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Abstract
Contemporary debates on economic globalization have emphasized the development
opportunities for the Global South through local firms becoming integrated into the
global commodity chains (GCCs), value chains (GVCs) and production networks (GPNs)
governed by leading multinational corporations. With increasing attention to the
negative sides of integration, an emergent issue is the role of disengagement from,
and operation outside of, the GPNs of lead firms. Through the case of the Indian
pharmaceutical industry, where a selective and short-term strategic decoupling and
subsequent recoupling has played a crucial role in the development of what is now the
largest such industry in the Global South, this article explores how decoupling from
GPNs may lead to positive development outcomes. The experience of India and the
pharmaceutical industry shows that a sequence of decoupling and recoupling can be
an alternative to strategic coupling as a route to economic development.
1. Introduction
Since the late 1980s, global integration has been widely regarded as a necessary
component of economic development strategy (Rodrik, 2000). The global commodity
chain (GCC), global value chain (GVC) and global production network (GPN)
frameworks have all emphasized the significance of global integration for the economic
development of firms and regions (Gereffi, 1999, 2001; Henderson et al., 2002; Coe
et al., 2004; Gereffi et al., 2005). The GPN approach has developed the concept of
strategic coupling to denote a process by which regions can achieve globalized
development through integration into the production networks governed by leading
multinational corporations (MNCs) (Coe et al., 2004). Yet many places, especially in
the Global South, have struggled to achieve strategic coupling and have faced
drawbacks to integration into GPNs (Coe and Hess, 2010; MacKinnon, 2012). For
some of these territories, an alternative approach may be to decouple as a prelude
to recoupling or to taking a different approach to integration. Although decoupling
from GPNs has been given some conceptual consideration, (Coe and Hess, 2010;
The Author (2013). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
Phillips, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012), its dynamics and its impact on economic develop-
ment remain to be more fully explored. Can some form of strategic decoupling be used
as an effective component of economic development strategy to overcome adverse
forms of incorporation in GPNs?
Taking the case of Indias pharmaceutical industry, this article develops a concept of
strategic decoupling and considers some of its potential implications for the Global
South. With the third largest such industry in the world in volume terms, India has
become a center of production and research for foreign pharmaceutical MNCs
(Chaudhuri, 2011; Haakonsson et al., 2013) as well as a source region for emerging
Indian-owned pharmaceutical MNCs (Chittoor and Ray, 2007; Athreye and Godley,
2009; Kedron and Bagchi-Sen, 2012). In addition to its economic development
importance, the industry has significance for public health through its crucial role in
providing more affordable medicines to consumers across the Global South (Waning
et al., 2010). The Indian pharmaceutical industry demonstrates how a strategic
decoupling from particular GPNs may, at times, serve as an alternative path to
development.
The role of GPNs in development is also crucial for a closer trading zone between
development and economic geography (Murphy, 2008; Vira and James, 2011). Moving
GPN research beyond lead firms and economies can help construct a more global
economic geography (Economic Geography, 2011). If regions and nations only become
the subject of analysis once they are engaged in strategic coupling with global lead
firms, various other forms of integration into the global economy and their
consequences for development may be overlooked. Considered here are the potential
for integration into SouthSouth production networks and the role of non-participation
in lead firm GPNs as regional and national development strategies.
Following a brief review of the GCC and GPN approaches to the integration of
developing firms and regions in the global economy, the concept of strategic decoupling
is introduced. I then describe phases of coupling, strategic decoupling and recoupling
in the development of Indias pharmaceutical industry over three different periods,
19471970, 19701991 and 19912005, respectively. The article concludes by briefly
considering the continuing scope for strategic decoupling at the present time.
within an economy, over such issues as uneven value capture, labor exploitation and
social conflict (Coe and Hess, 2010).
A focus on the role of global lead firms can also be criticized for a possible inclusionary
bias by only tracing actors and regions when they are participating in prominent GPNs
(Bair and Werner, 2011). Such an emphasis overlooks those development processes
arising in and through alternative forms of market internationalization and in places
where lead firms are absent (Murphy and Schindler, 2011). Moreover, little attention has
been placed on the role of the domestic market in GPNs (Yang, 2014). In some cases, a
considerable degree of prior economic development may be necessary to enable firms
to successfully export within the production networks of global lead firms. In East Asia,
state promotion policies have played an important role in the development of
technological capabilities prior to coupling with global lead firms (Yeung, 2009, 340).
An emphasis on lead firms as facilitators of upgrading and greater value capture in the
GCC and GPN literatures can produce an unintended effective affinity with the
neoliberal approach to development. For the most part, the role of the state in developing
initial capabilities for successful integration (Bair, 2005, 174), including policies
selectively restricting engagement with GPNs, remains under-explored.
Source: Authors compilation, based on Coe et al. (2004) and MacKinnon (2012).
In the same way as coupling can be seen as involving intervention and action on
the part of both territorial institutions and firms (Yeung, 2009), decoupling is
conceptualized here as a reduction or break in the prevailing form of linkage between
a particular GPN(s) and a territory, an outcome that may be the result of either a
firm-based decision or the initiative of territorial, including state, institutions. In
addition to sudden breaks or ruptures, decoupling can be a gradual shift. It is most
likely following earlier structural coupling that has produced a highly asymmetric
relationship between global firms and territories, with consequent lack of compatibility
between the strategic needs of firms and the regional and national development goals
of their host territories.
Decoupling has been widely construed as structural, involving a loss of the positive
contributions of coupling, for example of jobs or revenue (Coe and Hess, 2010; Bair and
Werner, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012). In such circumstances, any subsequent recoupling
may continue to be on asymmetric terms, owing to a lack of territorial assets. However,
territories may also have the opportunity to take advantage of decoupling from some
GPNs, especially if the detrimental effects of global ties on the economy and society
outweigh their contribution to value creation (Coe and Hess, 2010, 136). This article
explores how such a decoupling from global firms and markets may be strategic if it
leads to positive regional or national development outcomes that can overcome a
prevailing negative form of incorporation (Table 2). With the enhanced development of
territorial assets, strategic decoupling may pave a path toward more symmetrical forms
of recoupling (strategic or organic) in the future.
Unlike the view that incorporation in the world economy leads to underdevelopment
(Frank, 1966; Amin, 1976), a strategic decoupling perspective does not reject outright
the possibility of improved territorial development prospects through participating in
GPNs. Rather, strategic decoupling is a temporary and sequential strategy to improve
value creation, enhancement and capture for developmental objectives, and may be
Structural Divestment of FDI Old industrial Negative aspects Loss (e.g. jobs, High for structural
decoupling and loss of jobs regions in UK of decoupling regional recoupling; Low
to lower cost (MacKinnon, outweigh revenues) for strategic and
regions due 2012); La positive impacts organic
to declining Laguna, Mexico recoupling
competitiveness (Bair and
Werner, 2011)
Strategic Promotion and India and pharma- Positive aspects Gain (e.g. growth Low for structural
decoupling protection of ceutical industry of decoupling of local firms, recoupling; High
domestic firms (Section 5.2) outweigh functional for strategic and
and start-ups negative impacts upgrading); New organic
by a variety of opportunities recoupling
institutional in domestic
and policy markets; South
mechanisms south trade
followed by recoupling with the same or, usually, other GPNs. Depending on the extent
of territorial assets developed, a re-engagement may be based on a more symmetric
degree of power leading to a coupling that is more strategic and organic, and less
structural. As such, strategic decoupling may serve as a crucial component of a state
and regional strategy that takes advantage of globalization, rather than disengaging
entirely from it.
By decoupling from global lead firms, new opportunities for value creation and
enhancement may arise through engagement with other production networks, for
example those centered on domestic and regional (supra-national) markets. In lower
income markets with less stringent process and product standards, entry barriers can be
lower than those to supply markets in the Global North (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2011;
Staritz et al., 2011). Strategic decoupling may also offer an avenue for functional
upgrading by moving into higher end activities such as product development and
design, branding and marketing. For example, footwear and furniture firms in Brazil
have upgraded by specializing in the domestic and regional market (Navas-Aleman,
2011). Local firms can thus initiate and expand activities previously discouraged by
powerful global lead firms.
Opportunities for value enhancement through learning can also lead to strategic
decoupling. The early stages of industrial learning may draw on borrowing from abroad
in the form of copying and self-teaching (Amsden, 1989). For this imitative activity,
which does not require the involvement or cooperation of the innovator of that
technology, firms may access codified knowledge and/or take advantage of labor
mobility to develop a copied version of a product. Another learning opportunity is
provided through apprenticeship with other firms in the Global South (Haakonsson,
2009; Murphy, 2012). For example, SouthSouth production linkages with limited
involvement in the production networks of companies from the Global North led to
functional and process upgrading for Ugandas pharmaceutical industry (Haakonsson,
2009). Ultimately, if decoupling leads to the building up of firms that are domestically
owned and controlled (Wade, 2010), greater value is likely to be captured within the
territorial economy.
Greater value clearly does not arise automatically as a result of exiting lead-firm
GPNs and entering new production networks. However, the presence of competitive
pressure on domestic firms as a disciplinary factor combined with state regulation (Lall,
2004) can prevent uncompetitive industries emerging after decoupling. In return for
meeting performance requirements (e.g. exporting, import replacing, reducing the gap
between international and domestic prices, or increasing the proportion of local
content), the East Asian developmental states have supported firms in target industries
through policy mechanisms such as subsidies, licenses and protection (Amsden, 2001;
Chibber, 2003; Wade, 2010). Regional and national institutions can play an active role
in facilitating positive territorial development outcomes through the formation outside
global lead firms of domestic and other production networks, including those linked
to expanding markets in the Global South (Fold and Larsen, 2011; Pietrobelli and
Rabellotti, 2011, 1267).
As the following sections demonstrate, evidence from the Indian pharmaceutical
industry since independence suggests that its capabilities developed through a process
of strategic decoupling and recoupling. As key policies governing relationships with
MNCs have been set at the national level, the regulatory role of Indias central
government is particularly relevant to the development, including the public health
dimensions, of the pharmaceutical industry. The national scale has not been widely used
in the analysis of coupling with GPNs, yet it is a key governance framework for
territorial development and is also significant because national economies differ
so much in their global integration (Coe et al., 2004, 281; Hess and Yeung, 2006;
Rodrik, 2013).
1 A single representative was interviewed from most of the 65 firms and 20 other stakeholders, although in
four cases, two people were interviewed.
which form the structure of the following description of value creation, enhancement
and capture processes. Secondary literature (e.g. academic, policy documents,
corporate websites, media reports) has provided an additional macro-level perspective
and greater historical depth.
With global lead firms dominating the Indian market, domestic firms had limited
opportunities to participate in value creation activity. A few domestic companies
imported pharmaceuticals from global lead firms in the United States and Western
Europe and then coordinated local distribution. Only a very small number, however,
were able to enhance their value in this period, most notably Ranbaxy. Originally, a
supplier to A. Sinoigi, a Japanese firm, and then Lepetit SpA, an Italian firm, and now
one of the largest Indian pharmaceutical firms, Ranbaxy was able to initiate
manufacturing after Lepetit SpA exited. Typically, Indian firms were only able to
initiate their own manufacturing by operating independently of the MNCs. For
example, a Vadodara-based, small-scale company interviewed commenced operations
from 1952 to 1962 by importing medicines from Parke Davis in the US and then
repacking and selling, but only later initiated its own manufacturing by supplying
government health programs, an alternative to the MNC dominated market (Interview,
Vadodara, 8 October 2011). The quality of production from the small domestic
industry which did exist was questionable (Bakshi, 2011, 12). The most significant
expansion of domestic value creation at this time was the establishment of two
public sector firmsHindustan Antibiotics in 1954 and Indian Drugs and
Pharmaceuticals Limited (IDPL) in 1961, drawing on technology from the US-owned
Merck and from the Soviet Union. With MNCs reluctant to produce bulk drugs
in India, these units helped initiate domestically based pharmaceutical production,
introducing Indian scientists to production activity and thereby creating initial domestic
capabilities.
Domestic firms faced three major challenges to greater value enhancement. First, the
pharmaceutical MNCs enjoyed a technological advantage over the developing world
(Gereffi, 1983), arising from the huge advances, among them the discovery and
manufacture of antibiotics, of the therapeutic revolution in the world-wide pharma-
ceutical industry between 1940 and 1955. Although a nationalist industrialization
programme was launched promising to regulate foreign investment (Encarnation,
1989), to access the benefits of the therapeutic revolution few alternatives existed for
India other than to permit foreign companies to enter the domestic market in the
pharmaceutical industry. As an interviewee noted:
in those days, technology was driving the industry. Technology was very secretly guarded
by the multinational companies, so it was not coming out.
Interview, Vadodara, 8 October 2011
Second, owing to their reputation for better quality products and their large teams of
medical representatives, the MNC subsidiaries had a significant marketing advantage
within India. Referring to the dominance of such firms as Pfizer, Glaxo, Abbot,
Sandoz and Ciba in the 1960s, Bhandari observes that doctors were not willing to
touch drugs made by Indian companies (2005, 48). Third, the Patent Act 1911 also
regulated Indian firms, restricting their production of imitations of new drugs
(Hamied, 1988). Although several post-Independence government enquiries had
recommended changes, MNCs succeeded for 20 years in preventing any change to
domestic patent laws. Their success underscores the corporate power MNCs then
enjoyed and has been represented as perhaps the best example [in India] of the
deployment of foreign business pressure to influence government policy (Kochanek,
1974, 308).
An incremental policy shift involved a sequence of initiatives, starting with the Patent
Act 1970, the Drugs (Prices Control) Order 1970, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
(FERA) 1973, and finally and most significantly the New Drug Policy 1978. While
general restrictions on foreign-investment (FERA) were applied widely at a time when
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi would often refer to the foreign conspiracy against
India (Encarnation, 1989, 199), other policies and factors were more sector-specific and
are key to the trajectory of the pharmaceutical industry. The Patent Act of 1970, which
provided for short process patents (5 years) and no product patents in pharmaceuticals,
required relatively little state capacity to implement and was particularly influential in
an industry where new drugs can be copied relatively easily. As a result and unlike other
industries in India (Kohli, 2007), pharmaceuticals was less affected by the states limited
capacity to implement its industrial policy. As the Indian state moved to give less
priority to rapid industrialization during the 1970s, the pharmaceuticals sector received
considerable policy support because of its potential benefit for public health. Other key
distinguishing factors were the later start date of decoupling in pharmaceuticals, the
influential role of the public sector companies in developing pharmaceutical
technologies, and the lack of entry barriers for domestic firms.
Official initiatives in India during the 1970s and 1980s can be situated within the
broader movement across the developing world that came to be consolidated in the
New International Economic Order, and which sought to reform relationships with the
multinational pharmaceutical industry (Patel, 1983) to capture greater health and
economic value. While other countries made similar patent law revisions, however,
India achieved greater change in the pharmaceutical industry by imposing more
extensive restrictions. In Brazil, for example, pharmaceutical patent protection was
abolished in 1969, yet there were few other restrictions comparable to those in India,
and foreign investment in the pharmaceutical sector multiplied more than 5 times
between 1971 and 1979 (Gereffi, 1983, 229). In India, the FERA of 1973 and New Drug
Policy 1978 were particularly significant in reducing MNC involvement. The FERA
imposed restrictions on foreign equity holdings in core high technology industries,
including drugs and pharmaceuticals (Sahu, 1998, 67). Arising from the recommenda-
tions of the official Hathi Committee Report (1975), the New Drug Policy limited
foreign equity ownership (40% or less) and required MNCs to operate at a significantly
higher share of bulk drug production.2 This initiative was aimed at encouraging MNCs
to commence local production of bulk drugs and to protect the lucrative formulation
market for Indian firms. The Drugs (Prices Control) Order 1979 that followed placed
more than 347 drugs under price control.
2 A minimum bulk drug: formulation ratio of 1:5 was allowed for foreign firms, compared with 1:10 for
Indian firms and the previous 1:12.53 for MNCs (Drabu, 1986, 194).
stated that they had little difficulty with approval procedures for their firms. For
example, the director of a company set up in 1982 recalled how, compared with today,
the regulatory requirements to start and operate a pharmaceutical entity were less
stringent (Interview, Ahmedabad, 24 September 2011). Entrepreneurs also emerged
from IDPL, the public sector company, and its offshoots, founding Uniloids (1976),
Standard Organics (1980), Virchow Laboratories (1981), and most notably Dr. Reddys
Laboratories (1984), now one of the three largest Indian pharmaceutical firms. These
firms played a key role in the establishment of bulk drugs production in India.
Indian entrepreneurs also emerged from among those who had already gained crucial
technical and/or business experience working for MNCs in India. An interviewee
recalled how for:
technical people working in a multinational company, after 5 or 6 years you left that company
and started another company. You know all the technology.
Interview, Vadodara, 8 October 2011
For example, the managing director of a large Hyderabad-based bulk drugs producer
completed a PhD in chemistry and then, after 10 years experience working for Glaxo
India, started his own firm in 1984. He had experience:
in all aspects of the pharmaceutical product development, R&D, quality control, process devel-
opment, CGMP manufacture, so he figured if I can do it for Glaxo, why dont I do it for myself?
Interview, Hyderabad, 15 November 2011
In other instances, the founders of two Bangalore-based companies worked for Smith
Kline & French (SKF) before starting their own firms, respectively a bulk drugs
operation in 1984 and a small scale formulations facility in 1989. The former recalled
that working at SKF in the late 1970s and early 1980s gave:
exposure to a number of areas. I went to meetings with people from various departments,
various divisions. It was really my learning ground.
Interview, Bangalore, 24 November 2011
An alternative strategy for value enhancement was through imitative learning as part
of an altered relationship with MNCs. Indian firms had opportunities to access
technology independently of MNCs, by introducing products that were under patent
abroad. One interviewee recalled that:
we were not governed in the patent law. The multinationals say you cannot market a brand,
but you can reengineer and you can market the similar brand product in a different
manufacturing form or different process. That was the breakthrough.
Interview, Vadodara, 8 October 2011
Domestic firms could access knowledge through journals, manuals, contacts abroad
and by deconstructing global lead firms products in their laboratories, to then produce
their own imitated version (Horner, 2014). In this manner, Indian companies became
extremely good at chemistry skills (Interview, Mumbai, 28 July 2009), developing
numerous new processes. A number of drugs were introduced within 23 years of their
creation abroad (Hamied, 1988). MNCs were seemingly reluctant to license in
circumstances where Indian firms had the ability to copy their technology (Interview,
Bangalore, 21 November 2011), something which was legally permissible in the absence
of product patents. The technological advantage of the MNCs, the basis of their power
during the earlier period of structural coupling, was gradually and progressively eroded.
By the late 1970s, decoupling had allowed the Indian domestic firms to master the
technology of at least 76.8% of the bulk drugs and 97.5% of the formulations in
the Indian market, thereby making technology no longer a bottleneck for undertaking
the task of replacing most of the manufacturing activities of the TNCs (Chaudhuri,
1984, 1373).
The major remaining barrier to greater value enhancement for domestic firms was
the marketing advantage of the MNCs. Doctors and patients evidently had little
confidence in locally made products. One interviewee noted that in the 1980s and
earlier, for the doctors to initially believe [a product was effective], a multinational
had to promote it (Interview, Hyderabad, 17 November 2011). MNCs also had
considerably greater resources to provide as incentives to doctors (Interview, 20
October 2011, Mumbai). Nevertheless, corporate and legislative restrictions limited
the activities of MNC subsidiaries, with one interviewee suggesting that people in
May & Baker couldnt shift a reaction six inches without consulting London
(Interview, Hyderabad, 10 November 2011). More importantly, once Indian domestic
manufacturing did emerge, foreign companies were apparently unable to compete with
the cost structure of Indian manufacturers and so they cut back their activities
(Interview, 15 November 2011, Hyderabad).
same drugs in the UK (calculated from Hamied, 1988). In the 1617 year period
following the first moves toward strategic decoupling in the pharmaceutical sector, the
rise in the wholesale price index of medicines in India was, at 103.7%, significantly
lower than all products, at 277.8% (Singh, 1988).
In sum, the power relationship between multinationals and the Indian host territory
was radically rebalanced during the 1970s and 1980s. Global lead firms faced
progressively heavier restrictions, leading to a decline in the foreign dominance of the
Indian market. The Indian domestic industry grew, much of it independently from the
global lead firms. A sequence of policies had the cumulative effect of producing
strategic decoupling, facilitating the development of initial capabilities in preparation
for subsequent recoupling.
decoupling, to meet this emerging need. One interviewee explained: in India there are
two things which are very clearly advantageousthe skill and the knowledge which is
available in abundance; second, the cost (Interview, Mumbai, 23 July 2009). Another
explained that:
You see what Indian companies are doing in, say, US markets - taking market share or putting
that kind of pricing pressure into those markets. Other [multinational] companies have to
ensure that they have similar skills or infrastructure available to them. That is why they have to
come here.
Interview, Mumbai, 20 July 2009
The growing domestic market is another reason for the increasing interest of
pharmaceutical MNCs in India:
All the MNC companies who had already exited are now you know frantically strategising
their India business. You know how do I enter the market? Because its a $7 billion3 market,
growing at 12%. It cant be ignored.
Interview, Mumbai, 27 July 2009
Pharmaceutical MNCs have been partnering with large Indian firms, such as
Wockhardt, Cipla and Piramal Healthcare, as part of a more symmetrical coupling
with mutually advantageous value enhancement opportunities. One executive from a
large Indian firm observed that foreign MNCs need a marketing channel in India and
we need access to the product pipeline (Interview, Mumbai, 21 July 2009). In the
reverse direction, global lead firms provide access to highly-regulated markets in North
America and Western Europe by marketing and distributing products on behalf of
Indian firms. For example, an interviewee explained that:
We have partnered with multiple generic companies like Hospira, Actavis, Apotex, and Dava
to name a few in terms of putting our medicines into the market. We followed a policy where
we concentrate more on development and manufacturing and leave the front-end marketing
to the local people.
Interview, telephone, 20 July 2009
By providing a growing number of Indian firms with a revenue stream far greater than
could be obtained by solely serving the domestic market, these arrangements have acted
as an increasingly significant additional source of value enhancement as well as a source
of opportunities for learning about quality standards and production techniques for
regulated markets (Interview, Mumbai, 21 July 2009). In the words of the technical
manager of a medium-sized contract manufacturer:
Basically all the systems, the processes, the requirements, the SOPs [standard operating
procedures], everything is what we have adopted from these multinational companies.
Interview, Vadodara, 8 October 2011
3 By the end of 2010, the official estimate for the size of the domestic market was $11.2 billion (Department
of Pharmaceuticals 2012).
4 India now has the largest number of USFDA-approved plants outside of the United States.
6. Conclusion
The Indian pharmaceutical experience demonstrates how a sequence of strategic
decoupling and recoupling can create opportunities for imitative learning and
functional upgrading while also re-balancing the earlier asymmetrical power relations
between territories and GPNs. Strategic decoupling in the Indian pharmaceutical
industry has been driven by dual imperatives, one focused on economic benefits and
another on public health concerns, in particular the provision of medicines. Granting a
historical trajectory of strategic decoupling and recoupling has emerged, some of it has
been forced out of circumstance, notably the extent of liberalization and the
Table 6. Summary of value creation, enhancement and capture in GPNs for India and the pharmaceutical
industry
introduction of product patents, both of which have had major influences on the
subsequent forms of coupling. Although the state has aimed at breaking the negative
relationship with the multinational pharmaceutical industry and promoting domestic
firms, state action, particularly in relation to recoupling, has also been very much
contingent on the global and domestic economic contexts.
A focus on the couplings between territories and firms illuminates the relational
nature of development under economic globalization, and the analysis of decoupling in
GPNs gives renewed attention to the cautionary approach to integration taken by the
original world systems literature (Bair, 2009). Decoupling may be strategic for a
particular phase of development, allowing various scales of territories to improve their
form of integration into GPNs. By focusing on the varied Indian experience, this article
has sought to produce a deeper understanding of the breaking up and reform of
coupling relationships and their development implications. Strategic decoupling in the
Indian context was influenced by the possibility of governing access to a very large
internal market with growing purchasing power, which provided opportunities for
domestic firms to engage in a wide range of activities. However, smaller countries
elsewhere in the Global South may be more constrained in their opportunities for
engaging in similar forms of decoupling and recoupling.
With changes in global trade rules since the formation of the WTO in 1994, the policy
autonomy of developing countries has been substantially reduced (Wade, 2003; Lall,
2004), but states still have policy options to shape interaction with MNCs in areas such
as tariff ceilings, restrictions on FDI, requirements to hire local labor, technology
transfer, R&D, and domestic subsidies (Chang, 2009). The rise of new end markets in
the Global South (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2011; Staritz et al., 2011; Gereffi and Lee,
2012) presents new opportunities for coupling and decoupling. In 2012, for the first
time, a greater volume of exports from the Global South went to other countries in the
South than to the Global North (The Economist, 2013). Yet, many current
development policies give priority to attracting the FDI of global lead firms (Reiter
and Steensma, 2010) and to providing technical assistance and capacity building to
meet the export standards for high income markets (Staritz et al., 2011). The Indian
experience from the recent past suggests that alternative pathways may be available for
regions and nations struggling to achieve strategic coupling and upgrading through
GPN integration.
With the prospect that more inward-looking development strategies focused on
domestic and regional markets in the Global South may be emerging (Gereffi, 2014),
further research might explore how the potential of, and limits to, strategic decoupling,
as well as coupling, processes are manifest, including in smaller countries who might be
able to exploit growing niche opportunities in supra-national regional markets within
the Global South. The continued role of the state and its scope in planning and
anticipating coupling processes for territorial benefit also warrants further attention.
Ultimately, more analysis in other sectors and territories is needed to further
understand when these realignments become strategic and significant as economic
globalization continues to unfold.
Acknowledgements
The National Science Foundation Geography and Regional Science Programs Doctoral
Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (no. 1103231) and the Association of American
Geographers Economic Geography Specialty Group Graduate Student Research Award 2012
are gratefully acknowledged for supporting the fieldwork on which this paper is based. The
insightful comments of Harald Bathelt, the journal referees, Yuko Aoyama, James T. Murphy,
Balaji Parthasarathy and Seth Schindler are also gratefully acknowledged, as is feedback from the
organisers and participants in the Expanding the economic geography-development geography
trading zone session at RGS-IBG 2012 in Edinburgh and in the Value chains, neoliberalism
and global restructuring session at AAG 2013 in Los Angeles. The usual disclaimers apply.
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