Harvard Divinity School

The Philosophical Foundations of Soloveitchik's Critique of Interfaith Dialogue

Author(s): Daniel Rynhold
Source: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 101-120
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity School
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The PhilosophicalFoundationsof
Soloveitchik's Critiqueof Interfaith
Dialogue
Daniel Rynhold
King's College London

RabbiJoseph B. Soloveitchik (1903-1993) is often cited as the outstandingfigure

of modem OrthodoxJudaismin the twentiethcentury.'Born into one of the most
famousrabbinicfamiliesof nineteenth-centuryLithuanianJewry,Soloveitchikheld
unimpeachable"Orthodox"credentials,and as head of the Talmudfaculty at New
York'sYeshivaUniversity,he spent his active working life as a teacherof Talmud.
With his deep roots in the world of the Lithuanianyeshivah (Talmudicacademy),
Soloveitchik was an exemplarof the sophisticated"Brisker"method of Talmudic
study that had reached its apotheosis in the hands of his grandfather,the great R.
ChaimBrisker(1853-1918). This "Brisker"method,2with its emphasison concep-
tualprecisionand abstractanalysis, was characterizedby the value it placed on the
intellectualpursuitof Talmudstudy "for its own sake."3Significantly,though, the
intellectualpursuitsthatSoloveitchikvalued expandedhis intellectualhorizonsfar
beyondtraditionalTalmudicfare.Thus, in a famously pioneeringbreakwith family
tradition,at the age of twenty-twohe went to studyat the Universityof Berlinwhere

'An earlier version of this paper was presented at the British Association of Jewish Studies
Conference, University of Southampton,England, in July 2002.
2So called after the town of Brest-Litovsk (Brisk), where R. Chaim settled after his time as the
rosh (head) of the Volozhin Yeshivah.
3Forfurtherdiscussion of the Brisker method, see Norman Solomon, The Analytic Movement:
Hayyim Soloveitchik and his Circle (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1993); Marc B. Shapiro, "The
BriskerMethodReconsidered,"Tradition31, no. 3 (1997), 78-102; and Moshe Soloveitchik, "'What'
Hath Brisk Wrought:The Brisker Derekh Revisited," The Torah u-Madda Journal 9 (2000) 1-18.

HTR 96:1 (2003) 101-20

102 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

he would receive a doctoratein philosophy,concentratingon the epistemology and

ontology of the Neo-KantianJewish philosopher,HermannCohen.
At home, therefore, in the languages of both contemporaryphilosophy and
OrthodoxJudaism,Soloveitchikwas perfectlyplacedto articulatethe philosophical
andtheologicalfoundationsof an intellectuallysophisticatedOrthodoxyfor modern
Jews. The perceptionof Soloveitchikas the foremosttheoreticianof modernOrtho-
doxy, however,has since led boththe moretraditionalistandmore modernistwings
of thatcommunityto claim him as the embodimentof theirown understandingsof
whatit represents.This paperfocuses on one locus of this battleover Soloveitchik's
legacy: his 1964 article on interfaithdialogue, "Confrontation."4
In a recentarticle,LawrenceKaplanhas criticizedthe cultureof revisionismthat
infects the posthumoustreatmentof Soloveitchik's work and personality.5Kaplan
is equally wary of attemptsto paint Soloveitchik as an unreconstructedtradition-
alist who dabbled in philosophy out of strategic necessity as he is of attemptsto
portrayhim as a trailblazingthinkerwilling to compromise his traditionalismin
the name of secular philosophy. "Confrontation,"however, is widely seen as a
perfect example of how the traditionalLithuanianrosh yeshivah got the better of
the philosopherin its apparentforbiddingof Jewish-Christiandiscussion on theo-
logical matters.Even David Singer and Moshe Sokol, while certainly not guilty
of the simplificationsthatKaplancriticizes, tracedhis "strangelynegative attitude
towardsinter-religiousdialogue [to] a lingeringconcernover whatthey would say
in 'Brisk.' "6 Singer and Sokol can only see "Confrontation"as "a conservative
breakon his outreachto modernity."7
The central argumentof this paper is that Soloveitchik's entire approach to
interfaithdialogue can in fact be based on firm philosophical foundationsthat he
first laid out as early as 1944. Thus, far from being a conservative break on his
outreachto modernity,it reflectsa deep-seatedphilosophicalmethodologythatone
might even identify as partof that"modernity."I do not, however, intend to repeat
the mistakeof modernistrevisionism,for I believe thatwe ought not to dilute either
pole of Soloveitchik's thought.A subsidiary aim of this paper,therefore, will be
to show that facile one-dimensional analyses of his thought fail to do justice to
its complexity.
We will approachthese aims by summarizingthe argumentof "Confrontation"
in the first section of this paperand then, as a point of contrastwith our own ap-
proach,briefly addressingDavid Hartman'srecent political interpretationof that

4JosephB. Soloveitchik, "Confrontation,"Tradition6, no. 2 (1964) 5-29.

5LawrenceKaplan, "Revisionism and the Rav: The Struggle for the Soul of Modern Orthodoxy,"
Judaism 48 (1999) 290-311.
6DavidSinger and Moshe Sokol, "Joseph Soloveitchik: Lonely Man of Faith,"Modern Judaism
2 (1982) 227-72, at 255.
7Ibid.
 DANIEL RYNHOLD 103

article in the second section. The central argumentis found in the third section,
where we present Soloveitchik's philosophical methodology as described in The
Halakhic Mind' in order to show how it provides a philosophical route to the
conclusions of "Confrontation."Finally, in the concluding section we will look
at the bearing of our argumenton the debate concerning Soloveitchik's relative
traditionalismor modernism.

The Argumentof "Confrontation"

"Confrontation"begins with an analysis of the biblical accountsof the creationof
man,from which Soloveitchikextractsa philosophicalanthropologybased on three
progressivelevels of humanbeing. At the firstlevel, humanbeings aredescribedas
naturalnonconfrontedbeings whose existence is seen as "mergingharmoniously
with the general order of things and events."' Persons at this level are identified
by Soloveitchik as entirely "hedonically-mindedand pleasure-seeking,"10 with no
awarenessof their unique status within the hierarchyof being.
At the second level, though,humanbeings become confrontedbeings, conscious
of theirseparationfrom nature,in which the firstlevel of personis absorbed.These
beings confront their environmentas a subject does an object, discovering their
independencefrom natureand at thatpoint receiving a divine imperative.Thus, at
the same time that humanbeings are able to subject the naturalorderto their rule
anddominionthroughtheirintellect and creativity,the divine imperativehas them
nonethelesssurrenderingto God, respondingto a normativecall thatwill not allow
theirdominanceof natureto descend into a "demonicurge for power.""1
The third level that Soloveitchik describes is that of a furtherconfrontation
between subjectand subjectratherthansubjectand object. Here, thereis a recipro-
cal confrontationbetween two beings, both aware of their existential uniqueness
and both craving redemptionfrom the loneliness this entails. At this level of con-
frontation, communication is necessary for companionship, but Soloveitchik's
fundamentalcontentionis thatsuch communicationis always limitedin its efficacy.
Soloveitchik writes that "in all personal unions such as marriage,friendship, or
comradeship,however strongthe bonds unitingtwo individuals,the modi existen-
tiae remaintotally unique and hence, incongruous,at both levels, the ontological
and the experiential."•2Whateverinterests and common goals people may share,
the ultimate existential union is unachievable and thus, reflecting the dialectical

8JosephB. Soloveitchik, TheHalakhic Mind (New York:Free Press, 1986). Hereafter,references

to this work will be in the main text in the form HM, followed by page number.
9Soloveitchik, "Confrontation,"6.
'0lbid., 9
"Ibid., 13.
12Ibid., 15.
104 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

theme that constantlyrises to the surface of his work in this period, Soloveitc.hik
writes thatone is condemnedto practicing"thedifficult dialectical artof... being
one with and at the same time, different from, his human confronter,of living in
communityand simultaneouslyin solitude.""
It is on the basis of these anthropologicalmodels that Soloveitchik reaches his
conclusions regardingJewish-Christiandialogue. The implication that he draws
from his account is thatJews have been called to engage in a double confrontation
in which people arebothhumanbeings "sharingthe destiny of Adam in his general
encounterwith nature,and . .. members of a covenantal community which has
preservedits identity undermost unfavourableconditions, confrontedby another
faith community."'4The Jew has thereforebeen burdenedwith the double respon-
sibility of heeding the call to engage, as a humanbeing, the universalaspects of his
personalityand mission, while at the same time not sacrificingthe particularistic
aspects of the covenantthat God has made with the Jews.'5
In Soloveitchik'seyes, the westernizedJew has found it difficultto adjustto this
doubleconfrontation.Havingengaged in the universalcognitive quest describedat
the secondlevel of his anthropology,the modernJew is often unablesimultaneously
to withholdfrom this andstakeout the areaof irredeemableparticularitydescribed
at the thirdlevel. Thus, he does not understandthe trueconflictednatureof Jewish
identity.And it is this thatappearsto underlieSoloveitchik's concerns about Jew-
ish-Christiandialogue.The failureof modernJews to appreciatethe unique aspect
of Jewish identity means that they cannot understandthat "each faith community
is engaged in a singularnormativegesture reflecting the numinous natureof the
act of faith itself, and it is futile to try to find common denominators."'6
Moreover,those who understandonly a single-confrontationphilosophy areun-
able to see the possibility for genuine dialogue despite difference.This, according
to Soloveitchik, has been the problem with previous interfaithconfrontationsin
thatthey have been modeledsolely on the single confrontationbetween subjectand
object,in which the latteris seen as a commodityfor dominationby the former.Thus
"non-Jewishsociety has confrontedus throughoutthe ages in a mood of defiance,
as if we were partof the subhumanobjective orderseparatedby an abyss from the
human.""However, this does not rule out the possibility of interfaithdialogue for
Soloveitchik.Ratherit gives us the model of how thatdialogue must be conducted,
a model based on the double confrontationthat faced Adam and Eve:

13Ibid., 16.
14Ibid., 17.
15This particularismis reflected at three levels of the faith experience for Soloveitchik, though
made particularlyclear in the halakhic system's resistance to any attempts at universal rationaliza-
tion. See ibid., 18-19.
16Ibid., 19.
'7Ibid.,19-20.
 DANIEL RYNHOLD 105

In the samemanneras AdamandEve confrontedandattempted to subduea

maliciousscoffingnatureandyet nevertheless
encountered eachotheras two
cognizantof theirincommensurability
separateindividuals anduniqueness,so
alsotwofaithcommunities whichcoordinatetheireffortswhenconfronted by
the cosmicordermayfaceeachotherin the full knowledgeof theirdistinct-
ness andindividuality.'8
The most importantimplicationof this is thatdialogue can only takeplace at a level
where we share common ethical or social concerns, i.e., where we can find com-
mon denominators.But, given the incommunicablenatureof the faith experiences
particularto each community,dialogue at the deepest theological level is ruled out
ab initio in any respectful interfaithdialogue. It is here that the aforementioned
futility of looking for common denominatorsis encountered,for there are none to
be found: the faith experience cannot be universalized.19 Each community must
always be viewed from the perspectiveof its own conceptual frameworkand not
subjected to alien categories of thought, meaning that Judaism cannot therefore
be understoodthroughChristiancategories of reference (nor vice versa). Thus the
position that Soloveitchik advocates is summed up as follows:
We cooperatewith the membersof otherfaithcommunitiesin all fieldsof
constructivehumanendeavour, but,simultaneously withourintegrationinto
thegeneralsocialframework, we engagein a movementof recoilandretrace
oursteps.In a word,we belongto the humansocietyand,at the sametime,
we feel as strangersand outsiders .... We are indeed involved in the cultural
endeavourandyet we arecommittedto anotherdimensionof experience.20

David Hartman'sPolitical Interpretation

"Confrontation"has often been interpretedin a mannerthatreflects negatively on
interfaithdialogue. Moshe Meiselman,for example, writes that "WhenPope John
XXIII opened dialogue with the Jews, the Rav viewed this as a serious danger to
Judaism,and declaredthat no such dialogue be pursued."21
It should be obvious from our brief outline of the paper that "Confrontation"
itself does not present such a view. While it does set limits to the dialogue, most
notably to the inclusion of theological elements, that is far from forbidding en-
gagement in such dialogue at all, which indeed is seen as a vital expression of the
prescribeddouble confrontation.Nonetheless, Soloveitchik's position is certainly

18Ibid., 20
"'Whetheror not we need to find such common denominatorsin orderto engage in interfaithdia-
logue,as Soloveitchikappearsto believe,is a questionto whichwe will returnin the conclusion.
26.
20Ibid.,
21Moshe Meiselman,"TheRay, FeminismandPublicPolicy:An Insider'sOverview,"Tradition
33, no. 1 (1998) 5-30, at 22.
106 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

a conservative one. The question is whether, as Singer and Sokol state, it is only
Soloveitchik's psychological struggles with his Lithuanianheritage that prevent
fuller engagement.Recently,David Hartmanhas dismissed this psychological ap-
proach, substitutinga political interpretationof "Confrontation"that shows it to
be consistent with Soloveitchik's general theological presuppositions,and it will
be instructiveto focus brieflyon his argument,since our approachesshare certain
formal features.22
According to Hartman,the standardapproach that sees "Confrontation"as
forbiddingtheological dialogue is mistaken.The fear is not interfaithdialogue per
se, but who might undertakeit. According to Hartman,Soloveitchik is concerned
that the wrong type of Jew will engage in this dialogue. It is only the few, such as
Soloveitchikhimself, who can utilize the thoughtof an Otto or a Kierkegaardwith-
out sacrificingthe singularityof the Jewish faith experience.23But the westernized
Jew who misrepresentsandmisunderstandsJudaismas a religionrequiringonly the
single universalconfrontationmay well acquiesce in the subjugationof Judaismto
universalcategories that will eliminate its numinous faith element.
Fromthe Christianside, moreover,dialogue has not historicallybeen carriedout
in an atmosphereof mutualrespect.The Christian,engaged in a single confronta-
tion, has often sought to instrumentalizeJudaism, an approachthat Soloveitchik
fears would be acceptedby the singly confrontedmodem Jew.According to Hart-
man, therefore,"Confrontation"is a political responsum. Its form is dictated by
the natureof public disputation,a forum that often aims at accommodation and
compromise. But Soloveitchik does not thereby rule out "mutual exchange of
ideas, and the importanceof making sense of Judaismwithin a largerintellectual
frame of reference."24
While it is clearthatSoloveitchikdoes not rule out interfaithdialogue according
to Hartman,it is not entirely clear to me whetherHartmansees him as ruling out
theological dialogue. On the one hand, he writes:
Soloveitchikdoes not close the door to Jewish-Christian discussions,but
placesverycarefulbarriers,. . . remindingJewsthatthereis a dimensionto
theirfaiththatpermanently condemnsthemto separationand isolation.R.
Soloveitchik seemsto be sayingthat,on theone hand,he wouldallowcertain
individuals to participate
in thisdiscussionso longas theyareawarethatfull

22SeeDavid Hartman,Love and Terrorin the God Encounter: The Theological Legacy of Rabbi
Joseph B. Soloveitchik, vol. 1 (Woodstock, Vt.: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2001) ch. 5.
23A point reaffirmed by Walter Wurzburgerin his "Justification and Limitations of Interfaith
Dialogue," in Judaism and The Interfaith Movement (ed. Walter S. Wurzburgerand Eugene B.
Borowitz; New York: Synagogue Council of America, 1967) 7-16.
24Hartmann,Love and Terror, 156. Hartmanbelieves that Soloveitchik therefore distinguishes
between the private use by an individual of Christian theologians in order to make sense of one's
own faith experience and the public nature of interfaith dialogue, where such cross-fertilization
seems to have been severely circumscribed.
 DANIEL RYNHOLD 107

communication is not possible.For R. Soloveitchik,they cannotshareall

thingstogether,becausethereis no identitywithoutuniqueness,singularity
andseparateness.Therefore,in the dialoguewithChristianity,
he couldtrust
only thoseJewswho couldbearthe burdenof solitude.... Onlythosewho
canlive withwhatR. Soloveitchikcalls double-confrontationcan enterinto
Jewish-Christiandialogue.25
While this might appearto uphold the barriersagainst theological dialogue, more
generallyHartmannotes that "the incommunicablenatureof the faith experience
cannot be his final word on Jewish Christiandialogue."26Thus he sketches, albeit
very briefly,a place for such dialogue in what he terms"theexperientialdimension
of faith.""Howreligiousvalues areinternalizedandhow they shapehumancharac-
ter"27can provide a forumfor dialogue, and he gives as an example Soloveitchik's
reinterpretationof the concept of providence in terms of a demand to become a
self-creatingperson.This meansthat"JewsandChristianscan engage in a common
theological discussion on how theirrespective traditionscan develop self-creative
personalities"(emphasis added).28
The space thatthis creates for genuine theological dialogue would, it seems to
me, remainat best very limited. As Hartmanhimself admits, the faith experience
"is often interpretedin exclusivist language,""29and while a common understanding
of providence might provide a basis for dialogue, in many theological areas the
categories of thoughtof each faith traditionwould precludeit. Having said that, it
is worthnoting thatthe universal"secular"level at which Soloveitchik does allow
for dialoguemightitself be seen as theologicalratherthan"secular"when grounded
in the sharedreligious context of an interfaithdialogue.30
Whateverthe precise nuancesof his position, what Hartmanhas shown is that
Soloveitchik's stance need not be seen as anomalous, but as dictated by his un-
derstandingof the faith experience and the sociopolitical reality then confronting
Judaism.While I would agreewith Hartmanin his contentionthat"Confrontation"
need not be seen as a problematicanomalyin Soloveitchik's thought,I believe that
this conclusion need not be reachedby applyingan exclusively pragmaticanalysis.
Indeed,the point thatone must not interpretJudaismin terms of Christiancatego-
ries, which Hartmandepicts merely as a piece of practicaladvice for Christians,in

25Ibid.,150.
26Ibid.,138.
27Ibid.,155.
28Ibid.,156.
29Ibid.,163.
301ndeed,this is something that Soloveitchik himself notes in "Confrontation,"24 n. 8, and that
is particularlyemphasized by WalterWurzburgerin his "Justificationand Limitations of Interfaith
Dialogue." Kaplan also believes that this is central to Soloveitchik's position, as made manifest in
his avoidance of the term "secular"in a later piece, "On InterfaithRelationships,"repr.in A Treasury
of Tradition(ed. N. Lamm and W. Wurzburger;New York: Ktav, 1967) 78-80.
108 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

fact reflects a far more fundamentalphilosophical foundationfor the conclusions

of "Confrontation."

"Confrontation"and Soloveitchik's Philosophical Methodology

In the finalsectionof his 1944 workTheHalakhicMind,31Soloveitchiknotes thatthe
medievalJewishphilosophershadmistakenlyattemptedto forma Jewishworldview
out of foreignphilosophicalmaterialwhen in truth"thereis only a single sourcefrom
which a Jewish philosophical Weltanschauungcould emerge;... the Halakhah"
(HM, 101). Now this mightbe takenagainto be a reflectionof an inherentreligious
conservatism.Indeed,I would not deny that such considerationsmight have a part
to play in explaining Soloveitchik's choice of philosophical methodology. In The
HalakhicMind, however, the argumentfor this propositionis drawnentirely from
philosophy,most particularlyfrom the philosophy of science, though at the same
time the scientific theme of the enterpriseis temperedby a second antinaturalist
strandthat in many ways anticipateshis later existentialism.32
How exactly does he arriveat this conclusion? Soloveitchik's debt to the Mar-
burg school of Neo-Kantianismfor whom the physical sciences and mathematics
representedthe highest form of objective knowledge led him in his early works
to emphasize the importanceof establishing a religious philosophy on a sound
scientific or empiricalbasis. Thus:

religionshouldally itself with the forces of clear,logical cognition,as

uniquelyexemplifiedin thescientificmethod,eventhoughattimesthetwo
mightclashwithone another.33

31Foran excellent summary of this work, see William Kolbrener, "Towardsa Genuine Jewish
Philosophy: Halakhic Mind's New Philosophy of Religion," repr.in Exploring the Thoughtof Rabbi
Joseph B. Soloveitchik (ed. Marc D. Angel; Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav, 1997) 179-206.
32Whileexistentialism is at the forefront of the argumentin "Confrontation,"we will be trac-
ing a more "rationalistic"route to our conclusions, thus reflecting a methodological approach that
Soloveitchik continued to affirm throughout his writings. As Kolbrener ("Towards a Genuine
Jewish Philosophy," 198) correctly notes, "The Rav's later works are steeped in the religious phi-
losophy articulatedin The Halakhic Mind." Moreover, though the argument in this paper has not
to my knowledge been articulatedin any detail before, JonathanSacks does note in his perceptive
review of The Halakhic Mind: "There is a straight road from The Halakhic Mind to the argument
in "Confrontation"("Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's Early Epistemology," repr. in Tradition in
an UntraditionalAge [London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1990] 287-301r, esp. 297. The reason that the
philosophical route we will be tracing is not explicit in "Confrontation"might be connected with
the forum in which the paper was presented, where the highly technical argumentsof The Halakhic
Mind would not have been appropriate.
33JosephB. Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man (trans.Lawrence Kaplan;Philadelphia:Jewish Publica-
tion Society, 1983) 141 n. 4. Note that the term "science" when unqualified is used in what follows
to signify natural science. It is worth noting that in The Halakhic Mind, Soloveitchik notes both
pragmatic and theoretical reasons for preferring the scientific method. See HM, 52-56.
 DANIEL RYNHOLD 109

The religious philosophercould not, however, be expected to deal exclusively

with the quantitativeuniverseandmethodsof Newtonianscience, and Soloveitchik
argues that the scientific community itself opened up new vistas of opportunity
for the religious philosopher by questioning the classical Newtonian picture.
Most decisively, accordingto Soloveitchik, Newtonians stood accused of making
a methodologicalerror- thatof using an exclusively atomisticor piecemeal method
in order to form their quantitativepicture of nature.The discovery by quantum
physicists of datathatvitiatedacceptedNewtonian principlesled to the realization
that they must provide a new philosophical frameworkto explain the "enigmatic
behaviourof certain 'strings of events' " (HM, 60). What the quantumphysicists
understood,therefore,was the need to understandtheir "objective"data in terms
of a certain "subjective"framework,the need for a structuralwhole in order to
make sense of those individualphenomenathat could not be accountedfor by the
atomistic method.
Of possiblygreatersignificance,though,was the centralrealizationthattherewas
no given objective frameworkin terms of which these partscould be understood.
Soloveitchik points out that in the modern world, "scientiststhemselves differ in
theiremploymentof categoricalapparata"(HM,22). Scientistswork with a number
of different"philosophicalframes,"and the idea of a neutralframeworkthrough
which the neutralsubject views his object could no longer be taken for granted.
Though the classical and modern scientist agreed, therefore, that the world was
to be understoodin terms of abstractquantitativecategories ratherthan in terms
of Aristotelianessences, it was only the quantumscientist who realized that this
abstractframeworkdid not reflect some objectively given reality, and thus differ-
ent disciplines could work with differentmethods and frameworks.Moreover,for
Soloveitchik, this realizationon the part of the quantumphysicists led to an ap-
preciationof the fact that one's theoreticalframeworkdeterminesto some extent
the natureof the object being studied:

The claimof the naturalsciencesto absoluteobjectivitymustundergoa

thoroughrevision.... Thepristineobject,wheninterceptedby theexperi-
menter,is transformed,
chameleon-like,fromtranscendent imperviousness
to immanentmergerwiththesubject.(HM,25)

WhatSoloveitchikherecalls epistemologicalpluralismthereforeallows the religious

philosophersto interpretrealityin termsof theirown philosophicalframework,one
that is governed by their own goals and objectives. Thus, Soloveitchik writes:

Everysystemof cognitionstrivesto attaina distinctobjective.Systematic

knowledgemeans the understandingand graspingof the universe in
consonancewitha definitetelos... . Pluralismassertsonlythatthe object
reveals itself in manifoldways to the subject,and that a certaintelos
110 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

correspondsto each of these onticalmanifestations.Subsequently,the

philosopheror scientistmaychooseone of the manyaspectsof realityin
compliancewithhis goal.(HM,16)

So it is thanksto the quantumphysiciststhatreligiousphilosopherscan legitimately

take an interestin the "structuralwhole," the philosophicalsystem behindthe parts,
and also posit theirown such philosophicalsystem in orderto apprehendtheirown
reality.Science itself had concludedthatit could no longerbe grantedthe exclusive
right to call itself rationalat the expense of all other approachesto cognition.
The most importantmethodologicaltwist, though, arises when we ask how one
apprehendsthis structuralwhole. For Soloveitchikdoes not acceptthatthis "whole"
can be approacheddirectly. The attempt to "intuit"the essence of the religious
experience is "a frank admission of defeat for reason" (HM, 51). According to
Soloveitchik, therefore,we can only construct,or ratherreconstruct,the required
philosophicalframeworkout of the objective scientificdatathatit is itself intended
to explain. What we find here, therefore,in more general terms, is the insistence
that we reconstructthe subjective whole out of the objective parts, the theory out
of the observation.
While the partsare required,however, in orderto form the whole, at the same
time we have seen thatthe whole is requiredin orderto accountfor behaviorof the
parts.We are led thereforeinto a circularmethodwherebywe must simultaneously
attemptto adjustthe two mutuallyso as to arriveat a suitableequilibriumbetween
them. The correctmethod is one thatcombines atomistic and holistic approaches.
But as Soloveitchiknotes, the pointis thatthis is a packageratherthantwo disparate
methods:
The understanding
of both natureand spiritis dualistic,both mosaicand
structural--but(and this is of enormous importance)the mosaic and struc-
tural approaches are not two disparate methodological aspects which may
be independentlypursued: theyform one organic whole. (HM, 60; emphasis
added)
This descriptionby Soloveitchik of the methods of the scientist who must use the
"parts"(observations)to form the "whole" (theory) and yet can only understand
certainparts in the first place in terms of that whole suggests that he is applying
the well-known method of reflective equilibriumto theory construction.34
The idea is thatone constructsandjustifies a theory of X by moving back and
forth between one's consideredjudgments about X and the theoreticalprinciples

34Firstdescribed, to my knowledge, by Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast [India-

napolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973] 64) as a "process of justification [that] is the delicate one of
making mutual adjustmentsbetween rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement lies the
only justification needed for either."
 DANIEL RYNHOLD 111

that one forms by consideringthem. Over recent decades the method of reflective
equilibriumhas been a popularmethod of forming ethical theories for justifying
ethical practices. The most famous modern exponent of this is John Rawls, who
uses the methodto greateffect in his Theoryof Justice.35 Therethe idea is that one
forms the principlesof a theory of justice out of our consideredjudgments about
justice, i.e., those aboutwhich we aremost certain.36
At the same time, though,these
principlesthatwe form might actually show some of our consideredjudgments to
be incorrectand thereforein need of revision. A theory is thereforeonly justified
when it matches our consideredjudgments in a reflective equilibrium,not simply
our initial consideredjudgments.
What has been found particularlyattractive about this method in the ethical
sphere is its nonfoundationalnature.As Rawls explicitly states, the method does
not rely upon any foundational"self-evident"trueprinciplesorjudgmentsthat are
to bear the weight of justification.The existence of any such set of self-evidently
trueprinciplesis seen to be too contentiousto grounda theory.The method, there-
fore, does not attemptto justify ethical norms from some supposedArchimedean
point. In reflective equilibrium,rather,the justificatory weight "rests upon the
entire conception and how it fits with and organizes our consideredjudgments in
reflective equilibrium."37 In principle, anything could be subject to revision, and
the justificationof theory and observationlies in the coherence of the package.
It is importantto note that despite his general methodological comments, So-
loveitchik's actual applicationof this two-way method is highly circumscribed.38
Though he does, I believe, utilize the method to a certain extent in the aggadic
realm, many of his comments appearto insulate the halakhahfrom the practical
ramificationsof such a process.39 Nonetheless, certain key characteristicsof this
method do find applicationthroughouthis work. Centrally,the claim that there is
no Archimedeanpoint from which we can judge the truthof a particularsystem
leads us to a method by which we form our philosophical worldviews out of the
consideredjudgmentsof the systemitself. This inevitablyyields a pluralisticpicture

"35JohnRawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).

36A more detailed account of the nature of these considered judgments can be found in John
Rawls, "Outline of a Decision Procedurefor Ethics," Philosophical Review 60 (1951) 177-97; and
A Theory of Justice, 46-53.
37Rawls,A Theory of Justice, 579.
38I am grateful to Professor David Shatz for pointing this out to me, leading me to reevaluate
my position on this matter.I intend to deal in more detail with Soloveitchik's actual use and abuse
of the method in a forthcoming article.
39Examplesof such reservations can be found in Soloveitchik's "Mah Dodekh Mi-Dod," in
Be-sod ha-Yachad ve-ha-Yachud(ed. P. H. Peli; Jerusalem: Orot, 1976) 205-6; also in "U-Vik-
kashtem Mi-Sham," in Ish ha-Halakhah Galuy ve-Nistar (Jerusalem:World Zionist Organisation,
1979) 161-63.
112 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

of coherent systems that each gain a degree of autonomy in being released from
the need to reduce themselves to universalcommon denominators.
But havingestablishedthe rightto base one's philosophyon the consideredjudg-
ments of a system, the question that arises is, how are we to apply these methods
to the philosophy of Judaism?What are the "consideredjudgments"from which
the religious philosophermust begin in orderto reconstructhis philosophy?
According to Wilhelm Dilthey, a thinkerwho meritsexplicit mention a number
of times in Soloveitchik's writings,40 the subjective mental life of a human being,
which he termedErlebnis (experience), is the source of all our action and thought.
This experiencehas a seemingly naturaltendency to force itself out into the objec-
tive realm. Dilthey's experience becomes public in what he calls "expressions,"
which can include any public manifestationof experience from facial expressions
to works of art.Many of these expressions are permanentlyobjectified and make
up the mind-constructedworld or objective mind, which is "a covering term for
all modes of expression of humanlife as they manifest themselves in the external
world."41It is these concrete expressions of spirit that are the primarysources for
those studyingthe humanities:individualand collective subjective experience can
only be studied via the objective mind that makes that experience "accessible to
knowledge."42
We findsimilarlythatwhatSoloveitchikcalls "spirit"(ratherthan"experience")
naturallyexteriorizesitself, whetherin actions or in the various productsof those
actions, be they artworks,buildings,or indeed, religious or metaphysicalsystems.
Soloveitchikthereforesimilarlybelievedthatin orderto forma religiousphilosophy,
we must begin from the objective concrete productsof religious experience. Only
in this way can we attain any degree of objectivity.And it is here that Orthodox
Judaismcomes into its own, for Soloveitchikmaintainsthatin Judaismthe concrete
ethical andritualnormsof the halakhahformjust such an objective orderfor study.
The norms of the halakhahamountto a quantificationof the subjective religious
experience into something concrete for scientific or empirical study. Indeed, in a
view which has its roots in the Briskermethodof study mentionedearlier,whereby
the halakhicsystemis the actualizationof an abstractrationalsystemof conceptsand

40Withoutspeculating on the direct links that may or may not have existed between Soloveitchik
and Dilthey, there are, I believe, strong conceptual links between their ideas. Moreover, the fact
that Soloveitchik was a philosophy student at the University of Berlin from 1925 until 1931 and
that Dilthey occupied the chair in philosophy at the same institution from 1882 until 1905 makes
it inconceivable that Soloveitchik would not have been familiar with his thought.
4'RudolphMakreel,Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton:Princeton University
Press, 1992) 308.
42WilhelmDilthey, "The Construction of the Historical World," in Dilthey: Selected Writings
(ed. H. Rickman; Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1976) 194.
 DANIEL RYNHOLD 113

principles,Soloveitchik believes thatthe halakhahdoes not merely yield practical

norms but embodies an entire philosophical Weltanschauung:
If thephilosophyof religionasksforexamplehow thehomoreligiosusinter-
pretstheconceptsof time,space,causality,substance,ego, etc.,thenit would
have to look into the objectiveseriesand examinenorms,beliefs, articles
of faith,religioustextsetc. Outof this objectifiedmaterial,the philosopher
of religionmay gleansome hintsregardingthe structureof the mostbasic
religiouscognitiveconcepts.(HM,99)
Generally,we see thatfor Soloveitchik, the practiceof Judaism,widely conceived,
is a Diltheyan "expression"that expresses a certain worldview in the presupposi-
tions that its practicalrules embody.43
At this point we encounterthe centraldifference between the mannerin which
religiousphilosopherstreattheirdataandthe mannerin which naturalscientiststreat
theirs.This stemsfromthecentraldifferencebetweenthe subjectmatterof the human
andnaturalsciences: humanbehavior,unlikethe "behavior"of naturalobjects, has
an innercontentthatmakes it meaningful;it has a certainsemanticdimension. We
do not attemptto understandthe meaning of a stone falling as it does. We simply
explainit by referenceto a certaincausalexplanatoryframework.Humanbehavior,
however,is not to be understoodas a meremechanicalphenomenonbut is informed
by a set of values and purposes that we must understandin order to comprehend
the visible manifestationsthat we observe. Moreover, this "meaningful"aspect
of behavior is not merely incidental to it. It is essential to understandinghuman
action as such, for it is precisely this that makes something an action ratherthan
a simple bodily movement.What this means, though, is that there is an important
difference between the method of the scientist and the halakhist.
The claim is thatscientistsareonly interestedin the causalinterrelationsbetween
the members of the quantifiedobjective order that they study. The reconstructed
whole thatwas necessaryin orderto understandthe behaviorof this objective order,
however, is not an object of scientific study.It is not subjectto the causal relations
that interest scientists, and they are only interestedin it insofar as it allows them
to work with the individualprocesses within it. The actual "whole" itself for the
scientist is "anempty phrase,not suitablefor portrayingnatureas such"(HM, 58).
In the realmof meaningfulexpressions, on the otherhand, we are not interestedin
the causal relationsbetween objective expressions.We are neitherconcernedwith
the causal relationshipbetween the differentpracticesof a religion, nor the causal
relationshipbetween the practicesand the theory.

43For the classic treatmentof the idea that a system contains such fundamentalassumptions or
"constitutivemeanings,"see CharlesTaylor,"Interpretationand the Sciences of Man,"repr.in Read-
ings in the Philosophy of Social Science (ed. M. Martinand L. C. McIntyre;Cambridge,Mass.: MIT
Press, 1994) 181-211.
114 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

This leads to the classic antinaturalistconclusion that understandingrather

than causal explanation should be the focus of the social sciences, and for this
the explanatorymethod is unsuited.What we must do in this sphere is to use the
cognitive process of understandingin orderto interpretthe meaningof expressions.
This understanding,again a centralfeatureof the laterwork of Dilthey, is the com-
mon everyday process by which we understandthings, ratherthan some form of
technicalspecialization,thoughtherearecertainlytechniquesof interpretationthat
may need to be used to gain it.44The centralantinaturalistclaim, therefore,is that
thereis a form of interpretativeunderstandingthatis centralto the social sciences,
and that cannot be capturedby the use of natural-scientificmethods that involve
subsumptionunderuniversallaws. As Soloveitchik writes:
A scientificlaw is universalandrefersto the genusas a whole.The math-
ematicalsciencesoperatewithuniversalsandnot withparticulars.... The
humanistis concernednot only withthe conceptualanduniversal,but with
the concreteparticularand individual.Mentalrealityis characterized by
uniquenessandotherness.By reducingspiritualrealityto commondenomi-
natorswe eo ipsoemptyit of its content.(HM,32, 35)
Thus,the causalapproachis to be replacedby a methodof descriptivehermeneutics,
basically a method of interpretivismthat seems to be more appropriateto a realm
in which we are concernedto discover what practices"mean."We arrivetherefore
at the methodthatSoloveitchikcalls descriptivereconstruction,a methodin which
philosophersmust take a descriptiveapproachto the objective datawith which the
halakhahpresentsthem.
The implicationsof this approachhave been well describedby AviezerRavitzky:
Halakhicactivityis intendedto acquireabsoluteautonomy, to createits ideal
world,one whichprecedesanyotherreality... andwhichtranscendsany
temporalalterations.Thehalakhicsystemis thusprotectedfromanyattempt
at reductionto anotherrealm.It is opento innovation,
to constructive
creativ-
ity, butthesearemeantto be conductedby meansof its own unconditional
transtemporal conceptualsystem.45
By using the methodof descriptivereconstruction,we form our worldview by the
creation of autonomoushalakhic concepts and principles that serve to organize

44See Dilthey, "The Constructionof the Historical World,"218-20. For discussion of the methods
see Makreel, Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Studies, part 3; Theodore Plantinga, Historical
Understanding in the Thought of WilhelmDilthey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980)
ch. 6; and H. P. Rickman, WilhelmDilthey: Pioneer of the Human Studies (London: University of
California Press, 1979) ch. 10.
45AviezerRavitzky, "Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik on Human Knowledge: Between Neo-Kantian
and Maimonidean Philosophy,"Modern Judaism 6, no. 1 (1986) 158-59.
 DANIEL RYNHOLD 115

individual halakhot into a coherent system. Individual commandmentsmust be

interpretedin termsof the "uniqueautonomousnorms"of the halakhah,ratherthan
in terms imposed from without.
This autonomyis furtherreinforcedwhen we look at what Soloveitchik has to
say about the sort of descriptivecontent that he is looking for in the execution of
his method. Thus, he is quite explicit in his rejection of intentionalistaccounts of
such content.Accordingto the intentionalistaccount, the meaning of a text or text
analogueis whatthe authorhadin mind when creatingit. In orderto findthis mean-
ing, therefore,we have to reconstructthis initial authorialintention.46According
to Soloveitchik, though, the modem philosophy of religion
is not interestedin thegeneticapproachto the religiousact,nordoes it raise
theold problemof causality. It by-passesthe"how"questionandturnsit over
to explanatory psychology.(HM, 85-86)47
Interestingly,it is not just the psychological approachthat he is rejectinghere, for
Soloveitchikrejectsany approachthatattempts"theexplanationof religious norms
by antecedence"(HM, 86). Thus "we are not to look for any generatingcause or
goals" (HM, 94). This would rule out even the more modem intentionalisttheories
that focus on what the agent in question was doing by acting a certainway rather
thanon a literalact of psychological reconstruction.Soloveitchik, it seems, would
reject an interpretationthat lays bare the intentional context giving the reasons
behind these acts. The "why"question is simply not his concern. It is the "what"
of the commandmentsthatthe religious philosophermust attemptto discover.Any
attemptto retracethe causal antecedenceof the commandments,whetherin terms
of psychological reenactmentor in terms of aims and goals misses out on their
most importantaspects:

[T]hecausalistic
methodinvariably
leadsto circumrotary andnever
explanation
to penetrativedescription.The enumerationof causes . . . discloses the "what
hasgonebefore"butneverthe"is"of thesubjectmatter.(HM,98)

46Theintentionalist
accountof linguisticmeaningfindsits mostfamousexpressionin PaulGrice,
"Meaning," PhilosophicalReview66 (1957) 377-88. In applicationto texts, Collingwoodis one
of the mainproponentsof the view thatthe meaningof an act is to be identifiedwith the inner
psychologicalexperiencesthatoccurredin the author'smind,whichwe haveto reenact.See R. G.
Collingwood,"Human NatureandHumanHistory,"in Readingsin thePhilosophyof SocialScience
(ed. M. Martin and L. C. McIntyre;Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994) 163-71.
despiteSoloveitchik's
47Indeed, generallynegativeattitudeto Maimonides'
negativetheology,he
does seemto agreethatin this spherewe cannotlook to uncoverGod's"intentions."
See Abraham
R. Besdin, "May We InterpretHukkim?"in Man of Faith in the Modern World,vol. 2 of Reflections
of theRav(Hoboken,N.J.:Ktav,1989)91-99, esp. 93.
116 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Thefocalproblemis of a descriptivenature;Whatis thereligiousact?What

is its structure,
contextandmeaning?(HM,86)
What we see Soloveitchik endorsingthereforeis a hermeneutictheory,most fully
developed by Hans Georg Gadamerin recent times, though again found in its em-
bryonic form in the laterwork of Dilthey.48For Dilthey, "investigatingthe human
studies is more like findingthe meaningof a poem thanlike researchingin physics
or chemistry."49 Gadamerdevelops this idea furtherin arguingthatratherthan the
generating conditions of meaningful expressions, it is the substantive meaning
that one is referringto when one says that one has understoodthe meaning of a
theoremor a piece of music that is of interest for the human sciences. Gadamer's
centralpoint here is thatbefore we can explain why someone producesan expres-
sion, we must understandwhat thatexpression means. As PeterWinch points out,
"Unless there is a form of understandingthat is not the result of explanation, no
such thing as explanationwould be possible.""5 This understandingof truthcontent
or die Sache, as Gadamerrefers to it, yields the "what"ratherthan the "why" of
the expressions.
But accordingto this Gadamerianaccount,such meaningis found in the relation
between a text and its interpreter.For an intentionalist,the agent produces mean-
ing, but once it is producedthe meaning exists independentlyand does not itself
dependon an interpretingsubjectfor its existence. For Gadamer,though, meaning
only comes about when the subject confronts the expression in question. Thus,
whereasin intentionalismthe meaning is found in the intentionsof the author,ly-
ing complete and readyto be discovered, for Gadamermeaning is not found in the
expression alone, but is created in the confrontationbetween the expression and
the interpreter.Meaning,therefore,does not exist independentlyof the interpreting
subject,as it does for the intentionalists,but comes aboutas the resultof the dyadic
relationbetween text and interpreter.
Moreover, all interpretersarrive with certain perspectives or "horizons"that
influence the way they interpretthe expression. These form the given scheme
withinwhich they performtheiracts of interpretation.In thatcase, though,meaning
cannotbe simply identifiedwith the intentionsof the authorand cannot be seen as
something objectively "out there"awaiting discovery. Rather,meaning becomes
multivalent.Different interpreterswith their differenthorizons will find different
meanings in a certainexpression.

48Fora fuller, though still introductory,treatmentof the two accounts of meaning discussed here,
see Brian Fay, ContemporaryPhilosophy of Social Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) ch. 7.
49Rickman,Dilthey: Selected Writings, 10.
50PeterWinch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (2d ed.; London:
Routledge, 1990) x.
 DANIEL RYNHOLD 117

In this form, the hermeneutictheory of meaning seems to lead to relativism.51

If the meaning of anything depends to such an extent on the horizons of the in-
terpretingsubject, then surely different subjects with different horizons will find
different meanings in phenomena.With reference to interpretingpractices, how
do we judge whether we have justified our practice? We can only appeal to the
interpretationthat makes sense of the originally obscure phenomena. But how
are we to convince others of the sense of this interpretation?We can only show
the imaginary interlocutorshow the meaning that we have given coheres with
the system of meanings of which it is a part. We can therefore take them on an
interpretativejourney throughthe system, exhibiting how it all fits together.But
if they are not parties to the system in which all the various meanings are impli-
cated, then no appeal to the other parts of the system is going to convince them.
We cannot get beyond our own hermeneuticcircle and convince our interlocutors
if they are unwilling to enter its circumference.Thus, again we immediatelyallow
for a pluralistic universe of meanings correspondingto all the various different
systems, and we have no way of breakingout of our own interpretativecircles in
orderto test theirobjective validity.The interpretationcannotbe judged from some
putativeneutralstandpointand may thereforeto an extent remainimpenetrableto
those who are not adherentsof the particularworldview underconsideration.One
might attemptto portraythat worldview in a coherent fashion to those outside of
it, but such an interpretativetripis unlikely to convince an outside observerof the
truthof the system.
All of this, it seems to me, leads us directly to the conclusions that Soloveit-
chik reaches in "Confrontation."The method of descriptive reconstructionthat
begins with the assumptionthatthere is no Archimedeanpoint by which to judge
the relative merits of various systems is a philosophical approachthat questions
the imposition of universal categories of thought on different systems and their
reductionto common denominators.And Soloveitchik's use of descriptiveherme-
neutics in order to penetratethe depths of the religious consciousness reflects an
antinaturalistapproachto the humansciences, similarlyjustifiable on philosophi-
cal grounds, that erects furtherbarriersto the mutual understandingof different
religious systems. While it hardlyneeds stating that these philosophical methods
have theirproblems,and Soloveitchik himself does not deal with their limits, they
arenonethelessphilosophicalmethodsof engagement.And what this means is that
Soloveitchik's conclusions in "Confrontation"need not simply be construedas a
functionof pragmatismor religious conservatism.On the contrary,they exhibit an
intellectualintegritythat follows from his deepest philosophical convictions.

51Or at the very least, perspectivism, though for our purposes it is not necessary to detail the
manner in which it might lead to either or the distinctions between the two.
118 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Conclusions
The conclusions that we can draw regardingboth "Confrontation"itself and our
brief examinationof Soloveitchik'sphilosophicalmethodologyappearto converge
on one point. Soloveitchik does indeed limit interfaithdialogue to the sphere of
universalethical and social concerns,ruling out, or at the very least severely limit-
ing, the possibility of genuine theological dialogue. The key question, however, is
what dictates these limits?
Before addressingthisquestiondirectly,it is worthnotingthatwhile Soloveitchik
undoubtedlyplaces these strictureson interfaithdialogue, from the perspective
of pure theory his stance need not necessarily rule out the explanation of one's
theological system to the adherentsof anotherfaith. It would, though, imply that
such explanationsare likely to take the form of monologues ratherthan dialogues,
and participantsshould not be expected to yield to the claims of other religions
in this sphere.
Interestingly,of course,thereis no necessaryreasonfor such expectationsto form
the basis of interfaithdialogue. For Soloveitchik, a lack of common denominators
dictates that the relationshipwith God mediatedby the particularisticaspects of a
religion is "personal... [and] discussion will in no way enhance or hallow these
emotions."52Moreover,the attemptto find such commonality where none in fact
exists can only serve to distortone's understandingof a particularreligion. Thus
Soloveitchik writes that"we will not question, defend, offer apologies, analyze or
rationalizeour faith in dialogues centered about these 'private'topics."53Yet ac-
cording to Leora Batnitzky,Soloveitchik's near contemporaryFranzRosenzweig
believed that interfaithdialogue need neither lead to, nor be predicated upon,
theological commonality at all. Indeed, the very possibility of dialogue is "pre-
mised on real difference, and this means that the dialogue aims not at consensus,
but ratherat changingeach partner'sview of herself.""54 Thus, dialogue "produces
not mutual understanding,but the harsh and harrowingassessment of one point
of view over and against another.""5 On this view, mutual understandingwould
actually signal the end of Judaismand Christianity,each of which is defined by its
judgments against the other.
Nonetheless, on Rosenzweig's view each has something to gain from dialogue
with the other. Judaism'srejection of Christianityserves to confirm Christians'
commitmentto theirown universalmission since the recognitionof Jewish particu-
larityis a constantreminderof the unfulfillednatureof thatmission. And similarly

52Soloveitchik,"On InterfaithRelationships," 78.

79.
53Ibid.,
54LeoraBatnitzky, "Dialogue as Judgment, Not Mutual Affirmation: A New Look at Franz
Journalof Religion79 (1999) 523-44, at 524.
Rosenzweig'sDialogicalPhilosophy,"
55Ibid.
 DANIEL RYNHOLD 119

Christianity'srejection of Judaismultimately serves to reinforce Judaism'scom-

mitmentto its own particularity.While the precise reasoning behind all of this is
beyond the scope of this article,it is significantthat for Rosenzweig the very lack
of common denominatorsin dialogue enhances each faith community's commit-
ment to its own faith.
It could thereforebe arguedthatSoloveitchik'srestrictionson interfaithdialogue
arebasedon certainunderlyingassumptionsaboutits naturethatarenot universally
shared.And it might even be possible to trace a route from these assumptionsto a
certain Lithuanianinsularity,at least inasmuch as Soloveitchik shows no aware-
ness of this other contemporaneousmodel for dialogue that does not run the sort
of reductiverisks thathe fears.56
Our central argument,however, is that for Soloveitchik, as indeed for Rosen-
zweig, there is a direct philosophical path to the idea that one's faith experience
might be incommunicable, rendering theological interfaith dialogue futile. In
Soloveitchik's case, we have argued that it follows from a commitment to two
specific approachesfor which viable philosophical cases can be made, those of
descriptivereconstructionand antinaturalism.At the same time, though, there are
genuine concerns about the efficacy of these methods. Thus, the autonomy one
gains as a result of the method of descriptive reconstructionis achieved, it might
be argued,by utilizing an entirely circularmethod that can only allow for the jus-
tificationof the halakhicsystem by the particularlogic of thatsystem. Most simply
put, this criticism can be seen to arise from the very fact thatSoloveitchik says that
his method is descriptive:how can the mere descriptionof the scheme implicit in
a set of norms justify them? Soloveitchik's methods therefore do have a built-in
conservatism.It would surelymisrepresentSoloveitchik, however, to portraysuch
conservatismas the straightforwardtraditionalismof a Lithuanianrosh yeshiva.
Moreover,the reverse of this conservatism is a ratherradical form of relativ-
ism. Forif we cannotfind an objective groundingfor our interpretation,we are left
with a completely relativisticepistemology accordingto which all interpretations
of the world are legitimate. Soloveitchik's approachseems to lead us to a highly
untraditionalconclusion regardingthe radicalcontingency of one's understanding
of (andpossibly thereforecommitmentto) Judaism.57His methodology,therefore,
can be seen to betrayboth traditionaland nontraditionaltendencies.

561 am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this paper for suggesting this line of inquiry and
pointing me in the direction of Batnitzky's article.
57AlthoughSoloveitchik insists that the Jewish philosophy that he is advocating is a cognitive
matter that is resistant to such relativism, how we are supposed to judge the superiority of any
one system once we have accepted Soloveitchik's methodology is left rather obscure. Moreover,
as Kolbrener ("Towards a Genuine Jewish Philosophy," 196) notes, "the halakhic mind eschews
certainty in interpretation,his triumphis in proving that the quest for meaning in interpretationis
unending."
120 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

What this ought to do is leave us with a rathermore nuancedunderstandingof

Soloveitchikthanis allowedfor by those who would claim him for either the mod-
ernists or traditionalists.For the mistake that both sides appear to make is the
assumptionthatwe can categorizeeach of Soloveitchik's argumentsor conclusions
as a clear indicatorof one or the other.Such a view, it seems to me, reflects a very
naive understandingof the complexities of his thought, according to which one
can place each facet of it into a neat package that is either exclusively "Modern"
or exclusively "Orthodox."
While Soloveitchik's conclusions in "Confrontation"are often therefore por-
trayedas an example of his staunchtraditionalism,we have arguedthatin fact they
can be seen as flowing from a rathermodern set of philosophicalconsiderations.58
Moreover, those philosophical considerationscan themselves be seen as having
implications that are either inherentlyconservative or radicallyrelativistic. Thus,
when unravellingthe thoughtof Soloveitchik,the argumentregardinghis modernity
or Orthodoxyoften leads more to obfuscation than illumination.It is the complex
interplaybetween these two poles that in fact defines his thought,both in the par-
ticularexample of "Confrontation"and more generally.

58Itis worth noting in this regard Moshe Sokol's later piece in which he modifies some views
presented in the article that he coauthored with Singer and writes that "the choices [Soloveitchik]
made to retain the past were themselves highly personalized expressions of his own special brand
of modernity."See Moshe Sokol, " 'Ger ve-Toshav Anokhi': Modernity and Traditionalism in the
Life and Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik," repr.in Exploring the Thoughtof Rabbi Joseph
B. Soloveitchik (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav, 1997) 125-43, at 125-26.