G.) CIVIL PERSONALITY; BIRTH; DEATH; ART. 40, 41, 42; 390, 391, 712, 777 NCC; ART.

41, 96,
124, 99, 126, 142 FC; SEC 2 RULE 92 REVISED RULES OF COURT

ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. ALABANG HILLS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION

G.R. No. 187456
June 2, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent village association started the construction of a multi-purpose hall and a swimming pool on
one of the parcels of land still owned by petitioner, prompting a complaint for injunction and damages
from the latter. Respondent denied petitioners asseverations and claimed that the latter has no legal
capacity to sue since its existence as a registered corporate entity was revoked by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.

RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the latter has no personality to file the same, that the
subject property is a reserved area for the beneficial use of the homeowners, as mandated by law. CA
dismissed both appeals of petitioner and respondent, and affirmed the decision of the RTC. CA held that
where there is no claim against the respondent, because petitioner is already inexistent and has no
capacity to sue, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed, more so where the complaint is
dismissed at the instance of the respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether there was lack of capacity to sue

HELD:
YES. The definition of the term lack of capacity to sue enunciated in the said case still applies to the
case at bar. Indeed, as held by this Court and as correctly cited by the CA in the case of Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144 (1996): [l]ack of legal capacity to sue means that the
plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in
the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims[;] lack of capacity to sue refers to
a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of
juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party. ... In the instant case, petitioner lacks
capacity to sue because it no longer possesses juridical personality by reason of its dissolution and lapse
of the three-year grace period provided under Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORP vs NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER)
GR 182836
October 13, 2009

FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel and a member of respondent Union filed a claim
for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the CBA concluded between Continental and the Union. The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos
unborn child. Hortillanos wife, had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.

Continental Steel granted the claim for paternity leave but denied claims for bereavement leave and other
death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. Corporation argues that the CBA is clear
and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied.

The Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with
pay and death benefits. CA affirmed the resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death

HELD:
YES. Rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the
parents of the unborn child upon the latters death. Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide
at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality
could die. Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality.
One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already
has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

The unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the
power or aid of someone else. Under said general definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its
parents. It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is
specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor,
such should be interpreted in favor of labor.
DUEAS vs. SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 149417
June 4, 2004

FACTS:

Respondent Homeowners Association (SSHA) is seeking to require petitioner Dueas to provide for an
open space in the subdivision for recreational and community activities. Petitioner rejected the request
thus prompting the members of the association to seek redress from the NHA. HLURB decided that the
open requirement of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216, was not applicable to Santos
Subdivision.

HLURB-NCR office ruled that while SSHA failed to present evidence showing that it is an association duly
organized under Philippine law with capacity to sue, nonetheless, the suit could still prosper if viewed as
a suit filed by all its members who signed and verified the petition. However, the petition failed to show
any cause of action against herein petitioner as there is no evidence showing Santos-Dueas as the
owner/developer or successor-in-interest of Cecilio Santos, petitioners father, who was the
owner/developer and sole proprietor of Santos Subdivision.

CA ruled in favor of SSHA.

ISSUE:
Whether the homeowners association had legal personality to sue?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Article 44 of the Civil Code enumerates the various
classes of juridical persons. Under said Article, an association is considered a juridical person if the law
grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. The records of the present case are
bare of any showing by SSHA that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law. It was thus an
error for the HLURB-NCR Office to give due course to the complaint in HLURB Case, given the SSHAs
lack of capacity to sue in its own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit
by all the parties who signed and verified the complaint.

The members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid and legal authority. Neither can
their signatures confer on the association any legal capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs
to the Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice to endow SSHA with the
personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of membership in a federation are insufficient and
inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical personality and was not impleaded as a
party in HLURB Case nor in this case. Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized to
represent SSHA. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to
sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons
that is made a party, must be averred.
H) RA 9225, DOMICILE; ART 50, 51 NCC; ART 68, 69 FC; RESIDENCE VS DOMICILE; ANNULMENT
OR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AM 02-11-10 SC; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES; ELECTION LAWS

GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN

G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013

FACTS:
Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon were filed by respondents who are Eliseos
common-law wife and daughter and was opposed by petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quiazon to whom Eliseo
was married. Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo
having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence
of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).

RTC issued letters of administration to Elise and the motion for reconsideration was denied by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in declaring that Amelia was not legally married to Eliseo

HELD:
NO. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights.
Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), applicable four-square to the case
at hand.

In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by
contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit: Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
BAYOT vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 155635

November 7, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner American citizen Rebecca got married to Respondent Filipino citizen Vicente in Mandaluyong
City in 1979. In 1996, petitioner initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic and the
dissolution was ordered. Same court issued a decree settling the couples property relations pursuant to
an agreement they executed.

Petitioner filed with Makati RTC a declaration for nullity of marriage, but later withdrew the petition.
Another petition was filed in Muntinlupa RTC alleging the psychological incapacity of respondent husband
and sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains along with the payment of permanent
support for their child. Respondent husband filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petition is barred
by prior divorce.

Petitioner interposed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the DOJ, and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. To
the CA, the RTC ought to have granted respondent husbands motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether the Motion to Dismiss should be upheld?

HELD:

YES. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for
relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or
uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her
to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce
and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy
of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
LIMBONA VS COMELEC
GR 181097
June 25, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Norlainie, her husband, Mohammad, and respondent Malik were mayoralty candidates in Lanao
del Norte. Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for failure to comply with the residency
requiremen and a petition to disqualify Norlanie on the ground of lack of the one-year residency
requirement. Norlanie withdrew her candidacy. COMELEC granted the petition of Malik to disqualify
Mohammad, which prompted Norlanie to file a new certificate of candidacy as a substitute of Mohammad
which the COMELEC approved. Norlanie won the elections but was eventually disqualified because of
the second case of disqualification by Malik.

ISSUE:
Whether the domicile of Norlanie is the same as her husbands

HELD:
YES. The Court notes the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao
del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage)
is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners husband, effected the change
of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that
the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the
change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006.

Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide: Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Art. 69. The husband and
wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt
one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with
the solidarity of the family. Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate
residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions
of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007

FACTS:
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo. According
to her, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at Manila and that the decedents surviving
heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

Petitioner San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. According to him, respondent has no
legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Respondent presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of Hawaii to prove that the prior marriage of Felicisimo had been dissolved already.
However, petitioner asserts that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights
in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code. RTC also issued an order denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file
the petition and that venue was properly laid.

When the case was re-raffled, the trial court dismissed the letters of administration. According to the
decision, respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimos prior marriage was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo
who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court

ISSUE:
Whether respondent has the legal capacity to file the petition letters of administration

HELD:
YES. This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989), where the
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien
spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other. Also, when the object of a marriage
is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
MORIGO vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226
February 6, 2004

FACTS:
Lucio and Lucia, both Filipinos, were married in 1990 in Bohol. While Lucia was working in Canada, she
obtained a divorce decree. Lucio married another woman in 1992 in Bohol. Lucio then filed for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia in the RTC of Bohol, on the ground that no marriage actually
took place.

When Lucio was being accused of bigamy, petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question
in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution

RTC convicted petitioner for bigamy. While the CA case was pending, the trial court rendered a decision
in a Civil Case declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court
could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the
fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration
of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the first marriage

HELD:
YES. There was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of
the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married.
COTONER-ZACARIAS vs. SPOUSES REVILLA
G.R. No. 190901
November 12, 2014

FACTS:
Respondent spouses are the owners of a 15,000 sqm parcel of land in Cavite. Due to financial difficulties,
they borrowed money from petitioner. By way of security, the parties verbally agreed that Amada would
take physical possession of the property, cultivate it, then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the
loan and realty taxes. Upon full payment of the loan, petitioner would return the property to the Revilla
spouses.

Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document entitled Kasulatan ng Bilihan
ng Lupa before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite. This document shows the Revilla spouses as sellers
and Amada as buyer of the property. Petitioner was able to sell the parcel of land to another buyer and
the respondents soon discovered that the propertys tax declarations were not anymore in their name.

Respondents then demanded the cancellation of the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa from petitioner and
all subsequent transfers of the property, its reconveyance, and the restoration of its tax declaration in their
name.

Ruling in favor of the respondent spouses, the CA dismissed the appeals made by petitioner and the
subsequent buyer.

Petitioner now argues that the parties live in a very small barangay and while respondent worked in Saudi
Arabia, he admitted returning to the Philippines twice a year, while his wife never left Cavite. According
to the petitioner, the Revilla spouses never questioned the activities on the property for more than 16
years and is now barred by laches.

ISSUE:
Whether doctrines of equity such as laches apply only in the absence of statutory law

HELD:
YES. In any case, doctrines of equity such as laches apply only in the absence of statutory law. The Civil
Code clearly provides that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
not prescribe. This court has discussed: Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts
of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, should
be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis.
The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions for
declaration of the inexistence of a contract should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal
right, and petitioners can validly vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time.
REPUBLIC vs MARJENS INVESTMENT CORPORATION (MIC)
GR 156205
Nov. 12, 2014

FACTS:
DENR Region IV, through the OSG, filed a petition for for annulment of judgment, cancellation of title,
and reversion against respondents. The OSG argues that the land in question cannot be the subject of
disposition or registration for being within the category of unclassified public forest. Also, the land covered
not having been legally registered, remains and forms part of the public domain of the State.

Respondents on the other hand, contend that the subject property was already private property even
before the Spanish Crown ceded sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the United States of America.
Also, respondents assert that the government has lost its rights by laches and estoppel to question the
validity after almost 50 years have lapsed. Despite the notices previously made during registration, there
was no opposition from the government. Respondents now insist that it will be most unfair and will violate
their right to due process if they will again be required to undergo another trial to establish their long
continued, open, public, adverse possession and cultivation of the property in the concept of owners.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition applying the case of Cario v.Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, which recognized private ownership of lands already possessed or held by individuals
under claim of ownership as far back as testimony or memory goes and therefore never to have been
public land that Spain could bequeath to the United States of America.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government is barred by laches and estoppel

HELD:
YES. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert it. The following elements
must be present in order to constitute laches: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after
he had knowledge of defendants acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge
or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury
or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.