PAPER ID 4427941
Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Balkanization or
Democratization
Amaël Cattaruzza, Didier Danet and Stéphane Taillat., Research Fellows, CREC St Cyr, Arthur
Laudrain, Project Officer, French Air Force General Staff
 their implications for international security and cooperation
Abstract—Inherently linked to States’ sovereignty and its
relationship with third-party stakeholders, the governance of
cyberspace has become a subject of great debate and
controversies. One of the most prominent of them -the dominance
of the United States as an hegemon- has raised concerns and
triggered diverging reactions within the international community.
Looking at recent events such as the invalidation of the Safe
Harbor Agreement through the lenses of the balance of power, we
found that the reassertion of States in cyberspace is dependent on
the political significance given to cyberspace as both a
transnational realm and an American-dominated space. If most
States have adopted a balancing policy vis-à-vis the US by means
of either critical cooperation (EU, France) or what could be
described as a form of containment (Russia, China), some others
pursue free-riding policies (Ireland, Luxembourg), causing
regional struggles. We suggest that, given this fragmentation of the
Web, regulation of cyberspace would be best served through a
multilateral mode of governance which could enhance collective
security
Index Terms—Cyber diplomacy, cyberspace fragmentation,
digital Sovereignty, Government, Industry and academia
cooperation, Internet governance, Law and ethics in cyberspace
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE last semester of 2015 saw several attempts from States
to tighten their control over the digital domain. The Russian
Duma passed a bill in September mandating Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) to locate servers hosting data from Russian
citizens in Russia, thus protecting these data from what was
perceived as an intrusive global surveillance by the NSA (and
allowing the FSB to spy on Russian dissenters). The following
month, the European Court of Justice struck down the Safe
Harbor Agreement which until then permitted US companies to
transfer data from European users outside the European Union.
Despite their similarities in terms not only of sovereignty but
also of mistrust vis à vis the United States, these two events
reveal the deeply rooted ambiguities of cyberspace. However,
The paper was submitted for review on July 20, 2016. This work was
supported in part by the St Cyr-Sogeti-Thalès Chair on Cybersecurity and
Cyberdefense.
Amaël Cattaruzza is with the Centre de Recherche des Ecoles de
Coëtquidan, 56381 Guer cedex, France (e-mail: amael.cattaruzza@st-cyr.terre-
net.defense.gouv.fr).
Didier Danet is with the Centre de Recherche des Ecoles de Coëtquidan,
56381 Guer cedex, France (e-mail: didier.danet@st-cyr.terre-
net.defense.gouv.fr).
1
between States are far from similar.
In order to make sense of the impact of sovereignty in the digital
domain on world politics, it seems analytically useful to
compare its rise and structure with those of other transnational
spaces. Dating back from the global transformation of the 19th
century [1], the rise and intensification of commercial, financial
and information flows have created specific challenges for
States. The debates and concerns about sovereignty in the
digital domain can be traced back to the liberal tradition in
international relations and its beliefs in the causal relationship
between economic interdependence and the expansion of peace
through shared interests. First, according to this view, the
openness of cyberspace is a crucial feature that has to be
protected against the traditional logic of power politics [2].
Nevertheless, this link between “le doux commerce” and the
decreasing likelihood of war is far from being as deterministic
as liberal beliefs would imply. It is highly dependent on the
expectations of a dependent State toward the future trade and
investment environment in terms of access to raw materials and
markets [3]. Constructing the digital domain as a space of
conflict instead of a space of exchange between rivals and
competitors is thus not neutral and may have important
consequences on the behavior of States, likely leading to self-
fulfilling prophecies [4]. More importantly, this has deep
implications with regards to international security through a
specific “cybersecurity dilemma” [5]. Second, in addition to the
representations on the nature of relationships in cyberspace, one
has to take into account the securitization process by which
threats and vulnerabilities have been erected to a national
security level. Hence a logical (and political) link between the
reaffirmation of sovereign rights and monopoly in cyberspace
on the one hand, and the provision of security by the State on
the other. Furthermore, transnational spaces challenge this
particular dimension of sovereignty which is focused on the
regulation and control of both transnational flows and their
stakeholders [6], [7]. In other words, in cyberspace like in other
Stéphane Taillat is with the Centre de Recherche des Ecoles de Coëtquidan,
56381 Guer cedex, France (e-mail : stephane.taillat@st-cyr.terre-
net.defense.gouv.fr).
Arthur Laudrain is with the Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques Aérospatiales,
75007 Paris, France (e-mail: arthur.laudrain@kcl.ac.uk).
Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of the French government, Ministry of Defense or
other institutions.
 PAPER ID 4427941
transnational spaces, sovereignty is tied to control more than to
authority, while both matter in the domestic (territorial) space
which is yet the main focus of sovereign rights in the digital
domain. The transnational realm is thus submitted to an
incomplete regime of regulation which relies either on inter-
State cooperation or on an hegemonic power willing and able
to act as a stabilizer [8], [9].
We argue that in the absence of the latter, such a cooperation
would enhance the security and prosperity of cyberspace for the
US, its allies and virtually every State dependent on these flows.
Besides, establishing a framework for multilateral cooperation
between States in this particular field would provide a missing
link between the strict reaffirmation of State sovereignty and a
governance characterized by a loose regulation and the absence
of collective security mechanisms.
Yet, the dominance of US private and public actors on
cyberspace has given rise to a broad set of fears with regards to
the future of State sovereignty. These fears are common to both
allies and rivals and should not necessarily be seen as a
nationalistic move or as a balancing challenge to the hegemony.
Most States tried to protect or restore their “sovereignty” in
cyberspace in reaction to this asymmetric configuration
between the US and themselves. Of course, their policies have
taken diverging paths, from bandwagoning vis à vis the US to
the edification of a protectionist regime, the former reinforcing
the structuration of cyberspace between a core and a periphery,
the latter potentially leading to the risk of fragmenting a global
network into competing, closed and national networks. France
has chosen an intermediate position of critical cooperation,
stressing the need to promote a system of governance centered
on States and which would empower them at the expense of
private actors whose legitimacy is highly disputable. Hence its
leading role in promoting international negotiations whose
goals would be to build a regulative regime acceptable to both
the US and their partners.
The following paper is thus built around two main claims.
First, the reassertion of States in cyberspace is dependent on the
political significance given to cyberspace as both a
transnational realm and an American-dominated space. Second,
the regulation of cyberspace would be best served through a
multilateral mode of governance which could enhance
collective security. This article proceeds in two steps. It first
outlines the modalities by which the United States dominate
cyberspace. It then follows by analyzing the various ways and
logics by which States try to reassert their sovereignty. It
concludes by reviewing the question of governance and
democratization in cyberspace.
II. THE UNITED STATES AS THE DOMINANT POWER IN
CYBERSPACE
Governance in the digital domain rests on the participation of
a high number of stakeholders from States to NGOs through
corporations and international organizations. They define
norms and standards around a broad set of issues, mainly
technical, through procedures focused on concertation. In this
respect, this governance has often been seen as an example of
2
democratization and rejuvenation of traditional forms of State
governance.
However, this proliferation of actors and stakeholders should
not conceal the centrality of the US in this constellation. This
centrality is the result and the byproduct of both the role played
by the US in the world financial, commercial and technological
realms and the strategy outlined by the Clinton administration
in the years 1997-1998, according to which the federal
government gave its support to the corporations willing to
conquer cyberspace. This American predominance may take
multiple shapes with regards to other States.
The concept of "cyber dominance" is difficult to define and
assess for it is the product of a complex set of soft and hard
power, a mix of technical, economic, legal, institutional and
political factors. However, who could seriously doubt that the
United States is the leading actor in the development and
governance of cyberspace? In the field of operating systems, a
single firm, Microsoft (Windows), is holding more that 90% of
the world market share and the follower, Apple (MacOS), is
attracting most of the rest of the demand. On the market of
mobile phones operating systems, Google (Android) and Apple
(iOS) dominate the competition.
The conclusion would be the same as far as we consider
cloud storage (Microsoft Cloud), (proto)-quantum computing
(IBM’s Watson), server infrastructures (Apple’s data centers)
or productivity software (Microsoft Office). Universities in the
United States are fostering research and education, companies
drive investments and innovations, public and private
institutions spread the American way of governance in
cyberspace. In a Ricardian perspective of trade between
nations, this leading role of the US is mutually beneficial for the
wealth of every stakeholders and the global order that these
relations tend to shape. Does it mean that each and every
decision of the dominant actor is benevolent and that other
countries should comply by these rules or practices? This seems
to be the assumption of many policy makers in Washington.
President Obama vigorously condemned the decision of the
European Court of Justice which struck down the Safe Harbor
agreement.
“We have owned the Internet. Our companies have created
it, expanded it, perfected it in ways that [Europeans] can’t
compete. And oftentimes what is portrayed as high-minded
positions on issues sometimes is just designed to carve out some
of [Europe’s] commercial interests [10]”.
To some analysts, the Safe Harbor dispute is rooted in a
political resentment due to the massive surveillance programs
that Snowden's files have set on the agenda.
“By transforming US technology companies into tools of
national intelligence, Washington has badly damaged their
corporate reputations and exposed them to foreign sanctions
[11: 131]”.
Even if this political resentment does exist in many European
countries which were not taking an active part in NSA
 PAPER ID 4427941
programs, recent European initiatives proceed from a very
classical regulatory preoccupation.
The now very old dispute between European regulators and
US technology companies (Microsoft and now Google) is far
more due to antitrust motives than to some kind of political
retaliation against the NSA’s intrusive practices. The very large
market share owned by US companies worries European
regulators just as Rockefeller or Morgan trusts worried US
legislators by the end of the 19th century. Antitrust actions
undertaken by the European Commission are by no means
surprising since the rules are mostly the same in both
continents. President Obama’s accusations could be more
challenging on the tax optimizations dispute between some
European countries (France at the forefront) and big companies
who benefit from "free riding" policies lead by Ireland or
Luxembourg. But this is more an internal struggle within the
European Union rather than a dispute between Europe and the
United States.
Beyond disguised protectionism, the Safe Harbor
invalidation means that even if the US and Europe share the
same global values (human rights or individual freedom for
example), they do not align on the same equilibrium concerning
the balance between privacy protection and national security
constraints. For a very long time now, France has been cautious
about personal data flows. In 1978, a legal provision prevented
transfers of personal data beyond borders. The Safe Harbor
agreement was clearly in disharmony with this traditional
provision. For many years, regulators and policy makers
pretended not to see the problem in order not to face the
resentment of Facebook or Google customers. With Snowden's
revelations, this ostrich policy became unsustainable. Contrary
to Myron Brilliant1’s assertion, the decision of the European
Court was all but a surprise [12]. The US administration and
government must consider that the blurred lines between
companies and the Administration under American legal
provisions do not fit within traditional conceptions of privacy
in Europe. This situation could evolve however, as the French
experience demonstrates. After the attacks of Charlie and
Bataclan, public opinion and legal provisions shifted towards a
stronger enforcement of surveillance programs and intelligence
policies, at the expense of privacy principles. But the gap
between the US and Europe remains significant.
Another prominent litigation is related to the unilateralist
view of the US administration in the Microsoft case in which
the company is requested to provide personal data housed in its
Irish data center. Obviously, no European government would
disagree with the US administration on the fact that an effective
anti-drug policy is required and that a notorious drug dealer
should go to jail. This does not mean that efficiency must
prevail over basic principles of judicial cooperation.
“Rather than requesting the data through the ordinary
processes of intergovernmental exchange..., the United States is
using the global reach of its legal system to demand the data
1
US Chamber of Commerce Vice President for International Affairs.
3
even in the face of opposition from both the Irish government
and Silicon Valley companies [11: 132]”.
To many European analysts, this "benign neglect" of US
judges for cooperative procedures is considered a disguised
way of promoting internal American rules beyond US borders.
In all these cases, the apparent fragmentation of the governance
in the digital domain reveals the privileged situation of the
United States vis à vis other stakeholders. This situation gives
the United States the capacity to leverage other States’ access
to global flows in order to coerce or persuade them to act
accordingly to its interests. It would undoubtedly be more
accurate to remind that the US is far from being a unitary actor
when dealing with the definition and the pursuit of its interests
in cyberspace. This said, the diverging visions and interests
between public and private actors seem irrelevant when seen
from the outside. In this case, what remains is a global
convergence of these actors impulsed by the consideration of
national interests when stakes are deemed essential.
Of course, one could argue that this position is congruent
with the “Command of the Commons” [13] and the role of the
US as a global hegemon. But one should not take the acceptance
of hegemony for granted. Indeed, hegemony is not simply about
capabilities or political will, but rather a social role constructed
through social relations. Its most important feature is persuasion
and it functions through consent more than coercion [14]. In
other words, the regulative power of the US in the digital
domain is dependent on its perceived legitimacy on the
international stage.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND BALKANIZATION
States have attempted to assert their sovereignty across many
ways and means. While some have focused their claims of
independence from a US-dominated Internet, others have
attempted to secure greater control on their physical, logical and
social infrastructures. Although in practice policies have
followed both paths, the logic behind the affirmation of
sovereignty is more distinct because it doesn’t address the same
dimensions of what sovereignty entails. As Krasner famously
put it, sovereignty is a contested concept dependent on its social
and political construction through a complex historical process
[6]. If sovereignty as a norm implies external independence as
well as the exclusive legitimacy of the State in the political
order, it is also a practice involving domestic authority (by
claiming the monopoly on the use of coercion) as well as
control and regulation. Analytically, two different variables
have driven various policies with regards to the digital domain,
whether in practice or in discourse. First, how States perceive
the need to tighten their control on the digital domain as a
transnational space. Second, how they assess the potential
threat posed by the privileged position America enjoys in
cyberspace. Of course, both factors could be tied together with
regards to the expectation of actors. As we already mentioned,
the asymmetric position of the United States means that it has
the capacity to deny others access to global information flows
 PAPER ID 4427941
on which global trade rests. Depending on where they are
situated on these two spectrums, it is possible to highlight three
main political postures: bandwagoning (implying free riding),
hard balancing and critical cooperation. While the former is less
concerned by both aspects of cyberspace, the second is wary of
both and the latter is more concerned by transnational spaces
than American dominance. These perceptions are shaped by
two sets of domestic variables. Political or strategic culture on
the one hand, political institutions on the other. Together, they
form the structural factors alongside specific strategies of the
political elites toward their constituencies.
In addition, the assertion of sovereignty over cyberspace
raises a question over the model of sovereignty. It seems
impossible to apply the strict model of territorial sovereignty,
which implies linear borders and continuous area, because of
the transnational nature of cyberspace. Any attempt to take an
absolute control of cyberspace inside a national territory, even
in China and Russia, will always be partial. Even in the field,
this model is imperfectly applied to tangible frontiers.
Geographers as John Agnew has shown that the idea that
Westphalian territories are under the exclusive power of States
is only theoretical [15].
Similarly, it is important to debunk the myth that the digital
era relies on dematerialized infrastructures and content. It was
argued that digital networks enjoy greater flexibility, scalability
and survivability [16], which represent either the “bright” or
“dark side of connectivity” [17], depending on who is enjoying
these features. A new system of mass communication built like
a mix between an interactive television, Internet, radio and
mobile communication systems, it would however be
misleading to overemphasize their game-changing nature in
terms of social and political control.
The example of the Tunisian revolution of 2011 highlights it
clearly. As David M. Faris explains [18], the institutional
organization of communication networks in Tunisia made it
easy for the government to control and monitor information.
Tunisie Télécom, the State-owned telephone and Internet
provider, enjoys a monopoly position in this market. As it is the
pioneering telecom company of the country, it also owns the
overwhelming majority of Internet and phone access points and
hubs, including the central hub for underwater cables
connecting the country to the outside world, through Europe
[19].
Another aspect to keep in mind is the content. Owning
infrastructures is not an end but rather a mean to monitor and
control the content going through them. This is why, in parallel
with Tunisie Télécom, the government possessed a long-
standing propaganda and censorship agency, the Agence
Tunisienne de l'Information (ATI, Tunisia's Information
Agency). Active a few years after the arrival of Internet in the
2
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) tools allow a network administrator, among
other things, to intercept and modify emails before transmitting them to their
original recipient.
4
country in 1991, it is deeply embedded within Tunisie Télécom.
With the development of social networks and spread of
smartphones, there are increasingly at the very beginning of
content creation people, in the streets, reporting on what they
see. Here again, State's censorship was tight. Tunisian activist
Lina Ben Mhenni explains that, contrary to what was happening
in Egypt, it was very difficult for protesters to take photos of
exactions publicly [20]. Cameras would often be seized and
protesters arrested.
This end-to-end combination of infrastructures “modelled for
control” [21: 484] and monitoring & censorship abilities across
the board provided the government with an integrated view and
large powers over almost all information flows [21: 492]. This
said, censorship is never absolute, and counter-measures do
exist.
Indeed, this old habit of censorship created in the
population a strong sense of disbelief in State-controlled media
outlet, encouraging the use of circumventing tools, such as
proxy servers and virtual private networks (VPN).
Thus, it seems that social networks allow social movements
to take, at least temporarily, the upper-hand over governments.
Thanks to the implementation of Deep Packet Inspection
technologies between 2007 and 2011, the government had
effective influence over emails and traditional websites 2. It
lacked however efficient monitoring tools for social media.
Deep Packet Inspection is also not fit for the challenges of
instant messaging apps such as WhatsApp, since it requires
time for interception. The heavy crackdown on censorship
through gross methods, such as hacking Facebook users'
credentials, was too little and too late to prevent protests to
escalate.
The censorship system implemented by the Tunisian
government over almost two decades was indeed enjoying the
increased flexibility and scalability brought by contemporary
information technologies. However, this was in a significant
part possible because of the structural features of the Tunisian
network and its infrastructures. Even with this favorable context
for the government, the ATI failed to adapt quickly enough to
the technical challenges brought by this new generation of
online social networks. The Tunisian experience thus
demonstrates to what extent a State’s sovereignty over the
Internet relies on local features and may be fragmented,
incomplete and quickly overturned.
A. Bandwagoning
For a certain number of countries which are close allies to the
US and share their fundamental values and interests, the
strategy of aligning with the dominant power in cyberspace is
the best way to benefit from individual and joint efforts under
 PAPER ID 4427941
the lead of the US. This bandwagoning approach may proceed
from an economic policy aimed at attracting US investments
thanks to fiscal or legal incentives. In Europe for example,
Ireland or Luxembourg implemented successful tax policies
which lead companies such as Google or Microsoft to choose
these countries as their headquarters for the whole region. The
bandwagoning strategy may also imply deeper agreements from
a political point of view. The “Five Eyes” block took advantage
of the surveillance programs designed by the US administration
through shared procedures of data gathering and analysis. From
free trade policies to secret intelligence practices, the
bandwagoning strategy takes many forms and implies various
levels of cooperation and involvement in the US approach of
the Internet.
B. Hard-balancing
Several States have denounced this domination as
detrimental to their national security and perceived
international status. They have taken various steps in order to
re-establish what they see as their full digital sovereignty over
the physical layer (national preferences, physical relocation of
servers) as well as the logical and cognitive ones (struggle
against the “American propaganda”, censorship, promotion of
national solutions and Apps). This is the case of both of China
and Russia. China launched a massive crackdown on Western
and -especially- US companies, by passing new regulations up
to 2015 under which foreign corporations have to reveal the
source code of their softwares and firmwares in order to export
to the Mainland. Among others, IBM and Microsoft
surrendered to China’s demands, by installing backdoors into
their systems as well.
Yet, the choice to free oneself from the US dominance is
dependent on technical capabilities, financial costs and the
critical size of the would-be independent cyberspace.
The particular logic of States depends on their
representations of what is at stake in the cybersecurity realm.
China’s and Russia’s sovereigntist stance cannot be reduced to
mere nationalistic values or policies but has to be put in
perspective with regards to their perception of world politics
and, more broadly, to their conception of international relations.
In the case of China, the very notion of information security is
informed by the twin perception of the Internet as a “western”
Trojan horse and of the international order as detrimental to the
return of China on the front stage. Chinese cybersecurity has
been shaped by the perception of threats against the domestic
political and societal stability while offensive uses (mainly
economic intelligence gathering) should be seen within the
lenses of a broader “modernization” project [22].
Hence several ambiguities with regards to the assertion of
sovereignty. First, focusing on information security has mostly
produced shortcomings in the protection of infrastructures or
the struggle against cybercrime. Second, the pressing needs of
“modernization” mean that Chinese elites could not afford to
5
create an isolated network [4: 14–19]. Indeed, for the power
holder faced with a weak society, the core issue remains finding
the right balance between economic development and political
freedom. Cutting the country from outside influence by
isolating its network is taking the risk of jeopardizing economic
development. Yet, in a developing country, sustaining
economic growth is essential for a political power that needs to
address the needs and grievances of a rising middle-class [23].
This was described as the “Dictator’s Dilemma” [24].
Whatever the potential success of these attempts toward
more protectionist policies, they entail a risk of fragmentation
which has been described as “balkanization” by several
scholars and analysts [25], [26].
Yet, the idea of “balkanization” used by American
intellectuals is not neutral. Indeed, it is strongly linked in our
imagination to the recent conflicts in Yugoslavia in the 90’s.
Then, this word implies necessarily a strong pejorative
meaning, reminding blood and irrational casualties. Even
before the conflicts, Maria Todorova has demonstrated how the
terms of “Balkans” and “balkanization” have often been
associated to violence and “otherness” since the end of the 19th
century [27]. After the First World War, the word
“balkanization” gets a darker meaning, which involves an
uncontrolled process of State fragmentation in an infinity of
smaller territories - implying a continuous and unstoppable
chain of violence.
Thus, the application of this idea to cyberspace reveals an
implicit and systematic condemnation of all the actions that
would be described as “balkanization”, from Chinese attempts
to control the political content of cyberspace inside its territory
- and to use it eventually against its opponents - to other more
moderate initiatives (the debates on digital sovereignty in
France for instance). All the nuances between modes of action,
political objectives, will of actors, seem to disappear behind a
general and univocal reprobation.
Then, the fuzzy and very large definition of “balkanization”
seems to prevent any rational and strategic analysis of the
different State policies in the international level. Indeed, the
first uses of the notion of “cyberspace balkanization” were
relatively neutral. In 1995, the expression was used in a very
technical dimension to point out the potential incompatibility of
different languages and web browsers. It obtained a much
stronger political meaning during the 2000’s. Nowadays, in
almost all cases, the very notion of balkanization of cyberspace
is assimilated to a threat against the security and integrity of the
Internet, not against individual freedom.
Beyond a political discourse discounting claims of
sovereignty, it would be more analytically and politically useful
to unbox the digital domain in order to assess the potential
effects of this fragmentation process. On the one hand,
fragmentation poses a challenge to the regulation of behaviors
in cyberspace, whether in the case of judicial disputes or in the
case of cybercrime for instance. It might also increase the risk
of misunderstanding and escalation between States [28]. On the
other hand, it seems legitimate to consider the military side of
cyberspace (i.e. “cyber defense”) as a regal domain that has to
 PAPER ID 4427941
be protected by the State, even if at the same time it hampers
the probability of cooperation and collective security, even
among allies.
But at the same time, the defense of their sovereignty by
Russia and China remains ambivalent, especially in the realm
of international security. Both States were instrumental in
promoting an international code of conduct calling for a
“disarmament in cyberspace” in 2011, while Russia repeatedly
made an aggressive use of cyberspace in its operations against
Georgia and Ukraine [29]. It is also promoting an all-out
“information warfare” against the “West” [30], [31].
Sovereignty is thus interpreted, as in the case of the debate
about intervention, through an absolutist lens informed by a
simplistic vision of “Realpolitik”. In this view, the defense of
sovereignty is not the defense of a political norm regulating
international relations and enhancing stability, even if it is
presented as such to international audiences. Russia embodies
the “organised hypocrisy” envisioned by Stephen Krasner: an
instrumental use of sovereignty in defense of self-interests,
emphasizing one’s independence while minimizing that of
others [6]. What it means is that Russian political and economic
elites cannot afford to create the kind of closed networks as
those feared by the “Balkanization” discourse. On the other
hand, it also likely means they will endeavor to craft a space in
which hegemonic political discourse and control by the State
would make it difficult to plug into the global Internet.
C. Critical Cooperation
The strike down of the Safe Harbor Agreement by the
European Court of Justice in October 2015 underlined a change
of posture by European States and institutions regarding their
interests. While the US used to leverage the interdependence of
the global system for its own security goals, this event shows
how the EU and its member States actively claim a rebalancing
vis à vis the US and resist a US-centered global economy (or,
as Lebow and Reich pointed it, a US norms-centered economy
[14: 61]). Of course, this move was met with fierce criticism in
the US, European States being accused to act as protectionists
in disguise. Nevertheless, European claims focus on a tighter
control of private Corporations practices by the US federal
government. In other words, demands in favor of a rebalancing
in the governance framework are tied to the specific vision of
many European States with regards to public-private
relationships. Hence the stress put on the revalorization of
States’ role in the current governance system.
France has thus expressed its concerns vis à vis the lack of
control over the exchange of data and the threat posed by
cyberspace to its “digital sovereignty” [32: 147]. Even if it was
not echoed in its cyber strategy, three regulations support this
claim. First the Hadopi Law required ISPs to cooperate against
copyright infringers (2009), stressing the threat posed by the
digital domain to the conservation of national and European
cultural heritage. Second, the “Orientation and programming
law for homeland security performance” (LOPPSIE 2) allowed
6
law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop on communications in
the fight against organized crime (2011). Third, the Intelligence
Law required ISPs to set up automatic data analyzers (the so-
called “black boxes”) in order to monitor Internet traffic and
detect suspicious behaviors in the fight against terrorism
(2015). In this latter case, the French Parliament allowed ISPs
to restrict the sharing of information to metadata. These laws
highlight the gap between European and French regulations, the
former stating in the European e-Commerce directive that ISPs
must remain a “mere conduit” of information, the latter
extending their role to involve them in State security policies.
In this specific case, France’s assertion of its sovereignty was
motivated by the transnational nature of cyberspace, rather than
the fear of US dominance.
Nevertheless, concerns regarding the place of the European
Union as well as of European States are more tied to the reality
of a US-dominated space. French Senator Catherine Morin-
Desailly emphasized in a report the risk of Europe becoming a
“digital colony” of US “Internet Giants” [33]. She thus
suggested the creation of specific agencies both in France and
at the EU level (Commission and Council) in order to allow
these actors to play a greater role in the protection of their
digital spaces as well as in global governance. What could be
seen as a move to “Europeanize” the French position in
Brussels is yet congruent with the EU’s way of governance.
Indeed, two principles illustrate the promotion of
multilateralism by the EU, either at its level or through its
member States. First, the notion of inclusive multilateralism
(which opposes to minilateralism or narrower ways of
practicing multilateral cooperation). Second, the belief in the
compatibility between international norms resulting from
institutional cooperation on the one hand, and national
sovereignty on the other.
The fear to be marginalized in the Internet economy has been
also stressed two years ago by the French media figure Pierre
Bellanger, in a book titled “La souveraineté numérique” [digital
sovereignty] [34]. After the last economic crisis, he was aiming
to warn French opinion on an incoming potential digital crisis.
Indeed, with the growing digitalization of the service industry,
Bellanger noticed that almost half of the jobs in this sector could
disappear in France in the next two decades in favor of
American Internet giants. In order to avoid such a situation, he
suggested three concrete actions based on the notion of digital
sovereignty: the creation of a digital sovereignty
 PAPER ID 4427941 7

Commissioner, the development of a sovereign operating TABLE I

system, and the implementation of an agreement considering TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION VS STATE DEMOCRATIZATION
data as a global common. Mode of Multistakeholders Multilateral
governance

IV. DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE Theoretical transnationalism statism

framework

Governance in cyberspace involves two separate albeit

closely intertwined set of issues. First, those dealing with the Levels of transnational territorial
technical standards and norms allowing the very existence of governance
this space. Then, those related to the regulation of the behavior
of State actors and non-State actors alike, whether the latter are
Impacts on Global common Digital sovereignty
individuals, corporations or social actors. Under this architecture
perspective, it first appears that the very project of a free, open
and global Internet remains just that: a project. In other words,
the fragmentation of the Web already is a reality. Nevertheless, Forms of International International
it is very unlikely that wholly sovereign and closed networks regulation standards treaties (Montego
(examples of (ICANN) Bay)
are about to emerge. Indeed, the interoperability and the regulation)
connectedness of networks and systems remain the sine qua non
condition for the pursuit of economic gains resulting from the Leading Private Public
very existence of the Internet. cybersecurity (corporations, civil
actors society)
Yet, if technical governance is not without political issues (for
Modes of Asymmetrical Symmetrical/disym
instance on the links between ICANN and the US government negotiation partnership metrical
or on the cultural openness of Internet), it is mostly partnership
characterized by a strong regime. The regulation of the actors’
behaviors is characterized by a weak and narrow regime. Impacts on Distributed Uniformed
Indeed, not only jurisdictional loopholes between States are not collective security cooperation cooperation
offset by a strong international cooperation, but this cooperation
mostly tends to focus on cybercrime 3, and in a mindset close to
arms control4. The multi-stakeholder point of view allows the participation
of different actors, mostly private companies or civil society.
In addition, both domains rely on a multi-stakeholders It could refer to the transnationalist perspective [36], [37],
governance which involves private and public actors alike but particularly to James Rosenau’s notion of sovereignty-free
at the benefit of the former whose legitimacy, expertise and actors [38: 36]. Taking into account the will of non-state actors
interests regarding Internet and the cyberspace are deemed could on the one hand be considered as a path toward more
higher than those of the States. This model implies a de facto democracy. Indeed, it allows to balance between public and
US advantage which means the status-quo is no longer private policies - and seems to offers a better representation of
sustainable [35]. the societal diversity. Yet on the other hand the public/private
cooperation could also be criticized, because of the lack of
In this context, a major divide on Internet governance appears democratic legitimacy, if democracy is defined as the result of
at the international level. On the one hand, countries such as the an electoral process. In this way, the position of Russia or China
United States argues that multi-stakeholders governance would and even more of France should be considered not as a
be the only path to a more democratic cyberspace, an idea which provocation, but as a real counterpoint to the privatization of
relies on a certain conception of democracy and the Internet governance. This statist perspective might sound
democratization, close to the transnationalist perspective. On outdated compared to the transnationalist one, but it might still
the other hand, countries such as Russia or China defend the be the best way toward consensus between States at the
idea of an exclusive multilateral governance based on an international level.
“absolute” representation of sovereignty and deny any
legitimacy to private actors on the field of public policy. An Inclusive multilateral governance may be then considered not
intermediate path is the inclusive multilateral governance or as a threat of balkanization, but as a solution a minima, which
State democratization promoted by the European Union for could lead to the realization of an international treaty on
instance. The table I summarizes what is at stakes in both modes cyberspace sovereignty, a “Cyberspace Montego Bay
of governance. Convention”. De facto, the conference of Montego Bay
succeeded to produce an original territorial materialization of
sovereignty over the sea several centuries after Grotius and
3
See Convention of Budapest 2001.
4
See United Nations General Assembly, International code of conduct for
information security, Annex to the letter dated 9 January 2015.
 PAPER ID 4427941
Selden’s controversy in the 17th century. Such an agreement is
still missing for cyberspace. The challenge of the next decades
will be to agree at the international level on a common
definition of sovereignty over this domain. It seems to be the
only possibility to build trust on the international stage, and to
allow each State to formulate its own strategies and policies, to
rule its own “cyber-territory”. Then, it could be possible to
enhance international cooperation over cybersecurity, and
apply the collective security model over the Internet.
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1990.
Amaël Cattaruzza received a M.A. degree in
geography from Université Paris-Sorbonne,
Paris, in 2001. He completed his Ph.D. in
political geography at Université Paris-
Sorbonne, Paris, in 2005.
From 2006 to 2008, he has been a
scientific coordinator at the French Embassy
in Belgrade, Serbia. Since 2008, he has been
a senior lecturer with the International
Relations and Strategic Studies department at St Cyr Military
Academy, Coëtquidan, France as well as a research fellow with
the Changing Character of War Laboratory, Centre de
Recherche des Ecoles de St Cyr-Coëtquidan, France. He
recently published Géopolitique des conflits, Paris, Breal, 2016
with a chapter devoted to conflicts in cyberspace, and the Atlas
des guerres et conflits, Paris, Autrement, 2014. In 2014, he co-
edited with Didier Danet La Cyberdéfense.Quel territoire, quel
droit? Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes. His research
interest includes border security and sovereignty in cyberspace
and, more generally, in Europe. He teaches in the Post-master’s
degree in Cyberspace operations.
Dr. Cattaruzza is the secretary of the French Association
for Balkans Studies and the secretary of the French Political
Geography Committee.
 PAPER ID 4427941
Didier Danet graduated from the
Universities of Paris Ouest Nanterre (M.A.
in Law) and Rennes 1 where he completed
a Ph.D. in Management Sciences.
Agrégé de l’Université, he has been a
senior lecturer in Saint Cyr Military
Academy since 1986. He is head of the
Changing Character of War Laboratory and
director of the Post-master’s degree in
Cyberspace operations. His research fields of expertise are
focusing on innovation and armed forces. He is currently
developing research programs on robotization of the battlefield
(supported by Saint-Cyr/SOGETI/THALES Research Chair),
cyberspace operations and enhanced soldier. In 2015, he co-
edited Drones et Killer Robots : faut-il les interdire ? Rennes,
Presses Universitaires de Rennes and L’action militaire de A à
Z, Paris, Economica.
Dr. Danet is a fellow of Rennes 1 University where he is
teaching Law and Management.
Stéphane Taillat, agrégé de l’Université,
received the M.A. degree in modern
history from Université Paris-Sorbonne,
Paris, in 1996 and the M.A. degree in
political science and international
relations from the Institut d’Etudes
Politiques de Toulouse in 2007. He
received his Ph.D. in military history and
defense studies from Université Montpellier Paul-Valery in
2013.
Since 2010, he has been a lecturer with the International
Relations and Strategic Studies department at St Cyr Military
Academy, Coëtquidan, France as well as a research fellow with
the Changing Character of War Laboratory, Centre de
Recherche des Ecoles de St Cyr-Coëtquidan, France. Since
2014, he has been the deputy manager, Post-master’s degree in
Cyberspace operations at St Cyr Military Academy. He is the
co-editor of Guerre et Stratégie: approches, concepts, Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 2015 and the author of more
than a dozen articles and reports. His research interest includes
9
counterinsurgency strategy, cyberspace operations, military
organizations, norms in current international relations and
cooperation between states.
Dr. Taillat is a founding member of the French association
for the study of War and Strategy (AEGES).
Arthur Laudrain graduated from the
University of Montreal, CA, with a BSc in
international studies in 2015, after
attending the Graduate School of
International Studies (GSIS) at Seoul
National University, ROK, in 2014. He is
currently at the end of his curriculum as a
MA candidate in international peace and
security at the Department of War
Studies, King’s College London, UK.
In 2014, he volunteered with the United Nations
Environment Program, ROK, and War Child, UK. Last year, he
became part of King’s College’s crisis simulation team as a
Research Analyst. He joined in 2016 the Research and Outreach
Division of the Air Force General Staff as a Project Officer, at
the Centre for Strategic Aerospace Studies, Paris, FR. He is the
author or co-author of articles published in The National
Defense Review (Paris, FR) and STRIFE Journal (London,
UK). His research interests include lethal autonomous weapon
systems, security and defense in the cyber domain, international
law and the use of force, and Military-Nation relations.
Mr. Laudrain is a representative of the Association of Junior
Auditors in National Defense (ANAJ-IHEDN), and a member
of the French Association for the Study of War and Strategy
(AEGES). He was the co-recipient in 2015 of the Royal United
Services Institute’s Trench-Gascoigne Prize for his policy essay
on the French citizen reserve reform.