3.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Probable Cause; The

conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings+
4. Same; Same; Same; Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering
whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.-
Verily, Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not
there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged
should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction. [A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of [the prosecutions] evidence. The presence and absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits. Hence, the validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.

6. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Hearsay Evidence Rule; In

the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2005), the Supreme Court (SC) declared
that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.-
It was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWGs findings contained in the
Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-
serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory
nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the
course of its proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the
Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary
investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate
rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, it was held that probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. MA.

MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ (AS THEN OMBUDSMAN), DON M. FERRY,
JOSE R. TENGCO, JR., ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA, OFELIA I.
 CASTELL, AND RAFAEL A. SISON, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, RODOLFO M.
CUENCA, MANUEL I. TINIO, AND ANTONIO R. ROQUE, PRIVATE,Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing the Resolution2 dated May 30, 2007 and
the Order3 dated April 13, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-
03-0500-I, which dismissed the affidavit-complaint4 of petitioner Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) charging individual respondents Don M. Ferry (Ferry), Jose R.
Tengco, Jr. (Tengco), Rolando M. Zosa (Zosa), Cesar C. Zalamea (Zalamea), Ofelia I. Castell
(Castell), Rafael A. Sison (Sison), Rodolfo M. Cuenca (Cuenca), Manuel I. Tinio (Tinio), and
Antonio R. Roque (Roque) for allegedly violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019,5 for lack of probable cause.

The Facts

The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint6 dated July 15, 2003 filed by the PCGG -
through Rene B. Gorospe, the Legal Consultant in-charge of reviewing behest loan cases -
against former officers/directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), namely,
Ferry, Tengco, Zosa, Zalamea, Castell, and Sison, as well as former officers/stockholders of
National Galleon Shipping Corporation (Galleon),7 namely, Cuenca, Tinio, and Roque charging
them of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. In the Affidavit-Complaint, the PCGG
alleged that on October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued
Administrative Order No. 13,8 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) in order to identify various anomalous behest loans entered
into by the Philippine Government in the past. Later on, President Ramos issued Memorandum
Order No. 619 on November 9, 1992, laying down the criteria which the Ad Hoc Committee
may use as a frame of reference in determining whether or not a loan is behest in nature.
Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee, with the assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG)
consisting of officers and employees of different government financial institutions (GFIs),
examined and studied documents relative to loan accounts extended by GFIs to various
corporations during the regime of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) -
one of which is the loan account granted by the DBP to Galleon.10

After examining the aforesaid loan account, the TWG found, inter alia, that: (a) on September
19, 1979, DBP, pursuant to its Board Resolution No. 3002,11 approved guarantees in favor of
Galleon in the aggregate amount of US$90,280,000.00 for the purpose of securing foreign
currency borrowings from financial institutions related to Galleon's acquisition of five (5) brand
new and two (2) secondhand vessels;12 (b) Board Resolution No. 3002 specifically stated that
such accommodation "shall be undertaken at the behest of the Philippine Government;"13 (c) as a
condition for the grant of the guarantees, Board Resolution No. 3002 required Galleon to raise its
paid up capital to P98.963 Million by 1981,14 but Galleon was only able to raise its capital to
P46,740.755.00;15 (d) despite Galleon's failure to comply with such condition, DBP still granted
the guarantees; (e) as of June 30, 1981, Galleon's arrearages had already amounted to
P40,684,059.37, while the aggregate DBP obligations of Galleon already totaled
P691,058,027.92;16 (f) despite the outstanding debts, DBP still issued Board Resolution Nos.
400817 and 3001,18 approving further accommodations in Galleon's favor in the form of one-year
foreign currency loans to refinance the latter's arrearages, which amounted to P58,101,718.89 as
of September 30, 1982;19(g) despite Galleon's arrearages amounting to P128,182,654.38 and
obligations accumulating to P904,277,536.96, DBP still approved the release of Galleon's two
(2) secondhand vessels as collaterals resulting in collateral deficiency;20and (h) as of March 31,
1984, Galleon's total obligations to DBP amounted to P2,039,284,390.85, while the value of its
collaterals was only P539,000,000.00.21 These findings were then collated in an Executive
Summary22 which was submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee.

Based on the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations
obtained by Galleon from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans, considering
that: (a) Galleon was undercapitalized; (b) the loan itself was under collateralized; (c) the major
stockholders of Galleon were known to be cronies of President Marcos; and d) certain documents
pertaining to the loan account were found to bear "marginal notes" of President Marcos
himself.23 Resultantly, the PCGG filed the instant criminal complaint against individual
respondents, docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0500-I.

Except for Roque, Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell, the other individual respondents impleaded in
the affidavit-complaint did not file their respective counter-affidavits despite due notice.24

In his defense,25 Roque denied being a Marcos crony, and averred that he was only a minor
shareholder of Galleon and that he was in no position to influence the DBP in extending the
subject loan to Galleon.26 For his part,27 Zalamea maintained that he had no participation or
hand in the subject loan transactions as he joined the DBP as Chairman only in 1982, while the
execution of the transactions pertaining to such loan was done in 1979-1981, and that the
criminal charges against them are barred by prescription since it had been more than 20 years
before the complaint against them was filed on July 15, 2003.28 Similarly, Tengco also
argued29 that the criminal charges against them had already prescribed. He also contended that
his participation in the approval of the subject loan was at the board level only and was done in
the exercise of his sound business judgment through the collective act of the DBP Board of
Directors.30 Finally, Castell pleaded31 that her role in the handling of the projects and
transactions of Galleon involved only the supervision of employees, but with no approving
authority for matters like those involving the transactions pertaining to the subject loan obtained
by Galleon from DBP.32

The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Resolution33 dated May 30, 2007, the Ombudsman found no probable cause against private
respondents and, accordingly, dismissed the criminal complaint against them.34 It found that the
pieces of evidence attached to the case records were not sufficient to establish probable cause
against the individual respondents, considering that the documents presented by the PCGG
consisted mostly of executive summaries and technical reports, which are hearsay, self-serving,
and of little probative value.35 In this relation, the Ombudsman noted that the PCGG failed to
present "the documents which would directly establish the alleged illegal transactions like, the
Loan Agreement between DBP and [Galleon], the approved Board Resolutions by the DBP
officers/board of directors, the participation/voting that transpired at the board meetings wherein
the alleged behest loans were granted."36

Aggrieved, the PCGG moved for reconsideration,37 which was, however, denied in an
Order38 dated April 13, 2009; hence, this petition.39

The Issue Before the Court

The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the OMB gravely abused its
discretion in finding no probable cause to indict respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of
RA 3019.chanrobleslaw

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with
the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide
whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from
reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction.40 The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.41 The
Court's pronouncement inCiron v. Gutierrez42 is instructive on this matter, to wit:

xxx this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the
determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only on
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the Court
will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before
it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could
be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.43] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings -
whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether or
not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he
committed. InFenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,44 the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in
finding the existence thereof in the following manner, to wit:

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined assuch facts as
are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable
cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.45 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not

there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged
should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction.46 "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence and absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits."47 Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level."48

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused
its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against individual respondents for lack
of probable cause, as will be explained hereunder.

As already stated, individual respondents were accused of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
the elements of which are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with
such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions.49 In the same vein, they were likewise charged with violation of
Section 3 (g) of the same law, which has the following elements: (a) that the accused is a public
officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (c) that
such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.50 Notably, private individuals may also be charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of
RA 3019 if they conspired with public officers.51

A review of the records of the case reveals that Galleon made a request for guarantees from DBP
to cover its foreign borrowings for the purpose of acquiring new and secondhand vessels. In an
evaluation memorandum52 dated August 27, 1979, the DBP itself already raised various red flags
regarding Galleon's request, such as the following: (a) its guarantee accommodation request
covers 100% of its project cost, which is in excess of DBP's normal practice of financing only
80% of such cost; (b) its net profit margin was experiencing a steady decrease due to high
operating costs; (c) its paid-up capital is only P9.95 Million; and (d) aside from its proposal to
source the increase in equity from the expected profits from the operations of the vessels to be
acquired, Galleon has not shown any concrete proof on how it will be funding its equity build-
up.53 Despite the foregoing, DBP still agreed to grant Galleon's request under certain conditions
(e.g., increase in paid-up capital, placement of adequate collaterals), which were eventually not
complied with. Further, when Galleon's arrearages and obligations skyrocketed due to its failure
to service its debts, DBP, instead of securing its interest by demanding immediate payment or the
foreclosure of the collaterals, granted Galleon further accommodations in the form of foreign
currency loans and release of certain collaterals. As a result of the foregoing, among other things,
Galleon's total obligations to DBP ballooned all the way to P2,039,284,390.85, while the
collaterals securing such obligations were only valued at P539,000,000.00 as of March 31,
1984.54 Further, Galleon's paid-up capital remained only at P46,740,755.00 as of June 30,
1981.55

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the
accommodations extended by DBP to Galleon were in the nature of behest loans, which then led
to the filing of criminal cases against individual respondents, who were high-ranking officers
and/or directors of either Galleon or DBP, as evidenced by the various documents on record.
Specifically, Cuenca, Tinio, and Roque were Galleon stockholders and were its President,
Executive Vice-President and Treasurer, and Corporate Secretary, respectively.56 On the
other hand, the following individual respondents exercised official functions for the DBP during
the time it extended Galleon the aforesaid accommodations: (a) Ferry as DBP Vice Chairman
and Acting Chairman;57 (b) Tengco as DBP Board Member, Supervising Governor, and Acting
Chairman;58 (c) Zosa as DBP Supervising Governor and Chairman of the Loan Committee;59 (d)
Zalamea as DBP Chairman;60 (e) Castell as DBP Executive Officer and Manager of the
Industrial Projects Development III;61 and f) Sison as DBP Board Member and Acting
Chairman.62 As may be gleaned from the documents on record, it appears that each of these high-
ranking officers and/or directors of DBP had a hand in recommending the approval and/or
the actual approval of the series of accommodations that DBP granted in favor of Galleon,
which constituted the behest loans received by the latter during the regime of the late
President Marcos.

In view of the accusations that they were involved in the grant of behest loans, Roque, Zalamea,
Tengco, and Castell merely denied liability by maintaining that they had no participation in
such grant. Suffice it to say that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated during the
trial proper. On the other hand, Ferry, Zosa, Cuenca, Tinio, and Sison miserably failed to debunk
the charges against them by not filing their respective counter-affidavits despite due notice.
Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that individual respondents
may have indeed committed acts constituting the crimes charged against them, and as such
they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.

Finally, it was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG's findings contained in the
Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-
serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory
nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the
course of its proceedings.63 In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman,64 the Court declared
that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was
held that probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay,viz.:

Justice Brion's pronouncement in Unilever that "the determination of probable cause does not
depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the admissibility or
veracity of testimonies presented" correctly recognizes the doctrine in the United States that the
determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as
long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible. In United States v.
Ventresca, the United States Supreme Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," this Court has long held that
"the term 'probable cause' . . . means less than evidence which would justify condemnation," x x
x and that a finding of "probable cause" may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent
in a criminal trial, x x x As the Court stated in Brinegar v. United States x x x, "There is a large
difference between two things to be proved (guilt and probable cause), as well as between the
tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof
required to establish them." Thus, hearsay may be the bases for issuance of the warrant "so
long as there ... [is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." x x x And, in Aguilar, we
recognized that "an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the
direct personal observations of the affiant," so long as the magistrate is "informed of some
of the underlying circumstances" supporting the affiant's conclusions and his belief that
any informant involved "whose identity need not be disclosed..." was "credible" or his
information "reliable." x x x.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties, x x
x.65 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this case, assuming arguendo that the factual findings contained in the Executive Summary
prepared by the TWG from which the Ad Hoc Committee based its conclusions are indeed
hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit
the same, as such factual findings appear to be based on official documents prepared by DBP
itself in connection with the behest loans it allegedly extended in favor of Galleon. In this regard,
it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of
arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against
the respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of
guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction.66 To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party's defense or accusations and the
admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the
preliminary stage.67
In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict individual respondents
of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal
complaint against them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2007 and the Order
dated April 13, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-03-0500-I are
hereby REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman
is DIRECTED to issue the proper resolution indicting individual respondents Don M. Ferry,
Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Rolando ML Zosa, Cesar C. Zalamea, Ofelia I. Castell, Rafael A. Sison,
Rodolfo M. Cuenca, Manuel I. Tinio, and Antonio R. Roque of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g)
of Republic Act No. 3019, in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Illegal Arrests; An accused is estopped from

assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of
the information against him on this ground before arraignment.-
Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his warrantless arrest was illegal for not falling under
the permissible warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. This
being the case, accused-appellant Devincio says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgment
over his person. He also claims that there was no showing that he was informed of his
Constitutional rights at the time of his arrest and his rights under Sections 2 and 3 of Republic
Act No. 7438 during investigation. As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that
accused-appellant Devincio raised none of these issues anytime during the course of his trial.
These issues were raised for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. We affirm the
ruling of the Court of Appeals and quote below Miclat, Jr. v. People, 656 SCRA 539 (2011), on
this Courts treatment of an accuseds belated allegation of the illegality of his warrantless
arrest: At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the
case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant
of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In
the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the
irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial
court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of
an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused. (Citations omitted) The foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants
Devincio and Vicente who failed to raise their allegations before their arraignment. They
actively participated in the trial and posited their defenses without mentioning the alleged
illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are deemed to have waived their right to question
their arrests.

3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings
of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
high respect if not conclusive effect.-
This Court cannot sustain both accused-appellants arguments casting doubt on Corderos
positive identification of their participation in the commission of the crime. As oft-explained,
when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as
its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This
holds truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. Without any clear showing that
the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.
4. Same; Same; Out-of-Court Identification; Out-of-court identification is conducted by the
police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face
with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.-
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court identification made
by Cordero to have satisfied the totality of circumstances test. People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249
SCRA 54 (1995), is instructive on the rules and test for a valid out-of-court identification: Out-
of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru
lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.
Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness
and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 208404, February 24, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE LUGNASIN AND

DEVINCIO GUERRERO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the January 23, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02971, which affirmed with modification the March 24, 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-87600, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin, Tito Lugnasin, Excelso Lugnasin, Elmer Madrid, Rogelio
Baldaba and Devincio Guerrero" wherein accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin (Vicente) and
Devincio Guerrero (Devincio) were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.

On October 15, 1999, the Department of Justice filed an Information against Vicente, Devincio
and four other individuals, namely, Tito E. Lugnasin (Tito), Excelso B. Lugnasin (Excelso),
Elmer A. Madrid (Elmer), Rogelio D. Baldaba (Rogelio), and five other unidentified individuals:
John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe, George Doe, and James Doe, for the crime of kidnapping for
ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information
reads:

That on or about April 20, 1999 in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court accused VICENTE LUGNASIN, TITO LUGNASIN, EXCELSO LUGNASIN, ELMER
MADRID, ROGELIO BALDABA, DEVINCIO GUERRERO, and other persons whose
identities ha[ve] not yet been ascertained, while conspiring, conniving and confederating with
one another, did then and there with criminal and malicious intent, with the use of force, threat
and intimidation, with firearms, take and carry away the person of Nicassius Cordero, to the
Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, detaining him thereat, depriving Nicassius
Cordero of his liberty, against his free will and consent, for the purpose of extorting ransom
money for his safe release from detention said demand for the payment of ransom money was
made on the relatives of Nicassius Cordero, and the same was release[d] in the evening of April
24, 1999 along the South Luzon Expressway.3

When arraigned on November 5, 2001, accused-appellant Vicente pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Accused-appellant Devincio likewise pleaded not guilty when he was arraigned on
March 6, 2002. Both accused-appellants made no stipulation during their respective pre-trial
conferences except for their identities and the jurisdiction of the court.

The nine other accused remain at large.

The facts succinctly synthesized by the RTC are as follows:

The prosecution's lone witness, Nicassius Cordero narrated in court how he was abducted while
opening the garage door of his residence in Mindanao Avenue in the late evening of April 20,
1999 by three armed men. He identified Devincio Guerrero as the man with a 38 cal. revolver
who came from his left side and pushed him inside the car. The man who came from his right
side and identified later as Tito Lugnasin drove the car with Elmer Madrid riding at the back.
After divesting him of his P5,000.00 cash and asking some questions, he realized he was being
kidnapped for ransom. Repeatedly, he declared that he was not a rich man. Along Libis, another
cohort, Celso Lugnasin, rode with them until they reached the South Superhi[gh]way and after
paying the toll fee, they drove on for about fifteen minutes and stopped just behind an owner
type jeepney before they switched places. The jcepney driver introduced himself as Commander
and drove the car. [Cordero] saw Commander's face. He was later identified as Vicente
Lugnasin. After driving for some minutes more, they alighted, [Cordero's] abductors placed the
car's sunvisor around his face and ordered him to walk barefooted towards a small house.
[Cordero] was kept there for four days, while they negotiated with Saleena, his sister-in-law for
the ransom money. On the fourth day, Commander was already angry and threatened to finish
him off. He was eventually released, without ransom money being paid.

Vicente Lugnasin, a resident of Luzviminda I, Dasmarifias Quezon City denied the accusation,
saying he only saw Cordero for the first time at the Department of Justice and Cordero could not
even identify him. He recounted that on May 14, 1999[,] while preparing for the town fiesta
celebration, policemen came to his residence and arrested him and his brother Tito [and] cousin
Excelsio for alleged involvement in a robbery case. They were tortured, then put on display for
media men to feast on and for alleged victims to identify. After posting bail, he was later arrested
for illegal possession of firearms. He was also charged with two other cases, a bank robbery and
the Mercury Bank robbery, both pending before the sala of Judge Jose Mendoza.

Devincio Guerrero, a fish vendor at the Pasig Market, likewise denies any involvement in the
kindnap[ping] of Cordero. He swears he saw him for the first time only in the courtroom. He
recalled that nearing Holy Week in 2002 [,] five uniformed policemen arrested him without a
warrant in Lucena City, where he used to buy smoked fish to sell. He was transferred to Camp
Karingal before being detained at the QC Jail, where he is detained up to the present. On May
14, 1999[,] he was a sponsor at a baptism of the child of his kumpadre in Bgy. Luzviminda,
Dasmarinas, Cavite. On his way home, he was accosted by police officers while urinating along
the roadside. He was detained first at the Cavite City Jail then at the Trece Martires jail. He saw
Vicente Lugnasin only at the Quezon City Jail.4

The Court of Appeals also made a finding that accused-appellant Vicente made known their
intentions when he asked Cordero about his work, family, and a contact person, and told him that
they would be demanding 30 Million Pesos as ransom for his release.5

Ruling of the RTC

On March 24, 2003, the RTC, resolving the lone issue of "whether [or not] Cordero's
identification of Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero as among his kidnappers is
reliable"6 promulgated its Decision, finding both accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom described and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in conspiracy with each
other and other Does, the Court hereby sentences them to each suffer the penalty of Death and to
indemnify jointly and severally the private complainant Nicassius Cordero the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

The warrants of arrest issued against the other accused remain.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In convicting the accused-appellants, the RTC found Cordero to be a careful, truthful, and candid
witness, whose story was supported by the evidence submitted. It added that this was in contrast
to the accused-appellants' bare denial of their participation in the kidnapping. The RTC also
pointed out that Cordero was able to identify both accused-appellants as he saw their faces
before he was blindfolded.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 23, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the accused-appellants' conviction with
modification as to the penalty. The fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

The Decision dated March 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City, in
Criminal Case No. Q-99-87600, is MODIFIED in that the penalty of death imposed upon
appellants is AMENDED to Reclusion Perpetua, without the possibility of
parole.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court of Appeals held that the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom were
established by the prosecution through its lone witness, Cordero, whose credible testimony
should be accorded great weight. It also ruled that Cordero's identification of his abductors
conformed to the stringent guidelines of out-of court identification, contrary to accused-appellant
Devincio's assertion that it was marked with suggestiveness.9

As regards accused-appellant Devincio's argument that his warrantless arrest was illegal since it
did not fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure, as amended, the Court of
Appeals held that accused-appellant Devincio's right to question his arrest and subsequent
inquest/preliminary investigation is deemed waived due to his failure to raise such argument
before his arraignment.10

Addressing accused-appellant Devincio's claim that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438,
entitled "An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof were violated, the Court of Appeals pointed out that
he neither offered any evidence nor executed an extrajudicial confession or admission for such
allegation.11

Finally, in light of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the Court of Appeals modified the penalty from Death to reclusion perpetua without the
possibility of parole.12

Both accused-appellants are now before this Court praying for a reversal of their conviction on
the same arguments upon which their appeal to the Court of Appeals were anchored.13

Issues

Accused-appellant Devincio assigned the following errors in his Appellant's Brief:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE PROSECUTION WITNESS.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [DEVINCIO] GUILTY

NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENCE OF SUGGESTIVENESS IN [THE]
IDENTIFICATION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OF THE APPELLANT AS ONE OF
HIS ABDUCTORS.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING [DEVINCIO] 'S

WARRANTLESS ARREST AS ILLEGAL.

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [DEVINCIO]'S RIGHTS
UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSONS
ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE
DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.14

Accused-appellant Vicente, for his part, posed a lone error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [VICENTE] DESPITE THE

PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the assailed judgment of conviction.

Elements of Kidnapping for Ransom

established.

The accused-appellants were charged and convicted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,16viz.:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female, or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

From the aforequoted provision, in prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom,the prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the accused was a private
person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii)
the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for
ransom.17

A painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements were
proven in the criminal case on review.

The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the crime and both the
accused-appellants' culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused-appellants
Vicente and Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private individual,
Cordero's positive identification of both accused-appellants - as two of several men who
abducted him from the gate of his house, who brought him to a hut somewhere in the south, who
chained him to a bed, who essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause for four days,
and, which deprivation of his liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom from his family -
collectively establish the crime ofkidnapping for ransom as the actions of both the accused-
appellants were certain and clear, and their intent was explicit and made known to Cordero
himself.

Identification of the
Accused-Appellants.

This Court cannot sustain both accused-appellants' arguments casting doubt on Cordero's
positive identification of their participation in the commission of the crime. As oft-explained,
when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as
its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This
holds truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. Without any clear showing that
the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.18

Herein, there is nothing farfetched or incredible in Cordero's testimony. Both accused-appellants

failed to show that it was physically impossible for Cordero to recognize them, as in fact,
Cordero had the unhindered view of his captors' faces before he was even blindfolded. Therefore,
Cordero's eyewitness account deserves full faith and credit.

But accused-appellant Devincio avers that the length of time, which has elapsed from the time
Cordero was released, up to the time he identified his abductors would have already affected his
memory, such that the possibility of error in his identification of the abductors could not be
discounted. He also insists that Cordero's "subsequent identification of [him],in open court
should be disregarded since the initial identification was seriously flawed, i.e., it was
characterized by suggestiveness."19

On the other hand, accused-appellant Vicente argues that although denial is an inherently weak
defense, it assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength when the prosecution's
evidence, particularly as to the identity of the accused as the author of the crime, is feeble,
doubtful, inconclusive, or unreliable. He says that Cordero's identification of his abductors was
questionable due to the circumstances during his abduction and detention, i.e., it was dark when
he was abducted, he was instructed to go down on the floor of the vehicle and not to look at his
kidnappers, he was blindfolded, and his eyeglasses were removed.20

With the foregoing, both accused-appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying on Cordero's
identification of them as two of his abductors as it was doubtful and unreliable.

This Court disagrees.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court identification made by
Cordero to have satisfied the totality of circumstances test.

People v. Teehankee, Jr.21 is instructive on the rules and test for a valid out-of-court
identification:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru
mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness
and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (Citation omitted.)

Cordero was able to see the faces of the men who abducted him from his house due to the light
emanating from the pedestrian gate. He was also able to describe how these men approached
him, the kind of firearms they were carrying, how the men acted where they passed, where he
was taken, and even the sounds he heard. Cordero's testimonies were replete with detailed
descriptions of how he was abducted and who abducted him. To top it all, he was confident that
he could identify his abductors, as he did at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG), Camp Pantaleon Garcia, Imus, Cavite,22 and in open court.

This Court notes with approval the observation of the RTC, viz.:

Cordero gave a detailed narration of his abduction that fateful night of April 20, 1999. We
observed his demeanor, his reactions to questions asked of him. He was a careful witness,
truthful and candid. At times, we noted that he was in tears at the painful recollection of the
horror he went through. His story was supported by the evidence submitted.23

And as the Court of Appeals said, "Cordero was endeavoring to remember faces and incidents
and etch these in his memory."24 In People v. Martinez25 we held:

Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is
natural for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court has held that the most
natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed, xxx. All too often, the face
of the assailant and his body movements create a lasting impression on the victim's mind and
cannot thus be easily erased from his memory.

Cordero positively identified both accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente as two of his
kidnappers. He saw both accused-appellants' faces before he was blindfolded. Thus, it cannot be
said that the length of time between the crime and the identification of the accused-appellants,
which was only 26 days, had any effect on Cordero's memory, to render his positive
identification flawed.

Accused-appellant Devincio's contention that Cordero's out-of-court identification was marked

by suggestiveness must similarly fail for his failure to support it by solid evidence. The only
reason he gave for such argument was Cordero's knowledge that the persons who were being
investigated in connection with a robbery case were included in the police or photographic line-
up. However, that is not enough to strike down Cordero's identification for being tainted. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was on point when it quoted this Court's ruling in People
v. Villena26 as follows:

Eyewitness identification is often decisive of the conviction or acquittal of an accused.

Identification of an accused through mug shots is one of the established procedures in pinning
down criminals. However, to avoid charges of impermissible suggestion, there should be
nothing in the photograph that would focus attention on a single person, x x x. (Citation
omitted.)

As the OSG averred, the photographs shown to Cordero contained nothing to suggest whom he
should pick and identify as his abductors. Cordero testified as follows:

Cordero They asked me to see a lineup and I said I was still very afraid of them so they showed
me different photographs and asked if I co[u]ld identify who my abductors were and from a
series of photos, I was able to identify Vicente Lugnasin, Celso Lugnasin, Elmer Madrid,
Guerrero and I could not yet identify de Chaves but I saw him there walking around.28

But assuming for the sake of argument that Cordero's out-of-court identification was improper, it
will have no bearing on the conviction of the accused-appellants. We have ruled as follows:

[I]t is settled that an out-of-court identification does not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of
an independent in-court identification and that, even assuming that an out-of-court identification
was tainted with irregularity, the subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
attended it. xxx.29 (Citation omitted.)

Cordero's in-court identification was made with certainty when he pointed to both accused-
appellants in court when he was asked to identify them from among the people inside the
courtroom.

It is apparent in the case at bar that Cordero was able to categorically, candidly, and positively
identify both accused-appellants as two of his abductors both outside and inside the court. Thus,
his identification of the accused is worthy of credence and weight. This Court, in People v.
Cenahonon30said:

An affirmative testimony merits greater weight than a negative one, especially when the former
comes from a credible witness. Categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the witness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of real weight in law unless
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. (Citation omitted.)

As to the Alleged Illegality of Accused-

appellant Devincio Guerrero's
Warrantless Arrest and the Violation
of His Rights Under Republic Act
No. 7438.

Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his warrantless arrest was illegal for not falling under the
permissible warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.31 This
being the case, accused-appellant Devincio says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render
judgement over his person. He also claims that there was no showing that he was informed of his
Constitutional rights at the time of his arrest and his rights under Sections 2 and 3 of Republic
Act No. 7438 during investigation.32

As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that accused-appellant Devincio raised none of
these issues anytime during the course of his trial. These issues were raised for the first time on
appeal before the Court of Appeals. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals and quote
belowMiclat, Jr. v. People33 on this Court's treatment of an accused's belated allegation of the
illegality of his warrantless arrest:

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case,
jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

In the present case, at the time of petitioner's arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the
irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial
court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of
an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused. (Citations omitted.)

The foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente who failed to
raise their allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial and posited
their defenses without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are
deemed to have waived their right to question their arrests.

As regards accused-appellant Devincio's argument that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438
were violated, we likewise uphold the following ruling of the Court of Appeals:

With respect to appellant Devincio's argument that his rights under RA 7438 were violated while
he was under custodial investigation, aside from his bare-faced claim, he has offered no evidence
to sustain such claim; and appellant Devincio (or appellant Vicente, for that matter) has not
executed an extrajudicial confession or admission for, as stated in People vs. Buluran and
Valenzuela:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation
since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records show
that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during custodial investigation. Any
allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction.34 (Citation omitted.)

Damages Awarded.

The RTC awarded Cordero Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. However,
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to modify such award as follows:

1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.35

"The award of exemplary damages is justified, the lowering of the penalty to reclusion
perpetua in view of the prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty notwithstanding, it not
being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that a qualifying
circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the kidnapping."36

The accused-appellants shall be jointly and severally liable for these amounts awarded in favor
of Cordero. In addition, these amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum, to earn from the date of the finality of this Court's Decision until fully paid.37
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02971 finding accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio
Guerrero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole
is AFFIRMED with modification. Accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero
are ordered to pay Nicassius Cordero the following:

1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The foregoing amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to earn
from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary