(2)

This paper provide us good solution for solving the issues of fraud in auditing and as the
materials in studying accounting behavior especially on the scope of auditing. The results
suggest that the game-theoretic model is descriptive of many subjects behaviors and is useful in
interpreting the behavior of other subjects even if they played far off the equilibrium path. Of the
competing models, loss avoidance occurred most frequently, and led auditors and clients to be
more conservative in their reporting and switching behavior. Consistent with risk seeking
behavior, 13% of the auditors expressed clean opinions over 50% of the time despite evidence to
the contrary. On the other hand, adversarial and altruistic models did not appear descriptive.
Forecasts were attended to, but the follow-the-forecast model provided little additional insight
into individual auditor behavior
The experimental study in this paper also give us information about a significant number
of subjects attempted to avoid large losses, and a smaller number focused more on the upside
reward and than on the downside risk. The risk takers liberally expressed clean opinions despite
evidence to the contrary. Regardless of frequency, the consequences of such risk taking behavior
and resultant audit failures justify further examination. Future models should encompass all risk
preferences and might examine how ethical standards, sanctions, and compunctions interact with
risk preferences to decrease the frequency of audit failures.
In the other hand, there are also some consideration about the threats to internal validity
of this experiment research. Several measures were taken to promote independence among the 30
periods of the experimental sequence so as to more closely mirror the model’s single period
structure. This experimental is based on the behavioral of auditors and clients, as we know that
behavior is something that can change over time depend on the condition on that recent time and
the morale of the auditors is one of factor that need to treated well to see the tendency to change
or stay consistent, some factors which need to be considered are:
1. History Effects.
The action of the two members (auditors and clients) in the participative group by way
of unexpectedly moving around in an excited and the performance is bound to be high
in this group might have boosted the morale of all the members in the group. It would
be difficult to separate out how much of the increase in morale was due to the
 participative condition alone and how much to the sudden enthusiasm displayed by the
two members.

2. Testing.
Since this experimental use some behavior models in game-theoretic model, the pretests
are likely to have sensitized the respondents to the posttest. Thus, testing effects
would exist. However, if all the groups had been given both the pre- and the posttests,
the testing effects across all groups would have been taken care of and the posttests
of each of the experimental groups could have been compared with that of the
control group to detect the effects of the treatment. Unfortunately, the control group
was not given the pretest, and thus, this group‘s posttest scores were not biased by
the pretest—a phenomenon that could have occurred in the experimental groups.
Hence, it is incorrect, on the face of it, to compare the experimental groups‘ scores
with those of the control group.