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1. 'Simple'Separationof FormsfromSensibles
The languageof separationis prominentin Parmenides'opening remarks:
You see how great the difficulty is if someone marksthem off as forms themselvesby
themselves3(1 33a8-9, referringto the precedingargument)
...You have, so to speak, by no means yet graspedthe perplexityitself, how great
it is,4 if you aregoingto set up eachasa singleform,alwaysseparatingit off as something
from amongthe thingsthat are5 ... (alI-b2)
...whoeverposits the beingof each thingto be somethingitself by itself (c3-4).
This last phrase, 'itself by itself', also appearswith the same use at c5-6: no
form could be present in us, for as Socrates argues, it could not then be
'itself by itself'.
Parmenidesis drawingattention in these passagesto the thesis that a form
is not identical with any sensible. Formsare 'by themselves'becausethey are
differentiated from the many sensibles that fall under each. Although
Parmenidesoffers no furtherelaboration,it is worth noting here that the non-
identity of forms with sensibles is reinforced for Plato by the claim that
forms have categorialpropertiesin common which are sharedby no sensible.
All forms are eternal, immutable,intelligible, and the rest: sensiblesare none
of these.6
In the sense of 'separation'relevanthere, I shall also speak of the 'simple'
separation of forms from sensibles. As we shall see, there are other ways in
which forms and sensiblesare separate.
2. 'Proper of FormsfromSensibles
Separation'
The next four lines of Parmenides'remarksrun as follows:
So as many too of the forms which are which they are with respect to one another -
these have their being themselveswith respect to themselves,but not with respect to
the things among us, whether likenessesor however one is to regardthem, possessing
which we are calledeach thing(c8-d2).
For example:
...mastery itself is what it is of slavery itself, and likewise slavery itself is slavery of
masteryitself (e3 4).
In these lines, Parmenidesintroduces a quite different notion of separation,
which I shall call 'proper separation'. But before I argue for this reading,
mastery and slavery are relational forms. We can bring out their relational
characterby indicating, for example, that something belongs(or can belong)
in the range of the relation. Or, as Parmenidesdoes here, we may specify the
appropriateconverse relation. Thus by the claim, for example, that mastery
is what it is of slavery, I take Parmenidesto mean just that mastery is a
relation, and has as its converse the form slavery. His assertion, therefore,
gives a proper propertyof its subject.
Parmenideshangsa good deal of his subsequentargumenton the principles
illustratedby this and similarassertions.It is worth makingtwo points about
those assertionshere.
(1) Above all, the assertions,"Masteryis what it is with respect to slavery",
or "Masteryis masteryof slavery",are not to be confused with the claim that
mastery is a master of anything. In Parmenides'jargon, the connectives,
'...is what it [mastery] is with respect to...', or '...is mastery of ...', are not
used to assert that mastery is instantiated by anything (for example, by
mastery with respect to slavery).Rather,he uses them to make a point about
the logical relation of the two concepts concerned, namely, that the one
concept is the converseof the other.
How then is Parmenides'sentence, 'Masteryis masteryof slavery',related
to the issue of self-predication?In its broadestuse, the term 'self-predication'
can be applied to any sentence of the form rThe A is (an) A7. This defines
a purely syntactical notion of self-predication.9Other uses of the term vary
with the interpretationwe give to sentences whose surfacestructuresatisfies
our syntactical definition. Some instances of syntactical self-predicationin
Plato must be interpretedin a way that makes them logically vicious;others
presumablyneed not. It has often been supposed that Parmenides'sentence
here is logically vicious, involving the claim that mastery is an instance of
itself with respect to slavery.'0 On the interpretationoffered here, however,
Parmenides'sentence is an instance of syntactical self-predication, but is
harmless.
(2) Given the interpretationof Parmenides'sentence proposed, it follows
that mastery is not mastery of anything other than slavery, that is, of
anything which is not in fact its converse (133c9-d2, e5). In particular,it
would be a gross mistake to suppose that the converse of a relationR is not
the relation R-1, but some member of the domain of R-1. Mastery, for
example, is masteryof slavery,but not of any particularslave.
It is now easy to see why Parmenidesregardshis present point as logical-
3. 'FactualSeparation'
property of the form lion, entails the sentence, 'All lions are tawny', which is
a generalization over sensible lions. The entailment can also be seen as a
consequence of principles connecting statements about relations and state-
ments about the entities in the fields of those relations.
4. Parmenides'Strategy
such - that is, simple separation - is only the doctrine that forms and
sensibles are non-identical, and very different kinds of thing. (The sense in
wilich they are different is made more precise by the notion of the categorial
properties of the forms.) Perhapsthey are different enough that it is hard to
see how there can be relations between them (cf. Section III below). But
separationas such is not the view that there cannot be any relationsbetween
forms and sensibles, nor in fact does Parmenides'argument urge any such
conclusion.
A second source for attributingto the argumenta generalprohibition on
relations between forms and sensibles may be a misreadingof part of Plato's
text. Havingsketched the different kinds of separationand applied them to
the masteryexample, Parmenidesgoes on to summarizehis resultsso far:
But the things in us do not havetheirpowerwith respectto them nor they with respect
to us, but as I say, they on the one hand are themselvesof themselvesand with respect
to themselves,and the things among us on the other hand likewise (havetheir power)
with respectto themselves. (133e4-134al)
Does this deny the possibilityof relationsbetween any form and any sensible?
Not if it is a fair summaryof what Parmenideshas alreadyshown. Parmenides
has been discussingrelationalforms;he has in mind in particularhis exarnples
of mastery and slavery introducedjust above. So in the sentence, 'The things
among us do not have their power with respect to them', Parmenides'word
'them' cannot refer torall forms whatever,but only to relationalforms and
their converses. Thus, sensibles that bear R to something do not bear R to
the converse relation, but only to the entities in the domain of that converse.
Sensible masters, for example, are masters of slaves, not of slavery. So
Parmenideshas shown at most that some sensiblescannot stand in some rela-
tions to some forms: sensibles in the domain of a relationR cannot bear R
to the converseform R-1 .
We can now return to the main thread of Parmenides' argument.
Parmenides' strategy is to show that there is some statement observing
proper separation, which entails a statement which itself observes factual
separation, such that it is correct to say of Jones that he knows sensibles,
but never correct to say that he knows any form. Similarly, Parmenides
might have defended the claim that human masters are masters only of
human slaves by pointing to the statement observingproper separationthat
mastery is mastery of slavery.We must not confuse slaverywith its instances;
accordingly,the converse of the relationmasteryis the relationslavery,while
what sensible masters bear the relation mastery to must be sensible slaves.
Can Parmenidesuse an analogous argument to show that what persons can
know must likewise be only sensible objects of knowledge,and never forms?
It is easily shown, following Forrester,'2 that such an argumentcannot
succeed. By analogy with the mastery example, knowledge is knowledge of
its converse, namely the relation (being-an-)object-of-knowledge(-to). By
the same analogy, any entity in the domain of knowledge - for example,
any human knower - can never have knowledge of the converseform, that
is, of the form object-of-knowledge.But we may still know entities in the
domain of that form, whether forms or sensibles. So we may know any
instance of the form object-of-knowledge- form or sensible - and we may
not know only the form object-of-knowledgeitself. So Parmenides'argument
fails.13
This point does not hit home directly against Parmenidesin our text.
Forrester's argument shows that Parmenides'strategy cannot succeed: but
Parmenides' actual procedure makes a rather different use of the mastery
example, and so his argument too fails for ratherdifferent reasons.To see
this, we must consider the application Parmenidesmakes of his principles
of separation,and examine the statements about knowledge which he offers
with their aid as counterpartsto his statementsabout mastery.
Moresimply:
(1) Knowledgeis knowledgeof the forms.
...So too therefore for knowledge - that very thing which is knowledgeis knowledge
of this very thing which is truth (134a3-4) ...Again, each of the knowledges,whichis,
would be knowledgeof each of the things-that-are, whichis (a6-7)
But
...wouldn't knowledgeamong us be of truth amongus? and againwouldn'teach knowl-
edge among us turn out to be knowledge of each of the things-that-areamong us?
(a9-bl)
...But yet we do not havethe formsthemselves,and they cannotbe amongus (b3-4).
...But supposedlythe formsthemselveseach of whichis are knownby the form itself
of knowledge(b6-7).
...We do not have it [the form of knowledge] (b9);...So no form is known by us,
since we do not partakeof knowledgeitself (bI 1-12). So the beautifulitself, whichis,
and the good, and all that we suppose to be forms themselves,are unknowableto us
(b 14-c2).
a3-4 and 6--7 are statementsabout knowledgeitself and 'each of the knowl-
edges'.They areintendedto be analogousto the earlierstatement that mastery
is masteryof slavery,and like it to observeproperseparation.
Knowledge, like mastery, is a relation. More than this, the names of each
appear in (2) and (3) in superficiallysimilargrammaticalcontexts: 'Mastery
is mastery of...', 'Geometrical knowledge is knowledge of...'. Thus both
setences are, nearly enough, instances of syntactical self-predication(but of
nothingworsethan that). Despite these similarities,however,the discrepancies
between the two are more than enough to undermineParmenides'strategy.
(i) 'knowledge of figure' in (2) gives the genus and differentiarespectivelyof
the species geometricalknowledge. The differentiahere is, in full, 'concerned
with figure'. So the expression 'figure', by itself, has no important logical
role in the sentence. It is quite otherwise with the last word, 'slavery', in
(3), for it denotes the converse relation whose instances form the range of
the original relation, mastery. These facts are reflected in the different
extensional consequences of the two sentences. It follows from (3) that
III. CONCLUSION
tion.22 But this seems a temporary answer at best. For if the soul is suf-
ficiently like the forms to be able to know them, it is sufficiently unlike
sensibles for it to be a puzzle how the knowing soul can ever be related to a
human body. Recall for example the list of disparateproperties of soul and
body that Socrates reels off at Phaedo 80b, where the differencesthat divide
soul and body are, by design, precisely those that set apartsensiblesand the
forms.
Traces of these difficulties are evident also in the Phaedrus.Here, Plato
distinguishes two kinds of knowledge. The one, true knowledge, has its
characterin common with its own, special objects: it is "the veritableknowl-
edge of being that veritablyis". As such, therefore,it is all too different from
the "knowledge that is neighbour to becoming, and varies with the various
objects to which we commonly ascribebeing"(Phaedrus247d-e, Hackforth's
translation).More than this, however, true knowledge also calls for a special
kind of knower: either god or a discarnatesoul. With this last step, Plato
comes perilously close to saying that the difference between forms and the
sensible world is so great that incarnatesouls can have only the inferiorkind
of knowledge that is of "that to which we commonly ascribe being", while
only gods and souls in the discarnatestate can have true knowledge, which
is of the forms.
Plato's own remarkselsewhere, then, suggest that forms and sensibles are
so different that it may be a puzzle how a sensiblecan know the forms. How
can this puzzle be made more precise?Whatis needed is an exact statement
of the differencebetween forms and sensibles,that makesus doubt that there
could be relations between them. Parmenides'argumentdoes appearto speak
to this question. For a large part of the argument,Parmenidesis trying to
spell out the variouskinds of separation,and so give content to the idea that
forms and sensibles fall into different 'worlds'.Officially, the argumentleads
to the conclusion that, given the various kinds of separation, knowledge
relations between sensibles and forms are impossible. In fact, however, the
argument depends on fallacies that make its conclusion moot. But the
purpose of the argumentis not trivial. Indeed, in the Sophist Plato finds a
better argument,againwith separationas a premise (xcoptis,248a7), to show
that there is after all a categorial property of forms - namely, their im-
mutability - that may be incompatiblewith their knowability.3
Note that this account cannot hold for all sensiblesF if a likeness of the F is
itself a sensible and is F: cf. 133d3.
Parmenideshere relies on the point, which he repeats a number of times,
that we do not have the F itself (134b3, b9), that is, the F itself is never
present in any sensible (133c5, 134b4, b12). This is part of the thesis of
simple separation, as noted above. Despite his uncertainty on details,
Parmenidesis emphatic that predication of sensiblesis to be analyzed as an
immanence relation not between a form and a sensible, but between, for
example, a likeness of a form and a sensible.
For non-sensible-as subjects, the theory that now emergesis this:
For at least some non-sensiblex, if x is F, then x has the F itself (134cl1, d2), or x
possesses(metechein) the F itself (I 34c10).
This principle cannot hold for all non-sensibles that are F, for the F itself
is a non-sensible,and we know from 133d3 that the F itself is F (6,io'wa ...
eKeLVOt1q, 133d3). In the account Parmenidesgives, the principle is applied
only to the single non-sensible,god.
Parmenideshas an argument to persuade us that it is plausible to adopt
this new account of predication where god is the subject. Knowledgeitself,
he suggests,is 'moreperfect' thanknowledge-among-us, andso it is appropriate
that god (himself presumablyperfect) should have knowledge itself, rather
than mere knowledge-among-us.
(It is very often thought that a vicious notion of self-predicationis implicit
in the argument at this point. Thus, the form of knowledge is 'the most
perfect knowledge' because it is its own best instance. Weak though
Parmenides'argumentis, however, it does not requirea readingof this sort.
For example, Parmenidesmay think knowledgeis 'most perfect' only because
it is a form, and so shares the honorific status Plato accords to all forms. If
so, then the argumentrests on a principleof the affinity between god and the
forms: compare the similar principle of the affinity between the forms and
the soul, againindependentof any notion that the forms are self-exemplifying,
at Phaedo 78b ff.)
Parmenides'theory for predicatingthings of god may be useful to him in
two ways. First (i), if we say thlatgod knows something,we asserta relation
between god and knowledge itself, not between god and knowledge-in-us.
Given this result, Parmenidesmay feel able to arguethat althoughour knowl-
edge can be knowledge only of instancesof forms, not forms themselves,the
knowledge god has is not limited in this way. For, simple separationdoes not
separate god, as it does sensibles, from the forms. If, then, god knows
something, he has not the immanent form but knowledge itself. And unlike
knowledge-in-us,knowledgeitself can be knowledge of forms. This suggestion
is not in fact cogent. Parmenides'new theory for how things are predicatedof
god requires that god has knowledge itself, not the immanent form, knowl-
edge-in-us. But this fact makes no difference to the point that even god's
knowledge can be only an instance of knowledge. As such, god's knowledge
too is bound by the resultsof the previousargument.God's knowledgecan be
knowledge only of instances of forms, and no one, not even god, knows the
forms.
Accordingly, we will understandParmenidesin the presentargumentto be
arguingfor exactly the conclusion he states: if god has knowledge,he cannot
know sensibles. This is consistent with the conclusion to his earlierargument
and together with it produces the result that - since god cannot know
sensibles, while the forms are not known by anything - god in fact knows
nothing.24
(ii) Parmenides new theory of predication may, however, serve a dif-
ferent purpose. Parmenideswill want to borrow from his first argument
the principle of proper separation,in order to show that god's knowledge
cannot be knowledge of sensibles. But proper separationis a principleabout
relational forms, and does not govern 'the things among us', where this
phrase seems to cover any sensible whatever,includingimmanentcharacters.
So proper separationcannot apply to god's knowledgeunlessit too is a form,
and not a mere immanent character.Parmenides'theory for how things are
predicated of god thus smooths the way for his later appeal to the principle
of the separationof forms from sensibles.
(2) Parmenides, then, also claims support for his conclusion that god
cannot know sensibles from the principles of separation presented in his
earlier argument. Thus, 134d5-7 is verbally an echo of 133e4-134al.
According to properseparation,forms are what they are, or have their power,
with respect to one another. This was explained as the principle that the
converse of a relationalform is another relationalform. In accordancewith
this principle, knowledge itself has its power with respect to no non-form.
That is, the converse of the form knowledge, like the converse of any
relationalform, is itself a relationalform, not a sensible.
This is not the interpretationParmenidesnow gives to proper separation.
He now takes the principle to imply that if anything, say god, has knowl-
edge itself, then he cannot know any non-form. Parmenides has here
exploited an ambiguity in the expression'...has its power with respect to -- -2
between (i) '...has as its converse- - - and (ii) '...has instances which bear
that relation to -- -'. These two readings are redically different in intent.
Mastery, for example, has as its converse the relation slavery, but it is not
true to say that mastery has instances which are masters of slavery. Cor-
rectly understood, proper separation stipulates that a relation R has as its
converse another relational form, and not any sensible. For his present
purposes, however, Parmenidestakes the principle to imply that instances
of R cannot bear R to any non-forms. For example, since knowledge is a
relation that has its power with respect to forms, god cannot stand in that
relation to any non-forms. This conclusion is not legitimately obtained
by means of Parmenides' earlier principles. So as Parmenides himself
predicts, neither of his arguments - the argument that we cannot know
the forms,or that god cannot know sensibles- can stand close examination.25
Universityof Arizona
NOTES
for referring to separate forms: see among other examples, Symposium 211c8-dl,
Kat 'yvcy -reXeTvrWvo'east KaXdl.
SEi YJJ
6,O
J EKaaTOVrC.V 6VrWVrdaEL TL a PLpto6,evoc t5r aev, bI -2. I take rCv 6v'rwv
as genitive after &dOPL.'11EVOq
('von den Dingen getrennten ...Wesenheiten',Apelt,
cf. Parmenides158a2, althoughI take the genitiveto be closest to that at HippiasMajor
298d6-8 and Sophist 257e2, cf. Campbellad loc.). Cornfordand others construethe
words with the preceding g`Kaorov ('for every distinction you make among things',
Cornford, presumablyunderstandingCeKaaTov TCwv6vrwv as the combined object of
aopltoipevoq). On the reading I recommend, eKaaTov here distinguishes one form from
all the remainingforms (cf. Parmenides158al-3); TCZv6vrwv ... hpopto0'evoq indicates
its separationfrom the sensiblesthat fall underit.
6 Cf. Vlastos pp. 245ff for the interpretation of separation via the categorial
properties of forms (GregoryVlastos, 'The Third Man Argumentin the Parmenides',
reprintedin R. E. Allen (ed.), Studiesin Plato'sMetaphysics,New York 1965, pp. 231--
261). This providesthe link betweenseparationand Parmenides'other argumentsagainst
the theory of forms(see p. 105 above): for as Vlastossuggests,the assumptionsoperating
in those argumentscan be regardedas explications of separationin terms of various
categorialpropertiesof forms.
On 133c5-6, note that not being 'in' any sensible appearsamong the categorial
properties of forms at Timaeus 5 2a, cf. Symposium 21 la.
7 When Parmenidessays that they "havetheir being themselveswith respect to them-
selves", I take him to be speakingcollectively of the membersof the relevantproper
subset of forms, and to mean that the being of each is specifiedby referenceto some
other form in that set (but not that each has its being with referenceto itself). Cf.
Heindorfad loc. and Parmenides'own example at e3--4. The contraryview appearsfor
example in Weingartner:his gloss is "that forms do not obtain their being by virtue of
standingin relation to particulars,is precisely what has been meant all along by the
absolute and independent character of the forms" (Weingartner, op. cit., p. 185). By
missing the restriction to relational forms, Weingartneris forced to suppose that
Parmenides'argumenthinges on an exaggeratednotion of separationthat prohibits
all relationsbetweensensiblesand forms;againstthis, see pp. 110-111 below.
8 The predicateshe assertsof these forms then count as B1-predicates in Owen'sclas-
sification: G. E. L. Owen, 'Dialectic and Eristic in the Forms', pp. 108ff, in Owen
(ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic, Oxford 1968, pp. 103-125. (But simple separationis a
matter of A-predicates.)For other discussionof the distinctionsamong predicatesof
forms referred to here, see MichaelFrede, Pradikationund Existenzaussage.Hypom-
nemata, Heft 18, Gottingen 1967, pp. 33f and David Keyt, 'Plato's Paradoxthat the
Immutableis Unknowable',PhilosophicalQuarterly19 (1969), pp. 1 ff.
9 The purely syntactical definition of self-predicationis wider that that given by
Vlastos, who reservesthe term for cases of the instantiationof a form or concept by
itself, or the sentencesin which such cases are expressed(GregoryVlastos, 'The Unity
of the Virtues in the Protagoras',reprintedin his Platonic Studies, Princeton 1973,
n. 97).
10 Vlastos, for example, explains the claim that masteryis masteryonly of slaveryby
suggesting that only mastery is exactly a master, and only slavery exactly a slave, so
that only slavery can be an appropriate object of mastery's mastery (Vlastos, op. cit.,
p. 258). Otherswho have found a vicious form of self-predicationat workat this point
in the argumentincludeCornford(F. M. Cornford,Platoand Parmenides,London 1939,
pp. 98f), Runciman(W.G. Runciman,'Plato'sParmenides',in Allen, op. cit., p. 159),
Suhr (MartinSuhr,Platons Kritikan der Eleaten, Hamburg1969, p. 109), Weingartner,
op. cit., pp. 186, 189, Forrester,op. cit., p. 234, and Stough, op. cit., pp. 397-398.
Curiously,Cornforddoes briefly concede a harmlesslyself-predicationalinterpretation
of Parmenides'premisses:"Mastership,the Form, has as its correlate,the Form Slavery;
of each of the things that are, i.e. of that which each of them reallyis [of the Formof
each of the things that are]"). On yet another view, the distinction between subject
and predicatebecomes irrelevant,since the ealrtvexpressesan identity: d eirt x on this
view means 'what is identicalwith x' (H. F. Cherniss,'The Relation of the Timaeusto
Plato'sLaterDialogues',reprintedin Allen, op. cit., p. 372).
16 Cf. Charmides 171a5-7, Republic 438c6-e9, Sophist 257c7-d3, and Aristotle
Categories 1 a24ff.
17 Knowledge(episteme)is most clearlya relationin those passageswhereit is pictured
as a dynamis or power (Republic 477d, cf. 477bl0-1 1: e1rWT7f.l ...dretCT b'VTL lreIpVKE,
'yoc'aiW' c. Car TO 6'v, 508e3, cf. eS [and e6, 509a6]: WTt7uLr ... Kat LX7Eac,
__vWae__ TE KaL adXs?eiac..., Charmides 165c4-6: et -y&p 6ih -(Lyv(h)aKeLv ye Ti caTW
o aW poatiV7, S&io'V bTi naLTajpn nTrS V EThKa 7LrWo [ri here is object of 7Lyvw'aKEW,
not nominativesingularin agreementwith it, as Jowett3 takesit] .
Parmenides134a3-4 indicates the relationalcharacterof knowledgeby citing the
class of objects in its range:knowledgeitself is of truth itself - that is, of the forms -
while the various branches of knowledge are of some particularform or other. Cf.
Republic 438c6ff: EILaT'fl.n Ae'v a&rT 4ad5,uaToc aiuroo 67r=Tfll EaTTWv ti orov 6b'i 66
9ewvaLT7lIv i7LaT7;S7V, WMT97A7 6Tf'TL' iaL notodT 7rOLOVL
TLOc Kal TLWdL(cf. Charmides
168a6-8), Republic 477b1O-1 1 (cited above), Aristotle Categories 6b32ff: ...' 6wrLor
g?rtuT71TOVXS-yeTat UwT?7 Kal TO f lTOV 8lruT7 l 8LaTUUTdJv, andProclus,In Parm.
Comm., p. 933 Cousin:T7l)vAV' darTX C LaT7nI.7tairpbvc TO 0urXc) wT71Tov,Trv 66 swa
7rWTaI-
1.1Wvp TO T 67rtarTnTOV.
Geometry(geometricalepisteme),by contrast,is not a relation:it is one of the many
technai or epistemai (Sophist 257dl-2) - that is, it is a body of knowledge. Cf.
Charmides171a5-7, Republic 438c6-e9. This fits well with Aristotle'sview in the
Categoriesthat the species of the genus knowledge are not themselvesrelations (but
contrast Topics 145al3-18, cf. J. L. Ackrill,Aristotle's CategoriesandDe Interpretatione,
Oxford 1963, p. 108). The generalambiguityof the Greek 'episteme'(Note 14 above)
is in this case resolved by Parmenides'phrase 'each of the epistemai'at 134a3: for
'episteme'in the pluralmust referto bodies of knowledge.
" The point will be clearestif we borrowa set-theoreticaccountof genusand species.
Although this is almost certainly a distortion of Plato's generalviews on division(cf.
J. M. E. Moravcsik,'The Anatomy of Plato's Divisions', in Exegesis and Argument:
Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, ed. by E. N. Lee, A. P. D.
Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty, Phronesis suppl. vol. 1 (Van Gorcum, Assen, 1973),
pp. 324--348), it will not materiallyaffect anythingat issuehere.
'9 Add here to the referencesin n. 10 above, Sir David Ross, Plato's Theoryof Ideas,
Oxford 1951, p. 90, Gilbert Ryle, 'Plato's Parmenides',reprinted in Allen, op. cit.,
p. 109, and I. M. Crombie,An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, London 1963, Volume
II, p. 333. Reservationsabout this readingof the lines appearin Stough,op. cit., n. 29.
20 Contraryto Cornford,op. cit., p. 99, I take Parmenides' claims that we do not lhave
the form of knowledge(i.e. the form of knowledgeis not 'in' us) at b9 and that we do
not partake of the form knowledgeat bl 1-12 to be equivalent.All that Parmenides
needs for his argumentis to repeat the point that among us we find only instancesof
knowledge, not knowledge itself (nor even any of the many forms of knowledge:the
forms knowledgeof figure,knowledgeof odd and even, and so on). For 'partake'at bi 2,
cf. 133dl-2 (on which see Cornfordp. 96, n. 1, cf. p. 84, n. 3 and p. 85, n. 2), and
Fujisawa,op. cit., pp. 31ff. Plato's sentence at I 34b12 is discussedin some detail by
Peterson, op. cit.
21 Jones' geometricalknowledgemight also be understoodnon-relationally, as the class
of geometricalfacts Jones knows.This is, as often, the effect of the ambiguityof 'knowl-
edge', translatingthe Greek 'episteme',between knowledgein the propersense(a body
of knowledge), 'ndthe relationknowing:cf. Note 14 above.
22 So for example Cornford,op. cit., p. 99, Festugiere,op. cit., p. 189, n. 2, and cf.
Timaeus35a, and Symposium20leff on the natureof eros as an intermediary.
23 Sophist 248aff. (On this argument,see DavidKeyt, op.
cit.).
24 Parmenideshas now shown that god can know neither sensibles nor
forms, while
sensibles cannot know forms. Although he does not notice the point, it follows that
unless sensibles can know sensibles, both the domain and the range of the relation
knowledge are necessarilythe empty set. This is an intriguingconsequence,for - if
Parmenides'argumentsstand - Plato must defend the possibility that sensiblescan
have knowledge of the sensible world, else it becomes problematicalin what sense
knowledge(episteme: 'knowing')is a relationat all. (I am indebted to MerrileeSalmon
for pointing out to me the difficulties of a relationwhose domain and rangemust be
null.)
25 1 am grateful to James W. Forrester,Keith Lehrer,Ronald D. Milo, and Merrilee
Salmonfor helpfuldiscussionand criticism.