Petitioner Wilmer Grego files a petition against Respondent Humberto Basco to disqualify the

respondent from running in any elective position since respondent had been removed from office as a
result of an administrative case pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code (the Code), which took effect on January 1, 1992.
On Oct 31, 1981, Respondent Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon
finding of serious administrative misconduct on his part.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of
Manila during the January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office. He won
re-election upon the same office on May 11, 1992, and again for the third and final time on May 8,
1995. On respondent’s last elections for Councilor, he was beset by lawsuits from his opponents with
the main argument from them being that respondent should be disqualified because he had been
removed from office as a result of an administrative case and pursuant to Section 40 (b) of R.A. no.
7160 should not be legible for any elective position after.
Over the May 1995 election, respondent Basco had won the Council but had a disqualification
case pending against him by COMELEC. COMELEC suspended respondent’s proclamation/

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC suspended Respondent Basco on valid grounds?

Held:
Relevant provision on respondent’s situation reads as such:
SEC. 6 of Rep. Act 6646. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

This provision, however, does not support petitioner’s contention that the COMELEC should
have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word may indicates that the suspension of a
proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What is
merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest.
Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether or not
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own
determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such
discretion has been exercised whimsically and capriciously.
The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise
fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample
justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.