On Judith Jarvis Thomson's "A defence of abortion"

Dagmar Wilhelm

This is a specially written essay by Dagmar Wilhelm who lectures in philosophy at Keele University.

Part 1: A Defence of Abortion

The "famous violinist", "people seeds" and the chocolate example are three of a series of thought
experiments in philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson’s article "A defence of abortion ".

As the title suggests the article aims to defend abortion – at least in some cases. Thomson’s approach here
is relatively novel. Rather than engaging in the usual debate about the moral status of foetuses (are they
the kind of beings that have rights?) she explicitly assumes - "for the sake of the argument" - that foetuses
have a right to life but argues that this right to life does not necessarily extend to a right to the mother’s
body.

The "famous violinist" helps Thomson to make this point. The scenario is very much like the famous soccer
scenario, we are kidnapped and attached to a famous violinist with a fatal kidney problem, whose survival
depends on his staying attached to our circulatory system. The violinist uncontroversially has a right to life
(and this may or may not imply that no third party has a right to unplug the violinist) yet, Thomson hopes
we would agree, he does not have a right to the use of our body and hence we have a right to unplug
ourselves.

While "the famous violinist" is a powerful scenario and tends to elicit the desired response, it is quite limited
in scope. It is plausible to assume that the audience feels they have the right to unplug themselves because
they had been kidnapped and attached to this stranger without their consent. Translated to the ethics of
abortion, Thomson manages at most to establish that pregnancies resulting from rape can be legitimately
terminated.

"People seeds" are the thought experiment employed to consider pregnancies resulting from consensual
sex. Here we are asked to imagine living in a world where people seeds fly around; if they get into your
house they nest in carpets and upholstery. Because you know of these people seeds you have protective
screens in front of your windows. In the heat you sometimes open these windows and very rarely people
seeds find holes in the screens and end up in your house.

Thomson would assume that people would not consider themselves to be under any obligation to allow these
people seeds use of their house for nine months or years (though it would be terribly nice of you to welcome
them). So, by analogy, Thomson would hold that pregnancies resulting from consensual sexual acts (opening
windows in the heat) with faulty contraceptives (holes in the screens) can also be legitimately terminated.

Having shown that at least in two cases the foetus’ right to life does not outweigh the woman’s right to
control over her own body, the chocolate examples aims to show that we might still think that while the
woman is under no moral obligation to do so she still ought to refrain from termination. In the (relevant
variation of the) chocolate example the older of two brothers is given chocolate. This chocolate is given only
to him, i.e. he is not told to share it with his brother. The younger brother demands some of the chocolate.
Thomson wants to claim that the older boy is under no obligation to share the chocolate. More precisely:
because the older boy was given the chocolate just for himself the younger boy does not have a right to the
chocolate. If he does not have a right, withholding the chocolate is not a violation of a right and if it isn’t a
violation of a right it is not unjust. If it is not unjust it isn’t morally wrong. If not sharing the chocolate is
not morally wrong then the older boy cannot have a moral obligation to share. Yet, we would still think that
he ought to share. This ought is much weaker than a moral obligation. It is desirable (or possibly admirable)
that the older brother shares but it is beyond the call of duty. The distinction is familiar in everyday life: we
might think that people sometimes ought to forgive each other but we have no right claim to forgiveness.
Part 2: Why Violinists, People Seeds and Chocolate?

Thomson’s thought experiments have met with a lot of criticism. Some objections are concerned with the
scope of the argument. Others focus on the methodology itself.

One kind of criticism essentially holds that the analogy between a famous violinist, people seeds, chocolate
sharing and pregnancy and abortion are weak. Violinists are different from foetuses. A stranger is different
from a genetically related being. Having to lie in bed attached to some random stranger for nine months
does not compare to normal pregnancies. Using houses is different from using bodies. Sharing chocolate is
different from an unwanted pregnancy.

To some extend these are problems thought experiments which aim to elicit intuitions about what is right
or wrong generally have. In such a thought experiment the experimenter tries to transpose all morally
relevant features of a situation into an imaginary scenario to achieve greater transparency and focus.

Thomson wants to avoid getting involved in a debate about the moral status of foetuses. The point she
wants to drive home is that even if foetuses have a right to life this does not necessarily outweigh a woman’s
right to control over her body. So, with the famous violinist she chooses a being which has a right to life
(unless we think fatal kidney conditions negate that right) . To Thomson there are three other morally
relevant factors involved in abortion in certain cases: the foetus depends on the mother’s body for survival,
the mother has not consented to the use of her body and pregnancies are demanding on the body and limit
what mothers can do. Hence the violinist has a kidney condition which he can only survive if he is attached
to our body, we are kidnapped and attached to the violinist without consent and we have to lie in bed for
nine months.

Similarly in the people seeds experiment: What is morally relevant in the case of consensual sex with faulty
contraceptives is that consent to the pregnancy has not been given (contraceptives were used) and
pregnancy involves using the mother’s body. So, there are screens in front of our windows but the people
seeds find holes in screens and ultimately require usage of our house for nine months.

In deciding what the morally relevant features of a situation are, the experimenter relies on some believes
or explicit or tacit theories. Hence the choice of features is biased. What becomes transparent in the thought
experiment might not be what is morally relevant but what the experimenter’s moral allegiances are.
Thomson is guided by some beliefs that deny moral relevance of several factors: the differences between
having to lie in bed for nine months and experiencing a normal pregnancy, the difference between using a
house or using a body etc. But Thomson might be mistaken, these differences could be morally relevant. If
they are, then our intuitive judgments about the imaginary scenarios can no longer be simply applied also
to abortion. [1]

Another line of criticism affects especially the “people seeds”. Flying and nesting people seeds are quite far
removed from reality as we experience it. But thought experiments aim to elicit intuitions and intuitions –
to some degree – rely on our experience. It seems justified to point out that the world we are asked to
imagine is so bizarre and different from ours that we actually can’t say whether or not these seeds have
rights and whether or not these rights outweigh our property rights. We have no intuitive judgements about
something so far beyond our realm of experience. [2]

Having said all this, thought experiments manage to bring relevant issues to light with a clarity and
transparency often not achieved by other means. They help to bring to light individual’s own underlying
beliefs. If I do judge that I have a moral duty to allow people seeds the use of my house but don’t equally
feel morally obliged to refrain from terminating a pregnancy then maybe I become clear about what I think
about my relationship to my body vis-a-vis my relationship to my house. They also help to uncover
intrapersonal inconsistency. The online test and analysis manages to do the very well. Interactivity allows
for new possibilities. The online set-up can collect data that goes beyond the immediate experiment but
would or should be relevant to our judgments about the cases. Whereas reading Thomson herself we might
be confronted with inconsistency between our response to the scenarios and our response to terminating
pregnancies, the online set-up can uncover inconsistency between our declared moral principles, and our
responses.
In much the same way as thought experiments shed light on intrapersonal inconsistency and personal beliefs
and principles they are also a good heuristic for locating the source of disagreements between people.
Moreover, arguably, considering relatively unlikely scenarios allows for a degree of emotional detachment
which can be helpful in reasoned debate (this is not to say that emotions are morally irrelevant).

Thomson’s experiments specifically achieve something else, at the time quite remarkable in the context of
the abortion debate. She uses the second person pronoun: you are attached to the famous violinist and you
have people seeds nesting in your carpets. This allows her - to some degree - to bridge the gap between
the sexes within the debate. It is no longer the woman’s right to control over her body that is at issue; it is
yours, whatever you are.

Footnotes

1. Jonathan Dancy (1985) makes this point, for example, in 'The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics', Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, 66, pp. 141-153.

2. Kathleen Wilkes (1988) discusses this problem in some detail in Real People (Oxford: Clarendon Press).