[G.R. Nos. 128106-07. January 24, 2003.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GONZALO BALDOGO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo, a convicted felon serving sentence at the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, was
again convicted of murder and kidnapping by the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. He was
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death in the murder case and reclusion perpetua in the kidnapping case.
On automatic review, appellant averred that he had nothing to do with, and hence, should not be claimed for, the
death of Jorge Camacho, the victim, and the kidnapping and detention of Julie Camacho. Appellant claimed that he
was acting under duress because he was threatened by Edgardo Bermas, a fellow inmate of the penal colony, with
death unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do. IHcSCA

The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. The Court rejected appellant's claim that he was acting under
duress when he committed the alleged crimes. Appellant's insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain of
death, to cooperate with him in killing Jorge and kidnapping and detaining Julie was merely an afterthought. The
testimony of Julie, and the inculpatory acts of appellant no less, showed that the latter acted in concert with Bermas
and was himself a principal by direct participation. The Court also ruled that kidnapping was committed even Julie
was not locked up. Julie was seized and taken from her house through force and dragged to the mountain. Since
then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept under the control of appellant and Bermas. She was prevented
from going back home for a period of about six days. Patently then, appellant was guilty of kidnapping and illegally
detaining Julie. The Court, however, modified the penalty of death imposed by the trial court by reducing it to
reclusion perpetua, there being no established aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the
crime of murder.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TRIAL COURTS; GENERAL RULE;

EXCEPTIONS; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. This Court has held in a catena of cases that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the probative weight
of the collective evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate
court great respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison d'etre of this principle is that this Court has to contend itself
with the mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues posed by the parties. The rule, however, is not
iron clad. This Court has enumerated exceptions thereto, namely: (a) when patent inconsistencies in the statements
of witnesses are ignored by the trial court; (b) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the
evidence; (c) when the trial court ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or misconstrued facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case. In this case, the trial court found
the youthful Julie credible and her testimony entitled to full probative weight. Accused-appellant has not sufficiently
demonstrated to this Court the application of any of the aforestated exceptions.

2. ID.; ID.; FLIGHT; CONSTITUTES POTENT EVIDENCE OF CONFABULATION AND GUILT. The
flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house of Julio Sr. to the mountain where they found refuge
after killing Jorge, and their motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and detain Julie in conjunto constitute potent
evidence of their confabulation and of their guilt for the death of Jorge and kidnapping and detention of Julie.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ABSENCE OF ILL MOTIVE TO FALSELY TESTIFY
ENTITLES TESTIMONY OF WITNESS TO FULL PROBATIVE WEIGHT. The Court has repeatedly held that
the testimony of a minor of tender age and of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of an
older person so that once it is established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their
testimony should be given full credence and probative weight.

4. ID.; ID.; DENIAL; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER CATEGORICAL, POSITIVE, AND UNEQUIVOCAL
IDENTIFICATION. The bare denial by accused-appellant of the crimes charged constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical and positive testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification
of accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged. ETHaDC

5. CRIMINAL LAW; CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY; CONSPIRACY;

ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if two
or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before, during and after the
commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose and design and community of intent. It is not required that there
be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the commission of a felony; rather, it is sufficient that at the time
of the commission of the offense, all the conspirators had the same purpose and were united in its execution. In a
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. All the accused are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of their participation. For a conspirator to be criminally liable of murder or homicide, it is not necessary that
he actually attacks or kills the victim. As long as all the conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim, all
the conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said victim. In these cases, the prosecution adduced conclusive
proof that accused-appellant indeed conspired with Bermas to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie as shown by the cogent
facts and circumstances.

6. ID.; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; DURESS; THE FEAR MUST BE WELL FOUNDED AND
IMMEDIATE AND ACTUAL DAMAGES OF DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM MUST BE PRESENT;
COMPULSION MUST BE OF SUCH CHARACTER AS TO LEAVE NO OPPORTUNITY TO ACCUSED FOR
ESCAPE OR INTERPOSE SELF-DEFENSE IN EQUAL COMBAT. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of
the crimes charged, "the fear must be well-founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily
harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for
escape or interpose self-defense in equal combat." Accused-appellant is burdened to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his defense of duress. He should not be shielded from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear
from, or because of, a threat of a third person." As Lord Dennan declared in Reg. Vs. Tyler, "No man from fear of
circumstances to himself has the right to make himself a party to committing mischief on mankind."

7. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; NOT ESTABLISHED AS

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AS TO WHEN AND HOW ACCUSED PLANNED AND PREPARED TO KILL THE
VICTIM. The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, like any other qualifying
circumstance, must be proved with certainty as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation cannot be based
solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he
actually commits it. The prosecution must adduce clear and convincing evidence as to when and how the felony was
planned and prepared before it was effected. The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding to
commit the felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit the crime. The law does not prescribe a time
frame that must elapse from the time the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it.
Each case must be resolved on the basis of the extant factual milieu. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove
evident premeditation.
8. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; PRESENT IN THE KILLING OF MINOR CHILDREN WHO BY REASON OF
THEIR TENDER YEARS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO PUT UP A DEFENSE. It is clear that the killing
of Jorge was qualified by treachery. When Jorge was killed by accused-appellant and Bermas, he was barely 14
years old. The Court has previously held that the killing of minor children who by reason of their tender years could
not be expected to put up a defense is attended by treachery. Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of superior
strength is absorbed by said circumstance. CaESTA

9. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, NIGHTTIME AND

DWELLING; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. Although accused-appellant and Bermas were armed
with bolos, there is no evidence that they took advantage of their numerical superiority and weapons to kill Jorge.
Hence, abuse of superior strength cannot be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge. Nighttime cannot likewise
be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because there is no evidence that accused-appellant and Bermas
purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its execution or accomplishment or to evade their
arrest. Neither is dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed in their house or taken
from their house and killed outside the said house.

10. ID.; KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL SERIOUS DETENTION; INCLUDES NOT ONLY THE
IMPRISONMENT OF A PERSON BUT ALSO THE DEPRIVATION OF HIS LIBERTY IN WHATEVER FORM
AND WHATEVER LENGTH OF TIME. "Secuestrare" means sequestration. To sequester is to separate for a
special purpose, remove or set apart, withdraw from circulation. It also means to lock-up or imprison. "Encerrare" is
a broader concept than secuestrare. Encerrare includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. As explained by Groizard, "encerrar" es
meter a una persona cosa en parte de donde no pueda salir"; detener o arrestar, poner en prision, privar de la
libertad a alguno." He continued that "la detencion, la prision, la privacin de la libertad de una persona, en
cualquier forma y por cualquier medio por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre
ejercicio de su actividad." On his commentary on the Spanish Penal Code, Cuello Calon says that the law "preve dos
modalidades de privacion de libertad, el encierro y la detencion. Encerrar significa recluir a una persona en un lugar
de donde no puede salir, detener a una persona equivale a impedirle o restringirle la libertad de movimiento. Para
que el sujeto pasivo no quiera permanecer en el sitio donde esta recluido, pues no es posible llamar encierro ni
detencion a la estancia de un a persona en lugar del que no quiere salir."

11. ID.; COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR
ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE; THE EXCERPT OF THE PRISON RECORD OF APPELLANT IS NOT THE
BEST EVIDENCE OF QUASI-RECIDIVISM UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT. Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code is alleged in both Informations.
Accused-appellant is alleged to have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal colony
by final judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance. The
prosecution is burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. In the
present case, to prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a certified copy of the
judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to prove that the said judgment had become final and
executory. . . . . In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of accused-
appellant showing that he was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio (Branch 6) with a penalty of from six years and one day as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one
day as maximum and that the sentence of accused-appellant commenced on November 19, 1992 and that the
minimum term of the penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997. The excerpt of the prison record of accused-
appellant is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court to prove the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become final and executory. Said
excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the
judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution. The
barefaced fact that accused-appellant was detained in the penal colony does not prove the fact that final judgment for
homicide has been rendered against him. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime,
accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.

[G.R. No. 116132-33. August 23, 1995.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AURELIO DELOVINO y UDAL, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; RULE; EXCEPTION. It is

doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with
the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the witness stand and
determine if they are telling the truth or not. (People vs. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164 [1992].) The recognized exceptions
to the foregoing doctrine are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have affected the
result of the case. (People vs. de la Cruz, 229 SCRA 754 [1994]; People vs. Co, G.R. No. 112046, 11 July 1995)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The testimony of the complainant, although
uncorroborated, is credible and convinces us with moral certainty of the accused's guilt. No improper or ulterior
motive was shown why she would falsely testify against the accused, who was her neighbor. The latter categorically
admitted on cross-examination that he knew no reason why the complainant would charge him of rape and publicly
make known that fact. It is settled that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness
for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the said witness was not so actuated
and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. (People vs. Simon, 209 SCRA 148 [1992], People vs. Corpuz,
222 SCRA 842 [1993].) The complainant's conduct in these cases further convinces us that she told the truth and
filed these cases solely to obtain justice. She reported the commission of the crime to the police authorities, allowed
an examination of her private parts, and thereafter suffered the ordeal of a public trial. It is difficult to believe that an
unmarried woman, like her, would tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and
thereafter permit herself to be the subject of a public trial unless she was motivated by an honest desire to seek
justice. No young decent Filipina would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that
is the truth; it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. (People vs. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354 [1991].)

3. ID.; ID.; DENIAL, CANNOT PREVAIL OVER CREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT. The
accused's denial of sexual intercourse does not deserve even a passing glance. Denial is an inherently weak defense
and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the complainant. (People vs. Macam, 238 SCRA 306
[1994]; People vs. Cobre, 239 SCRA 159 [1994].)

4. ID.; ID.; IMPLIED ADMISSION; RULE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The accused failed to
deny the testimony of Antonette that he had offered to pay P40,000.00 to amicably settle these cases. Such an offer
was an implied admission of guilt (People vs. Manuel, 198 SCRA 818 [1991]; People vs. Flores, 239 SCRA 83
[1994].) pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads in part
as follows: In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to
be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; VIRGINITY, NOT AN ELEMENT THEREOF. That the laceration was
three months old does not prove that the accused had no carnal knowledge of Antonette on 20 October and 4
November 1992. Antonette established with moral certainty that the accused had raped her on those dates. Any prior
sexual intercourse which could have resulted in the hymenal laceration is irrelevant in these cases, for virginity is
not an element of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

6. ID.; ID.; MEDICAL EXAMINATION; NOT INDISPENSABLE IN THE PROSECUTION THEREOF;

RATIONALE. A medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Otherwise, grave and
irreparable injustice would be inflicted upon hapless victims if the crime were committed in remote areas where no
doctor could conduct a medical examination. So too, if the victim would not submit to it because what immediately
preoccupied her mind after the traumatic experience was not necessarily the filing of a complaint but rather the fear
of what the assailant would further inflict upon her should she reveal his criminal act, or the embarrassment and
humiliation accompanying a public disclosure of the ignominy and dishonor she had suffered in the hands of her
tormentor. (See People vs. Saldivia, 203 SCRA 461 [1991].)

7. ID.; ID.; LEWD DESIGNS, NEED NOT BE PROVED; CASE AT BAR. This Court cannot sustain the
finding of the trial court that although the complainant was brought against her will to the Queensland Motel in the
first case and to Cavite in the second case, the prosecution failed to prove the element of lewd designs. Lewd
designs means unchaste design. This Court finds that in both cases the principal purpose of the accused was to rape
the complainant and that her abduction was only a means to commit the rape. Rape, under any clime and
civilization, will always be unchaste. (People vs. Corpuz, 222 SCRA 842 [1993].) Thus, the abduction of the
complainant was obviously with lewd designs.

8. ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY; CASE AT BAR. The accused should be held liable for the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape defined and penalized under Article 342 (forcible abduction) and Article 335
(rape) of the Revised Penal Code. Pursuant to Article 48 of the said Code, the penalty for the more serious crime,
which is rape, shall be imposed in its maximum period. Since the two rapes were committed with a deadly weapon,
the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 335, to be imposed in its
maximum period death. But since these cases were committed when the imposition of the death penalty was still
prohibited under the Constitution, (Section 19[1], Article III. The death penalty was reimposed in certain crimes by
R.A. No. 7659, which took effect on 31 December 1993.) only reclusion perpetua may be imposed.

[G.R. No. 86816. May 14, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUFINO SAGUN, JR. AND JIM SAGUN, accused,
RUFINO SAGUN, JR., accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Alberto S. Caragan for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR.

Prosecution witnesses, Camacho and Gabriel, were straightforward and categorical in their testimonies. No ill
motive has been imputed to them to testify falsely against Appellant. Nor were they shown to have had any grudge
or ill feeling against him. They were only at a distance of about two (2) meters from where the criminal assault was
committed and witnessed clearly what had transpired, specially since there were lights proceeding from the dance
hall (TSN, 13 June 1984, p. 17). They could even tell that at the time of the assault, the victim was standing with his
hands in his pockets. Neither one could have been mistaken as to the identity of the assailants as said witnesses had
individually known each of them for some time before the incident (TSN, 14 May 1986, p. 79; 10 October 1988, p.
60).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY EXHIBITION OF RELUCTANCE IN GETTING INVOLVED IN

THE PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES. The defense, however, makes capital of the fact that Pat. Simon
Montera, the investigator and the police officer on duty at the time of the incident, testified that on 30 January 1982,
the assailant could not be identified. If that were so, Appellant concludes, then the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, Camacho and Gabriel, cannot be given credence because if they had, in fact, witnessed the commission of
the crime, they could have informed the authorities concerned as well as the brother of the victim, Jesus, soon after
the incident (Rollo, pp. 85-86; Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 3-4). It is not unusual, however, for witnesses
to a crime to exhibit reluctance in getting involved in the prosecution of offenses. This is a matter of judicial notice
(People vs. Pacabes, G.R. No. 55417, 24 June 1988, 137 SCRA 158; People vs. Coronado, G.R. No. 68932, 28
October 1986, 145 SCRA 150). Besides, there is evidence to show that even before the execution of his sworn
statement on 23 February 1982, witness Gabriel had already been investigated by the same Pat. Simon Montera in
the witness' house at San Gabriel II, Pangasinan. On that occasion, Gabriel had already revealed the names of
Appellant and Jim Sagun as the culprits (TSN, 24 October 1988, pp. 123-124).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. As far as inconsistencies in the
individual testimonies of Gabriel and Camacho are concerned, they refer to non-crucial details and, consequently,
cannot detract from their overall credibility (People vs. Delawin, G.R. Nos. 73762-63, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA
257). Thus, although in his Affidavit (Exhibit "B") Gabriel stated that Jim Sagun and the victim fought with each
other, in open Court, he stated that there was no such fighting (TSN, 24 October 1988, pp. 107-108). This
inconsistency does not necessarily discredit Gabriel. "Generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself
but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements. Omissions and misunderstandings by
the writer are not infrequent particularly under circumstances of hurry or impatience. For this reason, the infirmity of
affidavits as a species of evidence is much a matter of judicial experience" (Regalado, Compendium on Evidence,
Vol. II, p. 559, citing People vs. Mariquina, et al., 46 OG 6053; People vs. Mendoza, et al. G.R No. L-33127, 15
July 1981). Also, an "affidavit . . . will not always disclose the whole facts, and will oftentimes and without design
incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences, narrated . . ." (People vs. Andaya,
G.R. No. 63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570 citing People vs. Tan, 89 Phil. 337, 1951).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT; ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT. In
the final analysis, the basic issue is one of credibility and it is well-settled that the findings of the Trial Court on this
point are entitled to great weight and respect and will generally not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that
said Court had overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the
case (People vs. Jardiniano, G.R. No. L-37191, 30 March 1981, 103 SCRA 530, and a host of other cases). The
present case does not fall under any of the exceptions.

5. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; UNAVAILING IN THE FACE OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. Marshalled

against the unwavering testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Appellant's defense of alibi cannot prosper and was
correctly rejected by the Trial Court. Not only is alibi the weakest of defenses; it is also unavailing in the face of
positive identification (People vs. Tan, Jr., G.R. No. 53834, 24 November 1986, 145 SCRA 614).

[G.R. No. 129556. November 11, 1998.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REY GADO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Antonio A. Navarro III for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT,

GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. With regard to the credibility of Melencio Manalang, Sr., as witness, we
find no reason to disturb the trial court's findings. The settled and time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy the respect of appellate courts for the reason that
trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify (People vs. Cabiles, G.R.
112035, January 16, 1998; People vs. Moran, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). In
the absence of any arbitrariness in the trial court's findings and evaluation of evidence which tends to show that it
overlooked certain material facts and circumstances, such findings and evaluation of evidence should be respected
on review (People vs. Dio, 226 SCRA 176 [1993]). The presiding judge of the trial court had the opportunity to
actually observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses on the witness stand while being asked direct-
examination questions by the prosecution, cross-examination questions by the defense, as well as clarificatory
questions by the trial judge himself. Between the trial judge and this Court, the former is in a far better position to
determine whether a witness is telling the truth or not. From the records before us we find no reason to disturb the
trial court's assessment and to discredit Melencio Manalang, Sr. as a witness. cdasia

2. ID.; EVIDENCE; HEARSAY RULE; DYING DECLARATION; REQUISITES. As a rule, a dying

declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying declaration may be admissible as
evidence, four requisites must concur, namely: that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a
consciousness of an impending death, that the declarant is competent as a witness; and that the declaration is offered
in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim (People vs. Israel, 231 SCRA
155 [1994]).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. From the established facts in the case at
bar, the trial court correctly considered the declaration of the victim a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible.
The declarant was conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only from the victim's insistence right
after he reached their house that he should immediately be brought to the hospital and that he was becoming weaker
by the moment, but also from the serious nature of his wounds (People vs. Sarabia, 127 SCRA 100 [1984] and the
fact that the said victim died shortly afterwards (People vs. Araja, 105 SCRA 133 [1981]).

4. ID.; ID.; PART OF THE RES GESTAE; REQUISITES. For the admission of evidence as part of the res
gestae, it is required that (a) the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, (b) the statements forming
part thereof were made before the declarant had the opportunity to contrive, and (c) the statements refer to the
occurrence in question and its attending circumstances (People vs. Siscar, 140 SCRA 316 [1985]).

5. ID.; ID.; WHERE ELEMENTS OF BOTH DYING DECLARATION AND STATEMENT AS PART OF
THE RES GESTAE ARE PRESENT, THE STATEMENT MAY BE ADMITTED AS BOTH. We have ruled
that while the statement of the victim may not qualify as a dying declaration because it was not made under the
consciousness of impending death (People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil. 601 [1926]), it may still be admissible as part of the
res gestae if it was made immediately after the incident (People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538 [1928]), or a few hours
thereafter (People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA 303 [1974]). Definitely, the victim's statement in the case at hand was
made immediately after the incident, before he could even have the opportunity to contrive or concoct a story. Of
relevance, too, is the fact that on two occasions, first at their house, and later while he was being brought to the
hospital, he identified one and the same person as his assailant. Where the elements of both a dying declaration and
a statement as part of the res gestae are present, as in the case at bar, the statement may be admitted as a dying
declaration and the same time as part of the res gestae (People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859 [1983]). cDSAEI
6. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; VICTIM WAS SUDDENLY
STABBED WITHOUT CHANCE OF PUTTING UP DEFENSE. It seems fairly established, that more, than one
person attacked the victim. While he was being stabbed by accused-appellant, some of the companions of accused-
appellant where holding the victim in a defenseless position. The manner in which the stabbing was done tended
directly and specially to ensure its execution, affording the victim no chance to put up any defense. This constitutes
alevosia. The killing, therefore, was qualified to murder. It is to be noted also that accused-appellant and his
companions were supposed to assist the victim home. However, instead of bringing him safely home, accused-
appellant and his companions ganged up on the victim, who had no inkling of any impending attack, having placed
himself in the safekeeping of persons who then turned vicious assailants.

7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE: CREDIBILITY; ALIBI; UNAVAILING WHERE ACCUSED WAS

POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED. The defense of alibi presents itself to be very weak vis-a-vis the evidence adduced
by the prosecution pointing to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, as correctly pointed out by
Solicitor General in the People's Brief, for alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he
has been elsewhere when the crime was committed but he must further demonstrate that it would have been
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. (People vs. Esquilona,
248 SCRA 139 [1995]).

8. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; MUST BE DULY PROVED; CASE AT BAR. The
trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. However, we do not see how the
award of actual damages in the same amount may be justified in the light of the evidence tending to show that only
the total amount of P23,217.65 was actually spent. It is elementary that actual and compensatory damages, unlike
moral and exemplary damages cannot be left to the sole discretion of the court. The award of actual and
compensatory damages in the case at bar must, therefore, be reduced to the amount duly proved at the trial which is
to P23,217.65.

[G.R. No. 116279. January 29, 1996.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO CRISTOBAL, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General, for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office, for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT,

GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. When the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was
reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. None of these exceptions exists in this case.

3. ID; ID.; ID.; WHEN A WOMAN SAYS THAT SHE HAS BEEN RAPED, SHE SAYS IN EFFECT ALL
THAT IS NECESSARY TO SHOW THAT SHE HAS BEEN RAPED. It is also settled that when a woman says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped, and if her testimony
meets the test of credibility the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. Additionally, no married woman in
her right mind, like Cherry Tamayo, would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation in order to perpetuate a
falsehood. Neither would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and her family. If Cherry Tamayo
then resolved to face the ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret, she did so
simply to obtain justice.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BOLSTERED BY ABSENCE OF ILL-MOTIVE TO FALSELY CHARGE ACCUSED.

The accused was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of the complainant. In fact, in his answer to the court's
questions, he categorically stated that there was no grudge between him and the complainant. Where there is no
evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against
the accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the said testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. To cast doubt on the
credibility of the complainant, the accused cites an inconsistency in the testimony of the complainant. He points out
that at first, the complainant said that her panties were removed by the accused while she was already lying down,
but later she said that it was before she was laid down on the ground that the accused stripped her of her panties. The
accused failed to elevate this inconsistency to the level of a major one sufficient to strip the complainant of
credibility. Being too trivial, such inconsistency does not rock the pedestal upon which the complainant's credibility
rests. In fact, it enhances her credibility, as it manifests spontaneity and lack of scheming.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIBI; NOT GIVEN CREDENCE WHERE THERE IS NO PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY
FOR ACCUSED TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME DURING ITS COMMISSION. The alibi of the
accused thus maintains its weak and impotent state. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must establish the physical
impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The accused's
testimony placing himself somewhere else was corroborated by the testimony of Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano. But
he failed to establish physical impossibility because the alibi places him within only three kilometers from where the
crime was committed, a manageable distance to travel in a few minutes.

7. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AWARDED TO PREGNANT RAPE VICTIM.

For sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and
wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by
way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good is warranted. We
hereby fix it at P25,000.00.

8. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES TO RAPE VICTIM INCREASED TO P40,000.00. Pursuant to the
current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court should be increased from P30,000.00 to
P40,000.00.