SECOND DIVISION [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651.

September 4, 2001]
PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO, Regional Chairman, Special Task Force on Environment and Natural Resources (STF-
ENR) of Region 8, Tacloban City, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Leyte, Branch 34, and SHERIFF IV LEONARDO V. AGUILAR, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Tacloban City, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Leo C. Tabao, Assistant City Prosecutor of Tacloban, in his capacity as
Regional Chairman of the Region 8 Special Task Force on Environment and Natural Resources, against (1) Judge Frisco T.
Lilagan, presiding judge of the Leyte Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of judicial
authority, and willful disobedience to settled jurisprudence; and (2) Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar of the Leyte RTC, Office of the
Clerk of Court, for gross irregularity in the performance of official duties, giving unwarranted benefits to a private individual,
violation of Section 1(b) and (c) of P.D. No. 1829, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The records of this case reveal the following facts.
On February 24, 1998, a water craft registered under the name M/L Hadija, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the
port area of Tacloban City with a load of around 100 tons of tanbark. Due to previous irregular and illegal shipments of tanbark
from Bongao, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation in Region 8 (NBI-EVRO #8) decided to verify the shipments
accompanying documents as the M/L Hadija was unloading its cargo to its consignee, a certain Robert Hernandez.
The NBI agents found the documents irregular and incomplete, and consequently they ordered the unloading of the cargo
stopped.The tanbark, the boat M/L Hadija, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.
On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO #8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 68
(now Section 78) of P.D. No. 705,[1] the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines (as amended), against the captain and crew of
the M/L Hadija, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, and Marcial A. Dalimot. Bautista was a forester while
Dalimot was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) office in Tacloban City. Bautista and Dalimot were, thus, also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[2] along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the CENRO-
Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutors Office of Tacloban City.
In an order dated March 6, 1998,[3] complainant directed the seizure by the DENR of the M/L Hadija, its cargo, and the
three trucks pending preliminary investigation of the case. DENR thus took possession of the aforesaid items on March 10, 1998,
with notice to the consignee Robert Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director.
On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the Regional Trial Court of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized by
the DENR. The case was raffled off to Branch 34 of said court and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.
On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296. On March 17, 1998, confiscation
proceedings were conducted by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)-Leyte, with both Hernandez
and his counsel present.
On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed respondent Sheriff IV
Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration
of five days.[4]Respondent sheriff served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45
p.m. of March 19, 1998.
Thus, the filing of this administrative complaint against respondents via a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated
April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.
Complainant avers that replevin is not available where the properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal
proceedings for illegal logging. He points out that this is a well-settled issue and cites several decisions [5] of this Court and the
Court of Appeals on the matter. He argues that respondent judge should have known of the existing jurisprudence on this issue,
particularly since they are subject to mandatory judicial notice per Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded
them.But he avers that it is respondent judges duty to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence.
Complainant claims that respondent judge cannot claim ignorance of the proceedings in I.S. No. 98-296 for the following
reasons:(1) the defendants in the replevin case were all DENR officers, which should have alerted respondent judge to the
possibility that the items sought to be recovered were being held by the defendants in their official capacities; and (2) the
complaint for replevin itself states that the items were intercepted by the NBI for verification of supporting documents, which
should have made respondent judge suspect that the same were being held by authority of law.
As regards respondent sheriff Leonardo V. Aguilar, complainant states that it was incumbent upon Aguilar to safeguard the
M/L Hadija and prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine
Coast Guard.However, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriffs gross
negligence or his direct connivance with interested parties, according to complainant. As of the time of the filing of the complaint,
according to complainant, the whereabouts of the vessel and its crew were unknown.
 Moreover, complainant points out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to Hernandez on March 20 and 21,
1998, or within the five-day period that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the writ. Complainant argues that the
tanbark formed part of the peoples evidence in the criminal complaint against Hernandez and the others. By his act, respondent
sheriff effectively altered, suppressed, concealed, or destroyed the integrity of said evidence. For this act, complainant contends
that respondent sheriff may be held liable under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders.[6] Respondent sheriffs acts also constitute gross irregularity in the performance of his duty as
a court employee.
Complainant notes that respondent sheriff was absent from his office from March 20 to March 24, 1998. This period included
the dates he was supposed to have released the tanbark to Hernandez. Complainant contends that respondent sheriff not only
unlawfully released the tanbark, he also made it appear that he was not physically present when such act was done.
In separate indorsements dated September 9, 1998, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred this
administrative matter to both respondents for comment.
In his comment dated October 12, 1998,[7] respondent judge calls the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator to a
pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case that effectively prevented him from commenting on the
issue. The discussions that would have to be included in the comment, he says, would also resolve the pending motion to
dismiss. Respondent judge contends that complainant should have been prudent enough to wait for the resolution of the motion
to dismiss before filing the instant administrative case.
Respondent judge claims that he was unaware of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296. He only learned of the criminal case
from an urgent manifestation dated March 20, 1998, filed by complainant. He argues that he issued an order dated March 25,
1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the subject items, pending resolution of the urgent manifestation.
Respondent judge stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule
60 of the Revised Rules of Court. He also points out that said writ was issued provisionally and was not intended to be the final
disposition of the replevin case.
Respondent judge avers that the charge of gross ignorance of the law is premature since he has not made a ruling yet on
the motion to dismiss filed in the replevin case. He contends that it was too much to ask from him to take note of the fact that the
defendants in said case were officials of DENR and make assumptions based on such fact. Moreover, respondent judge submits
that while the complaint alleged that the cargo of tanbark was intercepted by the NBI, it also alleged that the consignee thereof
produced documents to prove that the shipment was legal.
In conclusion, respondent judge points out that no apprehension report was issued by the NBI regarding the
shipment. Neither did the DENR issue a seizure report. Respondent judge contends that the validity of the seizure of the subject
items by the DENR is a matter that will have to be resolved in relation to the motion to dismiss.
For his part, respondent sheriff submits [8] that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard precisely to prevent the
departure of the subject vessel, since he does not have the means to physically prevent said vessel from sailing. The Coast
Guard commander should have examined the vessel and its crew after being served the writ, to determine whether or not they
were engaged in any illegal activity.
Respondent sheriff narrates that no cargo was on board the vessel when he served the writ on the Coast Guard. He verified
the cargos status with DENR, which furnished him a copy of a fax transmission stating that the tanbark came from legitimate
sources except that the shipment documents were not in order. [9]
Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the
contrary. He argues further that since the items subject of the writ are in the custody of the court and could be disposed of only
through court order, there could not be any unwarranted benefit to a private individual as claimed by complainant.
Noting that the questioned shipment of tanbark was not covered by either an NBI apprehension report or a DENR seizure
report, respondent sheriff contends that complainant should have taken steps to protect the integrity of the shipment instead of
heaping blame upon others for his own negligence. Respondent sheriff avers that it was not his intention to obstruct the
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, contrary to complainants claim.
Respondent sheriff refutes complainants claim that he was absent from his office from March 20 to March 24, 1998, and
alleges that it was complainant who was absent from court hearings on several occasions, in violation of his duty as a prosecutor.
Respondent submitted two supplemental comments dated October 30, 1998, [10] and May 3, 1999,[11] (1) reiterating his
contention that the tanbark seized by the DENR and subject of the replevin case had been found to come from a legitimate
source, per an order signed by the Regional Director (Region 8) of the DENR, [12] and (2) informing the OCA that the main replevin
case was dismissed per an order of respondent judge dated November 27, 1998. [13]
As required by resolution of the Court dated January 24, 2001, the parties herein separately manifested that they are willing
to have the present case resolved based on the record on hand.
We note that in its report dated April 8, 1999, the OCA, after reviewing the case, recommended that respondent judge be
fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. At the same time, the OCA recommended that the charges
against respondent sheriff be dismissed for lack of merit.
The recommendation of the OCA is well taken, except for the amount of the fine to be imposed on said respondent judge.
The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark as well as the vessel on which it was loaded were
seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. [14] It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR
for official disposition and appropriate action. [15] A copy of the document evidencing the turnover to DENR was attached to the
complaint as Annex D.[16] To our mind, these allegations would have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR
has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the
shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies of special competence.[17] Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the
DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. [18] The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done
was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized representatives may order the
confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances used in
the commission of the offense.
In this regard, we declared in Paat v. Court of Appeals:

the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall
within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of
its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well
within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an
unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. xxx[19]

Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has
fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be the embodiment
of competence, integrity, and independence. To measure up to this standard, judges are expected to keep abreast of all laws
and prevailing jurisprudence.[20] Judges are duty bound to have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and
jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused,
not even a judge.[21]
We find, however, that respondent judge had already vacated the Writ of Seizure he issued on March 19, 1998, in a
subsequent Order dated November 27, 1998, dismissing the Civil Complaint for replevin filed by Robert Hernandez against the
Regional Director of the DENR and other officers. He also directed in said order the sheriff to return to CENRO, Tacloban City,
all the chattels confiscated by virtue of the Writ of Seizure.[22]
Further, we find that Sheriff Aguilar in his Final Return of the Writ, dated December 15, 1998, had already delivered to
CENRO the 102 tons and 120 kilos of tanbark duly receipted by CENRO representative Marcial A. Dalimot on the same date. [23]
The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00. Under the circumstances, considering
that this is the first complaint against him, we deem a fine of P10,000.00 to be sufficient.
Regarding the charges against respondent sheriff, we agree with the OCA that they should be dismissed. Respondent
sheriff merely complied with his ministerial duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to execute it promptly in accordance
with its mandates.[24]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan is hereby found liable for gross ignorance of the law and is accordingly
ordered to pay a FINE of P10,000.00, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely. The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
705[1] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277.[2]
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on
Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber
will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times
within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. [3]
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the
area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street.Thirty
minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at
the Marcos Bridge.[4]
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed
person. The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.[5]
 SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told
SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs. [6]
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargos supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin,
(2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger
regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a
certification[7] from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally
acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San
Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[8]
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-
appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs. [9]
At 10:00 oclock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO personnel examined
the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs
were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber. [10] When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the
seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board
feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.[11]
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of
P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate
No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control
and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total
volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd.
ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision
of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a
legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa[13] and Elpidio Sabal.[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose
timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th
PLTPs of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services. [15]
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him. He contended that
they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of
the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision[16]states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law. The bail bond filed for the
provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No.
PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors: [18]
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as amended by EO 277 for
possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere
possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required
certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused against
unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused under
custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because
E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws
and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:
 Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those laws and regulations which were already
in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law
inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and
regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of
1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order
provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.

Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-
based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized
DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.

xxx

3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF
LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the
processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be
valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales
invoice.

xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a single document to justify
his possession of the subject lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily showed documents to
justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest
Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of
title covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
THIS IS TO
CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on board truckb
earing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside the private land of
Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of facilitating the
transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan
and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes
first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was apprehended
on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD-548which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but
with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed
in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck
were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he needed
documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by
placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC
CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be transporting the subject
lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the
reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit 8, 8-A)
 While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the court has doubts that
this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4
and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did
not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would be for personal used
(sic) and x x came from PLTP. (Ibid) The letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the accused. Documents or
other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person
files or submits any document to a government agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a
duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the
identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his
stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO
who returned the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the person x x but they were already
reshuffled. (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not know if that person
was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:
xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I am hauling and
transporting my own lumber for my own needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport agreement. Why then, if he
was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source. [19]
xxx
Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section
68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellants argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor
cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.There are two
(2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest
laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or
other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial
because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents
as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for
being fruits of a poisonous tree. Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right
against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista, [20]thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a
search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the
occasion of a lawful arrest.The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall,
among others, be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from
a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
 This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable
or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in
the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellants truck. A member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548
loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were
patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended
it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in
between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumbers supporting documents, accused-appellant could not
present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive
search of appellants truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus
properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellants right to counsel under custodial
investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. G.R. No. 162243

ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,

Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 164516
- versus -

HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON.

ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
Respondent.

x-----------------------x
THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea
G. Gozun), in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR),
Petitioner, G.R. No. 171875

Present:
- versus -
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF YNARES-SANTIAGO,
THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP), AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Respondent. CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
 November 29, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

On the line are three consolidated Petitions, all arising from the 11 October 2002 Quezon City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Decision[1] granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP). The Court
of Appeals affirmed the 11 October 2002 RTC Decision, with modification, in a 19 February 2004 Decision.[2]

In G.R. No. 162243, then Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez,
who was later successively substituted by subsequent DENR Secretaries Elisea G. Gozun and Angelo T. Reyes, assails the 19
February 2004 Decision insofar as it granted the Petition for Mandamus. In G.R. No. 164516, PICOP assails the same Decision
insofar as it deleted the imposition of damages against then Secretary Alvarez. Secretary Reyes filed a third Petition docketed
as G.R. No. 171875, assailing the 16 December 2004 Amended Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals lifting the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction that enjoined the enforcement of the 11 October 2002 Decision and 10 February 2003 Orders of the RTC.

FACTS

The facts, culled from the records of the three consolidated petitions, are as follows:

On 24 May 1952, PICOPs predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was granted Timber License Agreement
(TLA) No. 43.[4] The TLA was amended on 26 April 1953 and 4 March 1959. As amended, TLA No. 43 covers an area of 75,545
hectares in Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley, and Davao Oriental.

Allegedly sometime in 1969, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued a presidential warranty to BBLCI, confirming
that TLA No. 43 definitely establishes the boundary lines of [BBLCIs] concession area. [5]

TLA No. 43, as amended, expired on 26 April 1977. It was renewed on 7 October 1977 for another 25 years to terminate
on April 25, 2002.[6]

On 23 December 1999, then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles promulgated DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
99-53 which had for its subject, the Regulations Governing the Integrated Forest Management Program (IFMP).[7]

In a 28 August 2000 letter to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), DENR-Region XIII-
D4, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, PICOP signified its intention to convert its TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA) invoking the provisions of Section 9, Chapter III of DAO No. 99-53.[8]

Acting on the said letter, Forester III Trifino M. Peregrino, In-Charge, Office of the CENRO, wrote a letter dated 1
September 2000 to PICOPs resident manager in Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, informing PICOP that we will consider said letter
as an advance notice considering that it is yet premature to act on your request since we are yet in CY 2000. [9]

In a 24 January 2001 letter, Neolito Frondozo, Group Manager, Forest Operations Manager of PICOP, requested for a
favorable indorsement of their letter of intent from the CENRO of the DENR, Region XIII-D4 in Bislig City. This was followed up
by another letter dated 25 January 2001 of Wilfredo D. Fuentes, Vice President and Resident Manager of PICOP, to the Regional
Executive Director (RED), DENR, Caraga Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan City, likewise, requesting for a favorable indorsement
of their letter of intent to the DENR Secretary.[10]

The Officer-In-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director Constantino A. Paye, Jr., in a 6 March 2001 Memorandum,
forwarded PICOPs letter of intent dated 28 August 2000 to the DENR Secretary informing the latter that the DENR Caraga
Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan City, had created a team tasked to conduct a performance evaluation on PICOP on the said TLA
pursuant to DAO No. 99-53.[11]

Subsequently, Elias R. Seraspi, Jr., RED, DENR, Caraga Region XIII in Ambago, Butuan City, submitted a 31 July
2001 Memorandum to the DENR Secretary on the performance evaluation of PICOP on its TLA No. 43.Paragraph 11 of the
same Memorandum reads:
 Hence, it is imperative to chart a good forest policy direction for the management, development and
protection of TLA No. 43 after it expires on April 26, 2002 for the purpose of sustainable forest management
of the area in support of national development. With this vision, the proper evaluation to consider the request
for automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 to IFMA pursuant to Section 9, DENR A.O. No. 99-53, upon its
expiration on April 26, 2002 is hereby recommended.[12]

Attached to said Memorandum, inter alia, were the 11 July 2001 Report and 27 July 2001 Supplemental Report of the
Performance Evaluation Team created to conduct such performance evaluation indicating violations by PICOP of existing DENR
Rules and Regulations governing TLA No. 43, such as the non-submission of its five-year forest protection plan and seven-year
reforestation plan as required by the DENR rules and regulations. The said 31 July 2001 Memorandum was forwarded to the
Forest Management Bureau (FMB) for appropriate action and recommendation. [13]

Sometime in September 2001, the DENR Secretary was furnished a copy of Forest Management Specialist II (FMS II)
Teofila L. Orlanes 24 September 2001 Memorandum concerning alleged unpaid and overdue forest charges of respondent on
TLA No. 43. Attached thereto was a 19 September 2001 Memorandum of Amelia D. Arayan, Bill Collector of the DENR R13-14,
Bislig City, likewise indicating purported unpaid and overdue forest charges by PICOP on its TLA No. 43. [14]

Said Memorandum was referred to FMB Director Romeo T. Acosta, who directed FMB Senior Forest Management
Specialist (SFMS) Ignacio Evangelista to proceed to Region 13 to gather forestry-related data and validate the report contained
in the respective Memoranda of Orlanes and Arayan. [15] SFMS Evangelista found that the 8 May 2001 to 7 July 2001 forest
charges adverted to in the Orlanes and Arayan Memoranda was belatedly filed.He also found that PICOP had not paid its regular
forest charges covering the period of 22 September 2001 to 26 April 2002 in the total amount of P15,056,054.05.[16] Moreso, he
discovered that from 1996 to 30 August 2002, PICOP was late in paying some of its forest charges in 1996, and was consistently
late in paying all its forestry charges from 1997 onwards. [17]

The overdue and unpaid forest charges (including penalties, interests and surcharges) of PICOP
total P150,169,485.02. Its silvicultural fees amount to P2,366,901.00 from 1996 up to 30 August 2002. In all, PICOP has an
outstanding and overdue total obligation on its forest charges in the amount of P167,592,440.90 as of 30 August 2002.[18]

Thus, FMB Director Acosta submitted a 5 October 2001 Memorandum to the DENR Secretary concerning PICOPs
application for conversion of its TLA No. 43 into an IFMA, viz:

RECOMMENDATION

The conversion of the TLA into IFMA is primarily aimed at sustaining the raw materials for the continuous
operation of the integrated wood processing plant of the company. However, the very complex issues
presented cannot just be ignored and have to be fully addressed to before further appropriate action is taken
on the application for conversion. In the absence of categorical comments and recommendation of the regional
office to resolve the issue, it is recommended that a transition team composed of the following be created: x x
x.[19]

In lieu of a transition team, the DENR Secretary constituted a negotiating team by virtue of Special Order No. 2001-
698 dated 23 October 2001 composed of Undersecretary Ramon J.P. Paje as chairman, with the following as members:
Undersecretary Gregorio V. Cabantac and FMB Assistant Director Neria A. Andin. The team was authorized to negotiate for
such terms and conditions as are advantageous to the Government. [20]

The DENR Secretary sent a 25 October 2001 letter to PICOP, through its president, requesting him to designate its
representative/s to discuss with the DENR negotiating team the conditions and details of the said IFMA including the production
sharing arrangement between PICOP and the government. [21]

Since PICOP failed to send a representative, and considering that TLA No. 43 was about to expire, DENR
Undersecretary Paje called for a meeting on 21 March 2002. It was only then, or almost five months from the receipt of the 25
October 2001 letter from the DENR Secretary, that PICOP sent its representatives to the DENR. [22]

On 9 April 2002, the DENR Negotiating Team issued Resolution No. 1, series of 2002, creating a Technical Working
Committee (TWC) to provide technical assistance to the negotiating team composed of representatives from both DENR and
PICOP.[23] On 10 April 2002, the members of the TWC met and discussed the findings of the Performance Evaluation Team that
PICOP has neither submitted its Five-Year Forest Protection Plan nor presented its Seven-Year Reforestation Plan, both being
required by DENR rules and regulations. In the same meeting, PICOP agreed to secure and submit a clearance from the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required by Section 59 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). [24]

On 15 April 2002, another TWC meeting was conducted, wherein the proposed validation of PICOPs overall
performance as part of the evaluation process for the conversion of the TLA into an IFMA was discussed with PICOP
representatives being given copies of the performance evaluation of PICOP on its TLA No. 43. [25] PICOPs representatives were
subsequently requested to prepare a map showing by categories the area planted with trees in compliance with PICOPs
reforestation requirements.[26]

In the next TWC meeting on 19 April 2002, PICOPs representatives were asked of their compliance with their
agreement during the 10 April 2002 meeting that they should have submitted a list of stockholders on 15 April 2002.The PICOP
representatives did not submit such list and instead inquired on the TWCs interpretation of the 25 October 2001 letter of the
DENR Secretary to PICOP, which provides in full, thus:
 25 October 2001

MR. TEODORO G. BERNARDINO

President
PICOP Resources Incorporated
2nd Flr, Moredel Building
2280 Pasong Tamo Extension
Makati City

Dear Mr. Bernardino:

Consistent with our attached Memorandum to Her Excellency, the President, dated 17 October 2001 and in
response to your Letter of Intent dated 25 February 2001, we wish to inform you that, pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order No. 99-53, we have cleared the conversion of PICOPs Timber License Agreement (TLA)
No. 43 to Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) effective from the expiration of said TLA on April
26, 2002.

In this regard, you are hereby requested to designate PICOPs representative(s) to discuss with the DENR
Team, created under Special Order No. 2001-638, the conditions and details of the said IFMA, including the
production sharing agreement between PICOP and the government.

For your information and guidance.

Very truly yours,

(sgd)
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ
Secretary[27]

It was the position of the DENR members of the TWC that PICOPs application for the IFMA conversion should undergo
the process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. PICOP representative Atty. Caingat, however, claimed that the TLA has been
converted and suggested the suspension of the meeting as they would submit a written position on the matter the following
day.[28]

On 22 April 2002, the TWC members of the DENR received a letter from PICOP dated 18 April 2002 insisting that the
conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA has already been completed and indicated that they had no choice except to decline
participation in the ongoing meeting and bring our issues to the proper public and legal forum. [29]

On 24 April 2002, the TWC submitted a Memorandum dated 22 April 2002 to the Undersecretary for Operations and
Undersecretary for Legal, Lands and International Affairs of the DENR, enumerating the salient points taken up during the TWC
meetings. This includes the performance evaluation report of the DENR Regional Office covering the period from 24 June
1999 to 23 June 2000. The report states that PICOP has not submitted its 5-Year Forest Protection Plan and 7-Year
Reforestation Plan; that it has unpaid and overdue forest charges; and its failure to secure a clearance from the Regional Office
of the NCIP considering the presence of Indigenous Peoples (IPs) in the area and Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claims issued
within the area.

The DENR Secretary instructed the RED, Caraga Region, to coordinate with PICOP and reiterate the requirements for
conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA.

Thereafter, the FMB Director received a letter dated 6 August 2002 from NCIP Chairperson Atty. Evelyn S. Dunuan
informing him that, based on their records, no certification has been issued to PICOP concerning its application for conversion
of its TLA No. 43 into IFMA, as there has never been an application or endorsement of such application to our office. [30]

On 12 August 2002, a meeting was held at the Office of the President of the Philippines presided by Undersecretary
Jose Tale and Undersecretary Jake Lagonera of the Office of the Executive Secretary. PICOPs representatives committed to
submit the following, to wit:

1. Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation issued on 12 August 2002 that extended
PICOPs corporate term for another fifty (50) years;

2. Proof of Payment of forest charges;

3. Proof of Payment of Reforestation Deposit;

4. Response to social issues, particularly clearance from the NCIP; and

5. Map showing reforestation activities on an annual basis.[31]

PICOP submitted its purported compliance with aforesaid undertaking through a letter dated 21 August 2002 to the
DENR Secretary. Upon evaluation of the documents submitted by PICOP, the TWC noted that:
 a) PICOP did not submit the required NCIP clearance;

b) The proof of payments for forest charges covers only the production period from 1 July 2001 to 21
September 2001;

c) The proof of payment of reforestation deposits covers only the period from the first quarter of CY 1999
to the second quarter of CY 2001;

d) The map of the areas planted through supplemental planting and social forestry is not sufficient
compliance per Performance Evaluation Teams 11 July 2001 report on PICOPs performance on its TLA
No. 43, pursuant to Section 6.6 of DAO 79-87; and

e) PICOP failed to respond completely to all the social issues raised. [32]

Accordingly, the Secretary of DENR claims that further processing of PICOPs application for the conversion of TLA No. 43 cannot
proceed until PICOP complies with the requirements.

Insisting that the conversion of its TLA No. 43 had been completed, PICOP filed a Petition for Mandamus against then
DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez before the RTC of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 220, presided by Hon. Jose
G. Paneda. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-47764 (hereinafter referred to as the MANDAMUS CASE).

On 11 October 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOPs Petition for Mandamus, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Mandamus is hereby GRANTED.

The Respondent DENR Secretary Hon. Heherson Alvarez is hereby ordered:

1. to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and/or documents to PICOP and issue the
corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43,
as amended;

2. to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area
of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioners pulp and paper mills
in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the government and
PICOPs predecessor-in-interest; and

3. to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP
strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, 1999 (sic) between the
government and PICOPs predecessor-in-interest (Exhibits H, H-1 to H-5, particularly the
following:

a) the area coverage of TLA No. 43, which forms part and parcel of the government
warranties;

b) PICOP tenure over the said area of TLA No. 43 and exclusive right to cut, collect and
remove sawtimber and pulpwood for the period ending on April 26, 1977; and said
period to be renewable for [an]other 25 years subject to compliance with constitutional
and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions; and

c) The peaceful and adequate enjoyment by PICOP of the area as described and
specified in the aforesaid amended Timber License Agreement No. 43.

The Respondent Secretary Alvarez is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum of P10 million a
month beginning May 2002 until the conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, to IFMA is formally effected and
the harvesting from the said area is granted.[33]

On 25 October 2002, the DENR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [34]

PICOP filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction. [35]

On 12 November 2002, then DENR Secretary Alvarez filed a Motion to Inhibit Hon. Jose G. Paneda from further trying
the case, attaching to said motion an administrative complaint against the latter which was filed by the former before the Office
of the Court Administrator.[36] The Motion was denied in an Order dated 10 December 2002.

On 19 December 2002, PICOP filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implead Hon. Elisea Gozun as respondent, [37] which
was granted. Elisea Gozun was, thus, substituted as respondent in her official capacity as the new DENR Secretary.[38]

On 6 November 2002, then NCIP Chairperson Atty. Evelyn S. Dunuan sent a letter to the DENR (1) informing the
DENR Secretary that after validation by the NCIP, it was found out that the area of 47,420 hectares covered by PICOPs TLA
No. 43 conflicts with the ancestral domains of the Manobos; and (2) reiterating the information that no NCIP certification was
sought by PICOP to certify that the area covered by TLA No. 43, subject of its IFMA conversion, does not overlap with any
ancestral domain. Accordingly, she strongly urge[d] the revocation of the one-year permit granted to PICOP until the full
provisions of [the] IPRA are followed and the rights of our Indigenous Peoples over their ancestral land claims are respected. [39]

On 25 November 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297, EXCLUDING A CERTAIN
AREA FROM THE OPERATION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 369 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1931, AND DECLARING THE SAME
AS MINERAL RESERVATION AND AS ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA.The excluded area consists of 8,100 hectares,
more or less, which formed part of PICOPs expired TLA No. 43, subject of its application for IFMA conversion. [40]

On 21 January 2003, PICOP filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the aforesaid presidential proclamation as
well as its implementing DENR Administrative Order No. 2002-35 (DAO No. 2002-35) which was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC
in Quezon City. The Petition was docketed as Special Civil Action No. Q-03-48648 (hereinafter referred to as the NULLITY
CASE).

In said NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondents therein [41] from
implementing the questioned issuances. The DENR Secretary and her co-respondents in said case filed on 6 February 2003 an
Omnibus Motion (1) To Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order dated 3 February 2003; and (2) To Dismiss (With Opposition
to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction).[42]

The trial court issued a Resolution dated 19 February 2003 granting the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
Petition does not state a cause of action.[43] PICOP filed a Motion for Reconsideration as well as a Motion to Inhibit. On 24 March
2003, the presiding judge of Branch 78 inhibited himself from hearing the case. [44]Accordingly, the NULLITY CASE was re-raffled
to Branch 221 of the RTC of Quezon City, which granted PICOPs Motion for Reconsideration by setting for hearing PICOPs
application for preliminary injunction.

Meanwhile, in the MANDAMUS CASE, the RTC denied the DENR Secretarys Motion for Reconsideration and granted
the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction via a 10 February
2003 Order.[45] The fallo of the 11 October 2002 Decision was practically copied in the 10 February 2003 Order, although there
was no mention of the damages imposed against then Secretary Alvarez. [46] The DENR Secretary filed a Notice of Appeal[47] from
the 11 October 2002 Decision and the 10 February 2003 Order.

On 28 February 2003, the DENR Secretary filed before the Court of Appeals, a Petition for Certiorari With a Most
Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction insofar as the trial court
ordered the execution of its 11 October 2002 Decision pending appeal. The petition (hereinafter referred to as the INJUNCTION
CASE) was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75698, which was assigned to the Special 13 th Division thereof.

On 11 March 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a 60-day TRO[48] enjoining the enforcement of the 11 October
2002 Decision and the 10 February 2003 Order of the RTC. On 30 April 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.[49]

On 30 October 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision [50] in the INJUNCTION CASE granting the Petition
and annulling the Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction issued by the trial court. PICOP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.[51]

On 19 February 2004, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [52] on the MANDAMUS CASE,
affirming the Decision of the RTC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with modification that the order directing then
DENR Secretary Alvarez to pay petitioner-appellee the sum of P10 million a month beginning May, 2002 until
the conversion to IFMA of TLA No. 43, as amended, is formally effected and the harvesting from the said area
is granted is hereby deleted. [53]

PICOP filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[54] of this Decision, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a 20
July 2004 Resolution.[55]

Meanwhile, in a 22 March 2004 Resolution,[56] the Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held in abeyance
the ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration of the INJUNCTION CASE pending the Seventh Divisions resolution of the Motion
for Reconsideration of the 19 February 2004 Decision in the MANDAMUS CASE.

The DENR Secretary and PICOP filed with this Court separate Petitions for Review on the 19 February 2004Court of
Appeals Decision in the MANDAMUS CASE. These Petitions were docketed as G.R. No. 162243 and 164516, respectively.

On 16 December 2004, the Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision [57] on
the INJUNCTION CASE lifting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction it had previously issued, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 22, 2004 holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion
for reconsideration of Our October 30, 2003 decision is set aside and the Decision dated October 30,
2003 reconsidered.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 30 April 2003 is hereby lifted and dissolved and the Order
dated 10 February 2003 allowing execution pending appeal and authorizing the issuance of the writ of
mandamus and/or writ of mandatory injunction is hereby affirmed. The Petition dated February 27, 2003 is
herewith dismissed.[58]
 Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration in a 9 March 2006 Resolution,[59] the DENR Secretary filed with this Court,
a Petition for Review[60] of the INJUNCTION CASE. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 171875.

On 5 July 2006, this Court resolved[61] to consolidate G.R. No. 162243, 164516, and 171875.

ISSUES

In G.R. No. 162243, the DENR Secretary brought forth the following issues for our consideration:

WHETHER THE PRESIDENTIAL WARRANTY IS A CONTRACT WHICH CONSTITUTES A LEGAL BAR TO

THE EXERCISE BY THE STATE OF ITS FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION REGARDING THE
EXPLORATION DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF ITS NATURAL RESOURCES.

II

WHETHER [PICOP] HAD ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER ITS FOREST CONCESSION AREA BY
VIRTUE OF THE AFORESAID PRESIDENTIAL WARRANTY.

III

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE BECAUSE
THE SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF PERTAINS TO THE EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAIN OF [THE
DENR SECRETARY].

IV

WHETHER [PICOPS] PETITION FOR MANDAMUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (1) FOR LACK OF
CAUSE OF ACTION; AND (2) BECAUSE THE SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF IS NOT CONTROLLABLE BY
CERTIORARI.

WHETHER [PICOP] HAS FAITHFULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ENTITLING IT TO AN IFMA CONVERSION.

VI

WHETHER [PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 605][62] HAS BEEN PARTLY REPEALED BY [REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8975].[63]

In G.R. No. 164516, PICOP submits the sole issue:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DELETED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO

PETITIONER BY THE TRIAL COURT.[64]

Finally, in G.R. No. 171875, the DENR Secretary submits the following arguments:

A. [PICOP] DID NOT ACTUALLY FILE A MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.

B. THERE ARE NO GOOD REASONS FOR THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.[65]

THIS COURTS RULING

Whether or not outright dismissal was proper

Since the third, fourth and sixth issues raised by the DENR Secretary, if determined in favor of the DENR Secretary,
would have warranted an outright dismissal of the MANDAMUS CASE as early as the trial court level, it is proper to resolve
these issues first.

The DENR Secretary alleges that the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the MANDAMUS CASE pertains to the
exclusive administrative domain of the DENR, and therefore, the RTC had been in error in taking cognizance thereof. The DENR
Secretary adds that, assuming arguendo that the RTC properly took cognizance of the MANDAMUS CASE, it committed a
reversible error in not dismissing the same (1) for lack of cause of action; and (2) because the subject matter thereof is not
controllable by mandamus.
 The Petition filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction with damages. Specifically, it sought to compel the DENR Secretary to: (1) sign, execute
and deliver the IFMA documents to PICOP; (2) issue the corresponding IFMA number assignment; and (3) approve the
harvesting of timber by PICOP from the area of TLA No. 43. The DENR Secretary contends that these acts relate to the licensing
regulation and management of forest resources, which task belongs exclusively to the DENR [66] as conveyed in its mandate:

SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos.[67]

The Court of Appeals ruled:

The contention does not hold water. In its petition for mandamus, [PICOP] asserted that DENR
Secretary Alvarez acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction in refusing to perform
his ministerial duty to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and to issue the corresponding IFMA number
to it. The cited jurisdiction of the DENR on licencing regulation and management of our environment and
natural resources is not disputed. In fact, the petition seeks to compel it to properly perform its said functions
in relation to [PICOP]. What is at stake is not the scope of the DENR jurisdiction but the manner by which it
exercises or refuses to exercise that jurisdiction.

The courts have the duty and power to strike down any official act or omission tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The 1987 Constitution is explicit in providing that judicial power includes not only the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. [68]

The Court of Appeals is correct. Since PICOP alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR Secretary, it
behooves the court to determine the same. An outright dismissal of the case would have prevented such determination.

For the same reason, the MANDAMUS CASE could not have been dismissed outright for lack of cause of action. A
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. [69] In ruling
upon the DENR Secretarys Motion to Dismiss, PICOPs allegation that it has a contract with the government should, thus, be
hypothetically admitted. Necessarily, the DENR Secretarys argument that there was no such contract should be considered in
the trial of the case and should be disregarded at this stage of the proceedings.

The DENR Secretary, however, counters that he/she has not yet exercised his/her exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, i.e., either to approve or disapprove PICOPs application for IFMA conversion. Hence, it is argued that PICOPs
immediate resort to the trial court was precipitate based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.[70]

The Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is disregarded when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, [71] which are averred to be extant in this case, citing PICOPs
employment of a sizable number of workers and its payment of millions in taxes to the government. [72] The Court of Appeals
appends:

Moreover, contrary to [the DENR Secretarys] claim, the approval of an application for IFMA conversion
is not purely discretionary on the part of the DENR Secretary since the approval of an IFMA conversion
depends upon compliance with the requirements provided under DAO No. 99-53.

Of course, as earlier intimated, even assuming, arguendo, that the approval of an IFMA conversion
involves the exercise of discretion by the DENR Secretary, the writ of mandamus may be issued to compel
the proper exercise of that discretion where it is shown that there was grave abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice, or palpable excess of authority.[73]

While the Court of Appeals is correct in making such rulings, such accuracy applies only insofar as the RTC
assessment that the MANDAMUS CASE should not have been subjected to outright dismissal. The issue of whether there
was indeed an urgency of judicial intervention (as to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus despite the exclusive jurisdiction
of the DENR) is ultimately connected to the truth of PICOPs assertions, which were hypothetically admitted in the motion to
dismiss stage. In other words, it all boils down to whether the DENR Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in
not executing the IFMA documents and in not approving PICOPs harvesting of timber from the area of TLA No. 43.

The sixth issue raised by the DENR Secretary concerns Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 605 which, according to
the Court of Appeals had been partly repealed by Republic Act No. 8975. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 605 provides:

SECTION 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance,
approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative
 official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the
disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.

According to the Court of Appeals,

Section 1 of PD 605 has been partly repealed by RA No. 8975, enacted on November 7, 2002. Section 3 of
the said law limits the prohibition on the issuance of restraining orders and injunctions to the following:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site of

location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined
under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any
such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.

Noticeably, the subject coverage on concessions, licenses and the like contemplated in Section 1 of
PD 605 is notreproduced in the foregoing enumeration under Section 3 of R.A. 8975. The effect of the non-
reenactment is a partial repeal of Section 1 of PD 605. It is a rule of legal hermenuetics (sic) that an act which
purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was
contained in the old act and not included in the act as revised. As the repealing clause of R.A. 8975 states:

Sec. 9. Repealing Clause All laws, decrees including Presidential Decree Nos.
605, 1818 and Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. [74]

The DENR Secretary claims that since Republic Act No. 8975 simply declares that Presidential Decree No. 605 or
parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly, then, there should be an inconsistency
between Presidential Decree No. 605 and Republic Act No. 8975 before there can be a partial repeal of Presidential Decree No.
605.

We agree with the DENR Secretary. Republic Act No. 8975 was not intended to set out in full all laws concerning the
prohibition against temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions. Republic Act No.
8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing such orders in connection with the implementation of government infrastructure projects,
while Presidential Decree No. 605 prohibits the issuance of the same, in any case involving licenses, concessions and the like,
in connection with the natural resources of the Philippines. This can be further seen from the respective titles of these two laws,
which, of course, should express the subjects thereof: [75]

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8975

AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION OF GOVERNMENT

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS FROM ISSUING
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS OR PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 605

BANNING THE ISSUANCE BY COURTS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING

CONCESSIONS, LICENSES, AND OTHER PERMITS ISSUED BY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICIALS OR BODIES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.

However, when the licenses, concessions and the like also entail government infrastructure projects, the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8975 should be deemed to apply,[76] and, thus, Presidential Decree No. 605 had been modified in this sense.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that Presidential Decree No. 605 subsists, the DENR Secretary must have missed our
ruling in Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito,[77] wherein we held that the prohibition in Presidential Decree No. 605 pertains to the
issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases, because to allow courts to judge these matters could disturb the smooth functioning
of the administrative machinery. But on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts
are not prevented by Presidential Decree No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

While there are indeed questions of facts in the present Petitions, the overriding controversy involved herein is one of
law: whether the Presidential Warranty issued by former President Marcos are contracts within the purview of the Constitutions
Non-Impairment Clause. Accordingly, the prohibition in Presidential Decree No. 605 against the issuance of preliminary injunction
in cases involving permits for the exploitation of natural resources does not apply in this case.

Moreover, as we held in Republic v. Nolasco,[78] statutes such as Presidential Decree No. 605, Presidential Decree No.
1818 and Republic Act No. 8975 merely proscribe the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction. They cannot, under pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take
cognizance of the issues raised in the principal action, as long as such action and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction. We
further held in Nolasco:

However, it must be clarified that Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright
dismissal of any complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent injunctive relief from the
implementation of national government infrastructure projects. What is expressly prohibited by the statute is
the issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary
mandatory injunctions. It does not preclude the lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints or
petitions that seek as ultimate relief the nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure
project. A statute such as Republic Act No. 8975 cannot diminish the constitutionally mandated judicial
power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. x x x.[79]

As the disposition of these consolidated Petitions will be dispositions of the principal actions, any applicability of the
prohibitions in Presidential Decree No. 605 will be mooted.

Whether or not the presidential warranty was a contract

PICOPs ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is the supposed contract entered into by the government in the
form of a Presidential Warranty, dated 29 July 1969 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR
Secretary refutes this claim, and alleges that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Presidential Warranty a
valid and subsisting contract under the Constitutions Non-Impairment Clause.

The Court of Appeals has this brief statement concerning the main issue of the MANDAMUS CASE:

The questioned warranty is a valid contract. It was freely entered into by the government and
[PICOP]. Mutual considerations were taken into account in the execution of that contract. [PICOP] invested
billions of pesos in its concession areas. In return, the government assured [PICOP] of its tenurial rights over
TLA No. 43, as amended, as well as its exclusive right to cut, collect and saw timber and pulpwood therein. The
DENR must perforce honor and respect the warranty by maintaining the area alloted (sic) to [PICOP] under
TLA No. 43, as amended.[80]

We are constrained to disagree. In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses concerning the
harvesting of timber in the countrys forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. [81] Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr.,[82] where we held:

In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss
the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government
by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would
have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code
(P.D. No. 705) which provides:

x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other
form of privilege granted herein x x x.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protected by the due process clause of the constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, [125
SCRA 302, 325 (1983)] this Court held:

x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not
a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to
whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right;
nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. (People vs. Ong Tin, 54
O.G. 7576). x x x
 We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary [190 SCRA
673, 684 (1990)]:

x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal

instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted.And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree
No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

cannot be invoked.

PICOP, however, argues that these rulings laid down in Tan v. Director of Forestry,[83] Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v.
Deputy Executive Secretary[84] and Oposa do not find application in the present case allegedly because the issue here is the
unlawful refusal of then DENR Secretary Alvarez to issue an IFMA to PICOP and not the matter of a timber license being merely
a license or privilege.[85]

We are not persuaded. PICOP filed the MANDAMUS CASE against then DENR Secretary Alvarez on the ground that
Secretary Alvarezs refusal to issue an IFMA in its favor allegedly violated its vested right over the area covered by its TLA No.
43 and presidential warranty, and impaired the obligation of contract under said agreement and warranty.[86]

The argument that the Presidential Warranty is a contract on the ground that there were mutual considerations taken
into account consisting in investments on PICOPs part is preposterous. All licensees put up investments in pursuing their
businesses. To construe these investments as consideration in a contract would be to stealthily render ineffective the settled
jurisprudence that a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permittee, and is not a
property in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts may
extend.[87] Neither shall we allow a circumvention of such doctrine by terming such permit as a warranty.

Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements for the
conversion of TLA No. 43 as amended into an IFMA

DAO No. 99-53 enumerates the requirements for the grant of the IFMA conversion:

Sec. 9. Qualifications of Applicants. The applicants for IFMA shall be:

(a) A Filipino citizen of legal age; or

(b) Partnership, cooperative or corporation whether public or private, duly registered under
Philippine laws.

However, in the case of application for conversion of TLA into IFMA, an automatic conversion after
proper evaluation shall be allowed, provided the TLA holder shall have signified such intention prior to the
expiry of the TLA, PROVIDED further, the TLA holder has shown satisfactory performance and have
complied with the terms and conditions of the TLA and pertinent rules and regulations.

Therefore, the following are the requisites for the automatic conversion of the TLA into an IFMA, to wit:

1. The TLA holder had signified its intent to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the expiration of its
TLA;
2. Proper evaluation was conducted on the application; and
3. The TLA holder has satisfactorily performed and complied with the terms and conditions of the
TLA and the pertinent rules and regulations.

The Court of Appeals held:

From the foregoing provision, it can be gleaned that as long as an applicant-corporation has signified
its intention to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the expiration of its TLA, has shown satisfactory
performance as a TLA holder and has complied with the terms and conditions of the TLA and pertinent rules
and regulations, conversion follows as a matter of course. It becomes automatic.

[PICOP] has complied with the administrative requirements. In its letter dated August 28, 2000 to the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) for DENR-RXIII-D4, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
it signified its intention to convert its TLA into an IFMA. It has also shown satisfactory performance as a TLA
 holder as evidenced by the July 31, 2001 Report of Director Elias Seraspi, Jr. The said report states that
[PICOP] was able to hold on its management and protection of its concession areas.

xxxx

Apparently, [the DENR Secretary] refuses to sign the documents on the grounds that [PICOP] has not
secured and submitted a clearance from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) showing
that its TLA areas do not overlap with existing ancestral domains: and that [PICOP] has outstanding and
overdue obligation in forest charges.

The two reasons last cited by the Secretary for refusing to sign and deliver the IFMA documents are
not real nor valid.

Section 59 of RA 8371, which requires prior certification from the NCIP that the areas affected do not
overlap with any ancestral domain before any IFMA can be entered into by the government, should be read in
conjunction with Sections 3 (a) and 56 of the same law.

Section 3 (a) of RA 8371 describes ancestral domains as areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present xxx. On the other hand, Section 56 of the same law
provides:

Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. Property rights within the ancestral
domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and
respected.

It can thus be deduced that Section 59 can only be interpreted to refer to ancestral domains which
have been duly established as such (i.e., the concerned indigenous people must have been in continuous
possession or occupation of the area concerned since time immemorial up to the present). Too, existing
property rights over the areas sought to be declared as part of an ancestral domain must be recognized and
respected.

[PICOP] has already acquired property rights over its concession areas. It has been in exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession and occupation of TLA No. 43 areas since 1952 to present. From
the time it managed and operated TLA No. 43, it has made huge investments on its concession areas. These
include the planting of millions of trees and the scientific silvicultural treatment of the forest to make it more
productive. Having acquired property rights over TLA No. 43 areas, [PICOP] need not be required to secure
clearance from the NCIP pursuant to Section 59 of RA 8371.

[The DENR Secretarys] claim that [PICOP] failed to settle its outstanding obligations to the
government in the form of unpaid forest charges do not inspire belief. Under Sec. 3 (3.5) of DENR
Memorandum Circular No. 96-04 dated March 14, before an Integrated Annual Operations Plan (IAOP) can
be issued, it is a condition precedent that the licensee has no pending forestry accounts. If it were true that
[PICOP] had unpaid forest charges, why was it issued IAOP for calendar year 2001-2002 by Secretary Alvarez
himself?[88]

Upon close scrutiny of the records, this Court observes that these findings of compliance by PICOP are negated by the
very evidence on which they are supposedly moored.

As clearly shown by the 31 July 2001 Memorandum of Regional Executive Director Elias D. Seraspi, Jr., DENR Caraga
Region, RED Seraspi neither made a categorical finding of PICOPs satisfactory performance on its TLA No. 43 nor favorably
recommended approval of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion. Rather, RED Seraspi recommended the proper evaluation
of PICOPs request for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA:

Hence, it is imperative to chart a good forest policy direction for the management, development and
protection of TLA No. 43 after it expires on April 26, 2002 for the purpose of sustainable forest management
of the area in support of national development. With this vision, the proper evaluation to consider the request
for automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 to IFMA pursuant to Section 9, DENR A.O. No. 99-53, upon its
expiration on April 26, 2002 is hereby recommended.[89]

Administrative Requirements

There was actually no way by which RED Seraspi could have come up with a satisfactory performance finding since
the very Performance Evaluation Team tasked to make the evaluation found PICOP to have violated existing DENR rules and
regulations. According to the 11 July 2002 Memorandum Report of the Performance Evaluation Team, PICOP has not submitted
its Five-Year Forest Protection Plan and its Seven-Year Reforestation Plan.[90]
 Forest charges are, on the other hand, due and payable within 30 days from removal of the forest products from the
cutting area when timber and other forest products are removed for domestic sales pursuant to Sections 6 and 6.2 of DAO No.
80, series of 1987. Thus:

Section 6. Payment of Forest Charges. x x x In such a case, the forest charges shall be due and
payable as follows:

6.1 When timber and other forest products are intended for export. x x x x

6.2 When timber and other forest products are to be removed for domestic sales. The forest charges shall
be due and payable within thirty (30) days from removal thereof at the cutting area, or where the forest
products are gathered; Provided, that such date of removal shall in no case be beyond thirty (30) days
when the products are cut, gathered and removed.

As testified to by FMB SFMS Ignacio M. Evangelista, PICOP failed to pay its regular forest charges covering the period
from 22 September 2001 to 26 April 2002 in the total amount of P15,056,054.05.[91] PICOP was also late in paying most of its
forest charges from 1996 onwards for which it is liable for a surcharge of 25% per annum on the tax due and interest of 20% per
annum which now amounts to P150,169,485.02.[92] Likewise, it has overdue and unpaid silvicultural fees in the amount
of P2,366,901.00 as of 30 August 2002.[93] In all, PICOP has unpaid and overdue forest charges in the sum of P167,592,440.90
as of 10 August 2002.[94]

PICOPs failure to pay its regular forest charges, interests, penalties and surcharges and silvicultural fees amounting
to P167,592,440.90 as of 30 August 2002 is further evidenced by the collection letters sent to PICOP and the absence of official
receipts in the DENR records in Bislig City evidencing payment of the overdue amounts stated in the said collection letters.[95] As
can be gleaned from SFMS Evangelistas tabulation, all the official receipts evidencing payments of PICOP with their
corresponding periods are indicated. However, there are no similar official receipts for the period covering 22 September
2001 to 26 April 2002, which indicate that no payment has been made for the same period.

With the DENR Secretarys presentation of its positive and categorical evidence showing PICOPs failure to pay its forest
charges amounting to P167,592,440.90 as of 10 August 2002, the burden of evidence has been shifted to PICOP to prove
otherwise. PICOP should have, thus, presented official receipts as proof of their payment of such forest charges, but failed to do
so.

Despite the foregoing evidence, the Court of Appeals declared that if it were true that PICOP has unpaid forest charges,
it should not have been issued an IAOP for the year 2001-2002 by Secretary Alvarez himself.[96] In doing so, the Court of Appeals
disregarded the part of the very evidence presented by PICOP itself, which shows that the IAOP was approved subject to several
conditions, not the least of which was the submission of proof of updated payment of forest charges from April 2001 to June
2001.[97]

Neither was this the only evidence presented by PICOP which showed that it has unpaid forest charges. PICOP
presented the certification of CENRO Calunsag which refers only to its alleged payment of regular forest charges covering the
period from 14 September 2001 to 15 May 2002.[98] The certification does not mention similar payment of the penalties,
surcharges and interests which it incurred in paying late several forest charges, which fact it did not rebut.

The 27 May 2002 Certification by CENRO Calunsag, on the other hand, specified only the period covering 14
September 2001 to 15 May 2002 and the amount of P53,603,719.85 paid by PICOP without indicating the corresponding volume
and date of production of the logs. This is in contrast to the findings of SFMS Evangelista which cover the period from CY 1996
to 30 August 2002 which includes penalties, interests, and surcharges for late payment pursuant to DAO 80, series of 1987.

Per request of PICOP, a certification dated 21 August 2002 was issued by Bill Collector Amelia D. Arayan, and attested
to by CENRO Calunsag, showing that PICOP paid only regular forest charges of its log production covering 1 July 2001 to 21
September 2001. However, there being log productions after 21 September 2001, PICOP failed to pay the corresponding regular
forest charges amounting to P15,056,054.05.[99] The same certification also shows delayed payment of forest charges, thereby
corroborating the testimony of SFMS Evangelista and substantiating the imposition of penalties and surcharges.

Finally, even if we consider for the sake of argument that the IAOP should not have been issued if PICOP had existing
forestry accounts, the issuance of the IAOP cannot be considered proof that PICOP has paid the same.Firstly, the best evidence
of payment is the receipt thereof. PICOP has not presented any evidence that such receipts had been lost or destroyed or cannot
be produced in court.[100] Secondly, it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is
usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. [101] If PICOP had been issued an IAOP in violation
of the law allegedly because it may not be issued if PICOP had existing forestry accounts, the government cannot be estopped
from collecting such amounts and providing the necessary sanctions therefor, including the withholding of the IFMA until such
amounts are paid.

Statutory Requirements

To recap, the Court of Appeals had relied on RED Seraspis certification in concluding that there was satisfactory
performance on the part of PICOP as a TLA holder, despite said certification showing non-compliance with the required Five-
Year Forest Protection Plan and Seven-Year Reforestation Plan. The Court of Appeals also declared that PICOP has paid its
outstanding obligations based on an inference that the IAOP would not have been issued if PICOP had unpaid forest charges,
contrary to the conditions laid down in the IAOP itself, and in violation of the Best Evidence Rule and the doctrine disallowing the
estoppel of the government from the acts of its officers.
 On the statutory requirement of procuring a clearance from the NCIP, the Court of Appeals held that PICOP need not
comply with the same at all. As quoted above, the Court of Appeals held that Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371, which requires
prior certification from the NCIP that the areas affected do not overlap with any ancestral domain before any IFMA can be entered
into by government, should be interpreted to refer to ancestral domains which have been duly established as such by the
continuous possession and occupation of the area concerned by indigenous peoples since time immemorial up to the
present. According to the Court of Appeals, PICOP has acquired property rights over the TLA No. 43 areas, being in exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession and occupation of TLA No. 43 areas since 1952 up to the present.

This ruling defies the settled jurisprudence we have mentioned earlier, including that of Oposa and Tan which held that
[a] license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does
it create a vested right; x x x.[102]

The Court of Appeals resort to statutory construction is, in itself, misplaced. Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371 is
clear and unambiguous:

SEC. 59. Certification Precondition. All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease,
or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a
field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That
no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the
ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or
controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there
is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend,
in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.

The court may not construe a statute that is clear and free from doubt. Time and again, it has been repeatedly declared
by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.There is only room
for application.[103] PICOPs intent to put a cloud of ambiguity in Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371 by invoking Section 3(a)
thereof fails miserably. Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 8371 defines ancestral domain as follows:

a) Ancestral domains Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It
shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

Ancestral domains remain as such even when possession or occupation of the area has been interrupted by causes
provided under the law such as voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private individuals/corporation. Therefore,
the issuance of TLA No. 43 in 1952 did not cause the Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples to lose their
possession or occupation over the area covered by TLA No. 43.

The issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title is merely a formal recognition of the ICCs/IPs rights of
possession and ownership over their ancestral domain identified and delineated in accordance with the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act,[104] and therefore, cannot be considered a condition precedent for the need for an NCIP certification. In the first place,
it is manifestly absurd to claim that the subject lands must first be proven to be part of ancestral domains before a certification
that they are not part of ancestral domains can be required. In Cruz v. Secretary of DENR,[105] where no single member of the
Court penned a majority opinion (since the petition to declare Republic Act No. 8371 unconstitutional was dismissed for the
reason that the votes were equally divided), Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, who voted to dismiss the petition, wrote in his separate
opinion:

As its subtitle suggests, [Section 59 of R.A. No. 8371] requires as a precondition for the issuance of
any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that
the area subject of the agreement does not lie with any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the
NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession
or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed
of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to
agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those
that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
 Another requirement determined by the Court of Appeals to have been complied with by PICOP, albeitimpliedly this
time by not mentioning it at all, is the requirement posed by Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code:

SEC. 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall
be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in
the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion
of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant
species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors
concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to
prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.

SEC. 27. Prior Consultation Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects
are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
These provisions are clear: the prior approval of local government units affected by the proposed conversion of a TLA
into an IFMA is necessary before any project or program can be implemented by the government authorities that may cause
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species.

The common evidence of the DENR Secretary and PICOP, namely the 31 July 2001 Memorandum of RED Seraspi,
enumerates the local government units and other groups which had expressed their opposition to PICOPs application for IFMA
conversion:

7. During the conduct of the performance evaluation of TLA No. 43 issues/complaints against PRI
were submitted thru Resolutions and letters. It is important that these are included in this report for assessment
of what are their worth, viz:

xxxx

7.2 Joint Resolution (unnumbered), dated March 19, 2001 of the Barangay Council and Barangay
Tribal Council of Simulao, Boston, Davao Oriental (ANNEX F) opposing the conversion of TLA
No. 43 into IFMA over the 17,112 hectares allegedly covered with CADC No. 095.

7.3 Resolution Nos. 10, s-2001 and 05, s-2001 (ANNEXES G & H) of the Bunawan Tribal
Council of Elders (BBMTCE) strongly demanding none renewal of PICOP TLA. They claim to
be the rightful owner of the area it being their alleged ancestral land.

7.4 Resolution No. 4, S-2001 of Sitio Linao, San Jose, Bislig City (ANNEX I) requesting not to
renew TLA 43 over the 900 hectares occupied by them.

7.5 Resolution No. 22, S-2001 (ANNEX J) of the Sanguniang Bayan, Lingig, Surigao del Sur not
to grant the conversion of TLA 43 citing the plight of former employees of PRI who were forced
to enter and farm portion of TLA No. 43, after they were laid off.

7.6 SP Resolution No. 2001-113 and CDC Resolution Nos. 09-2001 of the Sanguniang
Panglungsod of Bislig City (ANNEXES K & L) requesting to exclude the area of TLA No. 43
for watershed purposes.

7.7 Resolution No. 2001-164, dated June 01, 2001 (ANNEX M) Sanguniang Panglungsod
of Bislig Cityopposing the conversion of TLA 43 to IFMA for the reason that IFMA do not give
revenue benefits to the City.[106]

As stated in RED Seraspis 31 July 2001 Memorandum,[107] several indigenous groups and some affected local
government units have expressly opposed PICOPs application for IFMA conversion of its TLA No. 43.

PICOP merely submitted a purported resolution[108] of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of
PICOPs application for IFMA conversion. But Surigao del Sur is not the only province affected by the area covered by the
proposed IFMA. As even the Court of Appeals found, PICOPs TLA No. 43 traverses the length and breadth not only of Surigao
del Sur but also Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental.[109] How then can PICOP claim that it complied with
the Local Government Code requirement of obtaining prior approval of the Sangunian concerned when only one out of the four
affected local government units has purportedly signified its concurrence to the proposed IFMA conversion?

Finally, the DENR, by withholding the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA, has made a factual finding that
PICOP has not yet complied with the requirements for such a conversion. Findings of facts of administrative agencies are
generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling
under their jurisdiction.[110] Such finality of the DENRs factual finding, supported as it is by substantial evidence, can only be
overcome by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction, which is even more pronounced in a Petition
for Mandamus.
Whether or not there has already been a conversion of TLA No. 43
into an IFMA

The Court of Appeals declared that there exists no legal impediment to the conversion of respondents TLA No. 43 into an IFMA
as evidenced by petitioners letters dated 26 October 2002 and 26 April 2002:

Moreover, [the DENR Secretarys] own letters to [PICOP] confirm that it has established a clear right to the
automatic conversion of TLA No. 43 to IFMA. Thus, on October 26, 2002, [the DENR Secretary] stated in his
letter to [PICOP] that pursuant to DAO-99-53, we have cleared the conversion on PICOPs TLA No. 43 to IFMA
effective from the expiration of said TLA on April 26, 2002. Too, in its April 24, 2002 letter to [PICOP], [the
DENR Secretary] granted PICOPs TDMP [p]ending the formal approval of [its] IFMA xxx. It could thus be
deduced that there exists no legal impediment to the conversion of PICOPs TLA 43 to IFMA. Its approval
remains a formality.

We disagree. Then DENR Secretary Alvarezs 25 October 2001 letter is reproduced herein for reference:

Dear Mr. Bernardino:

Consistent with your attached Memorandum to her Excellency, the President, dated 17 October 2001 and in
response to your Letter of Intent dated 25 January 2001, we wish to inform you that, pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order No. 99-53, we have cleared the conversion of PICOPs Timber License Agreement
(TLA) No. 43 to Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) effective from the expiration of said TLA
on April 26, 2002.

In this regard, you are hereby requested to designate PICOPs representative(s) to discuss with the DENR
Team, created under Special Order No. 2001-638, the conditions and details of the said IFMA, including the
production sharing arrangement between PICOP and the government. [111]

By giving this clearance for the conversion of PICOPs TLA into an IFMA, the DENR Secretary cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be claimed to have granted the conversion itself. The letter is clear that the conversion could not be final since its
conditions and details still have to be discussed as stated in the second paragraph of said letter; hence, the same letter could
not have reduced to a mere formality the approval of the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.

Likewise, then DENR Secretary Alvarezs 26 April 2002 letter approving PICOPs Transition Development and Management Plan
(TDMP) cannot be considered as an approval of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion. Again, the aforesaid letter is quoted
in full:

April 24, 2002

MR. WILFREDO D. FUENTES

Vice President Resident Manager
PICOP Resources, Incorporated
2nd Floor, Moredel Building
2280 Pasong Tamo Extension
Makati City

Dear Mr. Fuentes:

This refers to your request for approval of the submitted Two-year Transition Development and Management
Plan of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PRI) for the areas under TLA No. 43 which expires on April 26, 2002.

Pending the formal approval of your IFMA and consistent with our letter to the PRI President dated 25
October 2002, we hereby grant your Transition Development and Management Plan (TDMP) for a period of
one (1) year, effective 26 April 2002.

Within such period we expect PRI to submit/comply with all the necessary requisites for the final
conversion of TLA 43 into IFMA, as provided for under DENR Administrative Order No. 99-53, including the
settlement of certain obligations such as taxes, if any, and submission of plans and programs for evaluation
and approval of item number 1 of your proposal contained in your letter dated February 4, 2002.

All other proposed activities in your TDMP, particularly items 2 7 of your letter dated February 4, 2002, are
hereby approved.

For your information and guidance.

Very truly yours,

(sgd)
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ
Secretary
 Cc: Mr. Teodoro G. Bernardino
President

The Director, FMB

The aforesaid letter speaks for itself. PICOPs application for IFMA conversion is still pending approval. Indeed, there could
have been no approval of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion because DAO No. 99-53 (which governs application for IFMA
conversion) requires full and complete compliance with the requirements for conversion before it may be approved. As stated in
the letter itself of then DENR Secretary Alvarez, PICOP has yet to submit/comply with all the necessary requisites for final
conversion of TLA No. 43 into IFMA.

Even assuming, however, that the IFMA has already been converted, this is all purely academic because of the above-
discussed settled jurisprudence that logging permits are not contracts within the Non-Impairment Clause and thus, can be
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded when the national interest so requires. If the DENR Secretary, therefore, finds that
the IFMA would be in violation of statutes, rules and regulations, particularly those protecting the rights of the local governments
and the indigenous peoples within the IFMA area, then it behooves the DENR Secretary to revoke such IFMA. These same
statutes, rules and regulations are the very same requirements mentioned above for the conversion of the TLA No. 43 into an
IFMA.

Whether or not it is proper to determine the constitutionality

of Proclamation No. 297 in these consolidated petitions

Another reason why the DENR Secretary wishes to further withhold the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA
is the 25 November 2002 Proclamation No. 297 excluding an area of 8,100 hectares, more or less, from the coverage of TLA
No. 43, as amended, and which declared the same as a mineral reservation and as an environmentally critical area. The DENR
Secretary claims that said Presidential Proclamation is rendered nugatory by the Court of Appeals disposition that the DENR
should honor and respect the area allotted to PICOP under TLA No. 43.[112]

PICOP claims that Proclamation No. 297 is a new matter which the DENR Secretary cannot raise before this Court
without offending the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. [113]

The DENR Secretary counters that it did not take up the issue of Proclamation No. 297 before the trial court precisely
because said proclamation was issued more than one month after the trial court rendered its 11 October 2002 Decision. The
DENR Secretary claims that PICOP cannot claim a violation of its right to due process because it raised the issue before the
Court of Appeals in its Memorandum.

While not giving in to the DENR Secretarys argument, PICOP claims that Proclamation No. 297 is violative of the
Constitution and an encroachment on the legislative powers of Congress.[114]

We agree with PICOP that this constitutional issue cannot be decided upon in this case. This Court will not touch the
issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that
when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may raise its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. [115]

The constitutional question presented by PICOP is not the very lis mota in these consolidated cases, as the preceding
discussions very well give us adequate grounds to grant the Petition in G.R. No. 162243, deny the Petition in G.R. No. 164516,
and dismiss the Petition in G.R. No. 171875. Moreover, PICOP has filed a separate petition for the declaration of nullity of
Proclamation No. 297, wherein the issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 is properly ventilated.

Consequently, all actions and reliefs sought by either PICOP or the DENR Secretary which has Proclamation No. 297
as its ground or subject should be ventilated either in the pending petition for the declaration of its nullity, or in another proper
suit instituted for that matter.

EPILOGUE AND DISPOSITION

In sum, the DENR Secretary has adequately proven that PICOP has, at this time, failed to comply with the
administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA. The Petition in G.R. No. 162243 should
therefore be granted.

On the other hand, as PICOP is not yet entitled to such conversion, then Secretary Alvarez had been correct in
withholding the same and thus cannot be held liable for damages therefor. Thus, the Petition in G.R. No. 164516 should be
dismissed.

Finally, the DENR Secretarys Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting by the Court of Appeals of the Preliminary
Injunction in its favor, is now mooted.

PICOPs noncompliance with the requirements for the conversion of their TLA is so glaring, that we almost see a
reluctance to uphold the law in light of PICOPs sizeable investments in its business, a fact repeatedly stressed by PICOP in its
pleadings. In applying the judicial policy of nurturing prosperity, consideration should also be given to the long-term effects of the
judicial evaluations involved, particularly to our nations greatest wealth, our vast natural resources.
 Our country has been blessed with rich, lush and verdant rain forests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora
and fauna may be found.[116] The legislative policy has been to preserve and nourish these natural resources as they are not
only for our benefit but more so for the countless future generations to which we are likewise responsible. It has also been
legislative policy to let the citizens of this country reap their benefits, foremost the citizens in close proximity to such resources,
through the local governments and the NCIP.

In working for the legislative policy of environmental preservation, the requirements of a five-year forest protection plan
and seven-year reforestation plan had been laid down, together with the levy of forest charges for the regulation of forestry
activities. In pursuing, on the other hand, the benefit distribution policy, the Local Government Code requires prior Sanggunian
approval to ensure that local communities partake in the fruits of their own backyard, while R.A. No. 8371 provides for the rights
of the indigenous peoples, who have been living in, managing, and nourishing these forests since time immemorial.

PICOP has been fortunate to have been awarded an enormous concession area and thus, a huge chunk of the benefits
of this countrys natural resources. Attached to this fortune is the responsibility to comply with the laws and regulations
implementing the stated legislative policies of environmental preservation and benefit distribution. These laws and regulations
should not be ignored, and the courts should not condone such blatant disregard by those who believe they are above the law
because of their sizable investments and significant number of workers employed.PICOP has only itself to blame for the
withholding of the conversion of its TLA. But while this disposition confers another chance to comply with the foregoing
requirements, the DENR Secretary can rightfully grow weary if the persistence on noncompliance will continue. The judicial
policy of nurturing prosperity would be better served by granting such concessions to someone who will abide by the law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 162243 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
affirmed the RTC Decision granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP)
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition in G.R. No. 164516 seeking the reversal of the same Decision insofar as it
nullified the award of damages in favor of PICOP is DENIED for lack of merit.The Petition in G.R. No. 171875, assailing the lifting
of the Preliminary Injunction in favor of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources is DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 121587. March 9, 1999]

SOLEDAD DY, doing business under the name and style RONWOOD LUMBER, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ODEL BERNARDO LAUSA, respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP 33099 setting aside two orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch 5) and the appellate courts resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows.
On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01 creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat
illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest
products in that city.[2] The team was composed of personnel of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP), the
Department of Natural Resources (DENR), and the Office of the City Mayor of Butuan. Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who
was the acting chief of civilian security in the mayors office, was a member of the team.
On July 1, 1993, the members of the task force received confidential information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber
would be brought to Butuan City from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area. Accordingly, the team set up a check-point along
kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan City.[3] What happened thereafter is summarized in the following portion of the decision of the Court
of Appeals:[4]

At around 10:00 p.m., two trucks with Plate Nos. KAK-542 and KBL-214 and loaded with lumber approached the
checkpoint. They were flagged down by the operatives but instead of stopping, they accelerated their speed hence, the task
force gave chase. They finally caught up with the two vehicles at the compound of Young Metalcraft and Peterwood Agro-
Forest Industries at Baan, Butuan City, about two kilometers from the checkpoint. When requested by the operatives, Pulcita
Lucero, caretaker/in charge of the compound could not produce any document as proof of the legality of the origin/possession
of the forest products.
 Forester Resurreccion Maxilom of the DENR issued a temporary seizure order and a seizure receipt for the two vehicles
and their cargo consisting of several pieces of lumber of different sizes and dimensions, but Lucero, the caretaker of the
compound where they were seized, refused to accept them. The seized lumber and vehicles were then taken to the City
motorpool and placed in the custody of respondent Lausa.
The next day, July 2, 1993, Maxilom submitted a memorandum-report to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) of Butuan City on the seizure of the lumber and the two vehicles. [5] On July 6, the CENRO issued
a notice of confiscation which was duly posted for three days.
For lack of claimants, DENR Regional Technical Director Raoul Geollegue recommended to the Secretary on July 29,
1993 the forfeiture of the lumber and the two vehicles. [6] Accordingly, on July 30, 1993, DENR Regional Director De la Rosa
ordered the CENRO of Butuan City to issue the requisite forfeiture orders,[7] which CENRO Angelita Orcasitas issued on August
15, 1993.[8]
On October 20, 1993, more than two months after the lumber had been forfeited, petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the
lumber, filed a suit for replevin in the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch 5) for its recovery. The next day, October 21,
1993, the trial court issued a preliminary writ of replevin.
On October 29, 1993, respondent Lausa filed a motion for the approval of a counterbond. Before the court could act on
his motion, he moved to dismiss and/or quash the writ of replevin on the ground that the lumber in question, having been seized
and forfeited by the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended (Revised Forestry Code), was under its custody and, therefore,
resort should first be made to the DENR.
On November 29, 1993, the trial court denied respondent Lausas application for the approval of the counterbond as well
as his motion to dismiss and/or quash the suit for replevin. For this reason, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals in which he sought the approval of his counterbond and the nullification of the two orders, dated October 21, 1993
and November 29, 1993, granting petitioners prayer for a preliminary writ of replevin and denying his Motion to Dismiss Case
and/or Quash Writ of Replevin.
On January 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and

a. The Orders dated 21 October 1993 and 29 November 1993 are SET ASIDE.

b. Respondent judge is directed to approve a duly qualified counterbond to be filed by petitioner, even with a period of at least
one year.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution, dated July 26, 1995. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner alleges that:

FIRST ERROR

WITH DUE RESPECT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE VERIFICATION MADE BY
LORENCIO DY AND NOT BY PETITIONER SOLEDAD Y. DY WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF THE
REPLEVIN WRIT.[10]

SECOND ERROR

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT A COUNTERBOND IN REPLEVIN WHICH IS
EFFECTIVE FOR ONLY ONE YEAR IS VALID TO CAUSE THE RETURN OF THE PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT.[11]

THIRD ERROR

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI.[12]

The appeal is without merit. The threshold question is whether the Regional Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the
replevin suit, considering that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement agents of the DENR
pursuant to P.D. No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In a long line of cases,
we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before a courts judicial power can be
sought. The premature invocation of a courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. [13]
Section 8 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

SEC. 8. Review. All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person
aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19,
series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition.

In Paat v. Court of Appeals,[14] where, as in the case at bar, the trial court issued a writ of replevin against the DENR, thus
allowing the claimant to obtain possession of the conveyance used in transporting undocumented forest products, this Court
stated:
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper cause of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies
in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly,
being an element of private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court. [15]
As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the
assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioners application for a replevin writ and denying private respondents motion to
dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR
and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency.
The appellate courts directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent of the DENR to file a counterbond in
order to recover custody of the lumber should be disregarded as being contrary to its order to dismiss the replevin suit of
petitioner. For, indeed, what it should have done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner filing her claim before
the Department of Natural Resources (DENR).
In view of the conclusion reached in this case, it is unnecessary to discuss the errors assigned by petitioner. These pertain
to the questions whether petitioners complaint below was properly verified and whether private respondents counterbond should
be approved. Both are based on the premise that the trial court can take cognizance over the case. As shown above, however,
such is not the case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 19, 1995, and its Resolution, dated July 26, 1995, in
CA-G.R. SP 33099 are AFFIRMED with the modification that the complaint for recovery of personal property is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

SESINANDO MERIDA, G.R. No. 158182

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- versus - AZCUNA,
CORONA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. June 12, 2008

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of
Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section
68,[3] Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705),[4] as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 May
2003 denied admission of petitioners motion for reconsideration.[5]
 The Facts

Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section
68 of PD 705, as amended, for cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod,
Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims
ownership.[6]

The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in
the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil.On 24 December
1998,[7] Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra
tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according
to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to
Royo Calixs written authorization signed by Calixs wife. [8]

On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When Hernandez confronted petitioner about the
felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that he cut the tree with Calixs permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner
not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.

On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber.
Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had
been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber, [9] deposited them for safekeeping with Royo,
and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR
subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter. [10]

Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging
petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-
affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with Calixs permission. The Provincial Prosecutor[11] found probable cause
to indict petitioner and filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).

During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez who testified on
the events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and
claimed, for the first time, that he had no part in the tree-cutting.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered the seized lumber forfeited in
Tansiongcos favor.[12] The trial court dismissed petitioners defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions that
he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calixs permission. With this finding and petitioners lack of DENR permit to cut
the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 ofPD 705, as amended.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as
provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated
in the governments favor.[13] The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial
admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing
irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent
preliminary investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial court.

On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of its ruling, sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion temporal. However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that the penalty to be
imposed on [petitioner] should be (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,[14] the
same penalty the trial court imposed.

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14 May 2003, did not admit his motion for
having been filed late.[15]

Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE CUTTING, GATHERING,

COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST LAND
APPLIES TO PETITIONER.
 II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR
CALIX AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705
AS AMENDED.

III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT THE STANDING
AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS
AMENDED.

[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE FILED BY
PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE
SAME.[16]
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that (1) the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest officer, filed the complaint
against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:[17]

1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on a complaint filed by
Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207

We sustain the OSGs claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals, [18] non-compliance
of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases. [19] However, these cases concern only defamation and other
crimes against chastity[20] and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does
not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall
immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly
committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall
file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon[21] that the phrase reports and complaints in Section 80 refers to reports and complaints as
might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development or any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence. [22]

Here, it was not forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or
officials who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims
ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine if there
is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report. [23] At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section
80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioners alleged violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case
falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.[24]

Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private

Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts [25] penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition
to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements
and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
 Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest
products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;[26] and (3) the possession of timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. [27] Petitioner stands charged of
having cut, gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private land[28] without x x x the necessary
permit x x x thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber, under the
second category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of gathering, collecting, or
removing but only the act of cutting a lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner cut x x
x timber in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit.[29]

We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit, petitioner adopted
conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod
Property and that he did so only with Calixs permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question.
We sustain the lower courts rulings that petitioners extrajudicial admissions bind him. [30] Petitioner does not explain why Royo
and Hernandez, public officials who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the stand to implicate petitioner
in a serious criminal offense, not to mention that the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further,
petitioner does not deny presenting Calixs authorization to Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the
Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use of Calixs authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree in the
Mayod Property.

We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes timber under Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended. PD 705 does not define timber, only forest product (which circuitously includes timber.) [31]Does the narra tree in
question constitute timber under Section 68? The closest this Court came to defining the term timber in Section 68 was to provide
that timber, includes lumber or processed log.[32] In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified
dimensions[33] or certain stand age or rotation age.[34] In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[35] this Court was faced with
a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - lumber - to determine whether possession of lumber is
punishable under that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that lumber should be taken in its ordinary or common usage
meaning to refer to processed log or timber, thus:

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as
defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing
plant, which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used
for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses
the term lumberin its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Websters Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market.
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far as possession
of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes
no distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should we. [36] x x x x (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term timber under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring
to wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery. [37] Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small
for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber. [38]
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same into several pieces of sawn lumber, about
three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x. These measurements were indicated in
the apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in
evidence.[39] Further, Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled log left in the Mayod Property measured 76
something centimeters [at the big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8
meters.[40] Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was timber fit for building or for carpentry or
joinery and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner

Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as
the case may be.
 2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is
more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property
stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5
pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is
not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of
earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.

The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber measuring 111 board feet were valued at P3,330.
However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod Property is included, the amount increases to P20,930.40. To prove this
allegation, the prosecution relied on Hernandezs testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension receipt he issued,
are his estimates based on prevailing local price.[41]

This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused
under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated estimate of such fact.[42] In the
absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article
309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. [43] In People v. Dator[44] where, as
here, the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the
prosecutions evidence for the lumbers value consisted of an estimate made by the apprehending authorities whose apparent
lack of corroboration was compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was not presented in evidence.
Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)[45] of the RPC.[46]

Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we find it proper
to impose on petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals
with the modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995

AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, Regional Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VIII,
Tacloban City, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Hinunangan Silago, Southern Leyte, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

At around 10:00 o'clock of November 14, 1992, police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended
Dionisio Golpe while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and logs were impounded. A complaint
was filed against Basilio Cabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent Judge
Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as
the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.

Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources filed the instant complaint
against respondent Judge alleging that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut forest products violated
Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Section 68 and 68-A1and Administrative Order No. 59,
Series of 1990.2 Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no authority to order the release of the truck despite the non-
inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office.

In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary investigation, he found that Golpe, the
owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of hollow blocks. On his way home
after delivering hollow blocks in Barangay Sto. Niño II, he met his friend Cabig who requested him to load sliced lumber and
deliver the same at Brgy. Lungsod-daan, Hinundayan to be used for the construction of a barangay high school building. They
were apprehended when the truck had a flat tire. After changing the tire, both the lumber and the truck were ordered deposited
at the police station of Hinunangan.

Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser participation in the crime of illegal logging and, being a mere accessory,
he might be utilized by the Acting Chief of Police as prosecution witness against Cabig. More importantly, the fact that the
complaint charged only Cabig, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the release of the truck
owned by Golpe.

The Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that a formal investigation be conducted. An excerpt
from its Memorandum states:

We find the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. While he is authorized to conduct preliminary

investigation in all cases of violations of P.D. 705, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines, Sec. 68-A thereof provides that it is the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative who may order the confiscation and disposition of the forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter.

There may be some facts that are not extant in the records which can only come out during a formal
investigation to better establish clear culpability or exoneration over the respondent.

In view thereof, and to give respondent an opportunity to clear himself, it is respectfully recommended that
this matter be referred to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San Juan,
Southern Leyte, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty days from receipt of the records.3

In the Resolution of November 8, 1993, the Court resolved to refer the case to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao, Jr.,
RTC, Branch 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, for investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the records.4

During the first two hearing dates, complainant was unable to attend but sent his representatives, DENR lawyer Constantino
Esber and legal assistant Romeo Gulong. Respondent Judge appeared with his counsel. However, on the third hearing date,
respondent Judge failed to appear as he suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. Thereafter, DENR counsel Esber manifested
that their office has filed a motion for reinvestigation and for the turnover of the jeep to the PNP and subsequently, to the
DENR. He also manifested that the complainant is submitting the administrative matter for resolution and recommendation
without adducing evidence against respondent. Respondent's counsel did not object to complainant's manifestation. The
counsel of both complainant and respondent jointly agreed to submit the case for appropriate action.

The Investigating Judge's confidential report, in part, states:

In view of this development in the course of an intended investigation this investigator could not elicit
additional facts than are found in the records, whether inculpatory or exculpatory. Respondent was given an
opportunity to explain the unfavorable circumstances against him but he was overtaken by a serious illness.
So much was expected from the complainant to supply the facts not extant in the records, but he lost interest
in substantiating his April 1993 report to the Supreme Court. In fact, he was submitting this administrative
matter for resolution without adducing evidence against respondent.

Except for the 21 January 1994 motion for reinvestigation of DENR counsel Esber which sought for the
inclusion of jeep owner and driver Dionisio Golpe in the criminal information, there is nothing new that can be
added to the facts found by the Honorable Deputy Court Administrator as reflected in his Memorandum for
the Honorable Chief Justice dated 12 October 1993.

There being no actual investigation conducted, no additional facts could be reported and consequently, there
is no basis for a recommendation on the basis of facts.

This investigator can only recommend appropriate action by the Supreme Court on the basis of the facts
already extant in the records with a prayer for consideration of respondent plight especially so since on
account of this investigation his health has deteriorated and may affect his efficiency output as a judge.
Perhaps, allowing him to bow out of the service with honor and corresponding benefits. 5
During the pendency of this case, respondent Judge filed for disability retirement. His application was approved but his pension
was not released pending the outcome of this case.

We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable, hence, he is
not subject to any disciplinary sanction.

According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall
carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with which it was committed." However, this
cannot be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for offense." In this case,
the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be
convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there was no justification for respondent
Judge not to release the truck.

Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A and Adm. Order No. 59, the DENR
Secretary or his duly authorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products
and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws.
However, as complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.

We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he conducted the preliminary investigation and satisfied
himself that there was no reason to continue keeping the truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705 and Adm. Order No. 59. The
release of the truck did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. The confiscation proceedings
under Adm. Order No. 596 is different from the confiscation under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty
imposed in the event of conviction. Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for
reinvestigation and motion to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as manifested before
the lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the
conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any criminal action which shall be filed against the owner
thereof or any person who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense."

Petitioner is of the opinion that under the circumstances, respondent Judge should have turned over the truck to the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition. No
doubt, this would have simplified matters and prevented the present situation from occurring wherein one government official
files a complaint against another. Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR field offices,
deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their
conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action
and disposition. A period of about two weeks lapsed from the time the seizure was made before a complaint was filed. During
this period, the apprehending policemen had enough time to turn over the logs and the truck to the nearest DENR field office
for proper action and disposition since the duty to turn over the truck to the nearest DENR field office rests on the officials
apprehending the illegal logs. There being no mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should
not be visited with disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR field office in San Juan, Southern Leyte.

The Court takes this opportunity to enjoin the National Police, the DENR, the prosecutors, and the members of the bench to
coordinate with each other for a successful campaign against illegal logging. It behooves all the concerned agencies to
seriously strive for the attainment of the constitutionally-declared policy to "protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature" 7 in order to preserve our natural resources
for the benefit of the generations still to come.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 92285 March 28, 1994

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., Presiding Judge Branch 48, Regional Trial Court of Manila, COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS and
A. J. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, respondents.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.

Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It
grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for
production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree
plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a
qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products.

On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from
Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs released on 12 April 1989, and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore
on 19 April 1989. The records do not disclose when the second shipment was released.

On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural Resources and
Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at
reasonable price."2

On 5 May 1989, PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a
temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing
matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. It was
docketed
as Civil Case No. 89-48836 and raffled to respondent Judge Demetrio M. Batario, Jr. PTFI prays for an order directing the
Commissioner of Customs to impound the subject importations and the AJIC be directed to pay petitioner P250,000.00 in
actual damages, P1,000,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.

On 14 June 1989, AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:

(a) The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular court, has "exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation or ascertain whether the conditions prescribed by law for an importation
have been complied with . . . . (and over cases of) seizure, detention or release of property affected . . . . ;" 3 (b) The release of
subject importations had rendered injunction moot and academic; 4 (c) The prayer for damages has no basis as the questioned
acts of the Commissioner are in accordance with law and no damages may be awarded based on future acts; 5 and, (d) The
complaint for injunction cannot stand it being mainly a provisional relief and not a principal remedy. 6

PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss. On 28 July 1989, AJIC's motion to dismiss was denied. However, on 8 February 1990, on
motion for reconsideration by AJIC and despite the opposition of PTFI, the Court reconsidered its 28 July 1989 order and
dismissed the case on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations."7

In this present recourse, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and prays for the continuation
of the hearing in Civil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for
injunction, i.e., "restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . . . for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36
(l) of the Forestry Code" and for damages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the importation of
safety matches . . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the
Forestry Code . . . ."8 PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before
the Court of Tax Appeals because the instant action is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then
argues that since it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted,
citing Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala.9

On the formal requirements, we hold that the claim of public respondent that the petition was filed late has no basis. The
records revealed that PTFI received the assailed order of 8 February 1990 on 20 February 1990, 10 hence, it had until 7 March
1990 to file petition for review on certiorari. On that date, PTFI filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to
file the petition.11 On 19 March 1990, this Court granted PTFI a thirty (30)-day non-extendible period to file its petition,12 thus
resetting the new deadline for the petition to 6 April 1990. On that date the petition was filed.

Petitioner anchors his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry
Code. The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products which
is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction
over seizure and forfeiture cases13 and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over prohibited
importations. 14

The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of
the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs
to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. To allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported
matches, as petitioner would, is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure
and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his determination and
declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of Customs 15 as well as the prayer for
injunction against importation of matches by private respondent AJIC 16 may not be granted without the court arrogating upon
itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban under the Tariff and Customs Code,
if true, does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement of statutory
rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has the power to "promulgate
all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Finance."17 Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require any particular method of
procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its
functions." 18

But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs 19 contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from
interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, 20 we
held that —

. . . . under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co.,
Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].)

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the
special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters
or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well
nigh indispensable . . . .

Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of
Customs to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary
upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by
way of the extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse
the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act
which is within its prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the
case at bench, we have no occasion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction as it is not before
us.

The petitioner's claim for damages against AJIC being inextricably linked with the legality of the importations, must necessarily
rise or fall with the main action to bar the question that "(e)very importation of matches by said defendant is a denial to plaintiff
of the protection and incentives granted it by Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code," 21merely indicates its reliance on the illegality of
the importations for its prayer for damages. In other words, if the importations were authorized, there would be no denial of the
plaintiff's protection and incentives under the Forestry Code. Necessarily, the claim for damages must await the decision
declaring the importations unlawful.

In Rosales v. Court of Appeals, we categorized a similar case for damages as premature since "(t)he finality of the
administrative case which gives life to petitioners' cause of action has not yet been reached." 22 The pendency of petitioner's
request to the Bureau of Customs for the implementation of the ban against the importation of matches under the Forestry
Code is impliedly admitted; in fact, it is apparent from the correspondence of counsel for petitioner that the Bureau is inclined to
sustain the validity of the importations. 23 Hence, as in Rosales, the order of the trial court granting the dismissal of the civil
case must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 89-
48836 dated 8 February 1990, the same AFFIRMED and, consequently, the instant petition for review is DENIED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES, respondents.

Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon in Criminal
Case No. 1591, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Godofredo, Arrozal, Luis Flares and twenty other John Does," dismissing
the information filed therein.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which read:

That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality of
General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does
whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging
Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte,
titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and
once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner
and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different
species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including government charges, to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.

Contrary to Law.

Lucena City, 7 January 1977. (p.17, Rollo).

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.

On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked (pp. 32-42, Rollo), The reconsideration
sought was denied on August 9, 1977 (p.42, Rollo).

On October 15, 1977, this petition was filed directly with this Court, raising the following questions of law: (1) whether or not the
information charged an offense; and (2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.

On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and the opinion of the trial
court, the information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of
P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without
the consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and
carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease, lease,
license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement
or permit for utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the
logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of
the logs was without the consent of the state.

We agree with the petitioner.

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.— Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement,
lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code. . . .

When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec.
2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958]; People v.
Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 57).

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other
forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to
any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license
agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.

The Order dismissing the complaint concluded that the information was defective because:
 . . ., it is noted that the Information alleges that the cutting, gathering and carrying away of the logs were
done without the consent of the owner of the land. While the prosecution admits that timber is a forest
product that belongs to the state, the information, however, fails to allege that the taking was without the
consent of the latter, for which reason the Information is patently defective. (p. 39, Rollo)

The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs
subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of
complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease
does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in
private woodlands. The case of Santiago v. Basilan Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 349, clarified the
matter on ownership of timber in private lands. This Court held therein:

The defendant has appealed, claiming that it should not be held liable to the plaintiff because the timber
which it cut and gathered on the land in question belongs to the government and not to the plaintiff, the latter
having failed to comply with a requirement of the law with respect to his property.

The provision of law referred to by appellant is a section of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended,
which reads;

"Sec. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. — Every private owner of land
containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the
same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the
boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal
Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may require.

Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such
land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its
registration in the Bureau of Forestry."

In the above provision of law, there is no statement to the effect that non-compliance with the requirement
would divest the owner of the land of his rights thereof and that said rights of ownership would be transferred
to the government. Of course, the land which had been registered and titled in the name of the plaintiff under
that Land Registration Act could no longer be the object of a forester license issued by the Director of
Forestry because ownership of said land includes also ownership of everything found on its surface (Art.
437, New Civil Code).

Obviously, the purpose of the registration required in section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to exempt
the title owner of the land from the payment of forestry charges as provided for under Section 266 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, to wit:

"Charges collective on forest products cut, gathered and removed from unregistered
private lands. — The charges above prescribed shall be collected on all forest products
cut, gathered and removed from any private land the title to which is not registered with the
Director of Forestry as required by the Forest Law; Provided, however, That in the
absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut, gather and remove timber and
other forest products from such land shall secure a license from the Director of Forestry
Law and Regulations. The cutting, gathering and removing of timber and the other forest
products from said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawful cutting,
gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and shall be subject to the
charges prescribed in such cases in this chapter.

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, while it is admitted that the plaintiff has failed to register the timber in his land as a private
woodland in accordance with the oft-repeated provision of the Revised Administrative Code, he still retained
his rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code) — the very rights violated by the defendant
Basilan Lumber Company.

While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not
follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private
lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the
information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was
without any authority or license from the government.

Anent the second issue raised, Section 80 of Presidential Decree 705, provides:
 Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. — A forest officer or employee of the Bureau shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined
in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used
in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of
committing the offense. The arresting forest officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours
from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to,
and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary
investigations and file informations in court.

If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the authorities designated by law to conduct
preliminary investigations, the delivery to, and filing of the complaint with, the latter shall be done within a
reasonable time sufficient for ordinary travel from the place of arrest to the place of delivery. The seized
products, materials and equipment shall be immediately disposed of in accordance with forestry
administrative orders promulgated by the Department Head.

The Department Head may deputize any member or unit of the Philippine Constabulary, police agency,
barangay or barrio official, or any qualified person to protect the forest and exercise the power or authority
provided for in the preceding paragraph.

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall
immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly
committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.

If there is a prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file
the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation
of criminal cases and file an information in Court.

The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the violation
of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to
arrest without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the
decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest
officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the
forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to
conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations in court.

The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged
offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest
officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal.

The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the information
was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705. We agree with the
observation of the Solicitor General that:

. . ., the authority given to the forest officer to investigate reports and complaints regarding the commission of
offenses defined in P.D. No. 705 by the said last and penultimate paragraphs of Section 80 may be
considered as covering only such reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned
to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development, or any of the
deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence. Such interpretation
becomes cogent when we consider that the whole of Section 80 deals precisely with the authority of forest
officers or employees to make arrests and institute criminal actions involving offenses defined in the Decree.
(p. 26, Rollo).

Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code
giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the crime.

Sec. 1687. Authority of fiscal to conduct investigation in criminal matter. — A provincial fiscal shall have
authority, if he deems it wise, to conduct an investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor. To
this end, he may summon reputed witnesses and require them to appear and testify upon oath before him. . .
.

With the exception of the so-called "private crimes" 1 and in election offenses, 2 prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be
commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not
divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations.
In both cases under said Sec. 80 namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for offenses committed in his presence);
or 2) after conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of violations of the decree (for violations not committed in his
presence) — he is still required to file the proper complaint with the appropriate official designated by law to conduct
preliminary investigations in court. Said section should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to
conduct investigations regarding offenses described in the decree rather, it should be construed as granting forest officers and
employees special authority to arrest and investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such authority
by those upon whom it is vested by general law.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the information is SET ASIDE.
Criminal Cases No. 1591 is reinstated.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No. 165448

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 27, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision[2] and 24 September 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts

On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total
volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.

On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect
and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.

Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under the
following terms and conditions:

2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;

3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an appropriate place
within the area.In the absence of plantable area in the property, the same is required to plant within
forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall be properly maintained and protected
to ensure/enhance growth and development of the planted seedlings;

4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O.
No. 277, Series of 1987; and

5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws and regulations shall
render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of penalties in accordance with
existing laws and regulations.

This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or as soon as the herein
authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first.[4]

On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and
Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers Camp without proper authority. They
proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the
cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site, together
with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest
rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with permit was
13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the trees cut
without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest charges were P11,833.25.

An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705[5] (PD 705) was filed against petitioner, Cuteng,
Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total volume and market price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55
M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00 bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total
sum of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No.
05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law.[6]
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy of the permit.Masing stated
that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit. He stated
that three of the trees were stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber.He stated that while he was cutting
trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.

Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner was in possession of the permit. He
stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while two were stumps and two were rotten.

Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely followed petitioners instructions.

Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit was issued. He stated that the
trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.

Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing cutting down the trees
in petitioners presence.

Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He allegedly informed his superior, Paul
Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring
a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of
trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 26 May 1994 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL
CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly
and severally, the Government in the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25, representing the market value
of and forest charges on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in the
costs.

The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government.

On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are acquitted
on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their provisional liberty in the
amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated February 4, 1996 and February 23,
1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper receipt therefor.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court further ruled
that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit.

Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial court’s Decision.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago and
Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto Aquino is found guilty, and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
 minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The
award of damages is deleted. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty to supervise the cutting
of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms of the permit which only he possessed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that while it was Teachers Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of Appeals
rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear of Santiago because petitioner could
have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The Court of Appeals further rejected petitioners contention that the law
contemplated cutting of trees without permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were not covered by the permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution
failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only
following orders as to which trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
lack of merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises questions of facts and not
questions of law. We do not agree.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. [10] For questions to be one of law, the same must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. [11] The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. [12]

In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.

Section 68 of PD 705 provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in
the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations. [13]

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was
charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed
the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber
was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because
all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what was
covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by
Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section
68 of PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership,
association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24 September 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special
Actions and Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI
CHUY PO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special
Actions and Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR
V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions
of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a
lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer
with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was
to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time material
to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special
Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the
lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to
conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the
driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. [1] The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.[2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet
of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. [3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under
administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet
because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally
sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and
origin.[4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the
seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited
from disposing them until further orders.[5]
 On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April
1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber
origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents being required
from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure. [6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an
unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without the
required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the
lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing
legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the
circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when
recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for transport
lumber using recycled documents.[7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No.
NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should
not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already
secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1 April and
3 April 1990, he ordered CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law the approximately
311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard. [9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a
restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case
(hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court.The
petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck
with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and
dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and
hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of
1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo,
Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been
suspended on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-
type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was
to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of the
team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and
general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the
stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport
vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan
lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor. [10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorariand
prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch
24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president and
general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution[11] whose dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for
illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of
almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.

It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents be released
to the rightful owner, Malupa.[12]
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III, who served as Chairman of the Task
Force on Illegal Logging.[13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
 That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations. [14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision[15] in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:

1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive,
Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and
vacated, and instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and
almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the proper court regarding the
lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-
322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon
compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the proper
court has taken cognizance and determined how those lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's
truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber
without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search
and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle.[16] As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that
made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose
validity the petitioner did not even question.[17] And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and
lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore
contrabands observed during the conduct of the search. [18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles
in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive
Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been rendered
moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner
admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the
appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings
based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber,
is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of
the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b)
Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals,
which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. [19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68
would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of
our forest resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE,[21] respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion
to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws
and regulations is not a crime."[22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, [23] the People filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
 On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [24] in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit
the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As
to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession of lumber, and
that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended,
the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has always been foisted by those
who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant
was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to
present any despite the period of extension granted to it. [25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March
1992.[26] Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed
on 2 May 1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing
the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure
was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the
seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search
and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack
of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition
of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the Random House Dictionary
of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building purposes," the respondent Court held
that since wood is included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily
included in Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest product involved in a violation
of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:

SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in
his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the
tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the
process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal
of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the
petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which the other two were consolidated.

G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an
offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency
of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense,[29] and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which
provides:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty,
be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found.
 Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the
places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion
of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation
of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter.It
is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the required legal documents,
are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber. They cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2)
because they are separated by the words approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not with the preposition
of. They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which
reads:

SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or
other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational
and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private respondents
obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other
items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four
corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the
pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the
information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint
Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to,[30] cannot lead one to infer that
what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution [31] of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for
the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for
illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and
lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion
that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the
required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
Processing plant; which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market. [32] Simply put, lumber is
a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. [33] And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents
is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.Neither should
we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said
case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the
petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied
with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power
vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.Then, too, as correctly
held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such
a search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate [34] that no search
or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs
searches, and (4) consented warrantless search.[35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation
of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge
Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days.Hence, it could be served
at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued
the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued
under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber without the required legal
documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in
the term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably fail to show prima facie that a reversible error
has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to comment
on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL
CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary
Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September
1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or
his authorized representative had the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which
provides as follows:

Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In
all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail in view of our disquisition and
ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves
administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious
efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to
take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to
come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance
to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and
protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent
Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case
No. 324-V-91, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said
criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor to hear and decide the case with
purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that
the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991
 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.