PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING (BOMBO RADYO PHILS.
, Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
INC.) vs. THE SECRETARY OF DOLE, THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR (DOLE REGION VII), and JUEZAN
[G.R. NO. 179652 : May 8, 2009] TINGA, J.
DOCTRINE: DOLE's prerogative hinges on the existence of
employer-employee relationship. If no EER exists, it is under
the NLRCs jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against People's
Broadcasting Service, Inc. (Bombo Radyo) for illegal
deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month
pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal
diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-
coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth before the DOLE
Regional Office, Cebu City.
During the preliminary investigation, the management informed
that complainant is a drama talent hired on a per drama "
participation basis" hence no employer-employee
relationship existed between them. They do not have control
over the talent if they decide to venture into another contract
with other broadcasting industries.
DOLE Regional Director ruled that Juezan is an employee of
Bombo Radyo, and that the former is entitled to his money
claims amounting to P203,726.30. On appeal to the DOLE
Secretary, Bombo Radyo denied once more the existence of
employer-employee relationship. Appeal dismissed.
On appeal to the CA, Bombo Radyo maintained that there is
no employer-employee relationship had ever existed because
it was the drama directors and producers who paid, supervised
and disciplined Juezan. It also added that the case was
beyond the jurisdiction of the DOLE and should have been
considered by the labor arbiter because the claim
exceeded P5,000.00.
CA: dismissed. DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction.
BOMBO RADYO:
1. NLRC, and not the DOLE Secretary, has jurisdiction over
Juezan's claim, in view of Articles 217 and 128 of the Labor
Code.
2. NO employer-employee relationship had ever existed
JUEZAN:
1. Under RA 7730, the jurisdiction of the SOLE or his duly
authorized representative is not anymore confined to the
restrictions on the amount of the claims stated in Article 129
and 217 of the Labor Code.
2. Employer-employee relationship exists
ISSUES:
1. WON the Secretary of Labor have the power (or jurisdiction)
to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship (EER)?
2. WON the Secretary of Labor still has the power (or
jurisdiction) to hear the case if NO EER exists?
RULING:
Extent of the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE
Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
7730:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of
this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists, the
representatives shall have the power to issue compliance
orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of
this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings
of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial
safety engineers made in the course of inspection.
The clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists" signifies that the employer-employee
relationship must have existed even before the emergence of
the controversy.
Necessarily, the DOLE's power does not apply in two
instances, namely:
(a) where the employer-employee relationship has ceased;
and
(b) where no such relationship has ever existed.
The first situation is categorically covered by Sec. 3, Rule 11 of
the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases issued
by the DOLE Secretary.
Accordingly, if on the face of the complaint, it can be
ascertained that employer-employee relationship no
longer exists, the case, whether accompanied by an
allegation of illegal dismissal, shall immediately be
endorsed by the Regional Director to the appropriate
branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
Clearly the law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the
claim when the EER has terminated or such relationship has
not arisen at all. The reason is obvious. In the second situation
especially, the existence of an EER is a matter which is not
easily determinable from an ordinary inspection, necessarily
so, because the elements of such a relationship are not
verifiable from a mere ocular examination. The intricacies and
implications of an EER demand that the level of scrutiny should
be far above the cursory and the mechanical. While
documents, particularly documents found in the employer's
office are the primary source materials, what may prove
decisive are factors related to the history of the employer's
business operations, its current state as well as accepted
contemporary practices in the industry. More often than not,
the question of EER becomes a battle of evidence, the
determination of which should be comprehensive and intensive
and therefore best left to the specialized quasi-judicial body
that is the NLRC.
It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial
and enforcement power somehow has to make a determination
of the existence of an EER. Such prerogatival determination,
however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and
enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely
preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLE's primary
function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The
determination of the existence of EER is still primarily lodged
with the NLRC. Thus, before the DOLE may exercise its
powers under Article 128, two important questions must be
resolved:
(1) Does the employer-employee relationship still exist, or
alternatively, was there ever an employer-employee
relationship to speak of; and
(2) Are there violations of the Labor Code or any labor law?
The actual existence of an employer-employee relationship
affects the complexion of the putative findings that the
Secretary of Labor may determine, since employees are
entitled to a different set of rights under the Labor Code from
the employer as opposed to non-employees. If there is no EER
in the first place, the duty of the employer to adhere to those
labor standards with respect to the non-employees is
questionable.
A mere assertion of absence of EER does not deprive the
DOLE of jurisdiction over the claim under Article 128 of the
Labor Code. At least a prima facie showing of such absence of
relationship, as in this case, is needed to preclude the DOLE
from the exercise of its power. The Secretary of Labor would
not have been precluded from exercising the powers under
Article 128 (b) over Bombo Radyo if another person with
better-grounded claim of employment than that which Juezan
had. Juezan, especially if he were an employee, could have
very well enjoined other employees to complain with the
DOLE, and, at the same time, Bombo Radyo could ill-afford to
disclaim an employment relationship with all of the people
under its aegis.
Without a doubt, Bombo Radyo, since the inception of this
case had been consistent in maintaining that Juezan is not its
employee. Certainly, after the investigation and based on the
evidence offered, puts in genuine doubt the existence of
employer-employee relationship. From that point on, the
prudent recourse on the part of the DOLE should have been to
refer Bombo Radyo to the NLRC for the proper dispensation of
his claims. Furthermore, the evidence presented by Juezan
were self-serving and negates the existence of an EER. The
requirement of substantial evidence as the quantum of proof
was not met by Juezan.
Lastly, Bombo Radyos appeal should not have been
dismissed based on the lack of security bond. The Deed of
Assignment in tandem with the Letter Agreement and Cash
Voucher is as good as cash and were done in good faith. It
manifested petitioner's willingness to pay the judgment
amount.
Petition GRANTED. NO Employer-Employee Relations exists.
RESOLUTION
MARCH 6, 2012
SAME FACTS. But this was considered as a second motion for
reconsideration before the SC.
ISSUE:
May the DOLE make a determination of whether or not an
employer-employee relationship exists? YES.
RULING:
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the
DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE
would only make a preliminary finding, that the power was
primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE
would first seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of
an employer-employee relationship, or that should the
existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed,
the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must
have the power to determine whether or not an employer-
employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether
or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art.
128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, has a ready set of guidelines to follow,
the same guide the courts themselves use. The elements to
determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1)
the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the
employers power to control the employees conduct. The use of
this test is not solely limited to the NLRC. The DOLE
Secretary, or his or her representatives, can utilize the same
test, even in the course of inspection, making use of the same
evidence that would have been presented before the NLRC.
If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-
employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter, to the
exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction
only if the employer-employee relationship has already been
terminated, or it appears, upon review, that no employer-
employee relationship existed in the first place.
The Court, in limiting the power of the DOLE, gave the
rationale that such limitation would eliminate the prospect of
competing conclusions between the DOLE and the NLRC. The
prospect of competing conclusions could just as well have
been eliminated by according respect to the DOLE findings, to
the exclusion of the NLRC.
It must also be remembered that the power of the DOLE to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship
need not necessarily result in an affirmative finding. The DOLE
may well make the determination that no employer-employee
relationship exists, thus divesting itself of jurisdiction over the
case. It must not be precluded from being able to reach its own
conclusions, not by the parties, and certainly not by this Court.
Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730,
the DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to
the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the
exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to
judicial review, not review by the NLRC.
To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to
give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code
or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE
that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the
DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If
the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee
relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a
complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a
claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the
Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which
provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment,
if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is
filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-
employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the
DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be
questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
In the present case, the finding of the DOLE Regional Director
that there was an employer-employee relationship has been
subjected to review by this Court, with the finding being that
there was no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and private respondent, based on the evidence
presented. Private respondent presented self-serving
allegations as well as self-defeating evidence. The findings of
the Regional Director were not based on substantial evidence,
and private respondent failed to prove the existence of an
 employer-employee relationship. The DOLE had no jurisdiction
over the case, as there was no employer-employee
relationship present. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint
against petitioner is proper.
Above ruling AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that in the
exercise of the DOLEs visitorial and enforcement power, the
Labor Secretary or the latters authorized representative shall
have the power to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, to the exclusion of the NLRC.
2. GEORGE A. ARRIOLA vs. PILIPINO STAR NGAYON, INC.
and/or MIGUEL G. BELMONTE
G.R. No. 175689. August 13, 2014.*
Money claims, such as backwages, consequent to an illegal
dismissal case: covered by Article 1146 of the Civil Code
DOCTRINES:
A columnist whose column is removed by the newspaper from
publication is not ipso facto terminated from work by the
newspaper company.
Money claims arising from employer-employee relationship:
covered by Article 291 of the Labor Code.
Article 491 of the Labor Code does not cover money claims
consequent to an illegal dismissal such as backwages. It also
does not cover claims for damages due to illegal dismissal.
These claims are governed by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (CCP).
FACTS:
George Arriola was a column writer for the newspaper Pilipino
Star Ngayon, Inc. since 1986. His column thereat was Tinig ng
Pamilyang OFWs.
On November 15, 2002, he filed a case for illegal dismissal
against Pilipino Star as he averred that on November 15, 1999,
he was arbitrarily dismissed when his column was removed
from publication by Pilipino Star.
In its defense, Pilipino Star argued that they never removed
Arriola; that it was Arriola who abandoned his work because he
went on to write for a rival newpaper, Imbestigador.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Pilipino Star. The labor
arbiter held that Arriolas case was filed out of time as it was
filed three years and one day from the date he was allegedly
illegally dismissed. The labor arbiter cited Art. 291 of the Labor
Code:
Art. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. All money claims arising from
employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of
this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time
the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever
barred.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arriolas suit involves a money claim
contemplated by Art. 291 of the Labor Code.
HELD:
No. Art. 291 of the Labor Code only covers the following
claims:
1. overtime pay,
2. holiday pay,
3. service incentive leave pay,
4. bonuses,
5. salary differentials,
6. illegal deductions by an employer, and
7. money claims arising from seafarer contracts.
It does not cover money claims consequent to an illegal
dismissal such as backwages. It also does not cover claims for
damages due to illegal dismissal. These claims are governed
by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides:
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four
years:
(1) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff... xxx
Further, in an illegal dismissal case, the claim for backwages,
the money claim, is just but one of the reliefs that an employee
prays before the arbiter.
As such, Arriolas claim for backwages is still filed within the
prescriptive period of four years.
However, Arriolas case must still be dismissed because it was
established that he in fact abandoned his work. In the first
place, it is a newspapers prerogative whether or not to remove
a particular column from publication. The removal of a certain
column does not ipso facto mean the removal of the columnist.
That being, Arriola should have reported to work even if his
column was removed.
AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC. v. ANTONIO
BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 156367 | May 16 2005
FACTS:
Antonio Bautista was employed by Auto Bus Transport
Systems, Inc. in May 1995. He was assigned to the Isabela-
Manila route and he was paid by commission (7% of gross
income per travel for twice a month).
In January 2000, while he was driving his bus he bumped
another bus owned by Auto Bus. He claimed that he bumped
the he accidentally bumped the bus as he was so tired and that
he has not slept for more than 24 hours because Auto Bus
required him to return to Isabela immediately after arriving at
Manila. Damages were computed and 30% or P75,551.50 of it
was being charged to Bautista. Bautista refused payment.
Auto Bus terminated Bautista after due hearing as part of Auto
Bus management prerogative. Bautista sued Auto Bus for
Illegal Dismissal. The Labor Arbiter Monroe Tabingan
dismissed Bautistas petition but ruled that Bautista is entitled
to P78,1117.87 13th month pay payments and P13,788.05 for
his unpaid service incentive leave pay.
The case was appealed before the National Labor Relations
Commission. NLRC modified the LAs ruling. It deleted the
award for 13th Month pay. The court of Appeals affirmed the
NLRC.
Auto Bus averred that Bautista is a commissioned employee
and if that is not reason enough that Bautista is also a field
personnel hence he is not entitled to a service incentive leave.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave.
If he is, Whether or not the three (3)-year prescriptive period
provided under Article 291 of the Labor Code, as amended, is
applicable to respondent's claim of service incentive leave pay.
HELD:
Yes, Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. The
Supreme Court emphasized that it does not mean that just
because an employee is paid on commission basis he is
already barred to receive service incentive leave pay.
said period shall be considered as one year. It is also
commutable to its money equivalent if not used or exhausted
at the end of the year. In other words, an employee who has
served for one year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave
days or he may collect its monetary value.

The question actually boils down to whether or not Bautista is a

field employee.
JOSE B. SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES'
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, 'field personnel shall COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT
refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Power
duties away from the principal place of business or branch Corporation), respondents.
office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the
No. L-65680. May 11, 1988
field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.

As a general rule, field personnel are those whose

performance of their job/service is not supervised by the
employer or his representative, the workplace being away from
the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot
be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid
specific amount for rendering specific service or performing
specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific
times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field
personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away
from the principal office of the employee.
Certainly, Bautista is not a field employee. He has a specific
route to traverse as a bus driver and that is a specific place
that he needs to be at work. There are inspectors hired by Auto
Bus to constantly check him. There are inspectors in bus stops
who inspects the passengers, the punched tickets, and the
driver. Therefore he is definitely supervised though he is away
from the Auto Bus main office.
On the other hand, the 3 year prescriptive period ran but
Bautista was able to file his suit in time before the prescriptive
period expired. It was only upon his filing of a complaint for
illegal dismissal, one month from the time of his dismissal, that
Bautista demanded from his former employer commutation of
his accumulated leave credits. His cause of action to claim the
payment of his accumulated service incentive leave thus
accrued from the time when his employer dismissed him and
failed to pay his accumulated leave credits.
Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for
service incentive leave pay only commenced from the time the
employer failed to compensate his accumulated service
incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. Since Bautista
had filed his money claim after only one month from the time of
his dismissal, necessarily, his money claim was filed within the
prescriptive period provided for by Article 291 of the Labor
Code.
Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every
employee who has served within 12 months, whether
continuous or broken reckoned from the date the employee
started working, including authorized absences and paid
regular holidays unless the working days in the establishment
as a matter of practice or policy, or that provided in the
employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which case
Facts:
1. Late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the
National Power Corporation in Quezon City as
accounting clerk in May 1974. Then, she became a
manager of the budget division.
2. On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to
cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma.
She was 40 years old.
3. Believing that the deceaseds fatal illness having been
contracted by her during employment was
service-connected, petitioner herein filed a claim
for death benefits under Presidential Decree No.
626, as amended.
4. GSIS denied the claim.
It was pointed out that parotid
carcinoma is a Malignant tumor of
the parotid gland (salivary gland)'
and that its development was not
caused by employment and
employment conditions.
5. Appellant elevated the claim to ECC.
6. ECC affirmed. It found that the deceaseds death
caused by parotid carcinoma is not compensable
because she did not contract nor suffer from the same
by reason of her work but by reason of embryonic
rests and epithelial growth.
7. Hence, this petition.
8. Petitioners allegations: attacks the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the law on
employees compensation which superseded the
Labor Code and the provisions of the Workmens
Compensation Act. He alleges that the said law
infringes upon the guarantees of promotion of social
justice, substantive due process, and equal protection
of laws, and also permits unjust discrimination and
amounts to class legislation in its enforcement. He
prays for the application of the Old Workmens
Compensation Act which provided for a
presumption of compensability whenever an
ailment supervened during the course of the
employment.
Issue:
 1. WON PD 626 is constitutional
2. WON parotid carcinoma is a compensable illness
under PD 626
Held.
1. Yes
The Court has recognized the validity of the present law
and has granted and rejected claims according to its
provisions. We find in it no infringement of the workers
constitutional rights. It is now settled jurisprudence that the
new law discarded the concepts of presumption of
compensability and aggravation to restore what the law
believes is a sensible equilibrium between the employers
obligation to pay workmens compensation and the
employees rights to receive reparation for
work-connected death or disability.
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmens
compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the
President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the
former workmens compensation program with its
presumptions, controversies, adversarial procedures, and
levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be
decided by the political departments.
2. No.
Under the present law, a compensable illness means any
illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by
the Employees Compensation Commission, or any illness
caused by employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions
Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or
cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational disease
considering the deceaseds employment as accounting clerk
and later as manager of the budget division. The petitioner
must, therefore, prove that his wifes ailment was caused by
her employment or that her working conditions increased the
risk of her contracting the fatal illness.
Petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased
visited regional and field operations and was, naturally,
exposed to the elements. According to the petitioner, the
deceaseds field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane
travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in her
ears. This, he says, caused her differentiated carcinoma
which, according to the certificate of Dr. Ariston Bautista,
apparently started on external auditory canal.
We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other
kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma is
still not known.
2) MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.
G.R. No. 90204. May 11, 1990.
TOPIC: Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefits
FACTS:
Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher for 11 years
at Buracan Elementary School in Masbate.
While performing her duties teaching, Mrs. Belarmino
who was 8-month pregnant accidentally slipped and fell
on the floor. She complained of abdominal pain and
stomach cramps which continued for several days.
Her abdominal pains persisted even after her delivery
(delivered at home). It was found that she was suffering
from septicemia post-partum (due to infected vaginal
lacerations resulting from delivery) which caused her
death.
Petitioner husband claimed for death benefits.
GSIS denied claim & held that septicemia post partum
is not an occupational disease, and neither was there
any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted by
reason of her employment; & the accident in the
classroom could not have caused the death, rather the
infection in delivery.
Employees Compensation Commission affirmed
GSIS
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to the claim of death
benefits. -YES
HELD:
ECC & GSIS peremptory denial of the petitioners claim
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation enumerates the grounds for compensability of
injury resulting in disability or death of an employee, as follows:
SECTION 1. Grounds
(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all of the following
conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the
place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his
official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order
for the employer.
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex A of these
Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after
January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death
shall be compensable under these Rules.
The illness (septicemia post partum) which resulted in the
death of Oania Belarmino, is not listed as an occupational
disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher.
However, her death from that ailment is compensable
because an employment accident and the conditions of
her employment contributed to its development. The
condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip
and fall and suffer injury as a result. Her fall on the classroom
floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the
development of post partum septicemia which resulted in
death. Her fall, therefore, was the proximate or responsible
cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading
to her demise.
Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury that arose in the
course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all
the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent
abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her
septicemia post partum, and death, are compensable.
Furthermore, poverty compelled the deceased to scrimp by
delivering her baby at home instead of in a hospital.
Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane
society by their denial of the petitioners claim for benefits
arising from the death of his wife, the respondents ignored this
imperative of Government, and thereby committed a grave
abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The
respondents ECC & GSIS are ordered to pay death benefits.
HINOGUIN v. ECC and GSIS (Armed Forces of the PH)
G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989
Doctrine: - A soldier should be presumed to be to be on official
duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put
aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an
approved vacation leave. Even vacation leave may, it should
be remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.
- When death occurred in the course of employment, it
is compensable.
Facts:
(1) Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974,
when he was called to military training by the
Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine
Army as a private first class.
(2) 1 August 1985: Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of
his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft.
Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain
Frankie Z. Besas to go on overnight pass to Aritao,
Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter
thereat." Captain Besas orally granted them
permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued
firearms with them, considering that Aritao was
regarded as "a critical place, i.e. it had peace and
order problems due to the presence of elements of
the New People's Army.
(3) Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog arrived in
Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the
same day. They proceeded to Dft. Alibuyos parents
where they had lunch. They had some gin and beer.
At 7 PM, they boarded a tricycle to return to their
Company Headquarters. Upon reaching the poblacion
of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked in front of
the tricycle, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not
noticing that the rifle's safety lever was on semi
automatic (and not on "safety"). He accidentally
touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process
and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in
the left lower abdomen.
(4) His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in
Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Capt. Besas, hurried to
the hospital upon being notified of the shooting and
there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter
confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been
accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog.
(5) Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical
Center in Quezon City and there he died on 7 August
1985. Death certificate lists septic shock as
immediate cause of death and generalized
septicemia of peritonitis as antecedent cause,
following his sustaining a gunshot wound.
(6) An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry
Battalion concluded that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin
was "purely accidental in nature."
(7) March 1986: petition Ciriaco Hinoguin filed his claim
for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as
amended), claiming that the death of his son was
work-connected and therefore compensable. This
was denied by the GSIS on the ground that
petitioner's son was not at his work place nor
 performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army
at the time of his death. MR: denied. This denial was
confirmed by the Workmens Compensation
Commission (WCC).
Issue: Whether the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is
compensable under the applicable statute and regulations ->
YES.
Held:
Because Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable
law is to be found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code.
Under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and
Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended (Implementing)
Rules on Employees' Compensation, the term "employee"
includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines."
Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing)
Rules provides in part as follows:
SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. (a) The
beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be
entitled to an income benefit if all of the following
conditions are satisfied:
(1) The employee had been duly reported to the
System;
(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and
(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as
well as the injury or sickness which caused his death.
His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such
death occurred before the employee is duly reported
for coverage of the System.
Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a
compensable "injury" quite simply as "any harmful change in
the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing)
Rules have, however, elaborated through Rule III, Section 1 (a)
which reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following grounds:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place
work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his
official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee
must have been executing an order for the employer.
The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1 cannot
always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as
if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line
in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a
soldier must go where his company is stationed.
A place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at
cannot be very different from a place where they are required
to go by their commanding officer. In this case, they were not
on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized
to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to
defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them
while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and
seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter.
As to whether he was performing official functions at the time
of the gunshot wound, it had already been pointed out that his
death occurred in line of duty. A soldier on active duty status
is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to
military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject
to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7
days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave
status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not).
A soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for
instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the
State or the Government. S soldier must also assume the risk
of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is
reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his
employment as a soldier.
Therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from
his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft.
Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in
the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence
compensable.
GSIS v CA & Alegre
Doctrine: Employees Compensation Commission; Guidelines
of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits: (a) that
the employee must be at the place where his work requires
him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing
his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained
elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
for the employer
Facts:
Private respondent, Felonilla Alegre, who was
married to SP02 Florencio Alegre, claims that her husband
was killed in relation to his duty when he was assigned in PNP
station in Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
Said deceased was driving his tricycle and ferrying
passenger with in the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex
when he met SP04 Alejandro Tenorio Jr whom he had an
altercation with by reason the tour of duty the former was
engaged with that led to verbal tussle between the two police
officers which transpire a fatal shooting that resulted to the
death of the deceased.
Private respondent has now filed a claim for the death
benefits she was entitled pursuant to PD 626 with petitioner,
GSIS. GSIS denied such claim and was further affirmed by the
ECC when a subsequent appeal was taken by private
respondent.
 CA reversed the decision of appellate courts stating
that SP02 Alegres death was within and has relation to work
therefore compensable.
A petition for review for certiorari was filed by the
GSIS and was given due course. Petitioner contends that the
guidelines are laid and the following conditions should be
satisfied and in order for ones injury resulting to death or
disability to be compensable.
1. The employee must have been injured at the place
where his work requires him to be;
2. The employee must have been performing his
official functions;
3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee
must have been executing an order for the employer. Which
the deceased has not satisfied therefore no death benefits may
be given to private respondent.
Issue: WON SP02 Alegre was engaged in performance of duty
Held:
The court ruled in the negative. It was explained by
the court that the 24 duty doctrine is not applicable in the case
at bar even if such doctrine applies to soldiers should as well
apply to policemen by reason that the nature of their function
are subjected to be summoned at any time and may be asked
by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in
maintaining the peace and security of the community therefore
private respondent should be denied the claims by reason that
the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met
his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically
private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no
particular directive or permission of his superior officer which
was the complete opposite in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura.
Petition was hereby granted.
09 Alano v ECC
FACTS
1. De Vera is the principal of Salinap Community
School; works fro 7:30am-5:30pm.
2. On Nov 29, 1976, on her way to work, at the usual
place she waits for a ride to school, around 7am, she
was ran over by a speeding bus, and instantaneously
died. She was survived by her children.
3. Her brother, Alano, in behalf of De Veras children,
filed a claim for income benefit with GSIS. GSIS
denied the claim because not an employment
accident.
4. ECC affirmed GSIS because: not during time of work,
not at workplace, not in performance of
duty/employment/work.
5. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE
Whether compensable death under employment accident.
HELD
WHEREFORE, the decision of the E
mployees' Compensation Commission app
ealed from is hereby SET ASIDEand the Go
vernment Service Insurance System is orde
red to pay the heirs of the deceased the su
m of TwelveThousand Pesos (P12,000.00) a
s death benefit and the sum of One Thousa
nd Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as
attorney's fees.
1. De Veras death is Compensable under
employment accident.
a. Similar case of Torbela v ECC, the court ruled
that the injuries causing his death, even if due to
vehicular accident at 5:45am, he was on his way
to work, and carrying work papers. Thus
the claim is compensablebecause an employee i
s accidentally injured at a point reasonably proxi
mateto the place at work, while he is going to and
from his work, such injury is deemed to have aris
en out of and in the course of his employment.
b. De Vera is in a place necessary for her to get to
work, not for private or personal reasons.
2. GSIS being the ultimate implementing arm of ECC
is not required to be impleaded to be required to
submit a memorandum.
Salvador Lazo v. ECC & GSIS
G.R No. 78617 June 18, 1990
Ponente: Padilla., J.
Digest Author: Puno, Ricardo Francisco D.
Topic : Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefits
Doctrine : Article 4 of the Labor Code: All doubts in the
implementation and interpretations of the provisions of the
Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of labor.
Facts
1. Lazo worked as a security guard for Central Bank on
a shift from 2pm-10pm.
2. One day as his shift ended, his reliever failed to come
which resulted in him working overtime till 5am which
was the time he asked his superior if he can leave
early so he can take home to Rizal his sack of rice.
3. About an hour later and while on the way home, the
jeep Lazo was riding in, met an accident and caused
him injuries.
4. As a result of this unfortunate even, he claimed for
disability benefits under P.D 626 which amended the
Labor Code with the GSIS which was denied. GSIS
alleges that Lazo was not arising out of or in the
course of employment. ECC affirmed the GSIS
decision.
5. Hence, this appeal.
Issue : W/N Lazos claim should be granted
Held: Yes
Analysis
1. Article 4 of the Labor Code: All doubts in the
implementation and interpretations of the provisions
of the Labor Code including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
2. In Iloilo Dock % Engineering v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, employment
includes.. reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work to be done. If the employee be injured
while passing the injury is one arising out of
and in the course of employment as much as though
it happened while the employee was engaged in his
work at the place of its performance.
3. Applying the logic in Vano v. ECC & GSIS where the
court awarded compensation to an employee who
met an accident while going to the place of his work
one day before official working day, there is no reason
to deny compensation for injury that happened an
hour after he had left his place of work.
NFD International Manning vs. Illescas
Sept. 29, 2010
Facts:
Esmeraldo C. Illescas entered into a Contract of Employment
with NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., acting for and in
behalf of its foreign principal, co-petitioner Barber Ship
Management, Ltd. Under the contract, respondent was
employed as Third Officer of M/V Shinrei for a period of nine
months, with a basic monthly salary of US$854.00. The
employment contract complied with the POEA Standard
Contract for Seafarers, and the standard terms and conditions
governing the employment of Filipino seafarers on board
ocean-going vessels.
When respondent had been on board the vessel for seven
months, Captain Jaspal Singh and Chief Officer Maydeo Rajev
ordered respondent to carry 25 fire hydrant caps from the deck
to the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the caps.
The next day, while carrying a heavy basketful of fire hydrant
caps, respondent felt a sudden snap on his back, with pain that
radiated down to the left side of his hips. He immediately
informed the ship captain about his condition, and he was
advised to take pain relievers. As the pain was initially
tolerable, he continued with his work. After a few days, the pain
became severe, and respondent had difficulty walking.
When the vessel was in Japan, Respondent was diagnosed to
be suffering from lumbago and sprain. The doctor gave
respondent medication and advised him to wear a corset,
avoid lifting heavy objects and get further examination and
treatment if the symptoms persisted. Despite the lighter work
assigned to respondent, he continued to experience
excruciating pain. The doctor declared that respondent was
unfit to work, and recommended that respondent return home
for further management.
Respondent was repatriated to the Philippines. Respondent
underwent a laminectomy with discectomy. Thereafter, he
underwent physical rehabilitation. Nevertheless, medical
examinations showed that there was still restriction in
respondents truncal mobility and in the lifting power of his
trunk. Dr. Almeda declared that respondent was unfit to work at
sea in any capacity as a seaman.
Petitioners received a letter from respondents counsel,
demanding the payment of disability benefit. The claim was
referred to Pandiman Philippines, Inc., the local correspondent
of the P&I Club with which petitioner Barber Ship Management
Ltd. was affiliated. In the meantime, respondent filed a
Complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
During the preliminary conferences in this case, the parties
explored the possibility of settlement. In a letter Pandiman
Philippines, Inc, in behalf of petitioners, offered to pay
respondent disability benefit in the amount of US$16,795.00,
corresponding to Grade 8 disability under the POEA Standard
Contract for Seafarers. Respondent, through counsel, refused
the offer on the ground that the injury sustained by him was
caused by an accident, which was compensable in the amount
of US$90,000.00 under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA)1
Since the parties failed to arrive at an agreement, the NLRC
directed them to file their Position Papers. Respondent
submitted that Section 20 (B.6) of the POEA Standard Contract
for Seafarers provides that In case of permanent total or
partial disability of a seafarer during the term of employment
caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be
compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits
enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of his
benefits arising from the illness or disease shall be governed
by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the
time the illness or disease was contracted. However,
respondent stated that he is a member of the Associated
Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP), which has a CBA with petitioners. Under the CBA,
he is entitled to a higher disability benefit in the amount of
US$90,000.00, since his injury resulted from an accident while
carrying a basketful of heavy fire hydrant caps on board the
vessel.
Petitioners countered that it is the POEA Standard Contract for
Seafarers, and not the CBA, that governs this case. They
stated that Blacks Law Dictionary defined accident as an
unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen or unlooked for
event. They argued that respondent's disability was not the
result of an accident, as respondent was merely performing his
normal duty of transporting fire hydrant caps from the deck to
the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the caps.
During the performance thereof, no unusual, unforeseen and
unexpected event transpired as proved by the absence of any
accident report.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the disability suffered by respondent
was caused by an accident (NO)
1
Art. 13: If a seafarer/officer, due to no fault of his own,
suffers permanent disability as a result of an accident
while serving on board or while traveling to or from the
vessel on Company's business or due to marine peril,
and as a result, his ability to work is permanently
reduced, totally or partially, the Company shall pay him a
disability compensation which, including the amounts
stipulated by the POEA's Rules and Regulations Part II,
Section C, shall be maximum of US$70,000 for ratings
and US$90,000 for officers.
A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any
injury, and who is assessed as less than 50%
permanently disabled, but permanently unfit for
further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be
entitled to a 100% compensation.
2.) Whether or not the disability is compensable under the
CBA (YES)
3.) Whether or not respondent is entitled to attorneys fees.
(YES)
Held:
Issue 1: (NO)
The Philippine Law Dictionary defines the word accident as
that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention
and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.
Accident, in its commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary
sense, has been defined as:
A fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event
happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly
or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to
whom it happens.
The word may be employed as denoting a calamity, casualty,
catastrophe, disaster, an undesirable or unfortunate
happening; any unexpected personal injury resulting from
any unlooked for mishap or occurrence; any unpleasant or
unfortunate occurrence, that causes injury, loss, suffering or
death; some untoward occurrence aside from the usual course
of events.
The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondent was
not an accident, but an injury sustained by respondent from
carrying the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which injury
resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the
result of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap,
occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted
from the performance of a duty. Although respondent may not
have expected the injury, yet, it is common knowledge that
carrying heavy objects can cause back injury, as what
happened in this case. Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as
unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous with
the term accident as defined above.
Issue 2: (YES)
Although the disability of respondent was not caused by an
accident, his disability is still compensable under Article 13 of
the CBA under the following provision:
A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and
who is assessed as less than 50% permanently disabled, but
permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity,
shall also be entitled to a 100% compensation.
The Court notes that the CBA states that the degree of
disability, which the company is liable to pay, shall be
determined by a doctor appointed by the company. In this
case, the POEA schedule is the basis of the assessment
whether a seafarers permanent disability is 50 percent or
more, or less than 50 percent.The Alegre Medical Clinic,
petitioners accredited clinic, found that respondent had a
Grade 8 disability (33.59%), described as moderate rigidity or
two-thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk. Dr.
Almeda, respondents independent doctor, on the other hand,
found respondent to be suffering from Grade 11 disability
(14.93%), described as slight rigidity or one-third (1/3) loss of
motion or lifting power of the trunk.
In HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar,the Court held that a claimant
may dispute the company-designated physicians report by
seasonably consulting another doctor. In such a case, the
medical report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the
labor tribunal and the court based on its inherent merit.In this
case, petitioners never questioned the weight given by the
Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals to the findings of
respondents independent doctor in regard to the disability of
respondent.
Dr. Almeda, respondents independent doctor, and petitioners
accredited medical clinic, both assessed respondents disability
in accordance with the POEA schedule as less than 50%
permanently disabled. Moreover, Dr. Almeda, who is a
specialist in occupational medicine and orthopedics, found that
respondent was unfit to work in any capacity as a seaman.
The Court finds merit in the reasons stated by Dr. Almeda in
his Medical Report for declaring respondent unfit to work in any
capacity as a seaman. (i.e.,Surgery can never stop the
pathological process nor restore the back to its previous state;
Even a successful disc removal, therefore, does not guarantee
a permanent cure as fibrosis can produce a dense constricting
scar tissue, which is presumed to be a prime cause of
recurrent symptoms.) Respondent is, therefore, entitled to
disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00 under the
CBA.
Issue 3: YES
This case involves the propriety of the award of disability
compensation under the CBA to respondent, who worked as a
seaman in the foreign vessel of petitioner Barber Ship
Management Ltd. The award of attorneys fees is justified under
Article 2208 (2) of the Civil Code. Even if petitioners did not
withhold payment of a smaller disability benefit, respondent
was compelled to litigate to be entitled to a higher disability
benefit.
12) Gloria Meez v. ECC and GSIS (Dept of Education &
Culture) (CARO)
Health, Safety, and Social Welfare Benefits
Facts:
- Meez was employed at DEC as a school teacher, but she
retired under the disability retirement plan at age 54, after
32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis (ailments).
- Before she retired, she was assigned at Raja Soliman
High School in Tondo-Manila, near a dirty creek.
- After she retired, she filed a claim for disability benefits
under PD 626, with GSIS
- She claims that she contracted pneumonitis and/or
bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis
after wetting and chilling during the course of employment
which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-
connected.
- Other circumstances aggravating her illness:
o She works the afternoon and night shifts, thus
varying climatic temperature at noon and night time
o Her place of work (RSHS) is surrounded by the
Divisoria market, Sta. Helena Bridge and Creek,
squatter houses, gasoline stations, etc. (in short very
polluted surroundings)
o She teaches social studies and handles about 250
students/day and is thus subjected to infections from
students with flu, colds, other respiratory infections.
- denied by GSIS; her ailments are not occupational
diseasesthey were found to be in the lease causally
related to her duties and conditions of work. GSIS also
 found that she didnt submit evidence showing that the
ailments were directly related to her job as school teacher
- Meez filed MR (twice) both denied because causal
relationship between the ailments and her occupation was
not established.
- Meez elevated to ECC affirmed GSIS; (1) her
employment had nothing to do with the development of
her disabling illnesses; (2) the ailments are not listed as
occupational diseases for the employment she was
engaged in as to merit compensation under PD 626.
Hence this petition
Issue: W/N Meez is entitled to disability benefits? (W/N her
ailments are work-related?)
Held: YES. Art. 167(1) of LC and Rule III, 1(b) & (c) of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provide that for
an illness to be compensable, it must either be:
1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease; or
2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by
the employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions.
Occupational disease: one which results from the nature of the
employment (conditions to which all employees of a class are
subject which produce the disease as a natural incident of a
particular occupation), attaches a hazard to that occupation
which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is
in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general.
To be occupational, the disease must be entirely caused by
conditions which are normal and constantly present and
characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things
which science and industry have not yet learned how to
eliminate.
Thus, her ailments can be considered as such occupational
diseases. All public HS teachers, admittedly the most
underpaid but overworked employees of the govt, are subject
to emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with
intractable teenagers, especially young boys, and harassed as
they are by various extra-curricular or non-academic
assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at
night, if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors.
For Meez, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that
her HS is situated in a tough areaBinondo district, which is
inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further
aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as
well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina
nearby. Women are most vulnerable to such unhealthy
conditions.
Even if the ailments are not occupational diseases, there is
ample proof that Meez contracted them by reason of her
occupation. Acute arthritis is an inflammation of a joint marked
by pain, as a result of rheumatism or gout (disease
characterized by painful inflammation of the joints due to
excessive amounts of uric acid in the blood as a result of poor
diet). It may thus be seen that uric acid eventually causes
arthritis, aside from excessive mental and physical stresses to
which teachers are subject by reason of their duties. Mental
stress: dealing with pubescent children all day long. Physical
stress (walking to work; malnourishment bc she cant afford
healthy food; standing for long periods of time; working 2 shifts,
etc!!!)
Melencio-Herrera, dissent: Petitioner retired due to rheumatoid
arthritis and pneumonitis. Those ailments are not listed as
occupational diseases. Nor is there adequate proof that the
risk of contracting them was increased by conditions under
which petitioner worked. In fact, in so far as rheumatoid
arthritis is concerned, it has been described as a chronic
systemic inflammatory disease unknown cause. It is also a
disease that is worlds apart from acute arthritis, mentioned in
page 7 of the Decision.
And, as I stated in my dissent in Biscarra vs. Republic and
WCC. Mitra vs. ECC, and Torbela vs. ECC, the rulings and
opinions of administrative agencies in areas within their
competence command great respect and weight, except in
case of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. With these
factors absent in this particular case, I vote for the affirmance
of the ruling of the ECC.
CLEMENTE v GSIS (Yap)
Petitioner/s: Carolina Clemente
Respondent/s: GSIS, DOH, Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC)
Topic: Health, Safety, and Social Welfare Benefits
Facts:
(1) Petitioner Carolinas husband, the late Pedro Clemente,
was a janitor in the DOH, assigned to Ilocos Norte Skin
Clinic. He was hospitalized for nephritis, and suffered from
portal cirrhosis and leprosy (Hansens Disease) as well.
He later died of uremia due to nephritis. Thereafter,
 Carolina filed with the GSIS a claim for employees
compensation under the LC.
(2) Carolina alleges: As a janitor, Pedro was exposed to
patients suffering from various kinds of skin diseases,
including leprosy or Hansens disease. For ten years,
Pedro had to clean the clinic and its surroundings and to
freely mix with the Clinics patients. Hence, it was during
this time that he was attacked by other dreadful diseases,
such as uremia, cancer of the liver, and nephritis.
(3) ECC alleges: Carolina failed to prove by substantial
evidence that Pedros ailments were indeed caused by his
employment. It maintains that he merely had a recurrence
of a pre-existing illness aggravated possibly by the nature
of his employment, and there is no evidence on record
showing that the nature of the deceaseds employment
was the direct cause of any of his illnesses.
(4) GSIS DENIED the claim.
- The ailments are not occupational diseases taking
into consideration the nature of his work, and/or were
not in the least causally related to his duties and
conditions of work.
(5) On appeal, ECC affirmed GSIS decision. According to
ECC:
- The ailments are not listed as occupational diseases
- No substantial evident of causal connection. In fact,
evidence shows that the deceased had already
contracted Hansens disease before the employment.
This proves that his working conditions did not
increase the risk of his contracting the same. If at all,
his employment merely aggravated his ailments.
Unfortunately, aggravation of a preexisting illness, a
rule under the old law, is not anymore a ground for
compensation under the new law.
(6) Carolina filed a petition for review of the ECC decision.
Issue: W/N Carolina is entitled to the grant of death benefits for
Pedros death. (YES)
Held:
(1) Art. 167(L) of the LC and Sec. 1(b) Rule III of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, for the
sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules
with the conditions therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must
be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions.
(2) As the illnesses of Pedro are admittedly not listed under
Annex A of the Rules as occupational diseases, Carolina
bases her claim under the theory of increased risk. The
Court herein quoted medical discussions that support
rather than negate the theory of increased risk.
- The major ailments of the Pedro, i.e. nephritis,
leprosy, etc. could be traced from bacterial and viral
infections. In the case of leprosy, it is known that the
source of infection is the discharge from lesions of
persons with active cases. It is believed that the
bacillus enters the body through the skin or through
the mucous membrane of the nose and throat.
- Quoting Sarmiento v ECC: Strict rules of evidence are
not applicable in claims for compensation. There is no
stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof
required is merely substantial evidence, which means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence
that the development of the disease is brought largely
by the conditions present in the nature of the job.
What the law requires is a reasonable work-
connection, and not a direct causal relation. It is
enough that the hypothesis on which the workmens
claim is based is probable.
(3) It is not unreasonable conclude that Pedros working
conditions definitely increased the risk of his contracting
the aforementioned ailments. As a janitor, he was exposed
to different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had
to clean the clinic itself where patients with different
illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital
equipment that had been used. He had to dispose of
garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of
each working day. He was the employee most exposed to
the dangerous concentration of infected materials, and not
being a medical practitioner, least likely to know how to
avoid the infection.
(4) Other arguments:
a. ECCs allegation: admit there may have been
aggravation, but such is no longer a ground for
compensation under present law.
o SC: The failure to explain how a sick person
was able to enter the government service
more than 10 years before he became too ill
to work is compensable. There is no
evidence to show that he was hired inspite of
having an existing disease liable to become
worse.
b. GSIS contended that it should be dropped as a
party
o SC: GSIS, as the ultimate implementing
agency of the ECCs decision, is a proper
party in this case. The law and the Rules
refer to the GSIS in all aspects of employee
compensation.
FALLO: Petition GRANTED. P12,000 in death benefits and
P1,200 in Atty.s Fees awarded.
14) NARAZO v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM
G.R. No. 80157 | February 6, 1990 | J. PADILLA
Topic: Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefits
FACTS
Geronimo Narazo was a Budget Examiner in the
Office of the Governor, Province of Negros Occidental
for 38 years. His duties included preparation of
budget, financial reports and review or examination of
budgets of some provincial and municipal offices
Narazo died at the age of 57 and his medical records
show that he was confined 3 times for urinary
retention, abdominal paid and anemia. Thereafter, he
was diagnosed with Uremia.
 After his death, his widow filed a claim with GSIS for
death benefits under the Employees Compensation
Law (PD 626, as amended).
The claim was denied as the cause of death was not
an occupational diseases and there is no showing
that the Geronimos position increased the risk of
contracting Uremia.
Amalia Narazo filed an MR, claiming that her
husbands work required long hours which inevitably
caused the development of his ailments. GSIS denied
the MR.
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)
affirmed the GSIS decision. The ailment was common
to men over the age of 50 and not due to the
occupation.
Amalia claims that the nature, length of time, and
circumstances of the occupation of her deceased
husband were not considered. The long hours and
pressure in the work aggravated the disease of
Geronimo.
ECC contended that there was lack of proof to the
claim, all that were shown are mere aggravation and
not work-connection causes.
ISSUE
WON Narazos death is a compensable sickness under PD
626
HELD
YES.
Rule III, Sec. 1, paragraph 3 of PD 626, defines a
compensable sickness as any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the
ECC or any illness caused by employment subject to
proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by working conditions.
The ECC is empowered to determine and approve
occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that
may be considered compensable based on peculiar
hazards of employment.
Thus, a sickness or death caused by said sickness is
compensable if the same is listed as an occupational
disease. If it is not so listed, compensation may still
be recovered if the illness was aggravated by
employment. However, it is incumbent upon the
claimant to show proof that the risk of contracting the
illness was increased by his working conditions.
The death of petitioners husband was caused by
"Uremia due to obstructive nephropathy and benign
prostatic hypertrophy," which is admittedly not among
those listed as occupational diseases.
Proof required in this case if mere substantial
evidence. In this case, the nature of the work of the
deceased as a Budget Examiner dealt with detailed
preparation and examination of documents.
Full concentration and thorough study of the entries of
accounts in the budget and/or financial reports were
necessary, such that the deceased had to sit for
hours, and more often that not, delay and even forego
urination in order not to interrupt the flow of
concentration. In addition, tension and pressure must
have aggravated the situation.
Court is persuaded that the cause of death is work-
related and is compensable.
Petition is GRANTED, ECC is REVERSED.
12 ORATE v CA, ECC , SSS (Manila Bay Spinning)
G.R. No. 132761. March 26, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS
1. On December 5, 1972, Norma Orate was employed
by Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc., as a regular
machine operator. Her duties included carrying cones
to and from spindle machines, placing bobbins into
the conveyor, manually stopping machine when
malfunctioning, and cleaning the machines.
2. On March 22, 1995, she was diagnosed with breast
cancer (left). She underwent mastectomy which
incapacitated her from performing heavy work. She
was forced to go on leave and, eventually, to retire
from service at the age of 44.
3. On November 17, 1995, Orate applied for employees
compensation benefits with SSS.
4. SSS: deny claim because not work-related illness
5. ECC: affirm denial;
- breast cancer is not occupational disease under
Rules on Employees Compensation
- not established that the risk of contracting said
ailment was increased by the working conditions
6. CA: reverse, award claim;
- Contracted before Labor Code, hence governing
law is Act No. 3428, under which there is a
presumption of compensability
- Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. failed to prove
that ailment did not arise out of or in the course of
employment
ISSUE
(1) What is the law applicable to petitioners claim for
disability benefits?
(2) Is she entitled under the applicable law to be
compensated for disability arising from breast carcinoma?
HELD
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
42280, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of
the Employees Compensation Commission in ECC
Case No. MS-7938-296, dismissing petitioners claim
for compensation benefits under the Employees
Compensation Program is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
1. Labor Code is applicable because no proof that
the ailment diagnosed in 1995, was actually
contracted before effectivity of Labor Code.
Presumption that Labor Code applies.
a. Difference b/w Labor Code and Act3428
Act 3428 (Workmens PD 442 (Labor Code)
Compensation Act)
June 10, 1928 Nov 1, 1974
Presumption of No presumption
compensability
Employee does not Employee must
need to present proof present proof
that injury/disease was
caused by the nature of
the work
 Administered by Although it is conceded that some cancers
SSS/GSIS are directly caused by heavy doses of chemicals or
substances, i.e., lung cancer, the law requires proof
Labor Code Features: for others.
- Supported by state insurance fund built up by the
contributions of employers based on the salaries This stems from the development in the law that no
of their employees longer is the poor employee still arrayed against the might and
- injured worker does not have to litigate his right power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of
to compensation affording all kinds of favorable presumptions to the employee.
- No employer opposes his claim This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund
- payment of benefits is more prompt and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to
- amount of death benefits has also been doubled. claimants who are not entitled under the law.
- employers duty is only to pay the regular monthly
premiums to the scheme Ortega vs. Social Security System

b. Labor Code applies, bec no proof to that breast Topic: HEALTH, SAFETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE
cancer was contracted prior its effectivity. BENEFITS - Art. 179
Governing law is determined by the date
when the claimant contracted the disease. An injury
or illness which intervened prior to January 1, 1975,
the effectivity date of P.D. No. 626, shall be governed FACTS:
by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, while those contracted on or after January 1,
1975 shall be governed by the Labor Code, as
amended by P.D. No. 626. Corollarily, where the
Ibarra P. Ortega, a member of respondent Social Security
claim for compensation benefit was filed after the
effectivity of P.D. No. 626 without any showing as to System (SSS), filed claims for partial permanent disability
when the disease intervened, the presumption is that benefits on account of his condition of (1) Generalized Arthritis
the disease was contracted after the effectivity of P.D. and (2) Partial Ankylosis, which the SSS granted.
No. 626. But Orate was diagnosed on March 22, 1995
and no evidence was presented as to when she
contracted said ailment. Hence, the presumption is
that her illness intervened when P.D. No. 626 was After the expiration of his disability pension, Ortega filed with
already the governing law. the SSS Malabon Branch Office a claim for total permanent
Previous cases where the Court applied
Act3428 despite filing the claim during effectivity disability benefits.
of Labor Code, do not apply in the case at bar. In
those cases the symptoms of breast cancer
manifested before or too close to the cut off date
January 1, 1975, that it is logical to presume that By Resolution, the Social Security Commission (SSC) denied
the breast carcinoma of the employee concerned Ortegas claim for lack of merit.
must have intervened prior to January 1, 1975.
But these manifestations are not present in the
case of Orate.
Ortega contended that:
2. No, not entitled to the claim.
a. Under the Labor Code, for breast carcinoma and
resulting disability to be compensable, the claimant
must prove, by substantial evidence, either of two (1) The medical opinion of the SSS physician who
things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an
interviewed him for less than three minutes cannot
occupational disease listed under Annex A of the
Rules on Employees Compensation; or (b) if the prevail over the findings of his physicians who have
sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting been treating him over a long period of time.
the disease was increased by the claimants working
conditions.

b. Breast cancer is not listed as an occupational disease
under Annex A of the Rules on Employees
Compensation.
c. Orate failed to prove that breast cancer is caused by
her employment.
Orates bare allegation that she was
exposed to some hazardous chemicals that create the
risk of contracting cancer, is not substantial evidence
to prove her claim. Even assuming that she was
dealing directly with chemicals, there is no proof that
the company did not implement measures to control
the hazards/risk.
(2) Ortega also relies on jurisprudence on work-
connected disability claims insofar as it relates to a
demonstration of disability to perform his trade and
profession.
Ortega moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. The SSC
thus directed the SSS to conduct a domiciliary visit and
physical examination on Ortega to ascertain whether he could
already qualify for such benefit.

To comply, Dr. Rebecca Sison (SSS senior physician)
examined Ortega and found no sufficient basis to warrant the
granting of total permanent disability benefits to him.
ISSUE: WON Ortega is entitled to SSS total permanent
disability benefits. (NO)
HELD: Ortegas petition is dismissed.
BENEFITS UNDER LABOR CODE VS. SSS LAW
Claims under the Labor Code for compensation and under the
Social Security Law for benefits are not the same as to their
nature and purpose. On the one hand, the pertinent provisions
of the Labor Code govern compensability of work-related
disabilities or when there is loss of income due to work-
connected or work-aggravated injury or illness.
On the other hand, the benefits under the Social Security Law
are intended to provide insurance or protection against the
hazards or risks of disability, sickness, old age or death, inter
alia, irrespective of whether they arose from or in the course of
the employment.
And unlike under the Social Security Law, a disability is total
and permanent under the Labor Code if, as a result of the
injury or sickness, the employee is: unable to perform any
gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120
days, regardless of whether he loses the use of any of his
body parts.
QUALIFIED GOVERNMENT PHYSICIANS
Fair play dictates that the SSS be afforded the opportunity to
properly meet the issue with respect to the new ailments
besetting petitioner, in line with the actual practice that only
qualified government physicians, by virtue of their oath as civil
service officials, are competent to examine persons and issue
medical certificates which will be used by the government for a
specific official purpose. This holds greater significance where
there exist differences or doubts as to the medical condition of
the person.
In this case, the SSS medical examiners are tasked by law to
analyze the extent of personal incapacity resulting from
disease or injury. Oftentimes, a physician who is adequately
versed in the knowledge of anatomy and physiology will find
himself deficient when called upon to express an opinion on
the permanent changes resulting from a disability.
Unlike the general practitioner who merely concerns himself
with the examination of his patient for purposes of diagnosis
and treatment, the medical examiner has to consider varied
factors and ascertain the claimants related history and
subjective complaints. The members of this Court cannot strip
their judicial robe and don the physicians gown, so to speak, in
a pretense to correlate variances in medical findings.
YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON.
CELSO AVELINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Cebu and SPOUSES
FELIX C. LIM and CONSTANCIA GEVEIA, respondents
No. L-43674. June 30, 1987.*
Doctrine: Workmens Compensation; Damages; An employee
or his heirs may choose between availing themselves of the
benefits under the WCA or giving in the regular courts under
the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by
reason of negligence but once the election is exercised,
employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other
remedy.
Facts: It appears that on December 22, 1971. Rolando G. Lim,
single, a licensed second mate, was on board the vessel M/S
Rajah, owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation,
when the same ran aground and sank near Sabtan Island,
Batanes. Rolando perished as a result of that incident.
Claiming that Rolandos untimely death at the age of
twenty-five was due to the negligence of petitioner, his parents,
respondents Felix Lim and Consorcia Geveia, sued petitioner
in the Court of First Instance on January 28, 1972 for
damages.
In its answer, petitioner-defendant alleged by way of
affirmative defenses that the complaint stated no cause of
action; that respondent-plaintiffs had received P4,160 from
petitioner and had signed release papers discharging petitioner
from any liability arising from the death of their son. and that
most significantly, the respondents had already been
compensated by the Workmens Compensation Commission
[WCC] for the same incident, for which reason they are now
precluded from seeking other remedies against the same
employer under the Civil Code.
In his order of December 29, 1975, respondent Judge
Avelino upheld respondents vigorous opposition and denied
petitioners motion to dismiss for being unmeritorious. Its
motion for reconsideration having met the same fate on
February 3, 1976, petitioner filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction, contending that respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he refused to dismiss the complaint
for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. This Court
subsequently granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the trial court from proceeding with the hearing of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation remedy under the
Workmens Compensation Act [WCA], and now under the
Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by
an employee, is exclusive of the other remedies available
under the Civil Code.
Held: Yes.
In the recent case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining
Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141, involving a
complaint for damages for the death of five miners in a cave-in
on June 28, 1967, this Court was confronted with three
divergent opinions on the exclusivity rule as presented by
several amici curiae. One view is that the injured employee or
his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to recover
damages [not compensation under the Workmens
Compensation Act) with the regular courts on the basis of
negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code. Another
view, as enunciated in the Robles case, is that the remedy of
an employee for workconnected injury or accident is exclusive
in accordance with Section 5 of the WCA. A third view is that
the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a
choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or
of suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But
once the election has been exercised, the employee or his
heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other
words, the employee cannot pursue both actions
simultaneously.
As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim
spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to
recover additional damages against petitioner under the Civil
Code. In open court, respondent Consorcia Geveia admitted
that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the
WCC and had received the compensation payable to them
under the WCA ]. It is therefore clear that respondents had not
only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been
duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand
that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first
election and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer
be allowed to exercise the second option. Having staked his
fortunes on a particular remedy, [he] is precluded from
pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is
rejected by the Compensation Commission.
In the light of this Courts recent pronouncement in
the Floresca case, respondent Judge Avelinos denial order of
petitioners motion to dismiss is adjudged to be improper.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Avelinos orders
dated December 29, 1975 and February 3, 1976 are
reversed and set aside. Civil Case No. 12861, entitled The
Spouses Felix C. Lim, and Consorcia Geveia vs. Ysmael
Maritime Corp. is hereby ordered dismissed. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 5,
1978 enjoining respondent Judge Avelino from conducting
further proceedings in said case is made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
18) SSS v. Edna AZOTE (CARO)
R.A. 1161, as amended by R.A. 8282 (SSS)
Facts:
- Edna and Edgardo Azote (SSS member) are married, with
6 kids who are beneficiaries. Edgardo died Edna filed
claim for death benefits with SSS. However, it appeared
from SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted a
form designating different beneficiaries, namely:
Rosemarie Azote, as spouse, and Elmer Azote as
dependent.
- Ednas claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as
beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal
guardian of her minor children. The benefits will be
stopped once a child would attain the age of 21.
- Edna filed a petition with SSC to claim the death benefits,
lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo.
- SSC averred that there was conflicting information in the
forms submitted by the deceased. It summoned
Rosemarie to file an Answer declared in default
- SSC dismissed Ednas petition; citing 24(c) of SS Law
explaining that though Edgardo filed the Form E-4
designating their 6 children as beneficiaries, he did not
revoke the designation of Rosemarie as his wife-
beneficiary, and Rosemarie was still presumed to be his
legal wife.
- NSO records also revealed that Edgardo and Rosemaries
marriage was registered and consequently Ednas
marriage to Edgardo was not valid as there was no
showing that his first marriage had been annulled or
dissolved
- Edna filed MR denied; it was incumbent upon her to
prove that her marriage with Edgardo was valid, which she
failed to do so.
- Edna raised to CA ruled in favor of Edna:
o SSC could not make a determination of the
in/validity of her marriage to Edgardo considering
no contest came from either Rosemarie or Elmer
o Edna had established her right to the benefits by
substantial evidence when she showed her
marriage certificate and baptismal certificates of her
children.
o When Edgardo made a deliberate change of his
wife-beneficiary to Edna, it is a clear manifestation
of his intention to revoke his former declaration
Issue: W/N Edna is entitled to the death benefits from SSS?
NO.
SSC Arguments:
- Under 5 of SS Law, SSC may determine the rightful
beneficiary in the performance of its quasi-judicial function
of adjudicating SS benefits.
- Edna was not the legit spouse because her marriage to
Edgardo was contracted during the lifetime of Rosemarie.
The designation of a wife-beneficiary merely creates a
disputable presumption that they are legally married and
may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
Held: The law in force at the time of Edgardos death was RA
8282, the amendatory law of RA 1161 (SS Law). Applying
8(e) & (k) of RA 8282, it is clear that only the legal spouse of
the deceased member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the
latters SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that
Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual
as evidenced by their marriage contract. It is of no moment that
Rosemarie, did not participate or oppose Ednas claim.
Rosemaries nonparticipation or her subsequent death did not
cure Ednas status.
Under Art. 41 of the FC, for a subsequent marriage to be valid,
the prior spouse must have been absent for four consecutive
years and the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. Edna did not adduce
evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was
either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration
of Rosemaries presumptive death before her marriage to
Edgardo.

CA erred in relying on the updated Form to establish Ednas

status and eligibility to claim the death benefits of deceased
member. Although an SSS member is free to designate a
beneficiary, the designation must always conform to the
statute. To blindly rely on the form submitted by the deceased
member would subject the entire SSS to the whims and
caprices of its members and would render the SS Law inutile.

Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine

the validity of marriages, it is required by 4(b)(7) of RA 8282
to examine available statistical and economic data to ensure
that the benefits are given to the rightful beneficiaries.