Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA;
Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA
and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining
the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land
on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of
these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by
native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6,
1906
MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land
Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land
hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State
opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military
reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo
lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of
immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez
& Tiglao vs Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his
possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The
government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine).
Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character as
to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many
years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except
insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if
he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained
the absolute owner.
Atitiw V. Zamora G.R. No. 143374
En Banc, J. Tinga
Case Digest by: Gino Angelo P. Yanga
Facts: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of
autonomous regions in MuslimMindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating
the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of the
Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino
shepromulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A
6766, an act providing for organicact for the cordillera autonomous region, a
plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. Thecourt declared
that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or
amended. Later onFebruary 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General
Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) whichincludes the assailed special
provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of
thewinding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O
328.The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the
special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000) directing that the appropriation for
the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay theseparation and
retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees.
Issue:1.
Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is
unconstitutional.2.
Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally
amend/repeal EO 220.3.
Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as
spelled out in EO.220
Ruling:In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that
xxx an appropriations bill covers abroader range of subject matter and
therefore includes more details compared to an ordinary bill. Thetitle of an
appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is not feasible to
come out with a titlethat embraces all the details included in an
appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of theRA8760 does not
constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations
bill mustrelate specifically to some particular appropriations.On the other
hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is
rejected, there is nosuch thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could
prevent the Congress from amending or repealingthe E.O. 220 because it is
no different from any other law.The last issue, the court ruled that, the
concept of separations of powers presupposes mutual respect.Therefore,
the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while the
sourcing of funds iswithin the powers of the legislature. In the absence of
any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannotcorrect the acts of either the
Executive or the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR.
G.R. No. 81564 April 26, 1990
ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS OF PASAY CITY,
PASIG AND MAKATI, METRO MANILA, petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 57, IN MAKATI, METRO
MANILA PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE FRANCISCO
X. VELEZ, AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL,
represented by DOMINGO C. PALOMARES,
ADMINISTRATOR, respondents.
G.R. No. 90176 April 26, 1990
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL, represented by
DOMINGO C. PALOMARES, ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO VASQUEZ, JR., Presiding Judge, BRANCH
118, RTC, RICARDO P. SANTIAGO, ET AL., respondents.
Taada, Vivo & Tan for the Intestate Estate of the Late Delfin Casal.
Antonio J. Dalangpan for himself and the heirs of Delfin Casal.
Pedro S. Ravelo for Gerardo Casal.
Filomeno Peralta, Jr. for Domingo C. Palomares.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners ** charge His Honor, Judge Francisco Velez, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati, Metro Manila, with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing an order authorizing the private respondent, through Domingo
Palomares, to perform acts of ownership over a 2,574-hectare parcel of land
known as Hacienda de Maricaban spread out in various parts of Makati,
Pasig, Taguig, Pasay City, and Paraaque. There is no controversy as to the
facts.
On November 5, 1985, the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, as
administrator of the heirs of Delfin Casal, commenced suit with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati, Metro Manila for declaratory relief, quieting
of title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192, and cancellation
of entries upon Original Certificate of Title No. 291.
Palomares had earlier come to this Court (February 27, 1985) on a similar
petition, and in addition, to direct the Register of Deeds to issue a duplicate
owner's copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 291, embracing allegedly
Hacienda de Maricaban, in lieu of the (alleged) lost one. On September 9,
1985, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit. (G.R. No. 69834).
On December 19, 1985, the petitioners filed their answer.
On June 2, 1986, the private respondent filed a motion to admit amended
complaint impleading the Republic of the Philippines and the Registers of
Deeds of Pasig, Makati, and Pasay City as parties-respondents, and
alleging, among other things, that: (1) on October 1, 1906, the Court of Land
Registration (James Ostrand, Presiding Judge) confirmed the title of Dolores
Pascual Casal y Ochoa, a native of Madrid, Spain, over the 2,574-hectare
parcel above-mentioned; (2) on October 17, 1906, the Register of Deeds of
Rizal issued OCT No. 291 in her name; (3) upon her death, and successive
deaths of her heirs, the property devolved on Gerardo, Reynaldo, Lolita, and
Erlinda, all surnamed Casal, great grandchildren of Dolores; (4) no
conveyances or dispositions of any kind have been allegedly made upon the
parcel; (5) TCT No. 192, which covers the same landholding, is allegedly
spurious and inexistent; (6) the State itself, by placing 27,213,255 square
meters thereof under a military reservation (Fort McKinley now Fort
Bonifacio), by Proclamation No. 423, and fifty hectares thereof pursuant to
Proclamation No. 192, had been guilty of landgrabbing; (7) any and all
holders of any and all TCTs emanating therefrom or from TCT No. 192, are
null, void, and of no force and effect; and (8) as a consequence thereof, the
heirs of Dolores Casal suffered various damages and attorney's fees.
On June 26, 1986, the petitioners filed an answer, stating, among other
things, that: (1) the estate of Dolores Casal (or Delfin Casal, her grandchild)
is not a juridical person authorized by law to bring suit; (2) the Registers of
Deeds of Makati, Pasig, and Pasay City are not the real parties in interest,
but rather, the registered owners over which the court had not acquired
jurisdiction; (3) the non-joinder of the real parties in interest is fatal; (4) OCT
No. 291 has long been cancelled; (5) Judge Gregorio Pineda of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, had earlier denied
prayers for the issuance of duplicate owner's copy of OCT No. 291 because
the land embraced therein had been validly delivered to the Government; (6)
the Supreme Court itself had denied the Casals' appeal; *** (7) as a
consequence, res judicata is a bar; (8) prescription has also set in; and (9)
the Casal's claims can not validly override the titles of innocent purchasers
for value.
On August 29, 1986, the respondent judge issued a temporary restraining
order, directing the petitioners to cease and desist from performing the acts
complained of.
In a subsequent memorandum, the petitioners alleged that Dolores Casal
had conveyed the property to the Government of the United States in 1906
and the Manila Railroad Company on which Judge Ostrand, the Presiding
Judge of the Court of Land Registration, later Justice of this Court, had
stamped his imprimatur.
On October 12, 1987, the respondent court issued an order in the tenor, as
follows:
No other opposition having been registered, this Court hereby resolves to
grant the plaintiffs' prayer in the OMNIBUS MOTION in order to safeguard
the integrity of the land embraced in OCT 291, hereby authorizing for this
purpose the plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares:
1. To order such subdivision and/or individual survey or surveys within
Parcel II, Parcel III and Parcel IV under Survey Plan Psu-2031 by a licensed
geodetic engineer or engineers at plaintiffs' expense in order to facilitate and
simplify the efficient administration of the property described in OCT 291;
and
2. To sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose (of) any area or areas or
portion or portions thereof, subject to the approval of the Intestate Estate
Court, to cover expenses for the payment of taxes to which the property is
subject, as well as expenses of administration and for the protection of the
integrity of the said lands.
SO ORDERED. 1
Eleven days later, or on October 23, 1987 to be precise, it issued another
order, as follows:
Acting on the plaintiffs MOTION dated October 15, 1987 praying for the
issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing the Order of this Court dated
October 12, 1987 before the expiration of the time to appeal, and after
inquiring from the plaintiff's counsel for their reason in seeking the same, the
Court hereby issues this clarificatory order affirming the power of the plaintiff
Domingo C. Palomares to execute and perform the acts authorized in the
said Order of October 12, 1987 without the need of a Writ of Execution,
where no relief has been sought therefrom by any party, said Order being
implementable at the instance of the said plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares,
anytime when the said Order becomes final 15 days after the said plaintiff
received copy of the same (see Section 39, Chapter IV, B.P. Blg. 129).
Plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares may therefore take whatever steps he
considers appropriate for the implementation of the said Order without need
of further Orders or additional authority from this Court.
SO ORDERED. 2
The petitioners filed a notice of appeal; the respondent court, however,
denied it" 3 "it being directed against . . . an interlocutory order. . . 4
Hence, this recourse.
The petitioners interpose the following questions:
A. Whether or not respondent Court can validly decide before trial in favor of
private respondent the ownership and possession of the 25,743,514 square
meters (of) land known as "Hacienda de Maricaban", which is the main issue
in this case;
B. Whether or not respondent Court can validly allow private respondent to
exercise and perform all acts of ownership and possession over the said
land before trial
C. Whether or not respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction to hear and
decide this action;
D. Whether of not respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing this action or allowing
petitioners to appeal from the orders in question. 5
In their comment, the private respondent averred, among other things, that:
(1) the respondent court, contrary to the petitioners' claim, did not decide the
case "before trial"; (2) OCT No. 291 had not been validly cancelled and that
the rubber stamp impression thereon, "CANCELLED" is a forgery; (3) the act
of Judge Pineda, in denying issuance of OCT No. 291, duplicate owner's
copy, can not be considered res judicata because that case involved
purportedly a mere petition for issuance of duplicate owner's copy; (4) non-
joinder of proper parties is not a jurisdictional defect; (5) the TCTs issued
thereafter are a nullity because OCT No. 291 had not been shown to have
been duly cancelled; (6) OCT No. 291 has become imprescriptible; and (7)
the private respondent has a valid right of dominion over the property.
In the meantime, the private respondent came to this Court
on certiorari (G.R. No. 90176) alleging that on December 15, 1987, in
connection with Sp. Proc. No. P-2993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
118, Pasay City, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late
Fortunato Santiago and Mariano Pantanilla Crisanta P. Santiago, et al.,
Petitioners," Judge Conrado Vasquez, Jr. issued an order disposing of
certain parcels which the private respondent claims as forming part and
parcel of Hacienda de Maricaban.
On June 20, 1988, the respondent judge in G.R. No. 81564 filed his own
comment, asserting, among other things, that: (1) what he had sought to bar,
by virtue of injunction, was incursions and forcible entries of trespassers and
squatters; (2) the petitioners can not rightly claim that he had prematurely
adjudicated the case, because there was allegedly no decision to begin with;
(3) that he issued the writ of preliminary injunction in order only to maintain
the status quo ante bellum that is, to re-place the private respondent, which
had been allegedly in prior possession, in possession; (4) he did not
allegedly authorize unbridled "acts of ownership" to be exercised on the
property; (5) all rights of dominion given thereon were subject to the
approval of the intestate estate court; (6) he denied the notice of appeal
because the order dated October 12, 1987, was interlocutory in nature from
which no appeal lies; (7) as to jurisdiction, the various motions filed by
petitioners, allegedly accepting the court's jurisdiction, have clothed the court
with jurisdiction, and that besides, the jurisdictional question was never
raised except now.
On July 7, 1988, the petitioners filed a reply traversing the respondent
judge's allegations.
On August 26, 1988, the respondent judge filed a supplemental comment.
He reiterated that the writ of injunction was directed only on such spaces not
occupied by the Government (Fort Bonifacio, Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy
Aquino International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population Commission, National
Science and Development Board, and National Housing Authority).
Meanwhile, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan for and on behalf purportedly of the "Heirs of
Delfin Casal" and the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, file a
Comment/Opposition in Intervention", dated December 23, 1988 asking for the
outright dismissal of the petition.
On December 14, 1989, the private respondent filed a manifestation, stating, among
other things, that assuming OCT No. 291 had been cancelled, there was still basis for
the respondent judge to prevent landgrabbers from entering into vacant portions of the
state embraced thereby.
The Court finds the issues, quintessentially, to be:
(1) Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?
(2) Did the respondent judge, in issuing the orders, dated October 12 and October 23,
1987, commit a grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction?
I.
Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the hectarage embraced by TCT No.
192 (OCT No. 291) consists of Government property. Three things persuade the
Court: (1) the decrees of Proclamations Nos. 192 and 435; (2) the incontrovertible fact
that OCT No. 291 has been duly cancelled; and (3) the division of the Court of
Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 00293, affirming the decision of Hon. Gregorio Pineda,
Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, in LRC (GLRO) Rec.
No. 2484, Case No. R-1467 thereof, entitled "In Re: Issuance of Owner's Duplicate of
Certificate of Title No. 291," as well as our own Resolution, in G.R. No. 69834, entitled
"Domingo Palomares, et al., v. Intermediate Appellate Court".
(a)
Proclamation No. 192 ("RESERVING FOR THE VETERANS CENTER SITE
PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN
THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON") and Proclamation No. 423
("RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG, TAGUIG, AND PARAAQUE
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND PASAY CITY") have the character of official assertions of
ownership, and the presumption is that they have been issued by right of sovereignty
and in the exercise of the State's dominical authority. We take not only judicial notice
thereof 6 but accept the same as a valid asseveration of regalian light over property.
With respect to the premises occupied by the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino
International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, the Population Commission, National Science
and Development Board, and the National Housing Authority, we do not have the
slightest doubt that they stand on Government property by sheer presumption that,
unless otherwise shown, what the Government occupies is what the Government
owns.
While there is no presumption that property is Government property until otherwise
shown, because the law recognizes private ownership, thus:
Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private
persons, either individually or collectively. 7
we find hard evidence on record that: (1) the property covered by OCT No. 291 had
been conveyed to the United States of America; (2) it had been later ceded to the
Republic of the Philippines, and (3) as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was cancelled
upon final order of Judge Ostrand.
Be that as it may, the private respondent in G.R. No. 81564 is pressed hard to
establish the fact that portions of the property, especially the open spaces referred to
in the lower court's writ of injunction and the private respondent's manifestation of
December 14, 1989, and which open spaces it claims to be outside Maricaban,
are indeed outside Maricaban (or OCT 291). With respect, however, to parts thereof
on which Fort Bonifacio, Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
Nayong Pilipino, Population Commission National Science and Development Board,
and National Housing Authority sit, the hands of the private respondent are tied.
Claims that Judge Ostrand's decree was a counterfeit is not only self-serving, it finds
no support from the records. The presumptions is "that official duty has been regularly
performed," 8 and the burden is on the private respondent to prove irregular
performance. The barren insistence that Judge Ostrands order was a forgery is not
sufficient to overthrow the presumption. To begin with, the act of forgery has been
seasonably disputed by the petitioners. Secondly, the Acting Registrar of Deeds of
Pasig, who supposedly certified to the fake character of Judge Ostrand's order, has
himself joined the other petitioners in opposing the reconveyance sought.
(b)
The decision in AC-G.R. No. 00293, dismissing the private respondent's petition for
the issuance of a new owner's copy of OCT No. 291, a dismissal affirmed by this
Court in G.R. No. 69834, also militates against the return of the property to the heirs of
Delfin Casal. The Appellate Court's judgment, a judgment sustained by this Court,
operates as, at the very least, the law of the case between the parties, that OCT No.
291 has been cancelled and the land covered has been conveyed and ceded to the
National Government. The fact that AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 dealt with a petition for
issuance of lost owner's duplicate copy is no argument because be that as it may, the
private respondent can not rightfully say that the heirs of Delfin Casal still have title to
the land. If it can not secure a new owner's copy, it can mean that they have lost title
thereto.
(c)
The principle of res judicata is also a bar to the instant proceedings. It should be noted
that in G.R. No. 69834, Mr. Domingo Palomares prayed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully prayed to the most
Honorable Supreme Court, that in the name of law, justice and fair play, to prevent and
frustrate "land-grabbing" by the government, decision be rendered:
FIRST, That a thorough review of the aforementioned resolution of the Intermediate
Appellate Court be made;
SECOND, That after due consideration, the resolution subject of review be set aside
based on the aforestated assignment of error;
THIRD, That the Order of the Lower Court dated Jan. 19, 1977 be affirmed as the
lawful and valid order;
FOURTH, To erase all doubts by declaring OCT No. 291 as continuously and existing
validly against the whole world;
FIFTH, Clearing OCT No. 291 of all adverse claims, since the herein petitioners are
the true and legally declared heirs; and
SIXTH, Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal to issue the Owner's Duplicate
Copy of OCT No. 291.
Petitioner-Appellant further prays for other just and equitable reliefs. ****
When we therefore denied that petition, we, in effect, held that reconstitution (of lost
duplicate owner's copy) was not possible because the mother title (OCT No. 291) had
been duly cancelled. And when we therefore declared OCT No. 291 to have been
cancelled, we perished all doubts as to the invalidity of Mr. Palomares' pretenses of
title to Maricaban. Our judgment was conclusive not only as to Mr. Palomares, but
also as to the existing status of the property. As we have held:
The lower Court correctly ruled that the present action is barred by the final judgment
rendered in the previous case of Tuason & Co. vs. Aguila, Civil Case No. Q-4275, of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The reason is plain: if the herein appellants really
had a preferential right to a conveyance of the land from J.M. Tuason & Co., or if the
certificate of (Torrens) title held by Tuason & Co. were truly void and ineffective, then
these facts should have been pleaded by these appellants in the previous case (Q-
4275), since such facts, if true, constituted a defense to the claim of Tuason & Co. for
recovery of possession. If appellants failed to plead such defenses in that previous
case, they are barred from litigating the same in any subsequent proceeding, for it is a
well established rule that as between the same parties and on the same subject and
cause of action, a final judgment is conclusive not only on matters directly adjudicated,
but also as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto. 9
II
Did the respondent judge, in issuing the order, dated October 12, 1987, commit a
grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of excess of jurisdiction?
(a)
The Court has no doubt that Judge Velez is here guilty of grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction to warrant certiorari. As above-stated, what
he gave away, by virtue of reconveyance, was property that inalienably belongs to the
Government or its successors. Worse, he gave away property without notice to the
actual possessors, that is, the present registered owner. It is beyond debate, as we
have indicated, that the land had been, since the cancellation of OCT No. 291,
parcelled out to a succession of buyers and owners. In the absence of notice, it
acquired no jurisdiction to decree redelivery or reconveyance. It is well-established
that owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable
parties, without whom no relief is available and without whom the court can render no
valid judgment. 10
Furthermore, the present holders of the land in question are innocent purchasers for
value, or presumed to be so in the absence of contrary evidence, against whom
reconveyance does not lie. 11
(b)
The respondent judge can not conceal his faults behind arguments that he did not
intend to convey the premises, but rather, to secure, allegedly, vacant portions thereof
from interlopers. First, this is not stated in his order. Second, that order is clear and
unequivocal that Domingo Palomares has the right "[t]o sell, exchange, lease or
otherwise dispose of any area or areas or portion or portions thereof . . . " 12 Third and
last, the security of the property is the lookout of the claimants, and not the court's. In
case the premises the respondent judge's injunctive writ have been directed belong to
others, let them air their plaints.
(c)
The Court is also agreed that the challenged order was issued with no benefit of trial
or hearing. The private respondent can not validly rely on AC-G.R. No. 00293 as the
"trial or hearing" to justify the issuance of its said order, in the first place, because it is
a different proceeding. But above all, the private respondent itself says that AC-G.R.
CV No. 00293 can not be made a basis for denying reconveyance because "the . . .
petition was merely for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
copy . . . 13 Accordingly, it can not invoke that case and yet, repudiate its effects. It is
the height of contradiction.
(d)
It was also grave error for the lower court to deny the Solicitor General's notice of
appeal. The Government had all the right to appeal because: (1) the order of October
12, 1987 was in the nature of a final judgment, as "final judgment" is known in law
(however it is captioned), that is to say, one that "finally disposes of the pending action
so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court; 14 (2) it did not merely
maintain the status quo, but allowed Mr. Domingo Palomares to transact on the
property by near right of dominion over it.
Judge Velez had therefore no reason, indeed, excuse, to deny the Government's
notice of appeal. What is plain is the fact that Judge Velez was hell-bent, so to speak,
in blocking the Government's efforts to defend what rightfully belongs to it.
What has obviously been lost on the parties, Judge Velez in particular, is the
established principle that injunction does not lie "to take property out of the possession
or control of one party and place it into that of another." 15 In this wise it has also been
held:
xxx xxx xxx
It is a well established doctrine in this jurisdiction that an injunction is not the proper
remedy for the recovery of possession of real estate and the improvements thereon,
as well as for the ejectments therefrom of the actual occupants who claim to have title
to or material interest therein. The use of said remedy in such cases has invariably
been considered unjustified, in open violation of the legal presumption that the bona
fide possessor of a certain piece of land and improvements thereon, holds the same
under claim of ownership and with a just title, and as an advanced concession of the
remedy to which the claimant might be entitled. (Citations omitted) 16
xxx xxx xxx
Injunction, moreover, is an extraordinary remedy. It lies only in certain cases, to wit:
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may
be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before judgment
when it is established:
(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of,
or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation
or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject
of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 17
xxx xxx xxx
The conspicuous and unusual zeal with which Judge Francisco Velez now defends his
acts 18 has not escaped us. His Honor should have borne in mind that in proceedings
under Rule 65 of the Rules, such as the present cases, the judge is included only as a
nominal party. Unless otherwise ordained by this Court, he is not called upon to
answer or comment on the petition, but rather, the private respondent. It is indeed
distressing to note that it is the very judge who has taken the cudgels for the latter, in
defending its interests, when he, the judge, should have remained a neutral
magistrate. Res ipsa loquitor. 19 He must get his just deserts.
III
The Court thus closes the long-drawn tale of Hacienda de Maricaban. In this
connection, let trial judges be cautioned on the indiscriminate disposition of our
dwindling natural resources to private persons. Accordingly, we grant G.R. No. 81564
and dismiss G.R. No. 90176, and so also, end what has come down as nearly a
century of uncertainty, doubt, and conflict Maricaban has left in its trail. The Court has
finally spoken. Let the matter rest.
WHEREFORE:
1. The petition in G.R. No. 81564 is GRANTED:
(a) The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by our Resolution, dated April 13, 1988,
enjoining the respondent judge from enforcing his: (i) order of October 12, 1987 and
(ii) the follow-up order of October 23, 1987, is made permanent and
(b) Original Certificate of Title No. 291 is declared duly CANCELLED;
2. The petition in G.R. No. 90176 is DISMISSED; and
3. Judge Francisco Velez is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
administratively dealt with for giving away, by virtue of reconveyance, property that
inalienably belongs to the Government, without notice to the registered owner, and
without benefit of trial or hearing; for blocking Government efforts to defend what
rightfully belongs to it; and for filing his comment of June 17, 1988 and supplemental
comment of August 26, 1988 without express leave of court.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997VICENTE VILLAFLOR, substituted by his heirs,
petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC.,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
The case is a petition for review on
certiorari
seeking the reversal of the CAs
order affirming the dismissal by the lower court of petitioners complaint against
PrivateRespondent Nasipit Lumber Co., Incorporated.The synopsis of the case is as
follows:The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty (140)
hectaresto four (4) different owners in 1940. The land was part of the public domain,
but thepetitioners predecessor in interest over which he acquired the property, have
been inopen, exclusive and notorious possession of the same for sometime. After
acquisition,petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.In
1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit Lumber
Co.Inc. However, an Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights was entered into
byboth parties in 1950. The respondent having complied all the
requirements agreedupon, assumed ownership and possession of the property since
then. Respondentcorporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over the
property to bolster hisclaim which the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the same
year as proof of anOrder of Award issued.In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had
passed, when petitioner, questioned and madeseveral collateral and extraneous
claims against the respondent. However, the Bureauof Lands dismissed the claim,
arguing that petitioner no longer has any substantialrights to question the
validity of acquisition of the respondent and the subsequentissuance of free patent by
the Bureau of
Lands.Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at the Ministry of Natu
ralResources which likewise dismissed the petition. On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed
acomplaint in the trial court for "Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed of Relinquish
ment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land subject of the
contract), and Damages" at about the same time that he appealed the decision of the
Minister of Natural Resources to the Office of the President.On January 28, 1983,
petitioner died. Petitioners heir substituted in his behalf to pursuethe claim. The trial
court in Butuan City who initially take cognizance of the case orderedthe case
dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted the due execution
andgenuineness of the contract and was estopped from proving its nullity, (2) the
verbal
lease agreements were unenforceable under Article 1403 (2) (e) of the Civil Code,
and(3) his causes of action were barred by extinctive prescription and/or laches. The
heirsappealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by uphelding
thelower courts ruling.Not satisfied, petitioner's heirs filed the instant
petition for review which the courtgranted, hence this
petition.IssuesWhether or not the petitioner still has cause of action to pursue claim of
ownership over the property since his rights thereon was already transferred
andrelinquished to the respondent by virtue of the Deed executed thereon;
andWhether or not the private respondent corporation is qualified to acquireownership
over the land of public domain.RulingThe petition is bereft of merit. The court ruled
that the petitioner no longer has a causeof action to demand declaration of nullity over
the rights conferred to respondents sincehis claimed thereof was merely based on
speculations, surmises and conjectures. Thepetitioners claim of ownership and rights
over the property was negated by proof thathe ceded the same to the respondent by
virtue of an Agreement on the Relinquishmentof Rights which they have executed.
The petitioner insistence that the court erred inaffirming his cause is misplaced. The
finding of the court and the agency which acquireprimary jurisdiction over the petition,
was accorded great weight by the court. As to the prohibition that xxxx
corporation or association may not hold alienable land of public domain except for
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares
, that courtdeclared that
xxx where the applicant had, before the Constitution took effect, fully complied with all
this obligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to aSales patent,
there would be no legal or equitable justification for refusing to issue or release the
sales patent.
The requirements for a sales application under the PublicLand Act for a corporation to
acquire ownership of public domain, was essentiallycomplied upon by the respondent,
hence no disqualification exist not to extend andvalidly issued the confirmation of title
over the land in question to the
respondentcorporation. All told, the only disqualification that can be imputed to private
respondent is theprohibition in the 1973 Constitution against the holding of alienable
lands of the publicdomain by corporations. However, this Court settled the matter,
declaring that saidconstitutional prohibition had no retroactive effect and could not
prevail over a
vested right
to the land. Application for patent for and in behalf of Nasipit has clearly
noimpediment, for they have proven satisfactory compliance of the requirements of G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989
thelaw. Petition is DISMISSED. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.
Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia
Bisnar.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the
decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426,
entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application for
confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec.
1256.
In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July
20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee
simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively
containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.)
situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p.
14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p. 41,
Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).
On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development, opposed the application on the grounds that:
1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to
acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having
been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish Government,
such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant, (3)
the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra 'or
title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory information
under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized mode of
acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.
2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.
3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record on
Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was
approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation:
Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby
apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as owners for more
than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names
of the applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and their
predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for
more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for
registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos
and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68,
Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the
classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the
absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as
agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government alleges that:
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable
agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered
under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act
2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for
doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government,
through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of
discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director of
Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until
the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126
SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands
vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480;
Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
(Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil.
401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under
the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera,
120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to
public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded (p.
26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving
that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he
is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient
to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived
from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing
of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for
registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby
dismissed without costs.
SO ORDERED.

Menguito vs. Republic Case Digest (G.R. No. 134308. December 14, 2000)
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC of Pasig City, granting the application for registration of the lands in question
to the petitioners.
FACTS:
On November 10, 1987, an application for Registration of Title was filed with the RTC
of Pasig City by herein petitioners who were successors-in-interest of the deceased
spouses Cirilo Froilan Menguito and Generoso Menguito.The petitioners sought to
have parcels of land, situated in Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, be brought under the operation of Land Registration Act as amended by the
Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto registered,
conformed and be declared as owners in fee simple of said parcels of land. The
petitioners also asked the Court to declare that they acquired the said parcels of land
through inheritance and that said lands were occupied by applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse
possession, in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. Petitioners, in their
application, opted to apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No.
141 as amended, should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the
instant case.
Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a notice of hearing
addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director of Land Management Bureau, the
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development,
and the owners of adjacent properties as mentioned in the application. The hearing
was scheduled on April 25, 1989.The addressees were then ordered to present such
claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence
in support of such claims and unless you appear at said court at the time and place
aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated
and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and
thereafter, you will forever be barred from contesting said application or any decree
entered thereon.'
The Solicitor General filed its opposition to the application for registration contending
that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The muniments of title and tax payment
receipts of applicant, according to the Solicitor General, do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for and the said
muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended possession
of applicant to be of recent vintage. The Solicitor General further contends that the
claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application
was filed on July 31, 1990. The Solicitor General claimed that the parcel applied is
part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to
private appropriation and thus, prayed for the the denial of the application for
registration and for the declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
On April 25, 1989, at the initial hearing, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared and
registered a verbal opposition to the application.
The lower court then issued an Order of General Default against the whole world,
except as against the oppositors Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who
was directed to file his written opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their Formal Offer of Evidence, together with
documentary exhibits.
On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition
to applicants formal offer of evidence. In the manifestation, it objected to the
extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12, 1985 for being self serving
and the tax declarations for being incompetent and insufficient proof of possession of
the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-in interest. the oppositor
Republic also objected to the tax receipts submitted by the applicants, the same being
incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It also objected
to the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in
favor of Pedro Menguito submitted by the applicants as being self-serving and a mere
photocopy. The first page of the Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed
by the applicants was also claimed by the oppositors as self-serving and mere
photocopy. The second page of said deed was also attacked as referring to different
parcels of land other than those being applied for. Oppositor respectfully prayed that
the application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be declared as
part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and that there is
no need for it to submit evidence in support of its opposition.
On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision affirming the order of general
default against the whole world and confirming the registerable title of the applicants.
On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a
reconsideration of the lower court decision, to which a written opposition was
interposed by the applicants.
On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals where the decision was reversed
due to the failure of the lower court to consider the legal requirements for registration
of imperfect titles. The Court of Appeals was not convinced that the land in question
had been classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State." The petitioners must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of public domain.
If the land was indeed alienable, petitioners still needs to establish possession of the
lots in question in an open, continuous, exclusive and adverse in the concept of owner
for at least 30 years, since June 12, 1945. Although petitioners can trace their
possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of their
predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before the
Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support such
claim. Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes
since 1974. Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes
on the land for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land
for tax purposes in 1943. However, they did not present any documents or any other
satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General statements, which are mere
conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice.
Cirilos children were the best witnesses because they could have substantiated
petitioners claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito
and they may even have in their possession documents that can adequately support
their supposed claim. However, they were not presented as witnesses. Instead,
petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo Menguito,
who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Tax declarations,
tax receipts and the Municipal Treasurers certifications of tax payments presented in
evidence by the petitioners were incompetent and insufficient because they are of
recent vintage.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
141, the petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: : (1) the land
applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. The records show that petitioners
failed to establish this two requisites.

Petitioners relied on a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit E indicating

that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. This proof is insufficient.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of

G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a
complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands,
praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel
of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is
a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said
Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as
damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every
allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question
was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and
control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in
accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the
possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her,
with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took
this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the
judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon
on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff
is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale
made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of
title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by
virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by
the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in
question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of
P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in
possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi
for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the
execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
"bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the
proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession
and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza,
and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon,
on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after
considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor
of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E).
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the
court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on
August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and
opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for
twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the
Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela
Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921,
issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document,
Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused
to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the
peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the
case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought
this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the
appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the
land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through
his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to
Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on
August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi
had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for
thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made
said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be
estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long
that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there
is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with
a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said
Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient,
under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be
the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain,
the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession
thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already
become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the
judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover
possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the
same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-33676 June 30, 1971
MARIANO PAJOMAYO, PATRICIO PAJOMAYO, EUSEBIO PAJOMAYO, SOLEDAD
PAJOMAYO assisted by her husband FLORIANO CHITONGCO, DEMFTRIO
PAJOMAYO, CRISTITA PAJOMAYO assisted by her husband MANUEL RAMIREZ,
PATROCINIO PAJOMAYO and CRISPO PAJOMAYO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
RODRIGO MANIPON and PERFECTA ZULUETA, defendants-appellants.
Francisco T. Gualberto for plaintiffs-appellees.
Tomas Tadeo, Jr. for defendants-appellants.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IX) in
its Civil Case No. U-655. The decision was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals
on November 3, 1964. In the resolution of the second special division of the Court of
Appeals, promulgate on April 27, 1971, this case was certified to this Court as one that
is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only errors on
question of law being involved in the appeal. 1
On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Branch IX, at Urdaneta, Pangasinan) a complaint alleging that they are owners pro-
indiviso of the parcel of land described in the complaint which is covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1089 in the name of Diego Pajomayo, issued by the office of the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan; that they had acquired the land as an inheritance
from their late father Diego Pajomayo; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had
been in actual, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of said property in the concept
of owners for a period of more than 70 years until the early part of the year 1956 when
the defendants dispossessed them of said property, resulting in their having suffered
annual damages amounting to around P1,100.00 representing the value of the crops
of rice; mongo, corn and vegetables that they failed to harvest; and that because they
have to file the present suit they must spend P800.00 for incidental expenses of
litigation and attorney's fees. The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the lawful
owners pro-indiviso of the land in question, and that the defendants be ordered to
vacate the land and pay them the damages they have suffered.
In their answer the defendants, after denying some of the allegations of the complaint,
alleged that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 14043 issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan, the said land having been adjudicated to them in the cadastral
proceedings of the Malasique cadastre and that apparently the plaintiffs are claiming
the same parcel of land. The defendants claim they had acquired the land mentioned
in their answer by inheritance from their deceased father Pioquinto Manipon, and that
they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse
possession of said land for more than 70 years, to the reclusion of plaintiffs; and that
as possessors in good faith they have introduced on the land improvements worth
P1,000.00. As affirmative defenses, the defendants allege that plaintiffs' action is
barred by res-judicata and/or prescription and that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. The defendants set up a counterclaim for damages in
the sum of P500.00 representing attorney's fees that they paid their counsel. The
defendants prayed that they be declared the owners of the parcel of land mentioned in
their answer; that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay them damages in the sum of
P500.00; and, in the alternative should judgment be rendered against them, that the
plaintiffs ordered jointly and severally to pay them the sum of P1,000.00 representing
the value of the improvements they have introduced on the land.
When the case, was called for trial on July 6, 1964, the counsels for the parties
submitted to the court a stipulation of facts, as follows:
1. That plaintiffs are the children and compulsory heirs of the late Diego Pajomayo;
2. That parties agree that the land in question is covered by two Certificates of Title,
one in the name of Diego Pajomayo under Original Cert. of Title No. 1089 issued
under Free Patent, owner's copy attached hereto as Annex A; and Original Cert. of
Title No. 14034, in the name of the Defendant Rodrigo Manipon, issued in Cadastral
Case No. 91 of Malasique Cadastre, certified true copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex B;
3. That parties agree to submit this case on the above stipulations without further
presentation of evidence.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed this Honorable Court that decision be rendered
upon the foregoing stipulation after the parties have submitted simultaneous
memoranda within a period of twenty (20) days from today.
Urdaneta, Pangasinan this 6th day of July, 1964.
On the basis of the foregoing stipulation of facts, the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IX) made a finding that Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 held
by the plaintiffs was issued earlier than Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 held by
the defendants, and on September 10, 1964 it rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court, rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, hereby orders the latter to vacate the land in question and deliver
possession thereof to the former who are entitled thereto as the heirs of Diego
Pajomayo who is hereby declared the legal and lawful owner of the said property.
The Register of Deeds for Pangasinan is hereby ordered to cancel de oficio Original
Certificate of Title No. 14034.
With costs of this suit against the defendant.
From the above-mentioned decision of the lower court, the defendants brought up the
present appeal. In their appeal the defendants made the following assignment of
errors:
1. The lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 of herein
appellants null and void notwithstanding the fact that this is not one of the reliefs
prayed for by the appellees.
2. The lower erred in ordering the herein appellants to vacate the land in question and
to deliver the possession thereof to the herein appellees although the latter failed to
prove their cause of action against the herein appellants.
3. The lower court erred in not applying the doctrine of res judicata in favor of herein
appellants.
The appeal has no merit. There is no question regarding the identity of the land
involved. The only question to be resolved in the present appeal is: which of the two
original certificates of title should prevail the No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs-
appellees which was issued in virtue of the homestead patent, or the No. 14034 held
by the defendants-appellants which was issued in connection with the cadastral
proceedings? Necessarily when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the
other, one should be declared null and void and should be ordered cancelled. And if a
party is declared to be the owner of a parcel of land pursuant to a valid certificate of
title said party is entitled to the possession of the land covered by said valid title. The
decree of registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does not have the effect of
annulling the title that had previously been issued in accordance with the provisions of
the land Registration Law (Act 496).
The lower court, therefore, had correctly ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Title
No 14034 held by the defendants when it declared that Original Certificate of Title No.
1089 held by the plaintiffs should prevail. Likewise, the lower court had correctly
ordered the defendants to vacate the land in question and deliver possession thereof
to plaintiffs after declaring plaintiffs entitled thereto as the heirs of Diego Pajomayo,
the lawful owner of the land.
Contrary to the claim of defendants, the doctrine of res judicata can not be applied in
their favor in the present case.
The undisputed fact is that the plaintiffs base their claim of title to the land in question
on Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 issued to their father, Diego Pajomayo, on
November 27, 1931 in virtue of a free patent that was granted to him. The law requires
that the homestead patent must be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of
the province where the land covered by the patent lies. Section 122 of the Land
Registration Act (Act 496) provides as follows:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging (to the
Government of the United States or) to the Government of the Philippine Islands are
alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become
registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation,
grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to came suck instrument before its
delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the
land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a
certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land and an owner's
duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of
conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance
or bind the land, but shall operate only as contract between the Government and the
grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make
registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and effect the
land, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be made in the office of the
register of deeds for the province where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be
paid by the grantee. After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's
duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act. (Emphasis
supplied).
Thus, it has been ruled by this Court that once a homestead patent granted in
accordance with the Public Land Act registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496
(Land Registration Act), the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the
force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act. In the cage WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with
of Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850, this Court held: costs against the defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.
The procedure under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter
VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both
take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued
is conclusive and final. (Act No. 496, secs. 35, 38, and 45, as amended; Act 926.
secs. 59 and 63, as amended; Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482; Grey Alba
vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Legarda, et al. vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 591) ... 2
In the case of Manalo vs. Lukban and Liwanag, 48 Phil. 973, 979, this Court said:
The record shows that the land covered by said judgment had already been granted
by the government to Monico Corpus Manuel as homesteader under the provisions of
Act 926, the corresponding certificate of title having been registered and issued to
said grantee. By virtue of said registration and issuance of the certificate of title, that
land is considered registered within the meaning of the Land Registration Act, No. 496
(sec. 122 of said Act).
So that when the trial was held in the cadastral proceeding which covered said land,
and when the judgment of June 29, 1922 concerning said land was rendered in said
proceeding, the title to that land could no longer be the subject of any inquiry,
determination or judgment, for it had already been adjudicated to Monico Corpus
Manuel more than ten years before, with all the legal formalities and with all the force
of a title under Act 496.
The doctrine laid down in the two cases above-cited has been affirmed and applied by
this Court in a long line of decisions. 3 The ruling regarding the validity and force of a
certificate of title issued in virtue of the registration of a homestead patent is applicable
to certificates of title issued in virtue of the registration of other land patents under the
Public land Law. In the case of Lahora, et al. vs. Dayanghirang, et al., G.R. No. L-
28565, January 30, 1971, 4 thus Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
held:
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the
certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by
the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded,
and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically
brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the
grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of said Act. In
other words, upon the expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title
becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration
proceeding.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary
prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive registration where,
Technical School), petitioner, vs. NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent.
more than one certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior
DECISION
certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second
ROMERO, J.:
certificate. 5
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
In the case now before Us, it appearing that Original Certificate of Title No. 14034
27, 1997, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissing herein
upon which the defendant appellants base their claim of ownership over the land in
petitioners complaint, as well as its resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioners
question was issued on April 1, 1957, while Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 upon
motion for reconsideration.
which plaintiffs-appellees base a similar claim was issued on November 27, 1931,
The facts are as follows:
under the law and the authorities. We have herein cited, the latter certificate of title
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio
should prevail, and the former should be cancelled.
Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an
application for saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest
Development. The Director of Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1,
1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in
1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This reserved lot
unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in
1970. Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for
the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School
(hereafter Opol National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended
projects, the school made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he
refused to move.
In view of Doldols refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint
for accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court
ruled in the schools favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to
the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from
1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991.
Opol National Schools motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied
by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol National School
elevated its case to this Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred on a question
of law when it held, contrary to the evidence on record, that respondent had been in
open, continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the land in dispute for thirty-
two years.
The petition is meritorious.
In ruling in Doldols favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public Land Act). Said provision,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, provides as follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.(Italics ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a citizen of
the Philippines may acquire alienable land of the public domain if he has possessed
the same for thirty years. Finding Doldol to have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-
two years, it ruled that the former had acquired ownership of the same, thereby
negating Opol National Schools claim over the questioned area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs. CA[1] where this
Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991) declared
that:
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
xxxxxxxxx
with the latters proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914,
by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
xxxxxxxxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength
of said patent.
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a
better right to possess the lot through the erroneous application of an outdated version
of Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office
of the Solicitor General erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the
aforementioned section was still good law. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141
provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26,
1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, [2] which provided for a simple thirty year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Italics ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act
requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b)
that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in
accordance with the District Foresters Certification dated September 20, 1978, that
the subject area is within Project 8, an alienable and disposable tract of public land, as
appearing in Bureau of Forest Land Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets
the first requirement.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been
occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as
presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be
from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot
since his occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12,
1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to
have acquired a right to the land in question as to segregate the same from the public
domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given that then
President Corazon Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General:
(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no
contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to
withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public
use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this
may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not
subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.[3]
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in
dispute.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 27, 1997, and Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, G.R. No. 144057 (January 17, 2005) Case
Digest
Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands
Facts:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land.
The application sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the land.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the
petition. The court issued an order of general default against the whole world except
as to Angeles and the government.
The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to the
subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in
1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees in addition to existing coconut
trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on
the subject land.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the
concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only
on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.
The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were
not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
Held:
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration
proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration
of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides
to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before
June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.
in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. ISSUES:

In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section
14(1) had been met by Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared alienable;
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land evidenced by
the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as well as the
tax declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which
strengthened one's bona fide claim of ownership.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite,
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession
of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather,
Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe
fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena,
had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from
their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
Velazco to Malabanan.
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any
time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of
land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its
use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code
on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945
have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the
RTC approved the application for registration. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article
422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the
defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions
of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The
Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes
thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of
P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, ISSUE:
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a HELD:
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public
domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners
Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Bracewell v. Court of Appeals
Decree. Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text
of the case cited. Xie xie!
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is G.R. No. 107427 January 25, 2000
no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for
the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner,
Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land vs.
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by respondents.
prescription.
PALOMO v. CA Facts:
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657)
FACTS: square meters of land located in Las Pias, Metro Manila.
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive
Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the In 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., who acquired the said parcels
same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Pias; after which
1937. corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the
Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with
Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter
issued in the name of petitioner, canceling the previous Tax Declarations In the said case, this Court ruled as follows
issued to Maria Cailles.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs.
The Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340).
petitioner's application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-
in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application
subject land is part of the public domain. is alienable or disposable. These petitioners failed to do.

On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of The homestead patent was issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the
petitioner. The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public
which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower court's Order. It domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void
also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of ab initio because at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners,
September 30, 1992. as successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of
Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area
Issues: was not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title
issued to herein petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.
a) Whether the failure of the petitioner to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time? Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative
Order recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We
b) Whether the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute only find on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development
acquisition of the lands applied for? from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned.

Held: Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for
confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to raised in this petition.
the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having
by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since 1908. On the other hand, it is the respondents' position that since the
subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on
March 27, 1972, petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his
application in 1963. Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.

A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, where a

homestead patent issued to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was
cancelled on the ground that at the time it was issued, the subject land was
still part of the public domain.