The "Anti-Market" Mentality Re-Examined: A Further Critique of The Substantive Approach To Economic Anthropology

The "Anti-Market" Mentality Re-Examined: A Further Critique of the Substantive Approach to
Economic Anthropology
Author(s): Scott Cook
Source: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter, 1969), pp. 378-406
Published by: University of New Mexico
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THE "ANTI-MARKET"MENTALITY RE-EXAMINED:A FURTHER
CRITIQUE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO ECONOMIC
ANTHROPOLOGY'
SCOTT COOK
Theprimary aimofthiselaboration ofanearlier critiqueofthesubstantive
approach
toeconomic anthropology isnotsomuch "rejection" ofthetenetsofthatapproach as
itis"penetration"toa deeper levelofanalysis.Thewider implicationsoftheformal-
substantive
controversycannot beappreciated untilitisviewedinitsproperintellectual
context,
namely as directly linkedto thepolemic in economic thoughtwhich was
inthemid-19th
initiated century with thewritingsof Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels.
Morespecifically,
itisargued (1) thatthe"anti-economics" ofPolanyi andhisfollow-
ersparallels
inorigin andrationale theviews oftheimmature Engels-viewswhich
weresubsequently negated in a definitivefashion throughthedevelopment of the
Marxian ofclassical
critique politicaleconomy, (2) that Polanyi's substan-
isa spurious
tivismbecause its to
of failure recognize and emphasize the
that essential
"materiality"
oftheeconomic processliesinproduction phenomena, and(3) thatonepistemological
grounds the method of economic must
anthropology incorporate concepts,
analytic
andtactics
strategies, from thewidest rangeofsources whichmight yieldoperationally
soundandanthropologically relevantresults.
IT IS INEVITABLE thattherecent
substantive in economic
controversy
byDavidKaplanon theformal-
article
wouldhavebeenwritten,
anthropology
1 I am grateful to Ed LeClairand to Hal Schneider forreading and commenting upon
an earlier
draft ofthispaper.
Two majorsetsof experiences havestimulated myrethinking of theseissues.First,in 2
yearsof continuous research,writing,and first-hand studyof economic problemsand processes
amongpeasant-artisan groupsin thevalleyof Oaxaca,Mexico(Cook 1968aand 1968c),I
painfullylearned of thetruth ofRapoport's insightfulstatements (1965:22)that". . . between
whatoneobserves and whatoneconcludes thereis a longand tortuous chainof reasoning, in-
ferenceandevaluation" andalsothateconomic lacks". . . well-defined
anthropology for
criteria
evaluatingtherelevance ofandtheimportance ofthedifferentlinksin thechainofmental steps
whichleadsfromwhatoneobserves, perceives, or imaginesto whatoneconcludes about'what
is.'" Two specificbenefitsof thisrealization
were:(1) acquiring a deeperunderstanding of the
limitationsandapplications of formal theory in theanalysisof empiricaldatapertaining to an
observable,real-world situation;and (2) reinforcing my beliefthatculturalgeography and
anthropologicalarchaeology provide necessarysourcesofdataandideasfortheunderstanding of
a small-scaleeconomy anditsregional role.
A secondset of experiences was initiated by my readingof the important studyby
Godelier(1967) andhassincerevolved aroundmystudyof theMarxian literature(e.g.,Marx
1904,1961,1965;MarxandEngels1968;Engels1940;SelsamandMartel1963;Kosik1967;
Lefebvre 1969; Sartre1968; Desan 1966; Marcuse1960; Garaudy1967; Nicolaus1968;
Hobsbawm 1965).Oneresult ofthisreading is tosuggestthata meaningful ofthe
reconciliation
formal-substantivecontroversy in economic anthropology maybe achieved through theimagina-
tiveapplication of thedialecticalmethod as conceived byHegeland as appliedto socialand
economic studiesbyMarx.
378
VoL.25,1969
MENTALITYRE-EXAMINED
THE "ANTI-MARKET" 379
sooneror later,as thedialeticof thisratheresotericbranchof anthropological

discoursefollowedit fluctuating course.My owncritique(Cook 1966a) of the
substantive approach was conceived as a catalytic antithesis to theossifying thesis
represented by thethought of Polanyi and his followers; it was designed ac-
to
tivatea dialecticin economic anthropological discourse. latter,as I viewedit
The
then,had becomepolarizedthroughthe influence of Polanyi'swork; it was
characterized by a "split-leveldialogue"in whichthe proponents of the 2
dominantviewsof economics-in-anthropology were talkingpast one another
and operating in separatespheresof discourse(Cook 1966a:323). Now, some
4 yearsafterthatcritiquewas written, a dialecticof sortshas begunto operate
and is leadingeconomicanthropological discoursetowarda convergence upon
commonthemes(e.g.,Firth1967; Godelier1967; LeClair and Schneider1968;
Dalton 1969). Giventhe overriding purposeof myoriginalcritique,I am de-
lighted with Dalton's recent statement (1969:99) that"ReadingCook (1966)
whois bothcausticand adamant. . . inducedme to tryto clarifytheissuesand
clearup themisunderstandings." Frommypointofview,criticism inacademicdis-
coursecan onlybecomeeffective whenit stimulates thoseit addressesto re-
examinetheirviewsand,in theprocess,shakestheirconfidence in thecorrectness
of thoseviews(Schaff1963:21).
In thedialectical context Kaplan'sarticlemustbe seenas bothprogressive and
retrogressive: progressive in thatit seeksto communicate the"wider relevance"
of thisrestricted scope-and-method debate;and retrogressive in thatit (1) per-
petuates some obscurantist tactics which have long characterized substantivist
polemic,(2) has pursued the widerimplications into those intellectualareas (i.e.,
theepistemology of formaleconomics and thephilosophy of science)which,in
myopinion,standto yieldtheleastin termsof anthropologically relevantprob-
and
lem-solutions, (3) has notably failed to a
yield meaningful reconciliation or
synthesis of the polarized and sectarianized controversy. Kaplan (1968b:245)
effectivelytantalizes us withhis visionof "an approachwhichstrivesto achieve
thegenerality of the'formalists' whileat thesametimekeepinga firmfoothold in
theempirical world-an approach that in the spirit of ecumenism might be called
'substantive formalism' or 'formalsubstantivism' " but failsto takeeventhefirst
steptowardthe realization of such a synthesis. Thus, Kaplan's "spiritof ecu-
menism"joinsCancian's"spiritof reconciliation" (1966:470) in thatpeculiarly
anthropological hell whosepolemicalroad is paved withgood intentions but is
basedon uncreative, underinformed thinking.
The present paper, unfortunately, doesnotrepresent a significant positivecon-
tributionto thereconciliation of theformal-substantive controversy. All I hopeto
380 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNALOF ANTHROPOLOGY
achieve
here-givenspacelimitations,
incomplete andthefeltneedto
thoughts,
refute to
Kaplan'sinterpretations-is
supplementmyoriginal byelaborat-
critique
and
ing re-examining the issues
raised to
there;and,also, some
offer preliminary
as tohowI think
suggestions thecontroversy
might bereconciled
(orsynthesized)
inthefuture.
KARLPOLANYI: THE GHOST OF ENGELS REINCARNATED

Thoseeconomic materialism
whoseone-sided
anthropologists them
provides
witha delusory rationale
fordenyingtheapplicability
of bourgeois
economic
theoryinthestudyofprimitive
andpeasanteconomies
shouldpondertheimplica-
tionsof thefollowing
statement
by Marx the
(1904:300), most andpro-
astute
found ofallsubstantivist
economic
thinkers:
Thebourgeois is themosthighly
society historical
differentiated of
organization
which
Thecategories
production. as theexpression
serve andthecom-
ofitsconditions
ofitsownorganization
prehension itatthesametime
enable togainaninsight
intothe
organization and theconditions whichprevailedunderall pastformsof
of production
society.. . . The anatomyof thehumanbeingis thekeyto the anatomyof the ape.
Buttheintimations
of a higher onlyif the
animalin loweronescanbe understood
animalof thehigherorderis alreadyknown.The bourgeoiseconomyfurnishes
thekey
toancient Thisis,however,
economy. bynomeanstrueof themethod ofthoseecono-
mistswhoblotoutall historical andseethebourgeois
differences formin all forms
of
Onecanunderstand
society. thenature
oftribute, etc.,afteronehaslearned
tithes, the
nature
ofrent.
Butthey
must
notbeconsidered
identical added].
[italics
It is,I think,evident thatthe"formalists" from Firthto Salisbury andBel-
shawhavesuccessfully usedthecategories,concepts,andprinciples of bourgeois
economics intheirstudiesofnon-bourgeois forms ofsocietyinstrict accordwith
Marx'sprogram, i.e.,withoutconfusingsocialmorphology withcultural content
andcontext. On theother hand,whileitis truethatthoseeconomic anthropolo-
gistswhoimplicitly viewsoftheMarxian
sharethematerialist tradition (e.g.,the
Polanyigroup) are more knowledgeable of the economic factsof lifein con-
trasting and
primitive peasant societies
than was Marx himself the
(given paucity
ofanthropological knowledge inhisday),itis equallytruethatin therealmof
theory andmethod these lag farbehind
materialists
latter-day Marx.Whereas he
wiselyargued forthe of
application (and himself the
applied) concepts of formal
economic theoryto thestudyof peasantand feudal(i.e.,non-industrial, non-
capitalist)economies, theydogmaticallyassertthat formaltheory leads to a dis-
tortionandmisunderstanding ofnon-market economies becauseitputatively repre-
THE "ANTI-MARKET"MENTALITY RE-EXAMINED 381
sents,as Sahlinswrites, a "historically

specificBusiness Outlook"(1965:226;cf.
Dalton1968:vliii, 1969passim).
It isa lastingtribute toMarx'sgenius as an economic thathispassion-
analyst
ateaversion to thedehumanizing of the
consequences bourgeois market economy
didnotsignificantly distort hisanalysisof thathistorical system. Nor did his
aversionprevent himfrom recognizingthatformal economic theory hada positive
analyticvalueespecially inexplaining theworkings ofthemarket system andalso
in offering a pointof departure forexplaining basiceconomic processes (e.g.,
product mix,factor proportions, distribution
ofproduct: seeLeClair1962)inany
economy, realorimagined. It was,ofcourse, hisdialectical method of "... ad-
vancing from theabstract to theconcrete" so that". . . theconcrete is grasped
andis reproduced in ourmindas a concrete . . ." (1904:294)whichprovided
Marxwiththenecessary epistemologicalbasisforunderstanding theheuristic and
explanatory utilityof formal economic reasoning and itsthoughtcategories (Go-
delier1967:184-191 etpassim; Garaudy 1967:127-141).
Unfortunately, it is theearlyEngelsrather thanMarx(earlyor late) who
provides the model which Polanyi and hisfollowers haveparalleledintheelabora-
tionoftheir viewson formal economic theory. One need notread veryfarinto
Engels' Outlines a
of Critique ofPolitical
Economy (1961),originallypublished
in 1844,toappreciate theextent towhich itanticipates themuchlaterarguments
ofPolanyi(1944,1947),Dalton(1961),andothercontributors to thesubstan-
tivist
literature in economic anthropology.Longbefore Polanyiappeared on the
scene,Engelsthrew outthebabyof formal economic theorywith the bath water
of thedehumanizing competitive principlesof the bourgeois market economy.
Indeed, theparallels between thepositions
ofEngelsandPolanyi areso striking
thatthefollowing concisestatement by Nicolaus(1968:44)in summary of
Engels' Outlines serves well
equally as a summary ofPolanyi's views:
Engelsarguedinthisarticle
thatthedevelopment ofthebourgeoiseconomy forthe
lastcentury,
aswellasthedevelopment
of the
economic which
theory corresponded toit,
couldbesummarized asonelong, andincreasingly
continuous, outrageousaffront
toall
fundamental ofmorality
principles anddecency. ... . Thebrunt ofEngels'attackwas
directedatwhatheconsidered thefundamental of the
principle bourgeois economy,
namely,theinstitution
ofthemarket.Allmoralbonds insocietyhavebeenoverthrown
bytheconversion ofhuman valuesintoexchange values;all ethical over-
principles
thrown the of
by principlescompetition; and all hitherto laws,
existing even thelaws
which thebirth
regulate ofhuman
and death beings, havebeenusurped bythelawsof
supplyanddemand. Humanity itself
hasbecome a market commodity [italics
added].
As Nicolaus (1968:44) goeson to pointoutin hisseminalarticle,Marxeven

in his earlywritings(1844-1849)"rejectedthe one-sidedmoralismof Engels'
critiqueto replaceit witha dialectical basis... [and] threwout thecategorical
imperatives which lurked beneath the surface of Engels'paper."Furthermore, in
his laterworks(e.g.,Contribution to theCritiqueof PoliticalEconomy;Grun-
drisse;Capital) Marx progressed beyondthis earlypositionand rejectedas
superficial thethesisthatthemarket mechanism is a motivating, causal,or funda-
mentalfactor;he recognized-asmostNeoclassicaleconomists nowdo (Parsons
and Smelser1956:20)--thatthe marketis merelya deviceto co-ordinate the
variousmoments of a processmorefundamental thanexchange, namely,pro-
duction(Nicolaus 1968:45-46).Polanyiand his followers in economicanthro-
pologyhave apparently failedto appreciatethe crucialimportance of Marx's
theoretical shiftin focusfromexchange toproduction phenomena; indeed, thereis
littleevidence in theirwritings to suggestthattheyarecognizant of therelevance
of Marxisteconomic thought to theirposition. It is precisely thismyopicperspec-
tive,this lack of awareness and understanding of their own intellectualoperations
and foundations, whichidentifies thePolanyigroup'ssubstantivism as a spurious
brandof materialism.
LeClairand Schneider, in outlining thedevelopment of economicanthropo-
logicalthought, have examinedthe Polanyiphenomenon underthe headingof
"The Ghostof MalinowskiReincarnated" because,accordingto them (1968:
9-10),"Polanyihas simply denied,as Malinowski had denied35 yearsearlier, the
relevance of current economic theory to anybutcontemporary marketeconomies."
Whilethisis true,I wouldsuggestthatPolanyi'sthought is,forreasonsindicated
above,moreprofoundly understandable as "The Ghostof EngelsReincarnated."
Likewise, LeClairand Schneider's perceptive remark(1968:10) that"The rein-
carnateseldomknowsmuchof hisearlierlife"is morepregnant withmeaningin
thisnewcontext;forif Polanyiand his followers had demonstrated an under-
standing of the theoretical implications of the Engels-Marx the
experience, recent
history of economic anthropological thought would have recorded a cumulative
analytic effort focused on resolving common problems within a generally accepted
conceptual framework-rather thanan enervating (if ultimately rewarding) sec-
tarianized polemic.Economicanthropology can,I submit, movebeyonditspresent
theoretical impasseby following Marx'sprecedent in positingproduction as the
coreof theeconomic processand as theanalytical keyto isolatingeconomically
relevantphenomena(Frankenberg 1967:69-70;Cook 1968a:29-30;Cook MS),
and in employing thedialecticalmethodto approximate economic reality(Marx
1904;Garaudy1967;Godelier1967). One of theimmediate resultsof thiscourse
ofactionwouldbethefacilitation ofa conceptual-empirical linkbetween cultural

geography (e.g.,Wagner 1964), archaeology (e.g.,Meggers 1968 and esp.
Flannery1968),andeconomic anthropology-an event which mustoccur, sooner
orlater,
if"substantiveformalism" istobecome a scientificreality.
Many economists employ a socialscience rhetoricin describing thescopeof
theirdiscipline,
thusdeluding others intothinking thateconomics is a social
science
withhuman behavior as itsprincipal subject matter and theunderstanding
ofhuman individualandsocialbehavior as itsmajorgoal.Butthefactremains
thatformal economics, as practiced bymostorthodox Neoclassical economists,
dealsonlyhypothetically (i.e.,deductively) with human behavior. The realobject
ofitsstudyis thebehavior ofessentially non-human (i.e.,non-social) and
entities
variables
suchas commodities, pricesor exchange ratios,and quantities (cf.
Boulding1961:82).
The ideathattheproper scopeofeconomic studies is socialrelationsderives
from Marxian political
economy andwhentransposed byorthodox economists to
describe
thescopeof theirdiscipline (i.e.,Neoclassical economics) is singularly
undescriptiveof theactualscopeof theirstudies. This ideawas expressed by
Engelsin1844as follows:
Political
economy beginswith
commodities, with
begins themoment when products
areexchanged foroneanother-whether byindividuals
orbyprimitive
communities.
Theproduct thatappearsinexchangeisa commodity.
Itis,however,
a commoditysolely
becausea relation
betweentwopersons orcommunities tothething,
attaches theprod-
uct,therelation
between producerandconsumer whoareherenolonger unitedinthe
sameperson.Herewehaveanexample ofa peculiar which
fact, runs
through thewhole
ofeconomics andwhich hascausedutter confusion
inthemindsofbourgeoisecono-
mists:Economicsdealsnotwiththings butwithrelations
between
personsandinthe
lastresort
between these
classes; relationsare,however, attached
always tothings and
appearasthings(quotedinSelsamandMartel 1963:106).
Oneofthecontended issuesinthecurrent formal-substantiveimpasse ineconomic
anthropologyhasitsinception in theposition expressed abovebyEngels(and
echoedbyPolanyiandhisfollowers) in which 2 things occur:(1) a validand
statement
penetrating of the of
scope "political economy"; and (2) aninvalidand
fallacious
argument that the study of "economics" is and must be coterminous
withthestudyof "political economy." Marxhimself (1904,1965),as I have
alreadydemonstrated, the that
accepted position political economy dealswith
relations
betweenpersons, and
persons things, and between classesbut did not
acceptoradvocatetheposition thatorthodox or
(i.e.,bourgeoisformal) economics
entailed
sucha study.
Manyeconomic anthropologistsincluding pioneering contributorsof the

statureofMalinowski, Thurnwald, andMauss,havemuddled important distinc-
tionsandrendered analysismoredifficult
byparalleling in theirconceptionsof
thescopeandmethod of economicanthropology the fallaciesof Engels rather
thanthemorescientificallyrewardingviewsofMarx.Economic anthropology,as
a socialscience,
mustpursuetheproblems andutilizethestrategiesof political
economy buttogetherwith-rather thanto theexclusion of-thoseof orthodox
economics; toestablish
itsscientific
statusitmust avoidEngels'error ofdiscarding
theproblems andstrategiesofformaleconomics inthename of economic
political
In
inquiry. other words,thescienceofeconomic anthropology mustemerge as a
method anda fundofknowledge based,among otherthings,ona foundation that
is equally
solidinitspolitical
economicandformal economic perspectives.
SUBSTANTIVISM: GENUINE AND SPURIOUS

Oneofthesalient paradoxesintherecent history ofeconomic anthropological
thought arisesfrom thefactthat2 ofthemostarticulate of the
fellow-travelers
Polanyischool(i.e.,Sahlinsand Kaplan) are also associates of theWhitean
schoolof evolutionism; theparadoxis thatbothof theseanthropologists have
chosen tofollow intheireconomic the
thinking spurious substantivismofPolanyi
rather thanthemoregenuine substantivism of White.WhereasPolanyi's sub-
stantivism isneither ofnorcompatible
conscious withitscounterparts inthetradi-
tionof Marxand Veblen,White'ssubstantivism (1959:237-260, 329-353)is
directlyin thistradition.
It is puzzling tome,as an anthropologist, whyPolanyi's viewshavereceived
so muchattention and from
(bothsympathetic otherwise) mycolleagues and
White's solittle.
Polanyiwasnot an anthropologist bytraining,and hisarguments
areframed inan idiosyncratic
andeclectic idiomofpolitical economy cummoral
philosophy cumeconomic history; White'sarguments, on theotherhand,are
framed intheidiom ofcultural
anthropology, aredirected tobasicproblemswhich
confront every whoundertakes
anthropologist aneconomic study,anddemonstrate
a broadknowledge oftherelevant ethnographicliterature.White, likePolanyi,
has
a sectarian ax togrindandis passionately scientificas a "truebeliever"mustbe.
But,unlike Polanyi,headvocates ananthropological cause(i.e.,evolutionism)
and
his with
tempers polemic logic, scientificinsight,clarity,and theoretical
relevance.
Thereare,ofcourse, severalcommon elements inPolanyi's andWhite'sviews
of"primitive" economies: both
they seethelatteras from
differing moreadvanced
economies in kind,notdegree;theybothconsider theprimitive economy to be

"embedded" in a sociocultural matrix in which kinship is the dominant institution
(thoughPolanyihadonlya nominal interestin thelatter);theybothconsider
sucheconomies to be typified not
bycooperation conflict; theybotharguethat
theterminology andpropositions ofbourgeois economics aremoreoften thannot
when
misleading applied to the of
analysis primitive economies. Nevertheless, it
mustbe emphasized, theyarrive at theseviewsin different ways:Polanyi a as
concomitant of hisideological critique of the"market economy" and of the
"market mentality," andWhiteas a concomitant ofhisanalytic studyofethno-
graphy andhisconcern withmethod, e.g.,hisparadigmatic delimitation of the
"economic context" (1959:237-242).
Thisisnottheplacetoelaborate further onthesimilarities anddissimilarities
ofthese2 approaches. Sufficeittosaythatwhen Whiteasserts abouta particular
custom
primitive (e.g.,bridalgiftexchange) orinstitution (e.g..thepotlatch orthe
kula)that itfinds its "chief and
meaning significance in the context ofsocial ritual,
theeconomic factor is subordinate andis significantonlyas a meanstotheend"
(1959:240),heinvariably supports hisinterpretation withprior analysis ofethno-
cases.
graphic And,moreover, itis on thebasis of thesystematic analysis ofmany
suchcasesthatWhitearrives at conclusions one or
(which may may accept) not
aboutthenatureof primitive economies. Polanyi, in contrast, was muchless
rigorousin hiscomparison of contrasting economies, muchmorerestricted and
inhiscoverage
superficial ofethnographic cases,and,inessence, adhered lesstoa
scientific
format inelaborating hisideasonprimitive economies andonissuesof
scopeandmethod ineconomic anthropology. Finally,Whiteclearly understands
thattheproduction concept, while itmay not definethe economic aspect ofcertain
services(e.g.,those involving "transfer" does an
activity), provide analytically
soundcriterion fordistinguishing theeconomic essenceoflaborand,consequently,
foroperationalizing the"materiality" of theeconomic field(1959:238-239 et
passim;Cook in never
MS). Polanyi, contrast, recognized that the materiality (i.e.,
thesubstantiveness) oftheeconomic fieldmust besought inproduction rather than
in theamorphous concept of "embeddedness" (e.g.,Neale 1964:1304;Polanyi
1968).
In short, anthropologists witha feltneedfora substantive approach to ec-
onomics which incorporates all ofthebasictenets ofthe"anti-market mentality"
are bestadvisedto consider thecontributions of Whiterather thanthoseof
Polanyi.Thiswillenablethemtoacquire a substantive perspective which is more
genuinelymaterialist thanitsPolanyi counterpart because ofitstheoretical empha-
sisonproduction toexchange,
(as opposed as the
anddistribution)
consumption,
central
economic
process.
THE POLEMICALSTRATEGY
In hisrecent inthisjournal,
article Kaplan(1968b)takesmetotaskforcer-
tainalleged
errorsofinterpretation
inmyoriginal ofsubstantivist
critique thought
in economicanthropology(Cook 1966a). Before attemptingto evaluate
and
refute I
Kaplan'sarguments, wish to reiterate
that mycritique wasundertaken
with2 principal
aimsinmind:(1) toexpose theideological ofthe
underpinnings
and
Polanyiapproach, (2) to establish on
limits itsuse in economicanthropo-
The critique
logicalinquiry. yielded 3 majorconclusionswhichKaplan(1968b:
230) hasadequatelysummarizedas follows:
First,heargues thatthesubstantivists'
intransigency
concerning thecross-cultural
offormal
applicability economic
theoryisa by-product
ofa romantic rooted
ideology in
anantipathytoward the"marketeconomy" andanidealizationofthe"primitive".
....
Thisidealization ofprimitive
economiclifetakestheform ofstressingthealtruism
andsolidarityofsuchlifeatthesametime thatitunderplays-or completelydisregards
-the conflict
andself-seekingwhichoften characterizes
it.Itisalsothisromantic,
anti-
marketideology whichhasledthesubstantivists
torejectthecross-cultural
applicability
offormaleconomic theorywithout
givingita fair
empiricaltrial.
Secondly, Cookcharges thesubstantivists
withhaving grossly the
misconceived
natureofthelogicofscientific
explanationingeneral
andofformal economictheory in
particular.
... .
Cookfinds
Finally, that
thesubstantivist hasa quaint
thesis antiquarian
ringtoit.
The recent publicationofPolanyi's collectedessays(1968),ofa concise and
informative biographicalsketch-intellectual of
portrait Polanyi(Zeisel1968),
and,finally, of a majorattempt by Daltonto defendPolanyi'sthought by
"transsubstantiating"it (1969) onlyreinforce, in theircontent, theessential
arguments inmyoriginal critique.If thegeneralstyleofthelatter wasoutspoken
andpolemical, thiswasbecause thetheses andantitheses itdeveloped aredirectly
linked to"passionate" ofdiscourse
traditions inthehistory ofeconomic thought
(e.g.,Marx1904;GideandRist1947;Euken1950;Schumpeter 1954;Heimann
1964;Cohen1967;Godelier1967)and in thesociology of knowledge (e.g.,
Mannheim 1936;Lichtheim 1967); and also,as I mentioned above,becauseI
deemed it tactically
expedient to counter in kindthepolemical setso
precedents
indeliblybyPolanyi andhisfollowers.
Whileithasbeenso construed byKaplanandothers (e.g.,Dalton1969:65et
passim), mycritique wasnotintended primarilyas a defense offormal economic
theory; myattempted explication ofeconomic reasoning, principles, method
and
MENTALITYRE-EXAMINED
THE "ANTI-MARKET" 387
(1966a:329-336) wasundertaken solelyinreaction toconsistent substantivist dis-

tortionsofthem(from mypointofviewas a former undergraduate andgraduate
student in economics). Furthermore, thecritique wasnotintended to promote
eitheran uncritical rejection of substantive theory or an uncritical acceptance of
formal theory. Rather, it was undertaken in the of
hope stimulating anthropol-
ogiststorecognize thepossibilities andthelimitations ofbothapproaches so that
they would be more in the
discriminating application of both to future studies in
economic anthropology (1966a:342).
As I interpret it,thestrategy in Kaplan'scounter-critique is to defendthe
embattled outpost ofPolanyi's substantivism notbyarguing foritspositive attri-
butesbut,rather, bycarrying theattackintothefortress oftheopposition (i.e.,
theNeoclassical economics of theformalists). In executing hisstrategy Kaplan
reliesuponthephilosophy ofscience, whose putative powers ofclarification cause
insecuresocialscientiststodoubt thescientificlegitimacy of theirmethod and of the
ithas
knowledge produced. fortify To hisarsenal Kaplan recruits from the ranks
ofthemethodologists offormal economic orthodoxy whoservetheir colleagues in
the"dismal science" as intellectual gadfliesbyconstantly exasperating them with
vexing questions like"To whatreality do ourtheoretical operations relate?"or
"Howdo welinkup ourhypothetico-deductive method toempirical reality so as
toachieve betterpredictions orexplanations?"
Kaplan,itseemstome,hasmoved beyond thelimits ofjustifiable naivete and
intotherealmofpresumption intheapplication ofthisstrategy which lureshim
to thefollowing position (1968b:228):"before raising questions abouttherele-
vanceoftraditional economic theory tonon-market economies, wecanlegitimately
posethemoregeneral question: towhatextent canformal economic analysis in-
form us abouttheoperation of anyconcrete economic In
system?" myopinion,
thisquestion-though admittedly important-is anillegitimate oneforan anthro-
That
pologist. Kaplanposes it and then attempts to answer it suggests to mea
seriousmisconception on his partof therealproblems in epistemology and
method whichconfront theworking economic anthropologist of the formalist
persuasion. Kaplan'sposition is tantamount tothatofan economist arguing that,
before heconcerns himself withthepossible relevance ofanthropological analysis
tothemodem industrial economy, hemustfirst grapple withthequestion ofthe
relevanceofanthropological analysis toanyeconomy (including thosewhich have
beenitstraditional concern). Theoneeconomist I knowofwhohasrecently made
a detailedcritique of anthropological method(i.e.,Berliner 1962) was wise
enoughto avoidtheelusiveepistemological aspectsof thatmethod. Moreover,
ifheoranyother economist hadproceeded ina fashion parallel tothatofKaplan,
388 OF ANTHROPOLOGY
SOUTHWESTERNJOURNAL
I wagerthatfew,if any,anthropologists wouldconsider hisprogram as justified,

legitimate, relevant,orreasonable.
Thus,thelogicalimplication of Kaplan'sposition(1968b:228)is a stillmore
generalquestion:to whatextentcan formalanalysisin anyscientific discipline
informus about the operationof any aspectof phenomenal reality?Or, as
Kaplan (1968b:247) himselfposesit lateron in hispaper:"whatis thelogical
roleof formalpropositions in our attempts to understand and explainthephe-
nomenalworld?"This is clearlya questionwhichcross-cuts disciplinary bound-
ariesandtowhichthephilosophers of sciencecan directtheirspeculations butfor
whichtheyareunlikely to formulate definitive discipline-specificanswers.
As a pointof departure forhiscartesian exercise,Kaplan fails to defineany
of his basic concepts(e.g., "concreteeconomicsystem");yethe proceeds,un-
daunted,to arguethattheexplanatory valueof formaleconomic propositions in
thecontext of a marketeconomy(sic) is dubiousat best (1968b:241),and that
theycan tell us littleof relevanceaboutany "concreteeconomicsystem." His
conclusion, whichwasneverreallyin doubtfromtheoutset,impliesthatPolanyi's
substantive economics can tell us something relevantabout suchsystems;but,
disappointingly, Kaplannevergetsaroundto informing us precisely whatit can
tellus or how.It wouldhavebeenenlightening if Kaplanwouldhaveaddressed
himself to important questions likethefollowing: What is a "concrete economic
system"? How does the economic anthropologist as external observer and analyst
relateto sucha system? Can, forexample, heseeit ortouchit-as a totality or in
its aspects?Or doesit arisethrough cognition, in which case it is not there ex-
ternally? Or does he simplyperceive it as a phenomenal entity external to him
(thusimplying thatit reallyexistsout there)?And,finally, to whatextentcan
substantive economics inform us abouttheoperationof any economicsystem-
concrete, possible,or otherwise? What willits methodbe?
The pointof thisdiscussion is the following: untilthefollowers of Polanyi
do what theirmentorneverdid, namely,provideus withat least tentative
answers to theseand otherbasicquestions pertaining to thenatureof theirown
concepts, propositions, and principles, I do not thinkit is incumbent uponthe
restof us to payseriousattention to theirjudgments on theexplanatory valueor
applicability (or lack of them) of formal economics in its indigenous domain
(i.e.,themarketeconomy)or, forthatmatter, in morefar-flung domains(i.e.,
primitive and peasanteconomies).Economicanthropologists are bestadvisedto
let theeconomists speak to and about their own problems scopeand method,
in
an enterprise they have intelligently pursued for more thana century without the
intervention of interlopers fromanthropology. The following statement by Joy
(1967:34), forexample,suggeststo me thateconomists

are stillable to handle
their
owndilemmas:
It cannotbetoostronglyemphasized thateconomicsisnotanimmutable bodyof
knowledge in
contained universallaws and generaltheories.
Indisputably, economics
theorizingisconcerned
toexplain thingswhich donotoccurinmany societies.
Indis-
putably,too,theassumptions
ofmany ofitsmodelsareinappropriate
tomany societies.
Equally,theassumptionsofitsmodels maybefound tobe,ormaybecome, inappropri-
atetothesocietieswherethemodels arenowclaimed tohaverelevance.In thisevent,
weshallnotscrap stilllessshallweallturn
economics; ... . Weshall,
anthropologists.
I hope,modify themodelsbylooking fornewhypotheses relevant
toidentify variables
andtheir In part,
interrelationships. weshallfind ourhypothesesbyobserving theway
people andinstitutions dobehave.
actually No doubt weshallcontinuetotestourhy-
potheseswith techniques-albeit
improved-similar tothosewenowuse.In short, we
shallcontinuetousethetoolsofeconomics-simulation, andtesting-to
measurement,
economics
investigate problemsasoursociety changes,andweshallextend ourapplica-
tions
notonly intimebutalsotothestudy forms
ofdifferent ofsocieties.
As hisanti-economics exercise mefornottreating
Kaplancriticizes
unfolds, a
in
problem myoriginal critiquewhichhe himselfs
concoctsinhis counter-critique,
namely, toseekto "confirm ordisconfirmeconomic theoryin anyeconomic sys-
tem, whether itbemarket ornon-market incharacter"(1968b:236) -as ifitwere
the primary taskof the working economic anthropologistto determine the
epistemologicalstatusof formal theoryinsteadofsimply employing selectedas-
pectsof it in an ad hocmanner. Morepointedly,howis thisdeficiency in my
critiquesupposed to relateto thevalidity
of myarguments againstthePolanyi
approach? According toKaplan(1968b:236):
Cook'sassertion thatthesubstantivists
haveprejudgedeconomic theoryandnever
madea serious efforttoapplyittonon-market
economicsis .. highly To
misleading.
untila number ofmethodological .
andconceptual areclarified,
it
begin with, problems
toknow
isdifficult justwhattherelevant dataare,sothatitisalmost
empirical impos-
sibletodecidewhat istocount asaninstance
ofthe"applicability"
ofeconomic theory
andwhat isnot.
itshouldbenotedthatKaplanfailstoproduce
First, evidence
anyspecific to
refutemycriticism of substantivist
prejudgment. Second,Kaplanis apparently
fromthemisconception
suffering thattheissueof "applicability"
cansomehow
be resolvedwithoutad hocoperationalizing the of
(i.e., process linking formal
to empirical
constructs reality)by theindividualworking economic anthropol-
pointis thatitis noneotherthantheeconomic
ogist.The crucial anthropologist
himselfwhomustultimately theconcepts
foroperationalizing
be responsible and
of
propositions economic theory or inthe of
(formal otherwise) study particular
empirically delimited economic fields(CookMS); hecannot andshouldnotex-

pectthis job to be done for him by the economic the
theorist, philosopher of
or
science, anyone else.This is the I
point sought to make (1966b:1495-1496) in
myreply to Cancian. It is preciselyin the resultsof the of
process operationaliza-
tionthattheexplanatory valueof formal economic conceptsandpropositions in
anthropology ultimately rests;butthiscanbeeffected onlythrough pursuit a
the of
method which assumes a priori thatsuchconcepts andpropositions arepotentially
relevantand,therefore, might beexplanatory. Polanyi andhisfollowers, nowsup-
portedbyKaplan,rejectandcriticize sucha method; therestofus advocate and
practiceit.
Itisnoexaggeration toassert thatKaplanflirts withnihilisminhisskepticism of
theanalytical effortsoftheformalists. He categorically rejects
my contention that
variouseconomic anthropologists havemaderelevant useofformal economic con-
and
cepts propositions in their research (Cook1966a:336)byobserving "to that
makeconcepts insomesensefit[original emphasis] a bodyofdataisquitea differ-
entmatter from demonstrating thatthey play a roleinexplaining andpredicting
human behavior" (Kaplan1968b:239). Thoseofus whohaveemployed certain
formal economic concepts andpropositions inourempirical research liketothink
thatthedatawerecompatible with them andnotthatthey werearbitrarily imposed
upon the data. Moreover, ifthe end resultof the is
applicationjudged tobe meta-
phorical-asKaplansuggests-this has not been presented by theformalists as
validscientific explanation; theymay not be saints, but thescientificintegrityof
theiranthropological research isuniformly high.
Kaplanmustbe awareof thefactthatthereis considerably moreeconomic
sophisticationunderlying theuseofformal concepts andpropositions inthework
ofFirth, Belshaw, andother formalists thanthere was,forexample, in thework
ofBoas(whowasmetaphorical inhisapplication oftheconcepts ofinvestment and
interestto theKwakiutl potlatch) or Thurnwald (1965:108-109, 136-140, 205-
208 et passimwithregardto theconcepts of wagesand capital).But again,
Kaplan'sperspective is so biasedthathe assures us thatit is thesubstantivists
nottheformalists whohaveinvested formal economic theorywithsomeempirical
content andthatitwasas a result oftheir "substantialization"ofeconomic theory
thattheyjudgedit to be limited in applicability to market-organized societies
(1968b:239).It is notsurprising thatKaplanfailsto support thisbizarre con-
tentionwitha singlecitation from thesubstantive literature,a failure whichhe
cannot accusemeofhaving committed vis-a-vis mystatement oftheaccomplish-
ments oftheformal approach.
That Kaplan (1968b:239-240) apparently misunderstands theelementary fea-

turesof theoperationalization processimplicitin the workof the formalists is
suggestedby his unreasonable criticismsof Salisbury'simportant study. The
crucialpointwhicheludesKaplan hereis thatSalisburycouldnot possiblyhave
collectedtherelevant data,muchlesshaveperformed theappropriate analytical
procedures on them,without usingcertainconcepts(e.g.,economizing, elasticity,
supplyand demand,exchange ratio,consumption, etc.) fromformal
distribution,
economictheoryas a pointof departure forhis study.Whether,in fact,these
havea highor lowdegreeof explanatory valuein theSiane context is notas im-
portant as how they are modified during the course of the research (via the
methodof successive approximations: see Cook 1966a:335-336; Cook MS). If
they are found not to fitand are totallydiscarded, theirapplicationhas stillbeen
heuristicallymeaningful (if not As so
"explanatory"). Joy(1967:34) perceptively
expresses it: "the mereelucidationof similarities and differences betweencon-
ventional modelsandobserved realitymight initselfbestimulating."And,toquote
thiswriter again (1967:34-35):
Evenifthenecessary to a rejection
amounts
modification of theinitialmodel,the
modelmaystillbeaneconomics
resulting model.If itis,thentheconclusionsofPolanyi
andDaltonareespecially Theywouldbe unfortunate
unfortunate. enoughiftheydis-
couragedthedevelopment modelsfromeconomics
of anthropological models.They
wouldclearly
be wrongiftheydiscouraged
anthropologists-or economists-from de-
economics
therequired
'veloping models.
Obviously,Joy'sremarksapplywithequal forceto categories, concepts,and

from
propositions formal as
economics, they do to more elaboratemodels.
The upshotof thisdiscussion is thatif Kaplan is seriousin hisstatement of
needfor"an approachwhichstrives to achieve thegeneralityof the'formalists'
whileat the same timekeepinga firmfootholdin the empiricalworld-an
approachthatin thespiritof ecumenism mightbe called'substantive formalism'
" (1968b:245),thenhe mustsomehowcultivatean
or 'formalsubstantivism'
of theefforts
appreciation by anthropologists likeSalisburyto operationalizethe
conceptsand propositionsof formal economic theory in theirwork. Or, more
broadly,he mustretracethestepswhichhaveled himto presumeto be able to
determine whetheror not formaleconomics is explanatoryof phenomena in any
empiricaleconomyand re-enterthe territoryof naivet6 where the rest of us
allowtheapplicability
anthropologists problemto resolveitselfin thecontext of
empiricalresearch.
THE ROMANTIC "ANTI-MARKET"SYNDROME RE-EXAMINED:

SEARCH FOR A METHOD IN THE MUDDLE
Giventhemethod andaimsofmyoriginal themostserious
critique, charge
Kaplan(1968b:232) levels
againstit is thatI misinterpreted
Polanyi'sviewof
"primitiveman"andhiseconomic life.Thecruxofhiscriticism (Kaplan1968b:
233) is that
. . itisfrom themethodological
perspectiveofconventional thatCook
economics
seems tolevel
hiscriticisms
atPolanyi
forromanticizingthe"nature"ofprimitive
man.
ButCook'sstrictures
aremisdirected.
Polanyi isnotconcernedwith"innate"
economic
orforthatmatter
propensities, with
thebehavior ofindividuals atall.
quaindividuals
Whatdoesconcern himisinstitutionalized
behavior.
Kaplan(1968b:236)drawsthefollowing conclusion fromhischaracterization
ofPolanyi as aninstitutionalist:
. . . thequestionthatshould
more beposed
properly iswhetherPolanyihasroman-
ticizedthe"institutional
framework"ofprimitiveliferather
thanthe"nature ofprimi-
tiveman";or,moreaccurately, sincePolanyiwasnotan anthropologist andmerely
usedtheempirical ofanthropologists,
findings whether asa discipline
anthropology has
romanticized economic
primitive Butthisis an entirely
institutions. different kindof
indictment than theoneCookintended.2
Evenifweassume, forthesakeafargument, thatKaplan'sjudgments aresound,
I amat a losstounderstand whatdifferenceitwouldmaketothevalidity ofmy
demonstration of a linkagebetween Polanyi'santi-market mentalityand his ro-
mantic viewsof theprimitive, whethertheselatterfocusuponthe"nature" or
uponthe"institutions" ofprimitiveman.Thefactstillremains thattorefute my
characterization ofthemodels ofprimitiveeconomic manandhissociety implicit
in Polanyi's Kaplanmustexplainawaythecategorical
writings, imperatives in
thosewritings whichattribute andcooperative
altruistic (and
propensities play
downself-seeking, and competitiveness)
aggressiveness, to economic manin a
non-market situation. I both
Finally, reject the spiritand of
rationale Kaplan's
suggestion thatanthropologistsaretobe heldaccountable forthearbitrary and
un-anthropological way inwhich Polanyi
interpreted and used theirfindings.To
borrow from Kaplan'sownrepertory ofeuphemisms, his (Kaplan's)"strikes me
asa curious argument forananthropologist"
(1968b:245).
In thepassages quotedaboveKaplanaccuses me,ineffect,of"psychologism"
2 The useofthepejorative
term"indictment"byKaplanimplies thatthelabel"romantic"
or theterm'"romanticization"
arousestrong within
emotions him--that it is somehow morally
or ethically to romanticize
reprehensible of external
one'sexperience phenomenal My
reality.
purposewasnotto indictPolanyi
forbeingromanticbutsimply to exposetheromantic under-
pinningsof histhought.
I leavethetaskofindicting
or praising
to thejurists and theologians.
in attributing a concern with"humannature"and "individual behavior" to

Polanyi the To
institutionalist. this
support interpretation Kaplan citesthree
phraseswhichI employed in myoriginal discussion (Cook 1966a:326-329),
namely, "innate andcooperative propensities,"
"inherently altruistic,"and"prin-
ciplesofbehavior." Moreover,heputsquotation marks around theterm "nature"
(Kaplan1968b:233)and"nature ofprimitiveman"(1968b:236)so as toimply
thatthesereflect myusagerather thanPolanyi's; thisis demonstrably notthe
case.Tediousas itmaybe,there is onlyonewayto settle thisissueconclusively
andthatisbyexamining Polanyi'sownstatements inextenso.
First,it is worth that
noting Kaplan(1968b:234)quotesfromonlyoneof
Polanyi's laterwritingstosupport hiscounter-interpretation ofPolanyi's thought;
he inexplicably ignorestheall-important earlierwritings (i.e.,1944,1947)in
which Polanyi's romanticanti-market syndrome wasgiven itsfirst,
mostcomplete,
andmostsystematic Paradoxically,
expression. it is Kaplan himself (1968b:229)
inanearlier sectionofhispaperwhoemphasizes theimportance ofPolanyi's early
workinthedevelopment ofhisthought:
AsbothNashandCookrightly pointout,itwaslargely under theimpact ofthe
writings ofKarlPolanyi andhisfollowers thatanthropologistsdivided themselvesinto
"formalist" and"substantivist"
camps. Theensuing debate seems tohavehadas its
major catalystthecollection
ofessays inPolanyi,Arensberg andPearson (1957).It is
interestingtonote,however,thatallofthebasicingredientsofthesubstantivist position
added]canbe found
[italics inPolanyi's TheGreatTransformation, originallypub-
lishedin1944.
I wouldextend thisargument byasserting thatthecareful studyof The Great
Transformation is essential
forachieving a correct understanding of Polanyi's
viewsonthescopeandmethod ofeconomic anthropology. These,in turn,area
by-product ofhisbasicintellectual
quest-toascertain theorigins ofthe"market
habit,"
by which he meant thepropensity totruck, and
barter, exchange forgain,
andofthe"market mentality,"
by which
he meant thepropensityto theorizeabout
themarket habitin formal economicterms(Cook1968b:968).
Contrary toKaplan'sstrong denial,Polanyi-inbothof hisearlyworks-is
concerned
directly with economic"motives," "incentives,"
"propensities,""human
passions,"and withthe"economic psychology of earlyman" (hisusage)in
general.In factmuchofPolanyi's discussion ofboththe"market" andthe"non-
market" economy in theidiomof hypothetical
is phrased individual psychology,
whichpervades thewritings of theClassicalpolitical economists. For instance,
Polanyi(1944:43-55, 269-273)repeatedlyrefersto"reciprocity"and"redistribu-
tion"as "principlesofbehavior";yetKaplan(1968b:233)implies thatthisusage
is mine in quoting my statementthat "Polanyi's model of primitivesociety is

based on two principlesof behavior[Kaplan's italics], reciprocity
and redistribu-
tion . . ." to supporthis accusationthat my "stricturesare misdirected."
The followingpassages fromPolanyi's earlywritings,whichprovidedthe raw
materialfromwhichI inferredPolanyi's utopianviewof primitivesocietyand his
romanticview of non-marketman (Cook 1966a:327), verifythe accuracyof my
originalinferences:
The outstanding discovery of recenthistoricaland anthropological researchis that
man'seconomy, as a rule,is submerged in hissocialrelationships.He doesnotact so as
to safeguardhis individualinterest in thepossessionof materialgoods; he acts so as to
safeguardhissocialstanding, hissocialclaims,hissocialassets.He valuesmaterialgoods
onlyin so far as theyservethisend. Neitherthe processof productionnor thatof
distribution is linkedto specificeconomicinterests attachedto thepossessionof goods;
but everysinglestepin thatprocessis gearedto a numberof social interestswhich
eventuallyensurethatthe requiredstepsbe taken . . .the economicsystemwill be
runon noneconomic motives.
. . Take the case of tribalsociety.The individual'seconomicinterestis rarely
paramount.. . . The maintenance of socialties . . . is crucial.First,becauseby dis-
regardingthe acceptedcode of honor,or generosity, the individualcuts himselfoff
fromthecommunity and becomesan outcast;second,because,in thelongrun,all social
obligations are reciprocal, and theirfulfillment servesalso theindividual'sgive-and-take
interestsbest.Such a situationmustexerta continuouspressureon the individualto
eliminateeconomicself-interest fromhis consciousness to thepointof makinghimun-
able . . . evento comprehend theimplications of hisown actionsin termsof suchan
interest.. . . The premiumset on generosity is so greatwhenmeasuredin termsof
social prestigeas to make any otherbehaviorthan that of utterself-forgetfulness
simplynotpay (1944:46).
Symmetry and centricitywillmeethalfwaytheneedsof reciprocity and redistribu-

tion;institutional
patterns and principlesof behaviorare mutuallyadjusted.As longas
socialorganization runsin itsruts,no individualeconomicmotivesneedcomeintoplay;
no shirkingof personaleffort need be feared;divisionof laborwill automatically be
ensured;economicobligationswill be duly discharged;and, above all, the material
meansforan exuberant displayof abundanceat all publicfestivals willbe provided.In
sucha community theidea of profitis barred;higglingand hagglingis decried;giving
freelyis acclaimedas a virtue;thesupposedpropensity to barter,truck,and exchange
does notappear.The economicsystemis, in effect, a merefunctionof socialorganiza-
tion(1944:49; italicsadded).
In effect,theindividualis notin dangerof starving

unlessthecommunity as a whole
is in a like predicament.It is thisabsenceof themenaceof individualdestitutionthat
makesprimitive society,in a sense,morehumanethan 19thcentury society,and at the
sametimeless"economic."
The sameappliesto thestimulusof individualgain. . . . If so-calledeconomicmo-
tiveswerenaturaltoman,wewouldhaveto judgeall earlyandprimitive

societies
as
unnatural
thoroughly (1947:112).
Thesestatements andmanyothers likethemarethestuff of whichthefabric
of Polanyi's substantivist thought is woven. I shareBelshaw's judgment (1968:
369) thatPolanyi's thought is anachronistic; it obviously combines pre-function-
alistsocialanthropology withpre-Marxian political economy. In short,Kaplan's
interpretation of Polanyi'sviewsnotonlyconflicts withminebut,moreim-
portantly, withPolanyi's ownexpression ofhisviews. Theselatter areadmittedly
ambiguous on some issues,but,overall, are so
they expressed adamantly as to
leavenodoubtabouttheir major themes and emphases.
It is clearfromthetotalcontext of mycritique, as wellas frommymore
recent commentaries onsubstantivist thought (1966b;1968a:10-32; 1968b),that
I creditPolanyi withan apparent ultimate concern withinstitutionalized orpat-
terned(as opposedto individual or idiosyncratic) behavior. In retrospect, my
use of themodifiers "innate"and "inherent" (1966a:327-328) to describe Po-
lanyi'sviewswasinthecontext ofa discussion of themodelofmanimplicit in
hischaracterization of thesalientfeatures of the"primitive" of
type society.
WhatI sought toconvey herewasthatthealtruistic andcooperative propensities
whichPolanyiattributes to primitive economic manas actorare innateor in-
herent intheidealsocietal context inwhich thishypothetical actorallegedly oper-
ates;thesepropensities areobviously notinnateor inherent in primitive man's
psychological or physical nature. For,likeanyothermodelof economic man,
Polanyi's is a fleshlessandbloodless abstraction: whatis innate(i.e.,generic) to
itcanonlybesothrough themandate ofitscreator (e.g.,Polanyi)andinevitably
reflectshisjudgments aboutthenature oftheidealized substantive context (i.e.,
primitivesociety) inwhich "economic" action occurs.
Kaplan'sassertion (1968b:233)that"Cookseemsto levelhiscriticisms at
Polanyiforromanticizing the 'nature' of man
primitive . . . from the method-
ologicalperspective of conventional economics" reflectshisfailure to appreciate
theextent to which theperspective implicit in certain expository sections of my
critiqueis, in essence,an accurate reflection of own
Polanyi's perspective. to But
properly understand Polanyi's perspective, one must firstunderstand hismethod;
andKaplanpresents noevidence thathehasacquired suchan understanding.
Polanyi's method wasanoutgrowth ofhisconcern withthedehumanizing and
anti-social consequences of theinstitutionalization of the"market economy."
Morespecifically, an inevitable consequence of hisquestfortheorigins of the
"market habit" and of the "market mentality" (Cook1968b:968) was that his
method wasreduced toa series ofunsubtle exercises incontradicting ornegating

thepostulates ofthatmentality (i.e.,thedoctrines ofClassicaleconomics). It is
nocoincidence, therefore, thattheopening paragraphs inPolanyi's firstessayin
economic anthropology dealwitha critique ofAdamSmith's postulatethatthe
division of laborin society wasdependent uponmarkets or,morespecifically,
t"upon man's 'propensity to barter, truck and exchange thingforanother'
one "
(1944:43). Nor is itcoincidental that thisessay was an integral partof hismajor
bookinpolitical economy, TheGreatTransformation-an expose ofthe"origins"
of theWestern capitalist economy-and thatthelatter work(together withhis
1947article)preceded in
in timeandanticipated content his laterwritingsin
economic anthropology.
AsI interpret it,then, Polanyi's intellectual output wastheproduct ofhiscon-
tinuous personal dialecticwithClassical economic thought andwiththeparticular
economic system which wasitsobject.In itsinception andelaboration Polanyi's
substantivism isbestunderstood as aninversion (both conscious andunconscious)
of Classicaleconomic thought: Polanyi's altruistic non-market economic manis
theantithesis oftheselfish market economic manofClassicaleconomics, justas
hissocial(or institutional) embedding of the economy is the of the
antithesis
Classicaleconomists' economic embedding of society(1944:43-67; 1947:114).
Polanyialludesto thismethod instatements suchas thefollowing (1944:44):
"To startwith, wemustdiscard somenineteenth century prejudices thatunder-
layAdamSmith's about
hypothesis primitive alleged man's forgain-
predilection
fuloccupations." Thus,Polanyi's perspective, as well as the idiom with which it
wasarticulated, wasa creature ofhisexercise incounterpoint tothepostulatesof
thepromoters ofthe"market mentality" (i.e.,theClassical economists) whom he
as his
appointed ideological opponents.
How didPolanyiapplythismethol of negation? His wasnottherigorous,
objective,andsystematically pursued method ofthescientist somuchas itwasthe
capricious, subjective, and passionately-induced method of thepolemicist. Its
effectiveness resides notso muchintheskillsofitsmanipulator butmorein the
elusive yetprovocative nature ofhistopicofinquiry. A first steptoward under-
standing Polanyi's method is to recognize that the series of categoricalimperatives
aboutthenature ofprimitive manandhiseconomic lifewhich pervadehiswritings
(e.g.,1944:46-55, 269-274; 1947;1968)werederived from hisattempted negation
ofthedoctrines ofClassical economic This
thought. attempt a setofanti-
yielded
theses pertaining to thebehavior of non-market economic man,whichPolanyi
proceeded tomodify of the of
tofithisinterpretation findingsanthropology. The
principal counter-postulates (antitheses) which Polanyi formulatedas a resultof

hiscritique ofClassical thought are the following (1944:269-274):
(1) Themotive ofgainisnot"natural" toman.
(2) Toexpect payment forlabor isnot"natural" toman.
(3) To restrict labor totheunavoidable minimum toman.
isnot"natural"
(4) Theusualincentives tolaborarenotgainbutreciprocity, competition,joyof
work, andsocial approbation.
(5) Economic systems, as a rule, areembedded distribution
insocialrelations; of
material goods is ensured by noneconomic motives.
(6) Individual foodcollection fortheuseofhisownperson andfamily doesnot
form of
part early man's life.
(7) Individual actsof"truck, barter,andexchange" areonlyexceptionallyprac-
ticedinprimitive society.
Thisisnottheplacetoexamine these propositionsagainsttheethnographic record,
butthosefamiliar withmodern anthropology willimmediately realizetheinac-
curacy ofPolanyi's antitheses.
Thismethod ofnegation, andtheconcern withthehypothetical-psychological
aspects of economic behavior which it entailed,
underlay latercontribu-
Polanyi's
tionsto economic on
anthropology "place the of economiesin societies"(1957:
239-242; 1968:116-138), asis clear from hisstatement:
Theproblem oftheplaceoftheeconomic systeminsociety
involves
several impor-
tantquestions suchas theseparateness ortheembeddedness ofthese the
institutions;
actualpsychological motives onwhich individuals inrunning
participate thoseinstitu-
tions. . (1968:122; italicsadded).
.
in
Also, examining the views on theplaceof theeconomic system in society as
presented by various thinkers from Montesquieu to Max Weber,Polanyi(1968:
123)advocated andpursued thefollowing analytic program:
Weshould fixourattention ontwopoints: (1) Howfardoestheassumption ofa
separate economic system insociety underlie,andhowfar,onthecontrary, istheview
indicative ofanapproach tosociety asa whole ofwhich theeconomicforms merely one
aspect? (2) Whatassumptions inregard motives
toactualpsychological [myitalics]
underlie theviews oftheauthors? Howfardothey assume ofspecifically
theexistence
economic motives?
It is clearthatPolanyi askedandwrote aboutthesequestions ofindividual psy-
chological motivation because he was concerned with theirrelevanceto the study
ofeconomic problems. His ultimate concern, ofcourse,waswithinstitutionalized
behavior (i.e.,socially embedded behavior) -a concern whichI neverdeniedas
Kaplan contends (1968b:233); but between hisactualpointofdeparture andhis
ideal destination
was bothan idiomand a methodwhichfocusedon individual
psychologicalmotives Polanyiwas less theculturol-
and conduct.In conclusion,
ogistand than
sociologist Kaplanrepresents him as beingsimplybecausehe was
andmoralphilosopher
moreof a politicaleconomist thanKaplanunderstands him
as being(1968b:232-236).
ON THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY:

PRESENT AND FUTURE
I willrespondto one morechargemadebyKaplan (1968b:245) againstmy
critiqueof Polanyi'ssubstantive approach:"Cook's contention, thatsinceprim-
itiveeconomies aredisappearing thesubstantivist me as
thesisis academic,strikes
a curiousargumentfor an anthropologist." Kaplan could have avoided still
anothermisunderstanding of myviewssimplyby havingacceptedtheinterpre-
tationsof2 ofhisanthropological colleagues,Cancianand Fried.Cancian (1966:
465), for example, makes the followingaccurate interpretationof myposition:
"he [Cook] shows.. thatmostsocietiesbynowparticipate in active'market'
economies, and thattherefore anysignificance thesubstantivistpositionmayhave
for the studyof 'non-market' economies is of littleimportance as a guide to
present fieldresearch."
Fried,on theotherhand,likeKaplan,raisesquestionsaboutmyattemptto
establishlimitson theapplicability of thesubstantivist approachto thestudyof
economic problems in thecontemporary world;but, unlike Kaplan,Fried (1968:
239-240) has notdistorted mypositionbyomitting referenceto thewidercondi-
tionswhichI emphasized as comprising themilieuin whicheconomicanthropo-
logicalinquiry mustnowbe conducted:
itmaybeprofitabletoinquireifCookisreallymeeting Polanyiheadon.Therecan
be little thatall contemporary
question economies areenmeshedtosomedegreeinwhat
werefer as theworldeconomy.
toabstractly Thatis,tosomeextent all havebeenpene-
tratedbymoney andtheeffects ofa market, nomatter howfarawayfrom themarket
place.But the of
effects a varietyof formsof imperialismand colonialism
and other
aspectsof theexpansion of certain
dominant economies shouldnotobscure thepos-
that there
sibility formerly may have existedother frameworks foreconomic systems
andsomeof thesemayhavebeenso organized as toeludecaptureandunderstanding
byeconomic basedonmarkets
theories andscarcity.
As thestatement byFriedcorrectly myattempt
implies, limitsto the
to establish
of
applicability substantivetheorywas to
designed cope with the accelerating
world-wide of marketphenomena
processof the diffusion linkedwiththe ex-
intrusion
pansionist of certaindominant, economies.
urban-industrial Giventhese
conditions,I believe thatitbecomes necessary fortheeconomic anthropologist (1)

to discern theessential aspects of the so-called "market principle" (Belshaw
1965:8-9)which maybeoperative ina given empirically defined exchange system,
(2) toisolate"traditional" from "modern" aspects ofthatprinciple, and (3) to
analyze their respective rolesin theobjectsystem. In thismilieueventhosesub-
stantivists
who,unlike Kaplan, admit that formal economic theory is explanatory
of economic processes in market economies (e.g., Dalton 1969:64 et passim)
mustagreethatan economic anthropology which draws the
upon theory of the
market economy will have wider applicability to the "real" world than an economic
anthropology which a priori rejectsthattheory.
Kaplan'sinterpretation, in striking contrast to thoseof Cancianand Fried,
distortsthemajorthrust ofmyoriginal argument. A careful reading ofthelatter
(Cook1966a:325)shows thatmyactualposition ispreciselytheopposite ofthat
which Kaplan attributes tome (cf. Dalton 1969:68). He asserts thatmy conten-
tionis "thatsinceprimitive economies aredisappearing thesubstantivist thesis
is academic," whereas I clearly statedtheopposite as follows: "It is undeniable
thatanthropology canstillprofit fromthestudyof extinct societiesas wellas
fromthestudyof extant'primitive' societies; and, in the fieldof economics,
substantive theory offers onemeaningful approach tosuchstudies"(Cook1966a:
325).
WhatI objected toinmyoriginal critique (andstillobjectto)is thePolanyi
group's paradoxical "anti-economics"-a doctrinaire viewpoint which emasculates
economic anthropology in theanalytic studyof market andmarket-related phe-
nomena andarbitrarily impoverishes its theoretical tool kitin the study of pro-
duction, transfer, and utilization in
processes anyspatio-temporal context. Let
mereiterate: I do notadvocate theuncritical or arbitrary rejection of certain
positive aspectsof thePolanyiapproach, although I believethattheanalytic
valueof thesehasyetto be convincingly demonstrated bytheiradvocates; nor
do I suggest thatanthropologists the
abandon study of extinct or extant pre-in-
dustrialsocieties andcultures. WhatI amadvocating is theviewthatthegreat
challenge to economic anthropological inquiry is to establishtheempirical bases
ofa formal-substantive approach in a contemporary world of contrasting market
economies andtoseekitstheoretical basesbywhatever methods enableittoreach
itsscientificobjective, the
namely, comparative understanding of differentrealand
possibleeconomic systems (Godelier 1967:245).
Thattheachievement ofthisaimwillentailtheselective anddiscriminating
useofthetoolkit of economic theory and
(orthodox unorthodox) shouldbe no
moredisturbing toanthropologists is
than the use ofsociological theory instudy-
ingproblemsinsocialanthropology,
theuseofpolitical
theoryinpoliticalanthro-
pology,or theuse of psychological
theoryin studies.
culture-and-personality
Indeed,thefollowing by an anthropologist
statement on theapplicabilityof
to studies
in
psychologyculture-and-personality anthropology is extend-
logically
able to theproblem of theapplicability
of economic theory to culture-and-
economy studies:
If ananthropologistwishes toaskpsychological[economic] thenheis
questions,
obliged to operate
within theconceptual andtheoreticalframework of psychology
[economics].Butthisdoesnotmeanthatanthropology asa discipline
isabout psychol-
ogy[economics],itmerely thatsomeanthropologists
signifies areinterestedinpsycho-
logical[economic]questions.It isthefailure
tofully
appreciatethefactthatdifferent
kindsofquestioninglogically necessitate
theuseofdifferentconceptsandtheoretical
schemes whichhassometimes madeculture-personality
[culture-economy] research
so
vulnerabletocriticism.
.... all-too-frequently have
anthropologists inferredpersonality
[economic] configurations
wholly orinlarge
partfrom culturaldata,ratherthandeal-
ingwithpersonality[economy] inmoreautonomous, i.e.,psychological
[economic]
terms.Sincethey thenwanttorelate personality
[economy] backto culture, their
methodologicalprocedure becomes circular
anda great dealoftheir theoretical
state-
mentstautological.
Substitutetheterms in brackets forthosepreceding themin thisquotation and
we havea concisestatement of therationale underlying mycriticism of the
"anti-economics" of thePolanyi group,as wellas of themethod whichI (and
others)advocate forthestudy ofpeasant-artisan
economies byeconomic anthro-
pologists(Cook 1968a:10-51; 1968c;MS). The culminating paradox is that the
authorofthesewords is noneother thanourlatestPolanyi-inspired critic of the
formal approach to economic anthropology,Kaplan(1968a:72).
Whatis fundamentally at stakehereis notonlya question of method but
alsoofcontrasting viewsofthenature ofknowledge anditspurposes. Kaplan's
approach totheproblem ofprediction versus
explanationinscientific inquiry and
hisargument fortheprimacy of explanation(1968b:241-245) glossesoverthe
factthatexplanation is a processofseveralaspectsandcanrelateto (1) whatis
actualoroccurring, to (2) whatmight occuroris capableof occurring, andto
(3) what must occur in
(i.e., philosophicaljargon it has"assertoric,""problem-
atic"and "apodictic" aspects, Moreover,
respectively). his critique of formal
economic theory onepistemological grounds(Kaplan1968b:236-245) canbe in-
as a
terpreted defense of the thesisthatknowledgeabout what is actualoroccur-
ringis categorically higher and of absolutely more value than otherkindsof
knowledge (i.e.,ofwhatmight occurorof whatmustoccur);andthatformal
economics oranyotherformofscientific inquiry shouldalwaysandnecessarily

seektheformer andavoidthelatterkindsof knowledge. Now thisthesismay
be true,buttheissuesinvolved in making a judgment aboutit areconsiderably
morecomplex thanKaplan'sdiscussion implies, andthesolutions to theseprob-
lemsare certainly beyondthetraditional boundaries of anthropological com-
petence(insofar as theyrelatetoother disciplinesandtoknowledge ingeneral).
Frommyperspective, thetrend of future inquiry in economic anthropology
mustbe focused on formulating andelaborating relevant operational procedures
combined withachieving thebroadest possible theoretical scope which includesa
recognition of the relevance of various kinds of knowledge to our understanding
of particular sectors of phenomenal reality(i.e.,thosewhichwe delimit for
study). In this context, one of our crucial problems as economic anthropologists
is to determine whatpositive roletheformal method ofNeoclassical economics
(andthedialectical method ofMarxian economics) canplayineconomic anthro-
pological inquiry. Perhaps economic anthropologists, likeeconomists, can profit
from a method which is basedon theassumption thatknowledge ofwhatmight
occur(i.e.,problematic) or of whatmustoccur(i.e.,apodictic)can lead the
investigator to more comprehensive knowledge of whatis actualor occurring
(i.e.,assertoric). It is in thisspiritthat Godelier (1967:258)discusses ourunder-
of a
standing "possible system":
Whatdoweunderstand bya "possible system"? It istherepresentation ofthecom-
monelement ofallpossible casesofthetype ofsystem considered.Forexample, there-
construction ofthe"totemic operator"which Levi-Straussgives usistherepresentation
ofthecommon formal element inallpossible systems oftotemic thought. A common
formal element isan"invariant factor"which isfound inallpossible varieties
andvaria-
tions ofthesystem considered. Formalism isan"eidetic" advance, inaccordance with
which thought detaches from
itself realsystems toconsider possible systemsand,thus,
toapproximate realityasthe"possible realized."
Whilethe philosophers of science(and Kaplan) are seekingdefinitive
answers to majorcross-disciplinary problems of epistemology, economic anthro-
pologists canbe experimenting withand formulating procedures fortheopera-
tionalization ofstrategies, models, theories, andconcepts from anysource which
theyjudge to bepotentially fruitfulin their for
quest comparative understanding
ofproduction, transfer, andutilization processes in contrasting contexts.
Finally,
thoseof us whoareconcerned aboutthescientific propriety ourefforts
of can
restassured, along with LeClair and Schneider (1968:473), that "Whatever the
philosophers of science might say (andwhattheysay is often confusing and
402 SOUTHWESTERNJOURNAL
OF ANTHROPOLOGY
scientific
contradictory) methodincludes modeofthought,
anyprocess, operation
or activity
whichwillsuccessfully
lead to verifiable
and verified
propositions
abouttheworldaroundus."3
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The "Anti-Market" Mentality Re-Examined: A Further Critique of the Substantive Approach to

sooneror later,as thedialeticof thisratheresotericbranchof anthropological

KARLPOLANYI: THE GHOST OF ENGELS REINCARNATED

sents,as Sahlinswrites, a "historically

As Nicolaus (1968:44) goeson to pointoutin hisseminalarticle,Marxeven

ofactionwouldbethefacilitation ofa conceptual-empirical linkbetween cultural

Manyeconomic anthropologistsincluding pioneering contributorsof the

SUBSTANTIVISM: GENUINE AND SPURIOUS

economies in kind,notdegree;theybothconsider theprimitive economy to be

(1966a:329-336) wasundertaken solelyinreaction toconsistent substantivist dis-

I wagerthatfew,if any,anthropologists wouldconsider hisprogram as justified,

(1967:34), forexample,suggeststo me thateconomists

empirically delimited economic fields(CookMS); hecannot andshouldnotex-

That Kaplan (1968b:239-240) apparently misunderstands theelementary fea-

Obviously,Joy'sremarksapplywithequal forceto categories, concepts,and

THE ROMANTIC "ANTI-MARKET"SYNDROME RE-EXAMINED:

in attributing a concern with"humannature"and "individual behavior" to

is mine in quoting my statementthat "Polanyi's model of primitivesociety is

Symmetry and centricitywillmeethalfwaytheneedsof reciprocity and redistribu-

In effect,theindividualis notin dangerof starving

tiveswerenaturaltoman,wewouldhaveto judgeall earlyandprimitive

method wasreduced toa series ofunsubtle exercises incontradicting ornegating

principal counter-postulates (antitheses) which Polanyi formulatedas a resultof

ON THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY:

conditions,I believe thatitbecomes necessary fortheeconomic anthropologist (1)

economics oranyotherformofscientific inquiry shouldalwaysandnecessarily

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