Game Theory - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia PDF

1/26/2016 GametheoryWikipedia,thefreeencyclopedia
Gametheory
FromWikipedia,thefreeencyclopedia
Gametheoryis"thestudyofmathematicalmodelsofconflictandcooperationbetweenintelligentrational
decisionmakers."[1]Gametheoryismainlyusedineconomics,politicalscience,andpsychology,aswellas
logic,computerscience,biologyandpoker.[2]Originally,itaddressedzerosumgames,inwhichone
person'sgainsresultinlossesfortheotherparticipants.Today,gametheoryappliestoawiderangeof
behavioralrelations,andisnowanumbrellatermforthescienceoflogicaldecisionmakinginhumans,
animals,andcomputers.
Moderngametheorybeganwiththeidearegardingtheexistenceofmixedstrategyequilibriaintwoperson
zerosumgamesanditsproofbyJohnvonNeumann.VonNeumann'soriginalproofusedBrouwerfixed
pointtheoremoncontinuousmappingsintocompactconvexsets,whichbecameastandardmethodingame
theoryandmathematicaleconomics.Hispaperwasfollowedbythe1944bookTheoryofGamesand
EconomicBehavior,cowrittenwithOskarMorgenstern,whichconsideredcooperativegamesofseveral
players.Thesecondeditionofthisbookprovidedanaxiomatictheoryofexpectedutility,whichallowed
mathematicalstatisticiansandeconomiststotreatdecisionmakingunderuncertainty.
Thistheorywasdevelopedextensivelyinthe1950sbymanyscholars.Gametheorywaslaterexplicitly
appliedtobiologyinthe1970s,althoughsimilardevelopmentsgobackatleastasfarasthe1930s.Game
theoryhasbeenwidelyrecognizedasanimportanttoolinmanyfields.WiththeNobelMemorialPrizein
EconomicSciencesgoingtogametheoristJeanTirolein2014,elevengametheoristshavenowwonthe
economicsNobelPrize.JohnMaynardSmithwasawardedtheCrafoordPrizeforhisapplicationofgame
theorytobiology.
Contents
1 Representationofgames
1.1 Extensiveform
1.2 Normalform
1.3 Characteristicfunctionform
2 Generalandapplieduses
2.1 Descriptionandmodeling
2.2 Prescriptiveornormativeanalysis
2.3 Economicsandbusiness
2.4 Politicalscience
2.5 Biology
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory 1/25
2.5 Biology
2.6 Computerscienceandlogic
2.7 Philosophy
3 Gametypes
3.1 Cooperative/Noncooperative
3.2 Symmetric/Asymmetric
3.3 Zerosum/Nonzerosum
3.4 Simultaneous/Sequential
3.5 Perfectinformationandimperfectinformation
3.6 Combinatorialgames
3.7 Infinitelylonggames
3.8 Discreteandcontinuousgames
3.9 Differentialgames
3.10 Manyplayerandpopulationgames
3.11 Stochasticoutcomes(andrelationtootherfields)
3.12 Metagames
3.13 PoolingGames
4 History
5 Inpopularculture
6 Seealso
7 Notes
8 Referencesandfurtherreading
8.1 Textbooksandgeneralreferences
8.2 Historicallyimportanttexts
8.3 Otherprintreferences
8.4 Websites
8.4 Websites
Representationofgames
Thegamesstudiedingametheoryarewelldefinedmathematicalobjects.Tobefullydefined,agamemust
specifythefollowingelements:theplayersofthegame,theinformationandactionsavailabletoeach
playerateachdecisionpoint,andthepayoffsforeachoutcome.(EricRasmusenreferstothesefour
"essentialelements"bytheacronym"PAPI".)[3]Agametheoristtypicallyusestheseelements,alongwitha
solutionconceptoftheirchoosing,todeduceasetofequilibriumstrategiesforeachplayersuchthat,when
thesestrategiesareemployed,noplayercanprofitbyunilaterallydeviatingfromtheirstrategy.These
equilibriumstrategiesdetermineanequilibriumtothegameastablestateinwhicheitheroneoutcome
occursorasetofoutcomesoccurwithknownprobability.
Mostcooperativegamesarepresentedinthecharacteristicfunctionform,whiletheextensiveandthe
normalformsareusedtodefinenoncooperativegames.
Extensiveform
Theextensiveformcanbeusedtoformalizegameswithatime
sequencingofmoves.Gameshereareplayedontrees(aspictured
here).Hereeachvertex(ornode)representsapointofchoicefora
player.Theplayerisspecifiedbyanumberlistedbythevertex.The
linesoutofthevertexrepresentapossibleactionforthatplayer.The
payoffsarespecifiedatthebottomofthetree.Theextensiveform
canbeviewedasamultiplayergeneralizationofadecisiontree.[4]
Anextensiveformgame
Thegamepicturedconsistsoftwoplayers.Thewaythisparticular
gameisstructured(i.e.,withsequentialdecisionmakingandperfectinformation),Player1"moves"firstby
choosingeitherForU(lettersareassignedarbitrarilyformathematicalpurposes).Nextinthesequence,
Player2,whohasnowseenPlayer1'smove,choosestoplayeitherAorR.OncePlayer2hasmadehis/
herchoice,thegameisconsideredfinishedandeachplayergetstheirrespectivepayoff.Supposethat
Player1choosesUandthenPlayer2choosesA:Player1thengetsapayoffof"eight"(whichinreal
worldtermscanbeinterpretedinmanyways,thesimplestofwhichisintermsofmoneybutcouldmean
thingssuchaseightdaysofvacationoreightcountriesconqueredoreveneightmoreopportunitiestoplay
thesamegameagainstotherplayers)andPlayer2getsapayoffof"two".
Theextensiveformcanalsocapturesimultaneousmovegamesandgameswithimperfectinformation.To
representit,eitheradottedlineconnectsdifferentverticestorepresentthemasbeingpartofthesame
informationset(i.e.theplayersdonotknowatwhichpointtheyare),oraclosedlineisdrawnaroundthem.
(Seeexampleintheimperfectinformationsection.)
Normalform
Thenormal(orstrategicform)gameisusually Player2 Player2

representedbyamatrixwhichshowstheplayers, choosesLeft choosesRight
strategies,andpayoffs(seetheexampletotheright).
Moregenerallyitcanberepresentedbyanyfunction Player1 4,3 1,1

thatassociatesapayoffforeachplayerwithevery choosesUp
possiblecombinationofactions.Intheaccompanying
exampletherearetwoplayersonechoosestherowand Player1
choosesDown
0,0 3,4
theotherchoosesthecolumn.Eachplayerhastwo
strategies,whicharespecifiedbythenumberofrows Normalformorpayoffmatrixofa2player,2
andthenumberofcolumns.Thepayoffsareprovidedin strategygame
theinterior.Thefirstnumberisthepayoffreceivedby
therowplayer(Player1inourexample)thesecondisthepayoffforthecolumnplayer(Player2inour
example).SupposethatPlayer1playsUpandthatPlayer2playsLeft.ThenPlayer1getsapayoffof4,and
Player2gets3.
Whenagameispresentedinnormalform,itispresumedthateachplayeractssimultaneouslyor,atleast,
withoutknowingtheactionsoftheother.Ifplayershavesomeinformationaboutthechoicesofother
players,thegameisusuallypresentedinextensiveform.
Everyextensiveformgamehasanequivalentnormalformgame,howeverthetransformationtonormal
formmayresultinanexponentialblowupinthesizeoftherepresentation,makingitcomputationally
impractical.[5]
Characteristicfunctionform
Ingamesthatpossessremovableutility,separaterewardsarenotgivenrather,thecharacteristicfunction
decidesthepayoffofeachunity.Theideaisthattheunitythatis'empty',sotospeak,doesnotreceivea
rewardatall.
TheoriginofthisformistobefoundinJohnvonNeumannandOskarMorgenstern'sbookwhenlooking
attheseinstances,theyguessedthatwhenaunion appears,itworksagainstthefraction asiftwo
individualswereplayinganormalgame.ThebalancedpayoffofCisabasicfunction.Althoughthereare
differingexamplesthathelpdeterminecoalitionalamountsfromnormalgames,notallappearthatintheir
functionformcanbederivedfromsuch.
Formally,acharacteristicfunctionisseenas:(N,v),whereNrepresentsthegroupofpeopleand
isanormalutility.
Suchcharacteristicfunctionshaveexpandedtodescribegameswherethereisnoremovableutility.
Generalandapplieduses
Asamethodofappliedmathematics,gametheoryhasbeenusedtostudyawidevarietyofhumanand
animalbehaviors.Itwasinitiallydevelopedineconomicstounderstandalargecollectionofeconomic
behaviors,includingbehaviorsoffirms,markets,andconsumers.Thefirstuseofgametheoreticanalysis
wasbyAntoineAugustinCournotin1838withhissolutionoftheCournotduopoly.Theuseofgame
theoryinthesocialscienceshasexpanded,andgametheoryhasbeenappliedtopolitical,sociological,and
psychologicalbehaviorsaswell.
AlthoughpretwentiethcenturynaturalistssuchasCharlesDarwinmadegametheoretickindsof
statements,theuseofgametheoreticanalysisinbiologybeganwithRonaldFisher'sstudiesofanimal
behaviorduringthe1930s.Thisworkpredatesthename"gametheory",butitsharesmanyimportant
featureswiththisfield.ThedevelopmentsineconomicswerelaterappliedtobiologylargelybyJohn
MaynardSmithinhisbookEvolutionandtheTheoryofGames.
Inadditiontobeingusedtodescribe,predict,andexplainbehavior,gametheoryhasalsobeenusedto
developtheoriesofethicalornormativebehaviorandtoprescribesuchbehavior.[6]Ineconomicsand
philosophy,scholarshaveappliedgametheorytohelpintheunderstandingofgoodorproperbehavior.
GametheoreticargumentsofthistypecanbefoundasfarbackasPlato.[7]
Descriptionandmodeling
Theprimaryuseofgametheoryistodescribeand
modelhowhumanpopulationsbehave.Somescholars
believethatbyfindingtheequilibriaofgamestheycan
predicthowactualhumanpopulationswillbehave
whenconfrontedwithsituationsanalogoustothegame
beingstudied.Thisparticularviewofgametheoryhas
beencriticized.First,itarguedthattheassumptions Afourstagecentipedegame.
madebygametheoristsareoftenviolatedwhenapplied
torealworldsituations.Gametheoristsusuallyassume
playersactrationally,butinpractice,humanbehavioroftendeviatesfromthismodel.Gametheorists
respondbycomparingtheirassumptionstothoseusedinphysics.Thuswhiletheirassumptionsdonot
alwayshold,theycantreatgametheoryasareasonablescientificidealakintothemodelsusedby
physicists.However,empiricalworkhasshownthatinsomeclassicgames,suchasthecentipedegame,
guess2/3oftheaveragegame,andthedictatorgame,peopleregularlydonotplayNashequilibria.Thereis
anongoingdebateregardingtheimportanceoftheseexperimentsandwhethertheanalysisofthe
experimentsfullycapturesallaspectsoftherelevantsituation.[8]
Somegametheorists,followingtheworkofJohnMaynardSmithandGeorgeR.Price,haveturnedto
evolutionarygametheoryinordertoresolvetheseissues.Thesemodelspresumeeithernorationalityor
boundedrationalityonthepartofplayers.Despitethename,evolutionarygametheorydoesnotnecessarily
presumenaturalselectioninthebiologicalsense.Evolutionarygametheoryincludesbothbiologicalaswell
asculturalevolutionandalsomodelsofindividuallearning(forexample,fictitiousplaydynamics).
Prescriptiveornormativeanalysis
Somescholars,likeLeonardSavage,seegametheorynotasapredictive Cooperate Defect

toolforthebehaviorofhumanbeings,butasasuggestionforhow
peopleoughttobehave.Sinceastrategy,correspondingtoaNash 10,
equilibriumofagameconstitutesone'sbestresponsetotheactionsof Cooperate 1,1
theotherplayersprovidedtheyarein(thesame)Nashequilibrium
0
playingastrategythatispartofaNashequilibriumseemsappropriate.
Thisnormativeuseofgametheoryhasalsocomeundercriticism.
Defect 0,10 5,5
ThePrisoner'sDilemma
Economicsandbusiness
Gametheoryisamajormethodusedinmathematicaleconomicsandbusinessformodelingcompeting
behaviorsofinteractingagents.[9]Applicationsincludeawidearrayofeconomicphenomenaand
approaches,suchasauctions,bargaining,mergers&acquisitionspricing,[10]fairdivision,duopolies,
oligopolies,socialnetworkformation,agentbasedcomputationaleconomics,[11]generalequilibrium,
mechanismdesign,[12]andvotingsystems[13]andacrosssuchbroadareasasexperimentaleconomics,[14]
behavioraleconomics,[15]informationeconomics,[3]industrialorganization,[16]andpolitical
economy.[17][18]
Thisresearchusuallyfocusesonparticularsetsofstrategiesknownas"solutionconcepts"or"equilibria".A
commonassumptionisthatplayersactrationally.Innoncooperativegames,themostfamousoftheseis
theNashequilibrium.AsetofstrategiesisaNashequilibriumifeachrepresentsabestresponsetothe
otherstrategies.IfalltheplayersareplayingthestrategiesinaNashequilibrium,theyhavenounilateral
incentivetodeviate,sincetheirstrategyisthebesttheycandogivenwhatothersaredoing.[19][20]
Thepayoffsofthegamearegenerallytakentorepresenttheutilityofindividualplayers.
Aprototypicalpaperongametheoryineconomicsbeginsbypresentingagamethatisanabstractionofa
particulareconomicsituation.Oneormoresolutionconceptsarechosen,andtheauthordemonstrates
whichstrategysetsinthepresentedgameareequilibriaoftheappropriatetype.Naturallyonemightwonder
towhatusethisinformationshouldbeput.Economistsandbusinessprofessorssuggesttwoprimaryuses
(notedabove):descriptiveandprescriptive.[6]
Politicalscience
Theapplicationofgametheorytopoliticalscienceisfocusedintheoverlappingareasoffairdivision,
politicaleconomy,publicchoice,warbargaining,positivepoliticaltheory,andsocialchoicetheory.Ineach
oftheseareas,researchershavedevelopedgametheoreticmodelsinwhichtheplayersareoftenvoters,
states,specialinterestgroups,andpoliticians.
EarlyexamplesofgametheoryappliedtopoliticalscienceareprovidedbyAnthonyDowns.InhisbookAn
EconomicTheoryofDemocracy,[21]heappliestheHotellingfirmlocationmodeltothepoliticalprocess.In
theDownsianmodel,politicalcandidatescommittoideologiesonaonedimensionalpolicyspace.Downs
firstshowshowthepoliticalcandidateswillconvergetotheideologypreferredbythemedianvoterif
votersarefullyinformed,butthenarguesthatvoterschoosetoremainrationallyignorantwhichallowsfor
candidatedivergence.
Ithasalsobeenproposedthatgametheoryexplainsthestabilityofanyformofpoliticalgovernment.
Takingthesimplestcaseofamonarchy,forexample,theking,beingonlyoneperson,doesnotandcannot
maintainhisauthoritybypersonallyexercisingphysicalcontroloverallorevenanysignificantnumberof
hissubjects.Sovereigncontrolisinsteadexplainedbytherecognitionbyeachcitizenthatallothercitizens
expecteachothertoviewtheking(orotherestablishedgovernment)asthepersonwhoseorderswillbe
followed.Coordinatingcommunicationamongcitizenstoreplacethesovereigniseffectivelybarred,since
conspiracytoreplacethesovereignisgenerallypunishableasacrime.Thus,inaprocessthatcanbe
modeledbyvariantsoftheprisoner'sdilemma,duringperiodsofstabilitynocitizenwillfinditrationalto
movetoreplacethesovereign,evenifallthecitizensknowtheywouldbebetteroffiftheywerealltoact
collectively.[22]
Agametheoreticexplanationfordemocraticpeaceisthatpublicandopendebateindemocraciessendclear
andreliableinformationregardingtheirintentionstootherstates.Incontrast,itisdifficulttoknowthe
intentionsofnondemocraticleaders,whateffectconcessionswillhave,andifpromiseswillbekept.Thus
therewillbemistrustandunwillingnesstomakeconcessionsifatleastoneofthepartiesinadisputeisa
nondemocracy.[23]
Gametheorycouldalsohelppredictanation'sresponseswhenthereisanewruleorlawtobeappliedto
thatnation.OneexamplewouldbePeterJohnWood's(2013)researchwhenhelookedintowhatnations
coulddotohelpreduceclimatechange.Woodthoughtthiscouldbeaccomplishedbymakingtreatieswith
othernationstoreducegreenhousegasemissions.However,heconcludedthatthisideacouldnotwork
becauseitwouldcreateaprisoner'sdilemmatothenations.[24]
Biology
Unlikethoseineconomics,thepayoffsforgamesinbiologyareoften Hawk Dove

interpretedascorrespondingtofitness.Inaddition,thefocushasbeen
lessonequilibriathatcorrespondtoanotionofrationalityandmoreon Hawk 20,20 80,40
onesthatwouldbemaintainedbyevolutionaryforces.Thebestknown
equilibriuminbiologyisknownastheevolutionarilystablestrategy Dove 40,80 60,60
(ESS),firstintroducedin(Smith&Price1973).Althoughitsinitial
motivationdidnotinvolveanyofthementalrequirementsoftheNash Thehawkdovegame
equilibrium,everyESSisaNashequilibrium.
Inbiology,gametheoryhasbeenusedasamodeltounderstandmanydifferentphenomena.Itwasfirst
usedtoexplaintheevolution(andstability)oftheapproximate1:1sexratios.(Fisher1930)suggestedthat
the1:1sexratiosarearesultofevolutionaryforcesactingonindividualswhocouldbeseenastryingto
maximizetheirnumberofgrandchildren.
Additionally,biologistshaveusedevolutionarygametheoryandtheESStoexplaintheemergenceof
animalcommunication.[25]Theanalysisofsignalinggamesandothercommunicationgameshasprovided
insightintotheevolutionofcommunicationamonganimals.Forexample,themobbingbehaviorofmany
species,inwhichalargenumberofpreyanimalsattackalargerpredator,seemstobeanexampleof
spontaneousemergentorganization.Antshavealsobeenshowntoexhibitfeedforwardbehaviorakinto
fashion(seePaulOrmerod'sButterflyEconomics).
Biologistshaveusedthegameofchickentoanalyzefightingbehaviorandterritoriality.[26]
AccordingtoMaynardSmith,intheprefacetoEvolutionandtheTheoryofGames,"paradoxically,ithas
turnedoutthatgametheoryismorereadilyappliedtobiologythantothefieldofeconomicbehaviourfor
whichitwasoriginallydesigned".Evolutionarygametheoryhasbeenusedtoexplainmanyseemingly
incongruousphenomenainnature.[27]
Onesuchphenomenonisknownasbiologicalaltruism.Thisisasituationinwhichanorganismappearsto
actinawaythatbenefitsotherorganismsandisdetrimentaltoitself.Thisisdistinctfromtraditional
notionsofaltruismbecausesuchactionsarenotconscious,butappeartobeevolutionaryadaptationsto
increaseoverallfitness.Examplescanbefoundinspeciesrangingfromvampirebatsthatregurgitateblood
theyhaveobtainedfromanight'shuntingandgiveittogroupmemberswhohavefailedtofeed,toworker
beesthatcareforthequeenbeefortheirentirelivesandnevermate,toVervetmonkeysthatwarngroup
membersofapredator'sapproach,evenwhenitendangersthatindividual'schanceofsurvival.[28]Allof
theseactionsincreasetheoverallfitnessofagroup,butoccuratacosttotheindividual.
Evolutionarygametheoryexplainsthisaltruismwiththeideaofkinselection.Altruistsdiscriminate
betweentheindividualstheyhelpandfavorrelatives.Hamilton'sruleexplainstheevolutionaryrationale
behindthisselectionwiththeequationc<b*rwherethecost(c)tothealtruistmustbelessthanthebenefit
(b)totherecipientmultipliedbythecoefficientofrelatedness(r).Themorecloselyrelatedtwoorganisms
arecausestheincidencesofaltruismtoincreasebecausetheysharemanyofthesamealleles.Thismeans
thatthealtruisticindividual,byensuringthattheallelesofitscloserelativearepassedon,(throughsurvival
ofitsoffspring)canforgotheoptionofhavingoffspringitselfbecausethesamenumberofallelesare
passedon.Helpingasiblingforexample(indiploidanimals),hasacoefficientof,because(onaverage)
anindividualsharesoftheallelesinitssibling'soffspring.Ensuringthatenoughofasiblingsoffspring
survivetoadulthoodprecludesthenecessityofthealtruisticindividualproducingoffspring.[28]The
coefficientvaluesdependheavilyonthescopeoftheplayingfieldforexampleifthechoiceofwhomto
favorincludesallgeneticlivingthings,notjustallrelatives,weassumethediscrepancybetweenallhumans
onlyaccountsforapproximately1%ofthediversityintheplayingfield,acoefficientthatwasinthe
smallerfieldbecomes0.995.Similarlyifitisconsideredthatinformationotherthanthatofageneticnature
(e.g.epigenetics,religion,science,etc.)persistedthroughtimetheplayingfieldbecomeslargerstill,and
thediscrepanciessmaller.
Computerscienceandlogic
Gametheoryhascometoplayanincreasinglyimportantroleinlogicandincomputerscience.Several
logicaltheorieshaveabasisingamesemantics.Inaddition,computerscientistshaveusedgamestomodel
interactivecomputations.Also,gametheoryprovidesatheoreticalbasistothefieldofmultiagentsystems.
Separately,gametheoryhasplayedaroleinonlinealgorithms.Inparticular,thekserverproblem,which
hasinthepastbeenreferredtoasgameswithmovingcostsandrequestanswergames.[29]Yao'sprincipleis
agametheoretictechniqueforprovinglowerboundsonthecomputationalcomplexityofrandomized
algorithms,especiallyonlinealgorithms.
Theemergenceoftheinternethasmotivatedthedevelopmentofalgorithmsforfindingequilibriaingames,
markets,computationalauctions,peertopeersystems,andsecurityandinformationmarkets.Algorithmic
gametheory[30]andwithinitalgorithmicmechanismdesign[31]combinecomputationalalgorithmdesign
andanalysisofcomplexsystemswitheconomictheory.[32]
Philosophy
Gametheoryhasbeenputtoseveralusesinphilosophy.Respondingto Stag Hare

twopapersbyW.V.O.Quine(1960,1967),Lewis(1969)usedgame
theorytodevelopaphilosophicalaccountofconvention.Insodoing,he Stag 3,3 0,2
providedthefirstanalysisofcommonknowledgeandemployeditin
analyzingplayincoordinationgames.Inaddition,hefirstsuggestedthat Hare 2,0 2,2
onecanunderstandmeaningintermsofsignalinggames.Thislater
suggestionhasbeenpursuedbyseveralphilosopherssinceLewis.[33] Staghunt
FollowingLewis(1969)gametheoreticaccountofconventions,EdnaUllmannMargalit(1977)and
Bicchieri(2006)havedevelopedtheoriesofsocialnormsthatdefinethemasNashequilibriathatresult
fromtransformingamixedmotivegameintoacoordinationgame.[34][35]
Gametheoryhasalsochallengedphilosopherstothinkintermsofinteractiveepistemology:whatitmeans
foracollectivetohavecommonbeliefsorknowledge,andwhataretheconsequencesofthisknowledgefor
thesocialoutcomesresultingfromagents'interactions.Philosopherswhohaveworkedinthisareainclude
Bicchieri(1989,1993),[36][37]Skyrms(1990),[38]andStalnaker(1999).[39]
Inethics,someauthorshaveattemptedtopursueThomasHobbes'projectofderivingmoralityfromself
interest.Sincegamesliketheprisoner'sdilemmapresentanapparentconflictbetweenmoralityandself
interest,explainingwhycooperationisrequiredbyselfinterestisanimportantcomponentofthisproject.
Thisgeneralstrategyisacomponentofthegeneralsocialcontractviewinpoliticalphilosophy(for
examples,seeGauthier(1986)andKavka(1986)).[40]
Otherauthorshaveattemptedtouseevolutionarygametheoryinordertoexplaintheemergenceofhuman
attitudesaboutmoralityandcorrespondinganimalbehaviors.Theseauthorslookatseveralgamesincluding
theprisoner'sdilemma,staghunt,andtheNashbargaininggameasprovidinganexplanationforthe
emergenceofattitudesaboutmorality(see,e.g.,Skyrms(1996,2004)andSoberandWilson(1999)).
Gametypes
Cooperative/Noncooperative
Agameiscooperativeiftheplayersareabletoformbindingcommitments.Forinstance,thelegalsystem
requiresthemtoadheretotheirpromises.Innoncooperativegames,thisisnotpossible.
Oftenitisassumedthatcommunicationamongplayersisallowedincooperativegames,butnotinnon
cooperativeones.However,thisclassificationontwobinarycriteriahasbeenquestioned,andsometimes
rejected.[41]
Ofthetwotypesofgames,noncooperativegamesareabletomodelsituationstothefinestdetails,
producingaccurateresults.Cooperativegamesfocusonthegameatlarge.Considerableeffortshavebeen
madetolinkthetwoapproaches.ThesocalledNashprogramme(Nashprogramistheresearchagendafor
investigatingontheonehandaxiomaticbargainingsolutionsandontheotherhandtheequilibrium
outcomesofstrategicbargainingprocedures)[42]hasalreadyestablishedmanyofthecooperativesolutions
asnoncooperativeequilibria.
Hybridgamescontaincooperativeandnoncooperativeelements.Forinstance,coalitionsofplayersare
formedinacooperativegame,buttheseplayinanoncooperativefashion.
Symmetric/Asymmetric
Asymmetricgameisagamewherethepayoffsforplayingaparticular E F
strategydependonlyontheotherstrategiesemployed,notonwhois
playingthem.Iftheidentitiesoftheplayerscanbechangedwithout E 1,2 0,0
changingthepayofftothestrategies,thenagameissymmetric.Manyof
thecommonlystudied22gamesaresymmetric.Thestandard F 0,0 1,2

representationsofchicken,theprisoner'sdilemma,andthestaghuntare
allsymmetricgames.Somescholarswouldconsidercertainasymmetric Anasymmetricgame
gamesasexamplesofthesegamesaswell.However,themostcommon
payoffsforeachofthesegamesaresymmetric.
Mostcommonlystudiedasymmetricgamesaregameswheretherearenotidenticalstrategysetsforboth
players.Forinstance,theultimatumgameandsimilarlythedictatorgamehavedifferentstrategiesforeach
player.Itispossible,however,foragametohaveidenticalstrategiesforbothplayers,yetbeasymmetric.
Forexample,thegamepicturedtotherightisasymmetricdespitehavingidenticalstrategysetsforboth
players.
Zerosum/Nonzerosum
Zerosumgamesareaspecialcaseofconstantsumgames,inwhich A B
choicesbyplayerscanneitherincreasenordecreasetheavailable
resources.Inzerosumgamesthetotalbenefittoallplayersinthegame, A 1,1 3,3
foreverycombinationofstrategies,alwaysaddstozero(more
informally,aplayerbenefitsonlyattheequalexpenseofothers).[43] B 0,0 2,2
Pokerexemplifiesazerosumgame(ignoringthepossibilityofthe
house'scut),becauseonewinsexactlytheamountone'sopponentslose. Azerosumgame
Otherzerosumgamesincludematchingpenniesandmostclassical
boardgamesincludingGoandchess.
Manygamesstudiedbygametheorists(includingtheinfamousprisoner'sdilemma)arenonzerosum
games,becausetheoutcomehasnetresultsgreaterorlessthanzero.Informally,innonzerosumgames,a
gainbyoneplayerdoesnotnecessarilycorrespondwithalossbyanother.
Constantsumgamescorrespondtoactivitiesliketheftandgambling,butnottothefundamentaleconomic
situationinwhichtherearepotentialgainsfromtrade.Itispossibletotransformanygameintoa(possibly
asymmetric)zerosumgamebyaddingadummyplayer(oftencalled"theboard")whoselossescompensate
theplayers'netwinnings.
Simultaneous/Sequential
Simultaneousgamesaregameswherebothplayersmovesimultaneously,oriftheydonotmove
simultaneously,thelaterplayersareunawareoftheearlierplayers'actions(makingthemeffectively
simultaneous).Sequentialgames(ordynamicgames)aregameswherelaterplayershavesomeknowledge
aboutearlieractions.Thisneednotbeperfectinformationabouteveryactionofearlierplayersitmightbe
verylittleknowledge.Forinstance,aplayermayknowthatanearlierplayerdidnotperformoneparticular
action,whilehedoesnotknowwhichoftheotheravailableactionsthefirstplayeractuallyperformed.
Thedifferencebetweensimultaneousandsequentialgamesiscapturedinthedifferentrepresentations
discussedabove.Often,normalformisusedtorepresentsimultaneousgames,whileextensiveformisused
torepresentsequentialones.Thetransformationofextensivetonormalformisoneway,meaningthat
multipleextensiveformgamescorrespondtothesamenormalform.Consequently,notionsofequilibrium
forsimultaneousgamesareinsufficientforreasoningaboutsequentialgamesseesubgameperfection.
Inshort,thedifferencesbetweensequentialandsimultaneousgamesareasfollows:
Sequential Simultaneous
Normallydenotedby Decisiontrees Payoffmatrices
Priorknowledge
Yes No
ofopponent'smove?
Timeaxis? Yes No
Extensiveformgame Strategygame
Alsoknownas
Extensivegame Strategicgame
Perfectinformationandimperfectinformation
Animportantsubsetofsequentialgamesconsistsofgamesof
perfectinformation.Agameisoneofperfectinformationifall
playersknowthemovespreviouslymadebyallotherplayers.
Thus,onlysequentialgamescanbegamesofperfect
informationbecauseplayersinsimultaneousgamesdonot
knowtheactionsoftheotherplayers.Mostgamesstudiedin
gametheoryareimperfectinformationgames.Interesting
examplesofperfectinformationgamesincludetheultimatum Agameofimperfectinformation(the
gameandcentipedegame.Recreationalgamesofperfect dottedlinerepresentsignoranceonthepart
informationgamesincludechessandcheckers.Manycard ofplayer2,formallycalledaninformation
gamesaregamesofimperfectinformation,suchaspokeror set)
contractbridge.[44]
Perfectinformationisoftenconfusedwithcompleteinformation,whichisasimilarconcept.Complete
informationrequiresthateveryplayerknowthestrategiesandpayoffsavailabletotheotherplayersbutnot
necessarilytheactionstaken.Gamesofincompleteinformationcanbereduced,however,togamesof
imperfectinformationbyintroducing"movesbynature".[45]
Combinatorialgames
Gamesinwhichthedifficultyoffindinganoptimalstrategystemsfromthemultiplicityofpossiblemoves
arecalledcombinatorialgames.Examplesincludechessandgo.Gamesthatinvolveimperfector
incompleteinformationmayalsohaveastrongcombinatorialcharacter,forinstancebackgammon.Thereis
nounifiedtheoryaddressingcombinatorialelementsingames.Thereare,however,mathematicaltoolsthat
cansolveparticularproblemsandanswergeneralquestions.[46]
Gamesofperfectinformationhavebeenstudiedincombinatorialgametheory,whichhasdevelopednovel
representations,e.g.surrealnumbers,aswellascombinatorialandalgebraic(andsometimesnon
constructive)proofmethodstosolvegamesofcertaintypes,including"loopy"gamesthatmayresultin
infinitelylongsequencesofmoves.Thesemethodsaddressgameswithhighercombinatorialcomplexity
thanthoseusuallyconsideredintraditional(or"economic")gametheory.[47][48]Atypicalgamethathas
beensolvedthiswayishex.Arelatedfieldofstudy,drawingfromcomputationalcomplexitytheory,is
gamecomplexity,whichisconcernedwithestimatingthecomputationaldifficultyoffindingoptimal
strategies.[49]
Researchinartificialintelligencehasaddressedbothperfectandimperfect(orincomplete)information
gamesthathaveverycomplexcombinatorialstructures(likechess,go,orbackgammon)forwhichno
provableoptimalstrategieshavebeenfound.Thepracticalsolutionsinvolvecomputationalheuristics,like
alphabetapruningoruseofartificialneuralnetworkstrainedbyreinforcementlearning,whichmake
gamesmoretractableincomputingpractice.[46][50]
Infinitelylonggames
Games,asstudiedbyeconomistsandrealworldgameplayers,aregenerallyfinishedinfinitelymany
moves.Puremathematiciansarenotsoconstrained,andsettheoristsinparticularstudygamesthatlastfor
infinitelymanymoves,withthewinner(orotherpayoff)notknownuntilafterallthosemovesare
completed.
Thefocusofattentionisusuallynotsomuchonthebestwaytoplaysuchagame,butwhetheroneplayer
hasawinningstrategy.(Itcanbeproven,usingtheaxiomofchoice,thattherearegamesevenwith
perfectinformationandwheretheonlyoutcomesare"win"or"lose"forwhichneitherplayerhasa
winningstrategy.)Theexistenceofsuchstrategies,forcleverlydesignedgames,hasimportant
consequencesindescriptivesettheory.
Discreteandcontinuousgames
Muchofgametheoryisconcernedwithfinite,discretegames,thathaveafinitenumberofplayers,moves,
events,outcomes,etc.Manyconceptscanbeextended,however.Continuousgamesallowplayersto
chooseastrategyfromacontinuousstrategyset.Forinstance,Cournotcompetitionistypicallymodeled
withplayers'strategiesbeinganynonnegativequantities,includingfractionalquantities.
Differentialgames
Differentialgamessuchasthecontinuouspursuitandevasiongamearecontinuousgameswherethe
evolutionoftheplayers'statevariablesisgovernedbydifferentialequations.Theproblemoffindingan
optimalstrategyinadifferentialgameiscloselyrelatedtotheoptimalcontroltheory.Inparticular,there
aretwotypesofstrategies:theopenloopstrategiesarefoundusingthePontryaginmaximumprinciple
whiletheclosedloopstrategiesarefoundusingBellman'sDynamicProgrammingmethod.
Aparticularcaseofdifferentialgamesarethegameswitharandomtimehorizon.[51]Insuchgames,the
terminaltimeisarandomvariablewithagivenprobabilitydistributionfunction.Therefore,theplayers
maximizethemathematicalexpectationofthecostfunction.Itwasshownthatthemodifiedoptimization
problemcanbereformulatedasadiscounteddifferentialgameoveraninfinitetimeinterval.
Manyplayerandpopulationgames
Gameswithanarbitrary,butfinite,numberofplayersareoftencallednpersongames.[52]Evolutionary
gametheoryconsidersgamesinvolvingapopulationofdecisionmakers,wherethefrequencywithwhicha
particulardecisionismadecanchangeovertimeinresponsetothedecisionsmadebyallindividualsinthe
population.Inbiology,thisisintendedtomodel(biological)evolution,wheregeneticallyprogrammed
organismspassalongsomeoftheirstrategyprogrammingtotheiroffspring.Ineconomics,thesametheory
isintendedtocapturepopulationchangesbecausepeopleplaythegamemanytimeswithintheirlifetime,
andconsciously(andperhapsrationally)switchstrategies.[53]
Stochasticoutcomes(andrelationtootherfields)
Individualdecisionproblemswithstochasticoutcomesaresometimesconsidered"oneplayergames".
Thesesituationsarenotconsideredgametheoreticalbysomeauthors.Theymaybemodeledusingsimilar
toolswithintherelateddisciplinesofdecisiontheory,operationsresearch,andareasofartificial
intelligence,particularlyAIplanning(withuncertainty)andmultiagentsystem.Althoughthesefieldsmay
havedifferentmotivators,themathematicsinvolvedaresubstantiallythesame,e.g.usingMarkovdecision
processes(MDP).
Stochasticoutcomescanalsobemodeledintermsofgametheorybyaddingarandomlyactingplayerwho
makes"chancemoves"("movesbynature").[54]Thisplayerisnottypicallyconsideredathirdplayerin
whatisotherwiseatwoplayergame,butmerelyservestoprovidearollofthedicewhererequiredbythe
game.
Forsomeproblems,differentapproachestomodelingstochasticoutcomesmayleadtodifferentsolutions.
Forexample,thedifferenceinapproachbetweenMDPsandtheminimaxsolutionisthatthelatterconsiders
theworstcaseoverasetofadversarialmoves,ratherthanreasoninginexpectationaboutthesemoves
givenafixedprobabilitydistribution.Theminimaxapproachmaybeadvantageouswherestochastic
modelsofuncertaintyarenotavailable,butmayalsobeoverestimatingextremelyunlikely(butcostly)
events,dramaticallyswayingthestrategyinsuchscenariosifitisassumedthatanadversarycanforcesuch
aneventtohappen.[55](SeeBlackswantheoryformorediscussiononthiskindofmodelingissue,
particularlyasitrelatestopredictingandlimitinglossesininvestmentbanking.)
Generalmodelsthatincludeallelementsofstochasticoutcomes,adversaries,andpartialornoisy
observability(ofmovesbyotherplayers)havealsobeenstudied.The"goldstandard"isconsideredtobe
partiallyobservablestochasticgame(POSG),butfewrealisticproblemsarecomputationallyfeasiblein
POSGrepresentation.[55]
Metagames
Thesearegamestheplayofwhichisthedevelopmentoftherulesforanothergame,thetargetorsubject
game.Metagamesseektomaximizetheutilityvalueoftherulesetdeveloped.Thetheoryofmetagamesis
relatedtomechanismdesigntheory.
ThetermmetagameanalysisisalsousedtorefertoapracticalapproachdevelopedbyNigelHoward.[56]
wherebyasituationisframedasastrategicgameinwhichstakeholderstrytorealisetheirobjectivesby
meansoftheoptionsavailabletothem.Subsequentdevelopmentshaveledtotheformulationof
confrontationanalysis.
PoolingGames
Thesearegamesprevailingoverallformsofsociety.Poolinggamesarerepeatedplayswithchanging
payofftableingeneraloveranexperiencedpathandtheirequilibriumstrategiesusuallytakeaformof
evolutionarysocialconventionandeconomicconvention.PoolingGameTheoryemergestoformally
recognizetheinteractionbetweenoptimalchoiceinoneplayandtheemergenceofforthcomingpayoff
tableupdatepath,identifytheinvarianceexistenceandrobustness,andpredictvarianceovertime.The
theoryisbasedupontopologicaltransformationclassificationofpayofftableupdateovertimetopredict
varianceandinvariance,andisalsowithinthejurisdictionofthecomputationallawofreachableoptimality
fororderedsystem.[57]
History
Earlydiscussionsofexamplesoftwopersongamesoccurredlong
beforetheriseofmodern,mathematicalgametheory.Thefirst
knowndiscussionofgametheoryoccurredinaletterwrittenby
CharlesWaldegrave,anactiveJacobite,anduncletoJames
Waldegrave,aBritishdiplomat,in1713.[58]Inthisletter,
Waldegraveprovidesaminimaxmixedstrategysolutiontoatwo
personversionofthecardgameleHer,andtheproblemisnow
knownasWaldegraveproblem.JamesMadisonmadewhatwenow
recognizeasagametheoreticanalysisofthewaysstatescanbe
expectedtobehaveunderdifferentsystemsoftaxation.[59][60]Inhis
1838Recherchessurlesprincipesmathmatiquesdelathoriedes
richesses(ResearchesintotheMathematicalPrinciplesofthe
TheoryofWealth),AntoineAugustinCournotconsideredaduopoly
andpresentsasolutionthatisarestrictedversionoftheNash
equilibrium.
In1913ErnstZermelopublishedbereineAnwendungder JohnvonNeumann
MengenlehreaufdieTheoriedesSchachspiels.Itprovedthatthe
optimalchessstrategyisstrictlydetermined.Thispavedthewayformoregeneraltheorems.[61]:429
TheDanishmathematicianZeuthenprovedthatthemathematicalmodelhadawinningstrategybyusing
Brouwer'sfixedpointtheorem.Inhis1938bookApplicationsauxJeuxdeHasardandearliernotes,mile
Borelprovedaminimaxtheoremfortwopersonzerosummatrixgamesonlywhenthepayoffmatrixwas
symmetric.Borelconjecturedthatnonexistenceofmixedstrategyequilibriaintwopersonzerosum
gameswouldoccur,aconjecturethatwasprovedfalse.
GametheorydidnotreallyexistasauniquefielduntilJohnvonNeumannpublishedapaperin1928.[62]
VonNeumann'soriginalproofusedBrouwer'sfixedpointtheoremoncontinuousmappingsintocompact
convexsets,whichbecameastandardmethodingametheoryandmathematicaleconomics.Hispaperwas
followedbyhis1944bookTheoryofGamesandEconomicBehavior.Thesecondeditionofthisbook
providedanaxiomatictheoryofutility,whichreincarnatedDanielBernoulli'soldtheoryofutility(ofthe
money)asanindependentdiscipline.VonNeumann'sworkingametheoryculminatedinthis1944book.
Thisfoundationalworkcontainsthemethodforfindingmutuallyconsistentsolutionsfortwopersonzero
sumgames.Duringthefollowingtimeperiod,workongametheorywasprimarilyfocusedoncooperative
gametheory,whichanalyzesoptimalstrategiesforgroupsofindividuals,presumingthattheycanenforce
agreementsbetweenthemaboutproperstrategies.[63]
In1950,thefirstmathematicaldiscussionoftheprisoner'sdilemmaappeared,andanexperimentwas
undertakenbynotablemathematiciansMerrillM.FloodandMelvinDresher,aspartoftheRAND
corporation'sinvestigationsintogametheory.RANDpursuedthestudiesbecauseofpossibleapplications
toglobalnuclearstrategy.[64]Aroundthissametime,JohnNashdevelopedacriterionformutual
consistencyofplayers'strategies,knownasNashequilibrium,applicabletoawidervarietyofgamesthan
thecriterionproposedbyvonNeumannandMorgenstern.Thisequilibriumissufficientlygeneraltoallow
fortheanalysisofnoncooperativegamesinadditiontocooperativeones.
Gametheoryexperiencedaflurryofactivityinthe1950s,duringwhichtimetheconceptsofthecore,the
extensiveformgame,fictitiousplay,repeatedgames,andtheShapleyvalueweredeveloped.Inaddition,
thefirstapplicationsofgametheorytophilosophyandpoliticalscienceoccurredduringthistime.
In1965,ReinhardSeltenintroducedhissolutionconceptofsubgameperfectequilibria,whichfurther
refinedtheNashequilibrium(laterhewouldintroducetremblinghandperfectionaswell).In1967,John
HarsanyidevelopedtheconceptsofcompleteinformationandBayesiangames.Nash,SeltenandHarsanyi
becameEconomicsNobelLaureatesin1994fortheircontributionstoeconomicgametheory.
Inthe1970s,gametheorywasextensivelyappliedinbiology,largelyasaresultoftheworkofJohn
MaynardSmithandhisevolutionarilystablestrategy.Inaddition,theconceptsofcorrelatedequilibrium,
tremblinghandperfection,andcommonknowledge[65]wereintroducedandanalyzed.
In2005,gametheoristsThomasSchellingandRobertAumannfollowedNash,SeltenandHarsanyias
NobelLaureates.Schellingworkedondynamicmodels,earlyexamplesofevolutionarygametheory.
Aumanncontributedmoretotheequilibriumschool,introducinganequilibriumcoarsening,correlated
equilibrium,anddevelopinganextensiveformalanalysisoftheassumptionofcommonknowledgeandof
itsconsequences.
In2007,LeonidHurwicz,togetherwithEricMaskinandRogerMyerson,wasawardedtheNobelPrizein
Economics"forhavinglaidthefoundationsofmechanismdesigntheory."Myerson'scontributionsinclude
thenotionofproperequilibrium,andanimportantgraduatetext:GameTheory,AnalysisofConflict.[1]
Hurwiczintroducedandformalizedtheconceptofincentivecompatibility.
In2012,AlvinE.RothandLloydS.ShapleywereawardedtheNobelPrizeinEconomics"forthetheoryof
stableallocationsandthepracticeofmarketdesign."
Inpopularculture
BasedonthebookbySylviaNasar,[66]thelifestoryofgametheoristandmathematicianJohnNashwas
turnedintothebiopicABeautifulMindstarringRussellCrowe.[67]
"Gamestheory"and"theoryofgames"arementionedinthemilitarysciencefictionnovelStarship
TroopersbyRobertA.Heinlein.[68]Inthe1997filmofthesamename,thecharacterCarlJenkinsrefersto
hisassignmenttomilitaryintelligenceasto"gamesandtheory."
ThefilmDr.Strangelovesatirizesgametheoreticideasaboutdeterrencetheory.Forexample,nuclear
deterrencedependsonthethreattoretaliatecatastrophicallyifanuclearattackisdetected.Agametheorist
mightarguethatsuchthreatscanfailtobecredible,inthesensethattheycanleadtosubgameimperfect
equilibria.Themovietakesthisideaonestepfurther,withtheRussiansirrevocablycommittingtoa
catastrophicnuclearresponsewithoutmakingthethreatpublic.
Seealso
Chainstoreparadox
CollectiveIntentionality
Combinatorialgametheory
Confrontationanalysis
Glossaryofgametheory
Intrahouseholdbargaining
Parrondo'sparadox
Quantumgametheory
Quantumrefereedgame
Rationality
Reversegametheory
Selfconfirmingequilibrium
Zermelo'stheorem(gametheory)
Lists
Listofemergingtechnologies
Listofgamesingametheory
Outlineofartificialintelligence
Notes
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39. Bicchieri,CristinaJeffrey,RichardSkyrms,Brian,eds.(1999),"Knowledge,Belief,andCounterfactual
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CombinatorialGameTheory,AKPetersLtd,pp.34,ISBN9781568812779
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55. HughBrendanMcMahan(2006),RobustPlanninginDomainswithStochasticOutcomes,Adversaries,and
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57. WenliangWang(2015).PoolingGameTheoryandPublicPensionPlan.ISBN9781507658246.
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61. ScrepantiErnestoZamagniStefano(2005).AnOutlineoftheHistoryofEconomicThought'(2nded.).Oxford
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62. Neumann,J.v.(1928),"ZurTheoriederGesellschaftsspiele",MathematischeAnnalen100(1):295320,
doi:10.1007/BF01448847Englishtranslation:Tucker,A.W.Luce,R.D.,eds.(1959),"OntheTheoryof
GamesofStrategy",ContributionstotheTheoryofGames4,pp.1342
63. Leonard,Robert(2010),VonNeumann,Morgenstern,andtheCreationofGameTheory,NewYork:Cambridge
UniversityPress,ISBN9780521562669
64. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisonerdilemma/.Plato.stanford.edu.Retrievedon20130103.
65. AlthoughcommonknowledgewasfirstdiscussedbythephilosopherDavidLewisinhisdissertation(andlater
book)Conventioninthelate1960s,itwasnotwidelyconsideredbyeconomistsuntilRobertAumann'sworkin
the1970s.
66. Nasar,Sylvia(1998)ABeautifulMind,Simon&Schuster.ISBN0684819066.
67. Singh,Simon(June14,1998)"BetweenGeniusandMadness"
(http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/06/14/reviews/980614.14singht.html),NewYorkTimes.
68. Heinlein,RobertA.(1959),StarshipTroopers
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Aumann,RobertJ.(1987),gametheory,TheNewPalgrave: Wikiquotehasquotations
ADictionaryofEconomics2,pp.46082. relatedto:Gametheory
TheNewPalgraveDictionaryofEconomics(2008).2nd
Edition:
Wikibookshasabookon
"gametheory"byRobertJ.Aumann.Abstract. thetopicof:Introduction
(http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article? toGameTheory
Wikiversityhaslearning
materialsaboutGame
Theory
Lookupgametheoryin
Wiktionary,thefree
dictionary.
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theory.
id=pde2008_G000007&q=game%20theory&topicid=&result_number=3)
"gametheoryineconomics,originsof,"byRobertLeonard.Abstract.
id=pde2008_G000193&goto=a&topicid=B2&result_number=10)
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id=pde2008_G000210&q=Behavioral%20economics%20&topicid=&result_number=2)
Camerer,Colin(2003),BehavioralGameTheory:ExperimentsinStrategicInteraction,RussellSage
Foundation,ISBN9780691090399Description(http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7517.html)and
Introduction(http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7517.html),pp.125.
Dixit,AvinashNalebuff,Barry(2008),"GameTheory",inDavidR.Henderson(ed.),Concise
EncyclopediaofEconomics(2nded.),Indianapolis:LibraryofEconomicsandLiberty,ISBN978
0865976658,OCLC237794267
Dutta,PrajitK.(1999),Strategiesandgames:theoryandpractice,MITPress,ISBN9780262
041690.Suitableforundergraduateandbusinessstudents.
Fernandez,LF.Bierman,HS.(1998),Gametheorywitheconomicapplications,AddisonWesley,
ISBN9780201847581.Suitableforupperlevelundergraduates.
Fudenberg,DrewTirole,Jean(1991),Gametheory,MITPress,ISBN9780262061414.
Acclaimedreferencetext.Description.(http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?
ttype=2&tid=8204)
Gibbons,RobertD.(1992),Gametheoryforappliedeconomists,PrincetonUniversityPress,
ISBN9780691003955.Suitableforadvancedundergraduates.
PublishedinEuropeasRobertGibbons(2001),APrimerinGameTheory,London:Harvester
Wheatsheaf,ISBN9780745011592.
Gintis,Herbert(2000),Gametheoryevolving:aproblemcenteredintroductiontomodelingstrategic
behavior,PrincetonUniversityPress,ISBN9780691009438
Green,JerryR.MasColell,AndreuWhinston,MichaelD.(1995),Microeconomictheory,Oxford
UniversityPress,ISBN9780195073409.Presentsgametheoryinformalwaysuitablefor
graduatelevel.
editedbyVincentF.Hendricks,PelleG.Hansen.(2007),Hansen,PelleG.Hendricks,VincentF.,
eds.,GameTheory:5Questions,NewYork,London:AutomaticPress/VIP,ISBN97887991013
44.Snippetsfrominterviews(http://www.gametheorists.com/).
Howard,Nigel(1971),ParadoxesofRationality:Games,Metagames,andPoliticalBehavior,
Cambridge,Massachusetts:TheMITPress,ISBN9780262582377
Isaacs,Rufus(1999),DifferentialGames:AMathematicalTheoryWithApplicationstoWarfareand
Pursuit,ControlandOptimization,NewYork:DoverPublications,ISBN9780486406824
Julmi,Christian(2012),IntroductiontoGameTheory,Copenhagen:BookBooN,ISBN97887403
02806
LeytonBrown,KevinShoham,Yoav(2008),EssentialsofGameTheory:AConcise,
MultidisciplinaryIntroduction,SanRafael,CA:Morgan&ClaypoolPublishers,ISBN978159829
5931.An88pagemathematicalintroductionfreeonline
(http://www.morganclaypool.com/doi/abs/10.2200/S00108ED1V01Y200802AIM003)atmany
universities.
Miller,JamesH.(2003),Gametheoryatwork:howtousegametheorytooutthinkandoutmaneuver
yourcompetition,NewYork:McGrawHill,ISBN9780071400206.Suitableforageneral
audience.
Osborne,MartinJ.(2004),Anintroductiontogametheory,OxfordUniversityPress,ISBN978019
5128956.Undergraduatetextbook.
Papayoanou,Paul(2010),GameTheoryforBusiness,ProbabilisticPublishing,ISBN9780
964793873.Primerforbusinessmenandwomen.
Petrosyan,LeonZenkevich,Nikolay(1996),GameTheory(SeriesonOptimization,3),World
ScientificPublishers,ISBN9789810223960
Osborne,MartinJ.Rubinstein,Ariel(1994),Acourseingametheory,MITPress,ISBN9780262
650403.Amodernintroductionatthegraduatelevel.
Poundstone,William(1992),Prisoner'sDilemma:JohnvonNeumann,GameTheoryandthePuzzle
oftheBomb,Anchor,ISBN9780385415804.Ageneralhistoryofgametheoryandgame
theoreticians.
Rasmusen,Eric(2006),GamesandInformation:AnIntroductiontoGameTheory(4thed.),Wiley
Blackwell,ISBN9781405136662
Shoham,YoavLeytonBrown,Kevin(2009),MultiagentSystems:Algorithmic,GameTheoretic,
andLogicalFoundations,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,ISBN9780521899437
Williams,JohnDavis(1954),TheCompleatStrategyst:BeingaPrimerontheTheoryofGamesof
Strategy(PDF),SantaMonica:RANDCorp.,ISBN9780833042224Praisedprimerandpopular
introductionforeverybody,neveroutofprint.
RogerMcCain'sGameTheory:ANontechnicalIntroductiontotheAnalysisofStrategy
(http://faculty.lebow.drexel.edu/McCainR//top/eco/game/game.html)(RevisedEdition)
ChristopherGriffin(2010)GameTheory:PennStateMath486LectureNotes
(http://www.personal.psu.edu/cxg286/Math486.pdf),pp.169,CCBYNCSAlicense,suitable
introductionforundergraduates
Webb,JamesN.(2007),Gametheory:decisions,interactionandevolution,Springerundergraduate
mathematicsseries,Springer,ISBN1846284236Consistenttreatmentofgametypesusually
claimedbydifferentappliedfields,e.g.Markovdecisionprocesses.
JosephE.Harrington(2008)Games,strategies,anddecisionmaking,Worth,ISBN0716766302.
Textbooksuitableforundergraduatesinappliedfieldsnumerousexamples,fewerformalismsin
conceptpresentation.
DrewFudenberg,DavidKLevine,ed.(2008).ALongRunCollaborationonLongRunGames.
Hackensack,NewJersey:WorldScientific.p.416.ISBN9789812818461.
AdamBrandenburger(2014).TheLanguageofGameTheory:PuttingEpistemicsintothe
MathematicsofGames.WorldScientificSeriesinEconomicTheory:Vol.5.Hackensack,New
Jersey:WorldScientific.p.300.ISBN9789814513432.
RogerAMcCain(2014).GameTheory:ANontechnicalIntroductiontotheAnalysisofStrategy(3rd
Edition).Hackensack,NewJersey:WorldScientific.p.600.ISBN9789814578875.
Historicallyimportanttexts
Aumann,R.J.andShapley,L.S.(1974),ValuesofNonAtomicGames,PrincetonUniversityPress
Cournot,A.Augustin(1838),"Recherchessurlesprinciplesmathematiquesdelathoriedes
richesses",Librairedessciencespolitiquesetsociales(Paris:M.Rivire&C.ie)
Edgeworth,FrancisY.(1881),MathematicalPsychics,London:KeganPaul
Farquharson,Robin(1969),TheoryofVoting,Blackwell(YaleU.P.intheU.S.),ISBN063112460
8
Luce,R.DuncanRaiffa,Howard(1957),Gamesanddecisions:introductionandcriticalsurvey,
NewYork:Wiley
reprintededition:R.DuncanLuceHowardRaiffa(1989),Gamesanddecisions:introduction
andcriticalsurvey,NewYork:DoverPublications,ISBN9780486659435
MaynardSmith,John(1982),Evolutionandthetheoryofgames,CambridgeUniversityPress,
ISBN9780521288842
MaynardSmith,JohnPrice,GeorgeR.(1973),"Thelogicofanimalconflict",Nature246(5427):
1518,Bibcode:1973Natur.246...15S,doi:10.1038/246015a0
Nash,John(1950),"Equilibriumpointsinnpersongames",ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyof
SciencesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica36(1):4849,Bibcode:1950PNAS...36...48N,
doi:10.1073/pnas.36.1.48,PMC1063129,PMID16588946
Shapley,L.S.(1953),AValuefornpersonGames,In:ContributionstotheTheoryofGamesvolume
II,H.W.KuhnandA.W.Tucker(eds.)
Shapley,L.S.(1953),StochasticGames,ProceedingsofNationalAcademyofScienceVol.39,
pp.10951100.
vonNeumann,John(1928),"ZurTheoriederGesellschaftsspiele",MathematischeAnnalen100(1):
295320,doi:10.1007/bf01448847Englishtranslation:"OntheTheoryofGamesofStrategy,"inA.
W.TuckerandR.D.Luce,ed.(1959),ContributionstotheTheoryofGames,v.4,p.42.
(https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=9lSVFzsTGWsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA42)Princeton
UniversityPress.
vonNeumann,JohnMorgenstern,Oskar(1944),Theoryofgamesandeconomicbehavior,Princeton
UniversityPress
Zermelo,Ernst(1913),"bereineAnwendungderMengenlehreaufdieTheoriedesSchachspiels",
ProceedingsoftheFifthInternationalCongressofMathematicians2:5014
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BenDavid,S.Borodin,AllanKarp,RichardTardos,G.Wigderson,A.(1994),"OnthePowerof
RandomizationinOnlineAlgorithms"(PDF),Algorithmica11(1):214,doi:10.1007/BF01294260
Downs,Anthony(1957),AnEconomictheoryofDemocracy,NewYork:Harper
Gauthier,David(1986),Moralsbyagreement,OxfordUniversityPress,ISBN9780198249924
AllanGibbard,"Manipulationofvotingschemes:ageneralresult",Econometrica,Vol.41,No.4
(1973),pp.587601.
Grim,PatrickKokalis,TrinaAlaiTafti,AliKilb,NicholasStDenis,Paul(2004),"Making
meaninghappen",JournalofExperimental&TheoreticalArtificialIntelligence16(4):209243,
doi:10.1080/09528130412331294715
Harper,DavidMaynardSmith,John(2003),Animalsignals,OxfordUniversityPress,ISBN9780
198526858
Lewis,David(1969),Convention:APhilosophicalStudy,ISBN9780631232575(2002edition)
McDonald,John(19501996),StrategyinPoker,Business&War,W.W.Norton,ISBN0393
31457X.Alayman'sintroduction.
Quine,W.v.O(1967),"TruthbyConvention",PhilosophicaEssaysforA.N.Whitehead,Russeland
RusselPublishers,ISBN9780846209706
Quine,W.v.O(1960),"CarnapandLogicalTruth",Synthese12(4):350374,
doi:10.1007/BF00485423
MarkA.Satterthwaite,"StrategyproofnessandArrow'sConditions:ExistenceandCorrespondence
TheoremsforVotingProceduresandSocialWelfareFunctions",JournalofEconomicTheory10
(April1975),187217.
Siegfried,Tom(2006),ABeautifulMath,JosephHenryPress,ISBN0309101921
Skyrms,Brian(1990),TheDynamicsofRationalDeliberation,HarvardUniversityPress,ISBN0
67421885X
Skyrms,Brian(1996),Evolutionofthesocialcontract,CambridgeUniversityPress,ISBN9780
521555838
Skyrms,Brian(2004),Thestaghuntandtheevolutionofsocialstructure,CambridgeUniversity
Press,ISBN9780521533928
Sober,ElliottWilson,DavidSloan(1998),Untoothers:theevolutionandpsychologyofunselfish
behavior,HarvardUniversityPress,ISBN9780674930476
Thrall,RobertM.Lucas,WilliamF.(1963)," persongamesinpartitionfunctionform",Naval
ResearchLogisticsQuarterly10(4):281298,doi:10.1002/nav.3800100126
Dolev,ShlomiPanagopoulou,PanagiotaRabie,MikaelSchiller,EladMichaelSpirakis,Paul
(2011),"Rationalityauthorityforprovablerationalbehavior",ACMPODC:289290,
doi:10.1145/1993806.1993858
Algorithms,games,andevolution(http://www.pnas.org/content/111/29/10620.full)(July2014),
ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciencesoftheUSA,vol.111,no.29
Websites
JamesMiller(2015):IntroductoryGameTheoryVideos(https://www.youtube.com/playlist?
list=PLqekkRyYeow3cR9U4c4wkIekm2pXxORPn).
Hazewinkel,Michiel,ed.(2001),"Games,theoryof",EncyclopediaofMathematics,Springer,
ISBN9781556080104
PaulWalker:HistoryofGameTheoryPage
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DavidLevine:GameTheory.Papers,LectureNotesandmuchmorestuff.(http://dklevine.com/)
AlvinRoth:GameTheoryandExperimentalEconomicspage
(https://web.archive.org/web/20130317205628/http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html
)attheWaybackMachine(archivedMarch17,2013)Comprehensivelistoflinkstogametheory
informationontheWeb
AdamKalai:GameTheoryandComputerScience
(http://wiki.cc.gatech.edu/theory/index.php/CS_8803_
_Game_Theory_and_Computer_Science._Spring_2008)LecturenotesonGameTheoryand
ComputerScience
MikeShor:GameTheory.net(http://www.gametheory.net/)Lecturenotes,interactive
illustrationsandotherinformation.
JimRatliff'sGraduateCourseinGameTheory(http://virtualperfection.com/gametheory/)(lecture
notes).
DonRoss:ReviewOfGameTheory(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gametheory/)intheStanford
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Introduction,workedexamples,playonlinetwopersonzerosumgames.
MarekM.Kaminski:GameTheoryandPolitics
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theoryandpoliticalscience.
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gametheory.htm)
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Machine(archivedApril11,2011)SeePapers
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accuracyofforecastsfromgametheoryandothermethods
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McKelvey,RichardD.,McLennan,AndrewM.,andTurocy,TheodoreL.(2007)Gambit:Software
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videosofthecourse(https://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=6EF60E1027E1A10B)
BenjaminMoritz,BernhardKnsgen,DannyBures,RonniWiersch,(2007)Spieltheorie
Software.de:AnapplicationforGameTheoryimplementedinJAVA(http://www.spieltheorie
software.de/).
AntoninKucera:StochasticTwoPlayerGames(http://slideslive.com/38891162/stochastic
twoplayergames).
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mod=space&uid=1565&do=blog&id=17894)WhatisMathematicalGameTheory(#2)
(http://blog.sciencenet.cn/home.php?mod=space&uid=1565&do=blog&id=20337)Whatis
MathematicalGameTheory(#3)(http://blog.sciencenet.cn/home.php?
mod=space&uid=1565&do=blog&id=21210)WhatisMathematicalGameTheory(#4)Many
persongametheory(http://blog.sciencenet.cn/home.php?
mod=space&uid=1565&do=blog&id=21735)WhatisMathematicalGameTheory?(#5)Finale,
summingup,andmyownview(http://blog.sciencenet.cn/home.php?
mod=space&uid=1565&do=blog&id=21891)
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Thenormal(orstrategicform)gameisusually Player2 Player2

Moregenerallyitcanberepresentedbyanyfunction Player1 4,3 1,1

Somescholars,likeLeonardSavage,seegametheorynotasapredictive Cooperate Defect

Unlikethoseineconomics,thepayoffsforgamesinbiologyareoften Hawk Dove

Gametheoryhasbeenputtoseveralusesinphilosophy.Respondingto Stag Hare

thecommonlystudied22gamesaresymmetric.Thestandard F 0,0 1,2

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