PEOPLE V.
DERILO | GR 117818 |APRIL stand in place of the evidence that must be
18, 1997
FACTS:
Roman Derilo and his company were charged
with murder committed by a band before the CFI
of Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information
alleges that the accused with treachery and evident
premeditation, with intent to kill, with the use of
firearm and bolos, confederated and helped one
another did then and there shot and stabbed one
Perpetua Adalim thus inflicting injuries which
caused her death. Only Baldimo was apprehended.
In his arraignment he pleaded not guilty which he
later substituted with one of guilty.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the plea of guilt of the accused
constitutes an admission of all material facts in
the information including the aggravating
circumstances alleged
II. Whether the penalty of death can be imposed
upon the accused considering the peculiar
antecedents on the application of two penal
laws
RULING:
I.
No. Qualifying and aggravating circumstance
before being taken into consideration for the
purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to
be imposed must be proved with equal certainty
and clearness as that which establishes the
commission of the act charged as the criminal
offense. It is not only the central fact of a killing
that must be shown beyond reasonable doubt;
every qualifying or aggravating circumstance
alleged to have been present and to have attended
such killing, must similarly be shown by the same
degree of proof. There was no evidence adduced
by the prosecution to prove the supposed evident
premeditation. Evident premeditation must be
based on external facts and must be evident, not
merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning.
As the pertinent principle lays down a rule of
procedure, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot
presented and is called for by said Section 3 of
Rule 116. Trial courts should no longer assume
that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the
attending circumstances alleged in the information
as they are now required to demand that the
prosecution should prove the exact liability of the
accused.
II.
Although Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article
248 of the Code by imposing a heavier penalty for
murder than that originally prescribed, the new
penalty provided in Section 6 of said amendatory
statute being reclusion perpetua to death cannot
be applied to the crime of murder committed in
1982 based on the principle of prospectivity of
penal laws. Further, the presumption is that
laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary
clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocally expressed or necessarily
implied.
Prior thereto, the Constitution took effect and it is
clear that any death penalty already imposed shall
be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Appellant, it will
be recalled, was sentenced in 1986 to suffer the
death penalty as then provided under the Revised
Penal Code. With the ratification of the
Constitution in 1987, that sentence should have
been reduced to reclusion perpetua under such
constitutional fiat.
PEOPLE V. VILLARAZA | GR L-46228 |
JANUARY 17, 1978
FACTS:
Caesar Puerto was charged with estafa in the city
court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on
October 16, 1974 two bouncing checks. City judge
Villaraza elevated the case for trial to the Court of
First Instance because in his opinion the case falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of that
court. According to Villaraza, estafa, as committed
by the accused is punishable by prision mayor
medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which
took effect on October 22, 1975 and which
amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Upon petition of the prosecution, the CFI of
Misamis Oriental returned the case to the city
court because in its opinion the case falls within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and,
the city court, as the first court should try it.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI has jurisdiction to try the instant
case
RULING:
The case was properly filed with the city court
which has original jurisdiction over it. The estafa
imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under
article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum.
The penalty of prision mayor medium, imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to
swindling by means of issuing bouncing checks
which was committed on or after October 22,
1975.
That increased penalty does not apply to estafa
committed by Puerto on October 16, 1974. To
apply it to Puerto would make the decree an ex
post facto law. Its retroactive application is
prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of the Revised
Penal Code and section 12, Article IV of the
Constitution.
PEOPLE V. WONG CHENG | GR NO.
18924 | OCTOBER 19, 1922
FACTS:
Wong Cheng was accused of having illegally
smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while said vessel
was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles
from the shores of the city.
The defendant presented his demurrer to the
information which alleged lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the lower court, which was granted and
dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court has jurisdiction over the
offense
RULING:
Yes. The lower court has jurisdiction over the
offense. The mere possession of opium aboard a
foreign vessel in transit was held not triable by our
courts, because it is the primary object of our
Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed
by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such
a ship, without being used in our territory, does
not bring about in the said territory those effects
that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence
such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits,
even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to
produce its pernicious effects within our territory.
.It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute.
PEOPLE V. LOL-LO | GR 17958 |
FEBRUARY 27, 1922
FACTS:
A boat of Dutch possession arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid at 7 oclock in the
evening. There, the boat was surrounded by six
vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed.
The Moros first asked for food, but once on the
Dutch boat, they took for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated two of the women. All of the persons on
the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two
young women, were again placed on it and holes
were made in it, with the idea that it would
submerge. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-
lo and Saraw. Lol-lo also raped one of the women.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in
South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de
officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the
offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of
the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not
constitute a public offense, under the laws in force
in the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE:

Whether the crime is punishable under the

Philippine Court

RULING:

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a

crime not against any particular state but against
all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes
has no territorial limits. As it is against all so
may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that
the crime was committed within the jurisdictional
3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."