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Problems of Post-Communism

ISSN: 1075-8216 (Print) 1557-783X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mppc20

Understanding the Contest Between the EU and


Russia in Their Shared Neighborhood

Dimitar Bechev

To cite this article: Dimitar Bechev (2015) Understanding the Contest Between the EU and
Russia in Their Shared Neighborhood, Problems of Post-Communism, 62:6, 340-349, DOI:
10.1080/10758216.2015.1067751

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1067751

Published online: 14 Dec 2015.

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Download by: [Licinia Simao] Date: 10 September 2016, At: 10:47


Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 62: 340–349, 2015
Copyright © 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1075-8216 (print)/1557-783X (online)
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2015.1067751

Understanding the Contest Between the EU and Russia


in Their Shared Neighborhood
Dimitar Bechev
Visiting Scholar, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

The Ukraine crisis has turned the EU and Russia from uneasy partners into rivals in the shared
neighborhood. But the rivalry differs from traditional power politics as seen during the cold war.
While the EU is not a serious competitor in the security field Russia is unable to present a credible
alternative to integration into the Single Market. As a result competition is most pronounced at the
level of discourse. “Othering” the EU has also been an aspect of Putin’s quest for legitimacy at
home. That is a reason enough to expect that the contest between Moscow and Brussels will last.

The Vilnius Summit debacle in November 2013 and the ensuing enlarging the existing Russia–Belarus–Kazakhstan Customs
crisis in Ukraine that poisoned relations between Russia and the Union (RuBeKz CU), effectively ushered in a new phase pitting
West, have conditioned a fundamental reappraisal of the Moscow against Brussels.4 Once a partner in Russia’s drive
European Union’s (EU) position in its Eastern neighborhood. toward modernization of the economy and society, the EU has
Talk of “the return of geopolitics” is now common among been recast as an obstacle to the re-integration of the post-Soviet
pundits and journalists, while the question of “who lost space under Moscow’s leadership. That marks a departure from
Ukraine?” animates many a public debate.1 Western govern- the time of the “color revolutions” (2003–2008), when the
ments have been agonizing whether to arm Kyiv and deter Kremlin saw the prospect of NATO expansion as an existential
further geographical spread of the hostilities or talk Russia into threat but viewed the EU’s outreach policies as benign. High-
de-escalation and, possibly, a grand bargain over Ukraine, using level officials, even Putin himself, made positive references
the lifting of sanctions as an incentive. Meanwhile, “Minsk 2,” intimating that a win–win outcome was not excluded.5 Back
the ceasefire deal reached by the so-called “Normandy Four” then, post-Soviet states were told that there was nothing wrong
(Russia, Ukraine, France, Germany) on February 12, 2015, in seeking close ties with Brussels but they would obtain better
showed that the EU preferred the diplomatic track.2 That gave terms only if they would bargain collectively, with Moscow as
Donbas separatists the time to consolidate their gains on the coordinator. The decision at NATO’s summit in Bucharest
ground by taking the strategic hub of Debaltseve, and President (April 2008) to halt expansion into the post-Soviet area, the
Vladimir Putin the opportunity to maneuver between EU capi- subsequent war in Georgia, and the “reset” with Russia
tals in an attempt to undercut their common front by applying announced by President Barack Obama upon his inauguration
divide-and-conquer tactics, although he failed to persuade any in 2009, shifted attention away from the United States to the EU.
member-state to veto the sanctions.3 Its Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative emerged as the principal
The unfolding Ukraine crisis highlights the shift from tool for bringing the countries of the region into the Western
uncomfortable coexistence to competition between the EU and orbit. In due course, a largely technocratic exercise centered on
Russia in their common neighborhood. Armed violence has trade agreements prompted a political crisis leading to the down-
swept aside the notion that comprehensive economic and func- fall of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych, the annexation
tional links catalyze stability through shared prosperity. Putin’s of Crimea by Russia, and the de facto secession of the Donetsk
return to the presidency in March 2012, with the promise to and Luhansk oblasts.
launch the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) by upgrading and The EU’s own discourse on Russia and the Eastern neigh-
bors has also changed. The standard view in Brussels posits the
EaP and the European Neighorhood Policy (ENP) as an exten-
Address correspondence to Dimitar Bechev, Center for European sion of the Single Market rather than an exercise in power
Studies, Harvard University, 27 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, politics intended to check or roll back Russian influence.
USA. Email: Bechev@fas.harvard.edu
THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA 341

Though not formally part of the ENP/EaP, Russia has implicitly transnational economic links, and to co-opt by projecting
been included in the list of beneficiaries due to its extensive “soft power” in the form of narratives of a common past
trade and investment links with the EU. The cooperation frame- and/or a shared future. In conclusion, it offers some general
work governing institutional ties with Moscow, the so-called observations regarding the ongoing competition of Moscow
Four Spaces, more or less replicates the ENP. Now, by contrast, and Brussels in the post-Soviet space.
the EU policy is more often than not seen as a check on the
Kremlin’s revisionist designs in the “near abroad” (blizhnyi
zarubezh). The shift is felt even in Germany, a long-standing COMPARING AND CONTRASTING RUSSIA AND
advocate of engagement and integration (Einbindung).6 Though THE EU IN THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD
the tone of the debate varies from one member-state to the other,
a growing number of voices now argue for a more muscular There is a richness of ways to define and conceptualize the
approach toward Russia, occasionally lamenting the EU’s lack differences between Russia and the EU as putative power
of resolve and the power capabilities needed to fend for its poles in a vast geographic area stretching from Belarus all the
interests. At the EaP’s Riga Summit (May 21, 2015), the pre- way to the Transcaucasus and the Caspian. One possibility
sident of the EU Council, Donald Tusk, formerly Poland’s involves an emphasis on ideological makeup: the EU is a
prime minister, stated that the EU “stays the course despite the union of democratic countries (though with variable degrees
intimidation, the aggression, even the war, of the last year,” of consolidation), whereas Russia has gradually shifted from
hastening to add, however, that the forum was “not an anti- a hybrid regime to a bona fide authoritarian one.9 Especially
Russia beauty contest.”7 in Putin’s third term as president and since the beginning of
Against the backdrop of shifting perceptions, this article the war in Ukraine, the Russian Federation has seen further
probes into the nature and dynamics of the contest between restrictions on rights and freedoms and a “hardening” of the
Russia and the EU over the neighborhood they share. It looks at Kremlin’s grip on state institutions and society. With the
the assets wielded by each of the two protagonists, including annexation of Crimea (March 2014), the president’s popular-
hard power, the gravity pull of each of their markets and the ity ratings have skyrocketed to unprecedented levels, well
modes of exporting economic integration, and, not least, the above 80 percent. Meanwhile, the murder of such a symbolic
narratives that underpin relations with neighbors. The key argu- figure as Boris Nemtsov, though possibly linked to rogue
ment put forward is that the prospects for an all-out rivalry, elements within the regime or indeed the semi-independent
where the EU embraces military force and Russia succeeds in leadership of Chechnya, has sent a stark warning to the
founding and sustaining an economic bloc, are less than certain. opposition as it prepares to challenge the United Russia
The interplay between a post-imperial state, on the one hand, party in the upcoming legislative elections.
and such a complex polity as the EU, on the other, produces Another, potentially more productive and less normatively
outcomes that are distinct from classical power politics as con- loaded, distinction derives from the fact that the EU is an
ceptualized by practitioners and popular writers as well as by the economic entity tasked with managing functional integration,
academic discipline of International Relations (IR).8 Indeed, the while Russia is a nation-state wielding the whole array of
fundamental differences in internal make-up, governance, coercive and co-optative tools, much like other sovereign
approach to foreign relations, and instruments wielded, along actors. That includes military power, economic weight, and
with the impact of economic interdependence, leads to sui cultural attraction. In the case of Ukraine, Russia has proven
generis forms of competition. While Russia cannot replace the not only capable but also willing to use military force as well as
EU as a purveyor of functional integration, the EU is in no economic carrots and sticks, from discounted gas to trade
position to effectively balance and contain Russian might with embargos to direct payments and subsidies, in order to main-
coercive means. In consequence, the competition between tain its primacy in the post-Soviet space. By contrast, the EU’s
Moscow and Brussels is at its most acute in the area of dis- external relations are mostly related to the cross-border projec-
course. What we witness are two rival narratives: Europe’s story tion of its own internal regulatory and technical standards, or
of political, economic, and institutional transformation in line “external governance” as it is termed by scholars of European
with its liberal democratic credo, on the one hand, and a counter- integration.10 Some concrete examples would be the rules on
narrative blending traditionalism, religious values, nostalgia for services, which are key to the “Deep and Comprehensive Free
the Soviet past, and the historical myths of victimhood and Trade Agreements” (DCFTA) that have been negotiated with
resistance linking Russia to its neighbors, on the other. Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova; the now famous Third
The article kicks off with a section that sketches out, in a Energy Package concerning the governance of the gas sector,
comparative fashion, the fundamental differences between which is extended to partner states through the so-called
the EU and the Russian Federation as polities and interna- Energy Community; or indeed the introduction of biometric
tional actors. It then proceeds to investigate how these passports as a precondition for visa liberalization.11
divergent constitutive features reflect on the three dimen- The difference in methods is rooted in a divergent
sions of power—the capacity to coerce by way of military approach to borders and governance. Being a nexus of
strength, to integrate by manipulating and enhancing sectoral regimes and rules, the EU has boundaries that are
342 BECHEV

rather fluid and allow for differentiated expansion; non- scant evidence to suggest that such efforts bear fruit. The
members like Norway or Switzerland partake in policies identity deficit undermines the capacity to articulate common
and institutions such as the Schengen Agreement while strategic interests and thus reinforces the technocratic bias in
some members stay out, whether by their choice or because external policies. While Russia, or rather its leadership, can
they are not in compliance with entry standards.12 To cope frame its actions in the “near abroad” in emotive terms under-
with complexity, the EU has developed a highly flexible and lying culture, historical memory, and national destiny, the EU
intricate framework of governance allowing for various as a whole—as opposed to individual member-states such as
degrees of inclusion and association of “third countries” in Poland, Romania, or the Baltics—falls back on the rhetoric of
its proximity. Russia, on the other hand, has legally defined modernization, economic efficiency, and “European values.”
borders, even if the presence of grey zones and breakaway What the above juxtaposition of the EU and Russia seeks
enclaves such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and now Donbas to demonstrate is that competition between the two cannot
blurs the distinction between “inside” and “outside.” It is be reduced to unequal capabilities and power resources,
furthermore governed from a single center, with the auton- with Brussels having the edge in the economic arena and
omy of federal units largely curtailed, especially since direct Moscow ahead when it comes to hard power. It is also
gubernatorial elections were abolished in 2004.13 rooted in differences at the level of “actorness” and identity.
Concentration of power, particularly in the field of foreign Figuratively speaking, the EU and Russia operate at very
policy, means a superior capacity to take and carry out dissimilar wavelengths, and this shapes the bilateral
decisions. While the EU operates on the basis of consensus, dynamic and its outcomes. Brussels and Moscow are cer-
finds itself constrained by a multiplicity of veto actors, and tainly not rivals in the military realm; they are competitors,
tends to produce lowest-common-denominator decisions, but also potential partners, when it comes to economic
“the power vertical” centered on the Kremlin results, in integration; and they have become antagonists in the dis-
theory if not always in practice, in more effective, purpose- cursive field. Why is that? As this article elaborates, the
ful action. In the run-up to Vilnius, repeated requests by principal reason is to do with the Putin regime’s decision to
President Yanukovych for financial aid were turned down frame the EU as its “Other” in order to consolidate power
by the EU’s leaders, and this provided Putin with leverage: internally but also in the post-Soviet space.
he promised that Russia would buy Ukrainian debt in return The sections that follow take a closer look at each of the
for a freezing of talks with Brussels.14 spheres where the EU and Russia interact.
There are also implications concerning the temporal aspects
of political action. While Russia can mobilize and “mix-and-
match” power resources to attain short-term goals, the EU’s THE EU AND RUSSIA IN THE MILITARY-
external policies are geared toward the long term and pursue STRATEGIC AREA
structural change at the level of institutions, norms, and socio-
political practices. The EU is furthermore less flexible inas- At the end of February 2015, Prime Minister David
much as it is legally constrained in ways that Russia is not, for Cameron announced that Britain would despatch a mission
example, in disbursing funds to partner countries or granting of up to 75 military trainers to advise Ukrainian forces on
concessions in areas such as visa-free travel. medical training, logistics, intelligence analysis, and, most
Lastly, there are key differences as regards the two actors’ important, infantry tactics.16 The move was intended to
self-identification and the ways this bears on relations with the demonstrate resolve to prop up Kyiv’s military in the face
outside world. Russia has a more cohesive sense of history and of lingering fears of a further push after the fall of
identity, though oscillating between civic and ethnic notions Debaltseve to the pro-Russian separatists. At the same
(the distinction between rossiiskii and russkii). Foreign policy time, London’s move underscored the reluctance of
is not only conducted from a single center but it can also be European decision-makers to supply lethal weapons to the
legitimized with reference to a coherent notion of national Ukrainian army, let alone send in “boots on the ground” to
interest and destiny. This is especially true in conditions of tip the balance of power in favor of Ukraine. In the trans-
authoritarian rule where the governing elite has a firm grip on atlantic debate on the issue, German chancellor Angela
the media and exercises a high degree of control over public Merkel has been one of the most assertive voices against
discourse. What is more, there is a clear sense of belonging to a military assistance, out of fear it might fuel false hopes in
larger community, be it the former Soviet Union, the Kyiv and provoke Russia. She shares the belief that Ukraine
Russophone sphere, or the lands inhabited by Eastern Slavs. cannot win, given the inferiority of its forces and having in
Contrast that with the EU, where overall legitimacy remains mind the humiliating defeats it suffered in eastern Ukraine
thin and is questioned by large swathes of voters across mem- in August 2014 and early 2015. On the other side of the
ber-states and influential political actors from various quarters debate are not the other EU countries but rather U.S. policy-
of the ideological spectrum. Though proactive foreign policy makers and pundits arguing in favor of aiding Ukraine to
in a growingly uncertain world presents itself, time and again, strengthen its defensive capabilities and raising the costs of
as a means to justify European integration internally,15 there is aggression for the separatists and the Kremlin. In short,
THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA 343

there is a consensus in the EU against direct military Abkhazia. The annexation of Crimea paved the way to
intervention. Russian naval supremacy in the Black Sea, with the port
The response to Moscow’s assertiveness has been to of Sevastopol, previously leased to Moscow, having passed
strengthen the commitment to collective defense under into direct control. Kremlin officials, including President
NATO as regards those members next door to Ukraine and Putin, have admitted that a 40,000-strong contingent is
Russia. That has actually marginalized EU’s Common now stationed across the border shared with Ukraine.
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The most that the Ukrainian authorities and NATO have piled up evidence of
Brussels institutions, in particular the European External direct involvement of regular Russian troops and heavy
Action Service (EEAS) and its head Federica Mogherini, equipment in the hostilities across the Donbas, while the
would do is launch a reappraisal of ENP strategy.17 Overall, Kremlin acknowledges only the presence of volunteers.
CSDP has very limited role in the Eastern neighborhood, Undergoing a modernization program to the tune of USD
especially in comparison to other regions such as the wes- 720 bn, the Russian armed forces have clear superiority in
tern Balkans. There are two ongoing operations: an EU terms of numerical strength, capabilities, and technological
Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) monitoring the sophistication over all the members of the Commonwealth
Ukraine–Moldova border and Moldova’s breakaway region of Independent States (CIS).21 Russia’s defense industries
of Transnistria, and an EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) remain the principal supplier of weapons, technology, and
observing the ceasefire line established following the 2008 related services across the post-Soviet region, where armed
Russian–Georgian war. There are no military deployments forces still rely largely on Soviet hardware, with Belarus,
in the post-Soviet space, nor is it likely that the EU will Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Tajikistan as the largest export
make greater commitments as a guarantor of peace and the markets.
territorial status quo. The EU is absent from some of the Given the fundamental disparity in coercive instruments,
“frozen conflicts” in the area, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, what the EU does to dissuade Russia from pushing further
although France is one of the co-chairs of the Organization into Ukraine is impose economic sanctions, including visa
for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Minsk Group. bans on high-ranking officials and businessmen and, more
There is a huge gap between the EU’s ambition, voiced significantly, restrictive measures to cut off key firms from
most prominently by the 2003 European Security Strategy, capital markets.22 This sort of response presents straightfor-
to deliver security and stability to its neighbours and its ward proof about the divergence between Moscow and
performance. Again, Ukraine is a case in point. The EU’s Brussels as rival poles in the neighborhood. While Russia
contribution boils down to a civilian EU Advisory Mission relies, first and foremost, on the active projection of power,
(EUAM) tasked with assisting security sector reform. This the EU’s leverage is passive in that it derives from the ability
operation, involving fewer than 60 experts, focuses by and to manipulate market access. The sanctions regime—that is,
large on modernizing Ukraine’s police.18 To be sure, Kyiv’s the withdrawal of access—is the negative aspect of that
demands have been much more ambitious. At the EU– power; the political and economic conditionality attached to
Ukraine Summit in April 2015, the EU turned down the ENP/EaP— that is, the granting of benefits in return for
President Petro Poroshenko’s request for a full-fledged policy adjustments and reforms—is the positive dimension.
peacekeeping mission to be deployed in the eastern pro- All that said, the jury is still out on whether the imposition of
vinces to monitor the implementation of Minsk 2.19 sanctions by the EU, or indeed the threat of escalation, has
The unwillingness and inability of the EU to deploy any direct effect on Russia’s choices as to the intensity,
military power is not exceptional to the Ukraine crisis but timing, and nature of military intervention into Ukraine.
has structural roots. Launched in the 1990s, CSDP is still in
a rudimentary stage, hampered by the lack of political will
to give the EU more resources and competences. Leading THE EU AND RUSSIA’S EXPERIMENT WITH
military powers such as France and the United Kingdom INTEGRATION
have chosen to cooperate outside Brussels institutions. The
2011 intervention in Libya, undertaken by London and The EU is hardly a match for Russia in terms of hard power,
Paris, exposed the limited capacity to bring to a successful but is Russia itself capable of building an economic bloc as
conclusion an operation of limited scope. The general eco- a counterweight to Brussels? The tug of war in the run-up to
nomic crisis has accelerated what experts describe as “the the Vilnius Summit, where the Kremlin applied pressure on
demilitarization of Europe,” with cuts going deep into the Viktor Yanukovych, by way of sanctions and positive indu-
defense budgets.20 cements, to abandon the EU’s Association Agreement (AA)
That is in stark contrast with Russia, which embraces and join the EEU, suggest there is a clear ambition to
military power as a paramount foreign policy instrument. challenge the EU’s initiatives promoting integration.
First off, Moscow has deployments across the Eastern Armenia’s earlier decision to freeze AA/DCFTA talks and
neighborhood, including “peacekeepers” in Transnistria opt for the customs union is another case in point. The
and military bases in Armenia, South Ossetia, and contest over the Eastern neighborhood was triggered as
344 BECHEV

much by the EU’s desire to assume a high-profile political that Russia imposed in August. Hosting successive ceasefire
role as by the Russian leadership’s effort to emulate the talks in Minsk, Alyaksandr Lukashenka has positioned him-
model of multilateral market governance developed in self as an intermediary in the diplomatic effort to end the
Europe. Relations with the EU took a more competitive, fighting in the Donbas.
zero-sum turn upon the Kremlin’s resolve to push forward The RuBeKz CU, the EEU’s backbone, has underper-
with the EEU and raise it to the level of regional fora such formed since its inception in 2010, and recently, trade
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the between the customs union’s three members has even con-
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or Asia- tracted: 5.5 percent in 2013 and 12 percent in the first half
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and establish it as of 2014. Trade disputes are not uncommon; for example, the
an alternative to the EU.23 spat between Russia’s and Belarus’s largest potash suppliers
Officially inaugurated at the start of 2015, the EEU is not in the summer of 2013, or the ban introduced by
a priori a rival project to the EU. For one, it draws exten- Kazakhstan on poultry imports from Russia and Belarus in
sively on the EU’s acquis as well as World Trade April 2014. (In August, Russia blocked shipments of poul-
Organization (WTO) rules.24 It pursues the removal of try from Kazakhstan under the pretext it originated from the
tariffs and non-tariff barriers as well as regulatory conver- United States.) In December 2014, Minsk sanitary authori-
gence with a view toward establishing free movement of ties blocked imports of noodles and coffee from Russia.
goods, capital, services, and people. The EEU is the latest Attitudes in Russian society toward deepening of links are
addition to a host of initiatives to spur integration across the also ambiguous. In excess of 80 percent of Russian citizens
CIS, where a web of free-trade agreements (FTAs), in addi- favor the introduction of visas for Central Asians (who now
tion to the RuBeKz CU, have co-existed since the 1990s enter freely), making it difficult to integrate labor markets.
with the frameworks promoted by the EU. In principle, Critics also bemoan the danger of the EEU “sucking in”
DCFTAs can operate in parallel with the regime binding Russian resources via subsidies in the form of loans, lower
Russia and the other post-Soviet states.25 It was the gas prices, or debt cancelations.29 In sum, the EEU’s maiden
Kremlin’s wish to expand the RuBeKz CU and refashion steps have been fraught with tensions. It is too early to
Eurasian economic integration from a purely functionalist declare the emergence of a credible competitor, or for that
into a geopolitical enterprise, that has “securitized” region- matter an interlocutor or partner, for the EU.30
alism, raised the political stakes, and ushered in conflict. One can attribute that relative failure to certain structural
The EEU has thus far failed to offer a long-term alter- features, not just the size and other characteristics of
native to integration into EU’s Single Market. Moldova, Russia’s market economy as opposed to the EU’s, but,
Georgia, and Ukraine have made a more or less clear choice more important, their very nature as political entities. First,
in favor of Brussels. Even actors considered friendly to the the supranational institutions in the EU are better adapted to
Kremlin, such as Moldova’s Party of Communists (PCRM), managing disparities of power between its constituents. This
the Georgian Dream coalition in Tbilisi, and even Viktor is not to suggest that the playing field is evened out. Yet,
Yanukovych until the fateful autumn of 2013, have moved potential hegemons such as Germany are constrained by
in the direction of the EU.26 The choice is informed by complex rules and mechanisms that redistribute influence
political preference and the wish to wrest a maximum as well as by bodies such as the European Commission and
degree of autonomy from Russia, but also by hard facts. the European Court of Justice. Elites in junior partner coun-
The EU is by far the largest trading partner for the three tries have greater incentives to comply as they obtain reci-
countries in question, whereas the relative share of Russia procal influence over collective decisions. By contrast, the
has actually declined over time. Among the CIS countries, CU/EEU exercise appears tainted by Putin’s ambitions to
Russia is the top partner only for Belarus; most trade has centralize power in his hands at the expense of the likes of
reoriented toward the EU (in the case of the EaP countries Lukashenka or Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev. Second,
and Kazakhstan) and China (most of Central Asia).27 the EU has developed, over time, more sophisticated legis-
The EEU’s current members do not fully endorse lative tools to sustain a Single Market. Third, it is flexible
Russia’s vision of integration. Belarus and Kazakhstan when it comes to levels of inclusion (from association to
share a strong preference to keep the EEU’s focus on eco- candidacy to accession), allowing governments to control
nomic matters and use it as a platform to boost exports and the process and move at their own pace.
budget revenues, rather than turn it into a geopolitical tool. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that, although the
Reportedly, it was on Astana’s request that “Economic” was EaP as a security promotion and democratization tool is
inserted in the entity’s name.28 Belarus and Kazakhstan getting very low marks, from a purely functional viewpoint
refused to implement sanctions against Ukraine in June it is moving forward and advancing its economic mission
2014, against the wishes of Putin, who argued for a com- vis-à-vis the frontrunners—Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia.
mon response to the Association Agreement Kyiv signed Meanwhile, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are staying at
with the EU. They furthermore declined to join the counter- arm’s length, with their leaders and elites unwilling to sign
sanctions against the EU members and other Western states up to Brussels’ political conditionality. The most likely
THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA 345

outcome therefore is the establishment of some sort of Externally, the model propagates the peaceful resolution of
modus vivendi with the EEU. The September 2014 decision conflicts through open borders, economic interdependence,
negotiated by the EU, Ukraine, and Russia to defer the and the pooling of sovereignty. It is at the heart of a sort of
implementation of Ukraine’s AA/DCFTA until the end of civilizing mission undertaken by the EU in relations with
2015 provides some clues. So, too, does the European proximate neighbors and the wider world and shapes the
Commission’s relative success in mediation between institutional discourse in Brussels as well as the academic
Moscow and Kyiv concerning supplies from Gazprom to reflection on integration (e.g., the scholarship on “transfor-
Naftohaz, Ukraine’s public gas utility, in the winter of mative power” that sprang up in the 2000s).33
2014–2015.31 Having resisted Russian demands for further Such narratives have found resonance across Eastern
delays in the implementation of the AA/DCFTA, the Europe, where the period of post-communist transition
European Commission continues to host trilateral meetings saw the West claim a privileged position as a source of
with Russia and Ukraine aiming to smooth the process and political, economic, and social models to be transplanted
address Moscow’s concerns.32 and followed.34 The underlying center–periphery structure
has a long and distinguished historical pedigree, with roots
reaching back at least to the eighteenth-century
THE CLASH OF NARRATIVES Enlightenment and beyond.35 Though challenged by both
the nationalist right and the radical anti-globalist left, the
The EU is nowhere near to mounting a challenge to Russia’s discourse has by and large preserved its dominant status
military supremacy in the western CIS. Equally, the nascent among the EU’s Central and East European neighbors as
EEU is unlikely to overcome the economic pull of the EU well as among large sectors of society in countries such as
and undo the trading and institutional links established Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. The early stages of the
thanks to the ENP/EaP. Each of the parties clearly has an Ukraine crisis and the mobilization around the Maidan
advantage in the respective issue-area. This state of affairs testify to its power to mobilize, although, in fairness, the
highlights a third level on which the EU and Russia interact protests escalated only after a heavy-handed crackdown by
and compete, that of narratives and discursive projections. It Yanukovych’s security forces unleashed long-held grie-
is arguably along this third axis where the contest becomes vances about the ruling elites’ arrogance and corruption.36
most visible, acute, and even uncompromising. When Russia’s relationship with the EU-centered constructions
demonstrators rallied at the Independence Square (Maidan of European values and identity is complex and ambiguous
nezalezhnosti) in central Kyiv, waving the EU flag and due to a host of historical factors. Starting with Peter the
calling on President Yanukovych to go along with the AA/ Great if not before, its elites have looked westward for
DCFTA, the question of belonging to EU or to Russia-led inspiration on how to structure politics, social life, and
Eurasia came to the political center-stage. The popular culture. Russia was part of the concert of great powers
mobilization took onboard the narrative of democracy pro- over the long nineteenth century ending with World War I,
motion and economic integration deployed by the EU to even if it was often viewed, both internally and externally,
explain and legitimize its actions beyond its borders. It was as being “in Europe but not of Europe.”37 The end of the
not long before the Maidan, which had also been the site of Cold War and deepening integration with the West gave a
mass demonstrations in the winter of 2004–2005, came to massive boost to economic, cultural, and societal ties with
be known as “Euromaidan,” a symbolic label popularized the EU, now the focal point of Europeanness. They contin-
through the social media. The pro-EU discourse prompted a ued to flourish even as authoritarian trends took hold after
rhetorical backlash by Russia framed as resistance to Vladimir Putin’s advent to power in 1999–2000. But immer-
Western meddling in its privileged sphere of cultural sion into and integration with the EU have been accompa-
influence. nied by Russian insistence on sovereign equality and its
Let us first take a look at the narratives underpinning the right to be a rule-maker of equal standing with Western
EU’s external relations. As already pointed out, unlike powers, rather than a rule-taker like the other post-commu-
Russia, the EU, a conglomerate of 28 countries with their nist countries on the EU’s periphery. Moreover, Moscow’s
particular historical paths, languages, and national cultures, traditional approach has entailed bypassing the Brussels
lacks a “thick identity” articulated in terms of myths of institutions and emphasizing relations with the larger mem-
belonging, stories of a shared past, or, indeed, a common ber-states, downplaying the EU as an actor commanding full
public sphere. What it does have, however, is a strong respect or a worthy interlocutor. To give one example, the
normative discourse stressing principles and values such as Kremlin and Gazprom insisted that the proposed South
liberal democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Stream gas pipeline, which would cross the Black Sea and
Technical rules dealing with market governance and the the Balkans en route to Italy and Austria, should be
supranational management of functional interdependence excluded from the EU’s Third Energy Package and that
constitute the operational, day-to-day manifestation of an intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) struck with the parti-
overall political model advancing those principles. cipating states should take precedence.
346 BECHEV

During Putin’s third presidential term (2012–2018), the brand of Eurasianism, a strand of thinking about the
EU has been promoted from an irrelevant bureaucratic con- Russian past and current politics that has a very rich and
traption into a threat. It has suffered from the hardening interesting history associated with the White Guard émigrés
anti-Western policies of the Kremlin. While Dmitry in interwar Europe, is seen as an influence on Putin’s
Medvedev’s presidency (2008–2012) embraced ideas favor- views.43 In that line of thinking, the EEU is not a mundane
ing modernization in partnership with the EU—and there- device limited to economic governance, but a long-needed
fore selective convergence with its values—Putin returned antidote to the West’s sanctimonious bluff, a way to restore
to the helm convinced that the West was plotting the desta- historical justice and roll back U.S. supremacy as well as the
bilization of the regime. The mass demonstrations in threat of Maidans and “color revolutions.”
Moscow, St Petersburg, and other big cities in the wake of This narrative has been targeted at domestic audiences in
the Duma elections in late 2011 seemed to confirm such Russia but it is also projected externally, through a plethora
suspicions.38 What followed was a clampdown on the lib- of transnational channels (media, political parties, the
eral opposition through restrictive measures such as those Russian Orthodox Church, civic groups, intellectuals, com-
concerning foreign-funded non-government organizations mentators, etc.). This is in addition to government agencies
(NGOs) introduced in mid-2012. Anti-Western rhetoric, a such as Rossotrudnichestvo or the Russian World
tool to consolidate support for the regime, has escalated Foundation, formally tasked with the spread of cultural
with the war in Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions. influence, that is, soft power. The prime focus of such actors
While the main target of the official propaganda has is the “near abroad.” Russian television plays a special role.
invariably been the United States, the EU has come under Watched across the CIS, channels like NTV, Pervyi Kanal
fire as well. True, state-controlled media continue to view (Channel One), or Rossiya-1 air the Kremlin’s message
the EU and its members as potential partners who need to widely, including to Russian speakers in Ukraine,
shed their dependence on America and show due respect for Moldova,44 and further afield. Popular anchors such as
Russia and its legitimate interests in the “near abroad.” At Dmitry Kiselyov at Telekanal Rossiya have won distinction
the same time, pro-regime spokespeople and even senior with vitriolic attacks against Europe’s moral decay and its
officials denounce Europe’s “otherness” and decadence. support for the “fascist junta” in Kyiv.45 (Since late 2013
Around the time of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, for Kiselyov has also been the director of Rossiya Segodnya,
example, they seized on campaigns in favor of lesbian-gay- the Russia Today news agency, which was established by
bisexual-transgender (LGBT) rights supported by EU-based presidential decree.) Others have pursued a more nuanced
activists and NGOs to draw a stark line of opposition line, distinguishing between Ukrainian president Petro
between Russia, a beacon of conservative and religious Poroshenko and right-wing extremist groups such as the
values, and the liberal consensus reigning in Europe (or Right Sector or certain paramilitary units operating in east-
“Gayropa”). In an echo of Russian conservatives’ critiques ern Ukraine. Still, they blame Kyiv authorities for not rein-
in the second half of the nineteenth century, the regime has ing in the latter and for failing to investigate the incidents
denounced present-day Europe’s corrupting effect on public such as the murder of pro-Russian activists in Odessa in
mores and the social fabric.39 May 2014.
The Kremlin’s narrative taps into lingering collective The message is prominent not only on popular Russian
traumas and grievances. On one level, Europe, and the TV channels, but also on the web. It has been reported that
West more broadly, are being accused of hypocrisy and pro-Kremlin activists are being mobilized to spread the
double standards, of using universalistic claims as a mere message over the web and social networks, previously a
window-dressing to mask power aspirations and self- domain where opposition opinion had an upper hand.46 The
interest.40 On another, they are portrayed as driven by state-funded television network RT (formerly Russia
values that are alien and subversive to Russia, Eastern Today), broadcasting in English, Spanish, Arabic, French,
Slavdom, or even Orthodox Christianity.41 and German, has been instrumental in disseminating
The conservative counter-narrative opposed to the EU Moscow’s official view on the war in Ukraine and the perils
and the West has been part and parcel of the effort to of U.S. hegemony to global viewers.
advance the EEU. The integration of the former Soviet Unsurprisingly, Ukraine has been at the forefront of the
space has been framed against references to culture and symbolic crusade against the West. In the run-up to Vilnius
religion as well as a shared historical memory of resistance, it became the target of a concerted campaign carried out by
sacrifice, and glory in the Fatherland War (1941–1945). a cohort of NGOs, media, commentators, and activists,
Putin’s return to the Kremlin, and the sustained effort of either funded by or close to the Kremlin, to portray the
bringing Ukraine onboard as part of his grand geopolitical AA/DCFTA as a threat to the traditional values of
project, propelled into the spotlight hitherto marginal intel- Orthodox Ukrainian Slavs.47 The annexation of Crimea in
lectuals such Aleksandr Dugin, a long-standing proponent the spring of 2014 marked the next stage as Russian autho-
of Russia’s “special path” and a staunch critic of the West, rities sought to enlist international support for their claims
including the EU.42 Influenced by Carl Schmitt, Dugin’s about the peninsula’s history and right to self-determination.
THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA 347

Friendly representatives from Europe’s far right (the Front broadly conceived, that have substantially altered the poli-
National in France, Jobbik from Hungary, Vlaams Belang tical terrain. On the one hand, we have the EU’s emergence
from Belgium, the Bulgarian Ataka party) were brought to as a sui generis international actor whose relations with
Crimea to monitor the independence referendum held on neighbors reflect its ability to extend its institutional order
March 16, 2014. They were also present at the elections beyond its borders. On the other hand is Russia as a domi-
held by the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk people’s nant military power that seeks to engineer a regional trading
republics in November 2014. Such allies have been key to bloc of its own, inspired but also competing with the EU.
the dual effort to delegitimize the government in Kyiv as But in the final analysis, the EEU will not be able to redraw
beholden to the United States and to posit Russia as a friend the economic map of the region and neutralize the pull of
of the “true” Europe of traditional values and national the Single Market, any more than Brussels or even the larger
sovereignty. They also rally against Brussels’ presumed member-states will be in a position to project hard power in
diktats and the erosion of sovereignty. Meanwhile, radical Russia’s “near abroad.”
left voices echo Kremlin claims that Ukraine has been taken As a result, the competition is most pronounced in the
over by Nazis. discursive field. To be sure, the war of words and stories is
The particular choice of allies abroad as well as the not something trivial, inasmuch as narratives have the power
marriage of traditionalism and Soviet nostalgia exemplify to mobilize. A case in point is the recent parliamentary elec-
Moscow’s sustained effort to insert itself in intra-EU debates tions in Moldova (November 2014), pitting against each other
and contestations. Breaking apart the West’s normative parties campaigning on pro-EU or pro-Kremlin tickets with all
monopoly entails, in equal measure, balancing the United the associated rhetorical baggage.49 The early stages of the
States in the global arena and, at the regional level, exposing Ukraine crisis provide another vivid illustration. Moreover,
present-day Europe’s impotence and moral bankruptcy. The the “othering” of the EU is performing an important task
substance of the challenge and its ideological coherence are domestically as it reinforces the Kremlin’s effort to rally
of secondary importance. Thus, in the so-called anti-Maidan public opinion against the West. That alone is reason enough
rallies in Moscow, overtly racist references to both to expect that the contest between Moscow and Brussels,
Ukrainians and President Barack Obama went side-by-side idiosyncratic as it is, will last.
with the glorification of the fight against Nazism and its
alleged latter-day proponents. Along with the United States,
the EU is depicted as advocating both fascist revisionism NOTES
and the unfettered liberalism that the Nazis opposed. There
are inconsistencies as well in the alternative vision offered 1. Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the
by the propaganda machine. The emphasis on ethnic and Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2014, at www.for
religious identity and the common references to Russkii mir eignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-geo
politics, accessed August 13, 2015; Ivan Krastev, “Who Lost
(Russian world), the community of Russian ethnics spread Ukraine?” Project Syndicate, December 12, 2013, at www.project-
across the former Soviet Union, clashes with the premise syndicate.org/commentary/ivan-krastev-looks-at-what-is-at-stake-for-
that Central Asia—and even sizeable territories in Russia europe-and-russia-in-kyiv-s-mass-protests, accessed August 13, 2015.
itself, such as the North Caucasus—have a place in 2. The so-called Minsk 2 deal was negotiated between President
Moscow-led Eurasia.48 Such cracks in the story, however, Vladimir Putin and the leaders of Ukraine, Germany, and
France. Full text in Russian is available at http://tvrain.ru/arti
are immaterial. In the final analysis, the propaganda cam- cles/polnyj_tekst_dogovora_po_vypolneniju_minskih_soglashenij-
paign against the United States and the EU has contributed, 381846/, accessed March 7, 2015; in English: www.ft.com/intl/
in conjunction with the war in Ukraine and the Western cms/s/0/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de.
sanctions, to legitimize Putin’s stranglehold on power html#axzz3j2FcThmb, accessed August 13, 2015. The text of the
domestically and his assertive policy in the “near abroad.” first Minsk memorandum, adopted on September 5, 2014, is
available at www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/english-language-
translation-of-the-sept-5-cease-fire-memorandum-in-minsk-365460.
html, accessed November 2, 2014.
CONCLUSION 3. In June 2015 the EU unanimously resolved to extend the sanctions
until the end of the year.
4. The EEU was first proposed by Putin in an article published in
The Ukraine crisis has turned the EU and Russia from
Izvestia on October 3, 2011. An English translation was released
partners into rivals. The sanctions and the continued ten- on October 10, 2011: Vladimir Putin, “A New Integration Project for
sions in the Donbas make a swift return to “business as Eurasia: The Future In the Making,” available on the website
usual,” as after the 2008 war in Georgia, hard to envision. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the
But the rivalry has its own logic, which is distinctive from European Union at www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-
the competition witnessed in the classic age of European minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-mak
ing-izvestia-3-, accessed August 13, 2015. The treaty establishing it
power politics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus on May 29, 2014,
indeed in the Cold War period. This is partly a function of and came into force on January 1, 2015. Armenia officially acceded
the forces of globalization and European integration, the following day; Kyrgyzstan joined in May.
348 BECHEV

5. This was underlined by José Manuel Barroso, ex-president of the Hungarian diplomat Kalman Miszei, formerly envoy to
European Commission, who shared the contents of his phone con- Transnistria, at the helm.
versations with Putin (“Putin has told me that he would not have an 19. Laurence Norman and Nick Shchetko, “EU, Ukraine Meet but Remain
objection in principle regarding membership of Ukraine in the EU”) at Odds on a Number of Issues,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2015, at
in Peter Spiegel, José Manuel Barroso: “Not Everything I Did Was www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-president-petro-poroshenko-eu-offi
Right,” Financial Times, November 4, 2014, at www.ft.com/cms/s/ cials-discuss-reforms-in-kiev-1430132684, accessed June 18, 2015.
0/4624563a-640b-11e4-8ade-00144feabdc0.html#slide0, accessed 20. Nick Witney, “How to Stop the Demilitarisation of Europe,”
November 10, 2014. European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, November 8,
6. On the changing German debate, see Ulrich Speck, “Germany Plays 2011, at www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/how_to_stop_the_demi
Good Cop, Bad Cop on Ukraine,” Carnegie Europe, June 25, 2014, litarisation_of_europe, accessed August 13, 2015.
at http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=56011, accessed August 21. On Russia’s military reform see Margarete Klein and Kristian Pester,
13, 2015. “Russia’s Armed Forces on Modernisation Course: Progress and
7. “EU says Riga Summit not ‘anti-Russia beauty contest,’” BBC Perspectives of Military Reform,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,
News, May 21, 2015, at www.bbc.com/news/world-europe- German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP
32824840, accessed June 18, 2015. Comments, January 2014, at www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/
8. For a classic account of power politics, see John. J, Mearsheimer, products/comments/2014C09_kle_pst.pdf, accessed August 13, 2015;
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, also see Russian Military Reform, a dedicated blog hosted by Dmitry
2001). Gorenburg, Harvard University, at https://russiamil.wordpress.com.
9. On hybrid regimes, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, 22. In a first wave of sanctions, prompted by the decision of Russia’s
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold Federation Council to authorize military intervention in Ukraine, the
War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Russia has EU agreed in early March 2014 to expel Russia from the G8 and freeze
been rated as having “a consolidated authoritarian regime” by bilateral talks on visa liberalization. What followed, after the annexation
international watchdog Freedom House since 2009, with its of Crimea, was the imposition of an asset freeze and travel bans on
democracy score rapidly deteriorating from 2012 onwards. See Russian officials as well as an embargo on imports from the area unless
the 2014 Nations in Transit report at https://freedomhouse.org/ accompanied by Ukraine customs stamps. The most serious measures to
report/nations-transit/2014/russia#.VP8ePRbs6fR, accessed March date, implemented after the downing of a Malaysian airliner in July
10, 2015. 2014, involves restrictions related to the capital markets, notably a
10. Dimitar Bechev, “Of Power and Powerlessness: EU and Its prohibition on extending financial services to several major Russian
Neighbours,” Comparative Politics 9, no. 4–5 (September/ banks including Sberbank, VTB, and Gazprombank, energy companies
December 2011): 414–31. For a broader theoretical discussion of including Rosneft and Novatek, as well as arms producers.
“external governance,” see Sandra Lavenex and Frank 23. Nicu Popescu, “Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the
Schimmelfennig, EU External Governance, special issue of Journal Likely,” Chaillot Paper No. 132, EU Institute for Security Studies,
of European Public Policy, 16, no. 6, 2009. September 9, 2014, at www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/
11. For a detailed overview of relations with Eastern neighbors across eurasian-union-the-real-the-imaginary-and-the-likely/, accessed
thematic areas from agriculture to environment to trade, see http:// August 13, 2015. For a more general discussion of the politics of
eeas.europa.eu/enp/eu-policy-areas/index_en.htm, accessed March economic integration in Eurasia, see Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna
10, 2015. Wolzcuk, Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics
12. See Jan Zielonka, EU as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013).
European Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 24. Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Russia, the Eurasian
13. President Dmitry Medvedev, shortly before he left office in 2012, Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or
introduced legislation to restore direct elections for governors, but Rivalry,” Chatham House Briefing Paper, REP BP 2012/01,
Putin, while implementing it, reserved the power to “nominate” can- August 1, 2012, 8, at www.chathamhouse.org/publications/
didates in a number of North Caucasus regions. Putin has implemented papers/view/185165, accessed August 13, 2015.
other initiatives by his predecessor, such as the simplification of party 25. CISFTA, a trade-liberalization treaty for CIS members, was signed
registration procedures and reduction of the electoral threshold from 7 on October 18, 2011, by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia,
percent to 5 percent in regional and national legislative elections. Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
14. Ukraine reportedly asked for compensation for losses by implementing 26. Georgia and Moldova signed association deals on June 27, 2014,
the DCFTA with the EU to the tune of USD 15 bn. “The Battle for entering into force on September 1. Ukraine’s President Petro
Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2013, at www.wsj.com/ Poroshenko, freshly elected on May 25, 2014, also signed in June,
news/articles/SB10001424052702303653004579213664244095466, with the AA due to come into force on November 1, and full
accessed March 10, 2015. implementation deferred until December 31, 2015. In a letter to EU
15. Argument developed in Christopher Bickerton, European Union Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht, the Russian government has in
Foreign Policy: From Effectiveness to Functionality (Basingstoke, the meantime demanded a large number of amendments to the treaty
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). (Robin Emmott and Jan Strupczewski, “Russia demands changes to
16. George Parker and Sam Jones, “David Cameron to Send Ukraine-EU trade deal,” Reuters, 18 September 2014).
UK Military Trainers to Ukraine,” Financial Times, February 27. Popescu, “Eurasian Union,” 12.
24, 2015, at www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/68784fca-bc4e-11e4-b6ec- 28. Ibid., 21.
00144feab7de.html#axzz3j2FcThmb, accessed August 13, 2015. 29. Ibid., 17–18.
17. See High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 30. For the opposite view advocating EU engagement with the EEU,
Policy, Joint Consultation Paper: “Towards a New European see Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, “The New European
Neighbourhood Policy,” March 4, 2015, at http://ec.europa.eu/enlar Disorder,” European Council on Foreign Relations Essay,
gement/neighbourhood/consultation/consultation.pdf, accessed November 20, 2014, at www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_
August 13, 2015. new_european_disorder322, accessed August 13, 2015.
18. The Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform 31. Alistair Macdonald and Philip Blenkinsop, “Ukraine, Russia, EU
Ukraine (EUAM) was launched on July 22, 2014, with the Agree to Natural Gas Supply Deal,” Reuters, October 30, 2014, at
THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA 349

www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/30/us-ukraine-crisis-gas-idUSKBN March 13, 2014; at www.pecat.co.rs/2014/03/aleksandar-geljevic-


0II0XQ20141030, accessed March 10, 2015. EU Commissioner dugin-putin-nikada-ne-izdaje-rusiju/, accessed November 3, 2014.
Maroš Šefčovič mediated in subsequent talks in March 2015. See 43. Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thorburn, “Putin’s Brain: Alexander
“Brussels Talks Avert Another Ukraine Gas Crisis,” EurActive, Dugin and the Philosophy Behind Putin’s Invasion of Crimea,”
March 3, 2015, at www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/brussels-talks- Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2014, at www.foreignaffairs.com/arti
avert-another-ukraine-gas-crisis-312556, accessed March 10, 2015. cles/russia-fsu/2014-03-31/putins-brain, accessed August 13, 2015.
32. European Commission, Outcome of the Trilateral Talks on the Also see Anton Shekhovtsov, “Putin’s Brain?” New Eastern
Implementation of the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement/Deep Europe, no. 4, 2014, at www.eurozine.com/articles/2014-09-12-she
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, STATEMENT/15/4992, khovtsov-en.html, accessed August 13, 2015.
Brussels, May 18, 2015, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 44. For a detailed analysis on the case of Moldova, see Stanislav
STATEMENT-15-4992_en.htm, accessed June 18, 2015. Secrieru, “How to Offset Russian Shadow Power? The Case of
33. There is a rich literature on the EU’s international presence and Moldova,” Polish Institute of International Affairs, Bulletin 125
relations with neighbors exploring the impact of narratives and (720), October 31, 2014, at www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=18536,
political discourse. A useful starting point is Kalypso Nicolaidis accessed November 3, 2014.
and Robert House, “‘This Is My EUtopia’ … Narrative as Power,” 45. In December 2013, Kiselyov openly attacked then German Foreign
Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 4: 767–92. It is a central Minster Guido Westerwelle, an openly gay public figure, over his
theme in the work of the Sociological Institutionalist school, itself visit to Kyiv’s Maidan, hinting at a homosexual entanglement
drawing on the Constructivist perspective in academic IR. See for between him and Ukrainian politician Vitaly Klitschko. “Russia’s
instance Thomas Diez and Antje Wiener, European Integration Chief Propagandist,” Eastern Approaches (blog), The Economist,
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), especially chapter December 10, 2013, at www.economist.com/blogs/easternap
8 by Thomas Risse and chapter 9 by Ole Waever. On Eastern proaches/2013/12/ukraine, accessed August 13, 2015.
enlargement and “transformative power,” see Heather Grabbe, The 46. Daisy Sindelar, “The Kremlin’s Troll Army,” The Atlantic, August 14,
EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanisation Through 2014, at www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-krem
Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke, UK: lins-troll-army/375932/, accessed August 13, 2015. For a recent jour-
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). nalistic investigation undertaken by Novaia gazeta and Saint
34. Milada Vachudova’s widely cited study of enlargement calls this Petersburg’s Moi raion (My area) news portal, see Andrei
narrative resonance the EU’s “passive leverage.” See Europe Soshnikov, “Stolitsa politicheskogo trollinga” (The capital of political
Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism trolling), March 11, 2015, at www.mr7.ru/articles/112478/, accessed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), especially chapters 3 and 4. August 13, 2015; and Diana Kachatrian, “Kak stat’ trollhanterom”
35. See Dimitar Bechev, Constructing South East Europe: The Politics of (How to become a troll-hunter), March, 10, 2015, at www.novayaga
Balkan Regional Cooperation (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave zeta.ru/inquests/67574.html, accessed August 13, 2015.
Macmillan, 2011), especially chapter 3. 47. A high-profile conference on “Orthodox–Slavic Values—the
36. For an informed and succinct account, see Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Foundation of Ukraine’s Civilizational Choice,” took place in Kyiv,
Crisis: What It Means for the West (New Haven: Yale University on July 27, 2013, with Putin taking part and delivering a speech. The
Press, 2014), 66–86. English translation is available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/5783,
37. Iver Neuman, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and accessed November 3, 2014. The conference marked the 1025th
International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 1995). anniversary of the Christian conversion of medieval Rus.
38. A recent example is contained in Putin’s speech delivered at the 48. The original Eurasianists, such as Prince Nikolai Trubetzkoy or the
Valdai Discussion Club’s session on October 24, 2014, in Sochi, historian Lev Gumilev, espoused very different views, stressing the
available in English translation at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23137, intertwined history, mutual borrowings, linkages, and influences
accessed November 3, 2014. between Muscovy and the peoples of the steppe, including the
39. Following the Austrian transvestite artist Conchita Wurst’s victory Mongol empire’s successors. For informed discussion of the
in the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest, Deputy Prime Minister Eurasianist tradition and its place in the intellectual life of the
Dmitry Rogozin tweeted, “Eurovision has shown euro-integrators post-Soviet period, see Dmitry Shlapentokh, ed., Russia Between
their euro-perspective: a bearded girl”; at https://twitter.com/ West and East: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism (Leiden–Boston,
Rogozin/status/465342677492711424, accessed November 3, Brill. 2007).
2014. 49. The elections saw the overtly pro-Moscow Party of Socialists garner-
40. See Putin’s Valdai speech of October 24, 2014 (quoted above). ing the largest share of votes, followed by the Liberal Democrats
41. Timothy Snyder, “Fascism, Russia and Ukraine,” New York Review of (pro-EU) and the Party of Communists (balancing between Russia
Books, March 20, 2014, at www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/ and EU). Overall, EU-friendly parties obtained 55 out of 101 seats in
mar/20/fascism-russia-and-ukraine/, accessed November 3, 2014. the parliament but failed to form a cabinet until February 2015, when
42. “EU will fail and we will create a new Europe,” as he declared in an the Communists agreed to support businessman Chiril Gaburici as
interview for Pečat (Stamp), a conservative website in Serbia, on prime minister.

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