Mendoza v. Comelec

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 149736. December 17, 2002.]
MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA, petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LEONARDO B. ROMAN,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
For resolution is a petition for certiorari led by petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza

and Mario E. Ibarra, seeking to set aside the resolution of the Commission on
Elections, dated August 15, 2001, in EPC No. 2001-5 and to declare respondent
Leonardo B. Roman's election as governor of Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and
void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, 8 of the Constitution, which provides
that:
The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay ocials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such ocial
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition.

VI TUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition. He
contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional Commission, the
Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full
terms before the proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full term, a recall
term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualication whether
served prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nine-
year, full three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J . joined, voted to dismiss the
petition on the ground that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6,
1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and Adormeo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which succession to a
local elective oce takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted
in determining whether an elective local ocial has served more than three
consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution does not prohibit elective
local ocials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in
fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of
service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation
of the oce by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30,
1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan
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by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May
14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two
consecutive terms (19951998 and 19982001), his election on that day was
actually only his third term for the same position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He argued
that a recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary
interpretation would in eect cut short the elected ocial's service to less than
nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of
political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters' obvious
preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the
votes cast. He explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to arm the clear choice
of the electorate, because in a democracy the people should, as much as legally
possible, be governed by leaders freely chosen by them in credible elections. He
concluded that, in election cases, when two conicting legal positions are of
almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the people's
overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that it is clear
from the constitutional provision that the disqualication applies only if the
terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous. Hence, service for
less than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count
to disqualify an elective local ocial from running for the same position. This
case is dierent from Socrates, where the full three consecutive terms had been
continuously served so that disqualication had clearly attached.
On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J., and
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ. concurred, holds the view
that the recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising the period June 28,
1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term. Since he thereafter
served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his
election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. X,
8 of the Constitution. For this reason, she voted to grant the petition and to
declare respondent's election on May 14, 2001 as null and void.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO-MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to grant the
petition. He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that to totally
ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would allow local
ocials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest
intent of the framers of the Constitution. He contended that respondent Roman's
election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term limit imposed by the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS DISMISSED.
THE SEPARATE OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES ARE HERETO ATTACHED AS PART OF
THIS RESOLUTION.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J : p

Petitioners would seek the disqualication of respondent Leonardo B. Roman on
the ground of his having transgressed the three-term limit under Section 8,
Article X, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code), providing, respectively, that
"Sec. 8. The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay
ocials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected." 1
"Sec. 43. Term of Oce. (a) The term of oce of all local elective
ocials elected after the eectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years,
starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for
by law, except that of elective barangay ocials: Provided, That all local
ocials rst elected during the local elections immediately following the
ratication of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992.
"( b ) No local elective ocial shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
oce for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective ocial
concerned was elected." 2
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a

number of times; viz:
TERMS MANNER OF ASSUMPTION
a) 19861988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan
by former President Corazon
Aquino and served up to 1988.
b) 19881992 Elected Governor and served up to
1992.
c) 19941995 Elected Governor during the
RECALL election in 1993, assumed
oce on 28 June 1994 and served
up to 1995.
d) 19951998 Elected Governor and served up to
1998.
e) 19982001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001. 3
On 22 February 2001, private respondent Roman again led a certicate of

candidacy for the same post in the 14th May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May
2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Bataan.
The focal issue presented before the Court in the instant petition would revolve
on the question of whether or not private respondent Roman exceeded the three-
term limit for elective local ocials, expressed in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, when he again ran for the position of Governor in the 14th
May 2001 elections, having occupied and served in that position following the
1 9 9 3 recall elections, as well as the 1995 and 1998 regular elections,
immediately prior to the 2001 elections. In ne, should respondent's incumbency
to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included in determining
the three-consecutive term limit xed by law?
In order that the three-consecutive term limit can apply, two conditions must
concur, i.e., (1) that the elective local ocial concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms to the same local government position, and (2) that he
has served three consecutive full terms, albeit a voluntary renunciation of the
oce for any length of time shall not be deemed to be an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which he is elected. The
constitutional provision does not appear to be all that imprecise for and in its
application. Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution is explicit that the "term of
oce of elective local ocials . . . shall be three years" which phrase is forthwith
followed by its mandate that "no such ocial shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms," and that "(v)oluntary renunciation of the oce for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he (is) elected." The law evidently
contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply.
The Constitutional Commission, in its deliberations, referred to a full nine (9)
years of service for each elective local government ocial in the application of
the prohibition, envisioning at the same time a continuous and uninterrupted
period of nine years by providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent
voluntarily gives up the oce.
Thus, we read from the records
"MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I think the vote on continuous service of nine years for
the Members of the House of Representatives or the lifetime
limitation of three terms has a very serious implication. The
interpretation of Commissioner Davide in the case of the Members
of the House is that they are allowed three consecutive terms.
They can hibernate for one term and can have another three
terms.
"The interpretation of Commissioner Garcia is that the limitation of three

terms is a lifetime limitation. This is a very important distinction for
the future; and perhaps, this should be discussed or at least we
can think about it a little longer, rather than vote on it immediately.
"MR. ROMULO.
I withdraw the motion, Madam President. We can handle this after lunch.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Can we have the proposals now, so that when we resume, we are ready
to vote on these?
"MR. ROMULO.

Madam President, in essence, is it the Davide interpretation or is it the
Garcia interpretation?
"Madam President, if it is the Davide interpretation . . .

"THE PRESIDENT.
May we state that the interpretation of Commissioner Davide or whatever

proposal Commissioner Davide will say now is the proposal of the
Committee on the Legislative as part of its committee report?
"MR. DAVIDE.
Yes.
"MR. ROMULO.
Yes, Madam President.
"MR. DAVIDE.
We want a vote on that particular issue so the Committee can now
nalize the substitute proposal in the draft.
"MR. GUINGONA.
Madam President, as manifested by Commissioner Monsod, this is a very
important question. Maybe we could allow one speaker to explain
very briey each side of the issue.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Can we have those speeches after lunch?
"MR. GUINGONA.
Yes, Madam President.
"THE PRESIDENT.
I would just like to have the proposals now so that during lunch break, at
least we can think about them, although I suppose we will have
some indigestion in the process. May we now have the proposal we
are going to speak about or vote on when we resume the session?
"MR. ROMULO.
Yes, the Garcia interpretation. Madam President.
"THE PRESIDENT.
We ask Commissioner Garcia to please state his interpretation.
"MR. GARCIA.
I propose that the local ocials be reelected twice and that they be
prohibited from running again after a total term of nine years in
public service for the same oce.
"THE PRESIDENT.

How about the Congressmen?
"MR. GARCIA.
This is both for the Representatives and the local ocials.
"THE PRESIDENT.
All right, for both Representatives and the local ocials.
"MR. ROMULO.
I think the same question can be raised as to Senators.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Senators have one reelection.
"MR. RODRIGO.
Before we take our lunch break, may I ask Commissioner Garcia a
question on his proposal.
"Let us say, a mayor has served for nine years, can he, after that, run as
governor?
"MR. GARCIA.
He can run for other oces if he wishes.
"MR. RODRIGO.
As long as it is another oce.
"THE PRESIDENT.
May we have the other proposal.
"MR. ROMULO.
Commissioner Davide would like to be recognized.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
"MR. DAVIDE.
The other proposal, Madam President, is: These ocials who can seek
two reelections can serve for a total term of nine years, after that,
they cannot seek another reelection. They should rest for one term
or more, but it will not bar them from running again after the lapse
of the term following the expiration of the nine-year period.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"MR. ROMULO.
We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the

blackboard, and these are Alternative No. 1 where there is no
further election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2
where there is no immediate reelection after three successive
terms.
"The proponents are now ready to explain briey. I ask that
Commissioner Garcia be recognized.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Garcia is recognized to speak on Alternative No. 1.
"MR. GARCIA.
I would like to advocate the proposition that no further election for local
and legislative ocials be allowed after a total of three terms or nine
years. I have four reasons why I would like to advocate this
proposal, which are as follows: (1) to prevent monopoly of political
power; (2) to broaden the choice of the people; (3) so that no one
is indispensable in running the aairs of the country; and (4) to
create a reserve of statesmen both in the national and local levels.
May I explain briey these four reasons.
"xxx xxx xxx.

"Turnovers in public oce after nine years will ensure that new ideas and
new approaches will be welcome. Public oce will no longer be a
preserve of conservatism and tradition. At the same time, we will
create a reserve of statesmen, both in the national and local levels,
since we will not deprive the community of the wealth of experience
and advice that could come from those who have served for nine
years in public oce.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"MR. REGALADO.
May I just ask Commissioner Garcia for a clarication. Under Alternative
No. 1, which says: 'No further election after a total of three terms,'
the three terms referred to here need not have been served
consecutively?
"MR. GARCIA.
The Commissioner is correct, madam President.
"MR. REGALADO.
In other words, whether there were interruptions, whether the
interruption took over a span of 20 or 25 years, as long as he has
been in that oce for a total of nine years , he is banned from
running for the same oce.
"MR. GARCIA.
The Commissioner is right, madam President.
"MR. REGALADO.
Thank you.
"MR. ROMULO.
I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
"MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I was reecting on this issue earlier and I asked to
speak because in this draft Constitution, we are recognizing
people's power. We have said that now there is a new awareness, a
new kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time,
we are prescreening candidates among whom they will choose. We
are saying that this 48-member Constitutional Commission has
decreed that those who have served for a period of nine years are
barred from running for the same position.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Thank you, Madam President.
"I think the issue is on Alternative No. 1 which is: 'no further election after
a total of three terms.' I will just put into action what we have
approved this morning which is Scheme No. II, providing for a term
of three years for the Members of the Lower House of Congress
and a term of three years also for the local ocials, from governor
down. We also approved this morning the alternative that the
Members of the Lower House shall have only two reelections,
meaning, one basic election plus two reelections will give them three
terms in the House; that the local ocials shall have two
reelections, meaning, one basic election plus two reelections or
three terms. Let us compare that now to the number of years in
accordance with Scheme No. II. Under Scheme No. II, the Members
of the Lower House and the local ocials shall serve for the rm
term of not three years but ve years so that we can synchronize
elections after that for every three years. So the Representatives
have already a term of ve years on the rst term, and another of
six years. So they will serve for eleven years before they will be
disqualied under that rst issue. I understand that the three terms
mentioned there are only for nine years. It is not so if we follow
what we approved this morning.
"In the case of the Senators, we approved that there is one reelection.
Under Scheme No. II, the Senators will have a term of ve years for
the rst election, and one reelection for a term of six years, which
will give them a total term of eleven years.
"Where does Alternative No. 1 stand now? May I ask the proponent
where it stands now? Is it for nine years or for two reelections as
we approved this morning? May I ask the proponent of Alternative
No. 1, Madam President.
"MR. GARCIA.
I am sorry but I think there are two dierent questions here: for the term
of oce of the Senators, it is a maximum of 12 years; for the
Representatives, it is a maximum of nine years.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
What happens now to what we approved this morning? We approved
Scheme No. II which provides a term of ve years for the
Representatives.
"MR. GARCIA.
I am sorry again, but for the rst election, the term of oce will have to
be xed by the Commission on Elections simply for adjustment
purposes because of the current term of the President, for
synchronization and for transitory purposes. But once it is
regularized, it will be dierent.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Is it a total of nine years ?
"MR. GARCIA.
Yes, it is still a total of nine years .
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Excluding those who were rst elected under Scheme No. II?
"MR. GARCIA.
Proper adjustments will have to be made for the rst election.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Who will make the proper adjustments?
"MR. GARCIA.
The Commission on Elections will make the proper adjustments.

"MR. DE CASTRO.
And what proper adjustments can it do?
"MR. GARCIA.
To make sure that the term is not more than nine years, if possible and if
not, we can give them a term of more or less one or two years,
depending on how it can be adjusted.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"MR. ABUBAKAR.
So if the people nd that their Representative is competent, we must have

condence in them because they know their Representative has
demonstrated his competence by action, because he lives with
them. Why should we defy the wishes of the people of that
district? Let one Gentleman answer me and it be on record that he
is against my position. As I said, the voice of the people is the voice
of God. We should not dictate what the people want. Why should
we arrogate unto ourselves the right of that district or that
province to choose its leaders and limit their total number of years
of service to only nine years?
"I would not speak for Batangas nor speak for Laguna, because their
people have the right to choose their own Representatives for a
term that they think is appropriate. We cannot speak for Sulu or
even for Cotabato because the situation is dierent. Maybe we will
have more leaders or maybe we will have only one of our faith and
our condence. Why limit his total number of years of service to
nine years?" 4 (Emphasis provided)
A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local ocial

merely serves the balance of the latter's term of oce; it is not a full three-year
term. It also goes without saying that an incumbent elective local ocial against
whom a recall election is initiated and who nevertheless wins in a recall election
must be viewed as being a continuing term of oce and not as a break in
reckoning his three consecutive terms. 5 In Lonzanida vs. Commission on
Elections, 6 this Court has held:
". . . The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt
to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of oce
and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected
ocial full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from oce for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service." 7
If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent's being
unable to nish his term of oce because of his ouster through valid recall
proceedings negates "one term" for purposes of applying the three-term limit, as
so intimated in Lonzanida, it stands to reason that the balance of the term
assumed by the newly elected local ocial in a recall election should not also be
held to be one term in reckoning the three-term limit. In both situations, neither
the elective local ocial who is unable to nish his term nor the elected local
ocial who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local ocial
following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year
term set by the Constitution.
This view is not inconsistent, but indeed in line, with the conclusion ultimately
reached in Socrates vs. Commission on Elections, 8 where the Court has
considered Hagedorn, following his three full terms of nine years, still qualied to
run in a recall election conducted about a year and a half after the most recent
regular local elections. A recall election term then, not being a full three-year
term, is not to be counted or used as a basis for disqualication whether it is held
prior or subsequent to the nine-year full three-term limit.

This same issue has been passed and ruled upon by the Commission on Elections
no less than ve times. 9 Consistently, it has held that the term of a newcomer
in recall elections cannot be counted as a full term and may not thus be included
in counting the three-term limit prescribed under the law. The Commission on
Elections, with its fact-nding facilities, its familiarity with political realities, and
its peculiar expertise in dealing with election controversies, should be in a good
vantage point to resolve issues of this nature. Concededly, no ready made
formulae are always extant to address occasional complex issues, allowing time
and experience to merely evolve and ultimately provide acceptable solutions. In
the administration of election laws, it would be unsound by an excessive zeal to
remove from the Commission on Elections the initiative it takes on such
questions which, in fact, by legal mandate properly belong to it. 10
Nor should it be ignored that the law here involved is a limitation on the right of
surage not only on the candidate for oce but also, and most importantly, on
the electorate. Respondent Roman has won the election to the post of Governor
of Bataan with a comfortable margin against his closest opponent. Where a
candidate appears to be the clear choice of the people, doubts on the candidate's
eligibility, even only as a practical matter, must be so resolved as to respect and
carry out, not defeat, the paramount will of the electorate. While the
Constitution would attempt to prevent the monopolization of political power,
indeed a wise rule, the precept of preserving the freedom of choice of the people
on who shall rightfully hold the reins of government for them is no less than
fundamental in looking at its overriding intent.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the instant petition on the foregoing theses.
MENDOZA, J .:
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman was elected governor of Bataan in a recall

election held in 1993 and served in that capacity for one year, from June 28,
1994 to June 30, 1995. Thereafter, he was elected to the same oce in the
regular elections of May 8, 1995 and May 11, 1998. Up to that point, he had
served a total of seven (7) years. On May 14, 2001, he ran for reelection
unopposed and won by a landslide, receiving 183,730 votes. The question is
whether his last election violates the three-term limit in the Constitution
considering that at that time he had served for only seven (7) consecutive years.
Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:
The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay ocials,
he was elected.
In several cases 1 decided over the past four years, this Court held that the
application of this provision requires the concurrence of two elements: (1)
election in regular elections for three consecutive terms and (2) service for the
full terms, each consisting of three years, for which the local ocial was elected.
Thus, in the rst case, Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, decided on September 3, 1998, this
Court held that a vice mayor, who had succeeded to the oce of mayor of
Pateros, Rizal, was qualied to run for the same position in three successive
regular elections without running afoul of the constitutional prohibition in
question.
The same ruling was made in Arcos v. COMELEC, decided on October 6, 1998:
Respondent, who as vice mayor of Legaspi City had become mayor by succession
on December 2, 1991 and had been elected to the same position in 1992 and
again in 1995, was qualied to run in 1998. Said the Court:
Indeed, on facts similar to those in the case at bar, this Court recently
held in Benjamin U. Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra, that the constitutional
provision which provides that "no (elective) local ocial shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms in the same position" contemplates
instances where an individual has not only fully served three consecutive
terms in the same elective local oce but has also been elected to the
same position for the same number of times.
The ruling in Borja, Jr. was applied to a recall election in Lonzanida v. COMELEC,
decided on July 28, 1999, in which it was held that a municipal mayor, who had
been elected for three consecutive terms and whose third election had been
declared void, was qualied to run for the same position in the immediately
succeeding election. This was because said local ocial had not previously been
elected in three successive elections nor had he served for three consecutive
terms.
The principle of Borja, Jr. was again applied in the recent case of Adormeo v.
COMELEC, decided on February 4, 2002. This Court held that a municipal mayor,
who had twice been elected to the same position and had lost in his bid for a
third term, was qualied to run in the immediately succeeding election even if in
the third term he had served in the same position by virtue of a recall election.
It will thus be seen that, in all the cases, this Court did not count the term during
which succession took place or a recall election was held in determining whether
an elective local ocial had served for more than three consecutive terms.
However, on November 12, 2002, this Court, while citing Borja, Jr. and its
progenies Arcos, Lonzanida and Adormeo in eect overruled these
precedents in Socrates v. COMELEC 2 by ruling that a city mayor, who had served
for three consecutive terms, was qualied to run in a recall election held in the
following term because of an "interruption" in the service caused by the holding
of a regular election. The Court said:
One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his
new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term
because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June
30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or
consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor. [pp. 18-19] [A]
necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the
start of a new term following the interruption. An ocial elected in recall
election serves the unexpired term of the recalled ocial. This unexpired
term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. [p.
23] [Were it] otherwise, an elective local ocial who serves a recall term
can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising the recall
term plus the regular three full terms. [p. 24] 3

Although I reached the same result as the majority in that case, I dissented
because I thought then as I still do that the local ocial in question was
qualied to run in the recall election not because of any interruption or break in
the continuity of his service but because the term for which he was elected was
less than three years. As I pointed out, the ruling of the majority in that case was
contrary to its professed basis because, while it would not count the term during
which the recall election was held in determining the limit of the preceding
terms, consistent with the ruling in Borja, Jr., Lonzamida and Adorneo, the
majority in Socrates did so for the purpose of determining the limit of the next
three consecutive terms which an elective local ocial would be entitled to
serve.
Indeed, it is error to think that, because a regular election is held between the
end of three terms and the term during which a recall election is held, there
occurs thereby "an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term
for which [the ocial concerned] was elected" within the meaning of Art. X, 8.
But it is "the continuity of the service for the full term" not "the continuity of
a full term" that is in question. We are talking here of "interruption in the
continuity of service," which can only refer to service which is being rendered.
For after service for three consecutive terms has been rendered there can be no
more interruption of service. The local ocial concerned, who has served for
three consecutive terms, can run in a recall election not because of any break in
his service but because the term to which he is elected is less than three years.
If, then, as in Socrates v. COMELEC, an elective local ocial can be elected in a
recall election even if he has already previously served for three consecutive
terms, 4 it should make no dierence in principle that the recall election in which
he is elected comes at the beginning of a series of three terms. The term for
which he is elected is likewise less than three years and, therefore, it should
likewise not be counted in determining how many consecutive terms he has
served in all.
To summarize, in applying the three-term limit, the term during which succession
takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted, either with the
three consecutive terms preceding, or with the three consecutive terms
succeeding, such term. It should not be counted not because of any interruption
in the continuity of the service but because such term is for less than three
years. Hence, the unexpired portion of a term, whether lled by succession or by
election in a recall, cannot be considered one full term. In the case at bar, since
respondent Roman's rst election in 1993 was in consequence of a recall and not
a regular election and he had not fully served three consecutive terms when he
was elected on May 14, 2001, I submit with respect that his last election is valid.
Indeed, the cases of Borja, Jr. and Arcos are on all fours with the instant case. In
these cases it was held that a vice mayor who had succeeded to the oce of
mayor can serve for three more consecutive terms as such if elected after the
expiration of the term during which he had served by succession. There is no
reason why the result should be dierent simply because in this case respondent
became governor by virtue of election in a recall, rather than by succession,
before winning in three consecutive regular elections. Succession and recall
election are alike. They are both modes of succession for the purpose of
automatically lling permanent vacancies in elective local oces to prevent a
hiatus in oce. 5 The local ocial who succeeds to the oce or is elected in a
recall simply nishes the term of his predecessor.
This is in contrast to a special election called to ll a vacancy either in the House
of Representatives or in the Senate. There the person elected wins a term even
though it is for less than three years (in the case of Representatives) or six years
(in the case of Senators) because, between the time the vacancy occurs and a
special election is held, there is an appreciable period during which the vacancy
exists so that the unexpired portion of the term is considered one term. There is
no automatic succession in such case. It is even possible that the vacancy will not
be lled because no special election has been called.
It may be that Borja, Jr.'s interpretation of the three-term limit can result in
giving an elective local ocial a longer tenure than the equivalent of three
consecutive terms, which is nine years. But so let it be. The Constitution does not
really prohibit service for more than three terms if continuity of service is
interrupted by means other than the voluntary renunciation of the incumbent.
To hold otherwise would result in limiting an elective local ocial's term to less
than three years, which is contrary to the Constitution. For as pointed out in
Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, the three-term limit in Art. X, 8 of the Constitution
actually embodies two complementary and reinforcing ideas:
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission. The rst is the notion of service of term,
derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of
a prolonged stay in oce. The second is the idea of election, derived from
the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish
to govern them be preserved. [I]ndeed, a fundamental tenet of
representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose
those whom they please to govern them [U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 US. 729, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995)]. To bar the election of a
local ocial because he has already served three terms, although the rst
as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would
therefore be to violate this principle. 6
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, I vote to dismiss the petition in this case and to
declare the election on May 14, 2001 of respondent Leonardo B. Roman, as
governor of Bataan, valid.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
"In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms . . .
The real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate
development of the social edice." 1
The instant Petition seeks to unseat Private Respondent Leonardo B. Roman,

incumbent provincial governor of Bataan, by reason of his allegedly having
exceeded the three-term limit for elective local ocials established by Section 8
of Article X of the Constitution; 2 as reiterated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160, the
Local Government Code. 3
Summation of the Facts and the Ponencia
For a clearer understanding of the case, let me restate the relevant facts very
briey. Mr. Roman won in the 1993 recall election for governor of the Province of
Bataan, assumed oce on June 28, 1994, and served the remainder of the term
which ended June 30, 1995. Thereafter, he was reelected in 1995, 1998 and
2001. Thus, he is now serving his ninth consecutive year as governor of Bataan.
It is argued that the Petition should be granted, in the light mainly of Borja v.
Comelec and Capco 4 and Lonzanida v. Comelec and Muli. 5 In these two cases,
this Court held that two conditions or requirements must concur in order that
the three-term limit may apply: rst, the ocial concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms to the same local government post; and second, such
ocial has fully served three consecutive terms.
It is further contended that these two conditions or requirements have been
satised in the instant case. Insofar as the rst requirement is concerned,
petitioners claim that Respondent Roman won in the recall election of 1993 and
was reelected in 1995 and 1998; and with respect to the second requirement, he
has already served a total of three consecutive terms the recall term (the
unexpired one year portion of the 19921995 term) being considered as one
term followed by the 19951998 and the 19982001 terms. They thus
conclude that private respondent should be deemed disqualied to run in the
2001 elections, because an electoral victory on his part would have constituted
his fourth consecutive term. Consequently, he is ineligible to serve his present
term (20012004) as governor.
In arriving at this conclusion, petitioners relied heavily on the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission on term limits; more specically, on the opinion
expressed by Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide Jr. (quoted in
Borja). In his view, a senator or a congressman who would win a special election
and serve the unexpired portion of the term of a predecessor would already be
considered as having served one term for purposes of reckoning term limits.
The Petition argues that the same principle must apply equally to the recall
terms of local ocials; otherwise the purpose of the three-term rule would be
circumvented. That is, an elective local ocial who has rst served a recall term
(as in the case of Respondent Roman) would otherwise be elected to and hold the
same elective position longer than three consecutive terms.
The dissenters led by the esteemed Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez cite this
Court's very recent ruling in Socrates v. Comelec, 6 which held that "[a]n ocial
elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled ocial. This
unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term
limit. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional
Commission: . . . Although the discussion referred to special elections for
Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle applies to a
recall election of local ocials. Otherwise an elective local ocial who serves a
recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the
recall term plus the regular three full terms. A local ocial who serves a recall
term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than
three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in
the recall election." 7 [Italics supplied]
An Apparent Distinction That Does Not Make a Real Dierence
The dissenters' overriding concern is the possibility that an elective local ocial,
like Respondent Roman who rst served a recall term, may be elected to and hold
the same position longer than three consecutive terms. With all due respect, I
believe that such concern is largely misplaced.
The private respondent in Borja was a vice mayor who succeeded to the oce of
mayor of Pateros upon the death of the incumbent. After serving the latter's
unexpired term of two years and ten months, the former ran for and was elected
mayor for three more terms of three years each. This Court ruled that he was
not disqualied to serve the last term. The three-term rule did not apply to him,
because his rst term (his succession to the mayoralty) was not by virtue of an
election but by operation of law.
By not disqualifying the said respondent, the Court permitted him to hold the
same oce for an uninterrupted period totaling eleven years and ten months.
How dierent is that case from the present one in which Respondent Roman, if
allowed to serve out his current term, would be in oce for a continuous period
o f only ten years? To argue and dierentiate that in one case there was
succession to oce and in the other a recall election would be to quibble over
an apparent distinction that does not make a real dierence.
Petitioners opine that in establishing term limits, the Constitution intended to
prevent a local ocial from holding the same oce for a period longer than three
consecutive terms or a total of nine years . Note, however, that whether the
initial accession to oce was by virtue of succession/operation of law or by virtue
of a recall election, the same evil (monopoly of political power) might still arise
at some point down the road.
In other words, the manner in which local ocials rst got into oce is of no
moment, whether or not they will later proceed to monopolize political power
and perpetuate themselves in oce. More plainly, one unusual mode of entry
into public oce would be simplistically favored over another if one ocial is
allowed to serve more than three terms, on the ground that the excess was by
virtue of a legal succession to a vacant oce; and to disallow another from so
serving, simply because the excess was by reason of a recall election. Specically,
assumption of oce by operation of law would be favored over that by recall
election.
More signicantly and disturbingly, such line of reasoning puts a higher premium
on an accidental or opportunistic succession to oce (for example, through the
death of the incumbent local ocial) over a collective and earnest expression of
the people's sovereign will (as through a recall election).
I cannot agree that a recall term must be deemed one full term for purposes of
computing the number of successive terms allowed. Under this theory,
Respondent Roman is disqualied from running for reelection in 2001 and thus
ineligible to serve out his current term of oce. This would in eect cut short his
service to less than nine years (the recall term of one year plus two terms of 3
years each and the expired portion of his current term) and thereby eectively
shortchange his constituents. It would in eect uphold legalism over the
people's will, the exercise of which was with the voters' expectation that
respondent would serve out his entire three-year term from 2001 to 2004.
The Borja Doctrine Should Apply Equally to Succession and Recall
I cannot help but ask how reducing the stay of Respondent Roman in oce could
possibly make more sense than allowing him to hold on for one year more than
the nine years normally accorded to local ocials. And here, the rationale in
Borja seems to be altogether apropos: "To consider C in the third case to have
served the rst term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for
reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right
of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. . . . To consider C as
eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the
Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the
evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken
that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed." 8
Still on the concept of the recall term being one term , as mentioned earlier, the
dissenters place much weight on the opinion expressed by then Commissioner
Davide during the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on term limits.
Nevertheless and with due respect, I see nothing in that exchange between him
and Commissioner Suarez that would in any manner support the claim that the
recall term of an elective local ocial must be treated as one term, in the same
manner as the term of oce of a senator or a congressman who wins in a special
election is deemed as such.
I have likewise scoured Borja, but found nothing that would support such a
hypothesis. Indeed, the only reason the exchange between the two respected
commissioners was quoted in that case was to highlight the dierence between
the situation of a vice mayor (an elective local ocial), who succeeds to the
mayorship by operation of law; and that of a congressman, who is elected to ll a
vacancy. In the latter instance, there is reason to regard the service of the
unexpired term as the congressman's rst term for purposes of determining term
limits. But that is neither here nor there, because that particular pronouncement
in Borja does not in any way shed light on the issue in this case, which involves a
recall term.
Socrates' Pronouncement on Recall Was Merely an Obiter
This Court's pronouncement in Socrates is of no avail either. The analysis
therein, as quoted earlier, cannot be regarded as controlling insofar as the
instant case is concerned. In that case, the main issue was whether a recall
election that took place after the fourth consecutive election had taken place was
to be deemed an "immediate reelection" to a fourth term. The Court answered
"No," there was "no immediate reelection after three consecutive terms." May I
quote below the rationale it articulated in that Decision:
"Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a
fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as
long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term: A recall election midway in the term following the third
executive term is a subsequent election but not immediate reelection after
the third term." 9
Obviously then, the issues in Socrates did not include the question whether a
recall term should be considered one term for purposes of reckoning term limits.
Therefore, the Court's ratiocination and analysis that a recall term is one term
for purposes of counting the three-term limit may be regarded merely as an
obiter dictum.
Thus, I nd no rm or sound jurisprudential basis for considering the recall term
of an elective local ocial as one term. Instead, I respectfully submit that, being
much less than the full term involved in the case of Respondent Roman, it should
not be counted as one term for purposes of reckoning the number of successive
terms allowed; and that, consequently, he should not be considered as being in
breach of the three-term limit.
A Proper Balancing of Policies Is Needed
Borja stressed the need to strike a balance between enforcing the policy of
preventing the establishment of political dynasties and the policy of enhancing
the freedom of choice of the people. And as held in Socrates, the concept of term
limits is, by its very nature, a restraint on the sovereign will of the people to
freely elect whomsoever they please. Term limits, though ensconced in the
Constitution, must thus be construed delicately to prevent them from unduly
subverting the manifest sovereign will of the electorate.
I submit that term limits should refer and strictly apply to the normal or
expected duration of electoral terms, barring unexpected or unforeseen
contingencies such as acts of nature or political upheavals as in this case. As
reiterated in Borja, the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations on
Article X, Section 8 "were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power."
The Ponencia Would Result in Massive Disenfranchisement
Moreover, I believe that applying the holding in Socrates to the instant case,
thereby causing the unceremonious removal of the hapless governor from oce,
would be an unwarranted "reaching back." It would be a retroactive and
inappropriate application of a jural doctrine to a situation that has never clearly
and unmistakably violated any statutory or constitutional prohibition.
Furthermore, to paraphrase Aquino v. Comelec, 10 a retroactive application of
Socrates would lead to a massive disenfranchisement of tens of thousands of
voters who, through no fault of theirs, voted in favor of candidates whom they
believed (and who themselves believed that they) could be validly voted for.
Such an unhappy result, triggered by a legal technicality, would go against the
guiding principle in election law: that in every election, the people's choice is the
paramount consideration; and their expressed will must, at all times, be given
eect. 11 Of similar import is our holding in Frivaldo v. Comelec, 12 reiterated in
Torayno Sr. v. Comelec. 13 We held therein that our electoral laws must be
liberally and equitably construed in order "to give fullest eect to the manifest
will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give
life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. In
other words, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will." 14
Obscure Legalisms Must Yield to Popular Sovereignty
Needless to say, after having won the last election by an overwhelming margin,
15 Mr. Roman is unarguably the choice of the voters. This Court cannot simply
turn a deaf ear to, much less stie, the people's voice. Elections and the contests
attendant thereto involve public interest of the highest priority. Thus,
technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand, if they
constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in
the choice of their elective ocials.
Verily, the resolution of this case hinges on a question of legal philosophy. Should
this Court interpret election laws literally in favor of obscure legalisms? Or
liberally in favor of upholding popular sovereignty? As held in Frivaldo:
"At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and
perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal
or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate
purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context
of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters'
obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. Indeed, to inict a thrice rejected candidate upon
the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny
and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience." 16
In conformity with the legal philosophy set forth above, I should point out that
petitioners have not discharged their burden. They have not clearly
demonstrated that the ineligibility of respondent governor is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding it and thereby
giving eect to the people's will would ultimately be more prejudicial to the
democratic fundamentals and juristic traditions of our country.
I n Socrates, I voted with the majority, not so much because of the strict legal
rationalization that a recall election midway to the fourth term was not an
"immediate election" after three consecutive terms. Rather, I did so because the
ponencia therein upheld the clear choice of the people: Mr. Edward Hagedorn. I
could not in conscience vote to place in oce Petitioner Dennis Socrates, who had
clearly been defeated in the then just concluded recall election. Verily, this Court
did not inict a rejected candidate upon the people of Puerto Princesa, for such
action would have constituted "judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault"
upon its own conscience.
By the same token, to unseat herein Respondent Leonardo B. Roman, the sitting
governor of Bataan, would constitute an unwelcome judicial imposition upon the
people. To do so would be to remove the one who has won the clear popular
mandate in an honest and credible election and to install in his place, by judicial
at, an obscure candidate who has been absolutely rejected by the electorate, or
another ocial (the vice governor) whom nobody voted for governor.
At bottom, tortuous and contentious legal arguments can be made in favor of
either (1) granting or (2) dismissing the herein Petition. In what would otherwise
be a legal dead heat arising from two conicting legal positions of almost equal
weight, I believe that, in an election contest, the scales of justice should be tilted
in favor of the people's overwhelming choice. Indeed, as earlier alluded to in the
quotation at the beginning of this Opinion, "in applying election laws, it would be
far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but
little understood legalisms." Finally, in a democracy, people should as much as
legally possible be governed by leaders freely chosen by them during credible
elections.
WHEREFORE, in this instance, I choose to uphold popular sovereignty over
complex and contentious legalisms and thus vote to DISMISS the Petition.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
I regret I am unable to agree with the decision of the majority of my brethren

and I nd it my duty to express my dissent.
The focal issue in the present petition for certiorari, 1 is whether a governor,
elected in a recall election and who has held oce for the unexpired term of his
predecessor, is considered to have served a full term for the purpose of applying
the three (3)-term limit under Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
I take the armative stand.
For a clearer understanding of my position, a brief review of the antecedents is
imperative.
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of governor of Bataan province for
several terms, to wit:
YEARS SERVED MANNER OF ASSUMPTION
a) 19861988 Appointed OIC Governor of the province of
Bataan by former President Corazon C. Aquino
and served up to 1988
b) 19881992 2 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 19941995 Elected Governor during the RECALL election in
1993, assumed oce on June 28, 1994 and served
up to 1995
d) 19951998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 19982001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001
f) 20012004 Elected Governor and presently the incumbent
Governor of Bataan
On May 25, 2001, petitioners Melanio Mendoza and Mario Ibarra, residents and
registered voters of Tenejero, Balanga, Bataan, led with the COMELEC en banc a
petition for quo warranto, 3 docketed as EPC No. 2001-5. Petitioners alleged that
respondent Roman has served as governor of Bataan for three (3) consecutive
t erm s counted from his assumption of oce by virtue of the 1993 recall
election. As such, he is disqualied/ineligible to seek a fourth term for the same
position in 2001, as he would violate the three-term limit for local elective
positions. Petitioners thus prayed that respondent Roman's proclamation as the
elected governor of Bataan in the 2001 elections be nullied.
In a Resolution dated August 15, 2001, the COMELEC dismissed petitioners'
petition for quo warranto on the ground that respondent Roman has not
exceeded the three-term limit because his service by virtue of the 1993 recall
election cannot be counted as a full term and, therefore, should not be
considered in applying the three-term limit. The COMELEC's ruling reads in part:
". . . We again state, for the record, that the term of respondent (Roman)
from 19951998 was his second full term if reckoned from his rst full
term from 1988-1992 and only for purposes of applying the three (3)-
term limit set forth by law. Hence, from the same reckoning point, the
third term was from 1998-2001. This was so because the 1993 recall
election was not counted as a full term and therefore, for purposes of the
three-term limit, was not included in the counting. It constituted an
interruption in the service of the full term of three (3) years which a local
elective ocial should, under the law, serve fully for purposes of counting
the term limit.
"In the present case, the reckoning point is the 19951998 term of
respondent, the 1995 elections being the rst regular election from the
interruption caused by the recall elections of 1993. Applying this new time
frame for purposes of the 2001 elections, the rst term of respondent
was from 19951998. The second consecutive term was from 1998
2001 and the third term will commence from June 2001 to June 2004."
4 (emphasis added)
Undaunted, petitioners come to this Court via the present petition maintaining
that respondent Roman violated the three-term limit rule for local elective
ocials when he ran for reelection as governor in the 2001 elections and,
therefore, his proclamation as such should be set aside.
On February 26, 2002, Congressman Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. of the second district of
Bataan led a petition-in-intervention which was admitted by this Court in its
Resolution of March 19, 2002. 5 As a registered voter and Representative of his
district, he joins petitioners in questioning the eligibility of respondent Roman.
In his comment 6 on the petition, respondent Roman contends that he is eligible
to run in the May 14, 2001 elections "for the Oce of Governor in the Province
of Bataan" since he did not serve the full 19921995 term; what he served was
only "the unexpired portion of Governor Enrique 'Tet' Garcia's 1992 to 1995
term." 7 In support of his contention respondent Roman cites Lonzanida vs.
Comelec 8 which held that the ocial concerned should have fully served three
consecutive terms in the same local government post for the three-term limit to
apply.
For its part, the Oce of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition to
declare respondent Roman's disqualication should be dismissed on the ground
that a recall election is not a regular election. 9 As such, service of an ocial
elected in a recall election should not be counted as a full term.
I nd the petition meritorious.
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 8. The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay
ocials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years an d no
such ocials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
he was elected." (emphasis added)
The above constitutional provision is echoed in Section 43 (b) of the Local

Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which reads:
"Sec. 43. Term of Oce. . . .
"(b) No local elective ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the oce for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective ocial concerned was
elected." (emphasis added)
In applying the three-term limit to an elective ocial, the foregoing

constitutional and statutory provisions provide that (1) he should have been
elected to a public oce; and (2) he should have served three consecutive terms
for the same elective position. These two requirements are present in the instant
case, thus barring respondent from serving as governor of Bataan from 2001 to
2004.
It bears emphasis that the said constitutional and statutory provisions on term
limits make no distinction as to the nature of the election whether regular,
special or recall elections. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that
where the law does not distinguish, the courts should make no distinction (Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos) . 10 Indeed, these provisions do
not conne the three-term rule to regular elections only. They include any
election (such as recall election) for the same position. As this Court ruled in
Borja, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, through Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza: 11
". . . Art. X, Section 8 contemplates service by local ocials for three

consecutive terms as a result of election . The rst sentence speaks of
'the term of oce of elective local ocials' and bars 'such ocials' from
serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in
explaining when an elective local ocial may be deemed to have served
his full term of oce, states that 'voluntary renunciation of the oce for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.' The
term served must therefore be one 'for which [the ocial concerned] was
elected.' The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of
the limitation on the number of terms an elective local ocial may serve. .
. . ." (emphasis added)
This Court has further ruled in Claudio vs. Commission on Elections, 12 also
through Mr. Justice Mendoza, that "election" includes recall "by means of which
voters decide whether they should retain their local ocial or elect his
replacement."
On the requirement that the ocial should have served three consecutive terms,
then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., now Chief Justice of this Court,
expressed the following opinion in answer to a query during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution:
"Commissioner Suarez: For example, a special election is called for a
Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the
unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a
term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would
disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of
this provision on disqualication, Madam President?
"Commissioner Davide: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a
special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms
for the Members of the Lower House." 13 (emphasis added)
While the above discussion on term limits specically refers to special elections
for Senators and Representatives, the same principle equally applies to a recall
term of local ocials. The constitutional provision is explicit that "the term of
oce of elective local ocials, . . . shall be three years and no such ocials shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms." In other words, the Constitution
limits the service of elective local ocials to a total of nine consecutive years. To
exclude the service of such ocial who won the recall election would certainly
permit a circumvention of the purpose of the three-term rule, since he may hold
the same elective position longer than three consecutive terms, or more than the
maximum nine consecutive years, as in the case of respondent Roman. In the
recent case of Socrates vs. Comelec, 14 this Court en banc, speaking through Mr.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, ruled:
"This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional
Commission: . . . . Although the discussion referred to special elections
for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle applies
to a recall election of local ocials. Otherwise, an elective local ocial who
serves a recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years
comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. . . . ."
At this juncture, it bears stressing that the object of the three-term limit is to
forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local ocial
who intends to perpetuate himself in oce. Another purpose is to broaden the
choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for oce, and to infuse
new blood in the political arena by disqualifying ocials from running for the
same oce after serving nine (9) consecutive years. 15 It is in the light of these
objectives that this Court should interpret the constitutional proscription. 16 The
courts, in construing the Constitution, should consider the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied.
As shown earlier, respondent Roman served as governor of Bataan from 1986 up
to the present. To date, he has perpetuated himself in the said position for more
than sixteen years. Is this not precisely the vice that the framers of the
Constitution intended to avert in prescribing the three-term limit rule? To say
that a recall term is not a full term is to provide a fertile ground for
circumventing the three-term limit rule. As in the construction of statutes, the
Constitution should be construed not so much according to the letter that killeth
but in line with the purpose for which it has been enacted. The Constitution is to
be given such construction as will advance its object, suppress or prevent the evil
it seeks to avoid, and secure the benets intended. The interpretation of the
Constitution should be done with a view to realizing its fundamental objective.
17
This Court, just a month ago, emphatically declared in Socrates 18 that although
an ocial elected in a recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled
ocial, this "unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the
three-term limit." It went further in saying that a "local ocial who serves a
recall term should know that (such) term is in itself one term although less than
three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in
the recall election." It now boggles my mind why the majority has made a
complete turn-around and totally disregarded this signicant pronouncement
which could have given life to the constitutional mandate.
In the law of public ocers, there is a settled distinction between term and
tenure. Term means the time during which the ocer may claim to hold the
oce as a matter of right. Upon the other hand, tenure represents the period
during which the incumbent actually holds oce. Tenure may be shorter than
term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. 19 In the case of
herein respondent who was elected in a recall election, his tenure was only for
the remaining term of the recalled ocial, then Governor Garcia. Be that as it
may, his election is still for a particular term inasmuch as during the unserved
period of the recalled ocial, he has a claim to hold such oce as a matter of
right. In short, his service for the remaining period is considered tenure for the
full term for which he was elected.
In fact, in Borja, 20 this Court, after citing the opinion of Father Joaquin G. Bernas
and Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then members of the Constitutional
Commission, made the categorical pronouncement that the unexpired portion of
the term is rightly counted as a full term, thus:
"Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas' comment on Art. VI, Section
7, which similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from
serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that 'if
one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another,
that unexpired term, no matter how short , will be considered one term
for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed
(Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution 637 [1996]).
"This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide

in answer to a query of Commissioner Suarez: 'For example, a special
election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have
to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving
the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So half
a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would
disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of
this provision on disqualication, Madam President?'
"Commissioner Davide said: 'Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there
is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms
for the Members of the Lower House' (2 Record 592, Session of August
7, 1986)."
". . . . In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for
which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to
limit the right to be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the
unexpired term is rightly counted as his rst term. Rather than refute
what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, Section 8 with regard to
elective local ocials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another
conrms the theory." (emphasis added)
Thus, although respondent only served the unexpired term of then Governor
(now Congressman) Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., the former's recall term as governor of
Bataan from 1994 to 1995 is rightly counted as his rst term for purposes of
applying the three-term limit. This was immediately followed by his election to
the same position for three more consecutive terms, to wit: 1995 to 1998; 1998
to 2001; and 2001 to 2004. Considering that his recall term is his rst term, his
reelections in the 1995 and the 1998 elections are his second and third terms,
respectively. Consequently, he is disqualied to run as governor in the 2001
elections, as that would already be his fourth consecutive term.
Respondent Roman cites Lonzanida vs. Comelec. 21 In this case, the two
requisites for the application of the three-term rule were absent so that the ban
against holding a further term did not apply to Lonzanida. To recall, Mayor
Lonzanida was ordered by the COMELEC to vacate his post on the ground that he
was not duly elected. Thus, his severance from oce was involuntary and
constituted an interruption of the continuity of his service under the
Constitution 22 and the law. 23 His renunciation being involuntary, this Court
ruled that he could not be considered to have served a full term for the purpose
of applying the three-term rule. As can be seen, the factual backdrop and the
ratio decidendi of Lonzanida are not on all fours with the present case.
Respondent, therefore, cannot invoke this Court's ruling in Lonzanida.
In ne, I am fully convinced that respondent Roman is ineligible for the elective
position of governor of the province of Bataan.
The political system of our country is one of democratic and republican
government. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. Also,
in a republican government, these laws are decreed by the people through their
representatives and through them, the people dictate the qualications as well
as the disqualications for service in government positions. Respondent is clearly
disqualied to serve as governor of the Province of Bataan for 2001 to 2004 as
he has exceeded the allowable term limit for local elective ocials. The will of a
majority or plurality of the voters of the province of Bataan should not be
considered to have cured such disqualication. To do so will seriously violate the
fundamental law itself. Simply put, the will of respondent Roman's constituency
should not prevail over the will of the entire Filipino people as expressed in the
Constitution.
It is basic that the Constitution is the people's quintessential act of sovereignty,
embodying the principles upon which the State and the government are founded.
24 Having the status of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all the
people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority at intermittent
times. Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a
State to govern themselves in a certain manner. 25 Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban himself, in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, 26 assured that "the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant
made by all the Filipinos to govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and
no sector, however distressed, is exempt from its compass."
Indeed, this is a sad day for me. Perhaps I will never understand why the
majority has allowed the will of respondent Roman's constituency to prevail over
the will of the entire Filipino people, thus completely disregarding the noble
purpose of the constitutional three-term limit rule.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the challenged
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated August 15, 2001 in EPC No. 2001-5.
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman is declared ineligible to assume oce as
governor of the province of Bataan for the term 20012004.
CARPIO, J .:
I dissent. Respondent Leonardo B. Roman was disqualied to run for Governor of

Bataan in the May 14, 2001 elections since he had been elected successively to
the same oce in the 1994 recall election and in the 1995 and 1998 regular
elections.
The applicable provision is Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which
provides as follows:
"The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay ocials,
he was elected." 1
The sole issue is whether a recall term is considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term limit of elective local ocials. I see no other way but to
consider a recall term as one term.
First, the framers of the 1987 Constitution unmistakably intended a recall term,
which is the unexpired term of the recalled ocial, to be considered as one term
for counting term limits. The following exchange during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission shows this clear intent, thus:
"MR. SUAREZ: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and
the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of
the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term
is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the
correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned
from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualication,
Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special
election, he will serve only the unexpired portion of that particular term
plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the
Members of the Lower House." 2
While the foregoing exchange referred specically to special elections for

Senators and Representatives, the same principle applies with equal force to the
recall term of elective local ocials. To hold otherwise would allow a local ocial
to be elected, and to serve, for more than nine consecutive years in the same
position. This is the case of respondent Roman who would be serving a total of
more than ten consecutive years as Governor of Bataan if he were not
disqualied to run in the 2001 elections.
Second, the framers of the 1987 Constitution unmistakably intended that
elective local ocials should not be elected to serve continuously for more than
nine years in the same position. The records of the Constitutional Commission
reveal that the three-term limit of Representatives and local ocials was clearly
understood to mean a maximum period of nine consecutive years. Thus:
"MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I think the vote on continuous service
of nine years for the Members of the House of Representatives or the
lifetime limitation of three terms has a very serious implication. . . . ." 3
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. DAVIDE: The other proposal, Madam President, is: These ocials
who can seek two reelections can serve for a total of nine years , after
that, they can seek another reelection. . . . ." 4
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. GARCIA: I would like to advocate the proposition that no further
election for local and legislative ocials be allowed after a total of three
terms or nine years. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Turnovers in public oce after nine years will ensure that new ideas and
new approaches will be welcome. . . . ." 5
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. DE CASTRO: . . . I understand that the three terms mentioned there
are only for nine years. . . . ." 6
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. GARCIA: I am sorry again, but for the rst election, the term of oce
will have to be xed by the Commission on Elections simply for
adjustment purposes because of the current term of the President, for
synchronization and for transitory purposes. But once it is regularized, it
will be dierent.
MR. DE CASTRO: Is it a total of nine years?
MR. GARCIA: Yes, it is a total of nine years.

xxx xxx xxx
MR. GARCIA: To make sure that the term is not more than nine years, if
possible and if not, we can give them a term of more or less one to two
years, depending on how it can be adjusted." 7
Indisputably, the framers of the Constitutional Commission intended the three-

term limit to mean a maximum service of nine consecutive years. This intent is
clear, denite and unequivocal. To rule that a recall term should be totally
ignored in counting the three-term limit will allow local ocials to be elected to
serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the
framers of the Constitution. This is exactly what will happen if respondent
Roman's recall term is not counted in computing the three-term limit, for Roman
will then serve as Governor for more than ten consecutive years.
The framers of the Constitution have xed the term limit of elective local
ocials at three consecutive terms, with a clear intention that the total shall not
exceed nine years. They have also intended that election to an unexpired term
shall be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit.
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, just like the intention of
legislators who draft a statute, certainly deserves great weight. When such
intention is clear, denite and unequivocal, the intention becomes controlling as
it expresses the true spirit of the Constitution or the law. As this Court aptly
stated, "The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give eect
to the intent of the framers of the organic law and the people adopting it." 8
Third, the 1987 Constitution does not require a public ocial, whether elective or
appointive, to serve his full term in order to be disqualied from re-election or
reappointment. A clear example is a Vice-President who succeeds by operation of
law as President. If the Vice-President succeeds to the Presidency to serve an
unexpired term of more than four years, he is disqualied from running for
President. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[N]o person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall
be qualied for election to the same oce at any time."
Similarly, one appointed to serve the unexpired term of a member of the Civil
Service Commission or the Commission on Elections is disqualied from
reappointment even if the unexpired term is less than the full term of seven
years. Appointment to these constitutional bodies is "without reappointment" 9
and "[A]ppointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor." 10 Unquestionably, the Constitution does not require complete
service of a full term of oce before the relevant constitutional disqualication
attaches.
Fourth, the instant case is not a situation where the ocial succeeded by
operation of law to the oce and served the unexpired term of his predecessor
as in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec 11 where the unexpired term was not counted in
computing the three-term limit. Here, respondent Roman was elected to serve
the unexpired term of his predecessor. To say that the recall term is a stray term,
belonging to no elected ocial in counting the three-term limit, is to ignore
reality. A recall term arises from a special election for a xed term of oce the
unexpired term of the recalled ocial. The ocial elected in a recall election has
the same functions and powers as an ocial elected to the same oce in a
regular election. The recall term is a legal and political fact that cannot just be
dismissed as a stray term.
I n Adormeo v. Comelec 12 and Socrates v. Comelec, 13 we ruled that the recall

term is not consecutive to the previous terms of one who wins the recall election
against the recalled ocial. The term of oce of the incumbent or recalled
ocial serves to break the continuity of service of the comebacking ocial who
wins a recall election. But a recall term of an ocial who is re-elected in the next
two regular elections, like that of respondent Roman in the instant case, is not
interrupted by any term of another ocial. Thus, such recall term should be
counted in computing the three-term limit.
Fifth, to consider a recall term as a stray term will encourage a person
disqualied because of the three-term limit to agitate for the recall of his
immediate successor. We held in Socrates that such a person can run in a recall
election. If he wins and his recall term is not counted in computing the three-
term limit, then he has nothing to lose and everything to gain by agitating for a
recall election. This will remove the stability of the term of oce of his
immediate successor, and subject the people to too many elections within a short
period. But if the recall term is counted as one term, then the truncated term
serves as an inherent limitation and natural disincentive to those who would
otherwise agitate for a recall election because they cannot wait for the next
regular elections.
Sixth, that respondent Roman won as Governor in the 2001 elections cannot
serve to exempt him from the three-term limit mandated by the Constitution.
The vote of the people of Bataan, while overwhelmingly for Roman, cannot
overcome the vote of the people of the entire Philippines when they ratied the
Constitution that now mandates the three-term limit. Besides, we must resolve
the constitutional issue here without regard to the accidental circumstance that
respondent Roman won overwhelmingly, for this constitutional issue could also
have been raised in a case where the margin of victory was whisker-thin.
We do not decide this constitutional issue because the people of Bataan have
strongly clamored for Roman's leadership as their Governor, but because we
must apply the clear, denite and unequivocal intent of the framers of the
Constitution. We do not decide this constitutional issue to meet the exigency of
Roman's remarkable election victory in the 2001 elections despite his
disqualication, but to guide all those who will run for public oce through the
ages for as long as the same constitutional three-term limit remains in place.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
AZCUNA, J .:
The adoption of term limits is new to our polity. It is a departure from the rule
that in a democracy the sovereign people can choose whoever is t and qualied
to be their leader for as often as is their will.
The restriction has for its reason the concern against accumulation of power
resulting from prolonged stay in oce.
These two ideas, however, represent the rule and the exception. The rule is the
fundamental tenet of representative democracy that the people should be
allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them. The exception is the
term limit provided for in the Constitution.
It follows that in applying the exception, it must be strictly construed, so that
only if it clearly applies should it be applied.
To my mind, the provision in question, the term limit for elective local ocials,
applies only if such ocial has served three consecutive terms in full.
Consequently, service of less than a full term, be it succession or recall election,
does not count in determining whether such ocial has served three consecutive
terms.
The Constitution is clear. The terms must be consecutive and the service must
be full, for the prohibition to apply:
"Sec. 8, Art. X. The term of oce of elective local ocials, except
barangay ocials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such ocial shall serve for more than three consecutive terms .
Voluntary renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected." (Emphasis supplied.)
Once these conditions obtain, however, the prohibition sets in and what is
prohibited is not simply an "immediate reelection, " 1 as contended by the
majority in Socrates v. Comelec, 2 but rather serving for more than three
consecutive terms, i. e., service in the immediately following term, the fourth
term.
Serving during such term, whether from the start, in the middle or at the end,
would still consist in service "for more than three consecutive terms." In
reference to the prohibited service, it is not required that it be for the full term.
What is proscribed is service, of any length, during the prohibited term, for such
would still constitute service for more than three consecutive terms.
There was a clear intent to require the person who has served in full the number
of consecutive terms, in this case three, to rest until the election for the term not
immediately following the last of the consecutive terms served. Hence, in
Socrates I joined in the separate opinion of the Chief Justice, as I agreed with
him that once an elected local ocial, in that case a mayor, has served three
consecutive terms in full, that person cannot serve for any time during the
immediately following term, whether by immediate reelection or by recall
election.
In the present case, respondent Roman's election as governor in the recall
election of 1992 should not be counted as one full term. For the disqualication
to attach, three consecutive terms must be served in full. This is the exception to
the rule, so it must be strictly complied with. Service for less than a full term,
except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not be counted to
determine the existence of the disqualication.
I therefore vote to DISMISS the petition in this case and to declare respondent
Leonardo B. Roman as NOT DISQUALIFIED to run for governor in the election of
May 14, 2001, as this was only for his third consecutive term. cACEHI
May 14, 2001, as this was only for his third consecutive term.
Footnotes
1. Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution.

2. Section 43, R.A. 7160.
3. Rollo, pp. 152-153.
4. Constitutional Commission, Records IV, pp. 235-242, 25 July 1986.

5. Thus, Section 72, R.A. No. 7160, provides:
"Sec. 72. Eectivity of Recall The recall of an elective local ocial shall be eective
only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on
recall. Should the ocial sought to be recalled receive the highest number of
votes, condence in him is thereby armed, and he shall continue in oce."
6. 311 SCRA 602.
7. At p. 613.
8. G.R. No. 154512, 12 November 2002.
9 . I n Onofre Cruz vs. Leonardo B. Roman (SPA No. 98-198) promulgated 28 May
1998 and armed by the En Banc on 03 September 1998; Bautista and
Magdalena vs. Roman (SPA No. 98-265) promulgated 10 December 1998 and
Ramos vs. Roman (SPA No. 01-068) promulgated 08 May 2001 and armed
by the COMELEC En Banc on 28 May 2001.
1 0 . S ee Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832; Pangandaman vs. COMELEC, 319
SCRA 283.
MENDOZA, J .:
1 . Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999);
Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002.
2. G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 & 155083-84, Nov. 12, 2002.

3. Emphasis added.
4. See Lonzanida v. COMELEC, supra; Adormeo v. COMELEC, supra.
5. Thus, the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) provides:
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Oces of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor,
and Vice Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the oce of the
governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become
the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the oces of the
governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor,
mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said
oce shall be lled automatically by the other sanggunian members according
to their ranking as dened herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the oce of the punong barangay, the highest
ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong
barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be
resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as dened herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
ocial lls a higher vacant oce, refuses to assume oce, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from oce, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his oce.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian
shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each
winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in
the immediately preceding local election.
SEC. 72. Eectivity of Recall. The recall of an elective local ocial shall be eective
only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on
recall. Should the ocial sought to be recalled received the highest number of
votes, condence in him is thereby armed, and he shall continue in oce.
6. 295 SCRA 165-166 (1998).
PANGANIBAN, J .:
1. Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727, 769, 772, June 28, 1996, per
Panganiban, J.
2. 8, Article X, Constitution provides:
"The term of oce of elective local ocials, except barangay ocials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such ocial shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the oce for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
3. 43(b), RA 7160 states:

"No local elective ocial shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the oce for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective ocial concerned was elected."
4. 295 SCRA 157, September 3, 1998, per Mendoza, J.
5. 311 SCRA 602, July 28, 1999, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

6. GR No. 154512, Nov. 12, 2002, per Carpio, J.
7. Id., pp. 23-24.
8. Borja, Jr. v. Comelec, supra, p. 170.
9. Socrates v. Comelec, supra, p. 15.

10. 248 SCRA 400, September 18, 1995, per Kapunan, J.
11. Benito v. Comelec, 235 SCRA 436, August 17, 1994, per Kapunan, J.
12. Supra.
13. 337 SCRA 574, August 9, 2000, per Panganiban, J.

14. Frivaldo v. Comelec, supra, pp. 770-771.
15. The records show that Mr. Roman gathered about 97% of the total votes cast
for governor in the 2001 elections in the Province of Bataan.
16. Supra, p. 769.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
1. Filed under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 (review of judgments and nal orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC, among others) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
2. For the purpose of the synchronization of the regular national and local elections,
Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and
the local ocials rst elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992." (emphasis added)
3 . Pursuant to Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881), which states that "any voter contesting the election of any Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city ocer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, shall le a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election." (emphasis added)
4. Rollo, at 64.
5. Id., at 190.
6. Id., at 76-85.
7. Comment, Rollo, at 82.
8. 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999).
9. Rollo, at 88-99; 218-225.

10. Guerrero vs. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 458, 467 (2000).
11. Supra, at 166.
12. 331 SCRA 388, 403-404 (2000).

13. 2 Record 592, Session of the Constitutional Commission on August 7, 1986,
cited in Borja vs. Comelec, id., at 166-167.
14. G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, at 23-24.
15. Lonzanida vs. Comelec, supra, at 609.
16. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970); Co
vs. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991).
17. Acar, et al. vs. Rosa, 19 SCRA 625, 626 (1967).
18. Supra.
19. Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 150 (2001); Gaminde vs. Commission on
Audit, 347 SCRA 655, 663 (2000).
20. Supra, at 166-167.
21. Supra, at 611-613.
22. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
23. Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160).

24. 16 Am Jur 2d Section 2.
25. Id.
26. 347 SCRA 128, 320 (2000), see separate opinion of Justice Panganiban.
CARPIO, J.:
1. This provision is reiterated in Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160, the Local Government
Code.
2. p. 592, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II.


7. Pp. 240241, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol II.
8. Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).
9 . Section 1 (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution; Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
10. Ibid.
11. 295 SCRA 166 (1998).
12. G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002.
13. G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 & 155083-84, November 12, 2002.
AZCUNA, J.:
1. This phrase does not appear anywhere in the Constitution.
2. G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 & 15508384, November 12, 2002.

Mendoza v. Comelec

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149736. December 17, 2002.]

MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA, petitioners, vs.

For resolution is a petition for certiorari led by petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza

After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition.

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Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a

On 22 February 2001, private respondent Roman again led a certicate of

"The interpretation of Commissioner Garcia is that the limitation of three

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"Madam President, if it is the Davide interpretation . . .

May we state that the interpretation of Commissioner Davide or whatever

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We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the

"xxx xxx xxx.

The Commission on Elections will make the proper adjustments.

So if the people nd that their Representative is competent, we must have

A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local ocial

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Respondent Leonardo B. Roman was elected governor of Bataan in a recall

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The instant Petition seeks to unseat Private Respondent Leonardo B. Roman,

I regret I am unable to agree with the decision of the majority of my brethren

The above constitutional provision is echoed in Section 43 (b) of the Local

In applying the three-term limit to an elective ocial, the foregoing

". . . Art. X, Section 8 contemplates service by local ocials for three

"This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide

I dissent. Respondent Leonardo B. Roman was disqualied to run for Governor of

While the foregoing exchange referred specically to special elections for

MR. GARCIA: Yes, it is a total of nine years.

Indisputably, the framers of the Constitutional Commission intended the three-

I n Adormeo v. Comelec 12 and Socrates v. Comelec, 13 we ruled that the recall

1. Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution.

4. Constitutional Commission, Records IV, pp. 235-242, 25 July 1986.

2. G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 & 155083-84, Nov. 12, 2002.

2. 8, Article X, Constitution provides:

3. 43(b), RA 7160 states:

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9. Socrates v. Comelec, supra, p. 15.

13. 337 SCRA 574, August 9, 2000, per Panganiban, J.

16. Supra, p. 769.

9. Rollo, at 88-99; 218-225.

12. 331 SCRA 388, 403-404 (2000).

23. Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160).

3. p. 235, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II.

6. p. 240, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II.

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