Selected Readings

SELECTED READINGS
The Dawn Newspaper, The Jakarta Post, The Wa shington Post, Huffington Post
and others
Readings in Current Affairs, Pakistan Affairs, International Relations, Essay and Gender
Studies, Criminology & Sociology
THE PARAGON ACADEMY (CSS/PCS) SELECTED READINGS
CONTENT LIST
1. A Vision of Connectivity by Muhammad Amir Rana

2. Pak-US: up, down or around? By Munir Akram
3. Rising dragon, wounded eagle by Munir Akram
4. Controversy trailing him, Trump heads for Israeli-Palestinian talks by Mike Smith
5. Axis of good and evil by Munir Akram
6. Kashmir: hard choices only by Pervez Hoodbhoy
7. End of Enlightenment? By Pervez Hoodbhoy
8. Water Security by Ignacio Artaza
9. Can Modi muzzle Kashmir? by Moonis Ahmer
10. Tracking extremism by Muhammad Amir Rana
11. Policy imperatives for CPEC by Ishrat Hussain
12. Warfare not likely but US-China trade tensions will rise by Ang Yuen Yuen
13. China’s Silk Road lends urgency to India’s Asia ambitions by Archena Chaudhary &
Dhwani Pandya
14. Europe’s response to the refugee crisis by Isaac Stanley Becker
15. On Afghan Refugees by Madiha Afzal
16. Pak-Afghanistan truth by Touqir Hussain
17. Jadhav’s Appeal by Ahmer Bilal Soofi
18. ICJ’s limited jurisdiction by Sikandar Ahmed Shah & Abid Rizvi
19. A History of Indian spies in Pakistan by Ali Osman
20. The Correct narrative on Pressler
21. China’s new world order by Zahid Hussain
22. Power of hate by Aasim Sajjad Akhtar
23. Modi’s American embrace by Munir Akram
24. K is for Kashmir by Munir Akram
25. Strategy –free force by Munir Akram
26. One Belt, One Road by Sikandar Ahmed Shah and Abid Rizvi
27. Conquering minds by Muhammad Amir Rana
28. Incomplete victory by Arsla Jawaid
29. Morality in Pakistan’s politics by Muhammad Amir Rana
30. A dark age by Munir Akram
31. The new cold war by Munir Akram
32. The refracted relationship by Munir Akram
33. Need for a new beginning by Muhammad Amir Rana
34. The merger question by Khadim Hussain
35. The dragon in the room by Munir Akram
36. Terms of re-engagement by Munir Akram
37. The nuclear dimension by Munir Akram
38. America’s new Afghan war by Munir Akram
39. Extremist minds on campus by Munir Akram
THE PARAGON ACADEMY (CSS/PCS) 03330386609

40. Uncounted numbers by Amin Hashwani

41. UN says world faces worst humanitarian crisis since WWII
42. Growing risk of mass starvation deaths in Africa, Yemen: UN
43. The Political face of JuD by Muhammad Amir Rana
44. Post-Globalization by Ali Tahir
45. Saving artifacts in Afghanistan by Ali M Latifi
46. The real story behind the crisis in Qatar and Saud Arabia’s involvement by Robert Fisk
47. Why Saudi Arabia hates Al Jazeera so much by Amanda Erickson
48. The Era of cyber-disaster may finally be here by Adam Taylor
49. The Ojhri camp disaster by Shaikh Aziz
50. Rohingya’s plight by Omar Waraich
51. China-US: shaping the future by Munir Akram
52. The power of the minority vote by Nadeem Paracha
53. Trump takes US out of Paris Climate accord by Anwar Iqbal
54. Islamic Alliance Controversy –Editorial
55. Kashmir solution –Editorial
56. The new Saudi Vision by Nadeem F Paracha
57. Iran announces new missile production line
58. Final phase of South Waziristan IDP’s return begins on Tuesday
59. What humanity has chosen to forget by Erash Omar Jamal
60. Funds for TDPs
61. OBOR connectivity shunned
62. Connecting through CPEC by Muhammad Amir Rana
63. Media and labor by Zeenat Hisam
64. New alliances, new wars by Munir Akram
65. Child protection by Rukhsana Shah
66. Beyond Privilege by Muhammad Saleem
67. India and Bangladesh: sharing the Teesta by SK Sarkar
68. Human Rights Record
69. Attacks on Schools-Editorial
70. Online terror threat-Editorial
71. Economic Survey-Editorial
72. Fixing Afghanistan by Muhammad Amir Rana
73. Pak-US Afghanistan Cooperation is key –Editorial
74. US Elections: What can Pakistan expect?
75. The Essence of Trumpism by Dr Moonis Ahmar
76. Stormy G20 ends with gestures for Trump on climate, trade
77. The robot debate is over: jobs are gone by Tim Dunlop
78. Indian Supreme Court cannot avoid decision on Babri Masjid case
79. Assessing India’s water threat by Fahim Zaman & syed Muhammad Abu-Bakr
80. The many sins of a liberal by Muhammad Amir Rana
81. Sexual harassment by Nadeem Omar Tarar
82. Women’s voting rights: Editorial

83. Short Notes on International Organizations
A vision of connectivity
PRESIDENT Donald Trump of the US has shaken the geopolitical landscape of the world in such
a way that many nations are struggling to adjust. At present, world politics are quite fluid,
which has created more space for Chinese President Xi Jinping to materialize his dream of
regional connectivity.
America’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has triggered a process of
regional realignments. Some TPP-linked nations, including Japan, India, Vietnam, Australia, and
Singapore, are considering prospects for a broader regional security and economic coalition.
These nations fear the growth of Chinese influence in the area. Other regions, including the
Middle East and central and South Asia are also reviewing their geopolitical priorities and
exploring new avenues of regional cooperation. Changing regional politics are suitable for the
growth of the Chinese One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative.
What exactly does the OBOR notion hold? It will provide connectivity in emerging geo-
economics with all trade routes leading to China. It will have geostrategic advantages for China
and OBOR partners but most importantly, it will foster new regional awakenings beyond
cultural, ethnic, historical and civilizational connections among nations.
This is prime time for Pakistan to review the notion of its regional consciousness. As far as this
country is concerned, amongst many, it is part of two major regional alliances: the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC).
The SCO is a broader alliance against common security threats, from extremism to narcotics;
Pakistan is going to be its functional member in the near future. Full membership will not allow
the country to get the benefit of collective advantages of the alliance but to evolve closer
economic and strategic relations with different members of the SCO. SAARC is a critical regional
alliance, as it perceives not only common economic and political interests but has also
emotional and civilizational context for member states.
However, apart from geographical proximity, South Asian nations share little in common. Many
scholars even raise the question whether something like ‘South Asianness’ exists between
them. Even if there is some cohesion, can common cultural values and civilizational links
transform into a regional bond of geo-economic and political cooperation?
Our social and political elite has to grow out of its obsession with ‘South Asianness’.
No doubt South Asian nations share some civilizational and religious traditions, but their ethnic,
linguistic, cultural and religious diversities have been sources of nationalism in all of them. Each
South Asian nation has unique and diverse cultural, ethnic and religious patterns. Some of these
expressions might be common to a few nations but in other customs and traditions, they are
entirely different. The Saarc website also shows that each nation has different cultural
expressions, which is reflected in their dress codes, foods, and customs.
One may argue that people from the same ethnicity could be divided across borders in South
Asia such as Punjabis, Bengalis, Tamils, Pakhtuns, the Baloch, etc, but most of these ethnicities

have evolved their own cultural and social expressions and feel less proximity with their ethnic
fellows across the borders.
The Saarc crisis also shows that South Asian nations must find some other common ground
based on mutual economic and political interests. The Indian media and many of its academics
have already declared Saarc a dead body. The initiators of the regional forum also appear
disinterested. Bangladesh is debating joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations forum.
Sri Lanka sees no value in being part of Saarc and feels more proximity with the Asean nations.
The disintegration of Saarc has started and South Asianness is losing its context. And even if it
holds together, it appears difficult for Saarc to make any difference in the region.
Saarc has been a non-political forum. On the demand of India, a clause was included that
bilateral political issues and conflicts will not be discussed here — but India itself exploited the
forum for political purposes. The prime objective of Saarc was the promotion of the welfare of
the peoples of South Asia and improvement in their quality of life; but it has achieved very little
in this regard. India also has attempted a minus-Pakistan formula and is exploring options for
alternative regional alliances such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation.
Saarc is history now, and Pakistan must explore new avenues for regional cooperation. The
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a part of OBOR provides many opportunities to
forge regional and bilateral economic and political ties with South Asian, central Asian and
Indian Ocean nations. Pakistan can take the initiative of promoting economic cooperation
among Arabian Sea nations including Iran, Oman and Yemen, and consider prospects for a
border-sea nations’ alliance among Arab states and a few South Asian nations, including Sri
Lanka and the Maldives. A similar equation can be found in western and northern neighbours,
mainly Afghanistan and Iran. To maximise the benefits of CPEC and gain more economic and
political advantages, Pakistan needs to do some out-of-the-box thinking.
The changing geopolitical arena will have multiple advantages for the country, but Pakistan’s
social and political elite has to grow out of its obsession with South Asianness. Similarly, the
security and political leadership has to rationalise its ties with Arab countries. What is needed is
a comprehensive review of the approach to the Middle East. Joining the 39-nation alliance led
by Saudi Arabia may not be a bad idea if it will convert into a security, economic and political
forum based on the common interests of all members. However, this should not come at the
cost of Pakistan’s relations with its immediate neighbour Iran, which also offers enormous
potential for economic cooperation. Better bilateral ties can be maintained with the US,
Europe, and the rest of the world while prioritising regional connectivity. This is the lesson
Pakistan can learn from the OBOR initiative and supplement it with its own vision of
connectivity.
Muhammad Amir Rana 29 Jan 2017
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn January 29th, 2017

Pak-US: up, down or around?
SINCE Donald Trump’s election, many in Islamabad have hoped that the tensions and friction in
Pakistan-US relations experienced with the Obama administration could be avoided under
Trump. This hope was kindled by the effusive call between Trump and Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif.
The policies of the new US administration towards Pakistan are so far unknown. Some of
Trump’s campaign remarks about Pakistan were uncomplimentary; others were neutral; most
were ill-informed. Given the myriad domestic and external issues that have consumed the
fledgling administration, and the accompanying policy and personnel turmoil in Washington,
formulation of policies towards Pakistan, or India, has yet to be seriously addressed.
Pakistan-US ties under Trump could go up, down or come around to past paradigms.
Pakistan’s new ambassador in Washington got off to a good start in his first remarks to the
press, highlighting the common interest in economic and counterterrorism cooperation.
Islamabad has been wise not to push its views on controversial issues publicly, given the US
president’s penchant for doubling down on his positions once expressed.
The policies of the new US administration towards Pakistan are so far unknown.
The early indications of US positions have emanated mostly from US generals, who appear to
be the only ones able to convince the new president to adjust ill-considered campaign
pronouncements.
Clearly, the Pentagon continues to view relations with Pakistan through the Afghan prism. In
testimony to the US Senate last month, Gen Nicholson, the US commander in Afghanistan,
while asking for additional troops, proposed a “holistic” review of US relations with Pakistan but
coloured his call by repeating the old mantra about the “Haqqani network” and Taliban “safe
havens” in Pakistan. But he also made references to Iran’s alleged help to the Taliban and
Russia’s new relations with them as added explanations for the military impasse.
The tone and content of more recent appearances by US generals in the Senate have been
more positive. Gen Vogel, the head of the US Central Command, acknowledged the value and
the need for continued counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan and omitted the negative
references to “safe havens”. A State Department report also acknowledged the need for
continued counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan.
This may reflect an evolution in the ‘ground situation’, including the fragility of the security
environment in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s angry response to the recent spate of TTP and IS
terrorist attacks in Pakistan, the growing role of Iran and Russia in Afghanistan and some revival
of Pakistan-US border cooperation.
A positive relationship with the Pentagon and the State Department is a necessary but
insufficient condition for improved ties. Pakistan’s adversaries, led and fuelled by the Indian

lobby, continue to work assiduously through US think tanks, the US Congress and the media to
prevent the restoration of good relations between Washington and Islamabad.
A recent panel report issued by the Hudson Institute and the Heritage Foundation, two right-
wing US think tanks, took hostility to new levels. The panel — co-chaired by Husain Haqqani,
Pakistan’s former ambassador to the US — calls on Pakistan to: eliminate its alleged support
and safe havens for the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis; shut down the outlawed pro-
Kashmiri Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammad, prosecute their leaders and stop supporting
the insurgency in (India-held) Kashmir; and accept restraints on its nuclear and missile
programmes.
The report places responsibility for compliance on the Pakistan Army and, in case of non-
compliance, proposes a ban on US military sales and assistance to Pakistan, termination of the
counterterrorism Coalition Support Funds and, eventually, Pakistan’s designation as a ‘state
sponsor of terrorism’. Some panel members advocated intensified drone strikes and even direct
US military action against insurgents on Pakistan territory.
There is no mention in the report of the Indian sponsored terrorist attacks against Pakistan or
India’s brutal suppression of the Kashmiris. It advocates acceptance of Indian rule over Kashmir,
blames only Pakistan for the violence there and urges the US not to play a mediatory role
between Pakistan and India. It does not require any nuclear or missile restraint from India.
Hopefully, the actual policy of the Trump administration will reflect greater balance and
objectivity. But this report illustrates the line of attack of Pakistan’s adversaries, and the
daunting task that confronts its diplomacy in Washington.
Islamabad must work assiduously to revive a working relationship with the US military, explain
its policies at the State Department, secure continuous access to the White House, lobby with
friends and foes on the Hill, turn around opinion in thinks tanks and academia, and counter the
media campaign financed by the Indian lobby.
Pakistan will need to evolve carefully considered positions on Afghanistan, counterterrorism,
and nuclear and security issues that can overcome tensions with the US without compromising
Pakistan’s strategic interests. Any ‘deal’ with the US, especially with the Trump administration,
must be the result of ‘give and take’, not unilateral concessions.
On Afghanistan, there is convergence on fighting IS, Al Qaeda and their associates. The TTP is
now close to, if not part of, either IS or Al Qaeda. The Afghan Taliban’s position is more
complex. While their links to these global terror groups need to be eliminated, there is also a
general consensus that peace will not return to Afghanistan without some accommodation
between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul. Absent such a settlement, war in Afghanistan, and the
foreign military presence there, will be never-ending.
On nuclear and security issues, the Pakistani and US positions can be reconciled provided
Washington adopts an even-handed stance regarding Pakistan’s needs for credible deterrence
against a larger, belligerent and militarised India. If a future Pakistan-India conflict is to be
avoided, some modality will have to be found to address the Kashmir dispute and end Indian
repression. The Kashmiris have not been crushed in 70 years. They will continue to resist Indian
rule, which India will inevitably blame on Pakistan, igniting serial crises in South Asia.
Pakistan will find it difficult to achieve an equitable ‘deal’ with the US if the impression gains
currency that there is a division between its civil and military leadership. Such mischief,

perpetrated over the last decade by some self-serving operators, has damaged Pakistan’s
security and national interest.
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Published in Dawn, March 19th, 2017
Rising dragon, wounded eagle
WHEN China’s former vice premier, Qian Qichen, was asked 20 years ago about the future of
Sino-US relations, he reportedly responded: “They *Sino-US relations] will never be as good as
they should be; and never be as bad as they can be.” This prognosis holds true today for the
world’s “most important bilateral relationship”.
The largest and second-largest economies are now deeply intertwined and interdependent
through trade, supply chains and finance. But the fortunes of the Chinese dragon have been
rising; the power of the American eagle has been dented by long wars and economic profligacy.
The Greek historian, Thucydides, postulated that when an established power faces a rising one,
a clash is almost inevitable.
In its final years, the Obama administration seemed to be rushing towards the Thucydides Trap.
Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ consisted of: an effort to build a string of US alliances around China’s
periphery — from Japan to India; the deployment of two-thirds of US naval power to the
Pacific; a challenge to China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea; and China’s exclusion
from the Trans Pacific (trade) Partnership.
Prospects for Sino-US relations worsened with Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric against China
and threats to slap punitive tariffs on its exports and declare it a “currency manipulator”. In
justifying his unprecedented call with Taiwan’s leader, Trump threatened to discard the One
China policy unless China agreed to trade concessions. Tensions were further heightened when
the incoming US secretary of state asserted that the US could deny China access to its claims in
the South China Sea.
The fortunes of the Chinese dragon have been rising; the power of the American eagle has
been dented.
Since then, the Trump administration has walked back, slowly, from its most extreme positions.
US Defence Secretary Mattis assured that the South China Sea disputes would have to be
resolved through negotiations. In a carefully choreographed call with the Chinese president,
Trump affirmed continued US adherence to the One China policy.
The recent Trump-Xi summit in Mar-a-Lago was expected to determine the direction of US-
China relations. Although the summit was overshadowed by the US missile strikes against Syria,
there was no acrimony, and agreement was reached on a high-level security dialogue and a
100-day plan to address trade.
However, uncertainty persists due to Trump’s unpredictability. He will not declare China a
“currency manipulator”. But Trump has now linked the trade talks to China’s help on North
Korea.

In his tweets, President Trump has repeatedly urged China to resolve the threat from North
Korea “or the US will”. The US deployment of a US carrier group towards the Korean Peninsula
has escalated tensions. But the US is unlikely to conduct a pre-emptive or punitive strike against
North Korea (à la Syria) given Pyongyang’s capacity for a devastating response. And, the
‘window’ for such a strike is likely to close shortly if, as expected, the left-wing candidate wins
the South Korean presidency and rules out the use of force.
China shares the US aim of denuclearising North Korea, and is deeply angered by Kim Jong-un’s
provocative nuclear and missile tests and indifference to China’s wider interests. China is likely
to support intensified Security Council sanctions against North Korea, including an embargo on
oil sales, if it continues its tests. Yet, China is unlikely to intensify pressure to the extent of
triggering the collapse of the North Korean economy or the Pyongyang regime. This could lead
to war, massive refugee flows into China and possible absorption of North Korea by the South,
bringing US troops to China’s border.
Under the circumstances, the best option may be a resumption of the five plus one (US, China,
Russia, Japan and South Korea plus North Korea) dialogue; a de facto ‘acceptance’ of North
Korea’s nuclear capabilities; and a freeze on its nuclear and missile development in exchange
for economic aid and assurances of regime survival. Even this outcome will be difficult to
negotiate.
Given the Korean crisis, it is fortunate that, at least so far, the US has not revived the
provocative challenge to China in the South China Sea. Absent US intervention, China will
probably display flexibility and offer economic cooperation to its Southeast Asian neighbours to
resolve maritime disputes. The peaceful resolution of the South China Sea disputes would
remove a major source of potential Sino-US friction and confrontation.
Apart from Korea, trade is the other headline issue for Trump in dealing with China. For its part,
Beijing wants a more balanced trade relationship with the US, and a reduction of the $300
billion bilateral trade surplus, through trade expansion rather than restriction. To this end, it
appears willing to facilitate US agricultural, services and other exports and to stimulate
domestic demand in China. But it will also urge the US to lift the wide-ranging restrictions on
the sale of advanced technological goods and services to China as one way of correcting the
trade imbalance.
Xi’s economic trump card may be an offer of Chinese participation in Trump’s plan to restore
and modernise America’s aging infrastructure. China has the finance, expertise and recent
experience to make a significant contribution. If Trump’s plans for tax breaks are stalled, he
may welcome China’s contribution.
Such cooperation on infrastructure may open the door to US participation in China’s path-
breaking One Belt, One Road initiative which its media has dubbed as ‘Globalisation 2.0’. China
has invited US participation in the project. It could be extremely lucrative for US corporations
and industry.
A first step in this direction may be active US participation in the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor endeavour. The Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are already financing
some CPEC-related projects in Pakistan. American companies are also involved as equipment
suppliers for power plants and financial, technical and legal consultants in various projects.

Ever since it arranged Henry Kissinger’s clandestine trip to China in 1971, Pakistan has had a
significant stake in the preservation of positive Sino-US relations. Today, if a great power
consensus can be achieved on a strategy for stability in Afghanistan and counterterrorism,
Pakistan can become the geographical locus for economic and strategic cooperation between
the world’s two primary powers.
Published in Dawn, April 16th, 2017
Controversy trailing him, Trump heads for Israeli-Palestinian talks
JERUSALEM: US President Donald Trump heads for Israel and the Palestinian territories on
Monday as part of his first trip abroad since taking office, hoping to renew peace efforts but
with controversy trailing him.
The unpredictable president arrives having already upturned expectations when it comes to the
decades-old Middle East conflict, giving Palestinians more hope than they may have anticipated
and disappointing right-wing Israelis who heralded his election.
He has spoken of reaching “the toughest deal to make”, one that has long bedevilled US
presidents, vowing “we will get it done”.
But he is also contending with a raft of problems back home, including a special counsel
investigating whether his associates colluded with Russia.
Any leader would face an enormous challenge in seeking to bring the Israelis and Palestinians
together for meaningful talks, and Trump’s inexperience and domestic political struggles will
only add to it.
Beyond that, Trump has faced criticism from Israelis in recent days related to the White House’s
approach to the ultra-sensitive status of Jerusalem.
Concerns have also been raised over Trump’s sharing of intelligence with Russia said to have
originally come from Israel.
“I think the trip’s in a lot of jeopardy being able to be productive because of all the chaos and
controversy that’s going on in Washington,” Dan Shapiro, US ambassador to Israel under Barack
Obama and now a senior fellow at Tel Aviv’s Institute for National Security Studies think tank,
told AFP.
‘Palestinians are cautious’
Trump arrives in Israel on Monday afternoon following his visit to Saudi Arabia and will hold
talks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later in the day in Jerusalem.
He is expected to become the first sitting US president to visit the Western Wall, the holiest site
where Jews can pray and located in east Jerusalem, which Israel occupied in 1967 and later
annexed.

Israel sees all of Jerusalem as its undivided capital, while the Palestinians view east Jerusalem as
the capital of their future state.
On Tuesday, he visits Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank for talks with Palestinian President
Mahmud Abbas.
After a visit later Tuesday to the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem, he is due to
give a speech at the Israel Museum.
Trump has sent mixed signals about how he will approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
He cast uncertainty over years of international efforts to foster a two-state solution when he
met Netanyahu at the White House in February.
At that meeting, he said he would support a single state if it led to peace, delighting Israeli
right-wingers who want to see their country annex most of the West Bank.
At the same time, he urged Israel to hold back on settlement building in the West Bank, a long-
standing concern of Palestinians and much of the world.
He also held face-to-face talks in Washington with Abbas earlier this month, confidently
predicting that a peace agreement was within grasp.
Trump advocated during his campaign breaking with decades of precedent and moving the
American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a prospect deeply alarming to Palestinians.
He has since backed away, saying the move was still being looked at.
Trump’s seeming openness to at least some of Abbas’s concerns has given Palestinians more
reason for hope than many may have expected, but still reason to remain wary, some analysts
say.
“The Palestinians are cautious since Trump’s position is not clear and seems to be still
developing,” said Palestinian political scientist Ghassan Khatib. “Trump’s early days led to
worry, so now with the help of other Arab countries they want to balance Trump’s position on
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”
‘Blame game’
On the Israeli side, Netanyahu heads what is seen as the most right-wing government in the
country’s history, and members of his coalition were elated with Trump’s election.
Some even called for an end to the idea of Palestinian state.
Trump’s actions since have left them disappointed, with the embassy remaining in Tel Aviv — at
least for now — and the White House seeks to restart peace efforts.
Even if Trump can see beyond his domestic political troubles and focus on moving peace efforts
forward, he will have to overcome the constraints of both Netanyahu and Abbas.
The 82-year-old Palestinian leader has grown unpopular, while Netanyahu will have difficulty
making significant concessions that his right-wing base will accept, many analysts say.
“Neither side wants to be in the position of saying no to him, and that does give him some
leverage,” said Shapiro. “But it’s still an uphill effort for an administration that is still new to
these issues, relatively inexperienced and with parties who are very well-practised in
positioning for the blame game rather than trying to work toward a common goal.”—AFP
Published in Dawn, May 22nd, 2017

Axis of good and evil
ON his first foreign foray, President Donald Trump, apart from asking the 50-odd Muslim
leaders assembled in Riyadh to act against “Islamist terrorism”, proposed a new alliance
between the US, Arab-Muslim states and Israel to oppose Iran’s hegemonic expansion and
support for ‘terrorism’, while simultaneously promising a peace agreement between Israel and
the Palestinians.
In his Riyadh speech, Trump called this a struggle between “good and evil”. Unfortunately, the
proposed coalition would combine many members who are ‘good’ with some who are ‘evil’.
Trump’s new plan reflects a radical turnaround from his expressed hostility to Islam and
condemnation of Saudi Arabia and “radical Islamic terrorism” during the presidential campaign.
However, despite the fanfare in Riyadh and Jerusalem, there are good reasons to be sceptical
about this plan’s success.
Trump’s intensified opposition to Iran is in itself not surprising. Two main sources of his support
base — the Republican right and Israel — were strongly opposed to Barack Obama’s
engagement with Iran. They wanted the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear programme
rather than the agreement negotiated to ensure that Iran does not have the capability to
develop nuclear weapons for at least a decade.
Obama’s apparent assumption was that in the wake of the nuclear bargain, Iran would use its
considerable influence to help in stabilising Iraq and Syria and the region. For its part, Iran
expected the US, under Obama’s Democratic successor (Hillary Clinton), not only to legally
abrogate the nuclear sanctions but also work to eliminate the unilateral US sanctions imposed
on Tehran in the context of terrorism and missile testing. Trump’s victory upended these
assumptions.
Under Trump, Iran is doubtful that the nuclear sanctions will be cancelled by the US Congress
and rightly fears that other US sanctions may be intensified, as threatened by Trump and his
advisers and members of the US Congress. Consequently, while continuing to fight the militant
Islamic State (IS) group and Al Qaeda in the region, Tehran has held back its cooperation with
the US and enhanced its military role in all of the region’s conflicts.
The Muslim states at the Riyadh summit should review the pros and cons of joining the anti-Iran
coalition.

While Trump has not renounced the nuclear deal, his administration is embarked on finding
ways to intensify pressure on Iran. The aim, at the minimum, is to secure a halt to Iran’s missile
testing, a more accommodative stance on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and termination of support
to Hezbollah and Hamas. To challenge Iran, Washington has now aligned itself completely with
Israel and Saudi Arabia.
For Riyadh, the return of its prodigal patron is heaven-sent. Angered by Obama’s ‘betrayal’, and
fearful of Iran’s rising power, Saudi Arabia had hastily announced the formation of a 41-nation
‘Islamic alliance’ last year. Given Iran’s explicit exclusion, the response to the ‘alliance’ was
lukewarm from most Muslim countries. The most notable development was the appointment
of Pakistan’s respected ex-army chief to head the military alliance.
With the revival of the traditional US-Saudi alliance, as illustrated in the $110 billion in arms
deals and $350bn in business contracts signed during Trump’s trip, the Saudis have less need
now for the ‘Islamic Alliance’ against Iran although it would be a useful appendage to the
renewed partnership with the US.
It is safe to presume that tensions in the Levant and the Gulf are likely to escalate in the wake
of the new “co-relation of forces” unleashed during Trump’s trip. However, it will not be easy,
even for the powerful coalition that is being formed, to reverse Iran’s dominant position in the
region.
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government in Baghdad depends on the Iranian-trained Shia
militias to do most of the fighting against IS, and restrain the Sunni tribes and Kurdish
ambitions. Similarly, Syria’s Assad could not survive without the Iranian Revolutionary Guards
and Shia militias.
In Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthis have proved resilient. Hezbollah, despite its preoccupation
with fighting for Assad, possesses the missile capabilities to do serious damage to Israel from
southern Lebanon and Syria. Iran also retains influence with Hamas, the only credible
Palestinian resistance to Israel.
Finally, Iran’s capacity for retaliation under pressure cannot be underestimated. It can, among
other things: foment trouble in the Gulf, especially Bahrain, destabilise Afghanistan and
provoke sectarian strife in Pakistan.
Trump himself affirmed in Jerusalem that Arab cooperation in an anti-Iran coalition will be
available only if a political settlement can be achieved between Israel and the Palestinians. The
2002 Saudi peace plan was mentioned as a basis for a settlement. This appears highly unlikely,
given Israel’s virtual foreclosure of a two-state solution. Trump has raised expectations which
are unlikely to be fulfilled.
Those Arab and Muslim states which were invited to Riyadh for the Arab Islamic American
summit would do well to carefully review the pros and cons of joining the anti-Iran coalition.
As has been noted critically in the Pakistani press, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not able to
speak at the Riyadh summit, nor to meet President Trump, while the leaders of lesser countries
were accorded that privilege. This may represent a deliberate snub, probably administered by
the Americans rather than the Saudis, or merely an organisational mishap. In any case, this
diplomatic snub or snafu may be a blessing in disguise since it provides Pakistan with even
greater justification to review its position on the anti-Iran coalition.

Since the early days, Pakistan has taken the consistent position that it will not take sides or
participate in conflicts between Muslim states. Thus, it adopted a neutral stance during the
Iran-Iraq war and participated in a six-nation Islamic heads of state committee to end the war.
Such neutrality did not detract from Pakistan’s traditional commitment to the security of Saudi
Arabia and the holy places.
This practised paradigm provides a sound guide for Pakistan’s policy in the current context.
Of course, Pakistan’s neutrality should be reciprocated by Iran in the context of Pakistan’s
challenges with Afghanistan and India.
Finally, Pakistan should expect to be pressed by the US to fall in line with its regional strategy
not only in the Gulf but especially in Afghanistan and South Asia. This is another reason for
Pakistan to determine its policies after due consideration of the entire spectrum of its strategic
interests.
Published in Dawn, May 28th, 2017
Kashmir: hard choices only
I RECENTLY received an extraordinary email from a troubled young Kashmiri in Srinagar. Days
before the Indian authorities turned off the internet, Saif (not his real name) had watched on
YouTube the 45-minute video documentary Crossing the Lines — Kashmir, Pakistan, India that I
had helped make in 2004 and mostly agreed with its non-partisan narrative. A nationalist boy
turned stone thrower, Saif is outraged by the brutality of Indian occupation. He is fortunate, he
says. His 14-year-old second cousin lost his left eye to pellets.
Read: What pellet guns have done to protesters in Kashmir
Saif continues to fight India but is worried. Protesters of his father’s generation were largely
nationalist, but today’s are a mixed bunch. IS and Pakistani flags are often unfurled after Friday
prayers, azadi demonstrations resound with calls for an Islamic state in Kashmir, and Nasim
Hijazi’s cartoon history of Muslim rule in India Aur Talwar Toot Gayee is serialised by local Urdu
papers. Significantly, Burhan Wani was laid in the grave by a crowd of thousands, wrapped in a
Pakistani flag, and celebrated as a martyr rather than Kashmiri freedom fighter.
Why this change? The present government — Narendra Modi’s — surely stands guilty. By
reducing space for democratic discourse, it promotes radicalisation. Unlike Vajpayee’s
accommodative politics, India offers little beyond the iron fist and draconian laws such as
AFSPA. The BJP-PDP alliance — shaky to start with — is almost over as each blames the other
for the two per cent voter turnout in last month’s by-elections. Hindutva’s religiosity is
displacing Nehru’s secularism all across India, and Indian democracy is yielding to Hindu
majoritarian rule.
Kashmiri nationalists must realise the grave dangers of giving more space to religious
extremists.
But blaming Modi is half an explanation, perhaps even less. In Palestine, after decades of
struggle against Israeli occupation, the secular PLO lost out to the religious radicalism of Hamas.
In Arab countries, young Muslims dream of fighting infidels and dying as martyrs. In Pakistan,

the celebrated army operations Raddul Fasaad and Zarb-i-Azb target armed militants fighting
for a Sharia state. Last week, the Higher Education Commission showed its concern by
convening a meeting of 60 university vice chancellors in Islamabad on rising extremism in
Pakistani campuses.
Extremism has further complicated an already complicated Kashmir situation. What now? For
long, Kashmiris, Pakistanis, and Indians have wagged fingers at the other for the 100,000 lives
lost over three decades. Where lies the future? Does any solution exist?
Read: Diary of a Kashmir curfew
A short retreat into mathematics: some equations indeed have solutions even if they need
much effort. But other equations can logically be shown to have no solution – nothing will ever
work for them. There is still a third type: that where solutions are possible but only under very
specific conditions.
Kashmir is not of the first category. Everything has been tried. Delhi and Islamabad have
created clients among the Valley’s leaders and political parties, and subversion is a widely used
instrument. But they too have turned out to be useless. Elections and inducements have also
failed to produce a decisive outcome, as have three Pakistan-India wars. A fourth war would
likely be nuclear.
All parties stand guilty. India, under various Congress governments, had once projected itself as
a secularist democracy distinct from an Islamic, military-dominated Pakistan. It appeared for
that reason to be preferable, but in practice its unconscionable manipulation of Kashmiri
politics led to the 1989 popular uprising, sparking an insurgency lasting into the early 2000s.
When it ended 90,000 civilians, militants, police, and soldiers had been killed. Remembered by
Kashmiri Muslims for his role in the 1990 Gawkadal bridge massacre, Governor Jagmohan
received the Padma Vibhushan last year.
Pakistan tried to translate India’s losses into its gains but failed. It soon hijacked the indigenous
uprising but the excesses committed by Pakistan-based mujahideen eclipsed those of Indian
security forces. The massacres of Kashmiri Pandits, targeting of civilians accused of
collaborating with India, destruction of cinema houses and liquor shops, forcing of women into
the veil, and revival of Shia-Sunni disputes, severely undermined the legitimacy of the Kashmiri
freedom movement.
Pakistan’s ‘bleed India with a thousand cuts’ policy is in a shambles today and jihad is an ugly
word in the world’s political lexicon. Say what you will about ‘Dawn Leaks’, but Pakistani
diplomats who represent Pakistan’s position in the world’s capitals know the world doesn’t care
about Kashmir. How else to explain Prime Minister Modi receiving Saudi Arabia’s highest
civilian award from King Salman bin Abdul Aziz?
If Kashmir is ever to have a solution — ie belong to the third type of math problem — then all
three contenders will need to rethink their present positions.
Thoughtful Indians must understand that cooling Kashmir lies in India’s hands, not Pakistan’s.
By formally acknowledging Kashmir as a problem that needs a political solution, using humane
methods of crowd control, and releasing political prisoners from Kashmiri jails, India could
move sensibly towards a lessening of internal tensions. Surely, if India considers Kashmiris to be
its citizens then it must treat them as such, not as traitors deserving bullets. Else it should hand
Kashmir over to Kashmiris — or Pakistan.

Thoughtful Pakistanis must realise that their country’s Kashmir-first policy has brought nothing
but misery all around. Using proxies has proven disastrous. A partial realisation has led to
detaining of LeT and JeM leaders, but Pakistan’s army must crack down upon all Kashmir-
oriented militant groups that still have a presence on Pakistani soil. Such groups are a menace
to Pakistan’s society and armed forces, apart from taking legitimacy away from those fighting
Indian rule.
Thoughtful Kashmiri nationalists — like Saif — must recognise the grave dangers of giving more
space to religious extremists. Their struggle should be for some form of pluralistic entity –
whether independent or under nominal Indian or Pakistani control. That entity must assure
personal and religious freedoms. An ISIS type state with its cruel practices makes mockery of
the very idea of azadi and would pave the way for Kashmir’s descent into hell.
Such rethinking would clear the road to peace through negotiations which, though narrowed,
still remains open. Every conflict in history, no matter how bitter, has ultimately been resolved.
In Kashmir’s case whether this happens peacefully, or after some apocalypse, cannot be
predicted.
The author teaches mathematics and physics in Lahore and Islamabad.
End of enlightenment?
I WAS invited to lecture on ‘Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness in the Age of Global
Terrorism’ at Missouri State University. Missouri is Trump country — he had a 70 per cent
majority there. Some essential points are excerpted below.
The first seven words of the title belong to the 1776 Declaration of Independence from Britain:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
Pursuit of Happiness.”
America’s founding fathers derived these ideas of equalitarianism from Europe’s then-bubbling
cauldron of the European Enlightenment. Thomas Jefferson’s phrase “all men are created
equal” is perhaps one of the best-known and profound sentences in the English language.
But truths once self-evident to Americans are no more evident to very many today. They
elected a president who sees differences between men as more important than their equality.
Had America’s judiciary not struck down his executive order banning Muslims from setting foot
on America’s soil, I could not have delivered the lecture. Europe — from where the
Enlightenment sprang — is witnessing the emergence of exclusionists like Marie Le Pen and
Geert Wilders. This phenomenon begs an understanding.
Some blame this on terrorist acts perpetrated by certain Muslims. Indeed one must not dismiss
the importance of fear. Terrorism terrifies. Crazed fanatics piloting airliners into skyscrapers or
driving trucks into holiday crowds scare everyone out of their wits. But how seriously should
one take this threat, and where did these monsters come from?
Truthfully, we all stand guilty. All scriptures contain a radical strain but whether or not that
tendency gets developed and amplified depends on political circumstances. A significant part of
today’s organised terrorist groups — though by no means all — originate from the actions of

the US and its allies. There would be no Taliban or Al Qaeda but for Ronald Reagan’s obsession
with the ‘Evil Empire’, and no IS but for George W. Bush’s criminal invasion of Iraq.
Terrorism alone does not explain why the US is drifting away from its wonderful
enlightenment ideals.
Even so, terrorists — unless they somehow seize nuclear weapons — are not an existential
threat to humanity. The number of victims of terrorism is small compared to wars, traffic
accidents, killings by deranged individuals, etc. Terrorism alone does not explain why the US is
drifting away from its wonderful Enlightenment ideals.
Among the real reasons is growing economic inequality. To profess equality of humans is one
thing, to enforce and protect this principle is yet another. When differences of wealth and
power become astronomically large, grand assertions lose meaning.
Example: A popular — but absurd — Urdu couplet tells of Mahmood (sultan) and Ayyaz (slave)
magically becoming equals as they pray side by side. But could King Salman al-Saud — just back
after traveling to Indonesia with 505 tons of expensive luggage — and a Javanese Muslim
peasant become equals even if that poor chap somehow got within praying distance alongside
the monarch?
The US is faced with an equally absurd situation. Extreme income inequality is imperiling its
future, and a decent life for citizens is ever harder to achieve. American CEOs draw seven-digit
salaries, workers just five-digit ones. University education is increasingly restricted to richer
sections of society. Forty-eight years ago in Boston I could do a weekly average of 20 hours of
menial labour and cover nearly half of my university education. Today the same number of
hours would not pay for even an eighth.
The upsurge of angry populism is actually fuelled not by terrorism but by America’s losing out in
the global race. This is the conclusion reached by a global investment firm (GMO) which
recently carried out an extensive data-driven study of this phenomenon. The report details how
neoliberal economic policies are leading the US towards disaster.
Arising in the 1970s, neoliberalism has four key economic signatures: the abandonment of full
employment as a desirable policy goal and its replacement with inflation targeting; an increase
in the globalisation of the flows of people, capital, and trade; a focus at a firm level on
shareholder value maximisation rather than reinvestment and growth; and the pursuit of
flexible labour markets and the disruption of trade unions and workers organisations.
The upshot: the US has increasingly become a winner-take-all society. According to Forbes, the
combined net worth of the 2016 class of the 400 richest Americans is $2.4 trillion, up from $2tr
in 2013. The New York Times reported that the richest 1pc in the United States now own more
wealth than the bottom 90pc. An angry populace is vulnerable to hate-spouting demagogues
who blame everyone — Chinese, Mexicans, and Muslims.
This is only going to get worse because the days of American hegemony are gone, as is its
absolute dominance of the world’s economy. When crises threaten, people everywhere tend to
retreat into their comfort zones. Resurgent tribalism, aggressive nationalism, and religious
fundamentalism become more attractive. But these can only provide solace, not solutions.
It would be tragic if the US were to fail its own constitution. Many countries are not even
formally committed to accepting the equality of their citizens, and many more sharply
discriminate between them even while professing not to. Pakistan’s constitution explicitly

distinguishes between Muslim and non-Muslim, Iran officially espouses vilayat-i-faqih

(guardianship of Islamic jurists), Saudi Arabia prohibits all places of worship on its soil except
mosques. Although Israel lacks a constitution because of a conflict between its religious and
secular forces, legally, as well as in practice, it privileges Jews over non-Jews. And India, which
was once committed to secularism, is now turning into a state for Hindus run by Hindus.
How can the future of humanity be protected against this return to primitivism? No magical
force drives history; there is only human agency. We must therefore educate ourselves into
rising above accidents of birth, think critically, examine facts before forming opinions, keep
widening the scope of our knowledge and, above all, act compassionately. To fight for universal
humanism, world citizenship, and for the Enlightenment spirit is the only option for a world
where boundaries are increasingly irrelevant.
The writer teaches physics in Lahore and Islamabad.
Water security
“WATER is not only for life … water is life.” This quote by the UN secretary general “reflects the
critical importance of water as a need that connects all aspects of human life. People’s well-
being and their economic development are profoundly linked to” water availability and
usability. Too little water at a time when it is needed most can result in droughts and food
insecurity. Conversely, too much water — in the form of floods or storms — can devastate an
entire population. Contaminated water, whether from human or industrial sources, claims the
lives of children and adults alike, affects the health of communities worldwide and has far-
reaching consequences.
The SDGs place emphasis on ensuring sustainable water availability and management. This
includes achieving universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water,
sanitation and hygiene for all, and ending open defecation with a particular emphasis on
women and girls. But while that is crucial, especially in Pakistan, water’s place in the SDGs goes
well beyond access. It must also account for critical issues such as integrated water resources
management, the efficiency of use, water quality, trans-boundary cooperation, and issues
related to water ecosystems and water disasters.
A holistic water policy is needed.
Problems associated with water are perhaps amongst the most important in Pakistan. The
country’s water profile has changed drastically in that it went from being a water-abundant
country to a water-stressed country. Per capita water availability during the period 1990–2015
fell from 2,172 to 1,306 cubic metres per inhabitant. Pakistan extracts almost 75 per cent of its
“freshwater annually, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on renewable water resources.
Despite remarkable improvements in the proportion of the population using improved water

sources and improved sanitation facilities”, over 27 million Pakistanis still do not have access to
safe water and almost 53m do not have access to adequate sanitation facilities.Approximately
39,000 children under the age of five die every year from diarrhoea caused by unsafe water and
poor sanitation.
The increasing demand for and erratic supply of water in Pakistan is resulting in severe
shortages. Factors such as population growth, rapid urbanisation, water-intensive farming
practices and industrialisation are all playing a role in increasing the country’s demand for
water. The supply side is simultaneously affected by climate change, which, in turn, has made
rainfall more erratic and led to both floods and droughts. Excessive groundwater pumping has
raised major sustainability concerns. Poor water infrastructure, including limited storage
capacity and inadequate canal lining, compounds water availability issues. Another factor of
concern is contaminated agricultural run-off, untreated industrial effluent, and household
waste that makes its way into water bodies and canals.
There were several attempts at the federal and provincial level to delineate the government’s
commitment to combating water issues. The national climate change policy, for example, listed
appropriate action plans for enhancing water storage and infrastructure. It spoke in detail of
better water-resource management, enhancing institutional capacities and creating awareness
about water issues. However, more is needed in terms of implementation. Pakistan has not
implemented any major water storage infrastructure projects since the commissioning of the
Mangla and Tarbela dams in the 1960s and 1970s, and water storage capacity has often
receded to less than 30 days whereas the minimum requirement is 120 days. Successful
initiatives do exist, such as the Clean Drinking Water for All project launched in Punjab, which
provided clean drinking water through new water filtration plants. However, major initiatives
are still limited.
Addressing issues of demand and supply requires interventions at both the individual and state
level. Households and industries alike need to use water more efficiently. It is imperative that
this apply to the agricultural sector as well. Examples would include strict regulations on the
plantation of water-intensive crops and on flood irrigation.
Here public education campaigns focusing on enhancing water usage awareness will help. At
the broader level, an integrated water management system that promises efficient water
distribution to all sub-sectors, is needed. Such an initiative must be formally entrenched and
supported by an effective institutional and legal system.
While water issues have been discussed at the policy level, for example, in the national climate
change policy and national drinking water policy, a more holistic national water policy is
required. This would include measures to promote efficient use through water pricing,
increasing water storage infrastructure, enforcing strict water quality management systems to
curb water pollution, controlling population growth and adopting sustainable urbanisation
patterns. Immediate attention to these proposals will help ensure that Pakistanis have
adequate water.
The writer is country director, UNDP Pakistan.

POLITICS: CAN MODI MUZZLE KASHMIR?
If voter turnouts are the midwives of a vibrant democracy, consider this: on April 7, 2017, only
about seven percent voters in Srinagar turned up for voting in by-polls on a Lok Sabha seat. The
elections were marred by violence: Indian media outlet NDTV reported nearly 200 instances of
violence, including incidents of stone-throwing and petrol bomb attacks. One polling booth was
torched by protestors and electronic voting machines were damaged to stop polling. As law
enforcement responded in kind, eight people were killed while about 100 security personnel
were injured. The seven percent turnout was the lowest in 30 years.
The Indian election commission subsequently ordered a re-poll, particularly in the 38 polling
stations of Budgam district of Srinagar which were the worst-hit during the first round of by-
polls. The voter turnout fell further: from seven percent, the re-polls returned a turnout of
about two percent.
While the India-held valley of Kashmir is in a deep state of violence for the last several years,
the current crisis in Kashmir signifies a democratic impasse. This has been brought on by the
Narendra Modi regime attempting to end the special status given to India-held Jammu &
Kashmir (IHK) as envisaged in Article 370 of the Indian constitution and fully absorb it into the
Indian Union.
India-held Jammu and Kashmir enjoys special status in the Indian constitution but the BJP’s
push to absorb it into the Indian Union has larger ramifications
The situation deteriorated after the killing of a Kashmiri youngster Burhan Wani, last July.
Kashmiri assertions against Indian military control and atrocities are reflected in frequent
protest marches particularly by the school and college female students in Srinagar. But the
Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) road to integrating Kashmir into the union is fraught with various
stumbling blocks. The Srinagar seat had, in fact, fellen vacant after a leader from the ruling
People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Tariq Hameed Karra, resigned in the aftermath of protests
following the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen activist Burhan Wani.
Former IHK chief minister and National Conference (NC) leader Dr Farooq Abdullah accused the
PDP of having betrayed the will of Kashmiris since the PDP had pledged to keep the BJP out of
Kashmir. Abdullah eventually won the violence-marred polls.
Recently, in an interview given to India Today, Farooq Abdullah made it clear that India should
wake up as it may lose Kashmir if it fails to control violence and mend fences with the youth
and those who are in revolt against New Delhi. Meanwhile, the Indian government informed its
Supreme Court that no talks will be held with separatists.
SIGNIFICANCE OF ARTICLE 370
Article 370 of the Indian constitution was formulated particularly for IHK. it provided special
autonomous status to people living under the Indian-controlled region. Enforced on January 26,
1950, Article 370 was termed an attempt by New Delhi to achieve two objectives: first, to
prevent the secession of Indian-controlled parts of IHK by providing special privileges in the
form of autonomy. And second, to ensure the secular nature of the Indian state. J&K is the only
Muslim-majority state in the Indian Union and is presented as a model of religious diversity and
unity of the Indian state.
An article titled “What is Article 370: three key points” which was published in the Times of
India on May 28, 2014, argues that as per Article 370, except for matters related to defence,
foreign affairs, finance and communications, the Indian parliament needs the state
government’s agreement to apply all other laws in IHK. This means, compared to other Indians,
the state’s residents live under a separate set of laws, including those related to citizenship,
ownership of property and fundamental rights. As a result of this provision, Indian citizens from
other states cannot purchase land or property in IHK.
But with the passage of time, the Indian state not only reneged from its pledge to hold a
plebiscite to determine whether the people of IHK want to join India or Pakistan, but also began
to curtail the so-called autonomy given to that former princely state under Article 370. For
instance, the positions of Sadr-i-Riasat (president) and prime minister were abolished and
deepening of the centre’s rule in IHK became a policy of the Indian state.
The two posts had been created under Article 370 to assure the identity of IHK but they were
replaced with those of governor and chief minister, respectively. As the years passed, the
original shape of Article 370 eroded as IHK came under the virtual occupation of the Indian
military with brutal acts of human rights violations, particularly against the Kashmiri Muslims
calling for “Azadi.”
It is quoted in M. Hidayatullah (ed.), Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 2 that “Gopalaswami
Ayyangar, while introducing article 306-A (now Article 370) in the Indian Constituent Assembly
on October 17, 1949, said that a distinction was made for Kashmir due to special conditions
prevailing in the region where a war had led to an agreed ceasefire in the year. According to
him, the Government of India had made certain commitments to the people of Kashmir, which
included an undertaking that an opportunity would be given to them to decide for themselves
whether they wished to remain with the Indian republic or leave it.”

Furthermore, “it was also agreed that the will of the people would be ascertained by means of
a plebiscite, provided peaceful and normal conditions were restored and impartiality of the
plebiscite could be guaranteed.”
Paradoxically, the special status given to IHK in the Indian Union is under a temporary provision
which was drafted in 1947 by Sheikh Abdullah who was appointed as prime minister of IHK by
Maharaja Hari Singh and the Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru. Nehru, with his Kashmiri
background, wanted to maintain the identity of IHK by providing it with a special status in the
Indian constitution, pending its final settlement. Sheikh Abdullah made it clear, however, that
IHK will not become an integral part of the Indian Union and would have full autonomy.
While the India-held valley of Kashmir is in a deep state of violence for the last several years,
the current crisis in Kashmir signifies a democratic impasse. This has been brought on by the
Narendra Modi regime attempting to end the special status given to India-held Kashmir (IHK)
as envisaged in Article 370 of the Indian constitution and fully absorb it into the Indian Union.
Ironically, Sheikh Abdullah, once an ardent supporter of Article 370, had by the early 1950s
developed differences with the Indian prime minister on the matter of granting maximum
autonomy to IHK which resulted in his removal from his office and arrest. In 1954, Article 35-A
was added to the Indian constitution which covered matters pertaining to employment,
immovable property and so forth.
TO UNDO OR NOT?
The Indian house is divided over whether to repeal or maintain Article 370.
The first school of thought wants to repeal it by abolishing the special status given to Jammu
and Kashmir and fully absorbing it into the Indian Union. This position is represented most
vociferously by the BJP.
During his election campaign more than two years ago, Narendra Modi made it clear that once
in power, the BJP will take all necessary measures to abrogate Article 370 from the Indian
constitution and annex IHK into the Indian Union. It was termed an irresponsible approach by
critics of the BJP with dangerous implications for the Indian Union. But the hardline BJP
leadership has maintained the stance.
According to the BJP’s spokesman Sambit Patra: “As far as the abrogation of Article 370 is
concerned, it continues to be part of the core ideology of the BJP, but right now we don’t have
enough numbers in the parliament to do away with it … but in future when we have the
required numbers we will work towards its removal.”
The second school of thought is against the repealing of the article as it considers the law to be
a guarantor of Indian secularism and one that maintains the identity of IHK.
History has proven that India has failed to honour its commitment made to the people of IHK
seven decades ago and tried to entrench its control over that territory by military means.
Repealing Article 370 is, however, an uphill task because the Indian parliament would have to
pass a bill to amend the constitution, containing a provision for the repeal of the article.

Indian writer S.P. Sathe in his article titled “Article 370: Constitutional Obligations and
Compulsions” in the April 28, 1990 issue of Economic and Political Weekly writes: “Such an
amendment will have to be passed by two-thirds of the members’ present and voting and
absolute majority of total membership in each house of parliament. Since an order under
Article 370 making the constitutional amendment under Article 368 ipso facto applicable to
Jammu and Kashmir cannot be issued except with the concurrence of the state government, no
unilateral action can be taken by the Centre in this regard.”
According to Sathe, “It is in India’s interest to retain Article 370 until the government of
Kashmir agrees to its repudiation. Article 370 should morally strengthen India’s claim over
Kashmir. Ultimately no one people can keep another people in subjection against their will. The
central government will have to win over the people of Kashmir and convince them that their
interests are safe in India and that they enjoy the fruits of democracy and autonomy within the
Indian federation. This is the real challenge before the Indian leadership and any talk of
abrogating Article 370 would further alienate the people of IHK from India.”
Given the history, the way forward is laden with more hurdles. The hard-line BJP and Hindu
nationalist mindset is firm on diluting the special status and identity of J&K by using tactics
ranging from establishing colonies in the valley for non-residents and Kashmiri Hindu pundits
who left the valley after the violence that took place in the 1990s, so as to transform the
demographic complexion to their advantage.
But they also have Muslim support. Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti’s government has
identified over 90 acres to construct 6,000 “transit homes” to resettle Kashmiri pundits. The
pundits’ families have been offered homes and jobs if they are willing to return and work in IHK
under a 500 crore-rupee drive of the Mufti government.
Secondly, Indian civil society, democratic institutions and technical complications in the way of
repealing Article 370 are sufficient to deter any move to undo the said article. The Modi regime
also knows that any attempt to repeal Article 370 will have far-reaching consequences which
may be detrimental to the Indian Union. Given the heterogeneous nature of the Kashmir
conflict, it will be an uphill task to seek a resolution of an issue without taking on board the
local stakeholders representing the five regions of IHK.
The BJP has been in power for more than two years but it has not taken any noticeable
initiative to repeal that article. This should provide a clue to the difficulties inherent in the
exercise. However, it would be wishful thinking to expect the current leadership of the BJP to
abandon its age-old dream to fully absorb J&K in the ambit of the Indian Union.
The writer is Meritorious Professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi.
Connect with him over email: amoonis@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, EOS, May 7th, 2017

Tracking extremism
THERE is apparently no direct link between the brutal lynching of Mashal Khan, the arrest of
Naureen Leghari, a convert to the so-called militant Islamic State (IS) group, and the surrender
of Jamaatul Ahrar (JuA) leader Ehsanullah Ehsan. Together, however, these incidents may
depict varying expressions of tendencies in extremism and terrorism.
Mashal Khan’s case was an expression of collective behaviour of extremism, which can be
invoked and exploited by interest groups for mala fide intentions. This can also be called the
‘criminal exploitation of extremism’, in which criminals take advantage of the masses’ religious
sentiments, knowing that the state and its institutions will hesitate to take action. These
attitudes are creating a conducive environment for ultra- and hyper-extremist groups to
operate in the vulnerable spaces that exist in every class and institution in Pakistan.
Naureen was not the first victim of the violent extremist tendencies in the country. She was
arrested in Lahore, while she was travelling to Syria for the nusra (support) of IS. Her case is
similar to that of the Muslim diaspora youth in the West, who are recruited in cyberspace with
their families having little idea. In Pakistan, radicalism is mainly a family phenomenon. The
process starts with a male member, and gradually, female members of the family transform.
Naureen’s inclination towards IS is a matter of concern, as her family was not aware of her

transformation. This is the first time evidence has been found that the Middle Eastern terrorist
group is targeting educated Pakistani youth. The potential for IS influence to spread,
particularly on campuses and amongst the upper-middle classes, has not been measured yet.
The overall socio-religious atmosphere and activities of radical groups on campus are alarming.
The problem is not confined to a few universities; this is a story of every campus.
People are becoming more sensitive about their religious and sectarian identity.
The contradictory statements given by Punjab’s Counterterrorism Department and the Inter-
Services Public Relations about Naureen’s travel to Syria reflect how the police handles such
sensitive cases and manipulates information. To get credit and to justify huge budgets,
counterterrorism departments manipulate information and exaggerate reports of the killing
and arrest of militants. Very little is known about the terrorist activities they were involved in.
The surrender of the JuA leader is big news, as the group was involved in major attacks during
the past few months. The JuA has denied the reports about his surrender and claims he was
arrested at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Whatever the case, this is an undeniable success.
What is to be seen now is how security institutions deal with the aftermath.
All these three incidents were reported within a week. The picture emerging from foreign and
Pakistani media warns of how extremism in society has reached a level that it can motivate a
mob to lynch anyone without proof. And while it is fine if a few terrorists surrender, it does not
indicate that the entire problem has been eliminated, as terrorist organisations such as IS still
have human resource. Naureen is an example. Some suspicious minds may go a step further
and see the surrender of the JuA spokesman as part of the process of converting the ‘bad’ into
the ‘good’, as happened in the case of the Punjabi Taliban leader, Asmatullah Muawiya. He was
found to have been involved in major terrorist attacks in the country but later detached himself
from the anti-Pakistan groups.
The state and the common Pakistani may not agree with the picture. Extremism changes
people’s perspectives. The social and religious imagination becomes narrow, if not abnormal.
One may argue that these are three separate incidents, and have nothing to do with each
other. One may bring statistical evidence to support the argument and point to the number of
terrorists that have been killed since the last attack in the country. The overall decrease in such
attacks may also be a good reason to claim success. Naureen’s case may be explained away as
one isolated incident, as IS is not present in Pakistan. As far as Mashal Khan is concerned, the
violence that led to his murder may be ‘justified’ as a sudden reaction of the faithful. This is
how we think.
These three incidents could constitute good case studies for understanding the dynamics of
extremism, crime, negligence, terrorism and counterterrorism strategies. However, examining
such phenomenon scientifically is not possible in a society that is not ready to accept science as
a pure discipline in its educational institutions.
The little work on the subject done by local and international scholars indicates that the
common man is becoming more sensitive about his religious and sectarian identity and
affiliation. Even the expression of religion is becoming more sectarian, with different identities
expressing themselves more vociferously, to the denial of others, facilitated by sectarian parties
allying with mainstream parties, the presence of sect-based madressahs, and the changing

geopolitical rivalry between Shia Iran and Wahabi Saudi Arabia. As old groups like the Pakistani
Taliban decline, other groups like IS make inroads, relying on the resources of Pakistani Taliban
militants.
Religious rituals once participated in by all are now are claimed by some, excluding others.
Almost all sects have their rituals or events marked publicly to show strength. In southern
Punjab, for instance, shrines and Sufism were a form of religious expression that people took as
cultural expression; but now, even in that ‘city of saints’, intolerance is rising, expressed in a
narrow religious-social context. In this process of the transformation of religious expression,
religious and sectarian minorities are suffering greatly.
However, the state has a counterargument and claim to make. The National Action Plan was
formed to address such deep-seated issues. Operation Zarb-e-Azb and now Operation Raddul
Fasaad have rooted out the militant infrastructure, and physical spaces have shrunk too. While
the state cannot fix the society’s thinking process, it can take several initiatives, from
educational to security sector reforms. But who is the state? From where are its operators
coming? Do they have the will or the vision to reverse the processes?
Published in Dawn, April 23rd, 2017
Policy imperatives for CPEC
MOST of the discussion about CPEC has so far focused on financing and future indebtedness but
the success of this initiative lies in successful interaction between investment, institutions and
policy. What policies are needed to maximise benefits and minimise costs to the country? There
are several, but at least six areas need careful design and execution.
Energy policy: The addition of 10,000MW of electricity to the national grid by 2018 would
overcome energy shortages. However, it may create unintended adverse consequences for
public finances and the liquidity of companies involved in the energy supply chain if other
components of the energy policy are not put right. The circular debt would get worse if the gap
between the purchase price of power paid by the distribution companies (DISCOs) and the sale
revenues collected by them is not bridged. The uniform tariff rate, transmission and distribution
losses and energy thefts, discrepancy in the amounts billed and recovered, and the growing
account receivables underpin this problem.
Unless DISCOs are either privatised or restructured as commercial organisations free from
political interference, this growing circular debt would end up widening the fiscal deficit. The
cost of generation to the end users can be reduced if competitive energy markets and energy
exchanges are set up, auctions are held for tariff determination and multiple buyers are
introduced instead of the present single buyer model. The National Transmission and Despatch

Company would recover only the wheeling charges for the use of their transmission
infrastructure.
Industrial policy: The Special Economic Zones (SEZs), industrial parks, etc to be set up along
CPEC should be open to Pakistani firms on the same terms as to the Chinese. Land should be
allotted on long-term lease rather than outright purchase and the leases auctioned only to
genuine, prequalified bidders to eliminate land grabbers and speculators. In Balochistan, some
portion should be reserved for local investors wherever feasible. The lease should incorporate a
provision that the allotment would be cancelled if the project is not operational within three
years. All infrastructure works — power, gas, water, roads, effluent plants, amenities — should
be in place before the possession is passed on.
Six areas need careful consideration if we are to maximise CPEC’s benefits.
Pre-feasibility studies should be carried out by SEZ authorities through expert consultancy firms
or universities, to provide baseline data and information about the kind of projects that can be
established in different zones.
Trade policy: External payments on account of repatriation of profits and debt servicing of CPEC
projects would put pressure on the current account. Exports must grow at least 15 per cent
annually to meet these new obligations, and remittances have to increase at their historical
level. The exchange rate has to be managed deftly to stimulate new export products, new firms
and penetration into new markets, while ensuring that prices of imports of capital goods,
machinery and equipment are not hiked up, which would make new investments unattractive.
Pakistani and other foreign companies winning competitive bidding should have a level playing
field.
Free trade Agreements have to be renegotiated to preserve the comparative advantage of
Pakistani exports and tariff quotas introduced to safeguard against material injury to Pakistani
manufacturers. Import tariff rates must be gradually reduced to enable Pakistani companies to
participate in the global supply chain.
Foreign exchange regime: The current foreign exchange regime is becoming too restrictive for
making timely payments to suppliers, vendors and financiers. Further restrictions would only
divert inflows towards informal channels, resulting in a vicious cycle. As inflows through official
channels recede, and demand for outflows through banking channels at interbank rates rises,
the State Bank would have to further tighten external payments, prolong the timing and
disallow certain genuine payments to conserve their reserves.
As more payments are pushed to the kerb market, the differential between the official and
open market rates would widen. Exporters and remitters would channel their earnings at the
higher open market rate, reducing the supply in the interbank market. The increased demand
by importers and other consumers of foreign exchange at the lower official rate would lead to a
demand-supply disequilibrium.
Market sentiment plays an important role in determining the exchange rate; any hint that
outflows on account of payments to the Chinese would lead to further restriction in the foreign
exchange regime would erode market players’ confidence.
Financial policy: Commercial banks should finance Pakistani companies, either stand alone or in
joint ventures with the Chinese companies in collaboration with the infrastructure
development fund. This would carefully scrutinise proposals from potential investors, calculate

future cash flows, and carry out scenario analysis for risk mitigation. For small and medium
enterprises working as sub-contractors to large firms or providing goods and services for CPEC
projects, or to establish start-up businesses, existing funds by DFID, USAID, etc should meet this
demand.
In Balochistan, southern KP and Gilgit-Baltistan, urban and rural infrastructure projects that link
the main highways and motorways under CPEC with the communities should be given priority
by their respective set-ups in allocation of development budgets.
Skill development policy: One of CPEC’s benefits would be the training and development of
skilled manpower. Plans have to be made to assess long-term manpower requirements, both
for construction as well as the operational phases of CPEC projects.
Various categories and levels of training programmes have to thus be designed and then
assigned to credible, prequalified providers. Particular attention should be given to train youth
from backward areas, starting with Gwadar all the way to the Karakoram Highway.
A number of private and non-profit organisations are actively engaged in quality vocational and
technical training, mainly in Karachi and Punjab. These organisations should be invited to set up
similar facilities in other parts of the country where CPEC projects are being executed.
In addition to this formal training, internships and attachments with Chinese companies
working on the projects should be made an integral part of the curriculum. If there is one
lasting legacy for which CPEC should be remembered, it is investment in producing skilled and
trained technical manpower with different levels of expertise.
The other missing link in which Pakistan is weak is the institutional capacity, for which a
separate analysis would be required.
The writer is former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan.
Warfare not likely but US-China trade tensions will rise
Ang Yuen Yuen For The Straits Times

President Donald Trump never fails to surprise. Since coming to office, he has taken the world
on a daily roller-coaster ride. The pendulum of US-China relations has swung from the threat of
war, as White House chief strategist Steve Bannon hawkishly declared, to more recent
conciliatory gestures. The rest of the world, including Singapore, will continue to watch
relations between the two great powers with bated breath.
I have had the privilege of learning about US-China relations first-hand after being named a
Public Intellectual Fellow by the National Committee of US-China Relations. During a recent visit
to Washington DC, I joined other fellows in dialogue with various experts and government
officials.
My first takeaway from the dialogues is that although Mr Trump's personality brings
tremendous uncertainty to foreign policy, there are moderating and stabilising forces within
the US bureaucracy. In particular, experts on defence see little possibility of military warfare, as
the American and Chinese military maintain multiple lines of open communication. Both sides
understand the dire costs of outright conflict, despite whatever the President might say at
whim.

My second takeaway is that although military warfare is unlikely, trade tensions will surely rise.
Prior to his election, Mr Trump called China a currency manipulator and threatened to slap
tariffs, as high as 45 per cent, on Chinese imports. Once elected, Mr Trump placed America's
trade deficit with China, which stood at US$347 billion (S$485 billion) in 2016, at the top of his
agenda. Not only that, he emphasised the damage that this deficit has done to the American
economy.
Mr Peter Navarro, the top US trade official, espouses and reinforces Mr Trump's mercantilist
view of trade. Even though Mr Navarro has recently toned down his combative stance, his
guiding philosophy is clear: Whenever import exceeds export, it must be a drag on growth.
As one expert experienced in commerce issues explained, Mr Trump's renewed focus on the
trade deficit is a striking departure from previous policies. Earlier US talks with China had
mainly focused on opening China's markets to American goods and investments. Underlying
that belief was that if China progressed towards an open market and consumption-led growth,
the trade deficit would naturally subside. Hence, the goal in the past was on pushing China to
undertake capitalist reforms. By contrast, under the current administration, the priority is to cut
imports from China, rather than to open China's markets to American companies.
What will rising trade tensions between the United States and China mean for Singapore? As
a highly trade- dependent economy, Singapore risks getting caught in the winds. If the US
slaps higher tariffs on China, it will certainly lead to higher prices in the US market, as well as
retaliation from China, which could spiral into a global recession.
Under this protectionist climate, Section 301 of US Trade Law, which permits the United States
to sanction countries for unfair trade practices, may be revived. This section was given up when
the World Trade Organisation was formed. Once reactivated, the US may initiate more dumping
and countervailing investigations against China, and potentially impose higher tariffs.
Meanwhile, China is clearly recalibrating its economy in preparation for rising protectionism.
This process began years before President Trump's election. The shock of the 2008 global
financial crisis, which originated in the US but spread to China, shook the Chinese leadership. It
exposed the vulnerability of China's dependence on export manufacturing for economic
growth.
To enhance its economic independence, China is taking a two-pronged approach. One is
outward investment, most prominently through the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. The other
approach, however, is little publicised: promoting industrial transfer within China - migration of
capital and factories from wealthy but saturated coastal cities to poor inland locales. In 2010,
China's Cabinet, the State Council, elevated industrial transfer to a national strategy, which
prompted a suite of new policies to encourage inland migration, as documented in my book,
How China Escaped The Poverty Trap.
What will rising trade tensions between the US and China mean for Singapore? As a highly
trade-dependent economy, Singapore risks getting caught in the winds. If the US slaps higher
tariffs on China, it will certainly lead to higher prices in the US market, as well as retaliation
from China, which could spiral into a global recession.
At the same time, Singapore could respond more proactively to the evolving terrain. Gone are
the days when the global economy was dominated by Western multinationals and China was

defined by low-wage manufacturing. Today, China has become a formidable source of outward
investment, and new hot spots are emerging in previously laggard parts of the country.
Curiously, the US and China appear to be switching roles. While Mr Trump calls for a return to
traditional US manufacturing in order to "bring jobs home", China aspires to build innovative
industries. China also has ambitious plans to connect its domestic regions into a national supply
chain, augmented by growing ties with neighbouring economies.
For Singapore to adapt, it must understand that the world is not only changing but also virtually
turning upside down.
 The writer is a political scientist at the University of Michigan and the first South-east
Asian to be named a Public Intellectual Fellow by the National Committee of US-China
Relations.
A version of this article appeared in the print edition of The Straits Times on April 04, 2017, with
the headline 'Warfare not likely but US-China trade tensions will rise'. Print Edition | Subscribe
China’s Silk Road lends urgency to India’s Asia ambitions
WHEN Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government approved $256 million to upgrade a
section of a remote border road last month, few took notice.
Yet India’s decision to revive plans for the highway, part of an ambitious 1,360-kilometer
crossing to link northeastern India with markets in Thailand and beyond, marks the next phase
in the jostle between New Delhi and Beijing for economic and strategic influence in the region.
In the last two years alone, India has assigned more than $4.7 billion in contracts for the
development of its border roads, according to government figures, including the highway which
will run from Moreh in Manipur through Tamu in Myanmar to Mae-Sot in Thailand.
The construction has taken on new urgency as China pushes ahead with its own vast “One Belt,
One Road” infrastructure initiative, expected to involve investments worth more than half a
trillion dollars across 62 nations. The intercontinental web of road, rail and trade links has
raised concerns among strategic rivals India, Russia, the US and Japan. A showcase of the plan
has unsettled equations in the South Asian neighbourhood, where border tensions often
simmer.

“With China’s growing interest in the region, as its wealth grows, its influence is growing
beyond its borders,’” said K. Yhome, New Delhi-based senior fellow at the Observer Research
Foundation. So while China is pushing for a north-south economic corridor under the “One Belt,
One Road” initiative, India is aiming to build links with its eastern neighbours, he said.
Under the Modi government’s “Act East” policy, India is investing in road and rail links on its
north-east borders, where it rubs shoulders with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, China, and
Myanmar.
But the plan for the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway is not a new one. It’s been on the
drawing board since 2001 when it was called the India-Myanmar Friendship Road, according to
Vijay Chhibber, India’s former roads secretary.
New Delhi has now proposed to further extend the Myanmar-Thailand link to Cambodia, Laos
and Vietnam, shortening travel from the Mekong river to India using water transport, in its bid
to bind it closer to the Association of South East Asian Nations and the Bay of Bengal Initiative
for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, according to Chhibber.
The road link will be funded by the Asian Development Bank under the South Asian Subregional
Economic Cooperation (SASEC) programme. Involving India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives,
Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka, the programme doubled investments on infrastructure to $6bn
since 2011 compared to $3.5bn in previous decade, said Ronald Antonio Q Butiong, Manila-
based director at ADB’s Regional Cooperation and Operations Coordination Division.
The SASEC nations, not including Myanmar which joined only this February, plan to invest a
further $4bn on infrastructure projects over the next three years, Butiong said. New projects
include the Kaladan multimodal transit transport project connecting India’s Mizoram state with
ports in Kolkata and Myanmar’s Sittwe. India has financed the $120m Sittwe port construction,
according to SASEC.
“Regional cooperation is a slow process and you have to have a lot of patience,” said Butiong by
phone from Manila. “You couldn’t imagine this happening a few years ago. But now it looks like
it’s becoming a reality.”
India chose not to attend President Xi Jinping’s two-day One Belt One Road summit in May.
Three months later, the two nuclear-armed powers are managing a tense military stand-off
over junction between Bhutan, China’s Tibet and India’s Sikkim.
The Chinese government has repeatedly said its Belt and Road initiative aims to enhance
regional connectivity, bringing economic benefits for China’s neighbours. It urged New Delhi to
shed “misgivings and doubts” about the project.
Roads, bridges and railways have been a weak link in India’s infrastructure in the north eastern
states. In part, it was left underdeveloped as strategy to make the region inaccessible to
Chinese troops if Beijing ever tried to repeat the four-week 1962 border war and encroach into
the territory India sees as its own.
This has also meant poor access for Indian businesses to markets of southeast Asia. Modi fast-
tracked decades-old infrastructure plans such as opening the nation’s longest bridge spanning
9.2 km across the Brahmaputra river to ensure the smooth movement of troops to the
northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, one of India’s most remote regions that is claimed in
full by China.

“For India to improve its influence, it needs to take some action otherwise it will be left
behind,” said Rajiv Biswas, Singapore-based chief economist at IHS Markit. “If India wants to be
part of growth dynamic of Asia it needs to develop infrastructure links and that is why this
project is a very important first step.”
In a brand new office in the heart of India’s capital New Delhi, Sanjay Jaju is meeting
contractors responsible for building roads in the country’s north eastern states for the National
Highways & Infrastructure Development Corp.
The three-year-old state-owned company, where Jaju is finance director, is an unusual entity in
the south Asian nation’s notoriously slow bureaucratic labyrinth. The highway through
Myanmar and Thailand is among the $4.7bn in contracts the company has assigned.
In the meantime, the corporation is busy acquiring land for its projects. “We’re creating
sovereign assets,” said Jaju. “Our international projects will take off this year.”
By arrangement with Bloomberg-The Washington Post
Published in Dawn, August 13th, 2017
MIGRATION: EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS
It was October 2015. With winter approaching and no end in sight to the flow of migrants
seeking refuge from the Syrian civil war, Germany needed a solution — fast.
Processing centres for refugees had exceeded capacity. Asylum claims were backlogged.
Temporary tent cities would not survive the punishing winter months.
So Germany did what governments increasingly do when facing apparently unmanageable
problems. It called in multinational management consulting firms, including New York-based
giant McKinsey & Co., to streamline its asylum procedures.
Applying the analytical tools of economics and the insights of business leaders to resettle
refugees

Germany has paid McKinsey 29.3 million Euros, the equivalent of nearly 34 million dollars, for
work with the federal migration office that began in October 2015 and continues to this day.
The office also brought in two Europe-based firms, Roland Berger and Ernst & Young.
Among McKinsey’s projects has been the development of fast-track arrival centres with the
capacity to process claims within days. The company’s work on migration issues also has taken
its consultants to Greece and Sweden, and this year McKinsey submitted a bid for a project with
the United Nations.
Experts in international law said the German case illustrates risks associated with McKinsey’s
input. Today, asylum decisions handed down by the federal migration office come faster but
are leaving an increasing number of migrants with fewer rights, above all the right to family
reunification, triggering hundreds of thousands of appeals that have created a new backlog —
not in asylum centres, but in German courts.
“We’re not used to seeing business consultants brought into the process,” said Minos
Mouzourakis of the Brussels-based European Council on Refugees and Exiles. “McKinsey and
others developed a system for more efficient management of asylum cases to make sure that
the backlog of cases could be cleared. This led to a substantial number of decisions being taken,
but with a significant drop in quality.”
Legal experts said the shift to limited protection, which accompanied the introduction of fast-
track asylum centres and expedited denial for certain classes of migrants, is inseparable from
the overall drive toward administrative efficiency and control of the movement of migrants —
goals championed by the firm.
“This is a very sensitive area of law where you can’t just streamline things, and I’m not sure that
McKinsey’s approach is one that systematically takes human rights concerns into account,” said
Nora Markard, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Hamburg and director of its
refugee law clinic.
Markard observed that more efficient procedures were introduced at the same time that the
federal migration office began granting only subsidiary protection — a status that says an
asylum seeker may suffer serious harm in his or her country of origin but doesn’t qualify as a
refugee — to an increasing number of migrants from Syria, thereby allowing them only a one-
year residence permit instead of the three allowed refugees, and denying them the right to
family reunification.
“It’s not coincidental that these changes happened at the same time,” Markard said. “The
government had to deal with a very large number of arrivals very quickly, which meant that
part of increasing efficiency was limiting entry in any way they could.”
Government officials interviewed were adamant that McKinsey’s work has not involved
specifying what sort of sanctuary should be granted. “Absolutely not,” said a spokeswoman for
the German migration office, Andrea Brinkmann, when asked whether McKinsey weighed in on
the use of subsidiary protection.
With 14,000 employees and offices around the world, McKinsey has advised corporations on
everything from aerospace to paper products, and public-sector institutions ranging from
schools to the CIA.
A 2016 report, “People on the move: Global migration’s impact and opportunity,” outlines how
more efficient integration procedures might boost national economies as well as benefit

migrants. Produced by the McKinsey Global Institute, the report applies “the analytical tools of
economics with the insights of business leaders” to the international refugee crisis.
One of its authors, Khaled Rifai, a partner in New York, said the company sees the use of
“temporary status,” a common shorthand for subsidiary protection, as effective in quickly
integrating new arrivals into jobs and housing, but he did not address the denial of the right to
family reunification.
“In general we can say that issuing temporary status that allows people to have access to labour
markets, to housing, to health is actually beneficial from an economic perspective in the short-
term in most cases, and is also beneficial from a social outcome perspective in the long-term,”
he said.
An economist by training, Rifai said he was “not a humanitarian law specialist steeped in the
Geneva Conventions.” He said his interest was personal; he is half-German, half-Syrian.
A McKinsey spokesman, Kai Peter Rath, said he couldn’t confirm the specifics of refugee-related
projects.
“I don’t want to call it secret,” he said. “Our policy is if the client wants to talk about it, it’s the
decision of the client.”
Public records and interviews with government officials, however, show that McKinsey’s
influence on refugee policy spans Europe — a role not widely publicised and surprising to some
legal experts.
“It’s the first I’ve heard that McKinsey was involved,” said James Hathaway, a professor of
refugee law at the University of Michigan.
Some of McKinsey’s earliest work on this issue was with the Swedish Migration Agency in 2008
and 2009, to install “lean management” practices, said Veronika Lindstrand Kant, the agency’s
deputy director of operations. Slashing processing times worked until 2015, when the new
wave of asylum seekers expanded the caseload. Migrants are again waiting about 500 days for
a decision, Lindstrand Kant said. McKinsey was paid more than 2 million dollars.
In late 2016 and early 2017 the company worked to reduce the backlog of asylum claims in
Greece, first with the European Commission, spokeswoman Natasha Bertaud said, and then
through a project funded by the European Asylum Support Office. It was paid about one million
dollars for the final project, said Jean-Pierre Schembri, a spokesman for the Malta-based
organisation.
The company is seeking to expand its reach. This spring it submitted a bid to the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees for a project on refugee resettlement. In an email, a
project manager in McKinsey’s Germany office asked an American legal expert to sign on to its
proposal, which was ultimately not accepted, a UNHCR spokeswoman said.
The expert, who asked not to be identified because she was not authorised to circulate the
request, declined to join the project. She said she was not convinced the company had
assembled a team of sufficiently high calibre to tackle resettlement.
Stephanie Kirchner contributed to this report. By arrangement with The Washington Post
Published in Dawn, EOS, August 13th, 2017

On Afghan refugees
PAKISTAN wants its Afghan refugees to go home. The repatriation numbers are staggering:
more than 600,000 Afghan refugees are said to have returned home from Pakistan in 2016, to a
country still under attack by the Afghan Taliban. In April alone, at least 140 soldiers and military
officers died in an assault on an Afghan military base, the deadliest such attack since 2001.
The ‘voluntary’ repatriation of Afghan refugees is in truth often forced, achieved by harassment
— through police extortion and bribery, raids and confiscation of legal documents, making the
legal status of many insecure and temporary. This violates the tripartite agreement between
the UNHCR, the refugee agency and the Pakistan and Afghan governments.

The thread that runs through this is Pakistan’s narrative on Afghan refugees — ‘economic
burdens’, ‘criminals’ and ‘terrorists’ — the latter being the latest refrain. After the APS,
Peshawar, attack, the National Action Plan called for a “comprehensive policy for Afghan
refugees, beginning with their registration” — thus linking them with the plan to counter
terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.
This conflation of refugees with terrorism is disingenuous (and hypocritical, given our derision
of the West’s parallel right-wing narrative on refugees). What is true is that Operation Zarb-i-
Azb drove the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) out of the tribal areas into Afghanistan, from
where they are now planning and conducting attacks on Pakistan. But are they Afghan? No. And
are they linked with Afghan refugees who have lived in Pakistan for decades? Again, no.
In between the blame game rests the fate of millions.
This narrative furthers our obfuscation on extremism — blaming attacks conducted by the TTP
on other countries, mainly India and the US. Refugees serve as yet another scapegoat, a
convenient foil that will inhibit the battle against extremism that must be waged within.
For years, Afghanistan has blamed Pakistan for attacks on its soil — planned by the Afghan
Taliban, many of whom had taken sanctuary in Pakistan after being driven out of Afghanistan
by the US since 2001. Pakistan now blames Afghanistan of the same thing with regard to the
TTP.
But these duelling Afghan and Pakistani narratives are one-sided. There is complicity on both
sides of their long, complex history — though arguably more on Pakistan’s side. Following the
Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan supported the Afghan Taliban in the ensuing power struggle. The
Afghan Taliban had brought forth another dark period in Afghanistan, leading to the 2001 US
invasion of the country and the war that followed. To date, Afghanistan alleges that Pakistan
allows the Taliban sanctuary on its soil from where they plan attacks on the former country.
On the other hand, Afghanistan would do well to remember that Pakistan has graciously hosted
millions of its refugees over the past four decades, even as it has itself been stressed
economically, and, more recently, in terms of security. And Afghanistan could also now deny
sanctuary to the TTP, but it has apparently not done so.
It is time for Pakistan to change its narrative and, better still, its policy towards the refugees
from Afghanistan. From a cynical perspective, driving refugees out further harms the country’s
image internationally. But from the more important moral perspective, returning them to a
place where they will be insecure is unconscionable.
Pakistan’s policy towards refugees has always been inadequate. Consider the children of
Afghan refugees born in Pakistan, for whom this has been the only home they have ever
known. They have no path to naturalisation. Of those born in Pakistan, only children of
Pakistani parents are legally entitled to citizenship.
Pakistan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, which calls
for their assimilation and naturalisation. When Afghan refugees are registered here, they can
get a Proof of Registration card that recognises them as “Afghan citizens temporarily residing in
Pakistan”.
But the Afghan conflict has dragged on for more than 40 years, and there is no end in sight.
Given that Pakistan has been home to millions of Afghan refugees for decades, it would do well
to offer those who want to stay a path to naturalisation, and economic and social integration.

When Pakistan’s own population is stretched, and many of the country’s own are ‘otherised’
and marginalised, one may wonder whether we can extend our hand to refugees. If we do, we
can offer an example to an increasingly xenophobic world intent on closing down borders. We
may well find that a nation that takes on the responsibility of others with humanity and
empathy finds a clearer path to overcoming its own demons.
The writer teaches at the University of Maryland, and is a Brookings Institution non-resident
fellow.
Twitter: @MadihaAfzal
Pak-Afghan truth
IN his remarks on the sidelines of the recent UN General Assembly session, President Ashraf
Ghani was sharply critical of Pakistan and of alleged militant safe havens there, whose
elimination he said was essential to achieving peace in Afghanistan.
In his formal address, he called upon Pakistan to engage his country in a comprehensive
dialogue on “peace, security and regional cooperation leading to prosperity”. The level of
sincerity of his statement may have been unclear but the underlying truth was self-evident.
Pakistan and Afghanistan needed to talk.
Both have been facing a moment of truth ever since the announcement of President Trump’s
Afghanistan strategy. To its credit, Pakistan has projected its case well, energised its contacts in
the region and held its ground in dealing with Washington.
Already the ice seems to have been broken in relations with the US. And Kabul, too, may have
taken note that the road to peace passes through Islamabad. Yet all this does not solve
Afghanistan’s problems or those of Pakistan. Public relations is not a substitute for policy.
Pakistan and Afghanistan have a tortuous shared history that has left a complicated legacy of a
divided ethnicity straddled along a disputed border. They now face serious challenges in the
form of extremism and terrorism to which both have contributed. The problems of each are
now tied to policies and conditions in the other country. These can only be addressed by
fundamentally altered Pakistan-Afghanistan relations which will require serious action. Not just
Pakistan, Afghanistan too needs to put its house in order.
Public relations is not a substitute for policy.
Packaged inside Trump’s rhetoric and the China-supported BRICS statement have been some
harsh truths that Pakistan especially should take note of. The Chinese have long felt a wake-up
call was overdue for Pakistan. The message was clear. China would defend Pakistan against US
pressure but not necessarily its policies, especially those impacting its own interests. China is
invested too heavily in Pakistan, particularly through CPEC, not to be worried about the shadow
cast by the militant groups on the stability of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
China recognises the importance of the US role in stabilising Afghanistan and the need for
Pakistan to support that role in its own interest and that of China. This is one reason China
would like Pakistan to retain its linkages with Washington. Not to mention Pakistan’s testy
relations with Washington will further embolden India and make its attitude even more hostile
towards Pakistan. That would make it still harder for Pakistan to bring about any course
correction, and for China to hover over Pakistan-India issues to maintain its relationship with
India which is important in its own right.
The spillover of the failed Afghan war has indeed caused horrendous problems for Pakistan.
And the US and the Afghans were largely responsible for this failure. But Pakistan ought to
admit that it too had contributed to the situation, and not just through Taliban sanctuaries.
Truth is the war’s failure was inherent in the situation developing over decades in Afghanistan
and in the border areas, as a spin-off of the American-led Afghan Jihad, which merged with the
jihadist currents long flowing in Pakistan since Ziaul Haq’s Islamisation and the creation of
militant outfits.
In the end, it was chaos waiting to happen once this new Afghanistan war started. Arguably,
there would have been no Pakistani Taliban had there been no Afghan Taliban.
The most serious national challenge for Pakistan now is its internal security and what is
happening next door in Afghanistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan need to reach a shared
perception of the Afghan Taliban and how to deal with them — no mean feat.
Only China and the US, the two countries with the most stakes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, can
bring them together. China wants a stable Afghanistan and Pakistan for the realisation of its
One Belt, One Road vision. And the US is concerned about its national security to which
terrorism poses a serious threat.
But the war to deal with that threat has gone horribly wrong. And Pakistan, Washington feels, is
not being helpful. Trump has tried intimidation and pressure. To its credit, Pakistan has stood
firm making a point that the relationship should serve both countries’ interests and not just of

one. Having made this clear, Pakistan must reflect and realise that much of what is being asked
of it, crudely by the US and subtly by China, may after all be in its own interest too.
The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct faculty Georgetown University and Maxwell School
of the Syracuse University, US.
Published in Dawn, September 24th, 2017
Jadhav’s appeal
THERE are two avenues available to Kulbhushan Jadhav and India if they want to challenge his
conviction. One, Jadhav himself may file a writ petition for which he would need to obtain a no-
objection certificate from the federal government as per the requirement of Section 83 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The second option is that the Indian state itself may invoke
Section 84 CPC and appear before the courts of Pakistan as a petitioner.
Section 83 CPC bars alien enemies residing in Pakistan from suing in the courts without the
permission of the federal government. The statutory explanation of Section 83 deems an alien

enemy as any person whose country is at war with or engaged in military operations against
Pakistan.
The above law is a statutory formulation of a well-recognised public policy doctrine that a
state’s judicial apparatus shall not facilitate the enemy and neither will a state make available
its remedies to the enemy. This public policy doctrine has been enshrined in the civil procedure
codes of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Nothing from India indicates that it regrets Jadhav’s unlawful activities.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan in its judgement (PLD 1969 SC 37) has explicitly stated that
Section 83 was a complete bar for an enemy alien.
In another judgement reported as PLD 1966 Karachi (WP) 161, the high court observed that:
“This law *Section 83+ … was grounded upon public policy which forbids doing of acts that will
be or may be to the advantage of the enemy state by increasing its capacity for prolonging
hostilities…”
It was further observed that: “To allow an alien enemy to sue or proceed during war in the
courts of the king would be to give to the enemy the advantage of enforcing his rights by the
assistance of the king with whom he is at war.”
The court further held that: “In international law, fighting between two countries can take place
without a formal declaration of war.”
This was due to the enactment of the UN Charter in 1945 after which the states stopped issuing
declarations of war and instead resorted to mostly covert tactics of organising or financing
military operations against each other.
Thus, the federal government while examining a request by Jadhav under Section 83 CPC will
need to come to a conclusion about whether Jadhav’s activities are to be viewed as an act of
waging a covert war on the part of the Indian state. For that purpose, it will be guided by the
language of sections 121, 121-A and 122 of the Pakistan Penal Code that sum up the concept of
waging war, or its attempt or its conspiracy within the territories of Pakistan. An identical
provision in the Indian Penal Code has been widely interpreted by several reported cases of the
Indian Supreme Court.
As mentioned here, the state of India may also consider filing the case itself on behalf of Jadhav
before the Pakistani courts under Section 84 of the CPC, since its foreign minister has
conclusively owned Jadhav as the “son of India” in her address before India’s lower house, the
Lok Sabha. The said section authorises foreign states to become petitioners before local courts
in the following words:
“84(1) A foreign state may sue in any court … Provided, that the object of the suit is to enforce
a private right vested in the head of such state or in any officer of such state in his public
capacity.”
If Section 83 was to be invoked given the existing material available through open sources, it
may be ruled that Jadhav is an enemy alien. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Pakistan had
earlier taken note of possible foreign connections of terrorist acts in the military courts

judgement PLD 2015 SC 401. The court had observed that “we are in a warlike situation”. It
further observed that “persons involved in the armed conflict against the state not only include
foreigners but there are also indications of foreign funding and instigation”. Only months after
the announcement of this judgement, Jadhav was arrested.
The federal government can only grant permission to Jadhav under Section 83 CPC if there is
evidence to suggest that covert hostilities have ceased. There has been no statement or any
other indication from the government of India to suggest that they regret the unlawful
activities of Jadhav or that they will discontinue from carrying out such activities in the future.
There is no offer even to adhere to the principle of non-intervention.
In the absence of any such statement or undertaking by India, the federal government will have
no choice except to make an executive determination that India is not discontinuing its efforts
of waging war inside Pakistan.
The writer is a former caretaker federal law minister.
ahmersoofi@absco.pk
Published in Dawn, April 23rd, 2017
ICJ’s limited jurisdiction
India has approached the International Court of Justice seeking to stay the execution of
Kulbhushan Jadhav. India has raised its claims before the court under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, which grants the right of consular access to a foreign
national “who is in prison, custody or detention” and the optional protocol to the VCCR, which
establishes the ICJ as the venue for resolving disputes under the VCCR. To raise its claims, India
has relied upon the court’s compromissory jurisdiction under Article 36(1) of the statute of the

ICJ which allows the latter to exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of a ‘special agreement’ — in
this case the optional protocol.
The court’s jurisdiction in such cases is, however, limited solely to the interpretation or
application of the special agreement. The court cannot decide on matters beyond the scope of
the concerned treaty, and as Article 36 of the VCCR only deals with communication and contact
with nationals of the sending state it does not impact convictions for espionage under domestic
or international law at all. Further, Pakistan is a dualist state, wherein any international treaty
signed can only be given effect domestically once it has been codified in the corpus of domestic
laws through implementing legislation. Consular access has not been a right explicitly
guaranteed under the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972.
Further, India’s claims rely upon a peacetime conception of international law, wherein consular
officials are guaranteed access to “nationals of the sending state” tried or convicted of ordinary
criminal offences. In Jadhav’s case, however, this legal framework seems inapplicable — as a
spy he engaged in activities including fomenting insurgency and attempting to destabilise
southwestern Pakistan. His activities would fall within the purview of International
Humanitarian Law, the lex specialis or specific law governing the conduct of hostilities between
nations.
Pakistan is well within its rights to try and sentence Jadhav under its domestic laws for
espionage.
The Geneva Conventions provide much of the substance of IHL. Within this framework the
Geneva Convention IV of 1949 is of particular significance, and relates to the treatment of non-
combatants in times of hostilities. As per Article 5 thereof, when such a non-combatant is
detained as a spy he forfeits his rights of communication under the convention. While such a
person must, as per Article 5, be treated with humanity and has the right to a fair trial, there is
nothing under IHL which prevents an individual from being sentenced to death for espionage.
IHL also draws a clear distinction between those engaged in hostilities and those engaged in
espionage. This principle is enshrined in Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions,
reflecting a long-established principle of international law present in earlier international legal
instruments. Combatants who adhere to IHL principles are, if captured, immune from
prosecution for acts committed while engaging in hostilities. This, however, does not apply to
those engaged in espionage: as per Article 46(1) of AP I any member of the armed forces of a
party to the conflict who falls into the power of the other party while engaging in espionage
shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy. Instead,
the requirements under Article 75 of AP I are for humane treatment and a fair trial. In this light,
therefore, Pakistan is well within its rights to try and sentence Jadhav under its domestic laws
for committing espionage.
While Jadhav’s activities were hostile acts, inimical to Pakistan’s national security and stability,
even if one were to assume that the peacetime regime of international law applied, India’s
claims before the ICJ would remain problematic. India’s declaration to the compulsory

jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36(2) of the ICJ statute ousts the jurisdiction of the court on
matters relating to actions taken in self-defence or in resistance to aggression.
As per the well-established international law principle of reciprocity, the caveats India
incorporated into its own declaration are also exercisable by Pakistan. The court will thus have
to determine whether exercising compromissory jurisdiction would result in a de facto exercise
of compulsory jurisdiction in areas over which it lacks jurisdiction. The dispute revolves around
the actions of Jadhav, an individual tried and sentenced by a competent court as a spy and
saboteur, and thus necessarily falls within the purview of “actions taken in self-defence or in
resistance to aggression”.
Furthermore, even if the court decides that it has jurisdiction in this case it is highly unlikely it
will establish admissibility as all local remedies have not yet been exhausted; even if the case
reaches the merits — and India is successful — a determination of a violation of consular access
still has no bearing on the illegality of Jadhav’s actions or the nature of his awarded punishment
as such are beyond the scope of the VCCR.
Jadhav’s situation, while peculiar, is not entirely without precedent. In Medellin v. Texas the
accused was a Mexican national tried and sentenced to death by the courts of Texas, despite
Mexico being denied consular access to him. Following his appeal, the US Supreme Court —
upholding Medellin’s sentence — held that even if a treaty constitutes an international
obligation it is not binding under domestic law unless the treaty is self-executing or the
legislature enacts the necessary implementing legislation.
The court also held that the ICJ’s decisions were nonbinding under domestic law and that,
without authority from the legislature or the constitution, the head of state could not
unilaterally enforce international treaties or ICJ decisions. While proceedings were under way
before US domestic courts, Mexico moved the ICJ on much the same grounds as India has —ie
denial of consular access to the accused. And while the ICJ finally held in favour of Mexico, the
courts of the US nonetheless asserted the supremacy of domestic law over the
pronouncements of the ICJ and the VCCR.
Sikander Ahmed Shah is former legal adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and law faculty at
Lums. Abid Rizvi is an expert on international law.
From Sarabjit to Jadhav: A history of Indian spies in Pakistan
Kulbhushan Jadhav, the Indian spy sentenced to death by Pakistan in a Field General Court
Marshal, may be the most prominent individual to be tried on espionage charges in recent
times — but Pakistan and India have a long history of arresting and trying 'spies'.
Sarabjit Singh
Sarabjit Singh was arrested by Pakistani authorities in August 1990. At the time, India said that
an inebriated 27-year-old Singh had strayed across the border while ploughing his field.
He was arrested on charges of carrying out four bombings in Faisalabad, Multan and Lahore
which killed 14 Pakistani citizens. He was later sentenced to death.

Singh was fatally assaulted on April 26, 2013, by two fellow prisoners in Kot Lakhpat jail. Singh
suffered severe injuries in the head and was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) at
Lahore’s Jinnah Hospital where a medical board comprising senior neurosurgeons treated him.
He died on May 2, 2013. The Indian government conducted a state funeral after his body was
brought back to India by his family members.
Kashmir Singh
Kashmir Singh was a convicted Indian spy on death row and spent 35 years in prison in Pakistan.
Throughout his incarceration, he insisted he was not a spy. He was arrested in 1973.
Kashmir Singh receives a hero's welcome on his return to India. -BBC

Singh was pardoned by then President Pervez Musharraf and returned to India where he was
given a hero's welcome.
“I was a spy and did my duty,” admitted Singh after crossing the border, the Press Trust of
Indianews agency reported, adding he was paid about 400 rupees a month for his work.
“I went to serve the country,” he told reporters in Chandigarh after his release.
“Even Pakistan authorities failed to get this information from me,” he added.
Ravindra Kaushik
Ravindra Kaushik was born in India's Rajasthan and was recruited by the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW) while working as a theatre artist.
After receiving two years of training, he was sent to Pakistan in 1975, where he enrolled in
Karachi University under the alias of Nabi Ahmad Shakir.
After graduation, Kaushik joined the Pakistan Army as a commissioned officer and got
promoted to the rank of Major.
During 1979-83, he passed on sensitive information to RAW. His run as a spy ended when
another Indian spy was caught by Pakistani forces. The arrested spy blew Kaushik's cover.
Kaushik was incarcerated for 16 years and died in 2001 while imprisoned in Multan Jail after
contracting pulmonary tuberculosis.
Sheikh Shamim
Sheikh Shamim was arrested by Pakistani authorities in 1989 and was charged with spying for
RAW, reported AFP.
Authorities said he was caught "red-handed” near the Pak-India border while spying. He was
hanged by the authorities in 1999.
The correct narrative on Pressler

THE Pressler amendment, passed by the US Congress in August 1985, was a blessing in disguise
for Pakistan. Thirty-two years since its passage, it is time to set the record straight.
An examination of the legislative history of the Pressler amendment to the US Foreign
Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, Section 620 E (e) reveals that it saved Pakistan-US security
relationship at a critical time, allowing the US to continue providing economic and military
assistance to Pakistan under the aid package passed in 1981-82 to fight the Soviets in the
region.
A year before the amendment was passed by Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on March 28, 1984, had adopted an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, proposed by two Democrat senators, Alan Cranston and John Glenn. Their proposed
amendment to Section 620 E (e) was quite stringent in its terms suggesting that no military or
technology equipment was to be provided to Pakistan unless the American president certified
that Pakistan did not “possess” a nuclear explosive device and that it was neither “developing”
nor “acquiring” a nuclear explosive device.
On April 3, 1984, the committee deleted this amendment in favour of a revised amendment
with a 9-8 vote. The adopted revision to the original Cranston-Glenn amendment was co-
sponsored by three Republican senators, Charles Percy, McC. Mathias Jr. and Larry Pressler.
This revised amendment was enacted in a separate bill in August 1985, popularly called the
Pressler amendment. It stated that no military or technology equipment was to be provided to
Pakistan unless the US president certified that Pakistan did not “possess” a nuclear explosive
device and that the assistance provided by America would “reduce significantly the risk that
Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device”.
If analysed carefully, the amendment favoured the continuation of economic and military
assistance to Pakistan.
The Pressler amendment made US economic and military assistance to Pakistan conditional
upon two certifications, one factual and one judgemental. The certification on Pakistan’s “non-
possession” of the nuclear explosive device was a factual finding where the US president was
required by law to review the relevant intelligence information about Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons-related activities and report to Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear
explosive device. The second certification was a judgemental finding where the US president
was required to testify on the non-proliferation impact of US assistance to Pakistan in reducing
the risk of Pakistan possessing a nuclear explosive device.
There are interesting elaborations on both. While the term “nuclear explosive device” was
clear, there were issues with respect to making the judgement about what “possession” meant.
Terms like “manufacturing” or “acquisition” of a nuclear explosive device were commonly used,
but the word “possession” of a nuclear explosive device had never been used, leaving it open to
interpretation and a “matter of first impression”.
A report prepared by legal advisers at the State Department who analysed the language used in
the Pressler amendment justified the Reagan administration’s position on what “possession”
and “non-possession” meant in Pakistan’s case. On possession it stated that if a country had
“manufactured” or “assembled” a nuclear explosive device then it “possessed” such a device. If
a country had the necessary components to assemble a functioning device but decided to keep
it disassembled in different locations, it “possessed” such a device. But a country did not

“possess” a nuclear explosive device if “one or more of the essential elements required to
assemble a device” were lacking, be it due to technical or policy constraints. In either event, the
report argued, what the country possessed was not “yet” a “nuclear explosive device”.
However, interestingly, the report stated that the finder of the fact about a country possessing
a nuclear device should be alerted to the consideration that there were “grey areas” between
“possession and non-possession” relating to the “timing” of the country’s policy decision to
stop short of “possessing” the nuclear explosive device which should be taken into account. The
second certification (judgemental) was dependent on the first certification that Pakistan “did
not possess” a nuclear device and therefore the assistance was to aim at significantly reducing
the risk that Pakistan in future would “possess” a nuclear explosive device.
Although this report did not represent the official view of the State Department, it clearly
explained the innuendos in the Pressler language that could have allowed Pakistan to avoid
Pressler sanctions had the administration chosen to share it with the Pakistani government. The
language of the amendment, however, was ingenious. If analysed carefully, it favoured the
continuation of economic and military assistance to Pakistan by using ambiguous terms like
“possession” of a nuclear explosive device, which as the report discussed, was open to
interpretation.
This ambiguity enshrined in the language of the amendment also gave the president enough
flexibility in case his certifications were later challenged in the court of law. The president could
say that he made the certification based on his best judgement given the available intelligence
at the time on Pakistan’s nuclear activities. And as is obvious, intelligence on any country’s
nuclear explosives programme that is being run clandestinely could never be complete since
facts about the programme would always be shrouded in secrecy making it unreasonable to
expect foolproof intelligence.
There is no evidence whether this report was shared with Pakistan. But there is evidence that
Pakistan was informed about the Pressler amendment before the Congress passed it in 1985.
Pakistan was told that it was the only way for continuance of the aid package. Pakistan was also
given a clear understanding that the presidential certifications required by the Pressler
amendment would be provided for the duration of the aid package. Pakistan was taken on
board and gave consent to the passage of the Pressler amendment. Pressler sanctions were
imposed on Pakistan in October 1990. The popular account of the sanctions relates to the
‘disposability’ of Pakistan for the US after the latter had achieved its strategic foreign policy
objectives by ‘using’ Pakistan to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. However, that too was not a
surprise for Pakistan for it had been forewarned.
The writer is a nuclear historian and Director Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at
University of Lahore.
China’s new world order

CHINA recently hosted 29 heads of state and government at the Belt and Road Forum,
reinforcing the country’s claim to leadership of an emerging geopolitical and economic world
order. The summit conference that also attracted representatives of more than 40 other
countries and multilateral financial agencies was the clearest expression yet of China breaking
out of its old foreign policy mould that had restrained it from attempting a global role.
China’s multibillion-dollar One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure development project
linking the old Silk Road with Europe, is a manifestation of China’s growing geopolitical
ambitions. A brainchild of President Xi Jinping, perhaps, the most powerful Chinese leader after
Mao Zedong, OBOR has now been under development for four years, spanning 68 countries
and accounting for up to 40 per cent of global GDP.
President Xi’s ambition of propelling China to centre stage of the global power game represents
a sharp departure from the approach of previous Chinese leaders who strictly adhered to Deng
Xiaoping’s tenet to “hide our capabilities and bide our time, never try to take the lead”. Thus
over the past two decades, China has avoided being drawn into global conflicts and has
completely focused its energies on development that helped it to become an economic
superpower.
China’s push to take the world leadership has come at a time when a strong anti-globalisation
wave is sweeping the Western world that is showing a growing tendency of returning to more
protectionist regimes. The United States under the Trump administration with its inward-
looking approach has virtually abandoned the mantle of globalisation thus ceding greater space
to Beijing’s assertion.
It is evident that OBOR is not just about infrastructure development.
It is not surprising that the OBOR initiative is being embraced by a wide range of countries from
Asia and Africa to Europe and even South America, notwithstanding some serious concerns
about the cost and benefits of the enormously ambitious project. Surely fewer European
countries showed up at the Beijing summit because of their reservations over China’s
reluctance to open doors to foreign companies.
While addressing the forum, President Xi tried to alleviate concerns about China’s dominance,
inviting other countries to take part in the project. China is spending roughly $150bn a year in
the 68 countries that have so far signed on to the plan. According to Chinese government
figures, around $1 trillion have already been invested in OBOR, with several more trillions due
to be invested over the next decade. This way Beijing hopes to find a more profitable avenue
for the country’s vast foreign exchange reserves, mostly invested in low-interest-bearing US
government securities.
It is evident that OBOR is not just about infrastructure development; one of the major
objectives of the initiative is to turn Eurasia into an economic and trading centre, breaking the
domination of the American-led transatlantic regime. It is also a manifestation of the changing
geopolitics and the realignment of forces, reflecting a move to shift the centre of gravity of
trade to the East and establish China’s predominance in global politics.
Indeed, Russia has lent active support to the Chinese initiative indicating a growing strategic
partnership between the two countries. Moscow’s major interest is to consolidate its primacy
in Central Asia through regional security and a trade bloc.

However, it is willing to accommodate China’s economic and geopolitical interests more than
ever because of Western sanctions following the Ukraine crisis. Since 2014, the two countries
have reached several high-profile multibillion-dollar economic and trade deals signalling their
close, evolving economic ties. Unsurprisingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin used the forum
to lash out at the US and other Western countries over their increasingly protectionist policies.
Surely China considers the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) a “flagship project” in the
whole scheme of OBOR. This multibillion-dollar investment programme has added a new
dimension to the friendship between Pakistan and China. From purely strategic and security
cooperation spanning more than five decades, the relationship has now evolved into a dynamic
economic and commercial partnership.
This growing bilateral cooperation comes at a time when China’s rising geopolitical ambition
also underscores its concerns about Pakistan’s security and its fledgling economy. Given its
geostrategic position, Pakistan has the potential to serve as a nexus for the two routes — the
continental Eurasian Silk Road Economic Belt and a Southeast Asian Maritime Silk Road
Although Beijing downplays geostrategic motivations, CPEC represents an international
extension of China’s effort to deliver security through economic development. Notwithstanding
their growing strategic cooperation, terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan have remained a major
source of worry for the Chinese government. China’s security concerns, especially those that
arise from its restive region of Xinjiang, and the Islamist militancy threatening Pakistan’s
stability have also been a strong factor in Beijing’s new approach to achieving security through
economic development.
This growing Pakistan-China strategic alliance has also exposed the regional geopolitical fault
lines. Predictably, India boycotted the Beijing forum citing serious reservations about the
project, particularly regarding China-funded development in Gilgit-Baltistan that is linked to the
Kashmir dispute. Yet another excuse given by the Indian authorities was that a trans-regional
project of this magnitude required wider consultation.
Explore: Is India trying to convince the world China’s OBOR plan is secretly colonial?
Despite their geopolitical rivalry and long-standing border dispute, trade between India and
China has grown significantly crossing $100bn. But there have been some visible signs of
tension between the two most populous nations in the past few years with the strengthening of
ties between Washington and New Delhi. India has openly sided with the US and Japan against
China over the South China Sea issue.
Indeed, the success of the summit has provoked a strong reaction from Delhi. So much so that
some leading commentators have called for tougher action to obstruct the OBOR project. “Far
from this, CPEC (the life and soul of OBOR) threatens India’s territorial integrity in a manner
unseen since 1962,” Samir Saran, a leading Indian commentator wrote in an op-ed piece.
Notwithstanding the scepticism, OBOR is a new geo-economic reality representing an emerging
world order. The process cannot be reversed.
The writer is an author and journalist.
zhussain100@yahoo.com
Twitter: @hidhussain
Power of hate

WHAT is it about hate that is so compelling? In the past two decades alone, one comes across
innumerable examples of demagogues and/or organised cliques being able to mobilise hordes
of people in the name of hate. Think the Rwandan genocide, the civil war in erstwhile
Yugoslavia, and our own Islamists. If we go even further back in time a definitive trend becomes
apparent. Fascism in Germany and Italy is probably the most quoted example of organised
slaughter, but we ignore at our own peril the hateful orgy of violence that took place in Punjab
during the partition of 1947-48. A long history of peaceful coexistence was expunged from the
record as Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus turned on one another in an unprecedented
demonstration of the power of hate.
Ever since then, the subcontinent has struggled to move beyond the politics of hate; state
ideologies have, in fact, been constructed around a process of ‘othering’ through which we
have learned to hate our neighbour. In Pakistan, this has meant not only assuming that all
Indians (read Hindus) are enemies of Pakistan (read Muslims), but perhaps more significantly
that those Pakistani (Muslims) that do not tow the official line are agents of the enemy.
This was how we denigrated the struggle of (East Pakistani) Bengalis, political movements of
other oppressed nations, and, for that matter, any and all class-based, pro-democracy and
other political movements that challenged the status quo.
It is in this context that we must think through another episode of political violence that jarred
the senses this past week. Sindhi labourers working at a construction site in Gwadar were
gunned down in broad daylight in an attack that was reportedly claimed by Baloch separatists.
That this incident should be condemned unequivocally goes without saying. But condemnation
alone is insufficient to counter the power of hate that motivates such brutal killings.
The Gwadar killings shows deep alienation.
Balochistan and the conflict that continues within it now only makes the news indirectly,
generally via CPEC-related discussions of security requirements, and the constant reminders
that all bad things in Balochistan are explained by India’s machinations. Yet public relations
strategies aside, it is clear that officialdom recognises the disaffection within Baloch society.
Greater efforts to integrate at least some segments through employment in the civil and
military services and scholarships to study abroad have abounded over the past few years, even
while the military ‘solution’ has continued to be pursued relentlessly and increasingly
indiscriminately.
The efforts at co-option aside, the incident in Gwadar confirms that the alienation in Baloch
society runs deep. This alienation has now metamorphosed into a politics of hate that
proclaims as just the targeting of non-Baloch workers who themselves are losers of Pakistan’s
social order. It is more than a little ironic that the victims in this case hailed from Naushero
Feroz, the heartland of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which the Zia
regime crushed mercilessly in the mid-1980s.
Was the Baloch movement always prone to xenophobia? Did it mirror the politics of hate
propagated by Pakistani officialdom? No, it did not. There has been a long history of non-Baloch
constituencies participating in the Baloch struggle for recognition, resources and equality. But
this progressive tradition has been steadily eroded over the past couple of decades, in part

because of global developments (read, the collapse of the socialist bloc) and also due to
systematic repression that has weeded out those who sought to transcend the politics of hate.
This isn’t to suggest that ultimate responsibility for the direction of the Baloch movement can
be deflected away from the leaders of this movement, because changes in objective realities
have to be responded to sensibly while remaining true to the principles that guide
emancipatory politics. The politics of hate cannot be defeated by another politics of hate.
Yet this also means that the rest of us Pakistanis need to think long and hard about the extent
to which hate has penetrated the body politic. There is a morbid helplessness about those of us
not directly exposed to political violence; we see hate and intolerance around us but usually shy
away from confronting it because we have not yet been immediately affected by its more
violent manifestation. This helplessness extends to our attitudes towards state narratives — we
empower the state to ‘eliminate’ non-state violence without considering at all the root causes
of this violence, including the role of the state in propagating hate of the ‘other’.
In some ways responding to hate and violence is easy — one can condemn it and wish for it to
be replaced by tolerance and peace. Yet at the same time we have to recognise that the power
of hate can only be challenged by another power — the wilful coming together of conscious
people to propagate an alternative politics to construct society in another image.
The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Modi’s American embrace
THE widely circulated picture of Indian Prime Minister Modi clinging to a visibly uncomfortable
Donald Trump’s breast illustrates the nature of the emerging relationship between India and
the US.
Modi’s eagerness to serve as America’s ‘natural partner’ to contain a rising China is based on
the expectation that this will provide India multiple advantages: latest military equipment and
technology; expanded US investment; unconditional US support against Pakistan, a free hand in
Kashmir and vigorous endorsement of India’s great power ambitions in South Asia, the Indian
Ocean and beyond.
The Indo-US alliance has grave security implications for Pakistan. It will exacerbate the military
imbalance and make India even more intransigent on Kashmir and belligerent towards Pakistan.
Indeed, to deflect attention from its failed oppression of the popular Kashmiri revolt, Modi may
feel sufficiently emboldened to actually attempt a cross-LoC ‘surgical strike’ against Pakistan,
provoking a war which is unlikely to remain limited.
However, the alliance with America will involve challenges and costs for India which Modi
appears to have discounted.
The US and India are unequal powers. As the practitioner of the Art of the Deal, Trump will not
be shy to exercise the leverage which the US will progressively acquire over India, eg, to open
India’s restrictive trade regime or curtail its traditional ties with Russia and Iran. To sustain the
‘partnership’, India will have to learn to bend, often, to America’s will, compromising the
‘independence’ of its foreign policy.
The alliance with America will involve challenges and costs for India.
As Pakistan discovered, defence ties with the US can be a mixed blessing. The arms and
technology tap can be turned on and off by Washington to secure desired behaviour from its
allies and partners. When Lockheed’s F-16 production is relocated to India, will the US, as it did
with Pakistan, implant software to neutralise the aircraft’s operational capabilities in a crisis?
New Delhi will never be sure that any equipment it acquires from the US, or Israel, will not be
‘compromised’ if India attempts to use this for purposes other than those endorsed by the US.
While the US will wish to use India to strategically harass China, it may be more reluctant to
support all India’s aims against Pakistan and other smaller neighbours. As a ‘global’ power, the
US will want to retain direct influence over Pakistan and other South Asian states rather than
delegate this to India.
Undeterred by such considerations, Modi seems to have embarked already on his assigned
mission to contain China. India is the only major country to reject China’s Belt and Road
initiative. It provoked China by inviting the Dalai Lama to disputed Arunachal Pradesh/south
Tibet. And, it has blocked Chinese road construction on Chinese territory along the Bhutan-
China border. Beijing has demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops “as soon as possible” and
reminded India of the lessons of history, ie India’s 1962 defeat.
In his book, Implosion: India’s Tryst with Reality, John Eliot argues that India is not well placed
to confront China. Although India’s GDP is growing annually at seven per cent and China at
6.5pc, the gap is widening since the Chinese economy is more than four times the size of
India’s.

Given that India has been unable to bully Pakistan, it is hardly in a position to confront China
simultaneously. Even the smaller South Asian states are entering into economic and defence
relationships with China. The Bangladesh government, although deeply beholden to India, is
buying Chinese submarines and will exploit its major Bay of Bengal gas field with a Chinese
rather than an Indian partner.
China’s Global Times asked: “With GDP several times higher than that of India, military
capabilities that can reach the Indian Ocean and having good relations with India’s peripheral
nations, coupled with the fact that India’s turbulent northern states border China, will Beijing
lose to New Delhi?”
India’s vulnerabilities are extensive. Kashmir remains India’s Achilles heel (where, so far, China
has urged Pakistan to exercise restraint). India is fighting 17 ‘active’ insurgencies in 119 districts
(according to former prime minister Manmohan Singh), including the Naxalite, Naga and Mizo
rebellions, the latter two in areas adjacent to China. With millions of Muslims and ‘lower’ caste
Hindus alienated by BJP-RSS inspired discrimination and violence, India is also fertile ground for
civil chaos.
Despite the grave implications of the Indo-US alliance, Pakistan should exercise strategic
patience. India is on the wrong side of history. It is building alliances with distant powers, the
US and Israel, both of which are disliked by the people if not all Muslim regimes. Pakistan has
the opportunity of building strong ties not only with China but also Russia, Iran, and others
across Eurasia who will be part of the Belt and Road initiative, which is likely to have a more
profound impact on regional peace and prosperity than the US military interventions in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc.
Faced with India’s growing militarisation, Pakistan’s primary objective is to ensure ‘full
spectrum deterrence’ against India. The successful test of the short-range Nasr missile is an
important step. Islamabad desperately needs a clear, active, national Kashmir strategy to
support and sustain the indigenous Kashmiri freedom movement. There is no longer any
downside to raising the Kashmir dispute formally in the UN Security Council and other
international forums, including the International Court of Justice.
Despite its imbalanced posture, there is no point in a confrontation with the US. In the
immediate future, Pakistan may need to reach tactical ‘accommodations’ with the US on
Afghanistan in exchange for its active support to end Indian-inspired terrorism in Pakistan.
Over time, the ‘correlation of forces’ in the region will change. India’s friendship with Russia
and Iran will erode. (Ayatollah Khamanei mentioned Kashmir twice of late). India may blunder
into a conflict with China. Its alliance with the US may erode if India proves reluctant to actually
confront China, loosen its links to Iran and Russia or to open its market to US trade and
investment.
Meanwhile, Pakistan should continue to ask Washington: would not US interests in Asia be
better served by cooperation rather than confrontation with China? Do you really want to step
into the Thucydides Trap?
Published in Dawn, July 9th, 2017

‘K’ is for Kashmir
WHILE celebrating the nation’s 70th independence anniversary, we cannot forget that the ‘K’ in
Pakistan’s name — Kashmir — is not (yet) part of our country. The men, women and children of
India-held Kashmir (IHK) are even now engaged in a heroic David and Goliath struggle for
freedom from India’s brutal occupation and oppression. Pakistan has done very little to support
them.
An equitable solution to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute will not be easy. However, for
political, strategic, moral and legal reasons, Pakistan cannot resile from its position on Kashmir.
By any objective criteria, Kashmir should have been part of Pakistan. The Kashmiris
demonstrate each day their desire for integration with Pakistan. Pakistan has a political and
moral obligation to support their aspirations and the political vision that inspired its own
creation.
Some among Pakistan’s elites appear to have lost the will to support the occupied territory’s
struggle.
Pakistan is a party to the UN Security Council resolutions prescribing a UN-supervised plebiscite
to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir to exercise their right to self-determination. It is
thus legally bound by this commitment.
Kashmir is the source of the rivers that feed the Indus Valley. Water is an existential issue.
Control over this life source cannot be legally surrendered to India.
Kashmir is India’s Achilles heel. Its massive military deployment in Kashmir diminishes India’s
capacity for aggression against Pakistan. Its brutal suppression of the Kashmiris erodes India’s
moral and political claim to regional domination and great power status. The leverage which
Kashmir provides Pakistan to achieve an ‘equal’ relationship with India should not be
unilaterally discarded.
Unfortunately, in the face of India’s growing power and the pressure exerted on Pakistan
through the campaign against ‘Islamic terrorism’, some among Pakistan’s elites appear to have
lost the will to support Kashmir’s struggle for self-determination and seem ready to accept the
status quo in Kashmir.
The much-touted peace plan negotiated with India during the latter years of the Musharraf
government was no more than a dressed-up acceptance of the status quo. It may have proved
to be even worse since it envisaged joint India-Pakistan ‘administration’ of both sides of Jammu
and Kashmir, thus conceding that India has a legitimate presence in Kashmir. Moreover, since
the ‘problem’ — insurgency and resistance — is in Indian-occupied Kashmir, why would
Pakistan give India an ‘administrative’ role in Azad Jammu and Kashmir? The mischief that India
could play there is not difficult to imagine. New Delhi could insist that the northern territories
be included as part of the area being jointly administered. It could seek a role in the
management of the Karakoram Highway and attempt to disrupt this sole and strategic road link
between Pakistan and China. (It is not surprising that the plan was rejected by Syed Geelani, the
one Kashmiri leader who has been the most vigorous and consistent in his support for
Kashmir’s integration with Pakistan.)
Unfortunately, intimidated by the US and India, the succeeding PPP and PML-N governments
shied away from actively supporting the Kashmir cause.

However, in a welcome signal, both the new prime minister and foreign minister have
expressed support for the Kashmiri cause in their maiden statements to the media.
Indeed, the present moment, when regional power equations are in flux and the Kashmiris have
launched a popular indigenous struggle for freedom, may be opportune for Pakistan to
promote a coherent strategy designed to halt India’s oppression, reassert the legitimacy of the
Kashmiri freedom struggle, and intensify international pressure on India to accommodate
Kashmiri rights and aspirations.
Pakistan should firstly support several objectives which the Kashmiris themselves need to
achieve: reunification and rejuvenation of the Hurriyat parties; selection of a deserving
successor to the indomitable but aging Syed Geelani; delegitimising the puppet government in
Srinagar; possible formation of a ‘shadow’ government; organisation of an ‘independent’
referendum (like the Iraqi Kurds) in Kashmir pending the UN plebiscite.
Second, to regain legitimacy, the composition and profile of the Kashmiri resistance has to
change. Its leadership must come mainly from new and younger Kashmiris untainted by
association with any proscribed terrorist group.
Third, the projection of the Kashmiri struggle and India’s oppression must be significantly
improved in the mainstream and social media. This is vital to achieving the strategy’s
objectives.
Pakistan should initiate an active and sustained diplomatic campaign to exert international
pressure on India. This campaign could include:
One, formal submission of the proposal to send a UN commission to investigate human rights
violations in IHK. If India blocks a visit, Pakistan can ask for an offsite report. Concurrently,
Pakistan should seek endorsement for a UN resolution calling for an end to Indian firing on
peaceful demonstrators; inhuman treatment of Kashmiri children and youth and women;
curfews; media blackouts; emergency laws; and the arbitrary detention of Kashmiri leaders.
Two, a formal proposal in the UN Security Council and General Assembly to adopt measures to
prevent another Pakistan-India war, including: formalisation of the 2003 LoC ceasefire;
expansion of the UNMOGIP and its deployment on both sides for comprehensive monitoring of
the ceasefire; withdrawal of heavy artillery from LoC positions; exchange of solemn mutual
assurances by Pakistan and India not to resort to force and not to interfere and intervene
against each other, including through the sponsorship of terrorism.
Three, a complaint to the International Court of Justice accusing India of violating the Genocide
Convention.
Four, approach the UN Security Council to implement its resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir by
appointing a special envoy to promote demilitarisation of both sides of Jammu and Kashmir and
to review and update the modalities for the organisation of a UN-supervised plebiscite there.
Pakistan’s active promotion of the Kashmir cause will not provoke a war, and it need not divert
Pakistan from economic development. Even if Pakistan’s proposals are not adopted in UN
forums, their submission and discussion will exert diplomatic pressure on India and ease the
suffering of the Kashmiri people. It may even convince India to seek a dialogue and a modicum
of normalisation with Pakistan.

Strategy-free force
IN a recent Wall Street Journal column, President Trump’s national security adviser, H.R.
McMaster, and senior economic adviser, Gary Cohn, wrote: “The world is not a global
community but an arena where nations, non-governmental actors and businesses engage and
compete for advantage”, and “we embrace” this “elemental nature of international affairs”.
Under the slogan ‘America First’, and led largely by his generals, Trump seeks to reassert global
primacy through raw military and economic power. In almost every conflict where it is engaged,
the US has escalated or threatened to escalate the use of force, even in the absence of a long-
term strategy.
Unfortunately, the preference for military options can be contagious. Other powers, like Russia,
Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have not been reluctant to resort to force. Even mini-
money states, like the UAE and Qatar, have embarked on foreign military operations. If military
force becomes the first rather than last option for states, international relations will be
transformed into a Hobbesian jungle of all against all.
In almost every conflict where it is engaged, the US has escalated the use of force.
The wars in Syria and Iraq reflect this dystopian reality. Latest events — the US downing of a
Syrian government aircraft and the Russian demand that US aircraft not fly west of the
Euphrates — have confirmed the danger of a direct US-Russia conflict in Syria. Once the militant
Islamic State group is defeated, Iraq’s three-way (Shia, Sunni, Kurd) crisis will revive, with the
Sunni minority turning to Saudi Arabia for support against the Shia-led government in Baghdad.
The Kurds in Iraq and Syria will try to break away, but face Turkish and Iranian opposition and
may be ultimately betrayed by their Western sponsors (again). Even after its defeat in Mosul
and Raqqa, IS will survive in some form, perhaps merging with other Sunni extremist groups, or
escaping to new locations, like Afghanistan. Its campaign of global terror will remain potent.
The Trump summit in Riyadh virtually declared the opening of hostilities against Iran.
Predictably, Iran blamed Saudi Arabia for the subsequent terror attacks in Tehran. US Secretary
of State Tillerson has upped the ante by referring to the prospect of regime change in Iran.
The recent Iranian missile strikes against IS in Syria were an unsubtle message to the US, Israel
and Saudi Arabia that Tehran has the will and capacity to retaliate against hostile actions. Iran
could inflame West Asia and the Levant; rain Hezbollah rockets on Israel; threaten Saudi
oilfields and US bases in Afghanistan; mobilise Shia minorities to destabilise shaky rulers in the
Gulf. The Saudi-UAE vendetta against Qatar reveals the fault lines within the Sunni alliance
which can be exploited by Iran in the context of the wider regional confrontation.
Afghanistan is about to endure another cycle of violence as the US digs itself deeper into the
Afghan quagmire. The new US ‘surge’ (of 4,000 troops) may prevent the collapse of the US-
installed Kabul regime, at enormous human and financial cost; but it will not deliver either
military victory or force the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. Pressure on Pakistan to
eliminate the alleged safe havens may prove counterproductive. A focus on fighting the Afghan
Taliban will erode the prospects of collective action against IS and other terrorist groups, like

the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, etc which are present in
Afghanistan and pose a threat to the entire region.
Kashmir could spark another India-Pakistan war. The popular Kashmiri revolt against Indian rule
has persisted for over a year despite Indian brutality, Pakistani impotence and world
indifference. In the run-up to the 2019, Indian general elections, Prime Minister Modi may try
to deflect attention from India’s Kashmiri quagmire by escalating the Line of Control ceasefire
violations or even attempting a (real) cross-LOC ‘strike’. The ensuing Pakistan-India
conventional conflict will not remain limited and could easily escalate to the nuclear level.
President Trump should press Modi in Washington this week to accept his offer of mediation to
avoid a disastrous Pakistan-India war.
So far, Trump has avoided the Thucydides Trap by holding back from an overt containment of
China. He has conditioned the US position on trade on Beijing’s ability to restrain North Korea’s
nuclear and missile programmes.
However, extreme Chinese pressure on North Korea is unlikely since this may lead to regime
collapse, millions of refugees, Korean unification and US troops on China’s border. Beijing’s
preference is for a freeze in North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes and reciprocal
military restraint by the US and its allies. If attempts to evolve a deal collapse, the military
option may come back to the fore and Sino-US differences on trade, the South China Sea and
other issues may revive, generating tensions across Asia.
Despite the early optimism in Moscow, Trump’s campaign desire for a cooperative relationship
with Russia has been stymied by the American ‘establishment’. On the contrary, the new
unilateral anti-Russia sanctions imposed by the US Congress last week are an indication that US-
Russian tensions will persist and probably escalate. Close ‘encounters’ between Russian-Nato
air and naval forces are now commonplace and could lead to a military incident.
The balance of power in Europe favours Russia. Its absorption of Crimea is a reality. Ukraine’s
division is unlikely to be overcome except on Moscow’s terms. Nato’s forward deployments,
and/or installation of an advanced ballistic missile defence system, will evoke strong Russian
responses even as support of several European countries, which desire cooperative relations
with Russia, wavers.
To manage the several simultaneous political, economic and technological transitions under
way, and meet the existential challenges of climate change, demographic explosion, poverty,
terrorism, refugees and communicable diseases, the international community requires intense
cooperation and collective action.
Such cooperation is impossible while states are allowed to have recourse to the untrammelled
and unilateral use of force. It is essential to revive unconditional adherence by states to their
UN Charter commitment to refrain from the use or threat of force in their international
relations. Making this commitment a reality should be the first priority of the UN’s new
secretary general.
Published in Dawn, June 25th, 2017

One Belt, One Road
GEN Joseph Dunford, chairman, US joint chiefs of staff, recently stated at a hearing of the US
Senate’s armed services committee: “I think in a globalised world there’s many belts and many
roads and no one nation should put themselves in a position of dictating ‘One Belt One Road’.
That said, the one belt one road also goes through disputed territory … that in itself shows the
vulnerability of trying to establish that sort of a dictate.”
In a separate hearing before the House of Representatives armed services committee,
Secretary of Defence Jim Mattis said that China, through its regional partnerships, is “focused
on limiting our ability to project power” and is “weakening our position in the Indo-Pacific
region”.
These statements, one with reference to Gilgit-Baltistan, the other relating more to US political
fears, speak less to any applicable international law than it does to the peculiar notion that the
US can — must — be able to influence ties between other sovereign nations. This runs counter
to the principle of sovereign equality in international law; while states can, and do, differ in
their relative global influence, the underlying legal principle is that all states are equal under
international law.
Mattis’s reference to ‘disputed territory’ ignores the principles enshrined in the UN Charter.
Article 55(b) obliges the UN to promote “solutions of international economic, social, health and
related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation”, and via Article 56
“all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55”. The entire corpus of
international law is predicated upon the notion that states should engage with one another in
peaceful, mutually beneficial relationships. The fact that such ties adversely affect one state’s
ability to project power over others does not render such relationships defunct.
Mattis is tone-deaf to regional realities.
Also, Mattis’s use of the term ‘disputed territory’, while technically correct, still speaks of a
failure to understand the geopolitical, historical and legal context of the Kashmir issue. Firstly,
the term ‘disputed territory’ is one which Pakistan maintains; India is content to identify the
region as falling within its own sovereign territories. The ‘Kashmir issue’ is also a political one
relating to the legitimate rights of self-determination and political sovereignty of the Kashmiri
people.
That Kashmir’s status is ‘disputed’, and to this day eludes resolution, has been recognised
consistently by Pakistan. In fact, this recognition, that the region’s political status is still
unresolved, is why certain political rights, eg the right to vote, have not been extended to its
residents. This understanding, that the political status of the region was still undetermined, was
reflected in the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Agreement, which established the border between China
and Pakistan. The boundaries were, as per Article 6 of the treaty, themselves subject to “the
settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India”, with the parties agreeing that

once the Kashmir issue was settled they would renegotiate the agreement to reflect changed
geopolitical realities and “sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement”.
Mattis also appears tone-deaf to regional historical realities. The CPEC initiative is not the first
time China has invested heavily in the region; in 2008, Beijing entered into an agreement with
the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority to engage in infrastructure
development in Kashmir following 2005’s devastating quake. Rehabilitation works in Bagh,
Muzaffarabad and Rawalakot were assigned to the China International Water and Electricity
Corporation and the China Xinjiang Beixin Group — both state-owned contracting firms.
Similarly, the Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project was also a joint Pakistan-China programme
initiated in 2008. The Karakoram Highway, the land route connecting Pakistan and China via
Kashmir, was a product of bilateral collaboration dating back to 1959. The KKH was upgraded
following a devastating landslide in 2010 — again with Chinese assistance.
Such development work in the ‘disputed territory’ is not unique to China-Pakistan ventures,
however; India has also committed to many infrastructure projects in the region’s Indian-held
portions and the US has never considered such projects in Kashmir a problem in the past.
Fixating merely on the nomenclature of One Belt, One Road obfuscates the real reasons behind
US unease with the initiative. Mattis’s statements speak to an ahistorical, idealised notion of
‘full-spectrum dominance’ in which the US sees fit to ‘project power’ across the world. The
‘disputed’ nature of Kashmir is not novel, nor is the Kashmiri peoples’ right to self-
determination under international law. What is novel is America’s growing chagrin at possibly
being rendered strategically irrelevant in South Asia.
Sikander Shah is former legal adviser to Pakistan’s foreign ministry, and faculty, Lums Law
School.
Abid Rivzi is an expert on international law.
Published in Dawn, October 29th, 2017

Conquering minds
REED from Al Qaeda in 2001, the Tora Bora caves and the tunnels in Afghanistan have now
fallen to violent extremists linked to the militant Islamic State (IS) group. This strategic ‘victory’
for the terrorist group came after the US dropped the so-called mother of all bombs in April on
its hideouts, a network of tunnels in Afghanistan.
The IS march in Afghanistan has once again proved that finding new physical spaces is not a
major issue for the terrorists; many conflict-ridden, ungoverned, and poorly administered
territories are available — from the sub-Saharan region to the tribal areas in the Arabian
Peninsula, from the bordering region between Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Philippines.
As the terrorists continue to mount threats to physical security, the response is also expected
to remain focused on employing greater force. This is also making it more challenging for
Muslim power elites to take on the terrorists in their ideological and intellectual spaces. The
Trump administration’s renewed focus on hard approaches to countering terrorism could
provide these elites with more excuses to continue living in their mental comfort zones.
Ironically, the claimants of Muslims’ religious leadership, Saudi Arabia and Iran, are accusing
each other of supporting terrorism. However, the Saudi and Iranian counterterrorism mantras
and alliances are nothing more than efforts to secure their own petty political and strategic
interests — at the cost of the lives of those these two countries claim to lead.
The IS is a manifestation of the intellectual bankruptcy of the Muslim ruling elites.
Their actions are not only bringing trouble to themselves but are also fuelling sectarian tensions
in Muslim societies and polarising Muslim-majority nations by forcing them to choose sides.
This is an appalling situation, mainly for many Muslim states including Pakistan, which are
struggling to adjust to the strategic and economic meltdown in the Middle East.
The IS is a manifestation of the intellectual bankruptcy of the Muslim ruling elites. The real
challenge thus is not the expansion of the group in physical spaces, but the mindset of the
ruling elites and their partners, ie the clergy, which is scared of new ideas. They don’t realise
that their traditionalism and orthodoxy are eroding their own foundations.
The need to evolve intellectual responses for countering extremism notwithstanding, a review
of collective wisdom and its expressions is also important, mainly to measure a nation’s level of
resilience and maturity. Parliament is the true representative of the collective wisdom of
Pakistanis. It has recently suggested a neutral role for Pakistan in the Middle East crisis. Similar
parliamentary advice came on the Yemen crisis. The policymakers and media of both Saudi
Arabia and UAE criticised this stance.
A statement circulating on social media, attributed to a top Saudi official, that criticised
Pakistani neutrality and parliament, should not be surprising because many believe that our

Arab brothers are not interested in Pakistan’s democratic credentials, but in the country’s
military power.
Let’s not forget that when parliament took a neutral position on Yemen, the UAE tried to
punish Pakistan through developing a strategic partnership with India, although it knew that
India could not support their misadventure in Yemen.
Many opinion makers in Arab countries also accused Pakistan for ‘using’ parliament as an
excuse to not send its troops for military adventures. Though in that case parliament proved a
blessing for the establishment, the maturity it has shown over the issue is commendable.
However, the actual challenge for parliament is to build intellectual and policy capital.
One can debate the capacity of parliamentarians and the government’s somewhat indifferent
attitude towards parliament, but this is still the institution which is keeping the country
cohesive. This is the institution which should address the issue of extremism and the IS in our
minds.
Parliament can take the lead in nurturing the process of inclusive nation-building, by initiating
debates on the extent to which diversity has been dissipated by policies of the past and
incorporating the voices of different groups in the country. Parliament can draw an outline of a
fresh national narrative. It can engage with all departments or institutions of the government,
informing them of the consequences of their actions on social diversity.
An active and effective parliament can fill the spaces which exist in our thoughts and that are
exploited by multiple ideological players including the IS. It is recognised that terrorist groups
are more afraid of non-violent, soft measures than hard measures. They exploit hard measures
by pushing the narrative of the ‘victimhood of Islamic forces’ to justify both their existence and
their violent acts. Their reaction is stronger if someone challenges their narrative; be it religious
scholars, the media or opinion makers. There are plenty of examples available that they hit
hard those who challenge their arguments.
The content analysis of any militant publication would be helpful to understand the ideological
paraphernalia of a terrorist group. For example, an old issue of Ahya-i-Khilafat (Revival of the
Caliphate), a mouthpiece of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, consisted of 15 articles including an
interview with its leader and profile of a leading commander. Four articles were dedicated to
their operations and so-called successes, two were against secularism, two detailed articles
were meant to elaborate and glorify the caliphate system; but four articles were allocated to
build their case against democracy and parliament. One article titled ‘I am a constitutional man’
was a satire on religious political leaders, ie what did it mean (for the militants) in religious
terms when these leaders said they believed in a constitutional democracy.
Parliament is a target of non-state actors and our Arab friends are also not happy with the
institution on different grounds. One is not sure whether or not our parliamentarians know
their importance and the role they have to play in developing a moderate and inclusive
Pakistan.
If parliament fails, it will fail the nation.

Incomplete victory
THE Iraqi government’s formal announcement of the recapture of Mosul, the last remaining
stronghold of the militant Islamic State group in Iraq, is certainly a huge achievement. Iraqi
special forces engaged in a battle against IS in Mosul since October 2016. According to Iraqi
authorities, some 900,000 people have been displaced in the operation. But while Prime
Minster Haider al-Abadi has claimed “total victory” in relegating IS to the “dustbin of history”,
there are several reasons why we should still be concerned.
Having recently returned from Iraq, my conversations with young people who fled Mosul less
than a month ago indicated strong concerns regarding the rebuilding of Iraq, IS infiltration in
IDP camps as well as militant sleeper cells spread across a barely functioning state. The
concerns extend to other countries that have seen ‘fighters’ respond to the call for global jihad;
these fighters have travelled to the epicentre of Baghdadi’s ‘caliphate’.
Pakistan has reason to worry. The US-based Soufan Group, that focuses on security intelligence
services, estimates that between 2011-2015, close to 30,000 “foreign fighters” from more than
80 countries travelled to Iraq and Syria (not all joined IS). At least 650 young men are believed
to have travelled from Pakistan to Syria and Iraq. Whether motivated by ideology or seeking the
thrill of adventure, Pakistani recruits were expected to serve on the front lines of a brutal battle
that has now raged for close to six years.
Even after the Mosul victory, there is fear in Iraq.
However, young men in Mosul recount seeing Afghan and Pakistani fighters manning check
posts at heavily guarded exit points leading out of Mosul, often looking frustrated or simply
bored.
This is not surprising. While IS recruitment of foot soldiers and lower rank fighters has often
been conducted through ideological indoctrination, it does not conclusively explain why young
men actually join militant groups.
In addition, jihadi loyalties formed on the basis of more material motivations are fluid, pointing
to quick turnovers according to the positioning and global influence of the group. While most
young men are drawn to international conflicts and enamoured of militant groups that promise
glory bolstered by slick videos as those produced by IS, the reality is far less exciting.
Media analysis of IS propaganda and its preferred news agencies reveal that by mid-2016 calls
to fight in Libya had decreased and as IS scrambled to maintain its stronghold and evade
international border control and aviation monitors put largely in place by Interpol, self-
motivated attacks and home-grown terrorism increased.
Western European states (which also face a refugee crisis) have experienced multiple high-
impact IS-led or motivated attacks since 2015. Risk analysis conducted by the US Treasury
Department revealed that since 2016, IS was earning less than 40 per cent of its revenue from
oil (mainly due to loss of territory) and was relying heavily on extortion (accounting for more
than a third of its revenue) and taxes.
Most recently, Mosul residents told me that with dwindling territory, deflecting recruits and
crunching finances, IS became more brutal in its means, desperately seeking new territory. With
its eyes set on new frontiers, Pakistan is likely to emerge as an attractive destination, especially

with a large cohort of returning fighters. An enabling environment will be one that IS, the Nusra
Front, and others will be looking to cash in on.
Those who have fled to IDP camps recount stories of neighbours and families being used as
human shields. Young people were massacred for using cell phones; their severed heads were
used as footballs.
Fear continues to permeate a country where sleeper cells remain active and IS sympathisers are
difficult to identify: a singular reliance on security.
While security is of paramount concern in order to defeat militant groups and regain control of
key cities, in the coming years should the Iraqi army and government lose the level of trust they
currently enjoy in Iraq and pursue solely a military battle, the deeper causes of violent
extremism will continue to prevail.
Abadi is correct to stress on “national unity” and while the Iraqi army remains widely popular at
the moment, the people of Mosul have not forgotten the army’s sectarian approach during the
Maliki period (2006-2014). Young people, marginalised, frustrated and disenchanted with a
government that fails to provide may become susceptible to the pull of extremism, generating a
vicious cycle that is difficult to break. Sectarianism will further deepen these fault lines.
The Iraqi army may have declared victory in Mosul but bomb attacks continue and even now
many hear the exchange of gunfire. As pockets of resistance exist, the road towards rebuilding
Iraq is long and the deep-rooted causes of violent extremism have yet to be addressed. The
fight against IS is far from over and a victory is premature at best. And not only for Iraq.
The writer is a policy researcher.

Morality in Pakistan’s politics
THE report released recently by the joint investigation team probing the Panama Papers case
against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family has raised the political temperature. It has
also exposed the moral crisis of our society, as well as the growing political parochialism. These
have only deepened in recent years.
The use of abusive language, the hurling of baseless and damaging accusations, and the
mocking of opponents have already been accepted as political norms in Pakistan. Ironically, all
this is done in the name of upholding morality. While such practices are more or less part of the
political culture of all South Asian nations, Pakistan in particular, the morality tool is used by the
powers that be to legitimise or delegitimise certain political actors.
Interestingly, in the local diction of politics, the antonym of morality is not immorality, but
corruption. Politics and politicians are deemed immoral because they are corrupt, and loot and
misuse public money. Veteran politician Javed Hashmi is spot-on when he criticises the
selective, opaque and subjective accountability of politicians. Corruption is a disease and a
crime and whoever commits it must be brought to justice. Yet employing a selective morality
approach entails the risk of not only blurring the political and legal domains, but also providing
political space to the apolitical.
Different groups seek power and legitimacy through developing their own moral orders.
The morality issue — including imposing one’s idea of morality on others — is complex and
widespread in Pakistan, and not confined to politics alone. While its varying shades reflect in
our behaviours, different institutions use it in multiple contexts. Morality is a social value, which
can extract legitimacy from religion, social contract or cultural norms, but it cannot be an
alternative to the rule of law. Academically, the rule of law is distinguished from democracy,
human rights, and social justice. The rule of law does not challenge morality and neither does it
intervene in political or democratic processes. But power elites confuse the rule of law with
morality, believing that authoritarian structures can be sustained only on moral grounds.
Where does the public stand in the debate over the rule of law and morality? The PML-N
leadership is using the argument that it is the right of the people to decide the fate of the
government through the electoral process. However, public support cannot be an alternative to
the supremacy of the law, as people choose a government to govern under the Constitution
and the rule of law. Secondly, electoral accountability applies to government performance, not
to an individual’s conduct in violating the rule of law.
Different groups and institutions seek power and legitimacy through developing their own
moral orders. Religious segments consider themselves the custodians of morality, mainly in the
social and religious domains. Security circles — and now the judiciary, too — feel an obligation
to establish a political moral order. Neither challenges the other; rather they have developed a
compatibility with each other’s moral orders.
It is well known that religious-political parties have political stakes as well, and differ with the
establishment on certain issues. Yet their differences remain confined to a manageable domain
where both try to avoid breaking up the system. The consensus on the Legal Framework Order
between the military regime and the religious parties’ alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal
(MMA), in 2002, which allowed Gen Musharraf to continue ruling in military uniform, is an

example. In return, the MMA not only saved its provincial governments in the then NWFP (KP)
and Balochistan, but also saved from disqualification those of its members of parliament whose
madressah degrees were not compatible with university graduation degrees.
In the NWFP, the MMA government tried to expand the outreach of its moral order through the
introduction of the Hasba bill (Sharia implementation bill) in 2003, but this was challenged and
nullified by the Supreme Court. It was an attempt to codify their moral order into a legal
framework, but it was a breach of their determined role and power elites stopped the party
from doing so. In subsequent years, religious parties stuck to their main role in the social and
religious domains, and the power elites hardly disturbed them when they demonstrated their
moral order on the streets.
Political parties, however, do not fit into this equation of partnership with the security
establishment. They are reminded time and again that they must be subservient to the security
establishment, particularly when they try to ‘assert’ themselves — at times even in the areas
the Constitution puts them in charge of. The MMA’s attempt to legalise its moral order was
foiled, but the establishment had already succeeded in codifying its moral order through
introducing amendments in Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution in 1985.
There does exist a body that can become a bridge between institutions — parliament.
Ironically, the ruling party has remained indifferent to parliament, which has also provided
space to apolitical forces to outclass the government using the morality argument.
The moral question becomes more dangerous when parliament is not given sovereign status by
the power elites, including political forces. This, however, does not harm anyone more than the
political parties themselves, the political process and above all, the ruling party. When
parliament does not take the lead in shaping the narratives and managing conflicts, it creates
grey areas that anyone can exploit. The political leadership should have the ability to identify
the grey areas, rather than operating in this murky space.
The current political crisis also presents an opportunity to the political leadership to review
their actions. The ruling parties in particular should amend their approach of undermining
parliament. This is the parliament that can review Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution and
establish parity among institutions while strengthening the rule of law, accountability, and
transparency.
On paper, the supremacy of parliament seems attractive; but in practice, political parties avoid
making it their source of strength and prefer to play on the morally high political ground.
Perhaps, it is easier to challenge opponents than the status quo.

A dark age
IN the 14th and 15th centuries, Christian Europe was divided by the rivalries of the kingdoms of
Spain, France and England, the Holy Roman Empire and the squabbling papal and city states of
Italy. They were unable to unite in halting the advance of the ascendant Ottomans who reached
the gates of Vienna and were stopped there more by Sultan Suleiman’s demise rather than
credible Christian resistance.
Today, the roles are reversed. It is the Muslim world which is unable to unite to fend off the
domination of the West. The crisis between Qatar and its GCC partners is reminiscent of the
rivalries of Italy’s papal states and role of external powers in determining the destiny of its
weak rulers.
The Islamic world, wracked by multiple conflicts and crises, is traversing a period akin to
Europe’s Dark Ages.
Today’s vulnerable Muslim world is wide open to the influence and domination of external
powers.
First, in many Muslim countries, there is crisis of political legitimacy. Governance structures,
mostly bequeathed by departing Western colonists, have corroded. The authoritarian regimes
in the GCC and Iran were untouched by the Arab Spring; but most are vulnerable domestically
to both democratic and ideological challenge.
Egypt has reverted to military rule. Turkey’s populist leader battles internal and external
opposition. External intervention in Libya has yielded a civil war and the emergence of the
militant Islamic State group and other terrorist groups. Similarly, Syria has been destroyed by
external intervention and a brutal sectarian and ethnic civil war. The fiction of Iraq’s unity is
preserved by the presence of Iranian militias, US military support and the war against IS. The
US-installed Afghan regime is weak, corrupt, divided, and militarily beleaguered. Ironically,
among OIC members, Pakistan is one of the few which, despite corruption scandals, retains a
modicum of democratic legitimacy.
Second, violence is spreading across the Muslim world. Global terrorist groups — IS, Al Qaeda,
Boko Haram, Al Shabab, etc — are now active participants in civil and cross-border conflicts and
pose a threat to global stability.
Muslim nations are not the main sponsors of global terrorism; they are its principal victims.
Some major powers have fought terrorists selectively and at times used them for partisan
purposes. No effort has been made to stop state terrorism or to differentiate between
terrorists and insurgencies which, like the Afghan Taliban, have local, negotiable goals. Most
important, no concerted effort has been made to address terrorism’s ‘root causes’: persistent
injustices against Muslim peoples eg in Palestine and Kashmir, or poverty, ignorance and social
alienation which create recruits for terrorism, including over the internet.
Third, the crises within the Islamic world have been exacerbated by ideological and doctrinal
differences. The most vital schism is between Sunni and Shia power. This schism was dormant
until Iran’s 1979 ‘Islamic Revolution’. It rose to the fore in the Iraq-Iran war. It was manifest in
the Afghan civil war between the Afghan Taliban and the Northern Alliance. It was, however,

the US invasion of Iraq, its dismantling of the Sunni-dominated Baath party and army and the
organisation of one-man one-vote elections that enabled the Iran-sponsored Shia parties to
gain central power in Iraq and extend Iranian influence across the Levant and beyond.
Iran’s rise is anathema to its Sunni rivals: Saudi Arabia, the GCC and Egypt. Turkey has also been
uncomfortable; although it has been obliged recently to moderate its rivalry and secure
Tehran’s cooperation to forestall Kurdish separatism. Pakistan’s once close ties with Iran also
deteriorated over time due to multiple reasons: Islamabad’s termination of peaceful nuclear
cooperation, competition for influence in post-Soviet Afghanistan, Iranian ‘interference’ with
Pakistan’s Shia community, cross-border events in Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan and Iran’s
sudden reversal of support on Kashmir in response to Indian ‘incentives’.
But the sectarian divide is not the sole ideological rift within the Muslim world today. The
Muslim Brotherhood and its populist ideology have become abhorrent to Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and the UAE. Hamas, the Palestinian affiliate of the Brotherhood, has suffered collateral
damage. On the other hand, Qatar and Turkey have espoused the Brotherhood and Hamas,
offered refuge to their adherents and support to them in the Libyan civil war. Such Qatari
divergence was evidently the main reason for the Saudi-UAE break with Doha.
Last, but not least, today’s weak, vulnerable Islamic world is wide open to the influence and
domination of major external powers. The recent Arab Islamic American Summit in Riyadh was,
more than anything, an illustration of the susceptibility of most of the assembled Muslim
nations to US domination. Russia also enjoys critical influence with several Muslim countries,
including Iran and Turkey, due to its military power and growing role in Syria and the region. So
far, China has remained aloof from inter-Islamic differences. Its desire seems to be to use its
economic and financial power as a force for greater cohesion with Muslim countries.
What seems most dangerous for the immediate future is the hard-line positions being adopted
by the Trump administration on most international disputes and crises, including North Korea,
South China Sea, Syria and Iran. If implemented, these positions, particularly the formation of
an alliance against Iran, are likely to lead to the intensification of the conflicts affecting the
Muslim world.
Pakistan’s main preoccupations are: TTP and IS terrorism, Afghanistan and India. It appears that
Pakistan will face challenges in addressing these issues. President Ghani’s recent atrocious
accusations against Pakistan obviously had clearance from his US patrons. Trump’s refusal to
meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Riyadh was no accident. The Pentagon’s pre-emptive
identification last week of Pakistan as host of a Chinese military base is another negative signal.
While addressing its own priorities, Pakistan cannot ‘play possum’ on issues involving the
Islamic world. Such abstention does not behove the Muslim world’s second largest nation, its
largest military power and its only nuclear weapon state. Pakistan has consistently concluded
that its national and security interests can be best advanced by promoting unity and
cooperation among Muslim countries. Today, more than ever, Pakistan is obliged to play an
active role to develop viable avenues for conflict resolution and cooperation among the Islamic
nations and, hopefully, lead the way to a new age of enlightenment in the Muslim world.

The new cold war
WHEN the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, US President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of
State James Baker promised Moscow that Nato would not be moved closer to Russia’s new
borders. That promise was broken some years later by the Bill Clinton administration when the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were incorporated into Nato, followed soon after by
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, previously part of the Soviet Union itself.
George Kennan, the famous ‘X’ who anonymously penned the 1947 Foreign Affairs article that
provided the blueprint for America’s successful containment of the Soviet Union, was quoted
by Tom Friedman (New York Times, May 2, 1998), as saying: “I think it (Nato expansion) is the
beginning of a new cold war. ...the Russians will gradually react ... it is a tragic mistake”.
The Russians did react, as Kennan predicted, after Vladimir Putin had consolidated power.
When the attempt was made to bring Georgia into Nato, Moscow sliced off two statelets from
Georgia. When the pro-Russian president of Ukraine was ousted in a ‘political coup’, Putin took
over Crimea and supported the ethnic Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.
Although the US is no longer the global hegemon, it continues to behave as if it is.
Today, Russia is again a first-rate military power. Its actions in Georgia and Ukraine will not be
reversed. Moscow’s forces robustly patrol its western land, air and sea frontiers. The
forthcoming large military manoeuvres across Belarus will illustrate Nato’s vulnerability. Russia
has also reasserted its political, military and diplomatic role in the world’s ‘hot spots’.
The cerebral president Barack Obama displayed surprising strategic naiveté by simultaneously
provoking Russia and announcing his vaunted ‘pivot to Asia’ to contain a rising China.
Despite America’s formidable naval power in the Pacific and its alliances with Japan, India and
Australia, the US will be unable to oblige China to relinquish any of the territories or islands it
claims unless it resorts to a full-blown war. China’s growing military and economic power also
implies that the US will be unable to build reliable alliances to encircle China or block its sea
routes.
In the new Cold War, America is pitted against two great powers which, between them, are
likely to control the Eurasian ‘heartland’ and thus, if Halford McKinder’s thesis is right, also
‘control the world’. The US, meanwhile, is mired in the self-created quagmires of Afghanistan,
Iraq and Syria.
Although Donald Trump is a geopolitical novice, realisation of his desire to normalise relations
with Russia (whatever his personal motives) would have reduced America’s great power
adversaries from two to one. The US Congress has scuttled this option by imposing the new
sanctions against Russia.
Trump’s effort to secure China’s cooperation on North Korea was also sensible. The attempt
proved infructuous because the US demand that China apply extreme pressure on Pyongyang
to unilaterally give up its nuclear and missile capabilities was exorbitant and unrealistic.
Trump’s tweeted rants against China after the latest North Korean missile tests, US weapons
sales to Taiwan, and renewed ‘freedom of navigation’ forays in the South China Sea have
soured the prospects of Sino-US cooperation.

The early years of the first Cold War, when the US and the Soviet Union sought to consolidate
their respective spheres of influence and resorted to brinkmanship, were the most dangerous.
It was only after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that both awoke to the danger of a nuclear
Armageddon and instituted measures to regulate their competition, including nuclear arms
control. Thereafter, the Cold War was fought either in the shadowy world of espionage and
sabotage or through proxies.
The second cold war is in an early and dangerous phase and will be difficult to ‘manage’.
First, unlike the first Cold War, it is a trilateral, not bilateral, power struggle. Crisis management
will become even more complicated once other militarily significant states align themselves
with or against the major powers. Indeed, as at the outbreak of the First World War,
international peace and security could be disrupted by the actions of any one of several state
and non-state actors.
Second, the US appears to be seriously overestimating its power. Although the US is no longer
the global hegemon, it continues to behave as if it is. Coercion and force seem to be
Washington’s preferred option to address almost every challenge it confronts. Unless such
belligerence is moderated, a great power conflict could erupt in Eastern Europe or the South
China Sea; and the US could end up in shooting wars with North Korea and Iran. Some have
even advocated US counterterrorist intervention in Pakistan without calculating the
consequences.
Third, the potential for catastrophe has been magnified because, unlike the 1950s, now there
are not two but nine nuclear weapon states. A conventional conflict in Korea or South Asia
could rapidly escalate to the nuclear level.
Fourth, today’s conflicts are mostly ‘hybrid’ wars, encompassing special operations, sabotage
and cyber warfare. As Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, Syria, Libya and Yemen have illustrated, it is
easy to start such ‘complex’ wars but extremely difficult to prevent their escalation and
expansion.
The most tragic consequence of the new cold war will be the erosion of the collective efforts
required to address the emerging existential and global threats: poverty and hunger, climate
change, nuclear war, mass migration, communicable diseases. Nor will it be possible to
collectively exploit the vast opportunities for human progress and wellbeing that technology
and innovation now promise.
In the article mentioned, George Kennan added that what bothered him was “how superficial
and ill informed the whole US Senate debate was’ (on Nato expansion). The same can be said
about recent debates in the US Congress on Russia, Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan
and a host of other issues.
The world’s destiny cannot be left to be determined by militarists, political pygmies, or partisan
interests. It is imperative that political leaders who possess a global vision of a shared human
future forge a new ‘Westphalian’ consensus to circumvent a second cold war, effectively
prohibit the resort to force, control armaments and promote active international cooperation
to address the common challenges that confront mankind.

The refracted relationship
THERE are significant reasons for the maintenance of close and cooperative relations between
Pakistan and the US.
Unfortunately, Washington has almost always conducted its relations with Pakistan as a
function of America’s other strategic or tactical priorities of the moment. Since US goals and
priorities change periodically, at times rapidly, Pakistan-US ties have often resembled a roller-
coaster ride. One day Pakistan is America’s ‘most-allied ally’, the next its ‘most-sanctioned’ ally.
After being proclaimed a non-Nato ally in the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’, during the Obama
years, Pakistan became the object of suspicion and hostility, and eventually the target of
hundreds of US drone strikes, the Abbottabad intervention and the ‘accidental’ Salala attack, as
Washington increasingly viewed Pakistan through the prism of Afghanistan and India.
Pakistan-US ties will be most fundamentally affected by the evolution in the US-China
relationship.
In Islamabad, hope was generated by the early effusive call between Donald Trump and Nawaz
Sharif. That hope has not been discarded yet; but some recent signals indicate that the US may
again determine its posture towards Pakistan in the context of its goals in Afghanistan and its
ties with India, Iran and China.
During his recent visit to the region, US National Security Adviser Gen H.R. McMaster reverted
to assertions about Pakistani ‘safe havens’ for the Afghan Taliban as a convenient explanation
for the military ‘impasse’ in Afghanistan.
Even if a few thousand additional US-Nato troops are sent back to Afghanistan, a foreign force
of under 20,000, operating in support of a demoralised, untrained Afghan army, won’t be able
to simultaneously arrest the current momentum of the 30-80,000 Taliban and defeat the
growing numbers of the militant Islamic State group and its associated terrorists, like the
Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.
There’s now an international consensus, to which Islamabad, Beijing and Moscow subscribe:
peace will be restored in Afghanistan only through a negotiated settlement between Kabul and
the Afghan Taliban, whose objectives are limited to Afghanistan, and that the focus of military
operations in Afghanistan should be to eliminate the growing presence of IS and affiliated
terrorist groups. Hopefully, the US will join this consensus. It would help greatly to align
Pakistan-US postures on Afghanistan and counterterrorism.
From reports of McMaster’s visit to New Delhi, it appears the US will continue Obama’s
endeavour to co-opt India as a strategic partner to contain China. Yet, unlike Obama, Trump

may well be more sensitive to the impact of his India policies on China and Pakistan. The new
administration may seek difficult quid pro quos from India, eg termination of its ties to Tehran.
Trump may accord priority to economic goals, such as restricting immigration from India and
opening India’s protected market for US goods, services and investment. Or, India may have its
own reservations about entering into a junior partnership with the US, particularly the
implications for its ties with Russia and Iran.
For Pakistan, the litmus test will be to see how far US defence and technology supplies to India
are sensitive to Pakistan’s security interests, since 70 per cent of India’s conventional and non-
conventional capabilities are deployed against Pakistan. Open-ended US military and political
support under Obama emboldened the Modi government to adopt an intransigent and
belligerent position towards Pakistan.
India’s ongoing brutal repression of the popular pro-freedom Kashmiri protests, the daily
violations of the LoC ceasefire, its ‘Cold Start’ forward military deployments, Pakistan’s ‘full
spectrum’ nuclear and missile response, and the absence of dialogue between Pakistan and
India, have combined to create an environment where the danger of another Pakistan-India
conflict is real and present. Such a conflict could escalate to the nuclear level. Trump’s offer of
mediation has been welcomed by Pakistan but rejected by India. Hopefully, he will persist with
this mediatory initiative.
The emerging Pakistan-US relationship may also be impacted by the growing US-Iran tensions.
Although Washington is unlikely to scrap the nuclear agreement with Iran, Trump and his
generals seem determined to arrest and reverse Iran’s rising power in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and
Syria, and curb the capacity of the Iran-backed Hezbollah to threaten Israel from Lebanon or
Syria’s southern borders.
An informal alliance is being forged between Israel, the US and its GCC allies. The Saudi
invitation to several Muslim countries, including Pakistan, to participate in meetings with
President Trump in Riyadh outlines the ambitions of this putative alliance. The situation could
become acute if a hard-liner is elected to replace President Rouhani in the forthcoming Iranian
elections.
The nature and dynamics of this new configuration in the Gulf and West Asia will have profound
and inverse implications for Pakistan’s relations with Iran, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia
and the US, on the other. Pakistan can avoid damage to one or the other relationship by
remaining aloof from this impending confrontation and, if possible, promoting mediatory
diplomacy to defuse the causes of the Iran-Saudi (and US) tensions.
Pakistan-US ties will be most fundamentally affected by the evolution in the US-China
relationship. The Obama administration’s proclaimed ‘pivot to Asia’ was designed to ‘contain’
China by deploying most of the US Navy to the Pacific and building a string of alliances around
China. India was to be built up as part of this containment strategy. Pakistan’s security interests
suffered collateral damage as Washington opened the floodgates of advanced weapons and
technology to India.
However, the ultimate shape of US-China ties under Trump is not yet clear. After some
disturbing early pronouncements, it appears that Trump has developed a respectful
relationship with China’s President Xi Jinping at their Mar-a-Lago summit. The US and Chinese
leaders are cooperating to contain the danger from North Korea. There is hope, at least on

China’s side, that a trade war will be avoided and a cooperative relationship forged on
investment, commerce and other areas of common interest.
A cooperative US-China relationship would be a major positive development for Pakistan.
Besides facilitating the implementation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, it would ease
Pakistan’s differences with the US on Afghanistan and India.
Dr Kissinger’s 1971 secret trip to Beijing, facilitated by Pakistan, led to the creation of what is
now the “most important bilateral relationship” in the world. Pakistan has an enormous stake
in the preservation of this relationship.

Need for a new beginning
IT appears as though the symptom of externalisation is gradually taking over the thinking
pattern of most people living in this country. While regional strategic and internal security
challenges and threats are generally externalised, many also see an external conspiracy in the
current political crisis and the Supreme Court’s disqualification of Mian Nawaz Sharif.
Some commentators have even pointed to certain Gulf countries that were mentioned in the
Panama case and were reportedly not very happy with the Pakistani government’s stance of
impartiality in the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. The mind’s association with externalisation
is like opium addiction: it makes it fly high to things that are far removed from reality.
An interesting disclosure came from the former interior minister, a day before the
disqualification verdict. In his presser the other day, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan claimed the
country was being encircled and that only he, Mr Sharif and two army men knew this. In this
backdrop, he advised Mian Nawaz Sharif to accept the Panama case verdict humbly.
Interestingly, he had reacted otherwise when the Justice Qazi Faez Isa commission report,
probing last year’s Quetta blast that claimed the lives of several lawyers, criticised his
performance as interior minister.
Without reassessing internal security challenges, external challenges cannot be countered.
He did not elaborate on what exactly he was referring to, but one can guess that his words
were somehow related to issues of security since he — as interior minister at the time — was in
charge of internal security. His stress on ‘encirclement’ can also be interpreted as the
compounding of challenges for Pakistan on the eve of the United States’ review of its policy
towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its growing strategic ties with India.
Yet, this is not a secret as debate on these issues is already going on in policy and opinion
circles. The turmoil in Afghanistan, unrest in India-held Kashmir, the growing Middle East crisis
and India’s opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor are among the factors that have
largely shaped external views of the country. These factors are connected to each other and
they also have an impact on the economy and the internal security environment.
Whatever Chaudhry Nisar may have been referring to, one thing is certain: a protracted
political crisis will only add to our external and internal challenges. At the same time, without
reassessing internal security challenges and re-evaluating past responses, external challenges
— including ‘conspiracies’ — cannot be countered. The new cabinet must rethink the
approaches and policies of the past few years. Internal security challenges are hardly connected
to political activism. Political actors have a right to activate their support base on national
issues. Freedom of speech and political activism in cyber and virtual spaces does not harm

national security. Rather such debates can counter extremism and strengthen democratic
processes.
A review of the internal security situation suggests that the frequency of medium- to large-scale
terrorist attacks has not changed much, compared to the previous year. Ambiguities continue
over the status of some banned militant groups, and this is also a cause of fissures between the
civil and military leaderships. Many groups that have been tagged as ‘proxies’ not only continue
to cause diplomatic problems but have also, gradually, taken control of the state narrative to
emerge as a new far right that is both interfering in ‘strategic affairs’ and, alarmingly, causing
space for mainstream politics to shrink.
The pace and success of the implementation of measures under the National Action Plan are far
from satisfactory. It appears that the government has been investing a great deal on monitoring
the implementation of the plan, rather than directly investing in counterterrorism initiatives. A
major hurdle in the way of the effective implementation of NAP has been the lack of a
centralised mechanism; the plan, importantly, lacks parliamentary oversight. On the other
hand, while security institutions have made a few adjustments in their operational strategies,
they have failed to completely transform their approach to counterterrorism.
Sectarian violence is and will remain a threat so long as sectarian extremist groups remain
active in Pakistan — the discourse of hatred in the country continues to be sectarian often
through sectarian streams of madressahs. The government’s approach in dealing with such
extremists has been oriented around counterterrorism, without addressing the causes that
promote this particular mindset.
Secondly, intolerance against religious minorities is still a major issue in the country. It is of
concern that the government has not taken any concrete measures to stop persecution on the
basis of religion. The government is not implementing its own laws to curb hate speech or the
targeting of religious minorities that are also being subjected to violence. These points in NAP
have hardly received any attention from the government.
Unfortunately, the government has given very little priority to parliament. Except for approval
of NAP and the occasional discussion on the security situation in the aftermath of major
terrorist incidents, the institution has not put in efforts to shape internal security policies.
Though a new cabinet will have only a few months to function, it can draw the contours of the
security policy with the guidance of parliament, while civilian law-enforcement agencies should
be the first line of defence against any extremist threat. The Constitution is the guiding principle
of any dialogue on tensions within the country.
While parliament’s role in security policy formulation and in countering extremism is vital, it is
also essential for enriching democracy and the country’s political culture. An active parliament
and a fine balance between parliamentary, policy and executive functions could foil all
conspiracies and help in the development of effective responses to internal and external
threats.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the next cabinet crafts new paths or remains a captive
of old habits.

The merger question
IT is heartening to note that the National Implementation Committee on Fata Reforms has
directed the finance minister to pursue the allocation of Fata’s share from the divisible pool
with the National Finance Commission over the next 10 years. The committee has outlined four
interdependent aspects of mainstreaming: political, legal, economic and security.
Though the only viable option chosen by Fata’s residents and taken up by the 10-party political
alliance on Fata has been a merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, some circles still doubt its
viability. Two reservations are usually presented. First, the will the people of Fata must be
ensured before any merger — implying that perhaps the majority of the people might not
support it. Second, there should be an exceptional arrangement for Fata’s governance because
of its peculiar nature and because of the dysfunctions of state institutions.
Four indicators suggest that an overwhelming majority in Fata support the merger. First, the 10-
party political alliance — consisting of all the major political parties in KP and Fata, except JUI-F
— supports it. Second, all the 19 elected parliamentarians of Fata, both MNAs and senators,
had asked the federal government to merge Fata with KP through tabling a private bill in
parliament in 2015. Third, all governmental and non-governmental surveys, reports and
commissions have so far found that an overwhelming majority of Fata’s residents support the
merger. Fourth, activists, civil society groups and literati of almost all Fata’s seven agencies
have recently held numerous demonstrations in favour of a merger.
Where the second reservation is concerned, perhaps few observers and analysts can claim a
substantial difference between its culture and that of the settled districts of KP adjacent to the
seven agencies. Even if differences are observed, they are a result of keeping Fata’s people in
isolation through a weird colonial administrative system.
Any delay in Fata reforms prolongs its people’s misery.
Nobody can dispute the need for structural institutional reforms in Pakistan. For this to happen,
a paradigm shift on the policy level is needed to transit from a security to a welfare state. It is
implausible to assume that a model of separately reformed institutional structure can be put in
place in Fata that is different from the rest of Pakistan. Advocating a separately reformed
institutional structure for Fata, howsoever well-meaning, might create another excuse for
delaying reforms. This means that the people of Fata will remain living under inhumane colonial
governance, and Fata as an area will remain a black hole to be used for irrational strategic
purposes for an indefinite period of time.
It’s now beyond any doubt that an end to the draconian regime of the Frontier Crimes
Regulation (FCR) is the only valid policy option for the government and state of Pakistan. Events

on the regional and international horizon necessitate immediate administrative, judicial,

political and economic reforms in Fata.
It is, however, significant to note a few anomalies in the Fata reforms recommendations,
suggestions and discourse in the power echelons of the federal government. The suggestion to
substitute the FCR with the Tribal Areas Rewaj Bill, 2017 is self defeating, as the bill seems to
contain many ambiguities. Having the governor and not the chief minister of KP head Fata’s
development council might be considered self-contradictory. Creating a new designation of
chief coordination officer for Fata during the transition period might lead to misgivings among
the people. Putting off local government elections in Fata until after the 2018 election might
hinder the tribal areas from attaining cultural dynamism, social evolution and political
participation.
The most viable option for reforms and the mainstreaming of Fata seems to be its
constitutional and administrative merger with KP. Administrative, judicial and political reforms
might be considered an eyewash if a merger is excluded from the whole reform project.
All the tribal agencies have more geographical proximity and cultural similarity with some
settled districts of KP than with each other. Agencies in the northern and southern parts of Fata
have no communication between them; hence, communication among these agencies is carried
out through the settled districts of KP. To add, various public service delivery departments of KP
are already functional in Fata. Almost the same bureaucracy works in the province that serves
in Fata. There will be few or no bottlenecks in the transition to regular governance.
The most critical argument in favour of Fata’s merger with KP is linked to a collective identity. It
is high time that the transition from the anachronistic identity of tribal Pakistan to the Pakhtuns
of Pakistan took place in all earnestness to resolve the severe identity crises.
The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.
khadimhussain565@gmail.com
Twitter: @khadimhussain4
Published in Dawn, October 22nd, 2017

The dragon in the room
A SOUTH ASIAN crisis is still brewing after US Secretary Rex Tillerson’s speed visits to
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The brief encounter in Islamabad confirmed the gulf in
Pakistan-US positions.
What the US and India want from Pakistan is impossible for it to deliver.
The US has decided to ‘stay on’ indefinitely in Afghanistan. It knows it cannot defeat the Afghan
Taliban. It is unwilling to accept an equitable political settlement. It wants to utilise Afghanistan
as a base to contain China, resist Russia, push back Iran and coerce Pakistan to target the
Afghan Taliban, in particular the Haqqanis, in order to make its ‘stay’ in Afghanistan as
‘comfortable’ as possible. The US also wants Pakistan to suppress the Kashmiri militants and
restrain its nuclear and missile programmes. These latter aims are, of course, fully shared by
India.
In his public remarks, Tillerson cloaked US demands in the garb of concern for Pakistan’s
stability. In fact, Pakistan is most certain to be destabilised if it accepts the US and Indian
demands.
In the Zarb-i-Azb and subsequent operations, Pakistan expelled the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani
fighters from its soil. Some Taliban leaders periodically cross into Pakistan, Iran and other
neighbouring countries. In the past, Washington encouraged Pakistan to maintain contacts with
Taliban leaders to promote a political settlement in Afghanistan. Now, however, it wants
Pakistan to kill or capture them.
In the crisis unfolding, China could do several things to support Pakistan.
If Pakistan does start doing so, it would produce two outcomes: one, the Afghan Taliban would
join the Pakistani Taliban, Jamaatul Ahrar and the militant Islamic State group in perpetrating
terrorism against Pakistan; and two, it would foreclose the possibility of a political settlement in
Afghanistan since there would be no one left in the insurgency with the authority or stature to
negotiate such a settlement. This will prolong Afghanistan’s civil war, the suffering of its people
and instability in the region.
The consequences of forcibly suppressing the Kashmiri militant groups are similarly predictable.
Two of these organisations, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, were placed on the
Security Council’s terrorism list when the previous government in Islamabad agreed to this
under US pressure. But these groups and others, like the Hizbul Mujahideen, enjoy considerable
popular support in Pakistan. Military and police action against members of these pro-Kashmiri
groups who have not committed any crime will produce a public outcry and possibly a violent
reaction and intensify, not restrict, extremism. A programme for deradicalisation of extremist

groups through job creation and social reintegration is the best option. This would be easier if
India halts its oppression in held Kashmir and agrees to a peaceful resolution of the dispute.
Unfortunately, Pakistan’s reasonable concerns fall on deaf ears in Washington and, of course, in
New Delhi. Encouraged by US patronage, the Modi government is brutally suppressing the
latest revolt of the Kashmiri people. It has also adopted an aggressive posture towards Pakistan:
sponsoring anti-Pakistan terrorism from Afghanistan; intensifying ceasefire violations along the
Line of Control; and issuing repeated threats of ‘surgical strikes’, ‘limited war’ and a ‘Cold Start’
attack against Pakistan.
Not only has the US not opposed Indian brutality in held Kashmir and aggression and threats
against Pakistan, it has itself threatened Pakistan with sanctions, drone strikes and military
intervention unless it complies with US demands. American drone strikes appear to be already
under way. If Pakistan does not respond to unilateral US strikes, India may feel emboldened to
carry out its threats of military incursion. A South Asian conflict could be ignited by
miscalculation if not design.
To twist an idiom, it is time for the dragon in the room (China) to make an appearance.
America’s new alliance with India, its intention to arm India to the teeth, and its endorsement
of New Delhi’s aim to kill the Kashmiri freedom movement, are designed to secure India’s
collaboration to contain China’s rising power across Asia. Tillerson made no bones in spelling
this out in his CSIS speech before visiting the region.
Likewise, the US decision to ‘stay on’ in Afghanistan is designed in large measure to restrict
China’s growing influence in South and Central Asia and, more specifically, to challenge, if not
disrupt, President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. Defence Secretary Mattis objected that
the Belt and Road passed through ‘disputed territory’. Tillerson last week criticised the
conditions of Chinese financing for the Belt and Road projects.
So far, China has responded somewhat passively to the US-India strategy. After Trump’s Aug 21
speech, the Chinese foreign minister defended Pakistan’s counterterrorism credentials. The
Chinese foreign ministry refuted Mattis’s comment against CPEC. However, given the anti-
Chinese genesis of the two-front threat which Pakistan faces today, and China’s strategic stake
in the success of CPEC, it appears essential that Beijing extend strong political support to its
oldest ‘strategic partner’ and ‘do more’ to equalise the South Asian equation that is presently
tilted against Pakistan.
During all previous Pakistan-India crises, especially the 1965 and 1971 wars, China extended
diplomatic, material and military support to Pakistan.
In the crisis now unfolding in South Asia, China could do several things to support Pakistan:
— strongly endorse Pakistan and the UN’s demand for a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan
and help build a regional coalition in favour of such a settlement;
— call for a just and peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with
international law and denounce India’s brutal repression of the Kashmiri people;
— oppose all threats of use of force against Pakistan from any quarter and declare that any
aggression against Pakistan will evoke an appropriate Chinese response;
— affirm that CPEC’s security is the common and joint responsibility of Pakistan and China;
— offer Pakistan advanced and appropriate weapons systems to defend and deter aggression
from the east or the west.

The forthcoming visit of President Trump to China offers the opportunity for a powerful
President Xi Jinping to convey China’s opposition to America’s India-centric policies and
destabilising demands on Pakistan, and to propose a plan for comprehensive Sino-US
cooperation to advance security and prosperity across Asia, including South Asia and the
developing world.
Terms of re-engagement
PAKISTAN-US relations have entered a new and tense phase following President Donald
Trump’s harsh allegations and threats against Pakistan in August and Islamabad’s angry
response.
Both sides, however, appear inclined to re-engage with each other. The nature of the future
relationship will be determined by the terms of such ‘re-engagement’.
After Pakistan postponed several meetings with US officials, the first encounter was the US-
requested meeting between Vice President Mike Pence and Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan
Abbasi on the margins of the UN General Assembly last month.
Vice President Pence was circumspect and respectful in this meeting. However, it was clear
then, and is clearer now, that the core US position and its demands on Pakistan have not
changed. On the contrary, Pakistan’s readiness to re-engage with the US, and the visible anxiety
among some in Islamabad to do so, appears to have once again emboldened US generals, if not
its diplomats, to resume pillorying Pakistan.
Read: Sense returns to Pak-US relations
After his meeting with the Pakistan foreign minister, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson dwelt
mainly on Pakistan’s intrinsic importance rather than its role in Afghanistan (although his
remark about the stability of Pakistan’s government indicated an interesting dimension of the
encounter). By Khawaja Asif’s own account, the interaction with US National Security Adviser
Gen H.R. McMaster was more confrontational.
And, even while the Pakistan foreign minister was in Washington, US Chief of Staff Gen Joseph
F. Dunford, speaking in the house, accused Pakistan’s ISI of “maintaining connections with
terrorist groups” (as if the CIA has never had such links!) and, more significantly, of “running its
own foreign policy”.
Someone has obviously convinced Gen Dunford that there is a gap in the positions of the ISI
and other parts of the Pakistan government. This is dangerous, because it could lead the US to
take ill-advised actions that could disrupt re-engagement and domestic stability in Pakistan.
Pakistan must not delude itself that its re-engagement will change US strategic goals.
The US defence secretary, testifying to US legislators, said the US would “make one more try” at
changing Pakistan’s “behaviour”, but if this does not work, it has more “powerful options” to
coerce compliance. Most of these US ‘options’ are by now well known, as are Pakistan’s likely
responses. Deploying these will spell a definitive break in relations.

More revealing was Jim Mattis’s assertion that China’s Belt and Road initiative ran through
“disputed territory”. The Karakoram Highway has been in existence for over 40 years; it is
strange that the US seems to have woken up to its passage through “disputed territory” only
after India’s declared opposition to CPEC.
New Delhi must be pleased; while China has expressed its unhappiness. But, most importantly,
this comment has no doubt reinforced the suspicion in Pakistan that that the US is part and
parcel of an Indian plan to disrupt CPEC, and China’s access to the Arabian Sea, by destabilising
Pakistan through Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorism and the Baloch Liberation Army
insurgency.
This conclusion would lead to two others: one, that America’s new desire to stay on indefinitely
in Afghanistan is designed primarily to advance its strategic goals in the region against China,
Russia, Iran and Pakistan, not to stabilise Afghanistan; and two, that its allegations about
Afghan Taliban ‘safe havens’ in Pakistan are designed mainly to justify future US political and
economic actions to destabilise Pakistan and disrupt CPEC.
In this construct, former Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s recent suspicions about the rise of
the militant Islamic State group in Afghanistan “under US watch” acquire new significance.
Moscow has voiced concern for some time about the danger of IS’s extension from Afghanistan
to Central Asia and Russia’s Caucasus region.
Iran has long alleged that the US ‘created’ IS in Iraq and Syria. China has been preoccupied by
the presence of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in Afghanistan. All three powers have
established contacts with the Afghan Taliban to promote a political settlement in Afghanistan
and counter IS and its associates.
Given these questions regarding US objectives, Islamabad would be well advised to define its
positions clearly before embarking on a new dialogue with the US.
On Afghanistan, Pakistan’s cooperation should be aimed at: one, the elimination of IS and its
associates, including the TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar; and two, the promotion of a negotiated
political settlement between Kabul and the Afghan Taliban (who will inevitably want a power-
sharing agreement and the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan).
Pakistan must make it clear that it will: oppose any security role for India in Afghanistan. And,
while it will act to halt any cross-border attacks from its side, it expects, in turn, that Kabul and
the coalition will halt cross-border attacks from Afghanistan.
On India and Kashmir, Pakistan should insist that the US help to halt: India’s human rights
violations in occupied Kashmir; its ceasefire violations along the Line of Control, and its
repeated threats of ‘surgical strikes’ and ‘limited’ war against Pakistan. Trump’s earlier offer to
mediate between Pakistan and India should be revived or the UN activated to do so.
Similarly, on nuclear issues, Pakistan’s determination to preserve its nuclear deterrence
capability leaves no room for unilateral restraint or concessions. The US should encourage
India’s acceptance of the reciprocal restraint regime which Pakistan has repeatedly proposed.
‘Process’ will greatly influence the outcome of the re-engagement. Pakistan should insist on a
clear agenda reflecting the objectives and concerns of both sides. Both should undertake to
refrain from public accusations and insults.
The talks should be based on the principle of reciprocity. (Unilateral concessions will lead to US
demands to ‘do more’.) Equivalence must be maintained in the level of interaction. Junior or

mid-level US officials should not be received by Pakistan’s leaders. It diminishes their

importance and weakens Pakistan’s negotiating positions.
Finally, Pakistan must not delude itself that its re-engagement will change US strategic
objectives and policy.
This will only happen if the US and China reach a global accommodation; or if China, Russia, Iran
and Pakistan succeed in promoting a political settlement in Afghanistan; or if the US military
and Kabul suffer dramatic defeats, and US public opinion obliges Washington to withdraw from
“the graveyard of empires” and end its longest war.
The nuclear dimension

US PRESIDENT Donald Trump spoke harshly about Pakistan; but he has not yet imposed
sanctions, as has been the case with Iran, nor threatened to “totally destroy” it, like North
Korea. Pakistani diplomats believe there is room to maintain a working if not a cosy relationship
with Washington.
That remains to be seen. Islamabad disagrees with the ‘new’ US strategy concerning
Afghanistan. It will not fight Afghanistan’s war on its soil. It will continue to oppose an
expanded Indian role in Afghanistan. It wants a political settlement between Kabul and the
Afghan Taliban, rather than continued conflict, and coordinated action to eliminate the militant
Islamic State group and Al Qaeda, as well as the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Jamaatul Ahrar
and the Balochistan Liberation Army, that operate from safe havens in Afghanistan.
Even if Pakistan and the US are able to reconcile their divergent positions on Afghanistan, the
emerging strategic alignments that will shape policies in Asia are unlikely to change. The US has
chosen India as its major strategic partner in Asia to counter the rising power of China. The
resulting escalation in the Indian threat to Pakistan’s security is either irrelevant for the US or
part of its strategic plan to weaken Pakistan’s opposition to Indo-US regional domination. The
recent visit of the US defence secretary to India has confirmed and reinforced their strategic
alliance and intention to collaborate in Afghanistan.
Without its nuclear and missile capabilities, Pakistan would have been sanctioned like Iran.
Pakistan’s ability to resist Indian diktat and to disagree with America’s strategic design flows
from one principal source: its nuclear and missile capabilities. Without this, Pakistan would
have been attacked like Iraq or sanctioned like Iran. On the other hand, North Korea, despite its
isolation, has been able to thumb its nose at America because of its demonstrated nuclear and
missile prowess.
An Islamic nuclear power was always anathema for America and much of the Western world.
The US worked ceaselessly — even when Pakistan was a close ally — to retard and reverse its
nuclear and missile programmes. This endeavour has intensified since the emergence of the
American alliance with India. Apart from the discriminatory technological and political
restrictions it has long imposed against Pakistan’s strategic programmes, the US now demands
that Pakistan unilaterally halt fissile material production and the development and deployment
of short- and long-range nuclear-capable missiles. Meanwhile, it is actively assisting India in

enlarging and modernising its nuclear arsenal, its missile and anti-ballistic missile capabilities,
its air and naval forces, as well as satellite and space capabilities.
There are credible and not-so-secret reports that the US has formulated plans to seize or
destroy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in a crisis. American think tanks have concocted scenarios
of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists or, even more absurdly, of the
Pakistan Army turning into an ‘extremist’ or ‘jihadi’ force. Indeed, such scary scenarios could be
engineered as an excuse to execute the ‘seize or destroy’ plans.
Matters are more likely to come to a head in the event of another war between Pakistan and
India. Kashmir is an ongoing dispute and a nuclear flashpoint. Every India-Pakistan war game
confirms the likelihood of a rapid escalation of a conflict to the nuclear level due to the
asymmetry in conventional forces. A war should thus be unthinkable. Yet, India’s political and
military leaders continue to speak of ‘surgical strikes’ and a ‘limited’ war against Pakistan. If
India does ever decide to go to war with Pakistan, it would have to first conduct a pre-emptive
strike to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Or, would the US be prepared to
do so on India’s behalf? Pakistan must be prepared for both contingencies.
Islamabad must presume that in the course of its past (ill-considered) ‘cooperation’ with the US
to enhance the ‘safety and security’ of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, the US has gained considerable
intelligence about Pakistan’s strategic assets. However, Pakistani officials correctly discount
America’s ability to seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. These are too many, and too widely
dispersed and well protected, thus not amenable to any seizure or strike. But nuclear delivery
systems are more difficult to hide and protect.
In a crisis, it is the delivery systems that will be the prime target of a pre-emptive strike. These
are most likely to be detected when, in a crisis, they are being ‘mated’ with the separately
stored warheads. Furthermore, as revealed during the current Korean drama, missile launches
can be sabotaged by cyberattacks and other technical means.
In the emerging strategic scenario, nuclear deterrence is Pakistan’s ultimate assurance against
external aggression and coercion.
Pakistan needs to take several measures so that the credibility of its nuclear deterrence is
assured. One, the massive deployment of artillery and short-range missiles (à la North Korea) as
the first line of conventional deterrence and defence against an Indian Cold Start attack. This
would deter Indian attack and also raise the nuclear threshold. Two, the multiplication of long-,
medium- and short-range nuclear-capable missiles to ensure the penetration of any ballistic
missile defence systems that India deploys. Three, the continued production of fissile materials
to provide warheads for the enlarged missile force.
Then, there is the need to ‘mate’ at least some warheads with delivery vehicles, their dispersal
and disguise, or protection in hardened silos, to respond to a pre-emptive strike. Eventually,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles could provide an assured second-strike capability. Five,
the deployment of effective air defence systems plus a limited number of advanced (and
expensive) anti-ballistic missile systems to protect command and control centres. Six, the
development of offensive and defensive cyber-warfare capabilities.
Following this, Pakistan needs the acquisition and deployment of early-warning capabilities —
satellites, surveillance aircraft and drones. In the meantime, Pakistan should utilise Chinese

early warning capabilities. Lastly, greater integration and inter-operability with Chinese land, air
and naval forces to enhance conventional and strategic deterrence, quickly and cheaply.
Once Pakistan can demonstrate the complete credibility of its nuclear deterrence posture, its
offers to negotiate peace and security in South Asia and to resolve the Kashmir dispute may
evoke a more positive response from both India and the US. Pakistan will then also be able to
pursue its socioeconomic objectives free from the threats of external coercion, intervention
and aggression.
Published in Dawn, October 1st, 2017
America’s new Afghan war
GIVEN US President Trump’s initial opposition to continuing the Afghan war, his new policy —
to escalate the US military campaign in Afghanistan and blame Pakistan for the stalemate and
threaten it with penalties — represents a serious political setback for Islamabad. After its
anticipated angry response, Pakistan’s senior diplomats have rightly advocated a continued
effort to engage the US and simultaneously develop a regional response to the new US policy.
Islamabad and other regional capitals no doubt realise that America is embarking on a ‘new’
war in Afghanistan, after its initial ‘war of revenge’ (2001-2004); ‘nation building’ ( 2005-2009)
and Obama’s various combinations of a ‘fight, talk, pacify and withdraw’ policy. Trump’s new
policy can be described as ‘stay and fight’.
The immediate US goal in Afghanistan is to prop up the pliant Kabul regime militarily and
prevent its overthrow by the Afghan Taliban. The US generals, who are driving this policy, know
that neither complete victory nor an acceptable political settlement is likely.
The US is no longer interested in a political settlement unless the Afghan Taliban accept
America’s terms.
The strategic purpose of staying on indefinitely in Afghanistan is not to pacify it but to use it as
a base for the promotion of America’s broader objectives in the region: one, to impose a ‘Pax
Indo-Americana’ in South Asia, including by securing Pakistan’s acceptance of the status quo in
Kashmir and severe restraints on Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capability; two, to reverse Iran’s
ascendancy in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq and neutralise its perceived threat to Israel; and, three,
to limit the influence of China and Russia in Afghanistan and its neighbourhood and impede
China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road initiative including the CPEC project.
The US is clearly no longer interested in a political settlement in Afghanistan unless the Afghan
Taliban accepts America’s terms. Washington is not asking Pakistan to persuade the Afghan

Taliban to agree to talks. It is demanding that Pakistan fight the Afghan Taliban itself and thus
make it ‘easier’ for the US to prevent a Taliban victory and ‘stay on’ in Afghanistan.
The Americans know full well that almost all the Afghan Taliban fighters are in Afghanistan.
Some may try at times to hide in border valleys and forests. Some Taliban leaders cross over to
the large refugee camps and Afghan ‘neighbourhoods’ in and around Pakistani cities. Their
periodic presence there has been used in the past by all parties, including the Americans, to
facilitate inter-Afghan contacts and dialogue.
If Pakistan were to capture or kill the Afghan Taliban leadership, they are likely to forge an
alliance with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and other militants who are attacking Pakistan. This
will severely exacerbate Pakistan’s security challenges, including from the India- and Kabul-
sponsored TTP and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) militants.
Second, with the elimination of the Afghan Taliban leadership, negotiating an Afghan peace
settlement will become virtually impossible. US generals may not mind a never-ending war; but
the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan deserve a strategy that leads to peace, not perpetual
war.
Third, eliminating the Afghan Taliban, whose political agenda is limited to Afghanistan, will
strengthen the extra-territorial terrorist groups in Afghanistan: the militant Islamic State (IS)
group (against whom the Afghan Taliban are fighting); Al Qaeda, with whom the Afghan Taliban
have renounced past links; and Al Qaeda associates TTP, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (Etim) which are mainly threatening
Afghanistan’s neighbours Pakistan, Russia, China and Central Asia. It is for these reasons that
these neighbours have opened channels of contact with the Afghan Taliban.
Pakistan’s energetic new prime minister has offered intensified counterterrorism cooperation
and joint border patrols to the US and Kabul. Pakistan’s ongoing programme to fence and
closely monitor the border can be effective in preventing cross-border attacks. The US should
convince Kabul to support it. Pakistan’s cooperation would encompass joint action against IS, Al
Qaeda and their associates. Islamabad can undertake further steps to promote dialogue
between Kabul and the Afghan Taliban. Naturally, Pakistan would expect reciprocal US and
Afghan action against the TTP and BLA safe havens in Afghanistan.
Even if Pakistan were to accommodate the US on Afghanistan, it would not be satisfied. Its
demands include calls for action against the pro-Kashmiri groups (Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammad) and for acceptance of one-sided constraints on Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence
capabilities.
Under US pressure, previous Pakistani governments agreed to put the LeT and JeM on the
Security Council’s ‘terrorism’ list. Islamabad has outlawed them and seized their assets. The US
and India want Pakistan to eliminate the iterations of these organisations and incarcerate their
leaders. It would be unwise for Pakistan to accept the onus for putting its ‘house in order’ and
enable India to subvert the legitimate Kashmiri struggle for self-determination and continue its
brutal repression in occupied Kashmir.
Pakistan is also unlikely to entertain American demands to halt the development and
deployment of short- and long-range nuclear-capable missiles, especially when the US is
promoting Indian armament, not disarmament, and is known to have formulated plans to
neutralise Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capabilities in a crisis.

Consequently, the proffered engagement with the US is likely to prove infructuous. Pakistan
should prepare itself to bear the ‘pain’ of the threatened US sanctions. It should draw its own
‘red lines’. Any sign of weakness will intensify, not ameliorate, US coercion.
The Pakistani foreign minister’s consultations with China, Turkey, Iran and Russia will hopefully
yield a regional consensus that would be valuable in resisting America’s new and aggressive
posture. Such a regional consensus could: one, accord highest priority to eliminating IS, Al
Qaeda and ‘associated’ militants TTP, Jamaatul Ahrar, Etim, IMU; two, extend support for a
negotiated settlement between Kabul and the Afghan Taliban; three, endorse Pakistan’s plan to
fence and closely monitor the Pak-Afghan border; and, four, demand strict respect by all,
including the US-Nato forces, for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan and other
regional states.
Ultimately, as history attests, an external military solution cannot be imposed on the Afghans.
Like others, the US will leave the ‘graveyard of empires’ in ignominy if it does not depart in
dignity.
Extremist minds on campus

IRRESPECTIVE of who had put it forth, the proposal to securitise educational campuses is a
terrible idea. Hopefully, it won’t be approved as it would add to our past failures to effectively
deal with the country’s education and security affairs.
The media hype around the arrest of some university-educated terrorists of the Ansarul Sharia
group in Karachi gives the impression that universities have become a breeding ground for
violent extremism. This is a simplistic interpretation of a complex phenomenon.
The suggestion to control campuses through security institutions is as bad as the response of
some official quarters that welcomed the idea. It is an indication not only of the lack of
empirical wisdom among those dealing with violent extremism — our most critical challenge —
but also their approach to academic institutions. Rather than facilitating an independent and
fair academic, intellectual and research atmosphere on campuses, the government apparently
deems educational institutions mere degree-awarding factories — perhaps that is why it
believes that the objective can be achieved even in a controlled atmosphere. Such measures,
however, would worsen the persisting academic crisis in universities.
The challenge of extremism is far more complex and deep rooted than is understood by
policymakers. Extremist tendencies are common in all segments of society, irrespective of their
socioeconomic status and educational backgrounds. A study carried out last year by the Sindh
Counter Terrorism Department revealed the diverse educational backgrounds of 500 detained
suspected militants. According to the study, 202 had not received any education at all. Among
the literate, 134 had Bachelor’s or Master’s degrees, 63 were matriculates, while 101 had
studied up to class nine. The institutional background of these suspects was also diverse as 169
had studied at madressahs, 98 at public schools and 92 at private institutions.
The challenge of extremism is far more complex and deep rooted than is understood by
policymakers.

The trends of violent and non-violent extremism amongst educated youth are cause for
concern as they represent technically skilled and academically strong individuals — and such
extremism is a great loss of the nation’s talent. At the same time, such qualified individuals
inject new energy in terrorist groups, as happened in the case of the Ansarul Sharia which
recently triggered a new wave of violence in Karachi.
The extent to which educational institutions’ curricula contribute to the construction of
extremist minds is debatable. One thing, however, is clear: certain religious narratives persist in
the country, and largely act as factors of violent and non-violent extremism. As these narratives
are widespread, the process of ideological radicalism or extremism can take place anywhere,
including in educational institutions, mosques, homes, neighbourhoods, even cyberspace.
One can’t deny the fact that student wings of religio-political parties and of sectarian,
charitable, radical and banned militant organisations are still active on educational campuses.
These wings have a key role in promoting religious extremism amongst students and have an
array of tools at their disposal to increase their influence. They consistently rely on radical
literature and publications and disseminate the message not only through the printed word but
also through CDs, DVDs, and the social media, depending on which group or class they are
targeting. For instance, social media is an important propagation and recruitment tool for
organisations such as the militant Islamic State group, and Al Qaeda as well as radical outfits
like Hizbut Tahrir. Sectarian and tribal militants still prefer printed publications though they are
also increasingly inclined to use different apps to communicate.
That radicalisation among educated youth is a recent phenomenon is an evolving myth. Public-
sector educational institutions have remained the primary target of militant organisations since
the 1980s, under state patronage to boost a ‘jihad’ culture in the country. There will be hardly a
town in Pakistan that doesn’t have a street or road named after the martyred of Kashmir or
Afghanistan, and most of them studied in some mainstream school, college or university.
After 9/11 it became difficult for militants to launch their recruitment campaigns in public
spaces. As an alternative, they first established their student wings with cover names and then
targeted teachers and encouraged them to form ‘jihadi study circles’ on their campuses. After
the Lal Masjid crisis in 2007, they amended their strategies, changed their mode of
communication and became sophisticated in their recruitment operations. During the past
decade, the number of multiple types of international, regional and local militant and radical
groups has increased in the country; they compete to make their calls more attractive, thus
hoping to ensnare the best minds.
Religiously motivated radicals and militants are still operating overtly and covertly on
campuses. While administrations fear radical elements and are thus reluctant to take action
against them, the government is neither willing to provide any protection to the
administrations nor take on such elements itself. Both the administrations and the government
try to silence alternative and moderate voices on campuses.
The ban on student unions badly hurts the academic and democratic atmosphere of campuses.
The fear that student groups will disturb the atmosphere is based on myopic perceptions. Most
studies on the subject recommend that the long-term effectiveness of student unions should
not be undermined by the excuse of short-lived tensions. The government should ban the
student wings of religious and militant organisations and focus on breaking the radical groups’

nexus with teachers and students. This can be achieved through allowing students to live in an
open academic and political atmosphere. The securitisation of campuses will further restrict
free spaces and the radicals will continue to invent new ways to survive and encroach.
The administrations of colleges and universities can take some initiatives themselves to secure
their campuses from the influence of extremists. They can form student-teacher vigilance
committees to spot the activities of radical groups on their premises and to promote the
culture of sharing and dialogue. The government can sensitise teachers about the threat and
organise refresher courses for this purpose.
Obviously, teachers and students would have more creative and practical solutions in their
minds; administrations and the government should have to listen to them and include their
voices in collective decisions for safe and secure campuses in the country.
Uncounted numbers
FOR those conscientious Pakistanis working for the social and economic progression of the
disenfranchised, the provisional data representing persons with disability from the 2017
Population Census of Pakistan was, quite simply, appalling.
It was a mathematician’s nightmare, a social scientist’s cringe; it elicited civil society’s collective
shock, and highlighted governmental ineptitude. Yet its most damning effect is its potential to
be a mortal blow to all those individuals with disability who yearn to be a part of the Pakistani
fabric as economically sound and educated contributors. To put it simply, an ill-fated journey
that began with statistical missteps might culminate in a societal tragedy of epic proportions.
Statistical misinformation: According to the provisional data, there are currently less than one
million persons with disability residing in Pakistan (0.48 per cent of the total population), a
figure which is illogically less than that of the previous census conducted in 1998 (which stated
the figure to be at 2.38pc of the total population or around 3.2m people). The global estimate
of persons with disabilities is 10pc to 15pc of the world population according to the World
Health Organisation, which if applied to Pakistan would number 20m to 31m.
The census has pushed the disabled further to the fringes.
Compared to the most recent population figures for many developed nations, let alone
developing countries, the number of persons with disabilities is, on average, higher than 10pc
nationally; a statistic corroborated by the 19pc of Americans declaring a disability in 2010. In a
developing nation such as Pakistan, a 0.48pc figure is not simply logically unsound, but also
systematically and patently unjust to a vast majority of an already underrepresented and

under-resourced segment of the population, that continues to lag woefully behind on all human
development indicators.
Due to glaring missteps on the part of the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, none of the provisions
for the inclusion of this frequently underrepresented community were added to the
documentation in the initial stages of the census. The process which was followed made
disability inclusion an unplanned and ineffective afterthought as opposed to a scientific,
empathetic and effectively executed consideration.
With elections looming large on the horizon, and a significant part of the population
misrepresented — the political ramifications are significant. The geographical spread of persons
with disabilities would mean that pivotal legislation at the provincial and federal levels will be
impacted, leading to disproportionate resource allocation.
Campaigning across the country will not be catered to the most disenfranchised, yet again —
thus not allowing for the right stakeholders to be represented. Voting stations will not get the
necessary accessibility considerations that would have been warranted had the numbers been
accurately depicted. Ironically, a democratic process that is meant to showcase the strength of
equality amongst all, irrespective of disability, will end up disenfranchising the ones most in
need of an equal seat.
Societal impact: We need look no further than a street corner to find a community that is
marginalised on a perpetual basis by unequal access to schools, hospitals, workplaces and
public transport. Coupled with facing barriers to social inclusion due to regressive mindsets,
lack of visibility in the population census serves to institutionalise discriminatory practices. The
inclusion of minorities in mainstream society has been proven in many cases to not only foster
greater social awareness, but also economic and educational development, especially in a
culturally diverse country such as Pakistan.
The grossly misrepresented numbers resonate individually, institutionally, and socially. As a
result, a vast majority of our population is pushed further to the fringes, and perhaps to the
road; it increases the disparity between the haves and have-nots; disabilities become more of a
social taboo; families feel more burdened; children more alienated; government increasingly
unconcerned — thus making positive and progressive change an elusive and increasingly
unattainable goal.
As a stakeholder in the advancement of a philosophy of ‘Pakistan for all’, we need to come
together to usher a paradigm change which translates charity to empathy; removes perception-
based societal barriers; values persons with disabilities as social assets, and not as liabilities. A
Pakistan where the deaf are heard and the visually impaired can give a vision; where the
intellectually impaired can earn a livelihood, putting a smile on their families’ faces; and one
where the physically impaired can scale new heights to grab the reins of their destiny.
Seventy years on, an inalienable right of our nation is to see hope translating into tangible
change. This change can only happen if we come together to right historical wrongs and raise a
voice for those who have been silenced.
The writer is president of NOWPDP, a disability inclusion initiative.
amin.hashwani@nowpdp.org
Published in Dawn, November 5th, 2017

UN says world faces worst humanitarian crisis since World War II
UNITED NATIONS: The United Nations is warning that the world is facing its worst humanitarian
crisis since the end of World War II, with more than 20 million people facing starvation and
famine in four countries.
The world body’s humanitarian chief Stephen O’Brien called on Friday for an urgent
mobilisation of funds — $4.4 billion by July — for northeastern Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan
and Yemen to “avert a catastrophe”. “Otherwise, many people will predictably die from hunger,
livelihoods will be lost and political gains that have been hardwon over the last few years will be
reversed,” O’Brien said in his stark warning to the UN Security Council.
“Without collective and coordinated global efforts, people will simply starve to death. Many
more will suffer and die from disease. Children stunted and out of school. Livelihoods, futures
and hope will be lost.” He called war-wracked Yemen “the largest humanitarian crisis in the
world,” with two thirds of the population, or 18.8 million people — three million more than in
January — in need of assistance and more than seven million with no regular access to food.
The conflict in Yemen has left more than 7,400 people dead and 40,000 wounded since an
Arab-state coalition intervened on the government’s side against rebels in March 2015,
according to UN figures.

In just the past two months alone, more than 48,000 people have fled fighting in the Arab
world’s poorest country, according to O’Brien, as it grapples with a proxy war fought by
archrivals Iran and Saudi Arabia.
‘Arbitrarily denying’ access
During recent meetings, O’Brien said senior leaders in both parties agreed to provide
continuous humanitarian access and respect international humanitarian law.
He noted that 4.9 million people received food assistance last month alone.
“Yet all parties to the conflict are arbitrarily denying sustained humanitarian access and
politicise aid,” he added.
“Already, the humanitarian suffering that we see in Yemen today is caused by the parties and
proxies and if they don’t change their behaviour now, they must be held accountable for the
inevitable famine, unnecessary deaths and associated amplification in suffering that will
follow.” He noted that despite assurances from all parties that he would obtain safe passage to
the flashpoint city of Taiz, he was in fact denied access and came under gunfire after retreating
to a short distance away.
A total of $2.1 billion are needed to reach 12 million people with life-saving assistance and
protection in Yemen this year, according to O’Brien, who noted that just six percent of those
funds have been received so far.
He announced that a ministerial-level pledging event for Yemen will take place in Geneva on
April 25, to be chaired by UN chief Antonio Guterres.
Politics behind ‘man-made famine’
During his visit last week to South Sudan, the world’s youngest nation, O’Brien said he found a
situation that is “worse than it has ever been”. “The famine in South Sudan is man-made,” he
added.
“Parties to the conflict are parties to the famine — as are those not intervening to make the
violence stop.” He said more than 7.5 million people need assistance, an increase of 1.4 million
fro last year. And some 3.4 million people are displaced, including nearly 200,000 who have fled
South Sudan since January alone.
More than half the population of Somalia — 6.2 million people — need humanitarian assistance
and protection, including 2.9 million at risk of famine.
Nearly one million children under the age of five will be “acutely malnourished” this year,
according to the humanitarian chief, who also visited the country.
“What I saw and heard during my visit to Somalia was distressing — women and children walk
for weeks in search of food and water,” O’Brien said.
“They have lost their livestock, water sources have dried up and they have nothing left to
survive on. With everything lost, women, boys, girls and men now move to urban centers.” In
northeastern Nigeria, O’Brien said 10.7 million people need humanitarian aid, including 7.1
million people who are “severely food insecure”. The humanitarian emergency afflicting the
area was triggered by the Boko Haram insurgency, which erupted in Nigeria in 2009. Poor
governance and climate change have also been powerful contributors to the crisis.
The conflict, which has left around 20,000 people dead and forced more than 2.6 million others
to flee their homes, has aggravated an already difficult humanitarian situation in one of the
poorest regions of the world.

Growing risk of 'mass' starvation deaths in Africa, Yemen: UN
The United Nations warned Tuesday of a growing risk of mass deaths from starvation among
people living in conflict and drought-hit areas of the Horn of Africa, Yemen and Nigeria.
An "avoidable humanitarian crisis... is fast becoming an inevitability", as the UN faces a "severe"
funding shortfall to help people affected by famine, said UN refugee agency spokesman Adrian
Edwards.
UNHCR's operations in famine-hit South Sudan, and in Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen, which are on
the brink of famine, are funded at between just three and 11 percent, he told reporters in
Geneva.
As a whole, the United Nations has requested $4.4 billion to address the crisis in the four
countries, but has so far received only $984 million, said UN humanitarian agency spokesman
Jens Laerke said.
The current crisis risks becoming worse than the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa that killed
more than 260,000 people in Somalia alone, Edwards said.
"A repeat must be avoided at all costs," he said.
More than 20 million people across Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen, are in areas hit by
drought and are experiencing famine or are at high risk of famine, according to UN numbers.
"It is of immediate urgency that more funds are committed to avert a further descent into
disaster in these acute crises," Laerke said.

In conflict-ravaged South Sudan, where the UN warned in February that fighting, insecurity, lack
of access to aid and the collapsing economy had left 100,000 people facing starvation, "a further
one million people are now on the brink of famine," Edwards said.
And in Yemen, which is already experiencing the world's largest humanitarian crisis, 17 million
people, or around 60 percent of the war-torn country's population, are going hungry.
In northern Nigeria meanwhile, seven million people are currently struggling with food insecurity,
with the situation particularly bad in the northeast of the country, a stronghold of Boko Haram
jihadists.
The situation is also "very, very dire" in troubled Somalia, said David Hermann, who coordinates
operations in the country for the International Committee of the Red Cross.
"The response should happen now, because if it doesn't happen now... people are going to die
from starvation," he told reporters.
Edwards said the growing food insecurity was pushing more and more people to leave their
homes across the region, with food needs cited as the main factor causing displacement in most
locations in Yemen and South Sudan for instance.
"In Sudan, for example, where our initial estimate was for 60,000 arrivals from South Sudan this
year, we are in the process of revising the expected total upwards to 180,000," he told reporters.
He said the lack of funding meant less food distributed to those who need it most: the more than
four million refugees in the region, most of whom are children.
"With no money to buy food, rations... are being cut," he said, adding that in Djibouti rations have
been cut by 12 percent, in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda by between 20 and 50 percent, and in
Uganda by up to 75 percent.
This can have dramatic consequences, he warned, since "many refugees are without full access to
livelihoods and agriculture or food production and their ability to take matters into their own
hands and help themselves is limited."
Meanwhile the UN Food and Agriculture Organization warned that at least seven million people
were at risk of severe hunger in the Lake Chad region, calling for "urgent support".
The region straddles northeast Nigeria, the far north of Cameroon, western Chad and southeast
Niger. The countries share a border on the shallow, freshwater lake.
"The crisis .. is rooted in decades of neglect, lack of rural development and the impact of climate
change," FAO Director-General Jose Graziano da Silva said in a statement.

The political face of JuD

THE Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) has transformed its political wing into a political party, so the latter is
not entirely new. Long-established but informal and not involved in electoral politics, the
political wing of the under-watch militant group has been reincarnated as a political party, the
Milli Muslim League (MML), whose registration with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)
is under process.
The move comes at a time when the country is heading towards a new election amidst political
turbulence. Some political analysts see in it an attempt by certain establishment quarters to
unite and launch a far-right political alliance to curtail the growing anti-establishment
sentiments in mainstream politics. They believe the establishment is dry-cleaning its assets to
launch them as part of that larger electoral alliance, which could include groups and parties
that were part of the Difa-i-Pakistan Council. This was formed to campaign for the severing of
ties with the US and to reject the government’s decision to grant India the status of Most
Favoured Nation.
In a low-key launching ceremony in Islamabad, MML leaders said that the party will have two
immediate goals: to defy attempts to repeal Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution; and to
protect the ideology of Pakistan. The second goal is apparently set to support the Kashmiri
freedom struggle. This is the modus operandi of all far-right parties — to garb their real

agendas in ideological objectives with a view to seeking broader national support and
outclassing their opponents.
It would be unique if the political wing of a militant group were to be registered with the ECP.
However, security analysts see the move in the context of growing international pressure on
Pakistan for not taking enough action against the Security Council’s designated terrorist groups
allegedly operating in the country. In particular, the concerns of the Financial Action Task Force,
an international watchdog tracking terror financing, have become more serious. The FATF is not
happy with the government’s stance vis-à-vis JuD chief Hafiz Saeed and the entities linked to
him, especially the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation, the JuD’s charity wing. FATF’s Asia Pacific
group is urging Pakistan to take tough decisions against JuD and its affiliated entities. According
to reports, banning the Tehreek-i-Azadi of Jammu Kashmir, one of the many groups set up by
Hafiz Saeed, and putting him under protective custody were part of government efforts to
avoid sanctions on international financial transactions.
Notwithstanding how analysts interpret the arrival of the MML, hardly anyone sees its
establishment as part of Pakistan’s reintegration or de-radicalisation efforts. There is no sign
that the government has evolved a de-radicalisation policy framework or that it is interested in
bringing banned groups into the mainstream. The MML’s establishment thus appears to be an
attempt by a militant group to legitimise its actions and avert international sanctions.
Secondly, the JuD and its charities need some breathing space in the country’s mainstream
media, and political and intelligentsia discourses, that are increasingly criticising it. The JuD is
not happy with the government’s measures to put a ban on the coverage of its activities. On the
other hand, the group continues to project itself as the custodian of Pakistan’s ideological
interests as a partner of the security establishment. The establishment, too, is not dispelling
this impression.
As far as reintegration is concerned, this is a serious affair and is needed to counter terrorism.
The contours of a reintegration plan that could be effective in our context have been discussed
many times. To recall, a process of independent consultations with different expert groups
recently advocated parliamentary oversight of such a process. The findings propelled the
suggestion of a high-powered truth and reconciliation commission to review policies that
produced militancy and the mainstreaming of those willing to shun violence. This commission
may deliberate on whether or not to identify wrongs committed in the past. Expert groups
opposed the idea of a general amnesty for repentant groups, and suggested a proper
mechanism to study the behaviour of militant groups to decide on the extent of their
reintegration.
One may call the formation of MML forced reintegration. External pressures and the changing
internal security dynamics have forced the JuD and its masters to exploit the reintegration
policy rhetoric. The MML is a JuD political wing and it would be a unique case in our history if
the political wing of a militant organisation were to be registered with the ECP as a political
party.
Yet, some are hopeful that through the formation of the MML, the JuD will make its formal
entry into democratic electoral politics, which it has thus far deemed haram. There is still plenty
of literature being produced by the JuD against democracy and the Constitution — or man-
made legislation. A brief background of the party’s anti-democratic ideology and practices can

be found in a book Qafila Dawat-o-Jihad, written by Ameer Hamza, a JuD founder. Indeed, the
JuD has the same worldview and anti-democratic attitude that are espoused by international
terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the militant Islamic State group. Interestingly, to save
their cadres from joining the IS, the JuD has published more than 20 booklets against the latter
and its ideology of takfir — declaring some fellow Muslims or Muslim rulers to be outside the
pale of Islam. These books also include Urdu translations of writings by Saudi scholars.
Participation in the democratic process may provide an opportunity for JuD leaders to further
review their narrow social views and ideology. As far as mainstream politics is concerned, the
MML will act as a far-right party and follow a pro-establishment agenda. There was space for
such a party that can organise and bring scattered far-right elements under one banner. In the
past, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam provided such services. But with time,
both have tended to distance themselves from the establishment. Far-right parties cannot
damage the electoral base of mainstream parties but can challenge their views on religious,
social and regional issues. Perhaps this is one of the purposes behind the MML’s establishment.
Post-globalisation
THE political economy of the world is changing again. Where is it heading, and who will
arbitrate its direction? What will be its new grundnorm? Will states reclaim control over their
markets? How will it impact multilateral institutions, nations, non-state actors and individuals
across an uneven world?
These questions have been around for a while and it will be some time before their final
answers take shape. Their relevance, nevertheless, has grown with the recent (and significant)
change of administration in the US. Social forces, akin to those responsible for the ongoing
political turmoil in western Europe, now control the levers of state power in the US, which has
set the ideological agenda of the global capitalist economy since the Second World War.
Across the West, the winds of social change have blown away entrenched economic, political
and moral distinctions between liberalism and conservatism, left and right, populism and
authoritarianism. There are now strange hybrids — erstwhile conservatives who adopt LGBT

causes, and proclaimed liberals who support rabid nationalism — that defy categorisation, and
many see the roots of a new kind of fascism sprouting from this mishmash.
These new identities are, in turn, reshaping the political landscape of Western democracies. In
their bid for survival and relevance, many political parties are trying to align themselves with
the pernicious populisms being espoused by demagogues and debutante parties. In many
cases, their leaders have had no qualms in ditching their old worldviews and embracing the
new reality and its champions.
Can Western populists really redefine the world’s economy?
Such a transition took place in the 1980s in the US and UK when political parties to the left of
centre moved away from welfare-ism to adopt the free market economic agenda of
globalisation, popularised by Reaganomics and Thatcherism, to remain relevant. However, the
current challenge is far greater and broader, with racial, cultural and religious undercurrents
that are more treacherous than its economic dimension.
The West had triumphantly proclaimed the rise of political liberalism intertwined with free
market economics as the ‘end of history’, the final iteration of government. As it is, this victory
has been short-lived, and the West is now gearing up to embark on another ideological journey.
Their populist leaderships would naturally aim to reconfigure the global economy in accordance
with the priorities of the social groups who elected them — constricting the free flow of goods,
capital and particularly labour across borders, and replacing globalisation with a new ideological
paradigm they pledged would reboot their stagnant economies. The question is whether they
can steer this new ideological shift and transmit it to the rest of the world, as was done in the
past through Bretton Woods Institutions and other means. There are at least three major
factors that make this a challenging task in today’s world.
First, the rise of competing centres of power and prosperity in different parts of the world,
brought about by two major historical developments, decolonisation and globalisation, which
radically transformed the world’s political and economic landscape after the Second World
War. There are many large nation-states outside the western hemisphere that possess the
military and economic clout to set their own domestic and regional political economy agendas
and assert their power in case the need arises. Many are actually hostile to the new economic
and political ideas being peddled by the West’s ascendant social groups and perceive them as
serious threats to world peace and prosperity.
Second, the West itself is a house divided. Its internal dissonance is at its worst since the
Second World War. More than any other force, globalisation has eroded its social and political
cohesion by creating economic winners and losers amongst states and individuals. It has also
nurtured a critical mass of individuals who staunchly believe in liberal values (openness,
tolerance and diversity) as the way forward for their societies and are willing to engage in
political activism. Mired in domestic troubles, Western states are mostly looking inwards. They
are interested in putting their own house in order rather than projecting their combined power
to the global arena.

Third, the digitisation and global outreach of communication, business and knowledge
networks. This great innovation of our times, a gift of globalisation, has eliminated the
distinction between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ when it comes to building ideological resistance
and disseminating alternative viewpoints. Similarly, global production and consumption value
chains have created interdependencies, which can only be calibrated through the convergence
of ideas across borders. It is difficult to subsume such complexities in ideological agendas that
serve the interests of particular groups or states.
The world beyond globalisation may actually be without a hegemonic ideology, with powerful
states pursuing their own agendas.
The writer, a civil servant, works at the Pakistan embassy in Washington, DC.
Footprints: Saving artefacts in Afghanistan

The Buddha rests quietly in a corner of the National Museum of Afghanistan.
While a group of Afghan restorers — with more than four decades of experience between them
— work to restore similar artefacts, the Buddha, dating back to at least the second century BC,
sits cross-legged, arms folded, awaiting its public debut in the city.
The statue, set to be unveiled to the public in the coming weeks, is a testament to the rich
history of a nation that has seen various empires and conquerors pass through its land.
“There are artefacts in every corner of this country,” said Fahim Rahimi, the director of the
National Museum of Afghanistan. However, even the layers of sand, silt and time have not been
able to keep these artefacts safe from the forces of conflict and capitalism.
Between 1990 (the start of the civil war) and 2001 (the initiation of the US-led invasion of the
country), more than 70 per cent of the nation’s historical and cultural artefacts were either

looted, destroyed or smuggled into other countries, said Nadir Shah Katawazi, head of public
affairs at the National Museum.
The Buddha itself, discovered near the nation’s largest copper mine, is an embodiment of the
duelling threats facing the physical remnants of Afghanistan’s cultural history. The statue,
sitting in a reconstructed stupa, was found in 2012 in the Mes Aynak area of the eastern
province of Logar. Mes Aynak, meaning literally “the little copper source,” is home to a 2,000-
year-old Buddhist city filled with ancient statues, manuscripts, frescoes, shrines and stupas. It is
also at the centre of a $3billion Chinese mining contract signed in 2007.
The Buddha itself was first spotted in the same year the China Metallurgical Group and the
Jiangxi Copper Company Limited, two state-owned Chinese mining companies, were supposed
to begin construction of their copper mine. Luckily for the Buddha, and hundreds of other
similar vestiges, disagreements between Kabul and Beijing on the terms of the agreement
delayed copper production. This allowed archaeologists more time to study and excavate the
site. The museum has even dedicated an entire room to dozens of discoveries from Men Aynak,
with many more currently being prepared for exhibition by Afghan restorers.
But the dangers to the physical remnants of Afghanistan’s varied history are not just limited to
foreign investment and private ventures. Katawazi, the public affairs director at the National
Museum, said that from 2002 to 2017, more than 25,000 looted artefacts have been returned
to the museum. Of those, at least 15,000 were found in foreign countries, including Pakistan,
Iran, the UK and the United States.
In a nation rich with history, the sale and smuggling of artefacts has made many people very
wealthy. “There’s a systematic group of smugglers who have profited enormously by taking
advantage of local people who are either not informed about the value of these items or are
driven by poverty to sell them,” said Rahimi, the museum director.
In 2009, the British government returned more than 3.4 tonnes of stolen Afghan antiquities
that were confiscated at Heathrow over a six-year span. In 2012, two Afghan smugglers were
arrested in Peshawar after they were caught trying to smuggle 16 ancient artefacts, several of
which originated from Afghanistan. Even stores in major cities have been known to deal in
illegally obtained historical goods.
Two former government officials recall an incident two years ago when, at a store located in a
market in a provincial capital where trafficked items are found, they were offered for $800 a
palm-sized Buddha-head discovered in the northern province of Parwan. (Archaeologists say it
is often the heads of the Buddhas that are the first to go missing.)
Though they turned down the offer, others are not so discerning. According to one official
involved in cultural preservation, many wealthy businessmen and powerful commanders have
been known to buy the artefacts and display them in their own homes. Others will simply
smuggle them into foreign countries, where they can fetch tens of thousands of dollars.
But there is still hope for the preservation of the nation’s history: the youth. Just before Rahimi,
the museum director, detailed the difficulties conflict and capitalism present to culture
preservation in Afghanistan, a 20-something worker at the museum approached him with a
development that put a smile on Rahimi’s face.

“I just talked to my family in Badakhshan and they said they found a gun that’s at least a
hundred years old and a clay pot that they can’t date,” he said. “They want to offer it to the
museum.”
Rahimi, clearly elated by the act of devotion, told the young man to deliver a message to his
family: “Tell them thank you for thinking of the country, you should be proud that they want to
preserve our history.”
The real story behind the crisis in Qatar — and Saudi Arabia’s involvement
THE Qatar crisis proves two things: the continued infantilisation of the Arab states, and the
total collapse of the Sunni Muslim unity supposedly created by Donald Trump’s preposterous
attendance at the Saudi summit two weeks ago.
After promising to fight to the death against Shia Iranian “terror,” Saudi Arabia and its closest
chums have now ganged up on one of the wealthiest of their neighbours, Qatar, for being a
fountainhead of “terror”. Only Shakespeare’s plays could come close to describing such
treachery. Shakespeare’s comedies, of course.
For, truly, there is something vastly fantastical about this charade. Qatar’s citizens have
certainly contributed to IS. But so have Saudi Arabia’s citizens. No Qataris flew the 9/11 planes

into New York and Washington. All but four of the 19 killers were Saudi. Bin Laden was not a
Qatari. He was a Saudi.
But Bin Laden favoured Qatar’s Al Jazeera channel with his personal broadcasts, and it was Al
Jazeera who tried to give spurious morality to the Al Qaeda/Jabhat al-Nusrah desperadoes of
Syria by allowing their leader hours of free airtime to explain what a moderate, peace-loving
group they all were.
First, let’s just get rid of the hysterically funny bits of this story. I see that Yemen is breaking air
links with Qatar. Quite a shock for the poor Qatari emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani,
since Yemen — under constant bombardment by his former Saudi and Emirati chums —
doesn’t have a single serviceable airliner left with which to create, let alone break, an air link.
The Maldives have also broken relations with Qatar. To be sure, this has nothing to do with the
recent promise of a Saudi five-year loan facility of $300m to the Maldives, the proposal of a
Saudi property company to invest $100m in a family resort in the Maldives and a promise by
Saudi Islamic scholars to spend $100,000 on 10 “world class” mosques in the Maldives. And let
us not mention the rather large number of IS and other Islamist cultists who arrived to fight for
IS in Iraq and Syria from — well, the Maldives.
Now the Qatari Emir hasn’t enough troops to defend his little country should the Saudis decide
to request that he ask their army to enter Qatar to restore stability — as the Saudis persuaded
the King of Bahrain to do back in 2011. But Sheikh Tamim no doubt hopes that the massive US
military air base in Qatar will deter such Saudi generosity.
When I asked his father, Sheikh Hamad (later uncharitably deposed by Tamim) why he didn’t
kick the Americans out of Qatar, he replied: “Because if I did, my Arab brothers would invade
me.” Like father, like son, I suppose. God Bless America.
All this started — so we are supposed to believe — with an alleged hacking of the Qatar News
Agency, which produced some uncomplimentary but distressingly truthful remarks by Qatar’s
emir about the need to maintain a relationship with Iran.
Qatar denied the veracity of the story. The Saudis decided it was true and broadcast the
contents on their own normally staid (and immensely boring) state television network. The
upstart emir, so went the message, had gone too far this time. The Saudis decided policy in the
Gulf, not miniscule Qatar. Wasn’t that what Trump’s visit proved?
But the Saudis had other problems to worry about. Kuwait, far from cutting relations with
Qatar, is now acting as a peacemaker between Qatar and the Saudis and Emiratis. The emirate
of Dubai is quite close to Iran, has tens of thousands of Iranian expatriates, and is hardly
following Abu Dhabi’s example of anti-Qatari wrath.
Oman was even staging joint naval manoeuvres with Iran a couple of months ago. Pakistan long
ago declined to send its army to help the Saudis in Yemen, because the Saudis asked for only
Sunni and no Shia soldiers; the Pakistani army was understandably outraged to realise that
Saudi Arabia was trying to sectarianise its military personnel. Pakistan’s former army
commander, General Raheel Sharif, is rumoured to be on the brink of resigning as head of the
Saudi-sponsored Muslim alliance to fight “terror”.
President-Field Marshal Abdel Fatah al-Sisi of Egypt has been roaring against Qatar for its
support of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood — and Qatar does indeed support the now-
banned group which Sisi falsely claims is part of IS — but significantly Egypt, though the

recipient of Saudi millions, also does not intend to supply its own troops to bolster the Saudis in
its catastrophic Yemen war. Besides, Sisi needs his Egyptian soldiers at home to fight off IS
attacks and maintain, along with Israel, the siege of the Palestinian Gaza Strip.
But if we look a bit further down the road, it’s not difficult to see what really worries the Saudis.
Qatar also maintains quiet links with the Asad regime. It helped secure the release of Syrian
Christian nuns in Jabhat al-Nusrah hands and has helped release Lebanese soldiers from IS
hands in western Syria. When the nuns emerged from captivity, they thanked both Bashar al-
Asad and Qatar.
And there are growing suspicions in the Gulf that Qatar has much larger ambitions: to fund the
rebuilding of post-war Syria. Even if Asad remained as president, Syria’s debt to Qatar would
place the nation under Qatari economic control.
And this would give tiny Qatar two golden rewards. It would give it a land empire to match its Al
Jazeera media empire. And it would extend its largesse to the Syrian territories, which many oil
companies would like to use as a pipeline route from the Gulf to Europe via Turkey, or via
tankers from the Syrian port of Lattakia.
For Europeans, such a route would reduce the chances of Russian oil blackmail, and make sea-
going oil routes less vulnerable if vessels did not have to move through the Gulf of Hormuz.
So rich pickings for Qatar — or for Saudi Arabia, of course, if the assumptions about US power
of the two emirs, Hamad and Tamim, prove worthless. A Saudi military force in Qatar would
allow Riyadh to gobble up all the liquid gas in the emirate. But surely the peace-loving “anti-
terror” Saudis — let’s forget the head-chopping for a moment — would never contemplate
such a fate for an Arab brother.
So let’s hope that for the moment, the routes of Qatar Airways are the only parts of the Qatari
body politics to get chopped off.
—By arrangement with The Independent
Why Saudi Arabia hates Al Jazeera so much

IF you want to understand why many Arab world leaders hate Al Jazeera, consider Sharia and
Life.
For years, the call-in show was one of the network’s most popular, reaching tens of millions.
Viewers would call in and pose their faith questions to Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian cleric and
a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. People would ask all kinds of things: Is it okay to
smoke during Ramazan? Does a female Palestinian woman have to wear a hijab while carrying
out a suicide bombing?
Before Al Jazeera, a show like this would have been unusual in the Arab world, where media is
tightly controlled. But the Qatari-owned network has a mandate to produce ambitious

journalism on a wide range of subjects (some taboo). It offers, too, a broader range of opinions
than most Arab media.
These qualities have made it the most popular network in the Middle East. It’s also attracted a
lot of enemies. Rulers in places like Saudi Arabia and Egypt resent the station’s broad reach and
its willingness to rile up opposition. They don’t like its Islamist bent, and they’re angry that their
populations are exposed to reporting critical of their regimes (and supportive of the Qatari
agenda).
For years, they’ve called on the station to evolve or go away. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan
have kicked Al Jazeera bureaus out of their countries. Saudi Arabia has also banned hotels from
offering the channel. And now Qatar is embroiled in a diplomatic war with a group of Arab
states, and shuttering Al Jazeera appears to be one key demand.
Pan-Arabic media potential
There are about 350 million Arab speakers across the Middle East. As far back as the 1950s and
‘60s, radio stations tried to reach this group. Sawt al-Arab radio, for example, was created by
Egypt to spread Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabist ideas. (It was so effective
that Nasser’s political opponents in Saudi Arabia jammed the station.)
In the 1990s, the Saudi royal family began buying Arabic newspapers and sharing them across
the region. They also developed a satellite station MBC, intended for a broad audience. That
never quite caught on, but it did show would-be moguls the potential of pan-Arabic media.
It taught the region’s leaders something else, too: that they might well lose their death grip on
the information their populations were able to consume. As Shibley Telhami, who wrote a book
on Arab media, explained, “this simultaneous sense of inspiration and threat is likely what
inspired the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, to start Al Jazeera ... in 1996”.
Since then, the country has poured billions into the network.
Thani had come to power only a year before, and he faced fierce criticism from the Saudi-run
newspapers. Al Jazeera, he hoped, would offer a different perspective, and maybe cut into the
people consuming Saudi media.
To build an audience, the channel produced content that would appeal to people. As Telhami
explained: “Viewers were exposed to programming that most Arabs hungered for, from
opposing opinions to more information on issues they cared deeply about as Arabs and
Muslims. This included live footage of bloodshed in Israeli confrontations with the Palestinians
— footage that Arab national television broadcasts limited so as not to awaken their public’s
passion.”
The station broke other important barriers too. It sent reporters to the Israeli Knesset and aired
debates live. During the 2008 Gaza war, Al Jazeera had more reporters on the ground than
anyone else, and it was the only station with live coverage. It also, Telhami writes, pushed for
“presentation of multiple views, including presenting Israeli views dating back to the 1990s,
when few other Arab stations dared do so, as well as airing Bin Laden tapes, Iranian views, and
hosting or covering speeches and news conferences of American officials — including then-
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, American military commanders and spokesmen, and
White House and State Department officials — during the Iraq war.”

These qualities were major selling points. By 2001, it had become the most-watched Arab
television station for news. By 2006, more than 75 per cent of Arabs called the network their
favourite or second-favourite news source.
Partisan viewpoint
The network’s success, though, also made it a target of criticism, both from the outside and
from within. After Sept 11, 2001, Americans accused the channel of stoking anger and fear
about US foreign policy. In 2012, China took action against Al Jazeera English. Indeed, the
channel has probably alienated every regional leader at one point or another.
Al Jazeera Arabic (which is run separately from Al Jazeera English) has also got a reputation for
supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. Hugh Miles, the author of The Al Jazeera Effect, compared
the network to Fox News, telling TheTelegraph that “Al Jazeera Arabic is very partisan and it
supports Islamists. I think that’s a defensible position because there are lots of Islamists and it’s
a popular view in many parts of the world. It’s not accepted by other Arab countries, which
regard it as seditious and threatening but they offer another perspective.”
“Al Jazeera is sensationalist, Islamic and pan-Arabic, but it mirrors Doha’s policy concerns in
more ways than it might care to acknowledge,” wrote Simon Henderson, director of the
Washington Institute’s Gulf and Energy Policy Programme, just four years after the network’s
launch. “Many Arab governments would prefer Al Jazeera to simply disappear.”
The latest diplomatic kerfuffle has some of the station’s reporters worried that that’s what’s
going to happen. While the station released a statement calling the demand for its closure
“nothing but an attempt to silence the freedom of expression in the region”, its staffers worry
that Qatar might agree to, say, restructure things so that the network has less freedom. Some
of its foreign reporters from places such as Egypt or Syria worry that they might be sent back to
their home countries.
Still, the network’s journalists say they’re staying positive. “There may be things going on at
higher diplomatic and political levels,” Al Jazeera English editor Giles Trendle told The
Telegraph. “But from Al Jazeera’s side, I would just say we are confident that we’re here to stay
and we’re committed to carrying on with our jobs and carrying on with our journalism.”
—By arrangement with The Washington Post
The era of cyber-disaster may finally be here
Want smart analysis of the most important news in your inbox every weekday along with other
global reads, interesting ideas and opinions to know? Sign up for the Today's WorldView
newsletter. On Friday, the world was hit by one of the biggest cyberattacks in recent history.

The culprit was “ransomware” known as WanaCryptOr 2.0, or WannaCry. It operates by

encrypting a computer system and demanding a ransom to release it. This money would be
paid in the digital currency bitcoin to an unknown source, who would — in theory, at least —
provide a decryption key to unlock the system. To do all this, the software exploits a
vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that is thought to have been first identified by the National
Security Agency and was later leaked online.
Interpol thinks that more than 200,000 people in more than 150 countries were affected — and
things could get worse. Experts are warning that many office workers could return to
work Monday and find their computers compromised.
The attack was a remarkable global event. It appears to have hit first in Britain, where it
effectively shut down parts of the National Health Service. But reports soon came in from all
over the world. Users in China, Germany, India and the United States were among those
affected.
For a few hours Friday, it seemed as if the world was facing a disruption of disaster-movie
proportions. Then, just as quickly as it started, the attack was stalled by a 22-year-old British
cybersecurity researcher who discovered a “kill switch” that stopped the ransomware from
spreading.
The risk isn't over. Whoever is behind the attack could update the ransomware and remove the
kill switch. Some reports Sunday suggested that this has already happened.
The evidence suggests that the unknown attackers had only one goal: profit. The ransom
demanded of each infected computer was a little more than $300 or so.
Authorities recommended that victims not pay, but even a small fraction of successful
ransoms would net the attackers a considerable amount of money.
Whatever the motive, the huge scale of the attack shows that cybersecurity can have
dangerous geopolitical consequences.
In Britain, some hospitals were forced to turn away patients and delay operations. The BBC
quoted one NHS staffer who said it was “absolute carnage” and that “patients will almost
certainly suffer and die because of this.” So far, no deaths have been reported, but that may
change. “The first death directly attributable to a cyberattack suddenly seems possible,”
the Financial Times's Tim Bradshaw wrote Sunday. If an attack were carried out by a country
rather than independent hackers, those deaths could be seen acts of war.
Other potential targets could be even more disruptive. On Sunday, Britain's Defense Secretary
Michael Fallon would not deny reports that Britain's nuclear submarines used the same version
of Windows that made them vulnerable to malware attacks. Concerns have been voiced about
the outdated computer systems on these submarines for some time, to little avail.
Americans should hope their nuclear command-and-control systems are safe, but it is possible
that may not matter. When General C. Robert Kehler, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command,
was quizzed by Sen. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) in 2013 on whether someone could hack into a Russian
or Chinese system and launch a nuclear missile, he was forced to give a vague
answer. “Senator, I don’t know . . . I do not know,” Kehler said.
Even if these doomsday scenarios don't ultimately take place, large-scale use of ransomware
presents a dangerous route to finances for criminal groups. “We've seen even terror groups

finance their organizations by using operations like cybercrime and ransomware,” Ryan
Kalember, a cybersecurity strategy expert at Proofpoint, said to CBS last year.
Such attacks can also exacerbate tensions between nation states. In Russia, where the Interior
Ministry was hit by WannaCry, some suggested that the attack was a U.S. retaliation for
Moscow's alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election. “I respect the honesty of the
United States,” Mikhail Delyagin, the director of the Institute of Problems of Globalization in
Russia, told the New York Times. “They threaten us with a cyberattack, and a cyberattack
follows. It’s logical.”
There's no denying, of course, that Washington does share some of the blame for the spread
of the attack. The Windows vulnerability exploited by the ransomware is believed to have been
first discovered by the NSA. Microsoft released a patch for the vulnerability after it leaked this
year, but many users may not have updated their systems.
Washington Post technology reporter Brian Fung suggested that this was one major lesson
politicians should take away from the debacle: The concept of law enforcement agencies having
“back doors” to computer programs and systems, even if it is for national security reasons,
dramatically increases the risk that criminal groups or other bad actors will also find these
vulnerabilities. “It would be like leaving keys under a doormat, which good guys could certainly
use, but also bad guys, too,” Fung wrote Saturday.
Academic and writer Zeynep Tufekci went further, suggesting that the world needs a “complete
overhaul of how technology companies, governments and institutions operate and handle
software.” Companies such as Microsoft and government agencies such as the NSA need to
take a proactive approach to dealing with vulnerabilities, Tufekci argued in the New York
Times's opinion pages. Careless individuals and cash-strapped institutions such as the NHS
simply can't do it on their own.
If governments don't step up, Tufekci wrote, the consequences could be “unthinkable.” And as
Friday's attack shows, the unthinkable is already far too real.
Want smart analysis of the most important news in your inbox every weekday along with other
global reads, interesting ideas and opinions to know? Sign up for the Today's WorldView
newsletter.
The Ojhri Camp disaster — Who's to blame?

April 10, 1988, would be remembered as a day of mass mourning; it was the day when in the
early morning the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi received a dreadful shock. It all

began with a low-density explosion, followed by a huge one, after which all kinds of missiles,
rockets and projectiles started raining down in all directions.
This was something similar to the Lydia earthquake over 2,000 years ago in Italy. It created a lot
of panic and fear; rumours of every kind gripped the capital — ranging from an Indian attack to
a disaster at the Kahuta nuclear facility.
For many hours, no one could be found who could tell what had happened.
Also read: 20 years on, Ojhri Camp truth remains locked up
At that time Gen Ziaul Haq was attending a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference
(OIC) in Kuwait and had to rush back home. The officials assured the people that there was no
reason for fear and that it was just an accidental explosion at the arms and ammunition depot
at Ojhri, located between Rawalpindi and Islamabad.
But since the national psyche had been tormented with many mythical lies and unfounded
stories, no one believed the official explanation.
Over a 100 people were killed and many more injured.
Zia wanted to save his men
Ojhri, an old-fashioned, World War II storage of arms and ammunition, was mainly made of
brick barracks with thatched roofs. Previously used as temporary army units, after the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, the influx of arms increased manifold and in 1979 the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) directorate chose the Ojhri Camp for temporary storage and disposal of
weapons, as and when required.
Though not congested, the Camp certainly needed management. Gen Khalid Mahmud Arif, in
his book Working with Zia mentions that on the ill-fated morning when some ammunition was
being shifted from one place to another by a rather untrained team, an accident took place.
“At about 09:30am, a box containing 122mm Rocket fell from the top of the stack while the
men were trying to slide it down. It hit the ground with a thud and exploded on impact, starting
a fire which panicked the workmen ... It was fitted with an inbuilt percussion fuse, which, the
experts claimed, could be activated by strong impact. In simpler language, this fuse had a point-
detonating mechanism without an inbuilt safety device,” he wrote.
The chain reaction in the dump played the worst part.
Also read: Islamabad`s children of the mist
The prime minister was on a brief visit to Sindh; when he learnt of the disaster he immediately
rushed to the capital. After initial inquiries he issued special orders for the rescue and
rehabilitation of victims.
The most important question was to identify what caused the disaster and initiate an inquiry.
On April 12, Junejo appointed a five-member inquiry commission headed by Gen Imranullah,
corps commander of Rawalpindi, besides a five-member ministerial committee to conduct an
inquiry into the tragedy.
This committee was to inquire into the matter and present a report to the prime minister who,
after studying the findings, would, in turn, prepare his report for the National Assembly. The
committee comprised Qazi Abdul Majid Abid, Mir Ibrahim Baloch and Malik Naeem Ahmad
Khan, while Mohammad Aslam Khattak was to act as chairman.
Also read: Defacing the constitution

While taking all these actions, Junejo did not communicate with Gen Zia, creating tension
between the two which led to the dismissal of the Junejo government and the dissolution of
the assemblies.
Gen Zia wanted an inquiry by men of his choice, ostensibly if it was the fault of “his men” they
would have to be spared.
Junejo knew it and perhaps that is the reason why he formed the committees before Gen Zia’s
arrival. It is said that Gen Imranullah had held the director general (DG) ISI responsible for the
tragedy and suggested appropriate action.
This was meant to hurt Gen Zia. Aslam Khattak’s report said that in war-like conditions that the
nation was in, accidents can occur and should be considered as a token of martyrdom in the
path of a noble cause; therefore, the four junior employees should be punished according to
law and the rest be forgiven, to end the fiasco.
As the inquiry row continued, the National Assembly demanded the parliamentary committee
report to be made public immediately and those found responsible be taken to task.
The defence minister, Rana Naeem Ahmed, wanted to get the report edited so that it could
become more unanimous and acceptable. This ensued into an exchange of hot words and
Aslam Khattak clarified that the report cannot be altered at any cost.
The defence minister started working on a new report. When Gen Imranullah was questioned,
he blamed the director general of the ISI. After some re-investigation Rana Naeem wrote the
report in which he clearly held the ISI responsible.
He wrote that since the Camp was under the DG ISI, action should be taken against the former
DG ISI Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman and the present DG ISI Gen Hamid Gul. The report once again
saw hectic vetting and in early May 1988, prime minister Junejo handed over these reports,
bearing signatures of the rest of the members, to Gen Zia. Junejo informed him that he would
discuss the issue after his return from South Korea and the Philippines.
When the reports were presented, there was a lot of confusion in the presidential house and
the general wanted to solve the issue in a manner that could spare his close associates.
Gen Zia’s biggest worry was Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman, the man he trusted most.
shaikhaziz38@gmail.com
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, February 7th, 2016
Rohingya’s plight

STANDING by Bangladesh’s border with Myanmar, we watched the refugees slowly cross the
thick, lime-green paddy fields. They wore signs of exhaustion. Their faces were drawn and their
bare feet badly bruised. They gratefully accepted the rations being offered by aid workers: a
bottle of water to quench their thirst, a high-energy biscuit to restore their strength, and an
offer of rest in the shade after days, sometimes weeks-long, arduous journeys.
A European aid worker suddenly turned to me and asked, “Do you think there’s any Western
country that would take in this many people?” It was a question that did not anticipate an
answer. At a time when refugees face what Pope Francis has hauntingly termed “the
globalisation of indifference”, Bangladesh stands out for opening its doors.
Over the past two months, more than 600,000 Rohingya refugees have fled killings, rape,
torture and arson to seek sanctuary in Bangladesh. Dozens did not make it, drowning in
capsized boats. Thousands are still making the journey, fearing persecution in a land where
they are constantly demonised as ‘Bengali terrorists’ and ‘illegal migrants’. If one adds the
numbers of Rohingya who were already here, cast out of their villages by earlier waves of
violence, there are now more than a million refugees scattered across Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar
District. They now far outnumber those still left in their homeland.
Bangladesh has made no secret of the fact that it wants the refugees to return.
In the past, they were reluctantly admitted into the country. “The Bangladesh government has
traditionally seen the Rohingya as people who need to be controlled, rather than supported,” a
UN official in Bangladesh told me. There have been pushbacks, and even attempts to starve
them out of the camps. In 1979, when more than 200,000 Rohingya took refuge in Bangladesh’s
camps, 10,000 of them perished of hunger within months.
This time could prove different. As the details of the crimes against humanity visited upon the
Rohingya spread across Bangladesh, there was a wave of popular sympathy. Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina shed her ambivalence and embraced them. On a visit to the camps in early
September, she said that if Bangladesh could feed more than 170 million Bangladeshis, it could
feed the new arrivals, too. The ruling Awami League has since adorned lampposts across Cox’s
Bazar with signs hailing Sheikh Hasina as “the mother of humanity”, proudly showing her
comforting Rohingya children.
But patience appears to be wearing thin. The Bangladeshi government has made no secret of
the fact that it wants the Rohingya to return to Myanmar as soon as possible. Ministers now
daily warn of the security risks that may emanate from the camps and the burden on their
poor, densely populated country.
Bangladesh has denied the Rohingya refugee status. They are being kept away from the local
community, consigned to a ‘mega camp’ where they are being squeezed into an endless sprawl
of flimsy bamboo and tarpaulin tents. The government has shunned the humanitarian
community’s pleas for multiple sites for easy access, and it is still toying with dangerous ideas of
relocating all of the Rohingya refugees offshore, on to a pair of uninhabitable silt islands.
Every Rohingya refugee I spoke to expressed a desire to go home — but only once shanti, or
peace, returns. Sadly, that is unlikely to be anytime soon. Much will depend on the very
generals in the Myanmar army, who have presided over ruthlessly efficient ethnic cleansing

operations, and who appear to see the expulsion of the Rohingya as a solution rather than a
problem.
Bangladesh already feels isolated. Its larger neighbours have been of little help. China has
squarely sided with Myanmar. India has recently softened its position, expressing some concern
for the violence in Rakhine state, without assigning any blame. The government of Narendra
Modi hasn’t ruled out its plans to forcibly return 40,000 Rohingya refugees currently in India to
Myanmar, in a brazen violation of international law.
Pakistan has a clear role to play here — one that it has yet to assume. As a close ally of China, it
must prevail upon Beijing to apply pressure on the Myanmar military, including halting sales of
weaponry to Myanmar — including the 16 Chinese-Pakistani fighter jets due to be delivered
this year. Myanmar’s generals are counting on the support of its powerful neighbour to shield it
from scrutiny.
Pakistan should also offer Bangladesh whatever support it can to host the Rohingya refugees in
humane, sustainable and dignified conditions — a move that would only enhance Pakistan’s
reputation in the region and beyond.
This must not become another human tragedy that dominates headlines for a few days, stirs
outrage on the streets, and then fades from people’s attentions while victims continue to suffer
for months and years. The Rohingya have suffered far too much to be abandoned yet again.
The writer is deputy South Asia director at Amnesty International.
China-US: shaping the future

THIS century’s future will be largely defined by the relationship between a rising China and a
resentful America.
China has so far risen peacefully. Over 40 years, the US and China have developed an
interdependent economic and a largely cooperative political relationship. The positive tone of
the two Xi-Trump summits generates hope that China and America may yet avoid the
Thucydides Trap (which postulates the inevitability of a clash between an established and rising
power).
At the recent 19th CPC Congress, President Xi Jinping outlined China’s rather modest objectives:
to become “a moderately prosperous country” and a “fully modern” economy and society by
2035 and “a global leader of composite national strength and international influence” by 2050.
The rivalry between China and the US will depend on the vibrancy of their governance systems.
On the other hand, Trump’s ‘America First’ slogan is a signal of a determination to win back the
economic, political and strategic pre-eminence which the US enjoyed over the last 70 years.
Trump’s ‘ideologue’, Steve Bannon, (out of office but still influential), sees China as “the
greatest -term threat to the US”. He said: “We have to reassert ourselves as the real Asian
power....”
Fortunately, Trump has so far stepped back from his campaign denunciations of China and
erosion of the ‘One China’ policy and focused instead on securing Chinese cooperation to
confront the North Korean nuclear threat and to redress the Sino-US trade ‘imbalance’.
However, Trump may be disappointed if these aims are not achieved in the near term. This
could lead to a more confrontational course, especially since even his ‘grown-up’ advisers, like
Defence Secretary Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, see China more as a rival than a
partner and have outlined policies to contain, and if needed, to confront it.
In the economic sphere, the US enjoys several advantages: the US dollar is the world’s main
reserve currency; the US heavily influences, if not controls, global financial markets and
institutions; it sits at the top of several ‘supply chain’ networks, and maintains a (narrowing)
lead in innovation and new technologies. But ‘demand’ in the US economy is low since people’s
‘basic needs’ have been met and population growth is slow. Manufacturing jobs have been lost
offshore due to high wages and aging equipment. They are unlikely to return. Despite massive
financial injections, the US growth is not more than two to three per cent.
China’s growth has been driven to a considerable extent by exports and investment. It is now
vulnerable on the external front given rising Chinese wages and Western trade protectionism.
However, trade dependency is a two-way street. And, the Chinese economy will continue to
grow due to rising demand from: the 300 million Chinese who are even now emerging from
poverty, the rapidly expanding consumerism of China’s growing ‘middle class’ and the trillion
dollars to be invested in projects under the historic Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, China
is creating an alternative financial structure that could eventually challenge the US-dominated
financial system and it is investing heavily, at all levels, in advanced technology.
The US retains a significant military edge over China. Its $600 billion military budget is more
than four times larger than China’s. The US possesses and is developing cutting-edge weapons
systems and war-fighting techniques. It has established formal and informal military alliances
with a number of militarily significant states, including three of Asia’s largest powers: Japan,

India and Australia. The US will continue attempts to exploit China’s maritime disputes in the
South China Sea and to build a string of alliances around China’s periphery to mobilise
resistance to China’s influence in the region.
However, China is rapidly developing the capacity to confront or neutralise America’s military
advantage. First, although China’s defence budget is smaller ($150bn), it can deliver a ‘bigger
bang for the buck’ (due to the huge cost differentials between China and the US). Second,
under President Xi Jinping’s guidance, the PLA is being comprehensively reformed to become a
“technologically sophisticated army”. China is spending heavily on military R&D. Some of the
weapons systems it has recently unveiled have surprised Western military observers.
Of course, America’s Asian military alliances are formidable. China’s only strategic and military
‘partner’ now is Pakistan. But to a considerable extent, China will be able to circumvent the US
and ‘allied’ naval dominance across the Indo-Pacific through the Belt and Road connection
across Eurasia. Notably, CPEC will transform China from a one-ocean to a two-ocean power.
Second, China is building strong economic and military links with a resurgent Russia which will
amply balance America’s Asian alliances. Finally, India, if not Japan and Australia, may turn out
to be a ‘fake friend’. China is its largest trading partner; while India will welcome America’s
economic, military and technological largesse, it is unlikely to confront China militarily,
especially not to advance US interests.
While America’s historical alliances no doubt enhance its global power and influence, it is also
severely constrained, politically and militarily, by ‘legacy issues’, such as the unconditional
commitment to Israel; the ‘war on terror’; the intervention in Iraq; the confrontation with Iran;
the Afghan quagmire; and the ‘new Cold War’ with Russia.
Most importantly, the outcome of the strategic rivalry between China and America will depend
on the vibrancy and credibility of their respective systems of governance. China’s ‘socialist
democracy’ is now seen as a most effective form of government. In contrast, the US political
system seems to be broken, divided and corrupt.
In an incisive article last month, entitled: ‘When China Leads’, Kevin Rudd, the former prime
minister of Australia, writes: “The West, by and large, has no idea what awaits it as China
continues its rise. The United States ... has become a global laughingstock.... Europe ... remains
a rolling seminar on itself...”. He adds: “It would be reckless to assume, as many still do in the
US, Europe, and elsewhere, that China’s transition to global pre-eminence will somehow simply
implode....”
In such circumstances, Washington would be wise to consider seriously Xi Jinping’s proposal to
create “a community of a shared future for mankind”.

Trump takes US out of Paris climate accord
WASHINGTON: In a letter to Congress, President Donald Trump said on Thursday that he was
pulling the United States out of the Paris Agreement because it’s bad for America.
“I cannot in good conscience support a deal that punishes the United States because that’s
what it does,” said the US president in an address broadcast live from the White House Rose
Garden. “This deal subjects our citizens to harsh living conditions but fails to protect the
environment.”
The deal, he said, also gave an undue advantage to other nations over the United States.
“This agreement is less about the climate and more about other countries gaining a financial
advantage over the US,” said Mr Trump.
In the letter to Congress, President Trump argues that the Paris accord, signed by the Obama
administration in November 2015, was a bad deal for America.
The letter explained that the president’s action fulfils the promise he made during the election
to put the American workers first.
“The accord was negotiated poorly by the Obama administration and signed out of desperation.
It front-loads costs on the American people to the detriment of our economy and job growth
while extracting meaningless commitments from the world’s top emitters like China,” the
administration argued in the letter.
Since Mr Trump has been known to change his mind at the last minute, environmentalists were
hoping that he would reconsider this decision as well but instead he announced the decision to
quit the accord at a late afternoon news briefing at the White House Rose Garden.
President Trump said on Wednesday that he was still listening to “a lot of people both ways”
but it seems that ultimately opponents of the deal prevailed.
The decision separates the United States from some of its closest European allies who spent
years negotiating the 2015 agreement to fight global warming and pollution by reducing carbon
emissions in nearly 200 nations.
During his travels in Europe last week, President Trump was repeatedly asked by his allies and
the pope to stay in the deal.
The withdrawal leaves the United States aligned only with Russia among the world’s
industrialized economies as China too has ratified the agreement. Since December 2016, 146
nations have signed the deal, agreeing to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to keep global
warming below 2 degrees Celsius.
Explaining why he decided to opt out of the deal, President Trump said by 2040, compliance
with this agreement would cut US production for paper down 12 per cent, of cement by 23 per
cent, iron and steel, by 38 per cent, coal by 86 per cent and natural gas by 31 per cent.
This would also cost the US close to three trillion dollars in lost GDP and and also the loss of 6.5
million industrial jobs, he added. “American households would have $7000 less annual income.”
President Trump said that while punishing the United States, the deal takes no meaningful
action against the world’s leading polluters. “China would be able to do whatever they want for
13 years, India’s compliance is contingent on receiving billions and billions and billions of dollars
of foreign aid form developed countries,” he said.

Islamic alliance controversy
THE message may be muddled, but the consequences could be serious. Earlier in the week,
foreign affairs adviser Sartaj Aziz appeared to have told a parliamentary committee that former
army chief Gen Raheel Sharif could not be recalled from Saudi Arabia, where the general is now
based as head of the Islamic Military Alliance. The Foreign Office soon rejected media reports of
Mr Aziz’s remarks to the Senate foreign affairs committee, claiming that the adviser had been
misquoted in the in-camera briefing. The Foreign Office claimed that the Saudi-led alliance’s
terms of reference had yet to be finalised, and that once Pakistan received them, the
government would in consultation with parliament decide which aspects of the alliance to
participate in. Tellingly, the Foreign Office clarification did not address whether Gen Sharif is in
Saudi Arabia in his personal capacity or whether the government has the right to withdraw the
retired army chief from IMA command.
Perhaps the government is unable to truthfully or accurately inform parliament about Gen
Sharif’s post-retirement agenda because it has not been involved in the discussions that led to
his accepting the position of military commander of the IMA. But that hardly absolves it of
responsibility for the bizarre and damaging episode that Gen Sharif’s stint in Saudi Arabia has
already become. Whatever the law and whatever the Foreign Office claims about his command
of the IMA, there is an undeniable public perception that the ex-army chief’s position is seen
internationally as Pakistan’s commitment to the alliance. More worryingly, Saudi Arabia itself
appears to believe that his command is a sign of Pakistan’s support for the Saudi-led IMA,
regardless of whether the state here publicly insists that it is committed to neutrality. The
recent spike in tensions with Iran and the denial by the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan that the
latter is acting as a mediator in the Qatar stand-off underline the complexity of the foreign
policy crisis the government may soon be confronted with.
It is obvious that Pakistan has no easy options. Yet, the official government stance that no
decision will be taken without consulting parliament is the correct one. Pakistan, it appears, has
little leverage and not enough influence to act as mediator in the GCC crisis. Saudi Arabia is a
country that Pakistan has a strategic and long-term relationship with. Disagreements or
differences in the short term ought not to obscure the foundational reasons for a close Pak-
Saudi relationship. At the same time, Pakistan cannot afford to follow an ally — no matter how
close to Pakistan — blindly. It is not clear why Gen Sharif himself believes his continued
command of the IMA can help Pakistan. The general ought to surrender his command and allow
Pakistan to follow its true national interest.

Kashmir solution
ON this Kashmir Solidarity Day, with the people of India-held Kashmir continuing to suffer from
the latest bout of violence and repression by the Indian state, some long-standing realities need
to be reiterated.
First, India will never be able to bury the Kashmir dispute — not inside IHK and not in its
relationship with Pakistan.
To the proud, defiant and infinitely courageous people of IHK, a message of solidarity is
important: whatever the rulers and policymakers in the region choose to do or not do,
oppressed people everywhere share a common bond — the quest for dignity, basic rights and
self-determination are fundamental to human existence. The state of India has long been in
denial of core human values in IHK, but its denial cannot go on forever — the rightful and
intrinsically just demands of the people of IHK will ultimately prevail.
Second, India’s stubborn refusal to engage with Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute under Prime
Minister Narendra Modi is a policy doomed to failure. For parochial, domestic reasons, Mr
Modi may be in denial of the centrality of the Kashmir dispute to the normalisation of ties
between the two countries, but that cannot undo the legal and moral basis of Pakistan’s
demand for a fair and just solution to the Kashmir dispute.
The framework of an eventual settlement is readily available and the initiation of publicly
acknowledged or backchannel talks can build on the last pragmatic and sensible approach to
conflict resolution: the four-point agenda of the Pervez Musharraf era. While the specifics can
change, the four-point agenda was based on the right principles: a phased, progressive,
mutually acceptable military de-escalation in the disputed region with a simultaneous,
coordinated ramping up of a people-centric governance structure.
If war is not an option — as it can become in a nuclear-armed region — then the honest pursuit
of peace is the only alternative.
Third, there are lessons for Pakistan in its thus far faulty strategy of keeping the Kashmir
dispute alive internally, inside the country, and externally, on the global stage.
Domestically, the reliance on the religious right and extremist networks to keep the Kashmir
dispute front and centre of the national consciousness has been a historical mistake.
Mainstream politics based on a mainstream acceptance of human rights and self-determination
and rooted in mainstream sections of society is the only sensible approach.
The more the Kashmir dispute is allowed to become the exclusive remit of right-wing and
violent groups, the more the inherent justness of the Kashmir cause will be obscured. The
external benefits will be clear too if Pakistan can present to the world a rational and peaceful
case and if the powerful human dimension of the suffering in IHK is made central to the
message of why the Kashmir dispute needs the outside world’s attention.
Kashmir Solidarity Day can be the start of a much-needed diplomatic and strategic rethink.
Published in Dawn February 5th, 2017

THE NEW SAUDI VISION
The October 27 edition of The Guardian, UK’s premier daily, quoted Saudi Arabia’s crown
prince, Mohammad Bin Salman, as saying that he is committed to “return the country to
moderate Islam.” He added that this is the kind of Islam the country practised before decades
of experimentation with stricter forms of the faith which produced an extreme state and polity
in the kingdom.
Salman said that this happened due to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in the Shia-majority Iran. He
explained that as a reaction to the revolution, governments in many Sunni-majority Muslim
countries tried to enforce “rigid doctrines” and that Saudi Arabia was one such country. He told
The Guardian that “they (the Sunni-majority countries) didn’t know how to deal with the rise of
radical Islam in Iran.”
Salman is set to become the next Saudi king. In fact, he already wields a tremendous amount of
influence and power within the Saudi monarchy. So his comments not only sent shockwaves
across the kingdom but also across two separate sections within the international community
which hold different, binary perceptions of Saudi Arabia. One of these sections is mostly made
up of observers in Europe and the US, and ‘moderate’ and ‘liberal Muslims’ in various Muslim
countries. For long they have maintained that in the last many decades, the Saudi state
formulated various ‘harsh strands’ of the Muslim faith. They say it did this to suppress dissent
within the kingdom. They add that the kingdom then began to export these strands to other
Muslim countries. It is suggested by this section that this was achieved through the power of
the ‘Petro Dollar’. Consequently, this policy radicalised various Muslim states and societies
which gave birth to some unprecedented forms of extremist terror. Ultimately, the move
returned to haunt Saudi Arabia as well.
The other section has always defended the aforementioned policy, saying that Saudi Arabia did
so to “counter-balance” the influence of revolutionary Iran which had begun to disseminate its
brand of radical political Islam after the 1979 revolution. This section also claims that the
formulation of harsh Saudi policies within the kingdom and their export to other Muslim
countries was necessary to combat ideas such as communism, socialism and secularism in the
Muslim world. Not surprisingly, a majority of those belonging to this school of thinking were
(and some still are) the direct recipients of financial and political Saudi patronage.
Nevertheless, the latter narrative has now been shattered by Salman. The November 5 edition
of The New York Times (NYT) reported that on November 4, Salman ordered a severe
crackdown against the kingdom’s influential clerics and religious establishment. The newspaper
added that members of this establishment had for years used the kingdom’s oil wealth “to
promote their intolerant interpretation of the Muslim faith to the world.” The same day 11
high-ranking princes from the ruling Saud family were also arrested. NYT reported that the

arrested princes had disagreed with Salman’s attempt to isolate Qatar and were accused of
having links with the Muslim Brotherhood organisation.
While explaining his vision of a “moderate Saudi Arabia”, Salman has often alluded to the
policies of former Saudi monarch, King Faisal Abdulaziz. Faisal was assassinated in 1975,
apparently by the brother of a man who was killed by the Saudi police in 1966. The man had
been a part of a rally in Riyadh whose participants were protesting against Faisal’s decision to
launch the kingdom’s first television station.
Faisal is still remembered in the Kingdom as being one of Saudi Arabia’s most ‘progressive’ and
‘modernist’ monarchs. He came to power in 1964 through a ‘palace coup’ which he pulled off
against his brother and the sitting monarch, Saud Bin Abdulaziz. Farzana Moon in No Islam But
Islam wrote that Faisal (as prime minister) was critical of his brother for “squandering the
kingdom’s oil wealth.” Faisal used the Saudi National Guards to oust Saud who had been in
power since 1953.
James P. Jankowski in his book Nasser’s Egypt wrote that at the time of Faisal’s ascendance, the
Middle-East in general and the Muslim world at large were awash with two modernist and left-
leaning ideas — Arab Nationalism and Ba’ath Socialism. The charismatic Egyptian president and
Arab nationalist Gamal Nasser, was being hailed as the “leader of the Muslim world.” Jankowski
quotes Nasser describing Saudi Arabia as being “backward” and “regressive.”
In her 2011 book on the Saudi monarchy, Professor Sherifa Zuhur wrote that to counter
Nasser’s influence over Arab youth, Faisal tried to rapidly modernise Saudi Arabia. He
introduced television, encouraged modern education and allowed Saudi women to work
alongside men in offices. Mordechai Abir, in his 1987 essay, ‘The Consolidation of the Ruling
Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia’ wrote that Faisal soon began to face resistance from
members of the country’s powerful religious establishment. As a result, Faisal blocked their
entry into the higher echelons of his regime.
When Nasser’s influence began to recede after his sudden demise in 1970, Faisal rose to
become a popular figure in the Muslim world, especially when he placed an oil embargo on the
US and those European countries that had supported Israel during the 1973 Egypt-Israel War.
This is also when Saudi Arabia began to pour money in the coffers of developing Muslim
countries to earn a major say in their internal affairs.
The princes, who were arrested on Salman’s orders this year on November 4 are said to also
have had links with the Muslim Brotherhood. This is interesting because Salman sees Faisal as
his hero but it was during Faisal’s tenure that Saudi Arabia became a major supporter and
financer of the Brotherhood. An Egyptian organisation, the Brotherhood had been opposing
Nasser’s regime across the 1950s and 1960s. Many of its members, exiled by Nasser, were
taken in by Faisal and allowed to study at and operate schools, colleges and universities in the
Kingdom.
It is only recently that the long love affair between the Saudi monarchy and the Brotherhood
began to erode. In his April 17 essay in the Middle East Eye, David Hearst wrote that Egyptian
leader Abdel Al-Sisi had managed to convince the Saudis about the threat that an organised
outfit such as the Muslim Brotherhood posed to the monarchy. Salman is vigorously pushing
ahead with his political, social and economic reforms. It will be interesting to see what impact

these changes will have on the politics and polity of those Muslim countries where the now
elapsing strand of Saudi ideology and faith had been embraced and imposed.
Published in Dawn, EOS, November 12th, 2017
Iran announces new missile production line
BEIRUT: Iran announced the launch of a new missile production line on Saturday, according to
state media, against a backdrop of tension between the United States and Tehran.
The Sayyad 3 missile can reach an altitude of 27 km and travel up to 120 km, Iranian defence
minister Hossein Dehghan said at a ceremony.
The missile can target fighter planes, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles and helicopters,
Dehghan said.
Last week, the United States slapped new economic sanctions on Iran over its ballistic missile
programme, and said Tehran’s “malign activities” in the Middle East undercut any “positive
contributions” coming from a 2015 Iran nuclear accord.
The measures signalled that the administration of President Donald Trump was seeking to put
more pressure on Iran while keeping in place the agreement between Tehran and six world
powers to curb its nuclear programme in return for lifting international oil and financial
sanctions.
The US government said it was targeting 18 entities and people for supporting what it said were
“illicit Iranian actors or transnational criminal activity”.
Those sanctioned had backed Iran’s military or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps by
developing drones and military equipment, producing and maintaining boats, and procuring
electronic components, it said. Others had “orchestrated the theft of US and Western software
programmes” sold to Iran’s government, the Treasury Department said.
On Monday, the Trump administration said Iran was complying with the nuclear agreement but
that it was in default of the spirit of the accord.
It was the second time Trump has certified Iranian compliance with the agreement since he
took office in January, despite having described it as “the worst deal ever” during his 2016
presidential campaign, criticising then-President Barack Obama, whose administration
negotiated the accord.
Dehghan said at the ceremony on Saturday that the recent $110 billion military deal between
the United States and Saudi Arabia, announced during Trumps visit to Riyadh in May, was
intended as a threat to Iran.
“We recently witnessed an immense purchase that some countries in the region paid as a
ransom to America and they intend to bring weapons into the region, and this purchase was
done with the goal of threatening Islamic Iran,” Dehghan said according to the website for state
TV.

Published in Dawn, July 23rd, 2017
Final phase of South Waziristan IDPs’ return begins on Tuesday
PESHAWAR: The final phase of the repatriation of South Waziristan Agency’s internally
displaced persons will begin on Tuesday (July 25) possibly marking the ‘complete’ return of
71,124 registered dislocated families to their homes.
Mian Adil Zahoor, assistant director (operations and relief) at the Fata Disaster Management
Authority (FDMA), told Dawn that around 3,500 displaced families would return to South
Waziristan Agency in the final phase.
He said the displaced persons, who intentionally didn’t want to return, would be de-notified as
IDPs and that the authority would stop their food ration and other relief assistance after de-
notification.
“After the return of these 3,500 families, the backlog of IDPs from South Waziristan will come
down to zero,” he said, adding that the repatriation of displaced persons to Orakzai and Kurram
agencies had already been completed.
The FDMA has already de-notified around 65,000 Fata families (around half a million people) as
IDPs. These families have taken up residence in settled areas of the country, mostly in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa.
“All de-notified families have submitted their voluntary return forms to the FDMA. These
families received cash assistance but didn’t return to native lands,” said Adil Zahoor.
According to the FDMA, 95.16 per cent return of IDPs to South Waziristan Agency has been
completed so far.
The National Database and Registration Authority (Nadra) has verified a total of 71,124
displaced families.
The civilians were forced to leave homes when the security forces launched the Rah-i-Nijat
operation against militants in Mehsud area of South Waziristan in 2009.
Militancy and nine years long delay in the return of IDPs caused colossal damages to properties,
especially houses.
The returnees complain about a lack of basic needs in native territories, which, they insist,
discourages their rehabilitation.
A journalist from South Waziristan said half of the repatriated families returned to Tank, Dera
Ismail, Karachi and other areas due to unavailability of basic facilities like healthcare, education,
drinking water, shelter and electricity in hometowns.

“The people submitted voluntary return forms, got cash assistance and came back to Tank and
Dera Ismail Khan,” he said, adding that almost half of the Mehsud population had shifted back
to settled areas.
The return of IDPs to North Waziristan and Khyber agencies hangs in balance apparently due to
the delicate security situation, especially the ongoing operation Khyber-IV in Rajgal area
bordering Afghanistan.
The return of families migrated to Afghanistan from North Waziristan Agency has been
temporarily suspended. The government has brought back a total of 4,911 families from
Afghanistan via the Ghulam Khan checkpoint and around 1,500 will be repatriated.
The tribal people had migrated to Afghanistan after the Pakistan Army launched the Zarb-i-Azb
operation in North Waziristan in June 2014.
The officials said several pockets in North Waziristan had not been de-notified as conflict zones
that caused delay in the complete return of IDPs in these two tribal agencies.
The FDMA says 18,120 Nadra-verified families from North Waziristan and 1,500 families from
Khyber Agency are waiting for their return.
It has announced that the repatriation of displaced families to Dandy Derpakhel area near
Miramshah will begin on August 28.
However, the IDPs from Miramshah Town and Datakhel tehsil have yet to receive timeframe for
return to hometowns.
Adil Zahoor said the complete return of IDPs might take three to four months.
The government had initially fixed Nov 2016 as the cutoff date for ending a decade-long misery
of IDPs.
Our Correspondent from Bannu adds: Elders of Madakhel, the sub-section of Ahmadzai Wazir
tribe, have complained about delay in the return of IDPs to North Waziristan Agency and
shortage of facilities for displaced families in Bakakhel Camp.
The complaint was made during a jirga held here on Saturday.
The participants set a one-week deadline for the authorities to ensure the provision of basic
needs at the camp warning they would set up a protest camp in front of Parliament House in
Islamabad of the demand wasn’t met.
“The camp has virtually become an interment centre, where tribal people live a miserable life,”
Malik Eid Mohammad Khan told the jirga.
He complained that the members of Madakhel tribe hadn’t been given tokens required by IDPs
for repatriation.
The elders warned that the IDPs would agitate if the government further delayed their return.
Published in Dawn, July 23rd, 2017
What humanity has chosen to forget
On December 4, 2000, the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 55/76 decided that
from 2001, June 20 would be observed as World Refugee Day, noting that 2001 marked the
50th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This Convention,
also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention, is a United Nations multilateral treaty that defines
who is a refugee, setting out the rights of individuals who are granted asylum and the
responsibilities of nations that grant them, by building on Article 14 of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as: “A
person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it..”
Of course, the UN itself came into being at the time of the last great refugee crisis, when 40.7
million people were displaced from their homes across Europe, Africa, China, Asia, etc., after
the Second World War. The same post-war chaos also gave birth to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, which guaranteed a “right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution”.
Years later, we are now witnessing the greatest movement of the uprooted that the world has
ever known. Even more than during the Second World War, as some 65.3 million people were
displaced from their homes, 21.3 million of them refugees, according to 2015 UN figures. With
nearly one percent of the world's population homeless and fleeing one form of persecution or
the other, the crisis keeps getting worse and worse, owing to more and more wars, a lack of
political cooperation between states and the world's desperation to look away from these
helpless people in the hope of forgetting them — to avoid taking any responsibility for their
fate.
The worst hit has clearly been the Syrians. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) estimated that half of the population of Syria will be in need of aid by the end of 2016.
Already the appeal for aid related to the crisis is the highest in history — more than USD 5
billion. Meanwhile, 1 in 4 people in the neighbouring Lebanon, which forbids the permanent
construction of refugee camps, are refugees.
Under these conditions, Syrian refugees are being horrifically exploited. In 2016, Foreign Policy
reported that “In April, 75 Syrian women were rescued from sexual slavery at a brothel in
Lebanon. They had been beaten, tortured, electrocuted, and compelled to have sex more than
10 times a day. Increasing numbers of teenage Syrian girls are entering early marriages in order
to receive financial and physical protection from their adult husbands.” And, according to a
2014 United Nations Population Fund study, 41 percent of Syrian youths in Lebanon said that
they have had suicidal urges, living amidst the horrors surrounding them.
Closer to home, we have the Rohingya refugees. Between October 9, 2016, and January 5,
2017, over 65,000 of them were estimated to have fled Myanmar to Bangladesh, according to a
report from the United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs. With its limited
resources, the Bangladesh government has struggled severely to handle the influx of refugees.
Meanwhile, according to the OHCHR, the accounts of “torture, murder and gang-rape” suffered
by the Rohingyas “at the hands of security forces were so severe they may account to ethnic
cleansing”. Yet, the world at large is still reluctant to address this issue. However, despite the
inhumane fate to which humanity has condemned the Rohingyas, the worst forgotten are
perhaps still the Palestinians refugees.
In fact, after the Second World War, the world's refugee crisis, one could argue, had actually
started with Israel's ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Palestinian population in both 1948 and

in the 1967 Six Day War. Hence, the UN General Assembly mandated The United Nations Relief
and Works Agency (UNRWA) in 1949 to provide both relief and public works for Palestinian
refugees.
The UNRWA today provides assistance to more than 5.2 million Palestinian refugees
throughout the Middle East. Its assistance to Gaza is so crucial that it makes up about 14
percent of Gaza's GDP. However, in 2015, the UNRWA was unable to meet its financial
obligations because of an increasing number of refugees to care for, decreasing funding and
Israel's deliberate attempts to thwart its efforts, for example, by adding USD 7.5 million extra
costs to its deliveries to Gaza. Ultimately, the UNRWA had to reduce funding to thousands of
refugee families in Gaza and to Palestinian refugees from Syria, which is estimated to affect
about 500,000 Palestinian children.
Countless more people from many more countries and regions are suffering in the same way.
The consensus among peoples and countries that finally helped solve the refugee crisis after
the Second World War is gravely missing today, along with the willingness to recognise the
severity of the situation and the suffering of refugees.
That is why World Refugee Day is so important today. Perhaps, in remembering the plight of
refugees across the world on this one day, we will recognise how we keep forgetting them for
the rest of the year. And that if we didn't, perhaps, we would take the time to pressurise world
leaders to the extent necessary for refugees to be treated with the humanity and dignity that
they deserve. And who knows, perhaps, we could even do one better; ensure that no one is
forced to leave their homes to stay alive, and become a refugee.
The writer is a member of the Editorial team at The Daily Star.

Funds for TDPs
THE editorial Diversion of Development Funds (July 22), indicates that the of money amount
allocated for temporarily displaced persons (TDPs) [under the Public Sector Development
Programme] was Rs100 billion but was cut by Rs38 billion. It adds that from the remainder,
around Rs24bn has been diverted to various expenditures not connected to TDPs.
The government is cognizant of the needs and requirements of TDPs. It has provided Rs93.8bn
during the last three years to facilitate their return to Fata. Funds have been provided for
transport, compensation, cash grants, rehabilitation, housing subsidy, reconstruction and
wheat subsidy on a timely basis.
With regards to budgetary allocations for 2016-17, it is clarified that Rs.55bn was allocated for
TDPs whereas your editorial indicates an allocation of Rs100bn. The allocation of Rs100bn
contained two components: (i) allocation for TDPs worth Rs55bn and (ii) allocation for security
enhancement worth Rs45bn. These are two separate initiatives and should not be considered a
single activity.
There seems to be some misunderstanding about the issue. Due to the improved security
situation, the requirements of TDPs have reduced as compared to previous years.
ADVERTISEMENT
A substantially high lump-sum allocation for TDPs is made keeping in view unforeseen
requirements. These funds are released on an urgent basis as per the needs and requirements
of TDPs. No request for the provision of funds is being denied or delayed at any stage.
It is also clarified that no cut has ever been imposed on the cost of requirements of TDPs. In
fact, amounts have been diverted from other heads for the purpose.
The needs and requirements have fully been met under all heads of expenditures for relief,
rehabilitation and reconstruction of TDPs.
Spokesman
Finance Division
Islamabad

OBOR connectivity shunned
ALL historic opportunities come with an element of risk. It is, therefore, quite appropriate to ask
hard questions about the financing and affordability of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,
and to which country will accrue the majority of gains in the years and decades ahead.
At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge that CPEC is only one plank, an important one
no doubt, of the vast One Belt, One Road project that Chinese President Xi Jinping has made the
centrepiece of his rule — a developmental and an infrastructure-building spree on a scale that
the world has not seen since the end of the Second World War.
While the US, architect of the current global economic and political order, has fretted that
OBOR amounts to China’s first attempt to redraw the global order, there is an undeniable
opportunity at the heart of the venture.
If engaged with sensibly and pragmatically, OBOR could help all of China’s trading partners and
regional neighbours, big and small, realise collective gains. That makes India’s decision to
boycott the OBOR summit all the more puzzling. Even the US and Japan sent delegations to the
summit in Beijing.
Explore: Is India trying to convince the world China’s OBOR plan is secretly colonial?
The Indian foreign ministry’s official reasons for declining to participate are contradictory. Citing
India’s own Act East, Neighbourhood First and Go West policies, the ministry spokesperson has
claimed that connectivity is at the heart of Indian foreign policy.
But the spokesperson has rejected that very connectivity through OBOR on the pretext of debt
traps and financial responsibility — a bizarre form of diplomacy where India appears to believe
that it is better placed to interpret the national interest of third countries and the sovereign
decisions they are making than those countries themselves.
Even the objection to CPEC because of the claim that the Gilgit-Baltistan region is integral to the
Kashmir issue is self-defeating; CPEC is only a part of OBOR, which has already drawn in virtually
all of India’s neighbours.
It is as if India believes that by ignoring OBOR, it can thwart its vast effects on the region. In
reality, even the most cautious cooperative approach by India could yield significant benefits
for both India and the region.

From a Pakistan-centric approach too, the Indian approach makes little sense. As the
relationship between China and India itself has shown, trade and economic cooperation can
reduce political tensions and create enough incentives for long-term disputes to not turn into
open conflict. If OBOR succeeds even to a small extent, it could draw the wider region into a
virtuous cycle of trade and prosperity that could cause the spectre of conflict among the
region’s three major military powers to recede.
Perhaps India sees itself as a global power to rival China eventually, but that does not mean it
should spurn sensible opportunities in the interim. India should reconsider its stance on OBOR.
Connecting through CPEC
THE Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing was an international media highlight. Meant to
increase international cooperation, the event has triggered debate on the prospects and
challenges for nations that may potentially join the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative — a
debate that will shape policy opinions in those countries in the coming weeks and months.
The forum was also an important occasion for Pakistan; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
was highlighted as a flagship project of the larger OBOR initiative. The upcoming summit in
Astana of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in June will be another such occasion
for Pakistan. Many in Pakistan have already started reviewing CPEC and the Pak-China geo-
economic alliance afresh. It seems that Pakistan will remain a key focus in the discourse on
regional economic and political affairs and alliances.
In his keynote address at the Belt and Road Forum, President Xi Jinping stressed that OBOR is
for economic development and free of any political agenda. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s
speech echoed this stance when he invited other countries to join CPEC. These assertions
notwithstanding, the strategic aspects of OBOR are still expected to dominate the debate on
this forum as well as the upcoming SCO summit, which primarily aims at dealing with common
security challenges.
Success requires consensus amongst us and cooperation with our neighbours.
The SCO summit will be significant because India and Pakistan are likely to become full
members this year — an interesting development in many ways, particularly in the context of
the China-led OBOR initiative. India and Pakistan have divergent positions on OBOR. Pakistan
sees CPEC as a flagship project of the Chinese dream of connectivity. India boycotted the Forum
in Beijing, failing to conceive of an idea parallel to competing with China. It is not certain if the

Indian and Pakistani prime ministers will meet on the sidelines of the SCO summit, but if it
happens it will be a major highlight of the event.
OBOR is a non-political development initiative. But when President Xi declares that a peaceful
and stable environment is essential for success, it brings strategic questions into the debate.
The SCO is not a strategic forum; it was created to respond to non-traditional security threats.
Dominated by China and Russia, the SCO scope has expanded to pacify interstate tensions as it
has some leverage in Central and South Asia.
The SCO summit will mean different things to different nations. For China, it’s another
opportunity to take into account the other countries’ concerns and interests. India will come
with a diplomatic posture compatible with that of a big power, and may try to reduce the
deficit of not attending the OBOR forum. India will obviously try to assert diplomatic pressure
on Pakistan, and it has specific issues for this purpose. Iran, an observer in the group, will
continue lobbying for the full membership, which Russia will support. President Tayyip Erdogan
is also willing to have Turkey join the organisation. If he succeeds, it will be another step
towards transforming SCO into a strategic alliance.
For Pakistan, the summit in June is another opportunity to capitalise on its geo-economic and
political interests by expanding cooperation with SCO states to combat common security
threats including the militant Islamic State group and other terrorist outfits. Most importantly,
it can showcase CPEC as a joint economic venture to the Central Asian states. In terms of trade
cooperation between China and OBOR countries, Pakistan stands among the countries with
high potential in terms of trading volume and rapid growth — it should focus on this economic
potential.
India and Afghanistan are two major challenges that make it difficult for the country’s
establishment to put geo-economics ahead of geostrategic considerations. Pakistan’s security
and political leaderships have offered India the opportunity to join CPEC. Whether or not India
responds positively, a debate on CPEC’s prospects has already started in India. The leadership
of India-held Kashmir also sees CPEC as an opportunity for economic growth and expansion of
its markets to Central Asia. Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti has already stated that CPEC could
make the region a hub of emerging economic opportunities. For Pakistan, connectivity with
India through CPEC can also help it to make progress on contentious issues, including Kashmir.
Afghanistan, being central to Pakistan’s future geo-economic prospects, can still be engaged —
although it has shown interest in joining CPEC, the full potential of this has yet to be explored.
Iran and the Central Asian states can also become part of CPEC, activating a portion of the Silk
Route via the Karakoram Highway and railway links, which will require new transit agreements.
For China, CPEC is important for the OBOR initiative. Regional peace with a stable Afghanistan is
a prerequisite for its success, which is why it was helping Kabul in the peace process. Although
Pakistan cannot guarantee peace in Afghanistan — the country has many destabilising factors
other than the Taliban — it can at least extend full support for peace negotiations, which is
important for Pakistan’s own global image. Pakistan can negotiate joint transit trade
agreements with Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China. It will provide some alternative
economic vision to Afghanistan. Once, this was the dream of Afghan president Ashraf Ghani as
well, but Pakistan was not a part of it.

For Pakistan, CPEC is important for economic connectivity with South and Central Asia, and the
SCO is essential for security connectivity. One cannot ignore the internal dimensions either.
CPEC can become an economic development model for OBOR countries, but only if internal
consensus remains intact. The government is responsible for chalking out a strategy to keep all
of the country’s stakeholders on board and make all of the processes transparent. The Ministry
of Planning, Development and Reform has to arrange weekly or fortnightly media briefings on
developments of CPEC projects, and it would be more productive if such briefings were
arranged at different chambers of commerce rather than in the bureaucratic atmosphere of the
official secretariats. The government must not ignore the internal front if it wants to maximise
the advantages of CPEC at the regional level.
Published in Dawn, May 21st, 2017
Media and labour
NOAM Chomsky pins his propaganda model on “inequality of wealth and power and its multi-
level effects on mass media interests and choices”. The media’s structure and its five basic
filters, as pointed out by Chomsky, are the same the world over, although there are variations
in cultural and political filters specific to each country. Hence, it came as no surprise when I saw
the news of the death of five coal miners on page six of a national newspaper a few days ago.
Generally speaking, the deaths of workers are deemed fit for page two or three and if the
number of dead is higher, the news is taken on the front page. I wondered about the filters in
this case: was it the location of the event (a village east of Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir — and
not in the provinces) or lack of representation (no trade union mediation).
The media marginalises, or filters out, the already marginalised. And the more marginalised you
are, the more you find yourself on the periphery. That’s what has happened with labour in
Pakistan. With the frontline defence of workers — the trade unions — on the retreat, labour
issues hardly find space in the media. The concerns of the over 60-million civilian workforce do
not affect the ‘corporate’ world to which much of the media belongs. Hence, there are fewer
news stories, scant analyses, and hardly any follow-up of even those tales of toil considered
newsworthy.
The internet is a strategic tool for re-energising trade unions.
But in all fairness, being an extension of ourselves, the media cannot be viewed in black or
white. It may not have been proactive in the case of labour, but it has supported, and still
supports, grass-roots movements, be it of workers or other marginalised sections. The media is
organic. A blend of technology and social systems, it keeps on evolving. The internet has
widened its scope enormously through cyberspace. It is dynamic and interactive and a lot
depends on how society uses it, changes its use over time and subverts corporate control. The
media needs an interface to achieve such a change. In the case of labour, this interface — trade
unions — has gone missing to a large extent. Yet, there still remain some trade unions and
federations in the country, civil society groups, activists and concerned consumers. It depends

on both labour and the media how to use this interface. Recently, swift mobilisation by
consumers, under the hashtag ‘BoycottKhaadi’, forced the management of the textile brand to
give its workers their due rights.
Though it is the age of social media and anyone with even moderate technical knowhow and
some financial resources can have a voice and speak for oneself in cyberspace, we must
contend with the fact that the majority of our workforce is deprived of even that. According to
a 2016 survey, only 17.8 per cent of Pakistan’s population have access to the internet, though
over 70pc have mobile phones. Hence the print and electronic media (radio and television)
remain crucial for the coverage of labour issues. Though the burden of responsibility falls on
workers to build and maintain linkages with correspondents and submit concise and timely
press releases, journalists could play a proactive role and investigate labour as their beat as
they do politics, economy and finance.
The use of the internet is emerging as one of the strategic tools for the re-energising of trade
unions in the western hemisphere. Trade unions maintain interactive websites and make use of
web-based communication platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. The internet links up the
labour movement with other forms of social and political activism existing in their respective
countries, and globally too if required. International trade unions and federations have
increased their outreach through interactive websites and solidarity campaigns giving agency
and voice to a larger number of workers.
Apart from websites run by trade unions, there are a number of web-based communication
platforms operated by labour activists. LabourStart stands out as a news and campaigning
website of the international trade union movement. Governed by an executive committee,
news links from all over the world are collected by its 960 volunteer correspondents.
In Pakistan, there are over 15 trade union federations. Some of them have a Facebook presence
and none have a website I could search. I believe our trade union federations do have the
wherewithal to start a web page. Perhaps they do not have young and dynamic members with
ambitions for wider outreach and an enthusiasm for technology.
Of late, two websites have emerged: labourwatchpakistan.com, a news portal, and Paycheck.pk
that gives information on labour laws. None provides campaigning services. Perhaps someone
from the labour resource groups, academic circles or young activists’ networks could take the
initiative, facilitate workers and open an all-purpose, national labour portal.
The writer is a researcher in the development sector.(zeenathisam2004@gmail.com)

New alliances, new wars
HISTORY attests that the conclusion of military alliances often leads to military conflict. Indeed,
alliances are often formed for the purpose of waging war. It is thus ominous that several new
alliances, formal and informal, are emerging currently in various parts of the world.
In South Asia, America’s new alliance with India has emboldened the Modi government to
adopt a more aggressive posture towards Pakistan. Under the American umbrella, New Delhi is
engaged in the brutal suppression of the latest Kashmiri revolt and ceasefire violations along
the LoC; it has threatened ‘surgical strikes’ and a ‘limited war’ and made military preparations
for a ‘Cold Start’ surprise attack against Pakistan.
India is now part of the ‘Quad’ (the US, Japan, India and Australia), the Asian military group
formed to counter China. The consequent overconfidence in New Delhi sparked the recent
military stand-off with China at Doklam.
Each component of the Middle East matrix is extremely complex.
Other military ‘alliances’ have been formed in the Middle East recently, including the Iranian
alliances with the governments of Iraq and Syria, and the Russian ‘alliance’ with Syria and Iran.
These have produced visible military outcomes which remain to be sanctified by political
agreements.
President Trump and his inner circle of advisers believe that they have devised a winning
strategy to both reverse Iran’s growing influence in the region and realise peace between Israel
and the Palestinians. The centrepiece of this strategy is a new informal alliance between the US,
Israel and Saudi Arabia. It is presumed that Saudi influence in the Arab and Sunni Muslim world
can be used to challenge Iran’s role in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and persuade the Palestinians to
negotiate a settlement with Israel that is acceptable to Israelis.

This strategy may have already produced some unintended consequences, such as the
‘isolation’ of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt; intensification of the war in
Yemen, and fresh political turbulence in Lebanon.
Each component of the Middle East matrix — Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, the Kurds,
Yemen and Palestine — is extremely complex. The positions of the regional players are well
entrenched. These will not be changed by the new US-initiated power configuration.
It is highly optimistic, and quite naive, to believe that the new alignment can produce a
settlement of the century-old Palestine ‘problem’. The present hard-line Israeli government is
unwilling to accept the creation of a ‘real’ Palestinian state or to halt its continued
encroachment on Palestinian territory. Riyadh has been unable so far to convince President
Mahmoud Abbas, much less the Hamas leadership, to open direct negotiations with Israel
without its commitment to a two-state solution.
Iran is now the dominant power in Iraq. It was the Iranian-formed Shia militias (and the Kurdish
peshmerga) which turned the tide against the militant Islamic State group. The Iraqi
government maintains cordial relations with Washington; but it is pro-Iranian leaders, like ex-
prime minister Jaafari, who call the shots in Baghdad. Sunni leaders and mavericks like Muqtada
al-Sadr have been marginalised.
Moreover, the precipitate Kurdish ‘independence referendum’ in northern Iraq has coalesced
the interests of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey against Kurdish separatism which is perceived to be
supported by Israel.
In Syria, Bashar al-Assad has just won the civil war with active military support from Iran,
Hezbollah and Russia. The Western and Saudi-/GCC-sponsored Sunni insurgency is in tatters. It
will be difficult to alter the Syrian power equation now.
In Lebanon, Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, is the dominant component of a fragile coalition between
the country’s Shia, Sunni and Christian factions. Ham-handed attempts to destabilise this
coalition could lead to another war between Israel and Hezbollah. Fortunately, neither side
wants a war, at least at present.
In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has been unable to dislodge the Houthi-led forces, despite a massive
bombing campaign. The Houthis, no doubt with Tehran’s support, have escalated the conflict
by the recent launch of the missile aimed at Riyadh. There is no military solution in Yemen; the
war can be ended only through a political settlement.
It is the convergent desire of the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia to intensify nuclear and missile
constraints on Iran through further sanctions and possibly to scuttle the nuclear agreement
negotiated between Iran and the six major powers. If, in response, Iran resumes nuclear
enrichment, the US and Israel may construe it as justification for a military strike against Iran.
An attack on Iran will be hard to justify and likely to produce catastrophic consequences.
While the US-led coalition will find it difficult to reverse Iran’s entrenched positions in Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon, or to justify military action against it, they may opt to destabilise Iran
internally. A low-level insurgency has been under way for some time in Iran’s Baluchistan-Sistan
province (as in Pakistani Balochistan). There are disaffected Azerbaijani, Kurdish and other
groups which could be used for subversion and sabotage. The recent terrorist attacks in Iran
may have been a precursor of such action.

However, Tehran is in a position to escalate reciprocal pressure on the members of this new
alliance. Bahrain’s Sunni rulers are vulnerable to their Shia-majority opposition. If pushed
further, Qatar could move closer to Iran and possibly disrupt the operation of US airbases there.
Iran enjoys considerable influence in Afghanistan with the Shia Hazaras and Persian-speaking
Tajiks and increasingly with the Afghan Taliban. It could, if it wished, severely destabilise the
Kabul regime and exert military pressure on the US-Nato forces in Afghanistan. Israel could face
missile and rocket attacks from Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia militias now present in Syria.
The heavy reliance on military force and coercion, especially by the US and some of its allies, is
intensifying the conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere. It has created the
danger of war in South Asia and on the Korean peninsula. It is time for the voices of reason and
responsibility — in America, China, Russia, Europe and the Arab and Muslim world — to caution
against militarism and demand strict adherence by all states, large and small, to the UN
Charter’s central principle: the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force in international
relations.
Child protection
CHILDREN are the most vulnerable segment of any society. In Pakistan, their plight is a
palimpsest of misery. Child labour, brick kiln bondage, domestic slavery, corporal punishment,
trafficking, prostitution, sexual abuse and many other crimes against children are perpetuated
every day due to the negligence of the state as well as poor enforcement of laws.
A major constraint is a lack of data due to inadequate monitoring and information systems of
children in conflict with the law and those who are economically and sexually abused.
Some years ago, the National Commission on Child Welfare and Development was handed over
to the Ministry of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs, in a bid to save it from being rendered
defunct by the 18th Amendment. NCCWD is now under the Ministry of Human Rights, but has
still not produced a national policy for child welfare and development, or any effective
mechanisms for child protection.
There’s no national policy for child welfare and development.
The last report submitted by NCCWD to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child was in
2007-08 on which the committee expressed serious concerns about the lack of basic
disaggregated data regarding affected children, deficiencies in the legal and administrative
system, and systematic and pervasive use of torture against children in custodial settings in the
country.
The HRCP report, 2016, states that while sexual assault against minors, child pornography and
trafficking were criminalised through an amendment to the Pakistan Penal Code by parliament,
the minimum age of criminal responsibility of a child was raised from seven years to 10 years in

2015, which is still horrendous and far below international norms. About 2,000 children
remained in prisons across the country in 2016. There are still no separate courts for them as
required by the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (JJSO).
According to the Society for the Protection of Rights of the Child, juvenile inmates in prisons
face overcrowding, malnutrition, poor sanitation, physical, mental and sexual abuse and a lack
of medical care, education and recreation. A Unicef study of 2006 found that children spent, on
average, 17 days in police lock-up, ranging from one day to five months; some jails had
designated separate juvenile wards but there were very few borstals and juvenile remand
homes in the country, and no facilities for girls.
KP is the only province to have initiated a system of data collection in collaboration with the
Pakistan Society of Criminology (PSC) and Save the Children Sweden. A separate register was
introduced in 2008 at all 238 police stations of KP, along with blue and pink proformae for
juvenile offenders and child victims respectively. An indigenous training manual was developed
for the KP police on the newly developed registers, based on actual case files of children in
conflict with the law, and detailed data collection techniques were imparted to officials at all
police stations in five districts.
Prior to the training, it was found that 98pc of police personnel were ignorant about the
Convention on the Rights of the Child; only 10pc had heard the name of the JJSO. The training
brought a visible change in their attitude towards child victims and offenders. It was found that
the previous logjam that deprived children from liberty was mainly due to ignorance and fixed
attitudes.
While international guidelines recommend that children in conflict with the law should be
released even prior to the court hearing if possible, on an average, only 33pc were released on
probation. After training, the majority of child offenders (61pc) were released with or without
bail.
The PSC developed a database according to the formats of the proformae operationalised it at
the CPO and the missing children centre.
A police child and women protection committee was established in September 2009 with
special arrangements for juvenile offenders and abused children, such as appointment of
psychologists and segregation of boys and girls. Additionally, a new directorate of Human
Rights, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Making, was established at CPO, Peshawar, and in 2010,
the KP Child Protection and Welfare Act was promulgated.
Subsequently, the Balochistan police replicated this system of data collection in collaboration
with the same partners, but both Punjab and Sindh — comprising 75pc of the population of the
country — did not opt for it when this facility was offered to them by the National Police
Bureau in 2009.
Adopting this system would have improved the lot of millions of children, but both provinces
continue to rely on a colonial approach and are not interested in police reforms or training to
implement best practices to protect children as required under international, national and
provincial laws.
The writer is a former federal secretary.
rukhsana.hassan@gmail.com

Footprints: BEYOND PRIVILEGE
SADAF, a 17-year-old domestic servant, set off for work on July 3. Barely an hour and a half
later, her elderly mother received a phone call from her daughter’s employers: Sadaf had
committed suicide “by hanging herself from a door.”
The girl had been working at a house on Jhang Road for almost a year. Her family had fallen into
dire straits since Sadaf’s father passed away four years ago. With bills piling up, Sadaf took up a
job. Her relatives remember her as incredibly courageous.
It was with disbelief that her mother Mukhtar Bibi and her family rushed to the house where
Sadaf used to work. Their grief quickly gave way to anger, they argue, because she couldn’t
have committed suicide: the door she had allegedly used to hang herself on was six feet in
height, and Sadaf’s knees were touching the floor.
The Saddar police registered a murder case against Imran, the owner of the house, and his wife,
and arrested them. Sadaf’s brother-in-law, Haji Mahmood, told Dawn that the victim, her
mother, and another sister lived at his house. “There was nothing unusual when she left home
that day,” he emphasises. “She did not appear anxious or frustrated.”
The case is not an isolated one. According to data shared on the website of the NGO Child
Rights Movement, at least 41 cases of violence against underage domestic servants were
reported between 2011 and 2013. According to the website, 19 of those children died from
critical injuries. This year, five cases of violence against underage domestic servants have been

reported in two and a half months from Faisalabad alone. Yet punishment for the perpetrators
is rare.
The Punjab government has been working on a law to protect domestic servants, says Punjab
Minister for Human Rights Khalil Tahir Sindhu, so that the state becomes the primary
complainant rather than the victim’s family members.
Ume Laila, executive director of NGO Homenet Pakistan, says the government and various
stakeholders have been working on the proposed law since 2014. It will be relief for domestic
workers, she says. “But mere enforcement of the law will not resolve the long-standing issues
of domestic workers. Strict implementation through an effective agency is mandatory,” she
argues.
On June 8, Amna, a seven-year-old girl working as a domestic servant at a house in the Hajiabad
area, broke a glass. Sidra, her employer, started beating the child. The ‘punishment’ did not end
there. Sidra, a well-educated daughter of a schoolteacher, then switched on an iron, tied Amna
to a bed and placed the hot iron on the girl’s belly. When the child screamed, Sidra threw her
out of the house.
An FIR was registered and the Sargodha Road police took Sidra into custody but she secured
bail.
Amna had been sent to work at Sidra’s house for Rs2,000 a month after her father died a few
years ago. She claims that she has not met her mother, Rani Bibi, for over a year and a half. “My
mother, who also works as a maid, collected my salary from the school where Sidra’s mother
teaches,” she explains.
Sidra was found by Ahmed, a shopkeeper, who called the police. According to them, she was
battered and bruised. Capital Police Officer Afzal Kausar says that when they registered the
case, they requested Rani Bibi to be the complainant but she refused because she was scared of
losing her own job. So the police became the complainant. Amna will now be sent to a
children’s shelter managed by the Rescue 1122 in Lahore.
The fancy façades of many houses in Faisalabad’s posh areas hide hundreds of children
employed as domestic servants. Many of them have been placed there by Janat Bibi, who has
been supplying domestic servants for almost 15 years. She collects a commission on these
placements — Rs1,500 from the servant and the same amount from the employer. “I don’t
know whether my business is legal or illegal; what I do know is that I am, in a way, serving
humanity and making an honest living,” she says.
The employers provide these children jobs, food, salary and accommodation and ease the lives
of poor people, she says. The majority of her pool of underage domestic servants are from the
city’s slums and surrounding villages. However, she adds, many children are brought here from
towns and villages in the peripheries of Faisalabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Multan and
Sheikhupura — many of them even come from as far as Sindh.
Nine-year-old Shazia, daughter of Mukhtar Abro, came from Shikarpur, Sindh, to work at a
house in Faisalabad’s Gulberg area. Last month before Eid, the parents pooled money together
to rent a coach and travel to Punjab. “We pooled in money so we could collect our children’s
salaries a couple of days before Eid,” the father explains.
Janat Bibi says most of their parents are illiterate and poor, and poverty forces them to send
their children to work. But she brushes aside complaints of the abuse of children. “If parents

are allowed to beat their children as a part of their upbringing, why shouldn’t they discipline
their servants?”
India and Bangladesh: sharing the Teesta
ONE of the main issues likely to be discussed during the Bangladesh Prime Minister’s impending
visit to India is the sharing of the Teesta river water. The issue has repeatedly featured in
previous talks, but without any concrete results. This time, can one expect any forward
movement?
The Teesta, after originating in Sikkim and passing through West Bengal, enters Bangladesh
before it merges into the Brahmaputra at Teestamukh. The river basin has a drainage area of
about 12,000 square kilometres, of which 83 per cent lies in India. The shortage of irrigation
water during the dry season in a year (November-April) is a common feature in this region.
The Teesta barrage, constructed by India about 90 kilometres upstream of the Indo-Bangladesh
border at Gajaldoba, lies in West Bengal, while Daoni/Dalia barrage constructed by Bangladesh
downstream lies about 15 km away from the international border. Both barrages are meant for
irrigation purposes.
Bangladesh’s appeal to share 50pc of the Teesta water dates back to 1972. An ad hoc sharing
agreement was reached in July 1983, whereby it was decided to allocate 36pc of the water to
Bangladesh, 39pc to India, with the remaining 25pc un-allocated.
The West Bengal government has been insisting that the state is unable to share more than
25pc of the water available at Gajaldoba with Bangladesh. It claims that beyond this volume,
the upstream areas of the state would be adversely affected.

In 2011, a proposal on interim sharing of water for 15 years was mooted and a process was
initiated. This included the arrangement that the lean period flows would be measured jointly
at Gajaldoba in West Bengal, at Doani/Dalia in Bangladesh, and at Kaunia in Bangladesh, and
that upon collection of the jointly collated data, the 90pc dependable flows would be worked
out. And this would form the basis for a long-term agreement.
Further, it was stipulated that 450 cusecs of water would be reserved for environmental flow
and the Indian side could utilise 450 cusecs upstream of Gajaldoba barrage for minor irrigation,
drinking, industrial purposes etc.
India would release the remaining water from Gajaldoba in such a way that 50pc at Gajaldoba
barrage would be available at Doani/Dalia barrage as well. This would effectively mean that the
West Bengal government would have to release only 25pc of the water available at Gajaldoba
barrage, which when added to the 25pc of the regenerated water between Gajaldoba and Dalia
would result in receiving life’s essential equivalent to 50pc of water available at Gajaldoba.
The proposition was not acceptable to West Bengal, as it claimed that the manner of release of
water was very vague. It argued that there could be years when regeneration between
Gajaldoba and Dalia would be less than 25pc. In such an eventuality, committing 50pc share of
water at Gajaldoba might affect the state’s important Teesta barrage project, indeed the largest
irrigation project in the eastern region, involving an irrigation potential of 0.9 million hectares
and 67.5 MW hydropower.
Because of the difference in perceptions, no agreement was reached during the 2011 and 2015
visits of the Indian prime minister to Bangladesh. Meanwhile, Dhaka has been raising the issue
of inadequate availability of the Teesta’s flow in Bangladesh because the water is yet to be
released by India.
At the core of the dispute is the proposition that there exists an institutional mechanism to look
into the flow of “water data” at critical points. In this case, the technical wing of the Indo-
Bangaladesh Joint River Commission (JRC) does the same at Gajaldoba barrage and Dalia
barrage, and exchanges the data among the parties.
Since there are different agencies which collect the flow data, these do not often match. There
is need for a common protocol for data collection by designated agencies. And the facts and
figures must be acceptable to both parties.
Bangladesh being a lower riparian country is hugely dependent on external sources of water —
to the extent of 90pc. A fair share of this volume comes from India. Bangladesh also faces the
problem of ground-water depletion as well as contamination, as does India. Being a single
hydrological unit, surface water and ground water have a symbiotic relationship.
Rather than concentrate on river water alone, the common objective should consider
integrated watershed management, combining both types of water. In addition, basin level
water management should be considered, as part of broader cooperation, since the Teesta
basin is a sub-basin of the greater Ganga, Brahmaputra and Meghna basins.
The Teesta is a highly emotive issue on both sides of the border. There is need for interaction at
the level of experts outside the governments from both countries to demystify the issue, and
for the flow-back of suggestions to the respective governments. This unofficial channel of
sharing of information is likely to build confidence between the two neighbours.

Geopolitically, Bangladesh is anxious to resolve the Teesta issue before the next general
election. It has been pending for the past 40 years. India being a ‘big brother’ in the region
wants to resolve the issue, considering its priority of the “Act East Policy and for countering
China’s proximity”. It is imperative to bring West Bengal to the drawing board for resolution,
and to convince the state government of the mutual benefit of the water sharing arrangement.
At this juncture, the way forward is to convince Bangladesh of the sincerity of India’s intention
to seek a mutually beneficial formula, and for this, to resume the sharing of genuine data on
sharing. The JRC mechanism must be sincerely utilised. Simultaneously, a national consensus
has to be built up within India on the importance of friendship with the neighbour through
equitable sharing of water.
—The Statesman/India
Human rights record
WEDNESDAY saw the release of the annual report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
in Islamabad. Unsurprisingly, it constitutes an indictment. It is no secret that the country’s
human rights record is grim, and has been so for decades. Unhappily, a perusal of the statistics
laid out in the State of Human Rights 2016 shows that matters are getting worse, perhaps
rapidly so. One figure given in the report stands out in particular. According to the Commission
of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, quoted by the HRCP report, the total number of missing
persons in the country currently stands at 1,219. Of these, 728 vanished within the span of just
12 months, the year under review. This is astonishing given that the issue has been at the
forefront of public debate as a major human rights outrage for years. The commission files
monthly performance reports with the federal and provincial governments, leaving the state no
possibility of being able to deny the problem. That this figure rose sharply over 2016 indicates
that not only is there lack of purpose when it comes to the state’s ‘promises’ to resolve the
issue, but that the perpetrators are operating with greater confidence and impunity.
Other data presented is no less shocking: growing restrictions on freedom of movement,
increasing blasphemy allegations and a trend towards mob lynching, and intimidation of the
judiciary and the media leading to a climate of fear — and to self-censorship where the latter is
concerned. Punjab, it appears, witnessed an increase in cases of rape, gang rape and abduction
last year, while in Karachi the frequency of bank robberies and theft of motorcycles and mobile

phones went up. Taken together, the picture presented is one of a society increasingly prone to
violence and anarchy, with the state, whose duty it is to ensure the rule of law, standing by
helplessly. Ponder, for example, another figure that ought to be taken as a clarion call for
action: the total number of cases pertaining to child sexual abuse — including abduction,
missing children, and child marriage — stood at 4,139 during the year under review, a 10pc
increase from 2015. While this could, as in cases of ‘honour’ crimes, partly be a result of
increased reporting of such incidents, it nevertheless brings the number of child abuse victims
to 11 per day. The country is on a grim human rights trajectory — and is ignoring this dangerous
reality at its own peril.
Attacks on schools
WITH Pakistan’s already dismal record in the education sector, the country scarcely needed any
more challenges on this front, but that is exactly what years of militancy have represented.
However, violent extremists are not the only ones culpable in the matter, a fact that a new
report by Human Rights Watch recognises. Dreams Turned into Nightmares: Attacks on
Students, Teachers and Schools in Pakistan examines the issue in a more holistic way — even
though researchers could not gain access to Balochistan, ironically for security reasons.
According to Global Terrorism Database figures that the HRW cites in its report, during the
period between 2007 and 2015, there were 867 attacks on educational institutions, resulting in
392 fatalities and 724 injuries. Based on interviews with students, teachers and parents, the
report highlights serious failures on the part of the provincial authorities over the course of the
decade between January 2007 and October 2016. Their policy of outsourcing security
responsibilities to school authorities has led to financial hardship for the administrations of
academic institutions and contributed to the disturbing trend of arming teachers, while criminal
cases have been filed against principals for inadequate security measures. The report also
includes within its scope the occupation of educational institutions by security forces (in KP and
Sindh), political groups and criminal elements. In Karachi, there was a time when some schools

in parts of Lyari were turned into MQM sector offices while many others in the area were
destroyed or occupied by gangsters.
The report points to the lack of reliable national data on school attacks; this is a critical gap in
knowledge which leaves the government ill-equipped to respond to them adequately or
institute protective measures. Given it was a horrific attack on a school, APS Peshawar — in
which more than 140 were slaughtered, including students, teachers and staff — that proved to
be the catalyst for the National Action Plan, it is surprising that none of its 20 points pertains to
the protection of education. That oversight should be addressed with the attention it deserves,
especially to girls’ education, which has suffered disproportionate harm. Priority should be
given to setting up rapid response units — that can be deployed in the event of an attack on a
school — and to rebuilding destroyed or damaged infrastructure, reclaiming occupied school
buildings, and providing psychosocial support to students who have suffered violence. That is
one way to secure this country’s future.
Published in Dawn, April 2nd, 2017
Online terror threat

PAKISTAN’S track record of internet governance this year has been a combination of bad
decisions and questionable motives thus far. We have seen bloggers go missing, with no
answers as to who abducted them and why. Online activists have been detained for allegedly
criticising the security establishment on social media. The interior minister has expressed his
hope to end online privacy, saying that proposals have been submitted to have each person’s
social media accounts connected to their mobile phone numbers by law. And once more, voices
have been raised for the banning of Facebook.
In this mess, the very real issue of the spread of terrorism online has been largely ignored. It is
then somewhat encouraging to learn that last week the Counter-Terrorism Department, Sindh,
provided the PTA, FIA and other authorities a list of websites and social media accounts linked
to the spread of extremism and terrorism. The CTD wants these websites closed or banned as
they have been used to glorify outfits such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, or provide updates of activities
carried out by the likes of the banned TTP. Data analysis identified the potential emergence of
new sectarian militant groups and separatist movements. It was also shared that “Pakhtun
ethnic extremism” was active on social media, though this was not probed further. The CTD’s

effort is a small step in the right direction, indicating that at least one agency is prioritising what
was termed a vital component of NAP against terror. However, this has been a provincial effort
to win a fight in a space that has no physical boundaries. Without similar coordinated efforts by
multiple law-enforcement agencies in all provinces and at the federal level, the growing
menace of militancy and extremism online cannot be tackled in a meaningful manner. A recent
investigation by Dawn uncovered the presence of over 700 Facebook pages and groups
operating publicly using the names of 41 banned outfits, indicating that the problem is
widespread and ever growing. Beyond the sharing of intelligence, the state apparatus needs to
be on one page when it comes to technology, human resources, workflows and best practices
in global counterterrorism. Most importantly, there must be political will on the part of all
stakeholders to prioritise the issue and pursue it relentlessly. Far more needs to be done, even
if this means putting the detainment of online activists and banning of social media on the
back-burner.
Economic Survey
NO matter how impassioned his appeals to the nation to look on the bright side of things,
Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, who presented the Economic Survey yesterday, cannot gloss over
the fact that the growth revival he and his government are touting as their achievement is
accompanied by an equally rapid and intensifying growth of vulnerabilities. What now remains
to be seen is which of these two — revival or vulnerabilities — will eventually win. The revival
of the growth process is most visible in the headline GDP figure that was recorded at 5.3pc this
year, climbing above the 5pc level for the first time in a decade. The chief vulnerability that is
haunting this achievement is the current account deficit, which will climb to $8.5bn by the end
of the year, compared to $2.5bn last year. We are told to not read too much into this number
as it is largely a result of ‘machinery imports’, which once commissioned, will help spur exports
and growth, and thereby lead to a reversal of the trend. At the moment, though, all bets are
open as to whether or not this prayer will be answered.
Beyond the vulnerabilities, the quality of the growth being touted also needs to be closely
examined. Much of the impetus this year has come from agriculture, which has benefited from

subsidised fertiliser as part of a package of incentives announced by the government last year,
when the sector experienced negative growth. Financial services have also contributed
significantly to growth in services, according to the minister, who cited a massive increase in
the asset base of banks. How long can the government continue to subsidise fertiliser? How
long will the financial system continue to register increases in its asset base considering that the
numbers of depositors is not rising and financial inclusion is still a long-haul job? Whereas it is
important to acknowledge the growth that has taken place this year, it is equally essential to
ask how lasting it will be, particularly in the absence of any large state-led impetus.
The minister made an appeal for a “charter of economy” to help build consensus around key
economic policies. This is an old appeal and must receive a positive response. The previous
government of the PPP had made this appeal first, and now that it is being echoed by the PML-
N, the grounds for a consensus exist. The transition year, leading into the elections, provides
the perfect opening to hammer out such a consensus. At a minimum, the charter can revolve
around what to do about public-sector enterprises and the future of the regulatory framework.
It is high time that this crucial question was addressed, and the political parties showed some
maturity towards tackling the enduring problems of the economy. There is still time to make
this happen.
Fixing Afghanistan
ATTEMPTS to fix Afghanistan have accelerated after the Trump-led US administration

announced its South Asia policy in August. Regional actors are realigning their positions to
respond to the new US policy as well as to other emerging geopolitical and geo-economic
dynamics in the region, which will certainly take time. Pakistan remains at the heart of the new
US policy on Afghanistan, although for reasons which Islamabad does not approve of.
The Trump-led US administration seems to have chalked out a long-term strategy keeping in
view that defeating the Afghan Taliban militarily is not possible. Apparently, the US objective is
to not allow the Taliban to win or to protract the conflict. Washington will try to achieve its goal
with minimum increase in troops on the ground.
The Quadrilateral Coordination Group — set up in 2015 for talks with the Afghan Taliban and
consisting of the US, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan — would be one component of America’s

political strategy. Backchannel efforts to engage Afghan Taliban commanders and to encourage
them to join the government are also seen as an integral part of this strategy. US Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson recently hinted at the inclusion of ‘moderate’ Taliban in the Afghan
government, although he did not elaborate who these moderate elements would be; nor is it
clear if the Taliban themselves would accept the US definition.
The US knows the sensitivities involved and will continue exploiting these to get Pakistan to
cooperate.
Washington wants certain roles for regional actors and appears to have divided the latter into
two clusters — immediate neighbours and stakeholders. In the short to medium term, the US
wants Pakistan to take action against the Haqqanis and force the Afghan Taliban to participate
in the process of political reconciliation. The removal of the Lashkar-e-Taiba from the US
National Defence Authorisation Act provision would have required the US defence secretary to
certify that Pakistan has taken steps to “significantly disrupt” the activities of both the LeT and
the Haqqani network. That is a significant indication of a palpably changing scenario.
However, it can be interpreted both ways — that the US will increase pressure on Pakistan to
deliver more on the Afghanistan front or that Pakistan has convinced the Trump administration
it will handle the local groups alone — through coercive ways or reintegration. The removal of
the LeT’s name indicates that the Milli Muslim League project has been successful in easing
some of the pressure on Islamabad, which does not want to see its Indian-centric strategic
priorities confused with US regional politics or its own security calculus.
The US knows the sensitivities and will continue exploiting these to get Pakistan to cooperate.
Though the message is clear about what the US expects in return, would it be possible for
Pakistan to deliver on the Haqqani front, especially when it is clear that Washington wants the
Haqqanis at the table or to confront them on the battlefield in Afghanistan?
President Trump in his policy review speech had announced America would quit the nation-
building project in Afghanistan, but how would he then achieve stability in the latter country?
Apparently, Washington wants to outsource the ‘nation-building’ project to India and wants it
to play a greater role in economic affairs and institutional building in Afghanistan.
Policymakers in Washington know that New Delhi would not put its troops on the ground in
Afghanistan. However, the Indian preference would be to play a calculated political, strategic
and economic role in Afghanistan without exceeding the strategic and financial costs too much.
India is one of the major beneficiaries of the crisis in Afghanistan, and has been trying to
replace Pakistan on the strategic and trade fronts in Afghanistan. The US will continue to pursue
India for playing a greater role in building infrastructure and institutions in Afghanistan.
Architects of the US policy see a special role for China in Afghanistan as being directly involved
in the peace-building process. Regional peace and stability are crucial for the One Belt, One
Road initiative but Beijing will not take any lead role in resolving regional disputes, preferring to
work in partnership with the US, Russia, Pakistan and Iran.
US Defence Secretary James Mattis criticised Russia and Iran for providing military and financial
support to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. The US may not have major concerns about Russia’s
part in any resolution of the Afghan crisis, but would not like an active role for Iran. It will prefer
to give this role to Central Asian neighbours both in political-economic and strategic terms.

America’s Afghan policy appears aggressive and is apparently based on the assumption of semi
or unconditional support from regional actors. But it has not considered the interests of other
actors. At the same time, it is based on a perception that the Taliban are a divided camp. On the
other hand, Kabul presumes the militant Islamic State group to be a lesser threat despite its
increasing influence and attacks in Afghanistan. Russia and China are more concerned about
the IS but Washington deems fixing the Afghan Taliban will reduce the space for IS though it has
killed more US troops than the Taliban. On the other hand, despite reports of possible
collaboration between the Taliban and the IS, the potential of the threat has not been assessed
as yet.
The US is, nevertheless, not anticipating a complete victory in Afghanistan and is ready to
capitalise on partial successes on the military, political and diplomatic fronts. This approach
creates doubts about America’s real intentions towards its partners and stakeholders. Recently,
the Pakistani prime minister’s adviser on national security, retired Gen Nasser Janjua, talked of
the closure of the Afghan war theatre at a ministerial-level gathering in Samarkand. He
demanded an honest review of America’s previous approaches as well. It is not clear whether
these were his personal views or if the establishment also supports this idea. Nor is it clear
what would be the modalities of shutting down the war theatre in Afghanistan. But it is an idea
worthy of consideration.
Pak-US-Afghan cooperation is key
THE tripartite military talks held in Kabul between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US earlier in
the week are a sensible development for at least three reasons. First, the high-level Pakistani
delegation led by DGMO Maj-Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza demonstrated that the military
establishment is indeed seeking continued engagement with Afghanistan and the US in the
latest phase of the fraught trilateral relationship. President Donald Trump’s truculent words
against Pakistan have caused consternation in policymaking circles and there is a danger that
emotionalism could supplant rational decision-making. Yet, the perilous security situation and a
seemingly permanent US military presence in Afghanistan are strong reasons for the three
countries to continue with talks and cooperation. Suspending dialogue or whipping up domestic
public sentiment against the US will only narrow Pakistan’s policy choices going forward.

Second, the dialogue between the military leaders is important because of the emphasis on
border management. A great deal of the friction between them is because of militant
sanctuaries on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan’s long-term aim of strengthening
border controls, curbing the informal flow of people across the frontier and coordinating with
security forces on the other side will necessarily make it more difficult for militants on either
side of the border to cross over at will. In the meantime, if military dialogue can include
intelligence-sharing for the identification and elimination of sanctuaries that all sides agree
need to be tackled as a priority, it may help create the space necessary for deeper political
engagement and a restarting of dialogue inside Afghanistan. For Pakistan, that will also mean
greater coordination and policy dialogue between the civilian and military arms of the state.
Given that it is Pakistan’s official position that there can be no military solution in Afghanistan,
the state’s diplomatic and political arms will necessarily have to play a role in the establishment
of long-term regional peace.
Third, the tripartite talks rightly identified action against the militant Islamic State group as a
common goal of all three countries. Indeed, if there is one issue on which all groups inside
Afghanistan and all external actors agree, it is the need to prevent IS from gaining space in the
region. Not only is the group a common enemy that military cooperation is necessary against,
cracking down jointly on the IS may help address some of the mistrust and suspicion that is
preventing greater collaborative efforts in the region. Finally, the first drone strike in Fata since
Mr Trump’s declaration of his administration’s strategy in Afghanistan is an early test of the
likelihood of cooperation. If the strike was conducted with Pakistan’s knowledge, it would
indicate pragmatic cooperation; if it was unilateral, the US may be sowing more trouble for
itself in the region.
US Elections: What can Pakistan expect?

This piece originally appeared in Dawn's Sunday Magazine on Nov 6, 2016.
President Hillary Clinton or President Donald Trump — both will have to deal with issues of
terrorism, security and civil-military disequilibrium in Pakistan as well as its complex
relationships with China, India and Afghanistan. How will the new US administration respond?
Images on Sunday explores what will likely happen…
On November 8, two days from today, the United States of America will elect a new president.
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is leading the race but this has been an unpredictable
election year. Despite being almost written off, businessman Donald Trump has — against all

expectations — improved his position during the last week of the campaign. Most political
pundits still agree that Clinton will eventually triumph, but this is a closer race than many of
them had predicted even last month.
This long-drawn-out presidential campaign has been unusual also in the sense that foreign
policy has received far less attention during the electioneering cycle than ever before. Yes,
China and Russia have been broadly cited as threats, and how to deal with the so-called ‘Islamic
State’ and terrorism were briefly debated. But this was mostly in terms of posturing about
which of the candidates would be a ‘tougher’ president.
On the other hand, the policies of the presidential candidates with respect to South Asia were
not raised at all. While the feat of capturing and killing Osama bin Laden was cited of course,
Pakistan was not mentioned even once. This was probably a first for Pakistan at least in the last
16 years.
So, what will the change of guard in America mean for Pakistan?
Pakistan fatigue
On key policy issues, there is bipartisan consensus in the US, but the new administration will of
course review foreign policy and reconfigure levers of US global engagement. It is unlikely,
however, that there will be a major shift in US’s Pakistan policy. The new administration is not
likely to disengage with Pakistan. But US policy will, in all probability, be tougher and more
conditional than before.
The best way to define the broader American view on Pakistan is Washington’s growing fatigue
in dealing with a long-standing ally and ‘frenemy’ at times.
Pakistan’s decades-old relationship with the US entered a new phase in the post 9/11 context,
and evolved into a close partnership under Gen Pervez Musharraf. But that moment of bilateral
partnership was transient. The two sides soon realised the limits of their engagement and
divergence on how they envisioned a post-Nato Afghanistan.
During President Obama’s current term, the relationship showed clear signs of exhaustion and
distrust. There are growing voices in Washington D.C. — especially in Congress — that Pakistan
is ‘not a reliable partner’ and ‘has harmed US interests.’ Pakistan has its own narrative that
highlights the cost it has borne of allying with the US over the past 15 years in particular.
“Geopolitics and its compulsions don’t change with the change in administration,” points out
Dr Rabia Akhtar, Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, University
of Lahore.
US policy circles, aided by sections of the media, continue to highlight Pakistan’s allegedly
duplicitous role in its continued support to the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban. The
Haqqani network is seen as a group responsible for the deaths of American troops in
Afghanistan.
Pakistan, meanwhile, points out the failures of US policy in the region and America’s inability to
achieve stability despite 15 years of occupation. Peace talks between the Afghan government
and the Taliban, with Pakistan’s facilitation, were initiated in 2015 but also failed.

Other events that would precede the arrival of a new president in the White House include a
bill by two US lawmakers in Congress to declare Pakistan as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism.’ This
bill, drafted by Republican Congressman Ted Poe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Terrorism, and Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, has very little chance of being
adopted. However, it signals the fact that Congress takes a different view from the executive
branch which appreciates the limits and complexities involved in managing the Pak-US
relationship.
Will Pakistan be ‘abandoned’ like in 1990 when the Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan?
Moeed Yusuf, Associate Vice President of the Asia Centre at the United States Institute of
Peace, does not think so. “The result of the US election is much less likely to matter for
*America’s+ Pakistan policy,” he says. “On Pakistan, the trajectory is likely to remain the same —
to keep Pakistan as a partner in the region despite the challenges.”
Daniel Markey, author of No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with
Islamabad, and a senior research professor at Johns Hopkins University confirms this view.
“Pakistan is still very important to the US, and a new administration would want to deepen
engagement if it had a reasonable expectation that doing so would advance US goals.”
But the US military and economic assistance to Pakistan since 2011 has declined in recent years.
The payments of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) has also witnessed delays and increased
scrutiny. This trajectory will not change with the new administration.
“At the moment, there’s a lot of scepticism and frustration with Pakistan,” says Markey. “So
basic trends favour reduced engagement in the near term, no matter who wins in November.
The spending of greater resources and the focusing of greater attention on Pakistan seems
unlikely. The early years of the Obama administration, when you had Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act
and other top-level initiatives that marked a highpoint in US efforts in Pakistan, and with the
surge in Afghanistan as well, those days are over.”
William B. Milam, a senior policy scholar at Woodrow Wilson Center and former US
Ambassador to Pakistan, adds a note of warning. “Most of what happens to the bilateral
relationship depends on Pakistan rather than the United States,” he says. “Nothing is going to
change if Pakistan continues to fiddle around with the Haqqanis.”
“Geopolitics and its compulsions don’t change with the change in administration,” points out Dr
Rabia Akhtar, Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, University of
Lahore.
Despite the growing distrust, the new administration is likely to continue a partnership with
Pakistan on counter-terrorism, which is viewed as a ‘shared’ security interest. Engagement with
Pakistan will be important for the new administration as US national security interests related
to countering terrorism and violent extremism increase. Creating an atmosphere for nuclear
security in South Asia and finding a way out in Afghanistan that would not result in an Iraq-like
situation are also important goals for which Pakistan is needed.
“The United States will still seek to work with Pakistan on top security issues, starting with
regional counter-terror operations,” says Markey. “And, at least, as long as the US is involved in
Afghanistan, Washington will have an interest in trying to work with Pakistan to support US war
aims.”

The next administration will feel “confident in working with Pakistan if the National Action Plan
is implemented and the extremist groups operating on Pakistani soil are neutralised,” says
Milam. “This could possibly alter the trajectory of bilateral relations.”
In recent years it has become apparent that the US has understood the necessity of creating an
environment conducive for an agreement with the Afghan Taliban. Milam holds that the next
administration would like to see what role Pakistan is willing to play in the Afghan peace
process.
The pivot towards India
The Obama administration has entered into a strategic partnership with India which has raised
alarm bells in Pakistan. For Pakistan’s policymakers — in essence the military establishment —
India is the prism through which regional and global alliances are looked at.
“We are now closer and closer to India … it is after all a functional democracy, this is a real
shift,” says Milam.
Both major political parties in the US view India as an American ally and have vowed to further
strengthen bilateral ties. The Democratic Party platform says, “Democrats will continue to
invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India — the world’s largest democracy, a nation
of great diversity, and an important …power.”
The Republican Party platform, meanwhile, describes India as a “geopolitical ally and a strategic
trading partner.” While supporting the economic reform programme of Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, its reference to the growing intolerance in the country is fleeting: “For all of
India’s religious communities, we urge protection against violence and discrimination.”
Regardless of who wins on November 8, therefore, Pakistan should clearly understand that its
historical leveraging of US alliance against India is coming to an end.
Given that Pakistan views India as its principal strategic adversary and military threat, the
deepening Indo-US defence cooperation, in particular, has been a serious cause of concern.
Pakistan’s contention is that the acquisition of advanced conventional weapons and systems by
India will increase conventional asymmetries between the two rival neighbours.
Pakistan also has serious reservations about the waver granted to India by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008, which is seen by the military establishment as a license for
expanding the Indian nuclear programme. Similarly, the Ballistic Missile Defence Programme is
viewed as a destabilising development, as it can embolden India to go for preemptive attacks
against Pakistan. The new Indo-US partnership may have a strong economic component but for
Pakistan it is the widening asymmetry in military capability that is the real concern.
Markey holds that Pakistan is “understandably worried about US-India strategic cooperation,”
even though the US government has long argued that “closer ties with India do not come at
Pakistan’s expense, and vice versa.” Yusuf thinks that the tilt is becoming clear and that it is
something Pakistan would need to deal with in the future. The next administration is likely to
cement the US-India relationship further.
The US tilt towards India is a clear outcome of the growing power of China. China has not only
successfully challenged Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy, it also owns at least 30 per cent of US
foreign debt, which continues to give it leverage over the US.
US relations with India are driven, of course, by economic motives as well. With an Indian
government under Modi eager to open doors and woo foreign investors, US businesses are

backing this shift and see opportunities in the large Indian market as well as opportunities for
cheaper manufacturing. The Pakistan establishment’s zero-sum manner of looking at the world
would require adjustment since, whoever wins the November election, the Indian and
American partnership will continue to grow.
“US leaders and policymakers are increasingly likely to see the region with a perspective
informed by closer working relationships with their Indian counterparts,” says Markey.
“Although this need not necessarily harm Pakistan, American sympathies — for instance, on the
issue of terrorist attacks in India — and American interests, such as US trade and investment in
India’s growing market, will undoubtedly make it harder for Pakistan to influence the policy
debate in the United States, especially when it comes to pressing its case against India.”
In clearer terms, what Markey is saying is that economic interests will influence policy shifts.
In an interview given to the Hindustan Times, Trump had expressed his love for India but had
refused to take sides. In fact, had he offered his mediation services to the two countries.
However, like most of his off-the-cuff remarks during the presidential campaign, not much
weight can be ascribed to this as an indicator of his policy directions.
US-India ties “should not be a cause of concern to Pakistan,” cautions Dr Akhtar. “India and
Pakistan’s threat perceptions follow different trajectories.”
Enter the dragon
As its relationship with the US falters, Pakistan has been actively transforming its defence-
centric engagement with China into an economic and infrastructure development partnership.
China’s commitment to invest 51 billion dollars in building the China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), connecting south-western China and Gwadar port in Balochistan, has been
cited as a ‘game changer.’
Officially, the US has welcomed the CPEC and finds a measure of relief that it will be aided by
China in the future to stabilise Pakistan’s fragile economy and prevent it from a meltdown. But
CPEC will also increase Chinese influence in Pakistan, which surely will limit Washington’s
historic domination of the region.
China is poised to exercise a more meaningful influence over Pakistan’s security posture,
especially in dealing with the jihadists that have been operating on Pakistani soil. In the long
run, Chinese influence could stabilise South Asia. During the recent India-Pakistan crisis, Beijing
and Washington have collaborated to defuse the tensions. The next US administration would
not want to lose its influence over Islamabad but the India factor might result in just that.
Markey confirms that the United States is not “opposed to the increased Chinese presence in
Pakistan, especially on the commercial and economic front.” To the contrary, “US policymakers
would very much like China to help stabilise and grow Pakistan’s economy because they see
that economic stability as a way to reduce security threats. By extension, the United States
does not perceive China’s role in Pakistani infrastructure development as inherently
threatening either.”
However, this puts Washington a bit at odds with New Delhi, where Indians tend to be more
wary about China’s role inside Pakistan. According to Markey, Washington does have at least
two questions about intensifying China-Pakistan relations.
“First, US officials wonder whether the commercial deals underway will promote a broader set
of Pakistani economic reforms in ways that would benefit its people and also promote FDI

[Foreign Direct Investment] from non-Chinese sources, including the United States,” says
Markey.
“At present, the Chinese deals with Pakistan lack sufficient transparency to judge.”
“Second, the United States will have mixed feelings about China’s presence in Gwadar, as over
the long run it clearly opens the door to a growing Chinese naval presence in the Arabian Sea,”
adds Markey.
Milam adds that China’s record in Africa suggests that “it does not always deliver on what all it
promises.” While the US welcomes Chinese support to Pakistan, he cautions Pakistan should
remember that Chinese “self-interest” is paramount in the growing economic relationship with
Pakistan.
Of course, one can say the exact same thing about the US relationship with Pakistan as well.
In the context of a brewing global geopolitical competition between China and the United
States, the extension of Beijing’s reach will create new complexity in its relations with
Washington.
Yusuf, however, is more optimistic. “The US and China need to proactively find ways to
complement each other and their assistance to Pakistan,” he says. “It could work well to
stabilise both Pakistan and Afghanistan.”
Pakistan will have to play a delicate balancing act with the new US administration. The
indications, however, are to the contrary. Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders promoting
CPEC as some sort of a bulwark against an Indian threat and a replacement for ties with the
United States will only complicate matters. This is why Pakistan’s diplomatic lens needs to be
readjusted — it should maximise leverage with both allies instead of viewing diplomatic
relationships as a zero-sum game.
And what about Kashmir?
During his first presidential campaign, Obama had highlighted how peace in South Asia was
linked to the Kashmir dispute. Over time he realised the impossibility of convincing India to
accept outside mediation on the issue. This is a hard fact well-known to Hillary Clinton and is
not going to change.
“It’s one thing for Trump to offer mediation for publicity purposes,” says Dr Akhtar, “and quite
another to understand that no such mediation on Kashmir will ever be welcomed by India
irrespective of whoever sitting in the White House initiates it.”
In the post-9/11 world, the US’s war on terror has provided a convenient framework for many
countries, including India and Pakistan, to brand insurgencies as terrorism. India has leveraged
the global discourse while Pakistan has been slow to appreciate the outlived utility of
supporting militancy in Kashmir.
It is quite clear that when it comes to Kashmir, the next US administration is neither going to
intervene nor will it support Pakistan’s stance on the support to militant networks. Hafiz Saeed,
head of Jamaatud Dawa, has a 10 million dollar bounty on his head and his organisation has
been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US government. Pakistan has
banked on Chinese support thus far but that too is not expected to last indefinitely.
“We might see fewer funds for counter-terrorism with the new administration pushing Pakistan
to act against outfits that launch attacks inside India,” says Dr Akhtar. “There could be

conditions that make the release of critical funds linked to Pakistan publicly accepting
and acknowledging their existence and ultimately dismantling terror networks.”
Nuclear stability is key
Of course, nothing is more important to the US than to maintain nuclear stability in South Asia.
Pakistan’s critics in Washington call it ‘nuclear blackmail’ but this is where the next
administration’s tasks are clear. Engagement on nuclear safety and stability cannot be divorced
from the way the US-Pakistan relationship is shifting and the way Pakistan’s image has been
projected globally. Pakistan has a major image deficit which plays an important role in the
nuclear question.
According to Yusuf, the next US administration will continue to engage on this issue. He adds
that despite nuclear arms, Pakistan’s insecure mindset has not changed, and that sets in a
perverse incentive of expanding the nuclear programme.
Pakistan’s dilemma is that to mainstream its nuclear programme, it has to cut a deal with
Washington. There is no way around it. China can’t get Pakistan into the NSG. It can only buy
Pakistan time.
Pakistan should expect the next US administration to continue to be worried about the scare of
‘loose nukes’ and the potential for tensions between India and Pakistan to escalate to a
nuclear-level conflict. A source suggests that Pakistan has already initiated a review of the Pak-
US nuclear relationship to better present and argue its case to the next US administration.
However, getting a policy change is linked, as ever, to how well Pakistan delivers on the security
goals in Afghanistan.
It is time for Pakistan to undertake a comprehensive review of its foreign policy. The US will
remain a dominant player in the region. Instead of being alarmed at the Indo-US alliance, it
should find ways of re-engaging with the US with a strategic view.
Raza Rumi is a writer, journalist and policy analyst. Currently he is a scholar in residence at
Ithaca College in the US where he teaches in the Honours Programme. He tweets @Razarumi
President Clinton
What to expect in US-Pak relations if Hillary is elected president
Hillary Clinton has plenty of experience of engaging with Pakistan. And not only through her
husband, President Bill Clinton’s engagement with prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir
Bhutto and Gen Pervez Musharraf. During her visits to the country as Secretary of State — in
one public appearance she was also dubbed Pakistan’s mother-in-law — she was seen as a
tough negotiator but also as someone who was redrawing the parameters of bilateral relations
by focusing on the civilian government.
Clinton’s memoir, Hard Choices, also recounts her meetings with Benazir Bhutto and later, her
husband, president Asif Ali Zardari. It was under her supervision that the largest civilian
assistance package to Pakistan — the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act — was approved. It is a separate
matter that the conditions of the bill were dismissed by Pakistan’s establishment and its allies in
the media as a hit on the national security goals and sovereignty of the country.
Her famous statement in 2011 that Pakistan could not keep “snakes in its backyard and expect
them only to bite *its+ neighbours” has become a benchmark for foreign policy objectives in
South Asia. Yet, Clinton is also aware of the complexities and nuances of the difficult
relationship.

Daniel Markey, a senior research professor at Johns Hopkins University, thinks that that the
bilateral relationship has “reached a stage in which she [Clinton] would be clearer about our
policy differences. So there’s a good chance that she would sound tougher.”
Whether the new administration is likely to change course on assistance programming or
expanding the fight against the Taliban in ways that would reinforce that tougher message is
unclear for now. Markey thinks that the approach would be clearer when Clinton, if elected,
names individuals to various jobs within her new national security team.
“But there’s a good chance her administration would veer into a tougher stance,” says Markey,
“partly as a means to improve US bargaining leverage with both Pakistan and the Taliban by
signalling a long-term US commitment to bolstering the Kabul government.”
Clinton has a record of direct and tough parleys with Pakistan’s military during her stint as US
Secretary of State. Many in Pakistan think, however, that the country would receive a fair
hearing from President Clinton, given her personal engagement with the country.
Clinton’s top aide, Huma Abedin is of South Asian origin with a Pakistani mother and an Indian
father. Some are tipping her to be Clinton’s chief of staff in the new administration. As Clinton’s
trusted adviser, she will provide the necessary insights into the region as she did while serving
as her deputy chief of staff at the State Department.
Clinton’s top priorities would likely be to work towards a safe US exit from Afghanistan and to
ensure that Pakistan leverages its influence on Afghan Taliban to make that happen. Peace talks
with Afghan Taliban are likely to be revived.
Markey, however, thinks that an ‘immediate’ or ‘radical’ policy change will not be on the cards
as “a Clinton administration would have a lot of other challenges right out of the gate, and top
officials would likely prefer to spend some time — maybe six to nine months — in reviewing
Afghanistan and Pakistan policy before pressing any big changes.”
Most experts, however, agree that if there is a regional crisis that forces Washington to pay
closer attention, such as an Indo-Pakistani conflict or a more serious breakdown in Afghanistan,
then an immediate policy change may come.
While the US has historically worked with the military, Markey holds that “a Clinton
administration would also wish to maintain engagement with Pakistan’s civilians, although it
might also want to rethink past patterns of assistance and other programming in Pakistan.”
The new US administration will recognise the value in bolstering Pakistan’s fragile democracy
but, at the end of the day, it is the military that can advance US national security interests. This
will, as before, tilt the scales toward security-focused institutions and thereby deepen the civil-
military disequilibrium in Pakistan.
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, November 6th, 2016
POLITICS: The ESSENCE OF TRUMPISM
We will eradicate radical Islamic terrorism from the face of the earth,” thundered President
Donald Trump in his inaugural speech after taking oath on January 20. A week later, President
Trump signed an executive order implementing the core of his doctrine by introducing “new
vetting measures to keep radical Islamic terrorists out.” The order, blocked by federal judges in

New York and Virginia, had suspended the entire refugee admission system for 120 days,
suspended the Syrian refugee programme indefinitely and banned entry from seven Muslim
majority countries — Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and Sudan — for 90 days. Earlier,
President Trump had signed an executive order that announced an intention to build a wall
along the border with Mexico, to quit Trans-Pacific Partnership and called for the renegotiation
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta).
What is the Trump doctrine and how will it affect American society, US foreign policy and the
world at large? Will it transform the US from a multicultural society to an intolerant and racist
country? Will the Trump doctrine meet its fate if American people reject steps taken by the
president and restore their country’s core values which, according to the former American
president Barack Obama, are at stake?
The history of doctrines proclaimed by different American presidents starts from President
James Monroe in his presidential address before the US Congress on December 23, 1823, in
which he had warned European powers not to meddle in the affairs of the Western
Hemisphere. The post-World War II doctrines by various American presidents primarily
reflected ‘cold war’ politics and East-West rivalry. Doctrines such as those of presidents
Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Clinton and Bush depicted policy statements
issued by American presidents on the occasion of ‘State of the Union’ messages. But the Trump
doctrine is entirely different from his predecessors’ because it specifically mentions radical
Islam as a major threat to America, the menace of immigration particularly from Mexico and
calls for ‘making America great again.’ The slogan “America First”, repeated a few times by
Trump in his oath-taking inaugural speech, also reflects his resolve to stop “American carnage
... right here, right now.”
Will America become great by closing doors to people on the basis of their race and religion?
No American president in recent history has become as controversial in less than 100 days in
office as has Trump. During the election campaign and in the post-election period, he has been
consistent in his approach and policy on issues which he thinks are critical and pivotal for the
present and future of the US. Trump’s capacity to open several fronts at the same time — such
as imposing a ban on immigration from seven Muslim countries, squabbling with Iran and
Mexico and confrontations with the judiciary and media — reflects his aggressive personality
traits and behaviour.
Three major characteristics shape the Trump doctrine. First, it is not the anti-immigrant and
anti-Muslim rhetoric of Trump which shaped the discourse of his election campaign, but his
mindset to change America and rid the country from all people who are perceived to be “bad
people” and a threat to the US security. His views on curbing immigration from Muslim
countries and erecting a wall along the 3,200km-long American-Mexican border are also shared
by Steve Bannon, appointed by Trump to the National Security Council, and Stephen Miller,
senior adviser and former communications director for Trump’s choice for Attorney General.

Trumpeting what they term “Judeo-Christian” civilisation and protecting America from the
threat of radical Islam, the troika hopes to reverse the process of diluting white American
tutelage. Michael Flynn, a retired general who recently resigned from the post of National
Security Adviser, is also known for his anti-Muslim views. As quoted in The Guardian Weekly
(February 3-9, 2017), Flynn stated: “I am totally convinced that without a proper sense of
urgency we will be eventually defeated, dominated and very likely destroyed. Do you want to
be ruled by men who eagerly drink the blood of their enemies?”
If America is changing under the influence of Trump, Bannon, Miller and Flynn, it will not be
difficult to gauge the implications of transforming the United States into an inward-looking,
parochial and suspicious country, preventing the flow of talent and enterprise from different
parts of the world, particularly from Muslim countries.
Second, Trump’s obsession with Islamophobia is not a myth but a reality. His call to the civilised
world to unite against what he calls ‘radical Islamic terrorism’ motivates ultra-conservatives and
white supremacists to deepen their attack on the Muslim community without distinguishing
between radical Islamists and moderate Muslims. On December 7, a month after the American
presidential elections were held, Trump called for “total and complete shutdown of Muslim
immigration.”
During his election campaign he repeatedly termed Islam a threat to America and such a threat,
according to him, could only be diluted by preventing immigration of Muslims and by forcing
Muslims living in the US to conform to the American way of life. After taking oath, he made it
clear that he had no quarrel with those Muslims who love America, but certainly that Muslims
having a deep bias against his country could not be tolerated. Trump’s assertion about those
Muslims who live in the US, want to take all the benefits and privileges of American society and
yet resent American culture, society and way of life is perhaps understandable. But the rhetoric
manages to tar all Muslims with the same brush.
The “Muslim card” used by Trump has managed to get support of those Americans who share
his perceptions about Islam and Muslims. After the release of the executive order banning
travel of people from seven Muslim countries, the Economist (London edition of February 4,
2017) reported: “A Reuters/IPSOs poll released on January 31 found 43 percent of those
questioned supported the ban on people from Muslim countries as a precaution against terror.
Among Republicans the support was 73 percent.” So, it is not just the lunatic fringe in the shape
of Trump, Bannon, Miller and Flynn who possess negative or rather hostile feelings against
Islam and Muslims, but a sizeable segment of (mostly white) Americans share such feelings.
Third, the Trump doctrine has been able to convince unemployed and low-paid white
Americans that the real threat to their lifestyle and values is from Muslims’ inability to
assimilate in the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. The Muslim drive to maintain their cultural
identity while living side by side with fellow white Americans by following a separate dress-code
and diet, tends to irritate people sharing the perceptions held by Trump and his supporters. The
Guardian Weekly’s cover story (of February 3-9) quotes Steve Bannon: “We are at the
beginning stages of global war against Islamic fascism.”
In American society, there is no dearth of people like Steve Bannon but it becomes a matter of
concern when such people reach the corridors of power and try to implement their thoughts
and ideas as governmental policies. This is exactly what is happening in the US these days.

George W. Bush was also considered a neo-conservative but had to eat his own words when, in
the aftermath of 9/11, he talked about “crusades”, referring to mediaeval-era wars between
Muslims and Christians. Despite the Republican Party’s tilt in favour of white Americans, in his
cabinet there were two noted African-Americans — General Colin Powell as Secretary of State
and Dr Condoleezza Rice as the National Security Adviser. In Trump’s cabinet there is no
significant African-American and almost all his close associates are white American males.
However, there is also a counter-narrative challenging the Trump doctrine amidst division
within Republican leaders on the manner in which the travel ban and visa suspension policy
were introduced. This created a lot of chaos and resulted in court battles and embarrassment
for the US at the international level. The counter-narrative to the Trump doctrine challenges
the position taken by Trump about the threat of Islamic radicalism. For instance, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock — a former chair of the UN Security Council’s counter-terrorism committee —
argues: “I don’t think Islamic terrorism is an existential threat to Western democracy. Western
democracy has other kinds of problems, in population, in reaction against globalisation, in the
fragmentation of political cultures, in the rise of the local over collective, I would put existential
concerns.”
Likewise, Mustafa Bayoumi, professor at Brooklyn College and author of How Does It Feel To Be
a Problem? says: “It’s clear that Trump uses Islam as a kind of rhetorical prop to feed his
populism.” Furthermore, the Council on American Islamic Relations has filed a lawsuit arguing
that the travel ban on passengers from seven Muslim countries conflicted with the first
amendment of the American constitution which guarantees the right of freedom of religion.
Furthermore, according to a report of the Cato Institute, a conservative American think tank
based in Washington DC, “Of the nearly 3.3 million refugees admitted to America between
1973 and 2015, only 20 have attempted a terrorist attack. In those attacks three Americans
were killed.”
Trumpism, which is the essence of the Trump doctrine, will not be stopped simply by the force
of a counter-narrative held by his opponents who consider his policies detrimental to US
interests. People sharing Trump’s vision of America are determined to use power to restore
what they call the ‘glorious past of America’ which was dominated by white Anglo-Saxon males.
Now, the inner circle of Trump consists of almost entirely white males. The greatness of
America emanated from its resolve to welcome talent from all over the world irrespective of
people’s race and religion. In that context, American democracy is certainly threatened by
Trumpism.
(Dr Moonis Ahmar is Professor of International Relations, University of Karachi.
Email: amoonis@hotmail.com).
Published in Dawn, EOS, March 19th, 2017
Stormy G20 ends with gestures for Trump on climate, trade

HAMBURG: World leaders made concessions on trade and climate language to Donald Trump
on Saturday at the end of the most fractious and riot-hit G20 summit ever, in exchange for
preserving a fragile unity of the club of major industrialised and emerging economies.
In a departure from final summit declarations that tend to outline consensus on issues that
range from fighting terrorism to financial governance, the extraordinary conclusions this year
spelled out differences on core issues.
It acknowledged Trump’s decision to go his own way on taking the United States out of the
2015 Paris climate accord and clearly stated Washington’s wish to continue using and selling
fossil fuels that are a main driver of global warming.
The declaration also stated for the first time the right of countries to protect their markets with
“legitimate trade defence instruments” — wording that essentially gives Trump wiggle room to
push on with his “America First” policy.
Trump, carried to the White House on a wave of public fury over deindustrialisation in vast
areas of the United States, had launched “Buy American” and “Hire American” campaigns.
The nationalistic stance has set him on collision course with many of America’s allies, who
warned Trump against an isolationist path and starting a round of trade war.
“Where there is no consensus, the communique spelt out the discord,” said host Chancellor
Angela Merkel, who was praised by Russian President Vladimir Putin for finding an “optimal
compromise” on the touchiest issue of climate.
French President Emmanuel Macron also hailed the approach, saying that the club found an
“indispensable balance” through the text and halted any backsliding on fighting climate change,
which is blamed for melting ice caps, rising seas and severe weather events.
The French leader, at his first G20 gathering, also took the opportunity to announce a new
climate summit for December 12, which he said would focus on climate financing.
If the meetings within the tightly secured G20 summit venue were anything but harmonious,
outside, chaos and violence gripped Germany’s second city.Within the summit walls, world
leaders were dancing a delicate diplomatic waltz, with discord not only dogging the main G20
conferences, but also adding tension to the atmosphere in bilateral asides.
Host Merkel herself admitted that “deep differences” remain with Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan after they met on the sidelines of the summit.
But it was Trump’s first head-to-head with Russia’s leader President Vladimir Putin that stole
the show.
A day after Trump slammed Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and Syria, the two men had a “robust
and lengthy exchange” about allegations of Russian meddling in the 2016 US election, Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson said.
But Tillerson, who was present at the meeting that ran two hours and 15 minutes, also said the
two leaders “connected very quickly” with “very clear positive chemistry”.
Trump said that the tete-a-tete was “tremendous” while Putin gave an upbeat assessment of
ties ahead with the US leader.
“There is every reason to believe that we will be able to at least partially re-establish the level
of cooperation that we need,” Putin said.
While scoring at his Russian encounter, Trump still faced another thorny meeting later on
Saturday, when he was due to hold talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

North Korea’s first intercontinental ballistic missile test this week was expected to top the
discussions, with Trump warning on Thursday that Pyongyang’s military sabre-rattling would
bear “consequences”.
Trump had also said he is considering a “severe” response to Pyongyang’s “very, very bad
behaviour”.
Ahead of the talks with Xi, Tillerson said the US would continue to press China to do more to
rein in North Korea.
“Our engagement is unchanged with China and our expectations are unchanged,” Tillerson said.
“We have not given up hope.”
The robot debate is over: the jobs are gone and they aren't coming back
Tim Dunlop

In 2013, the Oxford Martin School released a report that looked at the automation of work,
assessing the likelihood that robots and other technologies would replace humans. It concluded
that of the 702 job categories examined, 47% were susceptible to automation within the next
20 years. The report completely upended our ideas about the future of work.
Now, a new report by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in the United States is
set to be an even bigger wake-up call. Written by economists Daron Acemoglu (MIT) and
Pascual Restrepo (Boston University), it not only adds support to the Oxford Martin
conclusions, it actually suggests the jobs are already lost and unlikely to come back.
It contends that in the US between 1990 and 2007, the addition of each robot into
manufacturing industries resulted in the loss, on average, of 6.2 human jobs. It also suggests
automation depressed wages by between a quarter and a half of one per cent. “Using this
approach,” the report says, “we estimate large and robust negative effects of robots on
employment and wages across commuting zones.”
What is a robot exactly – and how do we make it pay tax?
There is another important insight: these jobs losses and lower wages are likely to have a
lasting and devastating effect. Author Daron Acemoglu told the New York Times that, “even if
overall employment and wages recover, there will be losers in the process, and it’s going to
take a very long time for these communities to recover. The market economy is not going to
create the jobs by itself for these workers who are bearing the brunt of the change.”
These are game-changing findings, so let me put them into context of the overall debate.
There has been a rather unproductive back-and-forth over whether or not robots are going to
take our jobs. This dead end approach was something I warned about in my book Why The
Future Is Workless when I wrote, “Let’s not go down the same route we have with climate
change and mindlessly divide ourselves into camps of sceptics and advocates. Let’s
instead bypass the ultimately futile argument about whether or not robots will take our jobs
(they will) and make the imaginative leap, together, into a workless future that can liberate us
all.”
Much of the argument has rested on the claim that technology ultimately creates as many jobs
as it destroys (an approach that author Calum Chace calls the “reverse Luddite fallacy”).
An automated world is coming and managing the unemployment fallout won't be easy
Greg Jericho
Probably the most influential proponent of this argument is MIT economist David Autor. His
important paper, Why Are There Still So Many Jobs?, although careful to allow for the fact that
past behaviour is not always a great predictor of future outcomes, nonetheless notes that

“journalists and even expert commentators tend to overstate the extent of machine
substitution for human labor and ignore the strong complementarities between automation
and labor that increase productivity, raise earnings, and augment demand for labor”.
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As recently as last week, Australian economic commentator, Ross Gittins, ran a similar line in a
strongly worded piece decrying so-called “futurologists” for scaring everyone about job losses.
He wrote, “improving the productivity of a nation’s labour increases its real income. When that
income is spent, jobs are created somewhere in the economy. Technological advance doesn’t
destroy jobs, it ‘displaces’ them from one part of the economy to another.”
This claim, of course, was always as much a guess about the future of work as anything offered
by dreaded “futurologists”, but the point is, the NBER report makes it even more tenuous than
it was. In fact, Acemoglu and Restrepo specifically argue there is little evidence of new jobs
being created, saying the results “indicate a very limited set of offsetting employment increases
in other industries and occupations”.
What lends the NBER report added authority is it doesn’t rely on modelling to predict what
robots are likely to do to jobs in the future, but on hard data to look at what robots are already
doing to jobs in the present. The results are so startling that even the authors were surprised,
having previously taken a much more sceptical line.
Robots will destroy our jobs – and we're not ready for it
So where does this leave us? Well, we need to keep things in perspective. The future of work is
a hugely complex issue, social and political as much as technological, and one new report,
however important, hardly settles the matter. Nonetheless, Acemoglu and Restrepo’s findings
do give us a new baseline for our discussions.
In so doing, they will likely reanimate calls for a universal basic income, because if there really
are fewer jobs, we are going to need new ways of distributing wealth.
The report also challenges the neoliberal tenet that unregulated markets are a surefire way to
full employment, and it can reasonably be taken to imply a large role for governments in
managing the change that is coming. Additionally, it undermines the persistent claim that
technology will create enough jobs in the future because this is what happened in the past.
Most importantly, the results suggest politicians and others who carelessly promise “jobs and
growth” need to stop waffling and start taking seriously the fact that the future of work is going
to be a very different beast to the past and present of work. We are likely to face not just
different sorts of work, but far fewer jobs.
How we respond to this reality will be a huge test for our democracies, and this report is an
important contribution to the ongoing debate.
Since you’re here …

… we have a small favour to ask. More people are reading the Guardian than ever but
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I appreciate there not being a paywall: it is more democratic for the media to be available for all
and not a commodity to be purchased by a few. I’m happy to make a contribution so others with
less means still have access to information.Thomasine F-R.
If everyone who reads our reporting, who likes it, helps fund it, our future would be much more
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you.
Indian Supreme Court cannot avoid decision on Babri Masjid case

NEW DELHI: The chief justice of India has suggested that he can act as a mediator in the
pending Babri Masjid demolition case. The expression of concern is a little odd as it comes at
the instance of an “inter-meddler”, and without the parties being present in court. No wonder
the suggestion on negotiations towards a mutual settlement has caused a flutter in the political
roost. In my opinion, the Babri Masjid demolition case is not a matter that can be settled
through a compromise. This case has constitutional implications. The constitution clearly states
that India is a secular republic.
I was in Geneva attending the UN Human Rights Commission meeting when I was informed that
the Babri Masjid had been demolished. On television, I watched the gory spectacle of BJP storm
troopers climbing up the walls of the mosque and breaking it down. The party Chief Minister’s,
Kalyan Singh, assurance to the Supreme Court that he would take steps to prevent the
demolition was belied. The Supreme Court by a majority just accepted his apology instead of
sending him to jail for contempt of court. But this was a relatively minor issue compared to the
ominous conspiracy of the Congress Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, who suddenly became
inaccessible to senior journalists, his home secretary and even his colleagues.
‘National Repentance Day’
I feel ashamed to admit the complicity of the judiciary, which despite the injunction since 1949
to bar people from entering the area did not proceed against the public. Even the higher
judiciary did not intervene; rather, it seemed to ignore the trespass.
The magnitude of the danger should have been grasped by all parties. The battle for secularism
should have been reflected in the determination to nip the canker of communalism in the bud.
As it turned out, nothing was done.
At that point of time, I had made a public statement, saying that the government should have
announced Dec 6 as a “National Repentance Day” when people will fast and pray for the unity
and welfare of all communities”. But the non-BJP parties analysed the situation as merely a law
and order problem and thus acquiesced in this dastardly action.
Whatever the history of the controversy, all parties let the matter be referred to Allahabad High
Court. Both sides were aggrieved with its decision. The BJP is insisting that it will build a temple
on the site where the mosque undoubtedly stood for over 500 years. The Muslims cannot
obviously agree to a shameful compromise on the sanctity of the masjid. The matter is before
the Supreme Court; it cannot avoid a decision which may not make everyone happy. It is its
constitutional duty and it has no other option.
Going by precedents, the case in favour of Muslims is invincible. I say this on the precedence of
the Shahidganj Masjid case in Lahore. It was decided by the Privy Council in 1940. The Supreme
Court need not decide on the merits of the argument whether Babri Masjid stood where the
Ram Temple once existed. This is of no consequence as it is not relevant to the judiciary’s
ultimate decision.
It is obvious to the meanest intelligence that it is impossible to prove that the birthplace of Lord
Ram was beneath the masjid. It may be a matter of faith, genuine or contrived, but that is no
proof. Nor for that matter can it ever be cited as a legal ground to take away the land from the
mosque.

If the finding is that the mosque was not built on Ram’s birthplace, then the Muslims can get
the land back. They will be free to use it in any way, including the construction of the mosque.
Alternatively even if it is assumed that there was a temple on the land of Babri Masjid, the suit
filed by the VHP/RSS has to be dismissed. Admittedly, Babri Masjid existed for over 500 years,
till it was demolished by the activists of the VHP/RSS on Dec 6, 1992. From the legal
perspective, the Sangh Parivar would have no right even if a temple had been demolished to
build the Babri Masjid. I say this in view of the precedent of the case of Shahidganj Masjid.
There was a mosque dating back to 1722. But by 1762, the shrine came under Sikh rule and was
used as a gurdwara. It was only in 1935 that a suit was filed claiming the building was a mosque
and should be returned to the Muslims.
The Privy Council observed that “their Lordships have every sympathy with a religious
sentiment which would ascribe sanctity and inviolability to a place of worship. However, they
cannot under the Limitation Act accept the contention that such a building cannot be possessed
adversely. The property now in question, having been possessed by Sikhs, was adversely given
to the waqf and to all interests thereunder for more than 12 years. The right of the mutawali
(caretaker) to take possession for the purposes of the waqf came to an end under the
Limitation Act.”
On a parity of reasoning, even if a temple existed prior to the construction of the masjid 500
years ago, the suit by the Hindu outfits like Nirmal Akhara VHP/BJP etc lacks basis. There is
another reason why in such a situation, the suit will fail because in common law, even a rightful
heir, if he kills his ancestor, forfeits his right of inheritance. In the masjid case too there was a
“murder most foul”, and hence the killer cannot be allowed to take the benefit of his own
dastardly deeds, whatever the factual position may be.
Of course, it is the privilege of the chief justice of India to constitute the bench. With respect, I
submit that it might be more reassuring if a bench of seven or nine judges hears the appeal.
The writer is a retired chief justice of the Delhi High Court.
The Statesman / India
Assessing India's water threat

Blood and water can’t flow together,” declared a belligerent Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi on September 26, 2016 in the wake of 19 Indian soldiers dying in a militant attack on Uri
military base, just inside Indian-administered Kashmir. Holding Pakistan responsible for the
violence, Modi promised to unshackle India’s policy of “restraint” — implying that India was
now going to hurt Pakistan by choking its water supply.
For the people of Pakistan, a nation dependent upon agriculture for its survival, the Indus rivers
are their lifeline. As it is, Pakistan is ranked second, after China, in the Water Shortage Index,
highlighting the vulnerability of the Pakistani population to frequent water shortages. Modi’s
proclamation generated lots of nationalistic hyperbole in the two nuclear-armed twins but also
inflicted some damage: many on this side of the border are perturbed about Modi making good
on his threat and stopping water supply to Pakistan.
Can Modi turn the taps off immediately?
Can Modi turn off the taps and choke Pakistan’s rivers?
Not quite.
The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, which governs water sharing arrangements between India
and Pakistan, outlines a framework for how either country can exploit water potential and how
they can’t. While the Indus Waters Treaty is upheld, India cannot turn the taps off — in fact, it
does not have the capacity at the moment to do so either — but it can definitely delay the
release of water flows. And historically, India hasn’t been averse to using this tactic when
relations with Pakistan turn sour. This time has been no different.
In a story printed in the October 12 edition of Dawn, irrigation department officials warned of a
record reduction of water levels at Head Marala in the Chenab. The fear is that water shortage
in the river and two of its canals, Marala-Ravi Link Canal and Upper Chenab Canal, can adversely
affect the sowing of crops particularly in Sialkot, Gujrat, Gujranwala and Sheikhupura districts.
The situation has worsened at the time of this report going into print.
The cultivation cycle in the subcontinent is divided into two seasons: khareef (monsoon) and
rabi (winter). Khareef sowing starts in July or even June while the sowing of rabi crops begins in
September and October, depending upon glacial melts and the amount of rains. The water
flows in the Indus system varies exponentially in different months. Up to 90 per cent of flows
can be accounted for during July to September.
For rabi crops such as wheat, pulses, onions, tomatoes and potatoes, timing is crucial. With
October at an end, the record reduction of Chenab water flows can translate into delayed rabi
sowing, which in turn will adversely impact produce for local consumption in the coming season
and lead to price inflation.
In practical terms, consider this: tomatoes are being sold in the market at 25 rupees per kilo
today; expect this price to rise manifold in the coming year. This is besides the food and income
insecurity that thousands of growers in Punjab and Sindh will be pushed into.
A crisis is certainly brewing.
Beyond hyperbole and nationalistic fervour, the two South Asian giants need to be at the
negotiating table. Normally a dispute like the one reported by Dawn on October 12 could have
been resolved at a meeting of the Indus water commissioners, mandated by the Indus Waters

Treaty to be held once a year. But the Indian assertion that these meetings will resume only
once “an atmosphere free of terror is established” spells disaster for our farmers. The only
safeguard that the Indus Waters Treaty offered Pakistan was through the Permanent Indus
Commission whose meetings India has been routinely flouting under one pretext or the other.
If the situation persists, Pakistan will have no option but to take the matter through the
cumbersome route of World Bank and international arbitration. All through this period, India
will enjoy undue exploitation of water resources at the expense of the people of Pakistan.
What can India not do?
Caught in nationalistic fervour, hawks in the Indian media have been blaming their previous
governments for failing to exercise a water offensive like the one PM Modi is intent on
implementing.
Indeed, India can hypothetically terminate the Indus Waters Treaty and restrict even the rivers
flowing into Pakistan through the diversion of Indus rivers waters. But when it comes to
practice, this position remains untenable.
The waters of the Indus rivers flow through deep gorges of the Karakoram and Himalayan
mountains. The only way to divert water from here is to tunnel through hundreds of kilometres
of the world’s highest and toughest mountains.
Granted that all technical problems have technical solutions. However such an undertaking
would be financially prohibitive, technically extremely challenging, and with minimal cost-
benefit ratios. The longest tunnel dug in the world is the Gotthard Base Tunnel to facilitate rail
travel. Although it is being drilled for the last 22 years through the Swiss Alps, it is merely 57
kilometres long and has already incurred an estimated cost of 12 billion US dollars. For India to
divert waters of the western Indus basin rivers for meaningful use, it will have to dig up to 300
kilometres of tunnels.
As such, diverting the water going into western rivers which feed Pakistan is not a feasible
option.
In addition, India has remained part of the Non-Aligned Movement and prides itself in having
contributed towards drafting many international conventions including the UN Convention on
the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997, Helsinki Rules 1966
and their Berlin Revisions of 2004. Politically, an attempt to scrap the Indus Waters Treaty
would bring massive international condemnation to India.
India’s planned infrastructure projects: how can they affect Pakistan?
While India may not have the capacity to turn off the taps immediately or divert the waters of
the rivers flowing into Pakistan, it is undertaking a number of projects that could have an
adverse impact on Pakistan’s water availability in the future.
The Indus Waters Treaty handed Pakistan the right to unrestricted use of the three western
rivers — Indus, Chenab and Jhelum. The eastern rivers — Sutlej, Beas and Ravi — went to India.
While the treaty allowed India to divert the waters of the eastern rivers, it could only tap into
3.6 MAF of water from the western rivers for irrigation, transport and power generation.
Experts at the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) complain that India has been constructing
huge water storages on all six Indus basin rivers, not just on the three under its full control. For
example, Baglihar and Salal on Chenab are already generating 450 MW/h and 690 MW/h
respectively while the planned Bursar and Pakal hydroelectric projects also on the Chenab will

produce 1020MW and 1000 MW/h respectively. The size of the energy outputs is an indication
of the size of the projects. Pakistan’s Mangla, for comparison, generates 1000MW/h.
In all, India is in different phases of planning or construction of some 60 storages of varying
capacity over the six Indus rivers, though analysis of satellite imagery obtained by Dawn
suggests the number may be more [see map]. Technical experts in Pakistan worry that such
storages will provide India ultimate strategic leverage of increasing or decreasing river flows
during tensions between the two countries, even if it cannot legally divert the waters for its
own use.
Sheraz Memon, additional commissioner of the Indus Water Commission, argues that India
does not have sufficient capacity to withhold the water of the western rivers nor it can divert
them. “But they may keep the implementation of the treaty at a snail’s pace, for example
through delaying the meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission and not providing data or
information about their new hydroelectric plants,” he warns.
There is also talk of expediting the construction of the Pakal Dul, Sawalkot, and Bursar dams,
also in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian media reports claim that the Indian government might also
resume work on the Tulbul Navigational Project — also known as Wullar Barrage — work on
which began in 1985 but stopped soon after Pakistan lodged a formal complaint against its
construction. Pakistan opposed the project at the time since it would have allowed India to
store, control and divert River Jhelum, which was a clear violation of the Indus Waters Treaty. If
completed, Tulbul will adversely affect the water storage potential of Mangla Dam.
Original sins
During 1956, Pakistani negotiators were warned by their irrigation officials and technical
experts not to accede to Indian delegation chief ND Gulhati’s demand — also supported by the
World Bank — to allow India to build small storages over the western rivers.
Until the signing of the treaty, the Indian predicament was that while Customary International
Law and conventions gave them a legitimate right over 33 MAF or 21 percent of the six Indus
rivers water — corresponding to 21 per cent of the Indus basin being in Indian territory — India
had little room to utilise this water within the basin. The Indus Waters Treaty gave them an
opportunity to divert water towards Rajasthan for irrigating over 700,000 acres of land which
was previously bare sand dunes.
Explore: Historical follies – Where Pakistan went wrong in negotiating the Indus Waters Treaty
Before the Treaty, the waters of the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej were utilised for the cultivation of
lands as far south as Bahawalpur State. Suddenly there was no water for thousands of farmers
on this side of the border until Tarbela Dam was finally opened in 1976.
But Pakistani negotiators at the time acquiesced, on the pretext that this shared water would
also benefit their Muslim brethren in Kashmir. Pakistani negotiators did not even bother to
specify the size of the so-called small storages but agreed to India officially withdrawing up to
3.6 MAF of water for local use. In comparison, the current storage capacity of Mangla Dam,
after expansion, is about 7.4 MAF.
Given the pliancy of Pakistani negotiators at the time, the Indus Waters Treaty emerged as a
treatise that was skewed in favour of India. Perhaps it is for this reason that PM Modi
announced that while India will not review or abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty, it will exploit

water under its share to the fullest. It will, for example, build more run-of-the-river hydropower
projects on the western rivers and irrigate over 400,000 acres in Jammu and Kashmir.
One thing seems certain: India will continue to build additional storages on the Indus rivers to
store more than its allowed quota of up to 3.6 MAF of water. This will also provide hawks the
option of delaying khareef crops in Pakistan from time to time. If the winters’ torment is harsh,
delay in summers sowing would be a national crisis.
Looking within: what Pakistan needs to do
There is a real danger that current Indian antics will push Pakistan towards construction of very
large dams at Diamer and Kalabagh, displacing more people and adversely impacting our
environment which is already in a poor state.
“India is employing pressure tactics on Pakistan by announcing it will speed up dam
construction,” argues Dr Pervaiz Amir, director of the Pakistan Water Partnership. “Pakistan
must address its own internal water security and create sufficient storage. India has 200
projects in hand. Saving water is a planned response by India, and Pakistan should follow suit.”
But increasing storage capacity is not the same as storage capacity from large dams, which in
any case is not the panacea that it is made out to be.
During the last 69 years, Pakistan has developed three major water storages at Tarbela, Mangla
and Chashma with a cumulative storage capacity of 12.1 MAF against average water flows of
133 MAF annually through the three Indus rivers. There have been little or no independent
studies to either assess or address the issues of resettlement, the massive loss to the
environment and overall economic cost due to construction of large dams. In addition, issues of
climate change —which have only recently come to the fore — raise questions about the risks
posed to and by large dams. Freak weather conditions, such as unusually intense cloudbursts,
are becoming more common and have already resulted in threats to people living downstream
of large dams.
To add insult to injury, we have been ruthlessly pumping out underground water through
tubewells. Such pumping is severely affecting the underground water levels in the country and
often being replaced by saline water, adversely affecting agricultural output. The number of
tubewells in Pakistan has risen from 2,400 to over 600,000 since 1960.
While we could continue to curse the World Bank bureaucracy, American interests in the region
and Indian cunning for having deprived the country of its water share, we must also look at our
own wasteful attitudes towards utilisation of available water resources as well as the politics
around available water.
Pakistan loses almost half of its existing available water through seepage in the irrigation
system [see table]. This is a prime cause of waterlogging and salinity which are turning large
areas of fertile land barren. Surely lining of water canals and water courses should be the first
priority in saving the water we have at our disposal, rather than the construction of large dams.
According to WAPDA’s published figures, average cereal production in Pakistan against a metre
cube of water is mere 0.13 kg. In India, the same amount of water yields 0.39 kg, yield in China
is estimated at 0.82 kg, in the US 1.56 kg and in Canada 8.2 kg [see table]. Clearly better
management of water resources, efficient crop yields and serious efforts towards population
control will be much more advantageous than building additional dams and storages that will

ultimately result in catastrophic environmental issues and human resettlement crises as being
faced in India and China.
The issue of water supply does not simply concern the two nuclear-armed neighbours. Tahir
Rasheed, CEO of the South Punjab Forest Company (SPFC) and a senior environmentalist, warns
that if the Indo-Pak water crisis spirals out of control, the friction can engulf other countries of
the region as well, especially Afghanistan.
Read more: Speech by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on Riparian Rights in International Law
“Afghanistan is *currently+ utilising 1.8 MAF of water *from the Kabul River which feeds into the
Indus+, which is estimated to rise to 3.6 MAF in the future,” says Rasheed. “Pakistan currently
does not have any water sharing accord with its northwestern neighbor. But the projected
increase of water use by Afghanistan can affect the lower riparian, Pakistan.”
In conclusion
The Indus Waters Commissioners of Pakistan and India have met every year since the Indus
Waters Treaty came into force. The wars of 1965 and 1971, the Siachen and Kargil conflicts and
the Mumbai attacks weren’t able to dent it. In standing the test of time, the treaty has shown
that it generates the least conflict and more cooperation between the South Asian neighbours.
The chances of India scrapping the treaty altogether and diverting the western rivers are
negligible to none. But one must not put past India its flouting the spirit of the treaty and
manipulating water flows to turn the screws on Pakistan.
Pakistan’s response, however, should not be as cavalier as when it negotiated the treaty,
ignoring sound technical advice and short-changing itself in the bargain. It needs to put its own
house in order on an urgent basis — by better utilising its existing water resources. Pakistan’s
protestations against India’s perfidy will then carry far more weight.
Fahim Zaman is a Dawn staffer.
Syed Muhammad Abubakar is an environmental journalist with an interest in climate change,
deforestation, food security and sustainable development. He tweets @SyedMAbubakar.
Research and cartography (Dawn-GIS): Dr Nawaz Huda, Maliha Naz Rana, Khalid Hanif
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, October 30th, 2016

The many ‘sins’ of a liberal

WHENEVER some political or ideological crisis engulfs Pakistan, liberals too are dragged in —
although irrelevantly, as they neither created the crisis nor will they resolve it. They have
already been pushed to the margins, and are no longer a part of the country’s power struggle.
Yet our power players — including the security establishment, political elites and even the
media — frequently employ the terms ‘liberalism’ and ‘liberal’ to discredit their opponents. It
appears as if they are either short on vocabulary, or tend to exploit most Pakistanis’ disdain for
liberals and liberal ideologies.
The ‘liberal’ label is also put on those who do not share the majority of people’s sociopolitical
and ideological viewpoints. Genuine liberals may also have views different from those held by
the majority, but they are active participants of any academic discourse both in the West and
East. But in Pakistan, the term ‘liberal’ has acquired multiple shades and expressions depending
upon the context in which it is used. It is also used to refer to the so-called open-minded
segments of society, including the upper classes of which the country’s establishment is a part.
Being labelled a ‘liberal’ in Pakistan is tantamount to being accused of treachery.
In the 1960s, the phrase ‘limousine liberals’ was used for wealthy and influential liberals in the
West, who would express their distress regarding status quo forces but only in a narrow
political spectrum. In Pakistan’s context, the term can be changed to ‘Pajero liberals’ as it is this
vehicle that is synonymous with power in this country. However, a major difference is that the
‘Pajero liberals’ want social freedom for themselves but conservatism for the majority, which is
a source of their social and political strength. And then there are the so-called desi liberals, who
are criticised by a certain political group for being desi and yet behaving like ‘liberals’.
However, the most dangerous context in which the attributes of a liberal change completely is
that of patriotism. In this typical Pakistani context, being a ‘liberal’ is considered the polar
opposite of being a ‘patriot’. Liberals in Pakistan are usually stigmatised by being marked as
anti-state, foreign agents and sometimes traitors. One can imagine the consequences of such
stigmatisation.
The implication is that they are either already on the payroll of the West, or have the potential
to be. For Pakistan’s power elites, the West should not be a source of political, social and
cultural inspiration. Similarly, although they like Chinese investment and geopolitical and
economic cooperation, they do not like Chinese sociocultural values.
Interestingly, the label of ‘foreign agent’ is not used for religious actors who receive financial
assistance from Gulf countries and openly promote their foreign donors’ sectarian and political
agendas.
In this paradigm, those following the country’s religious and social norms are considered
patriots, while those who don’t consider these norms obligatory are thought of as traitors.
Critical minds are also often tagged as ‘liberals’ in Pakistan. A rational religious mind is
immediately labelled as a ‘liberal mullah’. This had led to spaces for free thinking rapidly

shrinking, as evident in the dearth of intellectual discourse in the sociopolitical disciplines

offered by our academic institutions.
Meanwhile, campuses are busy engaged in internal politicking or hunting ‘liberals’ down. The
brutal killing of Mashal Khan in Mardan University this year is only a reflection of the
deteriorating situation on our campuses. Recent arrests of university graduates in Karachi in
connection with terrorist activities are also suggestive of what is going on in our institutions.
But the state is camouflaging this fact, fearing that it would have to confront the religious
organisations operating on campuses once the cat is out of the bag.
Individuals who use their right of freedom of expression are thus discredited as ‘liberals’ and
sometimes ‘liberal fascists’. The next step is to paint them as ‘traitors’ and ‘anti-Pakistan’. Does
our state really believe in democracy along with it all essentials and values? Or are democratic
governance and constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression merely empty slogans used
for internal and external consumption?
Usually, a dichotomous phrase is also used in this context: democracy in transition.
Interestingly, this transition has been going on for several decades now, and it is not yet certain
how long it will continue. One can only hope that this transition helps develop democratic
institutions and a democratic culture. But for that to happen, the foremost prerequisite is that
all accept democracy from their hearts, and not merely as a matter of expediency.
So why does the issue of ‘liberalism’ become relevant in chaotic times? To answer this, let’s
look at the debate from another angle.
Along with our political elites, the security establishment is considered a major power actor in
Pakistan. For the common folk, the latter is a saviour and political stability is its top priority.
Politicians are largely perceived as being linked with looting and corruption; the only exceptions
are those who ally themselves with the establishment.
The third major actor is the mainstream media and social media. Diverse in all of their
sociopolitical and ideological shades, formal and informal media exercise their right of
expression and also raise questions about the first two and other actors. But recently, some
media groups have been nurturing the perception that the patriotic credentials of those who do
not ally with the country’s ‘saviours’ should come under question, and these people would be
classified as ‘liberals’.
Since liberals also talk about human rights, including those of women and minorities, they are
also considered agents of social anarchy. Demanding political rights or supporting ‘corrupt’
political parties are essentially their major sins. This is the perspective that justifies silencing
critical voices on social media, and attacking and killing journalists.
This perspective is irritating for many, but Pakistan’s whole political and ideological paradigm is
built on certain perceptions and there is no let-up in sight. The liberals will have to suffer more.

Sexual harassment
DESPITE accounting for about half of Pakistan’s population, women are disproportionately
underrepresented in national employment registers. Given our society’s endemic gender
inequality, working women know that to compete in a man’s world they must work twice as
hard. From highly paid CEOs to lowly paid domestic workers, the social and psychological costs
that working women bear often outweigh the financial gains.
Feminist groups were in the vanguard of the struggle for political and social rights during the
heyday of the Gen Zia’s martial law regime, and women activists were the first to launch public
protests against legislation that amounted to state-sponsored gender discrimination — placing
the issue of women’s rights at the heart of the national democratic struggle.
Following amendments to criminal law regarding ‘honour’ killings in 2004, we have witnessed a
decade of progressive legislation being moved in parliament. In recent years, the efforts of the
Alliance against Sexual Harassment culminated into the enactment of the landmark Protection
Against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2010.
There is still a long way to go to create enabling work environments.
Under the act, a federal ombudsperson secretariat was created in Islamabad in 2010 specifically
for the resolution of cases of workplace harassment. Retired justice Yasmeen Abbasi, the
current federal ombudsperson, has contributed significantly to the implementation of the law.
The ombudsperson’s office is also working on amending the act to replace ‘women’ with
‘person’ in the act to make it more inclusive and extend its outreach to workers in the
uncharted shores of the informal economy.
However, the right of suo motu action, which is granted to all other federal and provincial
ombudspersons in the country, has been denied to the federal ombudsperson for workplace
harassment. Without the legal authority to proactively seek out cases of sexual harassment,
such as those that are brought to the public’s attention through the media, the
ombudsperson’s office must wait for the aggrieved person to step forward and lodge a formal
complaint before the law can take its course.
If a woman accuses a man of sexual harassment, her claim must be taken seriously. Sadly, the
prevalent chauvinist attitude assumes that the woman must be guilty of provocation. Such
allegations are routinely brushed aside in organisations dominated by men. Given this casual
attitude towards harassment and the fact that women are almost universally discriminated
against by men in Pakistan, some say that even if a woman wanted to make a false allegation
the attempt could be ignored. The National Implementation Watch Committee, a part of the
implementation framework, should proactively monitor cases of harassment to offset any
chance of the law being misused.

What does it say of the efficacy of the federal ombudsperson for workplace harassment that
even a member of parliament such as Aaisha Gulalai chose to make her allegations public and
fight a media trial with PTI chairperson Imran Khan rather than file a formal complaint with the
office? Parliamentarians must arm the ombudsperson’s office with the powers to actively
initiate investigations into workplace harassment, and make use of the mechanism themselves
to build trust in the institution.
Given the increasing number of women in higher education, business and employment, all
public and private organisations must abide by the act in letter and spirit. Many women are also
assuming active roles in politics and working across various tiers of political parties. It is high
time that the National Assembly speaker and the Senate chairperson establish an internal code
of conduct, and a complaint and appeal mechanism, to enable women parliamentarians to
participate in a fair, equitable political environment.
Gender sensitivity trainings workshops should be conducted in all places of work and education
in both the private and public sectors. Schools, colleges and universities — nurseries for
developing a young nation — should be the focal points for gender sensitisation programmes.
Notwithstanding the gaps in the implementation of laws designed to create enabling public,
work and home environments for women, the series of legislation and amendments in the
Penal Code are commendable attempts to reform not just criminal justice but also society.
These laws aim to change deep-seated gender inequalities, rooted in our social structure, which
tend to restrict the economic and intellectual potential of Pakistani women to unremunerated
household labour.
It is an obscure fact of our national history that nearly all our human rights bills have been
tabled by women parliamentarians, aided by rights activists. Pakistani women have struggled
very hard to achieve legal emancipation; however, there is still a long way to go to achieve
emancipation from the clutches of a patriarchal, social and cultural order.
The writer is vice president of the Council of Social Sciences Pakistan.

Women’s voting rights
ILLEGAL agreements among certain political parties or candidates have routinely barred women
in certain areas from contesting elections and voting in this country. In a long-awaited
development, legal protections for women’s electoral rights were recently instituted with
amendments to sections 78 and 103AAA of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, thereby
empowering the Election Commission of Pakistan to disqualify candidates who prevent women
from voting. This is a significant step, especially when female disenfranchisement is routine in
remote areas of KP and Balochistan. Tabled by Senator Sherry Rehman as the Representation of
the People [Amendment Bill, 2017], this law also allows the ECP to declare an election void,
calling for a repoll in constituencies where women have been stopped from voting. Under the
amended section 103AAA, the ECP can conduct summary inquiries when it gets reports of
election irregularities, declaring polls in such constituencies void. Appeals against the ECP’s
decisions can be filed in the Supreme Court.
Given that these amendments allow the ECP to counter the patriarchal traditions forming the
core of such unforgiveable and discriminatory behaviour, the law’s implementation is expected.
It should have no excuse not to nullify poll results in constituencies that bar women voters. The
ECP must start by making inquiries into last week’s Shangla by-election where women voters
were stopped. Moreover, political parties should be penalised for forcibly keeping women away
from the poll process. The belief in many conservative areas that women’s duties revolve
around their home, and not outside, is indicative of misogyny, and shows up exclusionary and
anti-women practices at all levels. Furthermore, in the run-up to the next general election, a bill
pending in parliament allowing for repolling at polling stations or even entire constituencies if
less than 10pc of registered women voters cast their ballot, must be passed. The state must
make it clear that interfering in women’s electoral rights will not be tolerated.

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