FILOIL REFINERY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
FILOIL SUPERVISORY & CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Beltran, Lacson & Associates for petitioner.
Lanting, Morabe Law Offices for private
respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The present appeal questions the right of
supervisors and confidential employees to organize
the respondent labor association and to bargain
collectively with their employer, petitioner
corporation herein, as upheld by respondent court
of industrial relations in its appealed orders and
resolution.
Respondent association is a labor organization duly
registered with the Department of Labor. It is
composed exclusively of the supervisory and
confidential employees of petitioner corporation.
There exists another entirely distinct labor
association composed of the corporation's rank-
and-file employees, the Filoil Employees & Workers
Association (FEWA) with which petitioner executed
a collective bargaining agreement. This collective
bargaining agreement expressly excluded from its
coverage petitioner's supervisory and confidential
employees, who in turn organized their own labor
association, respondent herein.
Respondent association filed on February 18, 1965
with the industrial court its petition for certification
as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
agent of all of petitioner's supervisory and
confidential employees working at its refinery in
Rosario, Cavite.
Petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of lack of cause of action
and of respondent court's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter, under its claim that supervisors
are not employees within the meaning of Republic
Act 875, the Industrial Peace Act, and that since
they are part of management, they do not have the
right to bargain collectively although they may
organize an organization of their own.
Respondent court in its order of May 26, 1965
denied the dismissal motion. It ruled that under the
express provisions of section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act, "(I)ndividuals employed as supervisors
shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of employees under their supervision
but may form separate organizations their own."1
It rejected petitioner's claim against respondent
association's right to bargain collectively, holding
that such was expressly granted under section 24
of the Industrial Peace Act, and asserting that "if
Congress deemed it wise for supervisors not to
have the right to strike, then it should have been so
expressly stated as in the case of government
employees. Section 11 of the Industrial Peace Act
gives government employees the right to belong to
any labor organization provided no obligation to
strike or join a strike is imposed by such labor
organization. The denial to government employees
of the right to strike is significant in the controversy
before this Court because it manifests to all that
Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 875 was
aware of the implications that when supervisors
were given the right to organize themselves into a
labor organization, they have correlative right to
declare a strike. In the case of supervisors, they
were enfranchised by Congress to organize
themselves into a labor organization and were
denied the right to strike. This means that the right
to strike was not denied them since no special
reason obtains among the supervisors as it does
obtain among government employees."2
The industrial court likewise dismissed petitioner's
objection against the composition of respondent
association in that it included as members technical
men and confidential employees in this wise: "(A)t
this point, it may be stressed that supervisors as a
general rule should form an association of their
own and should exclude all other types of
personnel unless a special consideration exists, like
example, that they are so few in number and that
there are other technical men or confidential men
equally few in number. In the latter case, the
supervisors, technical men and confidential
employees may be constituted into one unit."3
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said
order of May 26, 1965 was denied by respondent
court en banc per its resolution dated September 7,
1965 which affirmed the said order. No appeal
having been taken from the resolution, the petition
was accordingly set for hearing and the parties
submitted their stipulation of facts, stipulating inter
aliathat respondent association "has forty-seven
(47) members among the supervisory, technical
men and confidential employees of the company"
and that "all the forty seven (47) members of the
(respondent association) are being checked-off by
the company for union dues pursuant to the
individual check-off authorization submitted to the
company."
The parties could not agree, however, on the
composition of the appropriate bargaining unit
with petitioner corporation proposing that the 47
members of respondent association should be
broken up into five (5) separate collective
bargaining units, viz, the supervisors should form a
distinct unit separate from the rest of the
personnel who in turn would be divided into
separate and independent units or confidential
employees, professional personnel, "fringe"
employees consisting of five firemen, and twelve
(12) office and clerical employees.
Evidence was received by respondent court and it
was satisfied that executive personnel handling
personnel matters for the employer were duly
excluded from respondent association. Thus, per
respondent court's order of July 23, 1966, it is
noted that "not one of the employees listed under
Groups I and II including (their supervisor)
Leonardo R. Santos under Group III, is a member of
(respondent association)", since "(I)t appears that
the personnel listed under Groups I and Group II ...
are in the category of executives who have
supervision over the supervisors who are members
of (respondent association) and that Marcelo
Bernardo handles personnel matters of the
employer ... All of them should, therefore, be
excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit.4
Respondent court in its said order of July 23, 1966
consequently cast aside petitioner's sedulous
objections against the inclusion of the confidential
employees in the supervisors respondent
association, thus: "(F)rom the memorandum and
manifestation of the company, a persistent assault
against the inclusion of the confidential emloyees
with supervisors under one bargaining unit would
seem to be evident. Although this inclusion has
already been raised in the motion to dismiss filed
by the company and has already been resolved by
the Court en banc, with no appeal to the Supreme
Court having been taken by the company, we shall
try once more to show why such inclusion. It is
admitted by the company that confidential
employees are outside the coverage of the existing
collective bargaining agreement between the
respondent company and the rank and file union
(FEWA) by specific agreement. Since the
confidential employees are very few and are, by
practice and tradition, identified with
management, the NLRB, because of such "identity
of interest" (Wilson & Co., 68 NLRB 84), has
allowed their inclusion in the bargaining unit of
supervisors who are likewise identified with
management. This Court, a counterpart of the
NLRB, for same reason, should also allow the
inclusion of the confedential employees in the
bargaining unit of supervisor except of course
Marcelo Bernardo who, pursuant to Order of May
26, 1965, as affirmed by the Court en banc, should
be excluded because he handles personnel matters
for the employer."5
Respondent court pointed out that "in fact, out of
forty-three (43), excluding the twelve (12)
executive personnel under Groups I and II, the
company proposes five (5) bargaining units or eight
(8) employees per unit. This Court will be creating
fragmentary units which would not serve the
interest of industrial peace, much less in an industry
indispensable to the national interest like the one
at bar, as is now obtaining in the Philippine
National Railways, also an industry indispensable
to the national interest (Union de Maquinistas,
Fogoneros y Motormen vs. Philippine National
Railways, Case No. 67-IPA), with thirteen (13)
unions, if it breaks up the petitioner union into five
(5) bargaining units. The Court is likewise aware of
the ineffectiveness of a small union with a scanty
members as bargaining unit. The breaking up of
bargaining agents into tiny units will greatly impair
their organizational value. It has always been the
policy of the United States National Labor Relations
Board that, in deciding upon whether to include or
exclude a group of employees from a bargaining
unit, the Board has always allowed itself to be
guided by the determination as to whether its
action "will insure to the employees of the
Company the full benefit of their right to self-
organization and to collective bargaining and
otherwise effectuate the policies of the Act" (20
NLRB 705). We see no reason why this Tribunal
whose basic functions are the same as that of the
NLRB, should do less or otherwise depart from this
sound policy."6
Since respondent association "clearly represents
the majority of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit," respondent court therefore
certified it as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent for all the employees in the unit.
Respondent court per its resolution en banc dated
September 15, 1966 dismissed petitioner's motion
for reconsideration, holding that "as to the
question of the right of supervisors and
confidential employees to compel their employer
to bargain collectively, this has already been
passed upon by the Trial Court in its Order dated
May 26, 1965 which Order was affirmed by the
Court en banc in a resolution dated September 7,
1965. The Company did not appeal this resolution
to the Supreme Court. Hence, this matter, as far as
we are concerned, has already been resolved. We
find it, therefore, unnecessary to pass upon the
same again," and that it found no sufficient
justification to alter or modify the trial court's
order upholding the appropriateness of the
bargaining unit. On this latter point, Judge
Salvador, while concurring with the supervisors'
right of self-organization and collective bargaining,
cast a dissenting vote on the ground that the
Industrial Peace Act did not contemplate nor
provide for supervisors and confidential employees
to be under one bargaining unit and as to
"executive personnel" who have supervision over
the supervisors being excluded from any
representation, urged that "another supervisors'
unit must be created for these executive
personnel." The second point is not in contention
at bar since the "executive personnel" concerned
have not appealed their exclusion.
In this appeal, petitioner pursues anew its
contention that supervisors form part of
management and are not considered as employees
entitled to bargain collectively, arguing that "as
supervisors form part and parcel of management, it
is absurd for management to bargain collectively
with itself." Petitioner further argues that under
the American concept, supervisors are not
considered employees and that since our Congress
copied verbatim the Taft-Hartley Act's definition of
supervisor,7 its act of "incorporating the definition
in the Taft-Hartley Act" must be deemed an
expression of its intention "to follow the
intendment of said Act."
Petitioner's contentions are untenable, prescinding
from the fact of its failure to appeal in due course
respondent court's en banc resolution of
September 7, 1965 upholding the right of the
supervisors and confidential employees to organize
respondent association and to compel petitioner to
negotiate and bargain collectively with it.
Petitioner's argument that since supervisors form
part of management, to allow them to bargain
collectively would be tantamount to management
bargaining with itself may be a well-turned phrase
but ignores the dual status of a supervisor as a
representative of management and as an
employee.
If indeed the supervisor is absolutely
undistinguishable from management, then he
would be beyond removal or dismissal, for as
respondent association counters, "how can
management remove or dismiss itself?"
As stated for the Court by the now Chief Justice
in AG & P Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. C.I.R.,8 section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act "explicitly provides that
"employees" and this term includes supervisors
"shall have the right to self-organization, and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
through representations of their own choosing and
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or
protection" and that "individuals employed as
supervisors ... may form separate organizations of
their own". Indeed, it is well settled that "in
relation to his employer," a foreman or supervisor
"is an employee within the meaning of the Act" ...
For this reason, supervisors are entitled to engage
in union activities and any discrimination against
them by reason thereof constitutes an unfair labor
practice."
Petitioner's arguments go in reality to the wisdom
and policy of the Industrial Peace Act which
expressly grants supervisors the right to organize
and bargain collectively, which are beyond the
Court's power of review. Thus, the argument that
"it is axiomatic in the law of self-interest that an
employer must give a "better deal" to those who
act in his interest and in whom he has trust and
confidence. These are the supervisors and
confidential employees"9 and that "In the United
States there was a move to have a part of the
supervisory group to be aligned with labor. But the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act put an end to
this move." 10
So with petitioner's thesis that "(T)o then give
supervisors the right to compel employers to
bargain would in effect align labor and
management together against stockholders and
bondholders (capital) and inexorably tilt the
balance of power in favor of these hitherto
confliction forces. This is contrary to the nature and
philosophy of free enterprise." 11 This further
serves to point up the validity and rationale of the
Industrial Peace Act's provision, since the
supervisors and confidential employees, even
though they may exercise the prerogatives of
management as regards the rank and file
employees are indeed employees in relation to
their employer, the company which is owned by
the "stockholders and bondholders (capital)" in
petitioner's own words, and should therefore be
entitled under the law to bargain collectively with
the top management with respect to their terms
and conditions of employment.
Petitioner's argument that the express provisions
of section 3 of our Industrial Peace Act must give
way to the intendment of the Taft-Hartley Act
which exempts employers from the legal obligation
to recognize and negotiate with supervisors is
tenuous and groundless. The language of our own
statute is plain and unambiguous and admits of no
other interpretation.
The other principal ground of petitioner's appeal
questioning the confidential employees' inclusion
in the supevisors bargaining unit is equally
untenable. Respondent court correctly held that
since the confidential employee are very few in
number and are by practice and tradition identified
with the supervisors in their role as representives
of management vis-a-vis the rank and file
employee such identity of interest has allowed
their inclusion in the bargaining unit of supervisors-
managers for purposes of collective bargaining in
turn as employees in relation to the company as
their employer.
No arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed against respondent court's allowing the
inclusion of the confidential employees in the
supervisors' association for as admitted by
petitioner itself, supra, the supervisors and
confidential emplyees enjoy its trust and
confidence. Thisidentity of interest logically calls
for their inclusion in the same bargaining unit and
at the same time fulfills the law's objective of
insuring to them the full benefit of their right to
self-organization and to collective bargaining,
which could hardly be accomplished if the
respondent association's membership were to be
broken up into five separate ineffective tiny units,
as urged by petitioner.
Respondent court's action not being vulnerable to
challenge as being arbitrary or capricious is
therefore sustained, in line with the Court's
consistent rulings that the industrial court "enjoys
a wide discretion in determining the procedure
necessary to insure the fair and free choice of
bargaining representations by employees," and
that its action "in deciding upon an appropriate
unit for collective bargaining purposes is
discretionary ... and (that) its judgment in this
respect is entitled to almost complete finality,
unless its action is arbitrary or capricious" 12 and
that absent any grave abuse of discretion as to
justify the Court's intervention, "this Court has
repeatedly upheld the exercise of the Court of
Industrial Relations in matters concerning the
representation of employee groups." 13
ACCORDINGLY, the orders and resolution appealed
from are hereby affirmed and the petition at bar is
dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and
NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA SALES LABOR UNION-
INDEPENDENT, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for
petitioner.
E.N.A. Cruz & Associates for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) prays that
the Resolution dated March 19, 1991 and the
Order dated April 12, 1991 of public respondent
Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma declaring
respondent union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the Magnolia sales
personnel in northern Luzon be set aside for having
been issued in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion.
On June 4, 1990, the North Luzon Magnolia Sales
Labor Union (respondent union for brevity) filed
with the Department of Labor a petition for
certification election among all the regular sales
personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North
Luzon Sales Area. 1
Petitioner opposed the petition and questioned the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit sought to be
represented by respondent union. It claimed that
its bargaining history in its sales offices, plants and
warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit
for each sales office.
The petition was heard on November 9, 1990 with
petitioner
being represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the
Siguion Reyna law office. Atty. Batalla withdrew
petitioner's opposition to a certification election
and agreed to consider all the sales offices in
northern Luzon as one bargaining unit. At the pre-
election conference, the parties agreed inter alia,
on the date, time and place of the consent
election. Respondent union won the election held
on November 24, 1990. In an Order dated
December 3, 1990, 2 Mediator-Arbiter Benalfre J.
Galang certified respondent union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular sales
personnel in all the sales offices of Magnolia Dairy
Products in the North Luzon Sales Area.
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It
claimed that
Atty. Batalla was only authorized to agree to the
holding of certification elections subject to the
following conditions: (1) there would only be one
general election; (2) in this general election, the
individual sales offices shall still comprise separate
bargaining units. 3
In a Resolution dated March 19, 1991, 4 public
respondent, by authority of the Secretary of Labor,
denied SMC's appeal and affirmed the Order of the
Med- Arbiter.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner claims that:
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY
LAGUESMA ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE
IGNORED AND TOTALLY
DISREGARDED PETITIONER'S VALID
AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS WHY
THE ERROR MADE IN GOOD FAITH
BY PETITIONER'S COUNSEL BE
CORRECTED, AND INSTEAD RULED:
A
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS "THE SOLE AND
EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT FOR ALL THE
REGULAR SALES OFFICES OF MAGNOLIA DAIRY
PRODUCTS, NORTH LUZON SALES AREA",
COMPLETELY IGNORING THE ESTABLISHED
BARGAINING HISTORY OF PETITIONER SMC.
B
THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE "AGREEMENT" ENTERED INTO
AT THE HEARING ON
9 NOVEMBER 1990, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
ESTABLISHED FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE
APPLICABLE LAW ON THE MATTER.
We find no merit in the petition.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not
respondent union represents an appropriate
bargaining unit, and (2) whether or not petitioner is
bound by its lawyer's act of agreeing to consider
the sales personnel in the north Luzon sales area as
one bargaining unit.
Petitioner claims that in issuing the impugned
Orders, public respondent disregarded its collective
bargaining history which is to have a separate
bargaining unit for each sales office. It insists that
its prior collective bargaining history is the most
persuasive criterion in determining the
appropriateness of the collective bargaining unit.
There is no merit in the contention.
A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all of
the entire body of employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law." 5
The fundamental factors in determining the
appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the
will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); 6 (2) affinity
and unity of the employees' interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions
(Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of
employment status. 7
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has
categorically ruled that the existence of a prior
collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor
conclusive in the determination of what constitutes
an appropriate bargaining unit. 8
Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or
commonality of interests. The employees sought to
be represented by the collective bargaining agent
must have substantial mutual interests in terms of
employment and working conditions as evinced by
the type of work they perform.
In the case at bench, respondent union sought to
represent the sales personnel in the various
Magnolia sales offices in northern Luzon. There is
similarity of employment status for only the regular
sales personnel in the north Luzon area are
covered. They have the same duties and
responsibilities and substantially similar
compensation and working conditions. The
commonality of interest among he sales personnel
in the north Luzon sales area cannot be gainsaid. In
fact, in the certification election held on November
24, 1990, the employees concerned accepted
respondent union as their exclusive bargaining
agent. Clearly, they have expressed their desire to
be one.
Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales office
of Magnolia should constitute only one bargaining
unit. What greatly militates against this position is
the meager number of sales personnel in each of
the Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon. Even
the bargaining unit sought to be represented by
respondent union in the entire north Luzon sales
area consists only of approximately
9
fifty-five (55) employees. Surely, it would not be
for the best interest of these employees if they
would further be fractionalized. The adage "there is
strength in number" is the very rationale
underlying the formation of a labor union.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that Atty.
Batalla was merely a substitute lawyer for Atty.
Christine Ona, who got stranded in Legaspi City.
Atty. Batalla was allegedly unfamiliar with the
collective bargaining history of its establishment.
Petitioner claims it should not be bound by the
mistake committed by its substitute lawyer.
We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, the
collective bargaining history of a company is not
decisive of what should comprise the collective
bargaining unit. Insofar as the alleged "mistake" of
the substitute lawyer is concerned, we find that
this mistake was the direct result of the negligence
of petitioner's lawyers. It will be noted that Atty.
Ona was under the supervision of two (2) other
lawyers, Attys. Jacinto de la Rosa, Jr. and George C.
Nograles. There is nothing in the records to show
that these two (2) counsels were likewise
unavailable at that time. Instead of deferring the
hearing, petitioner's counsels chose to proceed
therewith. Indeed, prudence dictates that, in such
case, the lawyers allegedly actively involved in
SMC's labor case should have adequately and
sufficiently briefed the substitute lawyer with
respect to the matters involved in the case and the
specific limits of his authority. Unfortunately, this
was not done in this case. The negligence of its
lawyers binds petitioner. As held by this Court in
the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz: 10
. . . As a general rule, a client is
bound by the mistakes of his
counsel. Only when the application
of the general rule would result
in serious injustice should an
exception thereto be called for.
In the case at bench, petitioner insists that each of
the sales offices in northern Luzon should be
considered as a separate bargaining unit for
negotiations would be more expeditious. Petitioner
obviously chooses to follow the path of least
resistance. It is not, however, the convenience of
the employer that constitutes the determinative
factor in forming an appropriate bargaining unit.
Equally, if not more important, is the interest of the
employees. In choosing and crafting an appropriate
bargaining unit, extreme care should be taken to
prevent an employer from having any undue
advantage over the employees' bargaining
representative. Our workers are weak enough and
it is not our social policy to further debilitate their
bargaining representative.
In sum, we find that no arbitrariness or grave abuse
of discretion can be attributed to public
respondents certification of respondent union as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
regular Magnolia sales personnel of the north
Luzon sales area.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged
Resolution and Order of public respondent are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto, there being no showing
of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor
and Employment, and THE ALL U.P. WORKERS'
UNION, represented by its President, Rosario del
Rosario, respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari the University
of the Philippines seeks the nullification of the
Order dated October 30, 1990 of Director Pura
Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations
holding that "professors, associate professors and
assistant professors (of the University of the
Philippines) are . . rank-and-file employees . . ;"
consequently, they should, together with the so-
called non-academic, non-teaching, and all other
employees of the University, be represented by
only one labor organization. 1 The University is
joined in this undertaking by the Solicitor General
who "has taken a position not contrary to that of
petitioner and, in fact, has manifested . . that he is
not opposing the petition . . ." 2
The case 3 was initiated in the Bureau of Labor
Relations by a petition filed on March 2, 1990 by a
registered labor union, the "Organization of Non-
Academic Personnel of UP" (ONAPUP). 4 Claiming
to have a membership of 3,236 members
comprising more than 33% of the 9,617 persons
constituting the non-academic personnel of UP-
Diliman, Los Baos, Manila, and Visayas, it sought
the holding of a certification election among all
said non-academic employees of the University of
the Philippines. At a conference thereafter held on
March 22, 1990 in the Bureau, the University
stated that it had no objection to the election.
On April 18, 1990, another registered labor union,
the "All UP Workers' Union," 5 filed a comment, as
intervenor in the certification election proceeding.
Alleging that its membership covers both academic
and non-academic personnel, and that it aims to
unite all UP rank-and-file employees in one union,
it declared its assent to the holding of the election
provided the appropriate organizational unit was
first clearly defined. It observed in this connection
that the Research, Extension and Professional Staff
(REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel,
should not be deemed part of the organizational
unit.
For its part, the University, through its General
Counsel, 6 made of record its view that there
should be two (2) unions: one for academic, the
other for non-academic or administrative,
personnel considering the dichotomy of interests,
conditions and rules governing these employee
groups.
Director Calleja ruled on the matter on August 7,
1990. 7 She declared that "the appropriate
organizational unit . . should embrace all the
regular rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-
teaching, of the University of the Philippines,
including all its branches" and that there was no
sufficient evidence "to justify the grouping of the
non-academic or administrative personnel into an
organization unit apart and distinct from that of
the academic or teaching personnel." Director
Calleja adverted to Section 9 of Executive Order
No. 180, viz.:
Sec. 9. The appropriate
organizational unit shall be the
employer unit consisting of rank-
and-file employees, unless
circumstances otherwise require.
and Section 1, Rule IV of the Rules
Implementing said EO 180 (as amended by
SEC. 2, Resolution of Public Sector Labor
Management Council dated May 14,
1989, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
For purposes of registration, an
appropriate organizational unit may
refer to:
xxx xxx xxx
d. State universities or colleges,
government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
She went on to say that the general intent
of EO 180 was "not to fragmentize the
employer unit, as "can be gleaned from the
 definition of the term "accredited
employees' organization," which refers to:
. . a registered organization of the
rank-and-file employees as defined
in these rules recognized to
negotiate for the employees in an
organizational unit headed by an
officer with sufficient authority to
bind the agency, such as . . . . . .
state colleges and universities.
The Director thus commanded that a certification
election be "conducted among rank-and-file
employees, teaching and non-teaching" in all four
autonomous campuses of the UP, and that
management appear and bring copies of the
corresponding payrolls for January, June, and July,
1990 at the "usual pre-election conference . . ."
At the pre-election conference held on March 22,
1990 at the Labor Organizational Division of the
DOLE, 8 the University sought further clarification
of the coverage of the term, "rank-and-file"
personnel, asserting that not every employee could
properly be embraced within both teaching and
non-teaching categories since there are those
whose positions are in truth managerial and policy-
determining, and hence, excluded by law.
At a subsequent hearing (on October 4, 1990), the
University filed a Manifestation seeking the
exclusion from the organizational unit of those
employees holding supervisory positions among
non-academic personnel, and those in teaching
staff with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher,
submitting the following as grounds therefor:
1) Certain "high-level employees" with policy-
making, managerial, or confidential functions, are
ineligible to join rank-and-file employee
organizations under Section 3, EO 180:
Sec. 3. High-level employees whose
functions are normally considered as
policy-making or managerial or
whose duties are of a highly
confidential nature shall not be
eligible to join the organization of
rank-and file government
employees;
2) In the University hierarchy, not all teaching and
non-teaching personnel belong the rank-and file:
just as there are those occupying managerial
positions within the non-teaching roster, there is
also a dichotomy between various levels of the
teaching or academic staff;
3) Among the non-teaching employees composed
of Administrative Staff and Research personnel,
only those holding positions below Grade 18
should be regarded as rank-and-file, considering
that those holding higher grade positions, like
Chiefs of Sections, perform supervisory functions
including that of effectively recommending
termination of appointments or initiating
appointments and promotions; and
4) Not all teaching personnel may be deemed
included in the term, "rank-and-file;" only those
holding appointments at the instructor level may
be so considered, because those holding
appointments from Assistant Professor to
Associate Professor to full Professor take part, as
members of the University Council, a policy-making
body, in the initiation of policies and rules with
respect to faculty tenure and promotion. 9
The ONAPUP quite categorically made of record its
position; that it was not opposing the University's
proferred classification of rank-and file employees.
On the other hand, the "All UP Workers' Union"
opposed the University's view, in a Position Paper
presented by it under date of October 18, 1990.
Director Calleja subsequently promulgated an
Order dated October 30, 1990, resolving the "sole
issue" of "whether or not professors, associate
professors and assistant professors are included in
the definition of high-level employee(s)" in light of
Rule I, Section (1) of the Implementing Guidelines
of Executive Order No. 180, defining "high level
employee" as follows:
1. High Level Employee is one
whose functions are normally
considered policy determining,
managerial or one whose duties are
highly confidential in nature. A
managerial function refers to the
exercise of powers such as:
1. To effectively
recommend such
managerial actions;
2. To formulate or
execute management
policies and
decisions; or
 3. To hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off,
recall, dismiss, assign
or discipline
employees.
The Director adjudged that said teachers are rank-
and-file employees "qualified to join unions and
vote in certification elections." According to her
A careful perusal of the University
Code . . shows that the policy-
making powers of the Council are
limited to academic matters,
namely, prescribing courses of study
and rules of discipline, fixing student
admission and graduation
requirements, recommending to the
Board of Regents the conferment of
degrees, and disciplinary power over
students. The policy-determining
functions contemplated in the
definition of a high-level employee
pertain to managerial, executive, or
organization policies, such as hiring,
firing, and disciplining of employees,
salaries, teaching/working hours,
other monetary and non-monetary
benefits, and other terms and
conditions of employment. They are
the usual issues in collective
bargaining negotiations so that
whoever wields these powers would
be placed in a situation of conflicting
interests if he were allowed to join
the union of rank-and-file
employees.
The University seasonably moved for
reconsideration, seeking to make the following
points, to wit:
1) UP professors do "wield the most potent
managerial powers: the power to rule on tenure,
on the creation of new programs and new jobs,
and conversely, the abolition of old programs and
the attendant re-assignment of employees.
2) To say that the Council is "limited to (acting on)
academic matters" is error, since academic
decisions "are the most important decisions made
in a University . . (being, as it were) the heart, the
core of the University as a workplace.
3) Considering that the law regards as a "high level"
employee, one who performs either policy-
determining, managerial, or confidential functions,
the Director erred in applying only the "managerial
functions" test, ignoring the "policy-determining
functions" test.
4) The Director's interpretation of the law would
lead to absurd results, e.g.: "an administrative
officer of the College of Law is a high level
employee, while a full Professor who has published
several treatises and who has distinguished himself
in argument before the Supreme Court is a mere
rank-and-file employee. A dormitory manager is
classified as a high level employee, while a full
Professor or Political Science with a Ph. D. and
several Honorary doctorates is classified as rank-
and-file." 10
The motion for reconsideration was denied by
Director Calleja, by Order dated November 20,
1990.
The University would now have this Court declare
void the Director's Order of October 30, 1990 as
well as that of November 20, 1990. 11 A temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court, by
Resolution dated December 5, 1990 conformably
to the University's application therefor.
Two issues arise from these undisputed facts. One
is whether or not professors, associate professors
and assistant professors are "high-level employees"
"whose functions are normally considered policy
determining, managerial or . . highly confidential in
nature." The other is whether or not, they, and
other employees performing academic
functions, 12 should comprise a collective
bargaining unit distinct and different from that
consisting of the non-academic employees of the
University, 13 considering the dichotomy of
interests, conditions and rules existing between
them.
As regards the first issue, the Court is satisfied that
it has been correctly resolved by the respondent
Director of Bureau Relations. In light of Executive
Order No. 180 and its implementing rules, as well
as the University's charter and relevant regulations,
the professors, associate professors and assistant
professors (hereafter simply referred to as
professors) cannot be considered as exercising
such managerial or highly confidential functions as
would justify their being categorized as "high-level
employees" of the institution.
The Academic Personnel Committees, through
which the professors supposedly exercise
managerial functions, were constituted "in order to
foster greater involvement of the faculty and other
academic personnel in appointments, promotions,
and other personnel matters that directly affect
them." 14 Academic Personnel Committees at the
departmental and college levels were organized
"consistent with, and demonstrative of the very
idea of consulting the faculty and other academic
personnel on matters directly affecting them" and
to allow "flexibility in the determination of
guidelines peculiar to a particular department or
college." 15
Personnel actions affecting the faculty and other
academic personnel should, however, "be
considered under uniform guidelines and
consistent with the Resolution of the Board (of
Regents) adopted during its 789th Meeting (11-26-
69) creating the University Academic Personnel
Board." 16 Thus, the Departmental Academic
Personnel Committee is given the function of
"assist(ing) in the review of the recommendations
initiated by the Department Chairman with regard
to recruitment, selection, performance evaluation,
tenure and staff development, in accordance with
the general guidelines formulated by the University
Academic Personnel Board and the implementing
details laid down by the College Academic
Personnel Committee;" 17 while the College
Academic Personnel Committee is entrusted with
the following functions: 18
1. Assist the Dean in setting up the
details for the implementation of
policies, rules, standards or general
guidelines as formulated by the
University Academic Personnel
Board;
2. Review the recommendation
submitted by the DAPCs with regard
to recruitment, selection,
performance evaluation, tenure,
staff development, and promotion
of the faculty and other academic
personnel of the College;
3. Establish departmental priorities
in the allocation of available funds
for promotion;
4. Act on cases of disagreement
between the Chairman and the
members of the DAPC particularly
on personnel matters covered by
this Order;
5. Act on complaints and/or protests
against personnel actions made by
the Department Chairman and/or
the DAPC.
The University Academic Personnel Board, on the
other hand, performs the following functions: 19
1. Assist the Chancellor in the review
of the recommendations of the
CAPC'S.
2. Act on cases of disagreement
between the Dean and the CAPC.
3. Formulate policies, rules, and
standards with respect to the
selection, compensation, and
promotion of members of the
academic staff.
4. Assist the Chancellor in the review
of recommendations on academic
promotions and on other matters
affecting faculty status and welfare.
From the foregoing, it is evident that it is the
University Academic Personnel Committee,
composed of deans, the assistant for academic
affairs and the chief of personnel, which formulates
the policies, rules and standards respecting
selection, compensation and promotion of
members of the academic staff. The departmental
and college academic personnel committees'
functions are purely recommendatory in nature,
subject to review and evaluation by the University
Academic Personnel Board. In Franklin Baker
Company of the Philippines vs. Trajano, 20 this
Court reiterated the principle laid down in National
Merchandising Corp. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 21 that the power to recommend, in
order to qualify an employee as a supervisor or
managerial employee "must not only
be effective but the exercise of such authority
should not be merely of a routinary or clerical
nature but should require the use of independent
judgment." Where such recommendatory powers,
as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation,
review and final action by the department heads
and other higher executives of the company, the
same, although present, are not effective and not
an exercise of independent judgment as required
by law.
Significantly, the personnel actions that may be
recommended by the departmental and college
academic personnel committees must conform
with the general guidelines drawn up by the
university personnel academic committee. This
being the case, the members of the departmental
and college academic personnel committees are
not unlike the chiefs of divisions and sections of the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
whom this Court considered as rank-and-file
employees in National Waterworks & Sewerage
Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 22because
"given ready policies to execute and standard
practices to observe for their execution, . . . they
have little freedom of action, as their main function
is merely to carry out the company's orders, plans
and policies."
The power or prerogative pertaining to a high-level
employee "to effectively recommend such
managerial actions, to formulate or execute
management policies or decisions and/or to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or
discipline employees" 23 is exercised to a certain
degree by the university academic personnel
board/committees and ultimately by the Board of
Regents in accordance with Section 6 of the
University
Charter, 24 thus:
(e) To appoint, on the
recommendation of the President of
the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other
employees of the University; to fix
their compensation, hours of
service, and such other duties and
conditions as it may deem proper; to
grant them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it
may promulgate, any other
provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove
them for cause after investigation
and hearing shall have been had.
Another factor that militates against petitioner's
espousal of managerial employment status for all
its professors through membership in the
departmental and college academic personnel
committees is that not all professors are members
thereof. Membership and the number of members
in the committees are provided as follows: 25
Sec. 2. Membership in Committees.
Membership in committees may
be made either through
appointment, election, or by some
other means as may be determined
by the faculty and other academic
personnel of a particular
department or college.
Sec. 3. Number of Members. In
addition to the Chairman, in the
case of a department, and the Dean
in the case of a college, there shall
be such number of members
representing the faculty and
academic personnel as will afford a
fairly representative, deliberative
and manageable group that can
handle evaluation of personnel
actions.
Neither can membership in the University Council
elevate the professors to the status of high-level
employees. Section 6 (f) and 9 of the UP Charter
respectively provide: 26
Sec. 6. The Board of Regents shall
have the following powers and
duties . . . ;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To approve the courses of study
and rules of discipline drawn up by
the University Council as hereinafter
provided; . . .
Sec. 9. There shall be a University
Council consisting of the President
of the University and of all
instructors in the university holding
the rank of professor, associate
professor, or assistant professor.
The Council shall have the power to
prescribe the courses of study and
rules of discipline, subject to the
approval of the Board of Regents. It
shall fix the requirements for
 admission to any college of the
university, as well as for graduation
and the receiving of a degree. The
Council alone shall have the power
to recommend students or others to
be recipients of degrees. Through its
president or committees, it shall
have disciplinary power over the
students within the limits prescribed
by the rules of discipline approved by
the Board of Regents. The powers
and duties of the President of the
University, in addition to those
specifically provided in this Act shall
be those usually pertaining to the
office of president of a university.
It is readily apparent that the policy-determining
functions of the University Council are subject to
review, evaluation and final approval by the Board
of Regents. The Council's power of discipline is
likewise circumscribed by the limits imposed by the
Board of Regents. What has been said about the
recommendatory powers of the departmental and
college academic personnel committees applies
with equal force to the alleged policy-determining
functions of the University Council.
Even assuming arguendo that UP professors
discharge policy-determining functions through the
University Council, still such exercise would not
qualify them as high-level employees within the
context of E.O. 180. As correctly observed by
private respondent, "Executive Order No. 180 is a
law concerning public sector unionism. It must
therefore be construed within that context. Within
that context, the University of the Philippines
represents the government as an employer. 'Policy-
determining' refers to policy-determination in
university mattes that affect those same matters
that may be the subject of negotiation between
public sector management and labor. The reason
why 'policy-determining' has been laid down as a
test in segregating rank-and-file from management
is to ensure that those who lay down policies in
areas that are still negotiable in public sector
collective bargaining do not themselves become
part of those employees who seek to change these
policies for their collective welfare." 27
The policy-determining functions of the University
Council refer to academic matters, i.e. those
governing the relationship between the University
and its students, and not the University as an
employer and the professors as employees. It is
thus evident that no conflict of interest results in
the professors being members of the University
Council and being classified as rank-and-file
employees.
Be that as it may, does it follow, as public
respondent would propose, that all rank-and-file
employees of the university are to be organized
into a single collective bargaining unit?
A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire body of employees, which
the collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to
be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law. 28
Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria
for determining the proper collective bargaining
unit. Section 12 of the old law, Republic Act No.
875 otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act,
simply reads as follows: 29
Sec. 12. Exclusive Collective
Bargaining Representation for Labor
Organizations. The labor
organization designated or selected
for the purpose of collective
bargaining by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be
the exclusive representative of all
the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions
of employment; Provided, That any
individual employee or group of
employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to
their employer.
Although said Section 12 of the Industrial Peace Act
was subsequently incorporated into the Labor
Code with minor changes, no guidelines were
included in said Code for determination of an
appropriate bargaining unit in a given case. 30 Thus,
apart from the single descriptive word
"appropriate," no specific guide for determining
the proper collective bargaining unit can be found
in the statutes.
Even Executive Order No. 180 already adverted to
is not much help. All it says, in its Section 9, is that
"(t)he appropriate organizational unit shall be the
employer unit consisting of rank-and-file
employees, unless circumstances otherwise
require." Case law fortunately furnishes some
guidelines.
When first confronted with the task of determining
the proper collective bargaining unit in a particular
controversy, the Court had perforce to rely on
American jurisprudence. In Democratic Labor
Association vs. Cebu Stevedoring Company,
Inc., decided on February 28, 1958, 31 the Court
observed that "the issue of how to determine the
proper collective bargaining unit and what unit
would be appropriate to be the collective
bargaining
agency" . . . "is novel in this jurisdiction; however,
American precedents on the matter abound . . (to
which resort may be had) considering that our
present Magna Carta has been patterned after the
American law on the subject." Said the Court:
. . . Under these precedents, there
are various factors which must be
satisfied and considered in
determining the proper constituency
of a bargaining unit. No one
particular factor is itself decisive of
the determination. The weight
accorded to any particular factor
varies in accordance with the
particular question or questions that
may arise in a given case. What are
these factors? Rothenberg mentions
a good number, but the most
pertinent to our case are: (1) will of
the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2)
affinity and unit of employees'
interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and
working conditions; (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as
temporary, seasonal probationary
employees. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
An enlightening appraisal of the
problem of defining an appropriate
bargaining unit is given in the 10th
Annual Report of the National Labor
Relations Board wherein it is
emphasized that the factors which
said board may consider and weigh
in fixing appropriate units are: the
history, extent and type of
organization of employees; the
history of their collective bargaining;
the history, extent and type of
organization of employees in other
plants of the same employer, or
other employers in the same
industry; the skill, wages, work, and
working conditions of the
employees; the desires of the
employees; the eligibility of the
employees for membership in the
union or unions involved; and the
relationship between the unit or
units proposed and the employer's
organization, management, and
operation. . . .
. . In said report, it is likewise
emphasized that the basic test in
determining the appropriate
bargaining unit is that a unit, to be
appropriate, must affect a grouping
of employees who have substantial,
mutual interests in wages, hours,
working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining
(citing Smith on Labor Laws, 316-
317; Francisco, Labor Laws, 162). . . .
The Court further explained that "(t)he test of the
grouping is community or mutuality of interests.
And this is so because 'the basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights' (Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, 490)." Hence, in that case, the Court
upheld the trial court's conclusion that two
separate bargaining units should be formed, one
consisting of regular and permanent employees
and another consisting of casual laborers or
stevedores.
Since then, the "community or mutuality of
interests" test has provided the standard in
determining the proper constituency of a collective
bargaining unit. In Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette
Manufacturing Company, et al. vs. Alhambra
Employees' Association (PAFLU), 107 Phil. 23, the
Court, noting that the employees in the
administrative, sales and dispensary departments
of a cigar and cigarette manufacturing firm perform
work which have nothing to do with production
and maintenance, unlike those in the raw lead
(malalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precintera) and
engineering and garage departments, authorized
the formation of the former set of employees into
a separate collective bargaining unit. The ruling in
the Democratic Labor Association case, supra, was
reiterated in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Unit vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 176, where
casual employees were barred from joining the
union of the permanent and regular employees.
Applying the same "community or mutuality of
interests" test, but resulting in the formation of
only one collective bargaining units is the case
of National Association of Free Trade Unions vs.
Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers
Union-United Lumber and General Workers of the
Phils., G.R. No. 79526, December 21, 1990, 192
SCRA 598. In said case, the Court ordered the
formation of a single bargaining unit consisting of
the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the Logging
Division in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan Norte
of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. The
Court reasoned:
Certainly, there is a mutuality of
interest among the employees of
the Sawmill Division and the Logging
Division. Their functions mesh with
one another. One group needs the
other in the same way that the
company needs them both. There
may be difference as to the nature
of their individual assignments but
the distinctions are not enough to
warrant the formation of a separate
bargaining unit.
In the case at bar, the University employees may,
as already suggested, quite easily be categorized
into two general classes: one, the group composed
of employees whose functions are non-
academic, i.e., janitors, messengers, typists, clerks,
receptionists, carpenters, electricians, grounds-
keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics,
plumbers; 32 and two, the group made up of those
performing academic functions, i.e., full professors,
associate professors, assistant professors,
instructors who may be judges or government
executives and research, extension and
professorial staff. 33 Not much reflection is needed
to perceive that the community or mutuality of
interests which justifies the formation of a single
collective bargaining unit is wanting between the
academic and non-academic personnel of the
university. It would seem obvious that teachers
would find very little in common with the
University clerks and other non-academic
employees as regards responsibilities and
functions, working conditions, compensation rates,
social life and interests, skills and intellectual
pursuits, cultural activities, etc. On the contrary,
the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the
nature of the work and duties as well as in the
compensation and working conditions of the
academic and non-academic personnel dictate the
separation of these two categories of employees
for purposes of collective bargaining. The
formation of two separate bargaining units, the
first consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic
personnel, and the second, of the rank-and-file
academic employees, is the set-up that will best
assure to all the employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights. These special
circumstances, i.e., the dichotomy of interests and
concerns as well as the dissimilarity in the nature
and conditions of work, wages and compensation
between the academic and non-academic
personnel, bring the case at bar within the
exception contemplated in Section 9 of Executive
Order No. 180. It was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Labor Relations Director to have
ruled otherwise, ignoring plain and patent realities.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of October 30,
1990 is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as it declares the
professors, associate professors and assistant
professors of the University of the Philippines as
rank-and-file employees. The Order of August 7,
1990 is MODIFIED in the sense that the non-
academic rank-and-file employees of the University
of the Philippines shall constitute a bargaining unit
to the exclusion of the academic employees of the
institution i.e., full professors, associate
professors, assistant professors, instructors, and
the research, extension and professorial staff, who
may, if so minded, organize themselves into a
separate collective bargaining unit; and that,
therefore, only said non-academic rank-and-file
personnel of the University of the Philippines in
Diliman, Manila, Los Baos and the Visayas are to
participate in the certification election.
SO ORDERED.
St. James vs. Samahan GR No. 151326
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing
the 5 September 2001 Decision and 3 January 2002
Resolution of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP
No. 60197. The Court of Appeals sustained the
Decision of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) directing the opening of the
challenged ballots cast during the certification
election.
The Antecedent Facts
The Samahang Manggagawa sa St. James School of
Quezon City (Samahang Manggagawa) filed a
petition for certification election to determine the
collective bargaining representative of the motor
pool, construction and transportation employees of
St. James School of Quezon City (St. James). On 26
June 1999, the certification election was held at the
DOLE office in Intramuros, Manila. There were 149
eligible voters and 84 voters cast their votes. St.
James filed a certification election protest
challenging the 84 votes. St. James alleged that it
had 179 rank and file employees, none of whom
voted in the certification election. St. James argued
that those who voted were not its regular
employees but construction workers of an
independent contractor, Architect Conrado Bacoy
(Architect Bacoy).
In an Order dated 6 January 2000,[3] Med-Arbiter
Tomas F. Falconitin (Med-Arbiter Falconitin) ruled
that at the time of the certification election, the 84
voters were no longer working at St. James. Med-
Arbiter Falconitin supported his ruling using the
roster of rank and file employees submitted by St.
James, which did not include the names of the 84
voters. Med-Arbiter Falconitin also ruled that since
the construction projects have ceased, some of the
workers were no longer entitled to vote in the
certification election. Finally, Med-Arbiter
Falconitin ruled that even if the 84 workers were to
be included in the 179 rank and file employees of
St. James, the total number of voters would be
263. Thus, the 84 votes cast would not be sufficient
to constitute a majority of all eligible voters to have
a valid certification election. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the certification election
protest is hereby given due course.
Accordingly, judgment is
hereby rendered, declaring the
certification election for the rank
and file employees of
respondent/protestant St. James
School of Quezon City conducted on
June 26, 1999, a failure; and null and
void ab initio.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Samahang Manggagawa appealed to the Secretary
of Labor. In its Decision[5] dated 5 May 2000, the
DOLE[6] reversed the ruling of Med-Arbiter
Falconitin. The DOLE ruled that Samahang
Manggagawa seeks to represent the non-academic
personnel or the rank and file employees from the
motor pool, construction and transportation
departments, and not all the rank and file
employees of St. James. According to the DOLE,
Med-Arbiter Falconitin erred in including all the
rank and file employees of St. James, whether
teaching or non-teaching personnel, in the
computation of the total number of employees.
The DOLE ruled that the list submitted by St. James
contained only the administrative, teaching and
office personnel of the school. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is
hereby GRANTED and the order
dated 06 January 2000 of the Med-
Arbiter is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, an order is hereby
issued directing the Election Officer,
Lilibeth Cagara, DOLE-National
Capital Region to open and canvass
the 84 challenged ballots within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof,
subject to usual notice and
representation by the parties and
thereafter to issue the
corresponding certification of the
results.
SO DECIDED.[7]
St. James filed a motion for reconsideration. The
DOLE[8] denied the motion in its 19 June 2000
Resolution.[9] St. James filed a special civil action
before the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision[10] dated 5 September 2001, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition and ruled that
the DOLE did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in reversing the ruling of Med-Arbiter Falconitin. In
its 3 January 2002 Resolution,[11] the Court of
Appeals denied St. James motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
St. James questions the validity of the
formation of the labor union and the validity of the
certification election.[12]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Validity of the Formation of the Labor Union
St. James argues that majority of the members of
Samahang Manggagawa are not its employees but
employees of Architect Bacoy, an independent
contractor.
St. James may no longer question the
validity of the formation of the labor union.
The records[13] show that prior to the
holding of the certification election, St. James filed
a petition for cancellation of Samahang
Manggagawas union registration. Among the
grounds cited in the petition was the lack of
employer-employee relationship between St.
James and Samahang Manggagawas members. The
Med-Arbiter recommended the cancellation of the
union registration. DOLE Regional Director IV
Romeo Young (Director Young) adopted the Med-
Arbiters recommendation and cancelled Samahang
Manggagawas union registration. Samahang
Manggagawa filed an appeal before the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR). In its Decision[14] dated 22
January 1998, the BLR[15]reversed Director Youngs
Decision. In its Resolution[16] of 12 February 1998,
the BLR denied St. James motion for
reconsideration. St. James filed a special civil action
before the Court of Appeals. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 50918. In its 9 February
2001 Decision,[17] the Court of Appeals dismissed
St. James petition and affirmed the BLRs Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the construction
workers are actually St. James regular employees in
its motor pool, construction and transportation
departments. The Court of Appeals also ruled that
Architect Bacoy is a labor-only contractor and thus
an agent of St. James, which is the real employer.
St. James filed a petition for certiorari
before this Court. The case was docketed as G.R.
No. 149648. In a Resolution dated 10 October
2001, this Court denied the petition for St. James
error in the choice or mode of appeal.[18] The
Courts 10 October 2001 Resolution closed any
issue on the validity of the formation of the labor
union.
The Validity of the Certification Election
Section 13, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus Rules)
provides:

Section 13. Proclamation and
certification of results by election
officer; when proper. Upon
completion of the canvass there
being a valid election, the election
officer shall proclaim and certify as
winner the union which obtained a
majority of the valid votes cast
under any of the following
conditions:
a) No protest had been
filed or, even if one was
filed, the same was not
perfected within the five-
day period for perfection
of the protest;
b) No challenge of
eligibility issue was raised
or even if one was raised,
the resolution of the
same will not materially
change the result.
For this purpose, the election
officer shall immediately issue the
corresponding certification, copy
furnished all parties, which shall
form part of the records of the case.
The winning union shall have the
rights, privileges and obligations of a
duly certified collective bargaining
representative from the time the
certification is issued. The
proclamation and certification so
issued shall not be appealable.
According to St. James, the certification
election was conducted without quorum. St. James
alleges that it has 179 rank and file employees in its
Quezon City Campus. When the certification
election was held, none of these qualified rank and
file employees cast their votes because they were
all on duty in the school premises. The 84 voters
who cast their votes are employees of Architect
Bacoy. St. James also alleges that it has 570 rank
and file employees in all its campuses. Even if the
84 voters are its employees, the votes do not
constitute a majority vote of its rank and file
employees because the quorum should be based
on its 570 rank and file employees.
We cannot sustain the argument.
St. James has five campuses the Philamlife and
Scout Alcaraz, Quezon City campuses which are
pre-schools; the Paraaque City and Calamba,
Laguna campuses which offer elementary,
secondary and college education; and the Tandang
Sora, Quezon City campus which offers elementary
and secondary education.[19]
The members of Samahang Manggagawa are
employees in the Tandang Sora campus. Under its
constitution and by-laws, Samahang Manggagawa
seeks to represent the motor pool, construction
and transportation employees of the Tandang Sora
campus.[20] Thus, the computation of the quorum
should be based on the rank and file motor pool,
construction and transportation employees of the
Tandang Sora campus and not on all the employees
in St. James five campuses.
Section 2, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules provides:
Section 2. Qualification of
voters; inclusion-exclusion
proceedings. All employees who are
members of the appropriate
bargaining unit sought to be
represented by the petitioner at the
time of the certification or consent
election shall be qualified to vote. A
dismissed employee whose
dismissal is being contested in a
pending case shall be allowed to
vote in the election.
In case of disagreement over
the voters list or over the eligibility
of voters, all contested voters shall
be allowed to vote. However, their
votes shall be segregated and sealed
 in individual envelopes in
accordance with Section 9 of these
Rules.
The motor pool, construction and transportation
employees of the Tandang Sora campus had 149
qualified voters at the time of the certification
election. Hence, the 149 qualified voters should be
used to determine the existence of a quorum.
Since a majority or 84 out of the 149 qualified
voters cast their votes, a quorum existed in the
certification election.
St. James further alleges that the names of the 84
voters are not on the list of its rank and file
employees. On this score, we sustain the factual
finding of the DOLE that the list submitted by St.
James consists of its administrative, teaching and
office personnel. These administrative, teaching
and office personnel are not members of
Samahang Manggagawa. They do not belong to the
bargaining unit that Samahang Manggagawa seeks
to represent. Hence, the list submitted by St. James
may not be used as basis to determine the
members of Samahang Manggagawa.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
We AFFIRM the 5 September 2001 Decision and
the 3 January 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60197.
SO ORDERED.
BELYCA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
DIR. PURA FERRER CALLEJA, LABOR RELATIONS,
MANILA, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT; MED-ARBITER, RODOLFO S.
MILADO, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10 AND
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU-TUCP),
MINDANAO REGIONAL OFFICE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY, respondents.
Soriano and Arana Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Francisco D. Alas for respondent Associated Labor
Unions-TUCP.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking to annul or to set
aside the resolution of the Bureau of Labor
Relations dated November 24, 1986 and denying
the appeal, and the Bureau's resolution dated
January 13, 1987 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned
resolution dated November 24, 1986 (Rollo, p. 4)
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing considerations, the Order
is affirmed and the appeal
therefrom denied.
Let, therefore, the pertinent records
of the case be remanded to the
office of origin for the immediate
conduct of the certification election.
The dispositive portion of the resolution dated
January 13, 1987 (Rollo, p. 92) reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent
Belyca Corporation (Livestock Agro-
Division) is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit and the Bureau's Resolution
dated 24 November 1986 is
affirmed. Accordingly, let the
records of this case be immediately
forwarded to the Office of origin for
the holding of the certification
elections.
No further motion shall hereafter be
entertained.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated
Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment under Registration
Certificate No. 783-IP, filed with the Regional Office
No. 10, Ministry of Labor and Employment at
Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of
Belyca Corporation (Livestock and Agro-Division), a
duly organized, registered and existing corporation
engaged in the business of poultry raising, piggery
and planting of agricultural crops such as corn,
coffee and various vegetables, employing
approximately 205 rank and file
employees/workers, the collective bargaining unit
sought in the petition, or in case of doubt of the
union's majority representation, for the issuance of
an order authorizing the immediate holding of a
certification election (Rollo, p. 18). Although the
case was scheduled for hearing at least three
times, no amicable settlement was reached by the
parties. During the scheduled hearing of July 31,
1986 they, however, agreed to submit
simultaneously their respective position papers on
or before August 11, 1986 (rollo. p. 62).
Petitioner ALU-TUCP, private respondent herein, in
its petition and position paper alleged, among
others, (1) that there is no existing collective
bargaining agreement between the respondent
employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing
legitimate labor unions; (2) that there had neither
been a certification election conducted in the
proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve
(12) months prior to the filing of the petition nor a
contending union requesting for certification as
the. sole and exclusive bargaining representative in
the proposed bargaining unit; (3) that more than a
majority of respondent employer's rank-and-file
employees/workers in the proposed bargaining
unit or one hundred thirty-eight (138) as of the
date of the filing of the petition, have signed
membership with the ALU-TUCP and have
expressed their written consent and authorization
to the filing of the petition; (4) that in response to
petitioner union's two letters to the proprietor/
General Manager of respondent employer, dated
April 21, 1986 and May 8, 1 986, requesting for
direct recognition as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers,
respondent employer has locked out 119 of its
rank-and-file employees in the said bargaining unit
and had dismissed earlier the local union president,
vice-president and three other active members of
the local unions for which an unfair labor practice
case was filed by petitioner union against
respondent employer last July 2, 1986 before the
NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo, pp. 18;
263).<re||an1w> on June 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 231); and memorandum
Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged
in its position paper, among others, (1) that due to
the nature of its business, very few of its
employees are permanent, the overwhelming
majority of which are seasonal and casual and
regular employees; (2) that of the total 138 rank-
and-file employees who authorized, signed and
supported the filing of the petition (a) 14 were no
longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned
after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their membership
from petitioner union (d) 5 were retrenched on
June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to
malicious insubordination and destruction of
property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work
or stopped working; (3) that the 128 incumbent
employees or workers of the livestock section were
merely transferred from the agricultural section as
replacement for those who have either been
dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and (4) that the
statutory requirement for holding a certification
election has not been complied with by the union
(Rollo, p. 26).
The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election
sought for by petitioner union in his order dated
August 18, 1986 (Rollo, p. 62).
On February 4, 1987, respondent employer Belyca
Corporation, appealed the order of the Labor
Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila
(Rollo, p. 67) which denied the appeal (Rollo, p. 80)
and the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 92).
Thus, the instant petition received in this Court by
mail on February 20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 3).
In the resolution of March 4, 1987, the Second
Division of this Court required respondent Union to
comment on the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order (,Rollo, p. 95).
Respondent union filed its comment on March 30,
1987 (Rollo, p. 190); public respondents filed its
comment on April 8, 1987 (Rollo, p. 218).
On May 4, 1987, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition and to require the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within twenty
(20) days from notice (Rollo, p. 225).
The Office of the Solicitor General manifested on
June 11, 1987 that it is adopting the comment for
public respondents as its memorandum (Rollo, p.
226); memorandum for respondent ALU was filed
for petitioner, on July 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 435).
The issues raised in this petition are: the right at any time
I to present grievances
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPOSED to their employer.
BARGAINING UNIT IS AN According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT. maybe said to be a group of employees of a given
II employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTORY entire body of employees, which the collective
REQUIREMENT OF 30% (NOW 20%) interests of all the employees, consistent with
OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited
PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT, to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
ASKING FOR A CERTIFICATION under the collective bargaining provisions of the
ELECTION HAD BEEN STRICTLY law (Rothenberg in Labor Relations, p. 482).
COMPLIED WITH. This Court has already taken cognizance of the
In the instant case, respondent ALU seeks direct crucial issue of determining the proper
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining constituency of a collective bargaining unit.
agent of all the rank-and-file workers of the Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor
livestock and agro division of petitioner BELYCA Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103 Phil
Corporation (Rollo, p. 232), engaged in piggery, 1103 [1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove
poultry raising and the planting of agricultural Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employee's
crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables interest, such as substantial similarity of work and
(Rollo, p. 26). But petitioner contends that the duties or similarity of compensation and working
bargaining unit must include all the workers in its conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history;
integrated business concerns ranging from piggery, and (4) employment status, such as temporary,
poultry, to supermarts and cinemas so as not to seasonal and probationary employees".
split an otherwise single bargaining unit into Under the circumstances of that case, the Court
fragmented bargaining units (Rollo, p. stressed the importance of the fourth factor and
435).<re||an1w> sustained the trial court's conclusion that two
The Labor Code does not specifically define what separate bargaining units should be formed in
constitutes an appropriate collective bargaining dealing with respondent company, one consisting
unit. Article 256 of the Code provides: of regular and permanent employees and another
Art. 256. Exclusive consisting of casual laborers or stevedores.
bargaining Otherwise stated, temporary employees should be
representative.The treated separately from permanent employees. But
labor organization more importantly, this Court laid down the test of
designated or proper grouping, which is community and
selected by the mutuality of interest.
majority of the Thus, in a later case, (Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette
employees in an Manufacturing Co. et al. v. Alhambra Employees'
appropriate collective Association 107 Phil. 28 [1960]) where the
bargaining unit shall employment status was not at issue but the nature
be exclusive of work of the employees concerned; the Court
representative of the stressed the importance of the second factor
employees in such otherwise known as the substantial-mutual-
unit for the purpose interest test and found no reason to disturb the
of collective finding of the lower Court that the employees in
bargaining. However, the administrative, sales and dispensary
an individual departments perform work which has nothing to
employee or group of do with production and maintenance, unlike those
employee shall have in the raw leaf, cigar, cigarette and packing and
engineering and garage departments and therefore
community of interest which justifies the format or
existence as a separate appropriate collective
bargaining unit.
Still later in PLASLU v. CIR et al. (110 Phil. 180
[1960]) where the employment status of the
employees concerned was again challenged, the
Court reiterating the rulings, both in Democratic
Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc.
supra and Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Co. et al.
v. Alhambra Employees' Association (supra) held
that among the factors to be considered are:
employment status of the employees to be
affected, that is the positions and categories of
work to which they belong, and the unity of
employees' interest such as substantial similarity of
work and duties.
In any event, whether importance is focused on the
employment status or the mutuality of interest of
the employees concerned "the basic test of an
asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether
or not it is fundamentally the combination which
will best assure to all employees the exercise of
their collective bargaining rights (Democratic Labor
Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra)
Hence, still later following the substantial-mutual
interest test, the Court ruled that there is a
substantial difference between the work
performed by musicians and that of other persons
who participate in the production of a film which
suffice to show that they constitute a proper
bargaining unit. (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, 1 SCRA 132 [1961]).
Coming back to the case at bar, it is beyond
question that the employees of the livestock and
agro division of petitioner corporation perform
work entirely different from those performed by
employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among
others, the noted difference are: their working
conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including
the categories of their positions and employment
status. As stated by petitioner corporation in its
position paper, due to the nature of the business in
which its livestock-agro division is engaged very
few of its employees in the division are permanent,
the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal
and casual and not regular employees (Rollo, p.
26). Definitely, they have very little in common
with the employees of the supermarts and
cinemas. To lump all the employees of petitioner in
its integrated business concerns cannot result in an
efficacious bargaining unit comprised of
constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of
interest. Undeniably, the rank and file employees
of the livestock-agro division fully constitute a
bargaining unit that satisfies both requirements of
classification according to employment status and
of the substantial similarity of work and duties
which will ultimately assure its members the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
II
It is undisputed that petitioner BELYCA Corporation
(Livestock and Agro Division) employs more or less
two hundred five (205) rank-and-file employees
and workers. It has no existing duly certified
collective bargaining agreement with any
legitimate labor organization. There has not been
any certification election conducted in the
proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve
(12) months prior to the filing of the petition for
direct certification and/or certification election
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, and
there is no contending union requesting for
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative in the proposed bargaining unit.
The records show that on the filing of the petition
for certification and/or certification election on
June 3, 1986; 124 employees or workers which are
more than a majority of the rank-and-file
employees or workers in the proposed bargaining
unit had signed membership with respondent ALU-
TUCP and had expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition. Thus, the
Labor Arbiter ordered the certification election on
August 18, 1986 on a finding that 30% of the
statutory requirement under Art. 258 of the Labor
Code has been met.
But, petitioner corporation contends that after
June 3, 1986 four (4) employees resigned; six (6)
subsequently withdrew their membership; five (5)
were retrenched; twelve (12) were dismissed for
illegally and unlawfully barricading the entrance to
petitioner's farm; and one hundred (100) simply
abandoned their work.
Petitioner's claim was however belied by the
Memorandum of its personnel officer to the 119
employees dated July 28, 1986 showing that the
employees were on strike, which was confirmed by
the finding of the Bureau of Labor Relations to the
effect that they went on strike on July 24, 1986
(Rollo, p. 419). Earlier the local union president,
Warrencio Maputi; the Vice-president, Gilbert
Redoblado and three other active members of the
union Carmen Saguing, Roberto Romolo and
Iluminada Bonio were dismissed and a complaint
for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal etc. was
filed by the Union in their behalf on July 2, 1986
before the NLRC of Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo, p.
415).<re||an1w> The complaint was amended
on August 20, 1986 for respondent Union to
represent Warrencio Maputi and 137 others
against petitioner corporation and Bello Casanova
President and General Manager for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal, illegal lockout, etc. (Rollo,
p. 416).
Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the
statutory requirement is met, the Director of Labor
Relations has no choice but to call a certification
election (Atlas Free Workers Union AFWU PSSLU
Local v. Noriel, 104 SCRA 565 [1981]; Vismico
Industrial Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel,
131 SCRA 569 [1984]) It becomes in the language
of the New Labor Code "Mandatory for the Bureau
to conduct a certification election for the purpose
of determining the representative of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and
certify the winner as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all employees in the unit."
(Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y
Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel, 72 SCRA
24 [1976]; Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa v.
Noriel, 77 SCRA 414 [1977]); more so when there is
no existing collective bargaining agreement.
(Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v.
Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]); and there has not
been a certification election in the company for the
past three years (PLUM Federation of Industrial
and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA 299
[1982]) as in the instant case.
It is significant to note that 124 employees out of
the 205 employees of the Belyca Corporation have
expressed their written consent to the certification
election or more than a majority of the rank and
file employees and workers; much more than the
required 30% and over and above the present
requirement of 20% by Executive Order No. 111
issued on December 24, 1980 and applicable only
to unorganized establishments under Art. 257, of
the Labor Code, to which the BELYCA Corporation
belong (Ass. Trade Unions (ATU) v. Trajano, G.R.
No. 75321, June 20, 1988).) More than that, any
doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the
petition for holding a certification election cannot
be a bar to its being granted (Filipino Metals Corp.
v. Ople 107 SCRA 211 [1981]). Even doubts as to
the required 30% being met warrant holding of the
certification election (PLUM Federation of
Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA
299 [1982]). In fact, once the required percentage
requirement has been reached, the employees'
withdrawal from union membership taking place
after the filing of the petition for certification
election will not affect said petition. On the
contrary, the presumption arises that the
withdrawal was not free but was procured through
duress, coercion or for a valuable consideration (La
Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, 123 SCRA 679
[1983]). Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the
six (6) employees from the union will not be
counted against or deducted from the previous
number who had signed up for certification
elections Vismico Industrial Workers Association
(VIWA) v. Noriel 131 SCRA 569
[1984]).<re||an1w> Similarly, until a decision,
final in character, has been issued declaring the
strike illegal and the mass dismissal or
retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot be denied
participation in the certification election
notwithstanding, the vigorous condemnation of the
strike and the fact that the picketing were attended
by violence. Under the foregoing circumstances, it
does not necessarily follow that the strikers in
question are no longer entitled to participate in the
certification election on the theory that they have
automatically lost their jobs. (Barrera v. CIR, 107
SCRA 596 [1981]). For obvious reasons, the duty of
the employer to bargain collectively is nullified if
the purpose of the dismissal of the union members
is to defeat the union in the consent requirement
for certification election. (Samahang Manggagawa
Ng Via Mare v. Noriel, 98 SCRA 507 [1980]). As
stressed by this Court, the holding of a certification
election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented. (George and Peter Lines Inc. v.
Associated Labor Unions (ALU), 134 SCRA 82
[1986]).
Finally, as a general rule, a certification election is
the sole concern of the workers. The only
exception is where the employer has to file a
petition for certification election pursuant to Art.
259 of the Labor Code because the latter was
requested to bargain collectively. But thereafter
the role of the employer in the certification process
ceases. The employer becomes merely a bystander
(Trade Union of the Phil. and Allied Services
(TUPAS) v. Trajano, 120 SCRA 64 [1983]).
There is no showing that the instant case falls
under the above mentioned exception. However, it
will be noted that petitioner corporation from the
outset has actively participated and consistently
taken the position of adversary in the petition for
direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative and/or certification
election filed by respondent Associated Labor
Unions (ALU)-TUCP to the extent of filing this
petition for certiorari in this Court. Considering that
a petition for certification election is not a litigation
but a mere investigation of a non-adversary
character to determining the bargaining unit to
represent the employees (LVN Pictures, Inc. v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, supra; Bulakena
Restaurant & Caterer v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 45 SCRA 88 [1972]; George Peter Lines,
Inc. v. Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA 82 [1986];
Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA
470 [1987]), and its only purpose is to give the
employees true representation in their collective
bargaining with an employer (Confederation of
Citizens Labor Unions CCLU v. Noriel, 116 SCRA 694
[1982]), there appears to be no reason for the
employer's objection to the formation of subject
union, much less for the filing of the petition for a
certification election.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit (b) resolution of the
Bureau of Labor Relations dated Nov. 24, 1986 is
AFFIRMED; and the temporary restraining order
issued by the Court on March 4, 1987 is LIFTED
permanently.
SO ORDERED.