People v.
Apolinar, 1938 from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid
Facts:
The accused Apolinar was an occupant of a parcel of land owned
by Joaquin Gonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan. On the
midnight of December 22, 1936, Armed with a shotgun, Apolinar was
looking over the land when he observed that there was a man carrying a
bundle on his shoulder. Believing that he was a thief (of palay), Apolinar
called his attention but the thief ignored him. Apolinar then fired in the
air and then at the person who managed to flee. The person, later
identified as Domingo Petras, was able to get back to his house and told
Angel Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been wounded in the back
by a shotgun for getting palay from the part of the land tilled by the
accused. He had two wounds, one in each side of the spinal column and
were circular and a little bigger than a quarter of an inch according to the
medical reports.
Apolinar surrendered to the authorities immediately after the
incident and gave a sworn statement before the Justice of the Peace of
Umingan the day after. He stated that on that night, upon seeing a person
coming from the water, carrying a sack filled with palay, he shouted to ask
who it was but since there was no response, he fired in the air (warning
shot). He asked again and Petras still did not answer and instead turned
around and fled. Apolinar then fired at him. Apolinar did not say anything
regarding any aggression committed or attempted by Petras towards the
barrio chief Bonifacio Mendones, which is the basis of his defense.
Issue:
W/N Apolinar can invoke self-defense as a justifying
circumstance.
Held:
No. According to the defendant and his witness, the aggression
against Mendones was carried out by Petras with a bolo. In the present
case, no bolo has been presented before the court which would have
supported his defense. Furthermore, the evidence shows that upon
getting seriously wounded, he was carrying the sack of palay on his arms
coming from the land tilled by Apolinar. This is not, however, sufficient
justification. The right to property is not of such importance as right to
life. Defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only
when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said
property.
People v. Narvaez, 1983
Facts:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by
treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968,
Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were
constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his
house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard
sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the
group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they
could talk things over. Fleischer responded with No, gadamit, proceed,
go ahead. Defendant lost his equilibrium, and shot Fleisher with his
shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the
deceaseds gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the
company of Fleischers family) was involved in a legal battle with the
defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of
property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for
annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be
annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property
trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didnt pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove
his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled
that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
Issues:
1. WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the
fact that he acted in defense of his person.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant
although he acted in defence of his rights.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he
is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
Held:
1. No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls
of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on
the part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the
person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first
issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the
violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil
code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to
subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being
awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting
ownership into question. Its accepted that victim was the original
aggressor.
2. Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art.
11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
a) Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful
aggression towards appellants property rights. Fleisher had
given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace
before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaezs house and
putting up fence. A536 of the CC also provides that possession
may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art.
539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected
in his possession
b) Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel
attack. In case, killing was disproportionate to attack.
c) Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending
himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was
asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6)
RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender &
passion & obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation)
Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault
wasnt deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill.
Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However,
due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be
lowered 3 degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
3. No. He isnt liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for non-payment of
civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of A39 applicable to
fines only & not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages & costs of proceedings. Although it was
enacted only after its commission, considering that RA 5465 is
favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be
given retroactive effect pursuant to RPC A22.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances
and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4
mos. arresto mayor & to indemnify each group of heirs 4K w/o subsidiary
imprisonment & w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already
been detained 14 yrs so his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when
coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at
bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor.
However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.
People v. Chua Hiong, 1954
Facts:
Accused Federico Chua Hiong was found guilty of the crime of
libel for which he comes on appeal.
Chua Hiong assumes full authorship of the alleged libelous
publication which claimed that the investigations on his citizenship was
instigated by his nephew Cesario Gocheco. He claimed that in the 25 years
that they have known each other, Gocheco never lifted a finger to protest
his citizenship. He further claimed that Gocheco instigated the
investigation as a form revenge since they were opposing parties in a civil
case where Gocheco lost two-thirds of important inheritance left by one
Paulino Gocheco. He also claimed that the Benito Solipco who sent him a
piece of rope to hang himself with was fictitious and was Gocheco in
disguise.
Issue:
W/N Chua Hiong was justified when he gave the alleged libelous
matter for publication.
Held:
Yes. Chua Hiongs action was intended to counteract the
impression left in the mind of the public by the articles entitled Doubtful
Citizenship which the aggrieved party caused to be published in the
Manila Chronicle.
People v. Pelayo, 1966
Facts:
This is an appeal from the judgment convicting the accused of light
oral defamation.
On November 15, 1956, in the office of Atty. Clapano, the accused
told the latter, within the hearing of Francisco Baez, Rafael Mascarias,
and Prisco Parmisano, that while investigating the existence of gambling
in the community, a Chinese operator named Lim Peng told him that then
Governor (Senator during the pendency of the case) Almendras used to
receive from the Chinese P500 protection money. He added that
Almendras was not satisfied with P500 so he asked for P1000 but because
the Chinese could not afford that amount, Almendras raided his place.
On the following day, the accused delivered a privilege speech
during the regular session of the City Council of Davao City, wherein,
although without directly mentioning the governor as receving tongs,
the reference to the latter after a series of interpellation and answers
during the speech became obvious.
The accused admits having said those things but claims that (1) he
uttered those words in confidence to Clapano and that they are covered
by the rule on privileged communication, (2) that since the crime as
charged which is for serious slander is different from, and not included in,
the crime as proved which is intriguing against honor, the conviction is
illegal, (3) that he uttered those words and phrases in self-defense to what
then Gov. Almendras in the latters speech had stated of him in another
place a few days before, and (4) that the award for nominal damages
should have been what he was also entitled to as a result of the slander
made to him by Almedras.
Issue:
W/N the claim of the accused that he acted in self-defense is valid.
Held:
No. On his first contention, in the first place, his contention of
confidence is inconsistent with his other contention of self-defense. If the
communication was for the purpose of self-defense, it should no have
been made in confidence as he alleged. In the second place, the records
also show that on the following day, he delivered a speech at the session
of the City Council, wherein although he did not mention names, he made
it obvious that he was referring to Almendras. In the third place, there
were others who heard the remarks when he was talking to Clapano.
Thus, he could not have given the communication in confidence.
On his second contention, the facts do not constitute intriguing
against honor because the information given by the accused to Clapano
within the hearing of others allegedly came from a definite source. Where
the source of the information can be pin-pointed and definitely
determined and adopting the information as his own, passes the same to
another for the purpose of causing dishonor to the complainants
reputation, the act is not intriguing against honor but clearly one of
slander.
On his contention of self-defense, fot it to exist in instances such as
this, the defender should not go beyond explaining what was previously
said of him for the purpose of repairing or minimizing if not entirely
removing the effect of the damage caused to him. The principle does not
license him to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in return for what
he received.
Where the the goes beyond mere explaining his side, or repairing,
minimizing, or removing the effect of the damage by hitting back, his
retaliation becomes an entirely independent act of his own of which he
may stand to answer the consequences.
In the case at bar, if it is true that on a previous occasion Almendras
had imputed to the accused, that he, the latter, was receiving money from
gambling operators, the accused was not licensed to make the same
imputation or accusation because to do that is not an act of defense but
an aggression itself.
US v. Esmedia, 1910
Facts:
This is an appeal from a sentence convicting Ponciano and Mena
Esmedia of the crime of double homicide.
 Ciriaco Abando, his wife, and their son, Santiago, lived in the
barrio of Bongbongan in Sibalom, Antique. Gregorio Esmedia, father of
the two accused, son-in-law of Ciriaco and brother-in-law of Santiago,
lived in the same barrio. The two families lived very near each other and
owned adjoining rice lands. There has been a dispute between the
families with regards to the ownership of the rice land that was then
occupied by Ciriaco.
At about 2 pm on June 24, 1909, Ciriaco instructed Santiago to
go to a certain place in his rice field to let out water so that they could
plant rice in that said field. Santiago proceeded as ordered and while at
work, Gregorio appeared and started a quarrel with Santiago. Soon
thereafter, Gregorio drew a dagger and stabbed Santiago in the back.
Santiago fell to the ground but arose immediately and attacked Gregorio
with his bolo, inflicting several wounds on Gregorio which made him fall
to the ground. Before the conflict could end, the two accused appeared.
The two contend that they were working in their rice field
nearby, and upon seeing Ciriaco and Santiago attacking their father, they
went to the scene to help their father.
Ponciano claimed that when he got near the place, he was met
by Ciriaco and Santiago, who attacked him with bolos and clubs and that
he acted in self-defense when he knocked them both down. After they fell
down, Mena arrived. Ponciano further contends that he only used a club
and not a bolo.
As a result of this fight, Ciriaco was left dead on the scene,
Gregorio received fatal wounds from which he died within four hours, and
Santiago also received fatal wounds from which he died five days later.
Ciriaco received two wounds on the top of his head, one 8 cm
long and the other 3 cm long, caused by some cutting instrument, and
also sustained a fracture in the skull apparently caused by a blow. He also
had a wound on the head 3 cm deep, on the neck below the left ear 31
cm in depth (tang ina tagos na sa neck) and 3 cm in length, a bruise on the
left eye, and a wound on the right palm 3 cm in length and 2 mm deep.
Santagio received seven wounds. One crosswise of the head,
back of the left ear, 8 cm long and 1 cm deep. Another on top of his head,
just above the first wound, 5 cm long and 0.5 cm deep. Third on the left
part of the neck, 4 cm long. All of the three wounds being caused by a
cutting instrument. Fourth wound was caused by a sharp instrument, 1
cm deep and 8 cm long, on top of the head. Fifth wound is 2.5 cm long
and 5 mm deep which was in the nature of a contusion and appeared on
the frontal region of the head. Sixth is 2 cm long and 3.5 cm deep in the
back, and last is on the left hand, 4 cm long and 2 mm deep which had
apparently been caused by some cutting instrument.
Gregorio had four wounds. A bruise on the front of the head,
5x6 cm in dimension, one running across the head and caused by a cutting
instrument, 6 cm long. Another apparently caused by a blow with some
blunt instrument on the breast. A wound 1 cm deep apparently caused by
a cutting instrument and also a bruise on the left arm.
Issue:
W/N the two accused can be acquitted on the ground of
defense of relative.
Held:
Yes for the death of Santiago but not for Ciriaco.
The accused are exempt from criminal liability for having caused
the death of Santiago inasmuch as it has been shown that they inflicted
those wounds upon him in defense of their father who was fatally
wounded at the time. They honestly believed and had good grounds upon
which to found their belief that Santiago would continue his attack upon
their father.
As for the death of Ciriaco, when the accused attacked him, the
other trouble had already terminated and they were not in danger of any
bodily harm from him. Ciriaco was 80 and did not arrive on the scene until
after the trouble between the two accused and Santiago had terminated.
Furthermore, Ciriaco was entirely unarmed and made no demonstration
and said no word prior to the assault upon him by the two accused.
People v. Norma Hernandez, 1959
Facts:
The accused were charged with serious slander by deed.
The complainant, Vivencio Lascano, 19, started courting the accused
Maria Norma Hernandez sometime in August 1954,. After months of
courtship, Norma finally accepted Vivencio on January 6, 1955. On the
same day, they talked about their marriage, Norma telling Vivencio to
bring his parents to her house so that they could talk about their marriage.
On February 6, 1955, Vivencios parents together with his 12
(HAHAHAHAHAHA) aunts, bringing along 30 chickens and 3 goats, went
to Normas house to ask for her hand in marriage. The parents of both
agreed to the marriage. They set March 19, 1955 as the wedding date.
They likewise agreed that Vivencios parents would buy a wedding dress,
two vestidos, a pair of shoes for the bride, to advance P20 for fetching the
sponsors in the wedding and to repair the roof of Normas uncle.
The family of Vivencio prepared everything that was needed for the
wedding. While the celebration was going on, however, Norma could be
found nowhere. Vivencio and his parents waited until 12 midnight of
March 19 but Norma never showed up, causing them shame and
humiliation.
Norma testified that she was never in love with Vivencio and only
said yes to the marriage because her parents wanted her to. As the date
of the marriage was approaching, she felt a sense of torture because she
wasnt in love with Vivencio. She then decided to leave her home as a last
recourse to prevent the marriage. She went to Mindoro and stayed with
her cousin at Calapan where she remained until April of 1956 when she
was fetched by her cousin because she was under arrest for the present
case.
Appellee recommends reversal of the appealed judgment because
what Norma did does not constitute the crime of slander by deed.
Issue:
W/N the actions of the accused constitute slander by deed.
Held:
No. Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander, has not been
proven. Norma was merely exercising her right to not give her consent to
the marriage. Since no marriage can be solemnized unless the consent of
both parties are freely given, to penalize Norma for not continuing with
the proposed marriage would make the State practically instrumental in
in compelling an unwilling party to enter into marriage. If a party to an
agreement to marry can be who backs out should be held liable for the
crime of slander by deed, then that would be an inherent way of
compelling said party to go into a marriage without his or her free
consent.
Regina v. Dudley, 1884
Facts:
Dudley and Stephens along with Brooks and Parker(victim) were
cast away at sea without weeks of food and water except for some turnips
and a turtle. After twenty days, Dudley and Stephens proposed one
person sacrifice himself in order to save the rest. Brooks dissented while
Dudley and Stephens decided to kill Parker since he was the weakest and
youngest. On the 25th of July, seeing no rescue in sight, the two men killed
Parker and the three men feasted on his body. Four days later a vessel
rescued them and Dudley and Stephens were charged with murder.
Issue:
Whether the killing of Parker was murder considering the
circumstances of this case.
Held:
Yes, it is murder. Stephens and Dudley to be sentenced to death.
The necessity of hunger does not justify larceny, let alone murder.
Stephens and Dudley chose the weakest and youngest to kill and it was
not more necessary to kill him than any of the other grown men.
Stephens and Dudley were tempted to kill Parker but temptation
itself is not an excuse for murdering him. Their unfortunate circumstances
also do not lend leniency to the legal definition of murder.
Discussion:
As necessary the circumstances seemed where sacrificing ones life
would save the rest, that itself does not justify murder. The fact that
Dudley and Stephens chose the weakest person to be the victim also does
not justify that Parker could not have survived. Instead, by killing him, it
is only making certain that he had no chance of survival.
Ty v. People, 2004
Facts:
Ty's mother and sister was confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital. The total hospital bills amounted to P1 million. After signing a
contract of responsibility with the hospital, Ty issued 7 checks to cover
the said expenses, all of which were dishonored for being drawn against
a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital sued Ty for violation of BP
22. In her defense, Ty alleged that she issued the checks because of an
"uncontrollable fear of a greater injury". She averred that her mother
threatened to commit suicide due to the inhumane treatment she
allegedly suffered while confined in the hospital. Ty was found guilty by
the trial court of 7 counts of violation of BP 22. Ty appealed wherein she
reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or
injury.
Issue:
Is the defense of uncontrollable fear or avoidance of a greater evil
or injury tenable to warrant Ty's exemption from criminal liability?
Held:
Uncontrollable fear
For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear;
(2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is
greater than or at least equal to that committed.
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is
of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear
for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It
should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such
that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but
against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real
and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks a
condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother
could be discharged for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate
further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her
mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so
life-threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all
its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that
any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy
fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she
invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition
and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the
hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no
choice but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many
opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own
words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required
prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated
checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with
the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the
scene to avoid involvement.
Avoidance of a greater evil or injury
The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the
actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be
avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one
done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful
means of preventing it.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected
or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty
could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a
crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other
forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the
greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the
negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In
this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys
own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
People v. Belbes, 2000
FACTS (SUMMARIZED VERSION):
Patrolman Domingo Belbes was assigned to maintain peace and order at
the prom night of Pili Barangay High School. During the event, he
responded to a report by two female students that someone was making
trouble at one of the schools temporary building. He and Patrolman
Jose Pabon found Fernando Bataller, drunk, with his two companions,
and it appeared that Fernando was breaking the bamboo walls of the
temporary building. Belbes, armed with an armalite, fired at Bataller,
who was hit at several different parts of his body, and died. Whether or
not there was a confrontation is disputed (appellee says there was none,
appellant (Belbes) says there was).
Trial court held Belbes guilty for murder. In his appeal, Belbes said he
fired the shots at Bataller out of self-defense and that he was performing
his official functions when he did so.
FACTS (DETAILED VERSION):
APPELLEEs VERSION:
On the evening of February 16, 1990, Patrolan Domingo Belbes
(appellant) and Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned to maintain
peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay
High School, Pili, Bacacay, Albay.
9:00 PM: Two female students approached Teacher-in-charge
Mila Ulanca and said that somebody was making trouble.
Belbes (armed with an armalite rifle), and Pabon (armed with
a .38 caliber revolver) responded to the scene.
Meanwhile, Fernando Bataller, who was drunk, was with his
cousin Carlito Bataller, and friend Rosalio Belista. While
vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the schools
temporary building, the bamboo splits broke. The policemen
then arrived.
Moments (six seconds according to Mrs. Mila Ulanca) after,
bursts of gunfire Rat-tat-tat-tat-tat were heard. Without
warning, Belbes had fired his gun at Fernando Bataller, who
was hit on different parts of the body and died.
APPELLANTs (BELBESs) VERSION:
He and Pabon found Fernando Bataller making trouble and
destroying the wall of the temporary building. Fernando was
drunk or a little tipsy, and was not vomiting.
The two approached Fernando and identified themselves as
policemen, but the former ignored them. Pabon was in front of
Fernando (one meter away from each other). Fernando lunged
with a knife at Pabon, but the latter avoided it.
Fernando then stabbed Belbes, hitting the latters left
shoulder.
Belbes filed a warning shot. Fernandos companions (Carlito
and Rosalio) became aggressive. Fernando grabbed the
armalite.
While Belbes and Fernando were struggling, the gun went off
once, hitting Fernando. He cannot recall how many more shots
were fired after the gun was semi-automatic.
TRIAL COURT: Found Belbes GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua.
APPEAL: Belbes admits to firing the gunshots that killed Bataller. But he
claims that he did so in self-defense, and that that he was only
performing his official functions when he responded in the course of
police duties to the information that somebody was making trouble and
disturbing the peace.
Issue:
W/N the Trial Court was correct in holding the accused guilty for
murder.
Held:
No. Appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support
his claim of self-defense on the face of mortal danger while on police
duty. Where the accused admits to killing the victim in self defense, the
burden of evidence shifts to him.
However, the evidence reveals an incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in Article 11, paragraph number 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
For a person not to incur criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment
of a duty, 2 requisites must concur: (1) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty; (2) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office.
Although Belbes did act in the performance of his duty (first
requisite), the second requisite is lacking, for the killing need not be a
necessary consequence of the performance of his duty.
People v. Beronilla, 1955
Facts:
Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto
Adriatico file an appeal from the judgement of the Abra CFI, which
convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected
mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be
aiding the enemy.
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded
by Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col.
Arbold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army,
operating as guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment,
Beronilla received a memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury
of 12 bolo men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding
or abetting the enemy.
Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing
in Bangued, he was placed under custody and tried and sentenced to
death by the jury based on various complaints made by the residents.
Beronilla reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying I can only
compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the
whole case.
Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger
and jury, were indicted for the murder of Borjal. Soon after, President
Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty
to persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but
Beronilla and others were convicted on the grounds that the crime was
made on purely personal motives and that the crime was committed after
the expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.
Issue:
W/N the defendant-appellants actions are covered by justifying
circumstances for obedience to lawful order of superior.
Held:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which
as military subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good faith
without the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that
arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant to express
orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla
received the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area
commander, which called attention to the illegality of Borjals conviction
and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not have
dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not
show malice on their part because of the conduct of the trial, defense
through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of
illegality and death sentence review sent to the superior officers.
Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is
actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained of to be innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to
the benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of
contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were
contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because
if there are any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within
the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the accused.
Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.
People v. Bonoan, 1937
Facts:
On the morning of December 12, 1934, the accused Celestino
Bonoan met the pdeceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a
barbershop close to Toms Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was in the
barbershop at the time, heard the accused say in tagalog, I will kill you.
Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand,
which held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in tagalog, I
will pay you, but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then
stabbed Guison thrice on the left side.
The assault was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who
rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the
knife. Guison was taken to PGH where he died two days later.
Issue:
W/N the accused was insane at the time of the commission of
the crime.
Held:
Yes. The accused was repeatedly confined in the insane
department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from dementia praecox.
The symptoms of the disease are similar to those of depressive psychosis
where the mind appears deteriorated because when a person becomes
affected by the disease, during the period of excitement, he has no
control whatever of his acts. There is a pathologic lessening of normal
inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs
deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses.
Furthermore, an intern at San Lazaro Hospital testified that 4
days prior to the incident, the accused had an attack of insomnia which is
one of the symptoms of and may lead to dementia praecox. Also, the
police authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the
accused because they sent him to the Psychopathic Hospital the day
following the incident.
People v. Ambal, 1980
Facts:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the CFI of
Camiguin convicting him of parricide.
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found
under some flowering plants near the house of Honorato, Felicula
Vicente-Ambal, the wife of Honorato, mortally wounded.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her
body. She was brought to the hospital where she died 40 minutes after
arrival.
On the same morning, Honorato, after entrusting his child to a
neighbor, went to the house of the barangay captain and told him of the
act. He then took a pedicab and went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman who consequently confiscated Honoratos
long bolo the tip of which was broken. He was bespattered with blood, his
shirt was torn, and he appeared to be weak.
Their 15-year marriage was filled with quarrels and they even
sometimes choose not to stay in the conjugal abode. The immediate
provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Feliculas failure to
buy medicine for Honorato who was suffering from influenza. During the
quarrel, Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he died. That
remark infuriated him to attack his wife.
Issue:
W/N the defense of insanity was valid.
Held:
No. Two medical experts testified that Honorato was not
afflicted with a mental defect and was normal. Dr. Cresogono Llacuna
further testified that Honorato was normal but nervous.
Dr. Balbas psychosis due to short frustration tolerance
Dr. Llacuna psycho-neurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous
system
Both diagnoses were not equivalent to insanity.
The fact that immediately after the incident, he thought of
surrendering to the authorities is incontestable proof that he knew what
he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
(Uncharacteristic of insanity complete deprivation of intelligence)
People v. Puno, 1981
Facts:
At about 2 pm of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a
jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling
Kikay), 72, a widow, and his neighbor, in Little Baguio in Malabon, Rizal.
On seeing Aling Kikay in bed, Puno insulted her by saying,
mangkukulam ka, mambabarang, mayroon kang bubuyog. Then, he
repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a
hammer until she was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, who was in the
bedroom with the old woman, and Lina Pajes, a tenant of the adjoining
room. They testified that Punos eyes were reddish and his look was
baleful and menacing. After the killing, Puno went to Linas room where
Hilaria had taken refuge and warned them that if they tell anything to the
authorities he would have his revenge on them.
He then fled to his parents house and then went to the house
of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, in Calumpit, Bulacan.
Disregarding Punos threat, Lina, after noting that he had left,
notified the Malabon police of the killing.
Upon autopsy, it was discovered that the victim had lacerated
wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a
hard instrument. On opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and
generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was intracranial, traumatic
hemorrhage.

Issue:

W/N Puno is insane.

Held:

No. Notwithstanding the times when he didnt act normally

(read dog being boxed, seeing bees when there was none), medical
experts all provided statements proving that he although he was suffering
from schizophrenic reaction, the symptoms were not socially
incapacitating and that he could adjust himself to his environment.

The trial court also concluded that Puno was sane during the
incident and that he knew that what he did was wrong as shown by the
fact that he made threats to the witnesses and that if he really was a
homicidal maniac and had gone berserk, he would have also killed the
witnesses. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really
disposed of her because he thought she was a witch.