EXPRESS WAIVER house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the the items were
rmission to enter the the items were confiscated, the police officers took the three men to
G.R. No. L-95630 June 18, 1992
SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA. LUISA VEROY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. WILLIAM L. LAYAGUE, Presiding Judge, Branch XIV,
Regional Trial Court at Davao City; and BRIG. GEN. PANTALEON
DUMLAO, Commanding General, PC-Criminal Investigation
Service, respondents.
Facts: On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol
Station, PC/INP, acting upon a directive issued by Metrodiscom
Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of herein petitioners
in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used
as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with
the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner
was not present and they did not have a search warrant.The following
day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet conducted the search pursuant
to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. They
recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine, a bag etc. The spouse
Veroy were held liable for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of
Rebellion).
Issues: Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1866 the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in admitting in
evidence certain articles which were clearly inadmissible for being
violative of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Held: Yes.The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be
supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the
recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest;
(2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193
SCRA 122]).None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The
reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was
reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel
soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did
not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the
owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the
need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the
same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the
house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the
circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time
to procure a search warrant but did not.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is
malumprohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but
the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized
simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are
therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used
as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them
for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-
690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search
warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal
intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the
knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal
case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is
DISMISSED.
PEOPLE V. NUEVAS
GR No. 170233
22 February 2007
Tinga, J.
Police officers Fami and Cabling, during a stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking in Olongapo City, came across
Jesus Nuevas, who they suspected to be carrying drugs. Upon inquiry,
Nuevas showed them a plastic bag which contained marijuana leaves
and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. He then informed the officers of 2
other persons who would be making marijuana deliveries.
The police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas said his
associates, Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, could be located.
Din was carrying a plastic bag which contained marijuana packed in
newspaper and wrapped therein. When the police officers introduced
themselves, Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag over to them. After
1
the police office.
Police officer Fami then revealed that when the receipt of the
evidence was prepared, all 3 accused were not represented by counsel.
He likewise disclosed that he was the one who escorted all the
accused during their physical examination. He also escorted all 3 to
the Fiscals office where they were informed of the charges against
them.
The 3 were found guilty by the trial court, and the case was
automatically elevated to the CA for review. However, Nuevas
withdrew his appeal. Thus, the case was considered closed and
terminated as to him. The CA affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
W/N Din and Inocencio waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Held:
NO. The search conducted in Nuevas case was made with his
consent. However, in Dins case, there was none. There is reason to
believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with
the incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in
his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability,
he cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag, and even
revealed his associates, offering himself as an informant. His
actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to
find excuses, blame others, and save oneself even at the cost of others
lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas conviction had he
not withdrawn his appeal. On the other hand, with respect to the
search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such
consent had actually been given. The police officers gave inconsistent,
dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they got hold of
the plastic bag. Neither can Dins silence at the time be construed as
an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Thus, the
prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered
his right against unreasonable searches. On the other hand,
Inocencios supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was
sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that
Din was carrying. The act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to
establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally
possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof
that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired
with Din to possess the illegal items.
Ratio:
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried
through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure
becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The exceptions are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(2) Search of evidence in plain view;
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Elements of search of evidence in plain view:
(a) Prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b) Inadvertent discovery of the evidence by the police who
have the right to be where they are;
(c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except
without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of
the search and seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the articles procured.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. The arrest, however, must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police
have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the
object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be
seized.
It must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal detention and searchthe consent must
be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by
duress or coercion.
The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. It is the State which has the
burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obstrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a
waiver, it must first appear that:
(1) The right exists;
(2) The person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and
(3) The said person had an actual intention to relinquish such
right.
Obiter:
To behold is not to hold.
PEOPLE V DEQUINA
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Dequina et al were charged before the
RTC-Manila with violations of the offense of illegal
transport of marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
Police Officer III Wilfredo Masanggue testified that at about
6:00 a.m., of September 29, 1999, he and SPO1 Anthony
Blanco were instructed by their superior to proceed at the
corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila,
where, according to the report given by the informant, three
persons a male and two female[s] would be coming from
Baguio City to deliver unknown quantity of marijuana.
2
At around 9:00 a.m., they noticed a taxi cab coming from
Yuseco St. heading towards the direction of the pier. From
it emerged three passengers a man and two women each
one of them carrying a black travelling bag.
As the trio started walking towards the western portion of
Raxabago St., they drove and trailed them. As the patrol car
got closer behind them, [Dequina] noticed its presence. She
started walking in a more hurried pace.
While trying to get away, [Dequina] dropped the bag she
was carrying. As a result, the zipper of the bag gave way.
Bundles of dried leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags
case into view. Thus, they arrested the three accused.
During the investigation, it was discovered that each of the
three black travelling bags confiscated from the three
accused contained eleven bricks of marijuana.
Accused-appellants assail their conviction, asserting that
their arrests were illegal. They were not doing anything
illegal that would have justified their warrantless arrest,
much less a warrantless search of their persons and
belongings. A search made without a warrant cannot be
justified as an incident of arrest unless the arrest itself was
lawful.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrests of the appellants were lawful.
HELD:YES. Decision affirmed.
Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be
made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial
authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It further
decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is
defined to mean to carry or convey from one place to
another.The evidence in this case shows that at the time of
their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in flagrante
carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their
traveling bags.
Since a crime was then actually being committed by the
accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally
justified, and the following warrantless search of their
traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful
arrest.
 G.R. No. 178039 January 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO
UYBOCO y RAMOS
DOCTRINE: The arrest was validly executed pursuant to
FACTS: On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards,
siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were
abducted and brought to a house in Merville Subdivision,
Paraaque. Nimfa was able to recognized one of the
kidnappers as appellant, because she had seen the latter in
her employers office. 14 The kidnappers called Jepson and
demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls of
the kidnappers, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of
appellant because he had several business transactions.
After, numerous times of negotiation, the parties finally
agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million, some in ash and the
balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a
pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at
Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center and
ordered him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk
unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without
turning back. P/Insp. Escandor and P/Supt. Chan were
assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center and
brought a camera to take photo and video coverage of the
supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with
appellant and the latter as the one who took the ransom.
Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was
already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and
helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along
South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place
and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas
station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort
Bonifacio then heard on their radio that the suspects
vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction.
A few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it
reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. When said car
slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached
the vehicle.23 They introduced themselves as police officers
and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant.
Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a
scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and
handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the
compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz
saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search
without warrant? not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is
only but expected and legally so for the police to search his
Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
which provides: A peace officer or a private person may, WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from are
without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x; (b) When an AFFIRMED.
offense has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and, (c) x x x. A search incident to a
lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which states: A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.
RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest
covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be
effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the
person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Records show that both requirements are present in the
instant case. The police officers present in Magallanes
Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which
effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such
knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers
stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to
pass by. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require
the arresting officers to personally witness the commission
of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the
arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a
number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it
was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is
equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant
was legal because the latter consented to such. Even
assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the
police to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue
of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule
126. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right