G.R. No.
198694 February 13, 2013 Soque confiscated the sachet and brought Ramon to
RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y
MARTINEZ @ MON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review
on Centiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the June 30, 2011 Decision2 and September 20, 2011
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
No. 32544 which affirmed the April 30, 2009
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch
2 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08-358669 convicting
petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y
Martinez (Ramon) of the crime of possession of
dangerous drugs punished under Section 11(3) Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.’’
The Factual Antecedents
At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007,
PO2 Roberto Soque (PO2 Soque), PO2 Alejandro
Cepe(PO2 Cepe) and PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta),
who wereall assigned tothe Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
(SAID) Section of the Malate Police Station 9 (Police
Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along
Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they
heard a man shouting "Putanginamo!
Limangdaannabaito?" Forpurportedly violating Section
844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila
(Manila City Ordinance)which punishes breaches of the
peace, the man, later identified as Ramon,was
apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. In the
course thereof, the police officers were able to recover
from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance suspected to beshabu.PO2
Soquepropositioned Ramon and asked for ₱20,000.00
Police Station 9 where the former markedthe item with
the latter’s initials, "RMG." There, Police
Superintendent Ferdinand
RicafrenteQuirante(PSuptQuirante) prepared a request
for laboratory examination which, together with the
specimen, was brought by PO2 Soque to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination.
Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector Erickson
Calabocal (PSInspCalabocal)examinedthe specimen
which contained 0.173 gram of white crystalline
substanceand found the same positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu).
Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of
dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), Article II of RA
9165 throughan Information dated January 3, 2008
which states:
That on or about December 29, 2007, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being
authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing ZERO POINT ONE SEVEN THREE
(0.173) gram of white crystalline substance containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as SHABU,
a dangerous drug.5
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his
version of the incident. He narrated that on December
29, 2007, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, whilewalking
alongBalingkit Street to borrow a welding machine
from one Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing
approached and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon
affirming his identity, he was immediately handcuffed
by the man who eventually introduced himself as a
police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle
(sidecar) wherethe said officer asked him if he was
carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still
brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2
1
in exchange for his release.When Ramon’s
wife,AmaliaGoco, was unable to produce the
₱20,000.00 which PO2 Soquehad asked for, he
(Ramon) was brought to the Manila City Hall for
inquest proceedings.
The RTC Ruling
In its April 30, 2009 Decision, the RTCconvicted
Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs
as charged, finding all its elements tohave been
established through the testimonies of the
prosecution’sdisinterested witnesses. In this relation,it
alsoupheld the legality of Ramon’s warrantless arrest,
observing that Ramon was disturbing the peace in
violation of the Manila City Ordinance during the time
of his apprehension. Consequently, Ramon was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
oftwelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum
and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. Aggrieved, Ramon
elevated his conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its June 30, 2011 Decision,the CA denied Ramon’s
appeal and thereby affirmedhis conviction. Itupheld the
factual findings of the RTC which found that the
elements of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs
were extant, to wit: (1) that the accused is in possession
of a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.6
Likewise, the CA sustained the validity of the body
search made on Ramon as an incident of alawful
warrantless arrest for breach of the peace which he
committed in the presence of the police officers,
notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the
peace)subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Moreover, the CAobserved that every link in the chain
of custody of the prohibited drug wassufficiently
establishedfrom the time PO2Soque took the sameup to
its actual presentation in court.
Finally, it did not give credence to Ramon’s claim of
extortion as his asseverationsfailed to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the
police officers’ official duties.
The Issue
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not
the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC
convicting Ramon of the crime of possession of
dangerous drugs.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right
against unwarranted intrusions by the government.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) states that:
Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct
right remains revered, effects secured by government
authoritiesin contraventionof the foregoingarerendered
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in any
proceeding. In this regard, Section 3(2), Article III of
the Constitution provides that:
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section [referring to Section 2] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the
above-cited proscription is not, however, an absolute
and rigid one.7 As found in jurisprudence, the
traditional exceptions are customs searches, 8 searches
of moving vehicles,9seizure of evidence in plain
view,10 consented searches,11 "stop and frisk"
measures12 andsearches incidental to a lawful
arrest.13 This last-mentioned exception is of particular
significance to this case and thus, necessitates further
disquisition.
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent
search is one that is carried out under the parameters of
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court 14 which
requires that the apprehending officer must have been
spurred by probable cause to arresta person caught in
flagrante delicto. To be sure,the term probable cause
has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.15Specifically with respect to
arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.16 In this light, the determination
of the existence or absence of probable cause
necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.
Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for
allegedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City
Ordinance which provides as follows:
Sec. 844. – Breaches of the Peace. – No person shall
make, and, countenance, or assist in making any riot,
affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; or
2
assault, beat or use personal violence upon another
without just cause in any public place; or utter any
slanderous, threatening or abusive language or
expression or exhibit or display any emblem,
transparency, representation, motto, language, device,
instrument, or thing; or do any act, in any public place,
meeting or procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or
crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturbance or
disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly.1âwphi1
PENALTY: Imprisonment of not more than six (6)
months and / or fine not more than Two Hundred pesos
(PHP 200.00)
As may be readily gleaned, the foregoing
ordinancepenalizes the following acts: (1) making,
countenancing, or assisting in making any riot, affray,
disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; (2)
assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon
another without just cause in any public place; (3)
uttering any slanderous, threatening or abusive
language or expression or exhibiting or displaying any
emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language,
device, instrument, or thing; and (4) doing any act, in
any public place, meeting or procession, tending to
disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose,
or disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in
any lawful assembly. Evidently, the gravamen of these
offenses is the disruption of communal tranquillity.
Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same,
it must be established that the apprehension was
effected after a reasonable assessment by the police
officer that a public disturbance is being committed.
In this regard, PO2 Soque’s testimony detailed the
surrounding circumstances leading to Ramon’s
warrantless warrant, viz:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
ASST. CITY PROS. YAP:
Q: Tell the Court, what happened when you were there
on patrol? PO2 Soque:
A: While we were on routinary patrol we heard a man
shouting on top of his voice telling "Putang ina mo!
Limang daan na ba ito?" pointing to his right front
pocket, sir.
Q: There was a shouting, where was this man shouting,
where was the shouting came from?
A: Along the street of Balingkit, sir.
Q: How far were you from this shouting, as you said?
A: About ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Tell the Court what happened, what next follows?
A: We proceeded to the voice where it came from, then,
we saw a man, sir.
Q: Who was that man?
A: Goco, sir.
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
A: Ramon Martinez Goco, sir.
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
A: He is the one that we apprehended, sir.
Q: What was he doing then when you said you
responded immediately, when you saw a man?
A: We saw him shouting on top of his voice, sir.
Q: That is why you came near him, the one who
shouted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, what did you do, Mr. Witness, together with
your other cooperatives?
A: We apprehended him for bringing [sic] the silence of
the serenity of the place, sir.
Q: What time was that already at that time, the incident
of shouting?
A: Past 9:00, sir.
Q: Who actually accosted Goco, the one who shouted?
A: Me, sir.
Q: Tell the Court, how many were there at that time
present with Goco?
A: They scampered away when they saw the police
were coming near the place, sir, they scampered in
different directions.
Q: Tell the Court what were Cepe and Zeta doing also
when you approached the accused?
A: They followed me, sir.
Q: So, tell the Court what happened when you
approached accused therein Goco?
A: We apprehended Goco for violation for alarm
scandal, sir.
3
x x x x17
CROSS EXAMINATION:
xxxx
ATTY. AMURAO:
Q: So, just like Leveriza, Balingkit is also thickly
populated? PO2 Soque:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there are many people outside their houses?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And I can imagine everybody there outside was
talking also?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I was very noisy, everybody talking, altogether?
A: They were talking casually.
x x x x18
Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates
the presence of probable cause when the police officers
conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in
a thickly-populated place, with many people
conversing with each other on the street, would
constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844
of the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon
was not making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder,
disturbance, or breach of the peace; he was not
assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon
another; and, the words he allegedly shouted –
"Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" –are not
slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not
have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot
considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit
Street was still teeming with people and alive with
activity.
Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the
place of arrest ever complained that Ramon’s shouting
disturbed the public. On the contrary, a disinterested
member of the community (a certain Rosemarie
Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely
standing in front of the store of a certain MangRomy
when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2
Soque, approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed
and took him away.19
In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and
circumstances could not have engendereda well-
founded belief that any breach of the peace had been
committed by Ramon at the time that his warrantless
arrest was effected. All told, noprobable cause existedto
justify Ramon’s warrantless arrest.
Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest
depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or
functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the
decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of
the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his
liberty,20 this should not be exercised in a whimsical
manner, else a person’s liberty be subjected to
ubiquitous abuse. Aslaw enforcers, it is largely
expectedof them to conduct a more circumspect
assessment of the situation at hand. The determination
of probable cause is not a blanket-license to withhold
liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It
demarcates the line between legitimate human conduct
on the one hand, and ostensible criminal activity, on the
other. In this respect, it must be performedwisely and
cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a
reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as
constitutionally guaranteed rightslie at the fore, the
duty to determine probable cause should be clothed
with utmost conscientiousness as well as impelled by a
higher sense of public accountability.
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was
validly arrested the warantless search that resulted from
it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly
seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as
mandated by the above discussed constitutional
provision. In this regard, considering that the
confiscated shabuis the very corpus delicitof the crime
charged, Ramon's acquital should therefore come as a
matter of course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June
30, 2011 Decision and September 20, 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32544 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ramon
Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191023 February 06, 2013
DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision 1 dated September 30, 2009 and
Resolution2dated January 27, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31942. The CA
upheld the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City, Branch 231 finding petitioner Don
Djowel Sales y Abalahin guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of marijuana.
4
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) under
an Information which states:
That on or about the 24th day of May 2003, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused DON DJOWEL A. SALES, without authority
of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
0.23 gram of dried Marijuana fruiting tops, a dangerous
drug.
Contrary to law. x x x4
Upon arraignment, petitioner duly assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Evidence adduced by the prosecution at the trial
established that on May 24, 2003, petitioner was
scheduled to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for
Kalibo, Aklan at its 9:45 a.m. flight. He arrived at the
old Manila Domestic Airport (now Terminal 1),
Domestic Road, Pasay City at around 8:30 in the
morning. As part of the routine security check at the
predeparture area, petitioner passed through the Walk-
Thru Metal Detector Machine and immediately
thereafter was subjected to a body search by a male
frisker on duty, Daniel M. Soriano, a non-uniformed
personnel (NUP) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Aviation Security Group (ASG).5
While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something
slightly bulging inside the right pocket of his short
pants. When Soriano asked petitioner to bring the item
out, petitioner obliged but refused to open his hands.
Soriano struggled with petitioner as the latter was
nervous and reluctant to show what he brought out
from his pocket. Soriano then called the attention of his
supervisor, PO1 Cherry Trota-Bartolome who was
nearby.6
PO1 Trota-Bartolome approached petitioner and asked
him to open his hands. Petitioner finally opened his
right hand revealing two rolled paper sticks with dried
marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. After informing
petitioner of his constitutional rights, PO1 Trota-
Bartolome brought petitioner and the seized evidence
to the 2nd Police Center for Aviation Security (2nd
PCAS), PNP-ASG Intelligence and Investigation
Branch and immediately turned over petitioner to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Airport
Team at the Ramp Area, Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex, Pasay City.7 The
investigating officer, POII Samuel B. Hojilla, 8 placed
the markings on the two marijuana sticks: "SBH-A"
and "SBH-B."9
The specimens marked "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" when
subjected to chemical analysis at the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City yielded
positive results for the presence of marijuana, a
dangerous drug.10
Denying the charge against him, petitioner testified that
on May 24, 2003, he, together with his girl friend and
her family were headed to Boracay Island for a
vacation. While he was queuing to enter the airport, he
was frisked by two persons, a male and a female. The
two asked him to empty his pockets since it was
bulging. Inside his pocket were a pack of cigarettes and
cash in the amount of P8,000.00 in 500 peso-bills. His
girl friend told him to get a boarding pass but he asked
her to wait for him as he will still use the comfort
room. On the way to the comfort room, he was blocked
by a male person who frisked him for a second time,
asking for his boarding pass. This male person wearing
a white shirt without an ID card, asked petitioner to
empty his pockets which he did. The male person then
said it was "okay" but as petitioner proceeded to go
inside the comfort room, the male person called him
again saying that "this fell from you" and showing him
two "small white wrappings which seemed to be
marijuana." Petitioner told the male person that those
items were not his but the latter said they will talk
about it in the comfort room.11
At that point, petitioner claimed that his girl friend was
already shouting ("Ano ‘yan, ano ‘yan?") as she saw
PO1 Trota-Bartolome approaching them. PO1 Trota-
Bartolome then told petitioner to explain at the ground
floor while the male person (Soriano) was showing to
her the marijuana sticks saying "Ma’am, I saw this
from him." Petitioner went back to the comfort room
and there he saw his girl friend’s father (the Mayor of
their hometown, Camiling, Tarlac) talking with a police
officer. However, his girl friend and her family left him
and he was investigated by the police officers. 12
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the
following: PO1 Trota-Bartolome, P/Insp. Sandra
Decena-Go (Forensic Officer, Chemistry Division,
PNP-Crime Laboratory) and NUP Soriano.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court
finds the accused, Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, also
known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
The 0.23 gram of dried marijuana fruiting tops
confiscated from the accused is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government. The officer-in-
charge of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately
turnover the same to the appropriate government
agency for proper disposition in accordance with law.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.13
5
On appeal, the CA ruled that the body search conducted
on petitioner is a valid warrantless search made
pursuant to a routine airport security procedure allowed
by law. It found no merit in petitioner’s theory of
frame-up and extortion. On the issue of the integrity
and probative value of the evidence used to convict
petitioner, the CA held that there is no hiatus or
confusion that the marijuana that was marked at the
airport, then subjected to qualitative examination on the
same day and eventually introduced as evidence against
petitioner, is the same prohibited drug that was found in
his custody and possession when he was apprehended
at the pre-departure area of the airport in the morning
of May 24, 2003.
The CA also explained that while the "marijuana
leaves" referred to by Soriano in his testimony was
otherwise called by the public prosecutor and the
Forensic Chemical Officer as "dried marijuana fruiting
tops" in both the criminal information and the
Laboratory Report, these do not refer to different items.
Both marijuana leaves with fruiting tops were rolled in
two papers which were actually found and seized from
petitioner’s possession in the course of a routine
security search and frisking.
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner is now before us alleging that the CA failed
to address the following assigned errors:
IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE ITEMS
SUPPOSEDLY TAKEN FROM THE APPELLANT
WERE THE VERY SAME ITEMS THAT REACHED
THE CHEMIST FOR ANALYSIS;
THIS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE
PROSECUTION’S IMPROBABLE SCENARIO AT
THE AIRPORT WHERE, FOR NO SPECIAL
REASON GIVEN, THE APPELLANT HAD TO BE
METICULOUSLY BODILY SEARCHED EVEN
AFTER HE HAD TWICE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED
THROUGH THE DETECTOR.14
The petition has no merit.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral
certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the
object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2)
that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
that the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.15
In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily
established that airport security officers found in the
person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops
contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security
check at the airport’s pre-departure area. Petitioner at
first refused to show the contents of his short pants
pocket to Soriano who became suspicious when his
hand felt the "slightly bulging" item while frisking
petitioner.
In People v. Johnson,16 which also involved seizure of a
dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine frisk
at the airport, this Court ruled that such evidence
obtained in a warrantless search was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures,
thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition
is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism
has come increased security at the nation’s airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as
well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given
their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.17
Petitioner concedes that frisking passengers at the
airport is a standard procedure but assails the conduct
of Soriano and PO1 Trota-Bartolome in singling him
out by making him stretch out his arms and empty his
pockets. Petitioner believes such meticulous search was
unnecessary because, as Soriano himself testified, there
was no beep sound when petitioner walked past
through the metal detector and hence nothing
suspicious was indicated by that initial security check.
He likewise mentioned the fact that he was carrying a
bundle of money at that time, which he said was not
accounted for.
We find no irregularity in the search conducted on
petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his
pockets upon the frisker’s reasonable belief that what
he felt in his hand while frisking petitioner’s short pants
was a prohibited or illegal substance.
Such search was made pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of
R.A. No. 6235. Said provision reads:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline
or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the
following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof
and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search
for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances.
Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to
board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the
contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
(Italics in the original)
6
The ruling in People v. Johnson was applied in People
v. Canton18 where the accused, a female passenger was
frisked at the NAIA after passing through the metal
detector booth that emitted a beeping sound. Since the
frisker noticed something bulging at accused’s
abdomen, thighs and genital area, which felt like
packages containing rice granules, accused was
subjected to a thorough physical examination inside the
ladies’ room. Three sealed packages were taken from
accused’s body which when submitted for laboratory
examination yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused
was forthwith arrested and prosecuted for illegal
possession of a regulated drug.
Affirming accused Canton’s conviction for the crime of
illegal possession of shabu, we ruled that accused-
appellant was lawfully arrested without a warrant after
being caught in flagrante delicto. We further held that
the scope of a search pursuant to airport security
procedure is not confined only to search for weapons
under the "Terry search"19doctrine. The more extensive
search conducted on accused Canton was necessitated
by the discovery of packages on her body, her
apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused
the suspicion of the frisker that she was hiding
something illegal. Thus:
x x x. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235
authorizes search for prohibited materials or
substances. To limit the action of the airport security
personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft
and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and
thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including to further search without
warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the
strip search in the ladies’ room was justified under the
circumstances.20 (Emphasis supplied)
The search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants
pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana)
seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence.
Petitioner’s reluctance to show the contents of his short
pants pocket after the frisker’s hand felt the rolled
papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor
aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that he
was indeed carrying an item or material subject to
confiscation by the said authorities.
The trial and appellate courts correctly gave credence
to the straightforward and candid testimonies of PO1
Trota-Bartolome and NUP Soriano on the frisking of
petitioner at the pre-departure area, during which the
two rolled papers containing dried marijuana fruiting
tops were found in his possession, and on petitioner’s
immediate arrest and investigation by police officers
from the 2nd PCAS and PDEA teams stationed at the
airport. As a matter of settled jurisprudence on illegal
possession of drug cases, credence is usually accorded
the narration of the incident by the apprehending police
officers who are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner.21
Petitioner reiterates his defense of being a victim of an
alleged frameup and extortion.1âwphi1 However, the
CA found his claim unworthy of belief considering that
there is no evidence that the apprehending police
authorities had known petitioner before he was caught
and arrested for possession of marijuana. The CA aptly
observed:
It bears stressing that while the defense of Sales is
anchored heavily on his theory of purported frame-up
and extortion, nonetheless Sales’ testimony is without
any allegation that the police and security personnel
who participated in his arrest, investigation and
detention have demanded money in exchange for his
freedom, the withdrawal of the drugs charge against
him, or otherwise their desistance from testifying
against him in court. True enough, Sales himself
admitted in the course of the trial that the security and
police personnel demanded him to turn over and
surrender all his possessions, to wit: cellular phone,
pla[n]e ticket and boarding pass, except his
money (TSN, April 16, 2008, p. 18). This, to the mind
of this Court, strongly belied Sales’ imputation of
frame-up by the police to secure monetary
gain.22 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
Petitioner questions the integrity of the drug specimen
supposedly confiscated from him at the airport by PO1
Trota-Bartolome. He maintains that there was no
evidence adduced to assure that those items that
reached the Chemist were the same items which were
taken from him. This is crucial since the Chemist had
said that the items were brought to her, not by the PNP
officer, but another person (SPO2 Rosendo Olandesca
of PDEA) who was not presented as witness.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the presentation and
admission of the seized prohibited drug as an exhibit be
preceded by evidence to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
This requirement is essential to obviate the possibility
of substitution as well as to ensure that doubts
regarding the identity of the evidence are removed
through the monitoring and tracking of the movements
and custody of the seized prohibited item, from the
accused, to the police, to the forensic laboratory for
examination, and to its presentation in evidence in
court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include
testimony about every link in the chain or movements
of the illegal drug, from the moment of seizure until it
is finally adduced in evidence. It cannot be
overemphasized, however, that a testimony about a
perfect chain is almost always impossible to obtain. 23
The identity of the seized substance in dangerous drug
cases is thus established by showing its chain of
custody. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defined the concept of
"chain of custody" as follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
7
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
The rule on chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165 and
its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) expressly
demands the identification of the persons who handle
the confiscated items for the purpose of duly
monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are
seized from the accused until the time they are
presented in court.24 We have held, however, that the
failure of the prosecution to show compliance with the
procedural requirements provided in Section 21, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR is not fatal and does
not automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.25 What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.26 As long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. 27
After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the
prosecution in this case has established by facts proved
at the trial that the chain of custody requirement was
not broken.
During her direct-examination, PO1 Trota-Bartolome
narrated clearly and consistently how she obtained
initial custody of the seized dangerous drug while on
duty at the airport’s pre-departure area. Said witness
identified Exhibits "G" and "H" with markings "SBH-
A" and "SBH-B" presented in court to be the same
dried marijuana fruiting tops in two rolled papers that
they found in the possession of petitioner while the
latter was being frisked by Soriano. She also testified
that petitioner and the confiscated marijuana were
promptly brought to the PDEA team stationed at the
airport where it was marked in her presence by the
assigned officer, Samuel B. Hojilla, using his own
initials.28 The two rolled papers containing marijuana
fruiting tops with markings "SBH-A" and "SBH-B"
was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory on the
same day by SPO2 Rosendo Olandesca.29 Police
Inspector Engr. Sandra Decena-Go, Forensic Chemical
Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory likewise testified
that on the same day, she personally received from
SPO2 Olandesca the letter-request together with the
seized dried marijuana fruiting tops in two rolled
papers (sheet cigarette wrapper) like improvised
cigarette sticks, marked as "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" and
wrapped in white bond paper. 30 After describing the
condition of the specimen at the time she received it,
P/Insp. Decena-Go confirmed the findings of the
chemical analysis of the said substance already
presented in court, and identified her Initial Laboratory
Report and Certification, both dated May 24, 2003,
stating that the qualitative examination gave positive
results for the presence of Marijuana.31
We find no merit in petitioner’s argument that the non-
presentation of SPO2 Olandesca and PO2 Hojilla as
witnesses is fatal to the prosecution’s case. As this
Court held in People v. Amansec32:
x x x there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its
implementing rules, which requires each and everyone
who came into contact with the seized drugs to testify
in court. "As long as the chain of custody of the seized
drug was clearly established to have not been broken
and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the
drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every
person who came into possession of the drugs should
take the witness stand." This Court, in People v.
Hernandez,33 citing People v. Zeng Hua Dian,34 ruled:
After a thorough review of the records of this case we
find that the chain of custody of the seized substance
was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to
identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The
nonpresentation as witnesses of other persons such as
SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia,
the officer on duty, is not a crucial point against the
prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by
the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The
prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its
case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to
present as witnesses.35
In the light of the testimonial, documentary and object
evidence on record, the CA correctly concluded that the
identity, integrity and probative value of the seized
marijuana were adequately preserved. The prosecution
has proved with moral certainty that the two pieces of
rolled papers containing dried marijuana fruiting tops
presented in court were the same items seized from
petitioner during the routine frisk at the airport in the
morning of May 24, 2003. Its presentation in evidence
as part of the corpus delicti was therefore sufficient to
convict petitioner.
As to the penalty imposed by the R TC, we find the
same in order and proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari
is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2009
and Resolution dated January 27, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31942 are
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
8
PEREZ, J.:
For review through this appeal1 is the Decision2 dated
28 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-I I C. No. 03316, which affirmed the conviction of
herein accused-appellant Hadji Socor Cadidia (Cadidia)
of violation of Section 5 3 of Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
The prosecution presented Marilyn Trayvilla
(Trayvilla), a Non-Uniformed Personnel of the
Philippine National Police, who testified that on 31
July 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning, while
performing her duty as a female frisker assigned at the
Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I (domestic airport)
in Pasay City, she frisked the accused Cadidia upon her
entry at the departure area4 and she noticed something
unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia’s buttocks.
Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her
sanitary napkin which caused the unusual
thickness.5Not convinced with Cadidia’s explanation,
Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani M.
Bagsican (Bagsican) brought the accused to the
comfort room inside the domestic airport to check.
When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her
underwear, they discovered that inside were two
sachets of shabu . The two sachets of shabu were turned
over to their supervisor SPO3 Musalli I. Appang (SPO3
Appang).6 Trayvilla recalled that Cadidia denied that
the two sachets of shabu were hers and said that she
was only asked by an unidentified person to bring the
same.7 The accused was identified and found to be
bound for Butuan City on board Cebu Pacific Airline as
evidenced by her confiscated airline ticket. 8 In open
court, Trayvilla identified the two sachets containing
shabu previously marked as Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3."
She also identified the signature placed by her co-
employee, Bagsican, at the side of the items, as well as
the picture of the sanitary napkin used by the accused
to conceal the bags of shabu.9
The second prosecution witness, Bagsican,
corroborated the testimony of Trayvilla. She testified
that together with Trayvilla, she was also assigned as a
frisker at the departure area of the domestic airport.
While frisking the accused, Trayvilla noticed
something bulky in her maong pants.10 As a result,
Trayvilla asked for her help and with the accused, they
proceeded to the comfort room inside the domestic
airport. While inside the cubicle of the comfort room,
Bagsican asked the accused to open her pants and pull
down her underwear. Inside the accused’s sanitary
napkin were two plastic sachets of shabu which they
confiscated. Thereafter, she reported the incident to
their supervisor SPO3 Appang, to whom she endorsed
the confiscated items. They then proceeded to their
office to report to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group.11 In open court, she identified the
accused Cadidia as the one whom they apprehended.
She also identified the two plastic sachets of shabu they
confiscated from Cadidia and pointed to her initials
"LMB" she placed on the items for marking as well as
the picture of the napkin likewise marked with her
initials.12
Finally, the prosecution presented domestic airport
Police Supervisor SPO3 Appang who testified that on
31 July 2002 at around 6:40 in the morning, the
accused passed the walk-thru machine manned by two
domestic airport friskers, Trayvilla and Bagsican. When
Trayvilla frisked the accused, she called his attention
and informed him that something was kept inside the
accused’s private area. Accordingly, he instructed
Trayvilla and Bagsican to proceed to the comfort room
to check what the thing was. 13 Trayvilla and Bagsican
recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu from
the accused. The plastic sachets together with the
sanitary napkin were turned over to him by the friskers
Trayvilla and Bagsican. Subsequently, he turned over
the two plastic sachets and sanitary napkin to the
Intelligence and Investigation Office of the 2 nd
Regional Aviation Security Office (RASO), Domestic
International Airport.14 The seized items were then
turned over to SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of NAIA-
DITG.15 SP03 Appang placed his initials on the
confiscated items at the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency Office (PDEA) located at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport.16
The specimens in turn were referred by PO2 Samuel B.
Cobilla (PO2 Cobilla) of the NAIA-DITG to Forensic
Chemist Elisa G. Reyes (Forensic Chemist Reyes) of
the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for
examination.17
Due to the loss of the stenographic notes regarding the
latter part of the direct testimony of SPO3 Appang and
of Forensic Chemist Reyes, the prosecution and the
accused agreed to dispense with their testimonies and
agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
a. The prosecution will no longer recall SPO3
Appang to the witness stand in view of his
retirement from service;18
b. The parties agreed on Forensic Chemist
Reyes’ competence and expertise in her
field;19
c. That she was the one who examined the
specimen in this case against Hadji Socor
Cadidia, consisting of one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet, previously marked
as Exhibit "1" containing 48.48 grams of
white crystalline substance of Shabu, and,
one (1) knot-tied transparent plastic bag with
marking "Exhibit-2 LMB, RSA containing
98.29 grams white crystalline substance of
Shabu or Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;20
d. That after conducting laboratory
examination on the two (2) specimens, she
prepared the document and reduced her
findings into writing which is Chemistry
Report No. D-364-02 which is the Initial
Laboratory Report marked as Exhibit "C" 21;
and,
9
e. That thereafter, Forensic Chemist Reyes
likewise prepared the Final Chemistry Report
marked as Exhibit "D."22
The accused, of course, has a different story to tell.
Cadidia testified that on 31 July 2002, at around 8:15 in
the morning, she proceeded to the departure area of the
domestic airport at Pasay City to board a Cebu Pacific
plane bound for Butuan City. When she passed-by the
x-ray machine, two women, whom she later identified
as Trayvilla and Bagsican, apprehended her. 23 Trayvilla
and Bagsican held her arms and asked her if she was a
Muslim. When she replied in the affirmative, the two
women said that she might be carrying gold or
jewelries.24 Despite her denial, Trayvilla and Bagsican
brought her to the comfort room and told her she might
be carrying shabu. She again denied the allegation but
the two women told her to undress. 25 When she asked
why, they answered that her back was bulging. In reply,
she told them that she was having her menstrual period.
Trayvilla and Bagsican did not believe her and
proceeded to ask her to remove her underwear. They
later frisked her body but failed to recover
anything.26 Thereafter, the two women asked for money
as they allegedly recovered two plastic sachets
containing shabu from her. 27 At this moment, Cadidia
became afraid and called her relatives for money,
particularly her female relative Dam Bai. 28 Her relatives
arrived at the airport at around 1 o’clock in the
afternoon of the same day but she failed to talk to them
because she has already been brought to Camp Crame
for drug examination.29 She called her relatives again to
ask for ₱200,000.00 and to bring the amount at 7
o’clock in the morning of the next day. Her relatives
arrived on the agreed day and time but managed to
bring only ₱6,000.00 which the police officers found
unacceptable.30 As a consequence, Cadidia was
subjected to inquest proceedings.31 In her re-direct, she
testified that at that time, she was engaged in selling
compact discs in Quiapo, Manila. She recalled that the
names of the relatives she called for money were a
certain Lani and Andy.32
The defense presented its next witness Haaji Mohamad
Domrang (Domrang) to corroborate the statement of
accused Cadidia that she called up her relatives
including him to bring money to the airport and give
the same to the police officers. 33 Domrang testified that
he knew Cadidia as a jeweller with a place of business
in Greenhills. He recalled at around 9 o’clock in the
morning of 31 July 2002, he was with his nephew when
the latter received a call from Cadidia and was told by
the accused that she needed money amounting to
₱200,000.00.34 His nephew told him that he would go
to the airport, so he accompanied him. They arrived
there at around one o’clock in the afternoon but failed
to see Cadidia. However, they were able to talk to the
police officers at the airport and inquired about the
accused. The police officers replied that she was
brought to Camp Crame but will be brought back to the
airport at 7:00 o’clock in the evening. 35 The police
officers told Domrang and Andy that if they would not
be able to raise the ₱200,000.00, they would file a case
against Cadidia. Since they were able to raise
₱6,000.00 only, the police officers rejected the money. 36
After the arrest, the following Information was filed in
Criminal Case No. 02-1464 for violation of Sec. 5, Art.
II of Republic Act No. 9165:
That on or about the 31st of July 2002, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously transport 146.77 grams of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.37
Upon arraignment on 12 August 2002, Cadidia entered
a plea of "not guilty."38
On 7 April 2008, the trial court found the accused-
appellant guilty as charged. The disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused HADJI
SOCOR CADIDIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5 of Republic Act [No.] 9165, she
is hereby sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to
pay the fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱500,000.00).
The methamphetamine hydrochloride recovered from
the accused is considered confiscated in favor of the
government and to be turned to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its disposal.39
On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended that the
trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the
conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses’
Trayvilla and Bagsican as to who among them
instructed the accused-appellant to bring out the
contents of her underwear. 40 Another contradiction
pressed on by the defense was the recollection of
Bagsican that when she and Trayvilla found the illegal
drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her blazer for
safekeeping, in contrast with statement of SPO3
Appang that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out of
the comfort room, they immediately handed him the
shabu allegedly taken from the accused-
appellant.41 Appellant likewise argued against her
conviction by the trial court despite the fact that the
identity of the illegal drugs allegedly seized was not
proven with moral certainty due to the broken chain of
custody of evidence.42
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) countered that the inconsistencies of the
prosecution’s witnesses did not touch on material
points. Hence, they can be disregarded for they failed
to affect the credibility of the evidence as a whole. The
alleged inconsistencies failed to diminish the fact that
the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at
the departure area of the domestic airport transporting
shabu. The defenses of frame-up and alibi cannot stand
against the positive testimonies of the witnesses absent
any showing that they were impelled with any improper
motive to implicate her of the offense
charged.43 Finally, the OSG posited that the integrity of
evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is
10
any showing of bad faith, and accused-appellant failed
to overcome this presumption.44
In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the
alleged contradictory statements of the prosecution’s
witnesses did not diminish their credibility as they
pertained only to minor details and did not dwell on the
principal elements of the crime. It emphasized that the
more important matter was the positive identification of
the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime of
illegal transportation of dangerous drug. 45 Further, it
upheld the trial court’s ruling that the prosecution
satisfactorily preserved the chain of custody of
evidence over the seized drugs as well as the integrity
of the specimen confiscated from the accused-
appellant.46
In this instant appeal, the accused-appellant manifested
that she would no longer file her Supplemental Brief as
she had exhaustively discussed her assignment of errors
in her Appellant’s Brief.47
Before this Court for resolution are the two assigned
errors raised by the accused-appellant:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE
CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED
CONFISCATED DRUG.48
We uphold the ruling of both the trial and the appellate
courts.
At the outset, We find it unnecessary to discuss the
propriety of the charge of violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 against Cadidia for illegal
transportation of 146.77 grams of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride by the prosecution. As elucidated by the
trial court, "there is no doubt that the accused had the
intention to board the flight bound for Butuan as per
her plane ticket and had submitted herself to body
frisking at the final check-in counter at the airport when
she was found to be carrying prohibited drugs in her
persons (sic). In like manner, considering the weight of
the "shabu" and the intention of the accused to transport
the same to another place or destination, she must be
accordingly penalized under Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9165, x x x.49"
Now to the issues presented before this Court.
As to the first assignment of error, the accused casts
doubt on the set of facts presented by the prosecution
particularly the narration of Trayvilla, Bagsican and
SPO3 Appang. She alleges that since the testimonies
given by the witnesses were conflicting, the same
should not be given credit and should result in her
acquittal. She cited two instances as examples of
inconsistencies. First, Trayvilla in her testimony
recalled that she was the one who asked the accused to
bring out the contents of her underwear. However, in
her re-direct, she clarified that it was Bagsican who
asked the accused. Bagsican, in turn testified that she
was the one who asked the accused while Trayvilla was
beside her.50 Second, Bagsican in her testimony recalled
that after confiscation of the alleged illegal drugs, she
placed the items inside her blazer for safekeeping.
However, SPO3 Appang testified that when the two
female friskers came out from the comfort room, they
immediately handed to him the seized illegal drugs
allegedly taken from Cadidia.51
In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence should be given to the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when
they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there
is evidence to the contrary. 52 Further, the evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon
deserves much weight and respect because the judge
has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on
the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or
not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm the findings of
the lower court in the appreciation of facts and
credibility of the witnesses.53
Upon review of the records, we find no conflict in the
narration of events of the prosecution witnesses. In her
direct testimony, Trayvilla testified that both of them
asked Cadidia to remove what was inside her
underwear when she and Bagsican brought the accused
to the comfort room to check what was hidden
inside.54 However, in her re-direct, she clarified that it
was really Bagsican who particularly made the request
but she was then also inside the cubicle with the
accused.55 This clarification is sufficient for the Court
to conclude that the two of them were inside the cubicle
when the request to bring out the contents of the
underwear was made and the concealed illegal drug
was discovered.
The other inconsistency alleged by the accused pertains
to what happened during the confiscation of the illegal
drug at the cubicle. The accused alleges that Bagsican
and SPO3 Appang differed in their statements. Upon
review, We find no such inconsistency. Bagsican
testified that after confiscation, she put the two plastic
sachets of shabu in her blazer for safekeeping. She
further narrated that afterwards, she turned over the
accused and the plastic sachets to SPO3
Appang.56 SPO3 Appang, in turn, testified that when
the two female friskers went out of the comfort room,
they handed to him what was taken from the accused.
The statements can be harmonized as a continuous and
unbroken recollection of events.
11
Even assuming that the said set of facts provided
conflicting statements, We have consistently held time
and again that minor inconsistencies do not negate the
eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as
the perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies
as a whole presented a coherent and believable
recollection, the credibility would still be upheld. What
is essential is that the witnesses’ testimonies
corroborate one another on material details surrounding
the commission of the crime.57
The accused also assails the application of presumption
of regularity in the performance of duties of the
witnesses. She claimed that the self-serving testimonies
of Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome her
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the
Constitution.58
Again, we disagree.
In People v. Unisa,59 this Court held that "in cases
involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are
police officers for they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the
part of the police officers."
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to
show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime
against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as
an airport frisker when she handled the accused who
entered the x-ray machine of the departure area. There
was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the
accused especially in her private area. The unusual
thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking
prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3
Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of the
accused would only show that the two female friskers
were just doing their usual task when they found the
illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is
bolstered by the fact that the accused on the one hand
and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to
each other. Neither could they harbour any ill-will
against each other. The allegation of frame-up and
denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who
corroborated on circumstances surrounding the
apprehension.
As final attempt at acquittal, the accused harps on the
alleged broken chain of custody of the confiscated
drugs. She casts doubt on the identity of the drugs
allegedly taken from her and the one presented in open
court to prove her guilt.60 She also questions the lack of
physical inventory of the confiscated items at the crime
scene, the absence of photographs taken on the alleged
illegal drugs and the failure to mark the seized items
upon confiscation.61
The duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous
drugs and substances is discharged when the arresting
law enforcer ensures that the chain of custody is
unbroken. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines the chain of
custody as:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody was of the
seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.62
In Mallillin v. People,63 the requirements to establish
chain of custody were laid down by this Court. First,
testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence. Second, witnesses should describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
item.
The prosecution in this case was able to prove, through
the testimonies of its witnesses, that the integrity of the
seized item was preserved every step of the process.
As to the first link, Trayvilla and Bagsican testified that
upon confiscation of the two plastic sachets of illegal
drug from the accused, the seized items were
transferred to SPO3 Appang, who himself confirmed
such transfer. The second link pertains to the point
when SPO3 Appang turned over the two plastic sachets
and sanitary napkin to the RASO of the Domestic
International Airport.64 As to the marking, Bagsican
testified that she put her initials and signature on the
plastic sachet and the sanitary napkin at the
Investigation Office. Afterwards, the seized items were
turned over to SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of the NAIA-
DITG.65 SP03 Appang signed the confiscated items at
the PDEA Office which is also located at the airport. 66
As evidenced by the Initial Laboratory Report, 67 the
specimens were referred by PO2 Cobilla of the NAIA-
DITG to Forensic Chemist Reyes of the Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for
examination. Finally, based on the Chemistry
Report68 of Forensic Chemist Reyes and stipulation69 of
facts agreed upon by both parties, the specimen
submitted by PO2 Cobilla tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride after qualitative
testing. The same specimens contained in the two
plastic sachets previously marked were identified by
two female friskers Trayvilla and Bagsican in open
court as the same ones confiscated from the accused. 70
As to non-compliance of all the requirements laid down
by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 regarding the custody and disposition of
confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous
drugs,71 the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165 states that non-compliance with
12
these requirements under justifiable grounds shall not
render void and invalid such seizure of and custody
over said items as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team. What is important is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.72 The successful presentation of the
prosecution of every link of chain of custody as
discussed above is sufficient to hold the accused liable
for the offense charged.
On a final note, we held that airport frisking is an
authorized form of search and seizure.1âwphi1 As held
in similar cases of People v Johnson73 and People v
Canton,74 this Court affirmed the conviction or the
accused Leila Reyes Johnson and Susan Canton for
violation of drugs law when they were found to be in
hiding in their body illegal drugs upon airport frisking.
The Court in both cases explained the rationale for the
validity of airport frisking thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure or their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition
is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism
has come increased security at the nation s airports.
Passengers attempting to hoard an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors: their carry-on baggage as
well as checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects. physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches arc reasonable, given
their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity or the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed.
travellers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that the are subject to search and. if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would he subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.75
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED
Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 28 August 2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-H. C. No.
03316 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209387
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port
authorities, although done without search warrants, are
not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to
ensure the safety of the traveling public.
For resolution is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated September 28,
2012 and the Resolution3 dated August 23, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals, Cebu City. 4 The Court of Appeals
affirmed5 the trial court’s Judgment6 finding petitioner
Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of possessing unlicensed firearms
under Commission on Elections Resolution No.
77647 in relation to Section 2618 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 8819 during the 2007 election period.10
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island
vessel.11 He frequently traveled, "coming back and
forth taking a vessel."12 At around 12:00 noon of May
11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic
Port to go home to Iloilo. 13 While buying a ticket, he
allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. 14 It took
him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket.15
Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the
terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning
machine for inspection. 16 The operator of the x-ray
machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. 17
Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine
operator-on-duty on May 11, 2007. 18 She saw the
impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms
inside Dela Cruz’s bag.19 Upon seeing the suspected
firearms, she called the attention of port personnel
Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector
then.20
Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the
bag.21 Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative and
consented to Igot’s manual inspection of the bag.22
"Port Police Officer Adolfo Abregana [(Officer
Abregana)] was on duty at the terminal of the Cebu
Domestic Port in Pier 1-G when his attention was
called by . . . Igot."23 Igot told Officer Abregana that
there were firearms in a bag owned by a certain
person.24 Igot then pointed to the person. 25 That person
was later identified as Dela Cruz.26
Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. 27 The
bag was then inspected and the following items were
found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance;
seaman’s book; other personal items; and four (4) live
ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. 28 When asked
whether he had the proper documents for the firearms,
Dela Cruz answered in the negative.29
13
Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his
violation of a crime punishable by law. 30 He was also
informed of his constitutional rights.31
In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela
Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act No.
8294 for illegal possession of firearms:32
Criminal Case No. CBU -80084
That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about
12:45 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with the deliberate intent and without being
authorized by law, did then and there possess and carry
outside his residence one (1) Cal. 38 Simith [sic] &
Wesson revolver without serial number; one (1) .22
Smith & Wesson Magnum revolver without serial
number; one (1) North American Black Widow
magnum revolver without serial number and four
rounds of live ammunitions for cal. 38 without first
securing the necessary license to possess and permit to
carry from the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.33
Subsequently, another Information was filed charging
Dela Cruz with the violation of Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section
261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881:34
Criminal Case No. CBU 80085
That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about
12:45 in the afternoon, which is within the election
period for the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there
possess and carry outside his residence the following:
 One (1) cal. .38 Simith [sic] & Wesson
revolver without serial number;
One (1) cal. .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum
revolver without serial number;
One (1) North American Black Widow
magnum revolver without serial number and
four (4) rounds of live ammunitions for cal.
38.
CONTRARY TO LAW.35
Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges
during arraignment.36
After trial, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu
City found Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section
261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No.
CBU 80085.37 Dela Cruz was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one (1) year with disqualification
from holding public office and the right to suffrage.38
According to the trial court, the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dela Cruz
committed illegal possession of firearms. 39 It proved
the following elements: "(a) the existence of the subject
firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the license or permit to
possess the same."40 The prosecution presented the
firearms and live ammunitions found in Dela Cruz’s
possession.41 It also presented three (3) prosecution
witnesses who testified that the firearms were found
inside Dela Cruz’s bag.42 The prosecution also
presented a Certification that Dela Cruz did not file any
application for license to possess a firearm, and he was
not given authority to carry a firearm outside his
residence.43
The trial court also held that the search conducted by
the port authorities was reasonable and, thus, valid:44
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds
the search conducted by the port authorities reasonable
and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag
of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions,
accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante
delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant
under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in
the course of such valid search are thus admissible as
evidence against [the] accused.45
The trial court did not give credence to Dela Cruz’s
claim that the firearms were "planted" inside his bag by
the porter or anyone who could have accessed his bag
while he was buying a ticket.46 According to the trial
court, Dela Cruz’s argument was "easy to fabricate, but
terribly difficult to disprove." 47 Dela Cruz also did not
show improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to discredit their testimonies.48
The trial court dismissed the case for violation of
Republic Act No. 8294.49 It held that "Republic Act No.
8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that the person arrested committed ‘no other
crime.’"50Dela Cruz, who had been charged with illegal
possession of firearms, was also charged with violating
the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 7764.51
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Consolidated
Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of BP
Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU-80085, and hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment for a period of
one (1) year, and to suffer disqualification to hold
public office and deprivation of the right to suffrage.
14
While Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for Violation of
RA 8294 is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
cash bond posted by accused therein for his provisional
liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and released to said
accused.
The subject firearms (Exhs. "H", "I" & "J"), and the
live ammunitions (Exhs. "K to K-2"") shall, however,
remain in custodia legis for proper disposition of the
appropriate government agency.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s Judgment.53 It held that the defense failed to
show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by
improper motive; thus, their testimonies are entitled to
full faith and credit.54The acts of government
authorities were found to be regular.55
The Court of Appeals did not find Dela Cruz’s defense
of denial meritorious.56 "Denial as a defense has been
viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease
with which it can be concocted." 57 Dela Cruz did not
present any evidence "to show that he had authority to
carry outside of residence firearms and ammunition
during the period of effectivity of the Gun Ban [during]
election time."58 The prosecution was able to prove
Dela Cruz’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby DENIED. The assailed January 27, 2010
Consolidated Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12 of Cebu City in Criminal Case CBU-
59434 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs on accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.59 (Emphasis in the original)
Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 60 which
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated August 23, 2013.61
Dela Cruz filed this Petition on November 4, 2013. 62 In
the Resolution63 dated December 9, 2013, this court
required respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, to submit its Comment on the Petition.
Respondent submitted its Comment64 on March 6,
2014, which this court noted in the Resolution 65 dated
March 19, 2014.
Dela Cruz claims that he was an on-the-job trainee for
an inter-island vessel.66 He was "well[-]acquainted with
[the] inspection scheme [at the] ports."67 He would not
have risked placing prohibited items such as unlicensed
firearms inside his luggage knowing fully the
consequences of such an action.68
According to Dela Cruz, when he arrived at the port on
May 11, 2007, he left his luggage with a porter to buy a
ticket.69 "A considerable time of fifteen minutes went
by before he could secure the ticket while his luggage
was left sitting on the floor with only the porter
standing beside it."70 He claims that someone must have
placed the unlicensed firearms inside his bag during the
period he was away from it.71 He was surprised when
his attention was called by the x-ray machine operator
after the firearms were detected.72
Considering the circumstances, Dela Cruz argues that
there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless
search:73
In petitioner’s case, it may well be said that, with the
circumstances attending the search of his luggage, he
had no actual intention to relinquish his right against
warrantless searches. He knew in all honest belief that
when his luggage would pass through the routine x-ray
examination, nothing incriminating would be
recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that
he allowed the examination of his luggage. . . . [H]e
believed that no incriminating evidence w[ould] be
found. He knew he did not place those items. But what
is strikingly unique about his situation is that a
considerable time interval lapsed, creating an
opportunity for someone else to place inside his
luggage those incriminating items.74 (Emphasis in the
original)
Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of
Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and seizure,
thus warranting his conviction.75 Dela Cruz was
"caught in flagrante delicto carrying three (3) revolvers
and four (4) live ammunitions when his bag went
through the x-ray machine in the Cebu Domestic Port
on May 11, 2007, well within the election
period."76 The firearms were seized during a routine
baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport
security procedure.77
According to respondent, this case is similar to valid
warrantless searches and seizures conducted by airport
personnel pursuant to routine airport security
procedures.78
Records are also clear that Dela Cruz voluntarily
waived his right to unreasonable searches and
seizure.79 The trial court found that Dela Cruz
voluntarily gave his consent to the search.80
Dela Cruz’s claim that his bag was switched is also
baseless.81 The witnesses categorically testified that
Dela Cruz was "in possession of the bag before it went
through the x-ray machine, and he was also in
possession of the same bag that contained the firearms
when he was apprehended."82
Dela Cruz raised the lone issue of "whether the Court
of Appeals gravely erred in finding [him] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the
failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt[.]"83
The issues for resolution in this case are:
15
First, whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was
in possession of the illegal firearms within the meaning
of the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764,
in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;
Second, whether petitioner waived his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and
Lastly, assuming that there was no waiver, whether
there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
We deny the Petition.
I
The present criminal case was brought to this court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The penalty
imposed on petitioner by the trial court is material in
determining the mode of appeal to this court. A petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must be
differentiated from appeals under Rule 124, Section
1384 involving cases where the lower court imposed on
the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or, previously, death.85
In Mercado v. People:86
Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable
penalty in a criminal case brought to it on appeal is at
least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment,
then it should impose such penalty, refrain from
entering judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate
the entire records to this Court for review. This will
obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting
shuttling of criminal cases between this Court and the
Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire
jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and
can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has
fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do
justice in the case.
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes
a penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a review of the
case may be had only by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 where only errors or questions
of law may be raised.87 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari,
only questions of law are reviewed by this court. 88 The
rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 is based on sound and
practical policy considerations stemming from the
differing natures of a question of law and a question of
fact:
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence
to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. A question of fact exists when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.89
Concomitantly, factual findings of the lower courts as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding on this
court.90
In contrast, an appeal in a criminal case "throws the
whole case open for review[.]"91 The underlying
principle is that errors in an appealed judgment, even if
not specifically assigned, may be corrected motu
propio by the court if the consideration of these errors
is necessary to arrive at a just resolution of the
case.92 Nevertheless, "the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a
statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the
manner provided for by law[.]"93
II
Petitioner argues that the firearms found in his bag
were not his. Thus, he could not be liable for
possessing the contraband. Key to the resolution of this
case is whether petitioner possessed firearms without
the necessary authorization from the Commission on
Elections. Petitioner was charged under special laws:
Republic Act No. 8294 and Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The law applicable is Section 2(a) of Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764, which provides:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions. During the election period
from January 14, 2007 it shall be unlawful for:
a. Any person, including those possessing a permit to
carry firearms outside of residence or place of business,
to bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly
weapons in public places including any building, street,
park, private vehicle or public conveyance. For the
purpose firearm includes airgun, while deadly weapons
include hand grenades or other explosives, except
pyrotechnics[.]
Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 states:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be
guilty of an election offense:
....
(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of
business. – Any person who, although possessing a
permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside
his residence or place of business during the election
period, unless authorized in writing by the
Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or
air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of
business or extension hereof. (Par. (l), Id.)
16
This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and
disbursing officers while in the performance of their
duties or to persons who by nature of their official
duties, profession, business or occupation habitually
carry large sums of money or valuables.
For a full understanding of the nature of the
constitutional rights involved, we will examine three
(3) points of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy
of petitioner: first, when petitioner gave his bag for x-
ray scanning to port authorities; second, when the
baggage inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called
the Port Authority Police; and third, when the police
officer opened the bag to search, retrieve, and seize the
firearms and ammunition.
III
The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner
presented his bag for inspection to port personnel—the
x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning
the x-ray machine station.94 With regard to searches and
seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is
different from that imposed on state agents or
authorized government authorities.
In People v. Marti,95 the private forwarding and
shipping company, following standard operating
procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre
Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and detected
a peculiar odor from the packages.96 The representative
from the company found dried marijuana leaves in the
packages.97 He reported the matter to the National
Bureau of Investigation and brought the samples to the
Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory
examination.98 Agents from the National Bureau of
Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal
drugs.99 Andre Marti was charged with and was found
guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.100
This court held that there was no unreasonable search
or seizure.101 The evidence obtained against the accused
was not procured by the state acting through its police
officers or authorized government agencies. 102 The Bill
of Rights does not govern relationships between
individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of
private individuals:103
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers,
a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass
the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a
private establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search
and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.104
Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a
reasonable search conducted by private persons are not
covered by the exclusionary rule.105
To determine whether the intrusion by the port
personnel in this case was committed by private or
public persons, we revisit the history and organizational
structure of the Philippine Ports Authority.
Port security measures are consistent with the country’s
aim to develop transportation and trade in conjunction
with national and economic growth. In 1974, the
Philippine Ports Authority was created for the
reorganization of port administration and operation
functions.106 The Philippine Ports Authority’s Charter
was later revised through Presidential Decree No. 857.
The Revised Charter provided that the Authority may:
after consultation with relevant Government agencies,
make rules or regulations for the planning,
development, construction, maintenance, control,
supervision and management of any Port or Port
District and the services to be provided therein, and for
the maintenance of good order therein, and generally
for carrying out the process of this Decree.107
The Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given
police authority through Executive Order No.
513,108 which provides:
Sec. 2. Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new
paragraph to read as follows:
Section 6-c. Police Authority – The Authority shall
have such police authority within the ports
administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its
powers and functions and attain its purposes and
objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the
functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law
enforcement bodies within the area. Such police
authority shall include the following:
a) To provide security to cargoes, port
equipment, structure, facilities, personnel and
documents: Provided, however, That in ports
of entry, physical security to import and
export cargoes shall be exercised jointly with
the Bureau of Customs;
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and
movement within the port, of persons and
vehicles, as well as movement within the port
of watercraft;
c) To maintain peace and order inside the
port, in coordination with local police
authorities;
d) To supervise private security agencies
operating within the port area; and
e) To enforce rules and regulations
promulgated by the Authority pursuant to
law. (Emphasis supplied)
17
In 1992, the Cebu Port Authority was created to
specifically administer all ports located in the Province
of Cebu.109The Cebu Port Authority is a "public-benefit
corporation . . . under the supervision of the
Department of Transportation and Communications for
purposes of policy coordination."110 Control of the ports
was transferred to the Cebu Port Authority on January
1, 1996, when its operations officially began.111
In 2004, the Office for Transportation Security was
designated as the "single authority responsible for the
security of the transportation systems [in] the
country[.]"112 Its powers and functions included
providing security measures for all transportation
systems in the country:
b. Exercise operational control and
supervision over all units of law enforcement
agencies and agency personnel providing
security services in the transportation
systems, except for motor vehicles in land
transportation, jointly with the heads of the
bureaus or agencies to which the units or
personnel organically belong or are assigned;
c. Exercise responsibility for transportation
security operations including, but not limited
to, security screening of passengers, baggage
and cargoes, and hiring, retention, training
and testing of security screening personnel;
d. In coordination with the appropriate
agencies and/or instrumentalities of the
government, formulate, develop, promulgate
and implement comprehensive security plans,
policies, measures, strategies and programs
to ably and decisively deal with any threat to
the security of transportation systems, and
continually review, assess and upgrade such
security plans, policies, measures, strategies
and programs, to improve and enhance
transportation security and ensure the
adequacy of these security measures;
 e. Examine and audit the performance of
transportation security personnel, equipment
and facilities, and, thereafter, establish, on a
continuing basis, performance standards for
such personnel, equipment and facilities,
including for the training of personnel;
f. Prepare a security manual/master plan or
programme which shall prescribe the rules
and regulations for the efficient and safe
operation of all transportation systems,
including standards for security screening
procedures, prior screening or profiling of
individuals for the issuance of security access
passes, and determination of levels of
security clearances for personnel of the OTS,
the DOTC and its attached agencies, and
other agencies of the government;
g. Prescribe security and safety standards for
all transportation systems in accordance with
existing laws, rules, regulations and
international conventions;
h. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the DOTC, issue Transportation Security
Regulations/Rules and amend, rescind or
revise such regulations or rules as may be
necessary for the security of the
transportation systems of the
country[.]113 (Emphasis supplied)
The Cebu Port Authority has adopted security measures
imposed by the Office for Transportation Security,
including the National Security Programme for Sea
Transport and Maritime Infrastructure.114
The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by
the state to oversee the security of persons and vehicles
within its ports. While there is a distinction between
port personnel and port police officers in this case,
considering that port personnel are not necessarily law
enforcers, both should be considered agents of
government under Article III of the Constitution. The
actions of port personnel during routine security checks
at ports have the color of a state-related function.
In People v. Malngan,115 barangay tanod and the
Barangay Chairman were deemed as law enforcement
officers for purposes of applying Article III of the
Constitution.116 In People v. Lauga,117 this court held
that a "bantay bayan," in relation to the authority to
conduct a custodial investigation under Article III,
Section 12118 of the Constitution, "has the color of a
state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]" 119
Thus, with port security personnel’s functions having
the color of state-related functions and deemed agents
of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present
case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security
measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic
ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.
In People v. Suzuki,120 the accused "entered the pre-
departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal." 121 He
was "bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the
Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling
bag and a box marked ‘Bongbong’s piaya.’" 122 The
accused "proceeded to the ‘walk-through metal
detector,’ a machine which produces a red light and an
alarm once it detects the presence of metallic substance
or object."123 "Thereupon, the red light switched on and
the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic
substance either in his person or in the box he was
carrying."124 When the accused was asked to open the
content of the box, he answered "open,
open."125 Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops
were then found inside the box.126 Suzuki argued that
the box was only given to him as "pasalubong" by a
certain Pinky, whom he had sexual relations with the
night before.127 He did not know the contents of the
box.128
18
This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on
the accused was a valid exception to the prohibition
against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a
routine airport security procedure:129
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case. Given the
circumstances obtaining here, we find the search
conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and,
therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.
Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed
several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed to
have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his
arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The packs of
marijuana obtained in the course of such valid search
are thus admissible as evidence against
appellant.130(Citations omitted)
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable
reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition
is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism
has come increased security at the nation’s airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as
well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given
their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport
procedures.131 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v.
People.132 This court in Sales upheld the validity of the
search conducted as part of the routine security check
at the old Manila Domestic Airport—now Terminal 1
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.133
Port authorities were acting within their duties and
functions when it used x-ray scanning machines for
inspection of passengers’ bags.134 When the results of
the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the
bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct
a search of petitioner’s bag. Notably, petitioner did not
contest the results of the x-ray scan.
IV
Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second
point of intrusion—when the baggage inspector opened
petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the port
police officer?
We rule in the negative.
The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority
and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles
within the port. At this point, petitioner already
submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by
placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.
The presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning
was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to
present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if
he did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray
machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing
of probable cause that a crime is being or has been
committed are part of reasonable security regulations to
safeguard the passengers passing through ports or
terminals. Probable cause is:
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
induce a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that the items,
articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are
in the place to be searched.135
It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront
to an ordinary person’s right to travel if weighed
against the safety of all passengers and the security in
the port facility.
As one philosopher said, the balance between authority
and an individual’s liberty may be confined within the
harm that the individual may cause others. John Stuart
Mill’s "harm principle" provides:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even
right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or
entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting
him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him
must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The
19
only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.136
Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the
presentation of person and effects for port security
measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when
measured against the possible harm to society caused
by lawless persons.
V
A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy
occurred during petitioner’s submission to port security
measures. This court should determine whether the
requirements for a valid waiver against unreasonable
searches and seizures were met.
After detection of the firearms through the x-ray
scanning machine and inspection by the baggage
inspector, Officer Abregana was called to inspect
petitioner’s bag.
The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 137 A warrantless
search is presumed to be unreasonable. 138 However, this
court lays down the exceptions where warrantless
searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view";
(3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. 139
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals:140
In case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 141
Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not
validly consent to the search conducted by the port
authorities. He argues that he did not have an actual
intention to relinquish his right against a warrantless
search.
In cases involving the waiver of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be
weighed in its entirety. The trial court’s findings show
that petitioner presented his bag for scanning in the x-
ray machine.142When his bag went through the x-ray
machine and the firearms were detected, he voluntarily
submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities:
Prosecutor Narido:
Q. What did he tell you?
A. I asked him if I can check his bag?
Q. What was his response?
A. He consented and cooperated. I checked the bag. 143
It was after the port personnel’s inspection that Officer
Abregana’s attention was called and the bag was
inspected anew with petitioner’s consent.144
"[A]ppellate courts accord the highest respect to the
assessment of witnesses’ credibility by the trial court,
because the latter was in a better position to observe
their demeanor and deportment on the witness
stand."145 We do not find anything erroneous as to the
findings of fact of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
There was probable cause that petitioner was
committing a crime leading to the search of his
personal effects. As the trial court found:
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds
the search conducted by the port authorities reasonable
and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag
of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions,
accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante
delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant
under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in
the course of such valid search are thus admissible as
evidence against [the] accused.146
Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui
Malasugui147 and People v. Omaweng148 who permitted
authorities to search their persons and premises without
a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from claiming an
invalid warrantless search when he voluntarily
submitted to the search on his person. In addition,
petitioner’s consent to the search at the domestic port
was not given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances.149
This case should be differentiated from that of Aniag,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections,150 which involved the
search of a moving vehicle at a checkpoint. 151 In that
case, there was no implied acquiescence to the search
since the checkpoint set up by the police authorities
was conducted without proper consultation, and it left
motorists without any choice except to subject
themselves to the checkpoint:
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of
Arellano to the search constitutes an implied waiver of
petitioner’s right to question the reasonableness of the
search of the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of
checkpoints, it however stressed that "guidelines shall
be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and
20
political rights results from the implementation of this
authority," and that "the places and manner of setting
up of checkpoints shall be determined in consultation
with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security
Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323."
The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at
about five o’clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992.
The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes
later. It was not shown that news of impending
checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations,
and the reason for the same have been announced in the
media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal
checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the
public of the purpose of its operation. As a result,
motorists passing that place did not have any inkling
whatsoever about the reason behind the instant
exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and
search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any
choice but to submit to the PNP’s scrutiny. Otherwise,
any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would raise
suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to
arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive search
of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car
at that time it was stopped for inspection. As conceded
by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the
purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14)
armed policemen conducting the operation, driver
Arellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner
could not have marshalled the strength and the courage
to protest against the extensive search conducted in the
vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if
there was any, could not be more than a mere passive
conformity on Arellano’s part to the search, and
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.152 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
We also cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that
there was no valid consent to the search because his
consent was premised on his belief that there were no
prohibited items in his bag. The defendant’s belief that
no incriminating evidence would be found does not
automatically negate valid consent to the search when
incriminating items are found. His or her belief must be
measured against the totality of the
circumstances.153 Again, petitioner voluntarily
submitted himself to port security measures and, as he
claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security
measures since he had been traveling back and forth
through the sea port.
Consequently, we find respondent’s argument that the
present petition falls under a valid consented search and
during routine port security procedures meritorious.
The search conducted on petitioner’s bag is valid.
VI
The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is
different from a customs search.
Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a
valid search warrant, are allowed when "persons
exercising police authority under the customs law . . .
effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of
customs laws."154The Tariff and Customs Code
provides the authority for such warrantless search, as
this court ruled in Papa, et al. v. Mago, et al.:155
The Code authorizes persons having police authority
under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to
enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or
envelope or any person on board, or stop and search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases.156 (Citation omitted)
The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v.
People,157 in that the state’s policy to combat smuggling
must not lose to the difficulties posed by the debate on
whether the state has the duty to accord constitutional
protection to dutiable articles on which duty has not
been paid, as with a person’s papers and/or effects. 158
Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements
are: (1) the person/s conducting the search was/were
exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the
search was for the enforcement of customs law; and (3)
the place searched is not a dwelling place or house.
Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine
port security measures. The search was not conducted
by persons authorized under customs law. It was also
not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and
Customs Code or other customs laws. Although
customs searches usually occur within ports or
terminals, it is important that the search must be for the
enforcement of customs laws.
VII
In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be "in
possession of a firearm . . . outside of his residence
within the period of the election gun ban imposed by
the COMELEC sans authority[.]"159
In Abenes v. Court of Appeals,160 this court enumerated
the elements for a violation of the Gun Ban: "1) the
person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or
other deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs
during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is carried
in a public place."161 This court also ruled that under the
Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or
she has a written authority to possess a firearm is on the
accused.162
We find that the prosecution was able to establish all
the requisites for violation of the Gun Ban. The
firearms were found inside petitioner’s bag. Petitioner
did not present any valid authorization to carry the
firearms outside his residence during the period
designated by the Commission on Elections. He was
21
carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which
was a public place.
However, petitioner raised the following circumstances
in his defense: (1) that he was a frequent traveler and
was, thus, knowledgeable about the security measures
at the terminal; (2) that he left his bag with a porter for
a certain amount of time; and (3) that he voluntarily put
his bag on the x-ray machine for voluntary inspection.
All these circumstances were left uncontested by the
prosecution.
This court is now asked to determine whether these
circumstances are sufficient to raise reasonable doubt
on petitioner’s guilt.
When petitioner claimed that someone planted the
illegal firearms in his bag, the burden of evidence to
prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the
burden of evidence does not equate to the reversal of
the presumption of innocence. In People v.
Villanueva,163 this court discussed the difference
between burden of proof and burden of evidence, and
when the burden of evidence shifts to the accused:
Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the
onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the
commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with
the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or
persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does
not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution
throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution
has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by
presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of
the truth of the allegations in the information or has
established a prima facie case against the accused, the
burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it
incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to
meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie
case.164 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution’s evidence
that he had animus possidendi or the intent to possess
the illegal firearms. In People v. De Gracia,165 this court
elucidated on the concept of animus possidendi and the
importance of the intent to commit an act prohibited by
law as differentiated from criminal intent. 166 The
accused was charged with the qualified offense of
illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 resulting
from the coup d’etat staged in 1989 by the Reform
Armed Forces Movement - Soldiers of the Filipino
People.167 This court held that the actions of the
accused established his intent to possess the illegal
firearms:
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule,
intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate
the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit
the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously
intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to
commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the
crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second
(intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the
prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made
between criminal intent and intent to possess. While
mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to
convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it
must still be shown that there was animus possidendi
or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such
intent to possess is, however, without regard to any
other criminal or felonious intent which the accused
may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal
intent here refers to the intention of the accused to
commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. This is not important in convicting a person
under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order
that one may be found guilty of a violation of the
decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority
or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to
possess the same, even if such possession was made in
good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or
harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be
considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the
possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus
possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in
our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of
having intentionally possessed several firearms,
explosives and ammunition without the requisite
license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt.
Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first
one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military
operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia
standing in the room and holding the several explosives
marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. At first,
appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives.
Then, he alternatively contended that his act of
guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col.
Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof
because there was no intent on his part to possess the
same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy
of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or
indifferent material possession does not and cannot
inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be
determined on a case to case basis, taking into
consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the
accused and the surrounding circumstances. What
exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the
range of action. It is not controverted that appellant De
Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the
Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from the
service for going on absence without leave (AWOL).
We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude
that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the
dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of
ammunition which were confiscated by the military
from his possession. As a former soldier, it would be
absurd for him not to know anything about the
dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori,
22
he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in
his possession such a large quantity of explosives and
ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the
explosives were found is not a military camp or office,
nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be
stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an
ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be
suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place
intended to carry out the business of selling cars and
which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly,
with the trade of firearms and
ammunition.168 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The disquisition in De Gracia on the distinction
between criminal intent and intent to possess, which is
relevant to convictions for illegal possession of
firearms, was reiterated in Del Rosario v.
People.169 This court ruled that "[i]n the absence
of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs
no criminal liability."170
In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his
possession of the illegal firearms seized from his bag
was "temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless
possession[.]"171 As put by the trial court, petitioner’s
claim that anyone could have planted the firearms in
his bag while it was unattended is flimsy. 172 There are
dire consequences in accepting this claim at face value,
particularly that no one will be caught and convicted of
illegal possession of firearms.
Courts must also weigh the accused’s claim against the
totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
This includes determination of: (1) the motive of
whoever allegedly planted the illegal firearm(s); (2)
whether there was opportunity to plant the illegal
firearm(s); and (3) reasonableness of the situation
creating the opportunity.
Petitioner merely claims that someone must have
planted the firearms when he left his bag with the
porter. He did not identify who this person could have
been and he did not state any motive for this person to
plant the firearms in his possession, even if there was
indeed an opportunity to plant the firearms.
However, this court is mindful that, owing to the nature
of his work, petitioner was a frequent traveler who is
well-versed with port security measures. We cannot
accept that an average reasonable person aware of
travel security measures would leave his belongings
with a stranger for a relatively long period of time.
Also, records show that petitioner had only one (1) bag.
There was no evidence to show that a robust young
man like petitioner would have need of the porter’s
services. The defense did not identify nor present this
porter with whom petitioner left his bag.
VIII
The trial court was correct when it dismissed Criminal
Case No. CBU-80084 for violation of Republic Act No.
8294, otherwise known as illegal possession of
firearms. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294 provides:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,
Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition
or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – The penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a
fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .
32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime
was committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Agote v. Judge Lorenzo173 already settled the question
of whether there can be a "separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition if there is
another crime committed[.]"174 In that case, the
petitioner was charged with both illegal possession of
firearms and violation of the Gun Ban under
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 2826. 175 This
court acquitted petitioner in the case for illegal
possession of firearms since he simultaneously violated
the Gun Ban.176 This court also held that the unlicensed
firearm need not be actually used in the course of
committing the other crime for the application of
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294.177
Similarly, Madrigal v. People178 applied the ruling
in Agote and held that Section 1 of Republic Act No.
8294 is express in its terms that a person may not be
convicted for illegal possession of firearms if another
crime was committed.179
IX
We note that the trial court imposed the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of one (1) year and to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of
the right to suffrage. Under Section 264 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, persons found guilty of an election
offense "shall be punished with imprisonment of not
less than one year but not more than six years and shall
not be subject to probation."180 The Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies to offenses punished by both the
Revised Penal Code and special laws.181
The penalty to be imposed is a matter of law that courts
must follow. The trial court should have provided
minimum and maximum terms for petitioner’s penalty
of imprisonment as required by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.182Accordingly, we modify the penalty
imposed by the trial court. Based on the facts, we deem
it reasonable that petitioner be penalized with
imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum to two (2)
years as maximum.183
X
23
The records are unclear whether petitioner is currently
detained by the state or is out on bail. Petitioner’s
detention is relevant in determining whether he has
already served more than the penalty imposed upon
him by the trial court as modified by this court, or
whether he is qualified to the credit of his preventive
imprisonment with his service of sentence.
Article 29184 of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted
from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or accused
who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of their sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which
they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after
being informed of the effects thereof and with the
assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the
following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been
convicted previously twice or more times of
any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the
execution of their sentence they have failed
to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance
of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he
has undergone preventive imprisonment.1âwphi1
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30)
years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive
imprisonment for a period equal to the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to
which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the
proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review.
Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes
of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the
actual period of detention with good conduct time
allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is
absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial,
the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual
delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous
crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In
case the maximum penalty to which the accused may
be sentenced is lestierro [sic], he shall be released after
thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.

In case credit of preventive imprisonment is due,

petitioner must first signify his agreement to the
conditions set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.185 If petitioner has already served more than the
penalty imposed upon him by the trial court, then his
immediate release from custody is in order unless
detained for some other lawful cause.186

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court

of Appeals Decision dated September 8, 2012 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR
No. 01606 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Petitioner Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz is sentenced to
imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum to two (2)
years as maximum in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The period of his
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor
if he has given his written conformity to abide by the
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and if he is not out on bail.

SO ORDERED.

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