Bengson v HRET G.R.

No 142840, May 7, 2001

Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001

Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he
is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli.
However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection
therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was
elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that
Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those
who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to
an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces
of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

CADALIN ET AL VS. POEA ET AL

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767
NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDOvs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATIONS ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
GRN 104776, December 5,1994.

FACTS:

This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.

On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs
instituted a class suit by filing an Amended Complaint with the POEA for money claims arising from
their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN
& ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas,
and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to
recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.

The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts,
which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the
Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax
not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the
license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the Motion to Strike Out of the Records filed by
AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.

AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting
such motions.

On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked
that AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure to file their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their
answers within ten days from receipt of the order.

(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na remedies
ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties
were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective position papers.
On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed
a Consolidated Reply, POEA Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the amount of $824,
652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted their Appeal Memorandum For Partial
Appeal from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to the Notice of
Appeal filed earlier.

NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some of
the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by
the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.

The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the complainants were
deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June
16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri
Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:

Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement
increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being
from seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the morning .

Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.

Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be
paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.

Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years continuous service with his employer shall be
entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not
less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.

A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his
service in that year.

Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by
either party thereto after giving the other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in
respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days notice in respect of other workers. The party
terminating a contract without the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent
to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion
thereof.

Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a
leaving indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days wages for
each year of the first three years of service and of one months wages for each year of service
thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in
proportion to the period of his service completed within a year.

ISSUE:

1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who have
worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of
Bahrain).

2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable WON complainants claim
for the benefits provided therein have prescribed.)

3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)

RULING:

1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and
proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).

NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated
in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the
host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of the POEA Administrator
that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that
the laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more
favorable than those stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment contract which
provides that the compensation of the employee may be adjusted downward so that the total
computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation therein agree,
another part of the same provision categorically states that total remuneration and benefits do not fall
below that of the host country regulation and custom.

Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the
parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused
the obscurity.

Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form
containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely take it or leave it.
The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees
signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to
be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate the relations of the
parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by
them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the
parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into
their contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract
does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as
a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected
by giving effect to the parties own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear
some relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be
enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services were
rendered in that country.

2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was 3 years, as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of one year from
the date of the expiry of the Contract.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court), Procedural
matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive
law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed
either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v.
Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the
Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code, the claims
would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York.
The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not
specifically intended to be substantive, hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum
should apply. The Court observed: . . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign country,
and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as
well as within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We
think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is the most satisfactory
one.

The Court further noted: Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is entitled to
succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in
question was specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The
Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives. The American court applied the statute of
limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the
Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural
law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.

However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when
the country of the forum (local Court) has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of
the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a
foreign law. While there are several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute was not run against it.

Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: If by the laws of the state or country
where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the
1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:The state
shall promote social justice in all phases of national development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare (Sec. 18).

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as
provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accross:

(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the
litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.

3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court. When all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked
outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under different terms and condition
of employment.

Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on
the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall
be entitled to rile their claims in a class suit.

While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for
employees benefits), there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the
Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed
elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other
employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants
as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into
separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain can
not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.

WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as
Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B.
FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of
employment, one with private respondent Farrales and the other with private respondent Mamasig. 1
The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this
agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the
intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one months
salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts
of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this
agreement.

Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing training. Base station
was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.

roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA through Mr.
Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters, informing them
that they will be terminated effective September 1, 1980.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company
benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).

PIAs Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there claimed that both
private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad
sizeable quantities of personal effects; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had
been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice.
PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the
provisions of the employment contract.

Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had attained the
status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that the
stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to 3 years was null and void as violative of
the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual
employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the
MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly,
the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement
of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the
otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing
upon some other law to govern their relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially;
private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign
corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the
Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to
the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative
agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to
oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in
any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the
matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the
same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.
[DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?]
Petition denied.
_______
NOTES:

Another Issue: petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment with private
respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was governed by the
provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code.
A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract is the law
between the parties. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle.
The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the
equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected
with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle
is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions
dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is
clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the
impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to
appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their consistency with
applicable Philippine law and regulations.
G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA,

in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son

MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA,

Respondents.

FACTS:

Aniceto Fontanilla

bought from United Airlines,

through the Philippine Travel Bureauin Manila,

three Visit the U.S.A. tickets from himself, his wife and his minorson, Mychal, to visit the cities of
Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles.All

All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.

Having used the firstcoupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Aniceto changedtheir
itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issuedtickets with corresponding boarding
passes with the words: Check-in-required. They were then set to leave but were denied boarding
becausethe flight was overbooked. The

CA ruled that private respondents failure to comply with the check-in requirementwill not defeat his
claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with applyingthe laws of the USA, relying on the
Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of theUSA.

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

HELD:No. According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the law of the place where acontract is
made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity,obligation and interpretation shall
govern. This has been said to be the rule even thoughthe place where the contract was made is different
from the place where it is to beperformed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the
airline ticketwas issued, where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and theticket is
issued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore, although, the contractof carriage was to be
performed in the United States, the tickets were purchasedthrough petitioners agent in Manila. It is
true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C.,however, such fact did not change the nature of the
original contract of carriage enteredinto by the parties in Manila.
AZNAR VS GARCIA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to
HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY
Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier
case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when
he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen
of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California
law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term national law is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in
the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of
the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensens will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should
be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi,
the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the
conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended
and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to
the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved
is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no law
to the contrary in the place where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that
the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the
national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil
Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the
law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of
the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action
would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must
apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and
894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California,
is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not
by the internal law of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary

provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The national law
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly
mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.