COCA-COLA?

HELD: in Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Drilon that -

x x x x [t]he definition that regular employees are those who perform activities which are desirable and necessary for the
business of the employer is not determinative in this case. Any agreement may provide that one party shall render
services for and in behalf of another for a consideration (no matter how necessary for the latter's business) even without
being hired as an employee. This is precisely true in the case of an independent contractorship as well as in an agency
agreement. The Court agrees with the petitioner's argument that Article 280 is not the yardstick for determining the
existence of an employment relationship because it merely distinguishes between two kinds of employees, i.e., regular
employees and casual employees, for purposes of determining the right of an employee to certain benefits, to join or form
a union, or to security of tenure. Article 280 does not apply where the existence of an employment relationship is in
dispute.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship it is necessary to determine whether the following
factors are present:(a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power to
dismiss; and, (d) the power to control the employee's conduct.Notably, these are all found in the relationship between BJS
and Canonicato and not between Canonicato and petitioner COCA COLA. As the Solicitor-General manifested-

In the instant case, the selection and engagement of the janitors for petitioner were done by BJS. The application form
and letter submitted by private respondent (Canonicato) to BJS show that he acknowledged the fact that it was BJS who
did the hiring and not petitioner x x x x

BJS paid the wages of private respondent, as evidenced by the fact that on July 15, 1993, private respondent sent his
sister to BJS with a note authorizing her to receive his pay.

Power of dismissal is also exercised by BJS and not petitioner. BJS is the one that assigns the janitors to its clients and
transfers them when it sees fit. Since BJS is the one who engages their services, then it only follows that it also has the
power to dismiss them when justified under the circumstances.

Lastly, BJS has the power to control the conduct of the janitors. The supervisors of petitioner, being interested in the result
of the work of the janitors, also gives suggestions as to the performance of the janitors, but this does not mean that BJS
has no control over them. The interest of petitioner is only with respect to the result of their work. On the other hand, BJS
oversees the totality of their performance.

The power of the employer to control the work of the employee is said to be the most the most significant determinant.

Moreover, a closer scrutiny of the reports reveals that the painting jobs were performed by Canonicato sporadically, either
in a few days within a month and only for a few months in a year. This infrequency or irregularity of assignments
countervails Canonicatos submission that he was assigned specifically to undertake the task of painting the whole year
round. If anything, it hews closely to the assertion of BJS that it assigned Canonicato to these jobs to maintain and
sanitize the premises of petitioner COCA COLA pursuant to its contract of services with the company.

It is clear from these established circumstances that NLRC should have recognized BJS as the employer of Canonicato
and not COCA COLA.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS PROSPERO A. ABALLA

461 SCRA 392 (2005)

Facts:

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Sunflower) entered into a
one-year Contract of Service and such contract is renewed on a monthly basis until terminated. Pursuant to this,
respondent Prospero Aballa et al. rendered services to SMC.

After one year of rendering service, Aballa et al., filed a complaint before National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) praying that they be declared as regular employees of SMC. On the other hand, SMC filed before the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Notice of Closure due to serious business losses. Hence, the labor arbiter dismissed
the complaint and ruled in favor of SMC. Aballa et al. then appealed before the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the appeal
finding that Sunflower is an independent contractor.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed NLRCs decision on the ground that the agreement between SMC and
Sunflower showed a clear intent to abstain from establishing an employer-employee relationship.

Issue: Whether or not Aballa et al. are employees of SMC

Ruling:

The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an independent
contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the
employer, except only as to the results of the work.

In legitimate labor contracting, the law creates an employer-employee relationship for a limited purpose, i.e., to
ensure that the employees are paid their wages. The principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job
contractor, only for the payment of the employees wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Other than that,
the principal employer is not responsible for any claim made by the employees.

In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to
prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the
latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the
principal employer.

The Contract of Services between SMC and Sunflower shows that the parties clearly disavowed the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between SMC and private respondents. The language of a contract is not, however,
determinative of the parties relationship; rather it is the totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case. A
party cannot dictate, by the mere expedient of a unilateral declaration in a contract, the character of its business, i.e.,
whether as labor-only contractor or job contractor, it being crucial that its character be measured in terms of and
determined by the criteria set by statute.

What appears is that Sunflower does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials to qualify it as an independent contractor. On the other hand,
it is gathered that the lot, building, machineries and all other working tools utilized by Aballa et al. in carrying out their
tasks were owned and provided by SMC.

And from the job description provided by SMC itself, the work assigned to Aballa et al. was directly related to the
aquaculture operations of SMC. As for janitorial and messengerial services, that they are considered directly related to the
principal business of the employer has been jurisprudentially recognized.

Furthermore, Sunflower did not carry on an independent business or undertake the performance of its service
contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal, SMC, its apparent
role having been merely to recruit persons to work for SMC.

All the foregoing considerations affirm by more than substantial evidence the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between SMC and Aballa et al. Since Aballa et al. who were engaged in shrimp processing performed tasks
usually necessary or desirable in the aquaculture business of SMC, they should be deemed regular employees of the
latter and as such are entitled to all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment. They should thus be
awarded differential pay corresponding to the difference between the wages and benefits given them and those accorded
SMCs other regular employees.
LANZADERAS VS. AMETHYST SECURITY & GENERAL SERVICES, INC.,

404 SCRA 505

Facts:

Respondent RICC is engaged in the manufacture of industrial glue at Nahalinan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. It
leased a portion of its compound to its sister company, PICMW, which operated a shipbuilding and repair facility. To
secure their properties and personnel, RICC and PICMW entered into separate service contracts for detailing of security
guards with respondent Amethyst Security. Amethyst had been RICC/PICMWs security contractor since 1968.

One of the conditions of the service contracts between Amethyst and RICC/PICMW was for Amethyst to supply
the latter companies with security guards who must be between 25 to 45 years of age. The aforesaid condition was
maintained with every renewal of the service contracts. Per payrolls submitted by Amethyst, the petitioners who signed
therein were paid the minimum wage and benefits provided for by law, to wit: regular wage, nightshift differentials, 5-day
incentive leave pay, cost of living allowance, overtime pay, and holiday pay.[

When RICC/PICMW renewed their service contract with Amethyst in January 1998, respondent RICC in a letter dated
January 15, 1998, reminded Amethyst of their stipulated age limit for the latters guards detailed at the RICC/PICMW
compound. This prompted respondent Amethyst to issue an order on January 23, 1998, directing all security guards to
submit copies of their respective Birth Certificates. On January 30, 1998, petitioners who were at that time over 45 years
of age received Memorandum/Relief Orders relieving them from their existing postings as security guards of Amethyst
with RICC/PICMW, effective February 1, 1998. Petitioners were instructed to report to the main office of Amethyst for
reassignment. The order further stated that the failure of petitioners to comply with the directive would be construed as a
manifestation of their lack of interest to continue working as security personnel and Amethyst would consider them absent
without official leave (AWOL).

On April 21, 1998, Amethyst issued a Detail Order informing petitioners that it had been able to renegotiate their
assignments with RICC/PICMW. They were ordered to report to one Jose Pitas, Detachment Head of RICC/PICMW for
their new assignment as firewatch guards. Petitioners were again warned that failure to report to Pitas on May 1, 1998,
would mean that they were no longer interested in working as security guards and would be considered AWOL.

On November 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioners had been constructively dismissed from their
employment. He stated that the change of assignments from security guards to firewatch guards was tantamount to a
demotion, as the latter posting was of a lower category with corresponding diminution in pay. He also opined that although
no employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and respondents RICC/PICMW, the latter were
considered indirect employers of petitioners, and thus, solidarily liable with respondent security agency pursuant to Article
107 of the Labor Code.

The respondents appealed to the NLRC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC
reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the relief of the petitioners from their posts was
a legitimate exercise of business prerogative by RICC/PICMW.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated October 29, 1999.

The petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as CA-
G.R. SP No. 56347.

In a resolution dated January 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but on May 19, 2000, it was denied in this wise:

Hence this petition for review.

Issue: whether petitioners were constructively dismissed, thus, entitling them to their claims and other monetary benefits.

Ruling: Petitioners aver that the age requirement for posting of guards at RICC/PICMW was a new provision in the
service contract. This averment is inaccurate. Admittedly, the security services contract between Amethyst (formerly
Calmar) Security Agency and RICC/PICMW had continuously been renewed since 1968 and featured the particular
provision on the age limit (not exceeding 45 years) of the security guards with each renewal. Petitioners could not claim
ignorance of the said provision. They could not claim to be have been caught by surprise when Amethyst relieved them
from their posting at RICC/PICMW due to their failure to meet the stipulated age limits. Petitioners acted in bad faith when
they tried to mislead Amethyst as to their respective actual age.

Lastly, petitioners claims of constructive dismissal could not be sustained. Their averments fall short of what this Court
considers as constructive dismissal. Petitioners could not fairly claim involuntary resignation on the ground that their
continued employment was rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely.[Neither could they show persuasively that their
transfer or assignment from security guards to firewatch guards involved diminution in pay or demotion in rank. Nor was
there a clear showing of an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by their employer - Amethyst - that made
their employment so unbearable that it could foreclose any option by them except to forego their continued employment.

The condition imposed by respondent RICC/PICMW, as a principal or client of the contractor Amethyst, regarding the age
requirement of the security guards to be designated in its compound, is a valid contractual stipulation. It is an inherent
right of RICC/PICMW, as the principal or client, to specify the qualifications of the guards who shall render service
pursuant to a service contract. It stands to reason that in a service contract, the client may require from the service
contractor that the personnel assigned to the client should meet certain standards and possess certain qualifications,
conformably to the clients needs.

Security of tenure, although provided in the Constitution, does not give an employee an absolute vested right in a position
as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change their assignment or transfer them where they will be most
useful. When a transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to an employee; and it does not involve a
demotion in rank or diminution of his pay, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to
a constructive dismissal.

Case law recognizes the employers right to transfer or assign employees from one area of operation to another, or one
office to another or in pursuit of its legitimate business interest, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of
salary, benefits and other privileges and not motivated by discrimination or made in bad faith, or effected as a form of
punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. This matter is a prerogative inherent in the employers right to effectively
control and manage the enterprise.

We note that Amethyst gave petitioners an option as to their new deployment. They could stay on with RICC/PICMW as
fire watch guards, pursuant to negotiated agreement between Amethyst and RICC/PICMW to accommodate the displaced
security guards. Or they could be transferred to another locality, Cagayan de Oro City, but in the same role as security
guards. Petitioners, however, refused to report to Amethyst headquarters, despite knowledge that they were being called
to receive instructions regarding new deployment. Petitioners action not to report for work is a form of defiant action that
petitioners failed to justify. Even if it could be argued that their collective action stemmed from their resentment against the
age rule being enforced by Amethyst, we find nothing in the circumstances of this case to show sufficient reason to
excuse petitioners failure to heed managements exercise of a management prerogative.

Thus, we agree with respondents that there is no reason to hold Amethyst liable for violations claimed by petitioners. It
follows also that we find no ground to hold co-respondents RICC/PICMW liable, except for salary differential ordered in
the NLRC decision. The only time the indirect employer may be made solidarily liable with the contractor is when the
contractor fails to pay his employees their wages and other benefits claimed.

People v Panis 142 SCRA 664 (1986)

Facts:

Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging
that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of
authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a
private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi
Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of
illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there
would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment
for a fee."

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of
the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment
and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of
recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code.

Held:

Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any
act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person
or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged
in recruitment and placement."

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto
but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and
placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of
employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)
workers.

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and
placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned
savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the
hands of their own countrymen.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ,
ROMULO SAULO
344 SCRA 605 (2000)

FACTS:

Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter was recruiting workers for Taiwan,
went to accused-appellants house in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together with Angeles Javier and Amelia de
la Cruz, in order to discuss her chances for overseas employment. During that meeting which took place sometime in April
or May, 1990, accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would be able to leave for Taiwan as a factory worker once she
gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing of her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with
Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they were
authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan.Maligaya paid
accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated May 21, 1990
signed by accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21908). Seeing that he had
reneged on his promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant with the POEA.[4]

Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was told by Ligaya, accused-appellants wife, to
apply for work abroad through accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellants Quezon City residence, Javier was
told by accused-appellant that he could get her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give him
P35,000.00 for purposes of preparing Javiers passport. Javier gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to accused-appellant,
but she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas employment never materialized, Javier was
prompted to bring the matter before the POEA.[5]

On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli Sanchez, went to accused-appellants
house in order to discuss his prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in the case of Maligaya and Javier, accused-
appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him a job as a factory worker in Taiwan if he paid him P30,000.00 for the
processing of his papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00 to accused-appellants wife, who issued a receipt dated April 21, 1990
(Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount of P6,800.00 in the presence of
accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in
Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a friend of accused-appellant,
as shown by a receipt dated September 14, 1990 (Exhibit C in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Again, accused-appellant
failed to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon thus filed a complaint with the POEA.

ISSUE:

WON the recruitment was illegal.

RULING:

YES.

After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the trial court was justified in holding that
accused-appellant was engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly established that
accused-appellant promised the three complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon
employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their papers and procure
their passports. Relying completely upon such representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to
accused-appellant in exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of obtaining employment abroad. It is
not disputed that accused-appellant is not authorized[11] nor licensed[12] by the Department of Labor and Employment to
engage in recruitment and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of accused-
appellants recruitment activities criminal.

Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Accused-appellants asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by clear and convincing evidence. They cannot
stand against the straightforward and explicit testimonies of the complainants, who have identified accused-appellant as
the person who enticed them to part with their money upon his representation that he had the capability of obtaining
employment for them abroad. In the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper
motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.[13]

The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to complainants does not weaken the case of the
prosecution. A person charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimonies of the
complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.[14] The absence of receipts to evidence payment does not warrant
an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LETICIA SAGAYAGA, ALAMA SO, VICENTE SO YAN HAN and
ORLANDO BURGOS, accused LETICIA SAGAYAGA, appellant (G. R No. 123726 February 23, 2004)
FACTS:

Complainants, Elmer Janer, Eric Farol and Elmer Ramos filed a case of Illegal Recruitment against the accused, Sagaya,
So, So Yan Han and Burgos who were the personnels of the Alvis Placement Service Corporation. They promised the
complainants an overseas job (Factory Worker) in Taiwan. Upon completion of the necessary requirements for
employment and the placement fee amounting to Php 70, 000 Php 75, 000, the accused failed to render the job that
was promised. The complainant contested a refund but the accused failed to render and reimburse the money which
made them decide to file a complaint of Illegal Recruitment to the court. The other accused remained at large while
Sagayaga, in her expense, pleaded not guilty contesting that she had no participation in the operation of the Alavis
Placement Service Corporation and she was just part of her job as a treasurer of the said company to receive the
placement fees of the complainants.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant Sagayaga will be held guilty of Illegal Recruitment?

RULING: YES. Wherefore, the appeal of Sagayaga was erred without merit for she acted as a principal by direct
participation on the offense of Illegal Recruitment. She participated actively and consciously in the illegal recruitment as
manifested by the fact that she signed in her capacity as the corporations Assistant General Manager. The court
also erred the provisions under Republic Act No. 8042 Section 6, which provides that illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in large scale, viz, committed agaiits three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group, the imposable penalty for which is life imprisonment and a fine not less than Php 500,
000 nor more that Php 1,000,000. In which, in this case, there were three (3) private complainants, namely, Elmer Janer,
Eric Farol and Elmer Ramos. Thus, the trial court denied the appeal and convicted the appellant of large scale illegal
recruitment and sentenced her to suffer life imprisonment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DOMINGA CORRALES FORTUNA, appellant.

395 SCRA 354 (2003)
Facts:

On 29 September 1998, Dominga Corrales Fortuna, herein appellant, was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale
under Section 6, paragraph (m), of Republic Act No. 8042, said to have been committed thusly:

That sometime in the month of July, 1998, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is neither a licensee nor holder of authority in the overseas
private recruitment or placements activities, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undertake a recruitment
activity by inducing and convincing REBECCA P. DE LEON, ANNIE M. NUQUE, NENITA A. ANDASAN, ANGELYN N.
MAGPAYO, LINA N. GANOT and EDGARDO C. SALVADOR, that she could secure for them a job in Taiwan, and as a
result of such enticement, said Rebecca P. De Leon, Annie M. Nuque, Nenita A. Andasan, Angolan N. Magpayo, Lina N.
Ganot and Edgardo C. Salvador, who were interested to have such employment, gave and delivered to the accused the
total sum of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P32,400.00), Philippine Currency, representing
medical fees in connection thereof, to the latters damage and prejudice as they were not able to get a job in Taiwan
through no fault of their own as promised by the accused, who likewise failed to reimburse to herein complainants the
aforementioned amount despite repeated demands; that considering that there are six (6) or more complainants
prejudiced by the unlawful acts of the accused, the same is deemed committed in large scale and considered an offense
involving economic sabotage.[1]

When arraigned on 29 February 2000, appellant Dominga Fortuna, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged; trial then ensued.

Taking the witness stand for the prosecution were private complainants Lina Ganot, Nenita Andasan and Angelyn
Magpayo.

Lina N. Ganot, Angelyn N. Magpayo, Nenita A. Andasan, Rebecca P. De Leon, Annie M. Nuque and Edgardo L. Salvador
met Dominga Fortuna y Corrales in a seminar on Tupperware products being then promoted for sale in Cabanatuan City.
Fortuna took the occasion to converse with private complainants, along with some of the attendees, offering job
placements in Taiwan. Convinced that Fortuna could actually provide them with jobs abroad, private complainants, on 06
July 1998, each gave her the amount of P5,400.00 to take care of the processing fee for medical examination and other
expenses for securing their respective passports. On 13 July 1998, private complainants took the medical examination in
Manila. Weeks went by but the promised departure had not materialized. Suspecting that something was not right, they
finally demanded that Fortuna return their money. Fortuna, in the meanwhile, went into hiding. After having later learned
that Fortuna had neither a license nor an authority to undertake recruiting activities, Angelyn Magpayo filed a complaint
which, in due time, ultimately resulted in the indictment of Fortuna for illegal recruitment. During the preliminary
investigation, as well as later at the trial, Fortuna gave assurance to have the money she had received from private
complainants returned to them but, except for the amount of P1,250.00 paid to Angelyn Magpayo, Fortuna was unable to
make good her promise.

Dominga Fortuna, in her testimony, admitted having attended the seminar on June 1998 where she then met Annie
Nuque, Rebecca De Leon, Nenita Andasan, Edgardo Salvador, Angelyn Magpayo and Lina Ganot. During the seminar,
she purchased Tupperware products from private complainants after she was convinced to be their sub-agent. Initially,
she was able to remit payments to private complainants on her sales but, when she failed to make subsequent
remittances, she was threatened with criminal prosecution. In order to settle the matter, she executed separate
promissory notes. When she again failed to pay, private complainants filed the case for illegal recruitment against her.
Originally, there were six private complainants but eventually only three of them pursued the case because the others
were finally able to leave for abroad.

ISSUE: WON there was illegal recruitment.

RULING:

YES. For purposes of this act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract of services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article
13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, that
any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group. There is no showing that any of the complainants had ill-motives against accused Dominga
Fortuna other than to bring her to the bar of justice. Furthermore, appellant was a stranger to private complainants before
the recruitment. It is contrary to human nature and experience for persons to conspire and accuse a stranger of such a
serious crime like this that would take the latters liberty and send him or her to prison. Against the prosecutions
overwhelming evidence, accused could only offer a bare denial and an obviously concocted story.
Doctrinally, the assessment made on testimonial evidence by the trial judge is accorded the highest respect for it is he
who has the distinct opportunity to directly perceive the demeanor of witnesses and personally ascertain their reliability.
The rule has been said that a person charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimony of
the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing, and that the absence of receipts to evidence payment to the
recruiter would not warrant an acquittal, a receipt not being fatal to the prosecution's cause.