1. PEOPLE v. MELISSA CHUA, GR No.
o. 184058, 2010-03-10 February 23, 2002 and it was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on April 2,
Facts:
Melissa Chua was indicted for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and was convicted
thereof by RTC. She was also indicted for five counts of Estafa but was convicted
only for three.
The Information reads:
That sometime during the month of September, 2002, said accused,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to ERIK
DE GUIA TAN, MARILYN O. MACARANAS, NAPOLEON H. YU, JR., HARRY
JAMES P. KING and ROBERTO C. ANGELES for overseas employment abroad
without first having secured the required license from the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by law and without valid reasons and without the fault of
said complainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse expenses
incurred in connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of their
deployment.
Appellant denied the charges. Claiming having worked as a temporary cashier from
January to October, 2002 at the office of Golden Gate, owned by one Marilyn
Calueng, she maintained that Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency and that
Josie, who is her godmother, was an agent.
Admitting having received P80,000 each from Marilyn and Tan, receipt of which she
issued but denying receiving any amount from King, she claimed that she turned over
the money to the documentation officer, one Arlene Vega, who in turn remitted the
money to Marilyn Calueng whose present whereabouts she did not know.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of illegal recrtuitment
Ruling:
it is clear that any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-
holder of contracts, or as in the present case, an agency with an expired license, shall
be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. And illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three or more persons individually or as a group.
In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a cashier from
January to October 2002, was initially authorized to recruit workers for deployment
abroad. Per the certification from the POEA, Golden Gate's license only expired on
2002.
Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the
complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent representation that they
would be able to secure for them employment abroad.
Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not make
her any less an employee to be held liable for illegal recruitment as principal by direct
participation, together with the employer, as it was shown that she actively and
consciously participated in the recruitment process.
2. PEOPLE v. RODOLFO GALLO Y GADOT, GR No. 187730, 2010-06-29
Facts:
accused-appellant Gallo were charged with syndicated illegal recruitment and
eighteen (18) counts of estafa. after trial, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa, respectively.
the present appeal concerns solely accused-appellant's conviction for syndicated
illegal recruitment and for estafa the because said accused representing themselves to
have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad and promise employment/job placement abroad in Korea as factory workers
and charge or accept directly or indirectly from the amount of P30,000.00 -
P120,000.00 as placement fees and without valid reasons and without the fault of the
said complainants failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse the expenses
incurred by the said complainants in connection with their documentation and
processing for purposes of their deployment.
Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment
because he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency.
He alleges that the trial court erred in adopting the asseveration of the private
complainant that he was indeed an employee because such was not duly supported by
competent evidence.
Issues:
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate despite the failure of the prosecution to prove
the same beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
We disagree.
To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the
offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
under Art. 34 of the Labor
Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the illegal recruitment is
committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with
one another.
we believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense
sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was never licensed by
the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
In the instant case, Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows
that, in consideration of a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received
the amount of Php 45,000.00 from
Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agency's
purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process,
collected money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts
constitutive of illegal recruitment.
Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that
he was indeed an employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his active
participation in the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the one
who issued and signed the official receipt belies his profession of innocence.
This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant
and the other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the
commission of the crime of syndicated illegal recruitment.
it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with the rest of the officers and
employees of MPM Agency participated in a network of deception. Verily, the active
involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at one single purpose to
divest complainants with their money on the pretext of guaranteed employment
abroad.
3. CLAUDIO S. YAP v. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT, GR No.
179532, 2011-05-30
Facts:
Thus, Yap filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages before the Labor
Arbiter (LA).
Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT by Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. The
contract of employment was for a duration of 12 months. Yap boarded M/T
SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However the vessel was sold.
Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was informed that the same was sold and
will be scrapped.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the
scrapping bonus. However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to
accept the payment of one-month basic wage.
He insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract
since he was illegally dismissed from employment.
He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.
[Respondents], for their part, contended that Yap's employment contract was validly
terminated due to the sale of the vessel and no arrangement was made for Yap's
transfer to Thenamaris' other vessels.
Thus, Yap filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages before the Labor
Arbiter (LA).
LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and respondents sought recourse from
the NLRC.
In its decision, the NLRC affirmed the LA's findings
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. the NLRC reversed its earlier
Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to grant only three (3) months salary
for every year of the unexpired term because there is no full year of unexpired term
which this can be applied."
Hence - CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC
petitioner posits that, assuming said provision of law is constitutional, the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it reduced petitioner's backwages from nine months to three
months as his nine-month unexpired term cannot accommodate the lesser relief of
three months for every year of the unexpired term.[24]
Issues:
Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent that it affords an illegally
dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of - "salaries for [the] unexpired portion
of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" - is constitutional
Assuming that it is, whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting
petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term of 9 months is
far short of the "every year of the unexpired term" threshold.
Ruling:
the 5th paragraph of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, is violative of Section 1, Article III
and Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution to the extent that it gives an erring
employer the option to pay an illegally dismissed migrant worker only three months
for every year of the unexpired term of his contract; that said provision of law has
long been a source of abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and that
said provision violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution because,
while illegally dismissed local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of
reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time compensation was
withheld from them up to their actual reinstatement, migrant workers, by virtue of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, have to waive nine months of their collectible
backwages every time they have a year of unexpired term of contract to reckon with.
Verily, we have already declared in Serrano that the clause "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In an exhaustive
discussion of the intricacies and ramifications of the said clause, this Court, in
Serrano, pertinently held:
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect
classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-
term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on
the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with
fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of
OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all.
To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in
effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning
agencies may violate an OFW's security of tenure which an employment contract
embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional
provision of law.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the
aforementioned exception. After all, it was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his
job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents.
Petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
5. TRANSACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION v. SECRETARY
OF LABOR, GR No. 109583, 1997-09-05
Facts:
Petitioner , a private fee-charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible
recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought
employment as domestic helpers through petitioner's employees, Aragon, Ben Hur
Domincil and his wife Cecille.
The applicants paid placement fees ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but
petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus,
they were constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of
Articles 32 and 34(a) of the Labor Code
Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents,
and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview applicants,
and the spouses Domincil were not authorized to collect fees from the applicants.
Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the money claimed by respondents. Petitioner
maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any money to unauthorized
individuals.
the license of respondent TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to
participate in the overseas placement and recruitment of workers is hereby ordered
CANCELLED, effective immediately.
Petitioner contends that Secretary Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed orders viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and
decide illegal recruitment cases, including the authority to cancel recruitment licenses
Issues:
whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or
revoke the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.
Ruling:
The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for
overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article
35 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 35. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority. - The Minister of
Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by
the
Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National
Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws,
General Orders and Letters of Instructions."
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for
violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor
has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the
authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to 'restrict and regulate the recruitment
and placement activities of all agencies,' but also to 'promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions' governing said activities.
Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the
POEA, 'on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request
for investigation by any aggrieved person, x x (authority to) conduct the necessary
proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any
agency or entity' for certain enumerated offenses including -
1. the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of
money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed
by the Administration, and
2. any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other
relevant laws, rules and regulations.
In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or
cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is
concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.
6. REPUBLIC v. PRINCIPALIA MANAGEMENT, GR NO. 167639,
2006-04-19
Facts:
This case stemmed from two separate complaints filed before POEA against
Principalia for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations.
In the first complaint, Concha alleged that she applied with Principalia for placement
and employment as caregiver or physical therapist in the USA or Canada. Despite
paying P20,000.00 out of the P150,000.00 fee required by Principalia which was not
properly receipted, Principalia failed to deploy Concha for employment abroad.
Baldoza initiated the second complaint alleging that Principalia assured him of
employment in Doha, Qatar as a machine operator. After paying P20,000.00 as
placement fee, he departed for Doha, Qatar but when he arrived at the jobsite, he was
made to work as welder, a job which he had no skills.
He insisted that he was hired as machine operator but the alternative position offered
to him was that of helper, which he refused. Thus, he was repatriated
POEA suspended Principalia's documentary processing.
Principalia moved for reconsideration which the POEA granted
Meanwhile, before the promulgation of POEA's order lifting the suspension,
Principalia filed a Complaint to the Administrator of POEA before RTC "Annulment
of Order for Suspension of Documentation Processing with Damages and Application
for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction”
Principalia claimed that the suspension of its documentary processing would ruin its
reputation and goodwill and would cause the loss of its applicants, employers and
principals.
The Court granted a 72-hour restraining order enjoining Administrator to refrain from
imposing the suspension orders before the matter can be heard in full.
the application for the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction is
hereby GRANTED
The trial court stressed that it issued the injunctive writ because the order of
suspension is still pending appeal before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; that there is a possibility that Principalia will suffer tremendous losses
and even closure of business pending appeal
POEA appealed and avers that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting
the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction when the requirements to issue the same
have not been met. It asserts that Principalia had no clear and convincing right to the
relief demanded as it had no proof of irreparable damage as required under the Rules
of Court.
Issues:
Whether POEA have authority to exercise regulatory functions over principalia
pending appeal
Ruling:
We do not agree.
The trial court did not decree that the POEA, as the granting authority of Principalia's
license to recruit, is not allowed to determine Principalia's compliance with the
conditions for the grant, as POEA would have us believe. For all intents and purposes,
POEA can determine whether the licensee has complied with the requirements. In this
instance, the trial court observed that the Order of Suspension was pending appeal
with the Secretary of DOLE
Thus, until such time that the appeal is resolved with finality by the DOLE, Principalia
has a clear and convincing right to operate as a recruitment agency.
Furthermore, irreparable damage was duly proven by Principalia. Suspension of its
license is not easily quantifiable nor is it susceptible to simple mathematical
computation, as alleged by POEA. The trial court in its Order stated, thus:
In the meantime that the appeal has not been resolved, Plaintiff's clients/principals
will have to look for other agencies here and abroad, to supply their needs for
employees and workers. The end result would be a tremendous loss and even closure
of its business.
More importantly, Plaintiff's reputation would be tarnished and it would be difficult,
if not impossible for it to regain its existing clientele if the immediate implementation
of the suspension of its license continues.
Moreover, POEA would have no authority to exercise its regulatory functions over
Principalia because the matter had already been brought to the jurisdiction of the
DOLE. Principalia has been granted the license to recruit and process documents for
Filipinos interested to work abroad. Thus, POEA's action of suspending Principalia's
license before final adjudication by the DOLE would be premature and would amount
to a violation of the latter's right to recruit and deploy workers.
7. SANTOSA B. DATUMAN v. FIRST COSMOPOLITAN
MANPOWER, GR No. 156029, 2008-11-14
Facts:
respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc. recruited
petitioner
Datuman to work abroad under the following terms and conditions:
Site of employment - Bahrain
Employees
- Saleslady
Classification/Position/Grade
Basic Monthly Salary - US$370.00
Duration of Contract - One (1) year
Mohammed Sharif Abbas Ghulam
Foreign Employer -
Hussain
On 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain. However, her employer took her
passport when she arrived there; and instead of working as a saleslady, she was forced
to work as a domestic helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00),
equivalent only to One Hundred US Dollars. This was contrary to the agreed salary
of US$370.00 indicated in her Contract of Employment
On 1989, her employer compelled her to sign another contract, transferring her to
another employer as housemaid for the duration of two (2) years.
Left with no choice, she continued working against her will. Worse, she even worked
without compensation from September 1991 to April 1993 because of her employer's
continued failure and refusal to pay her salary despite demand. In
On 1993, she was able to finally return to the Philippines petitioner filed a complaint
before the POEA Adjudication Office against respondent for underpayment and
nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay and refund of her plane fare
While the case was pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC. Respondent
countered that petitioner actually agreed to work in Bahrain as a housemaid because
it was the only position available then.
However, since such position was not yet allowed by the POEA at that time, they
mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating petitioner's position as
saleslady.
Respondent added that it was actually petitioner herself who violated the terms of
their contract when she allegedly transferred to another employer without respondent's
knowledge and approval.
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding respondent liable
Worthy of mention is the fact that respondent agency admitted that it had entered into
an illegal contract with complainant by proposing the position of a housemaid which
said position was then not allowed by the POEA, by making it appear in the
Employment Contract that the position being applied for is the position of a saleslady.
As it is, we find indubitably clear that the foreign employer had took advantage to the
herein hopeless complainant and because of this ordeal, the same obviously rendered
complainant's continuous employment unreasonable if not downright impossible.
Moreover, complainant was forced against her will to continue with her employment
notwithstanding the fact that it was in violation of the original Employment Contract
including the illegal withholding of her passport.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding
respondent Agency liable for violating the term of Employment Contract
CA reversed the decision NLRC and the Labor Arbiter
Issues:
whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioner's monetary claims
Ruling:
Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:
Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. - Every applicant for
license to operate a private employment agency or manning agency shall
submit a written application together with the following requirements: x x
x f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant: x x x
(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims
and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the
contract; including but not limited to payment of wages, death and disability
compensation and repatriation. (emphasis supplied)
The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume joint
and solidary liability with the employer.[ This Court has, time and again, ruled that
private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-
based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment
agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate
and sufficient payment of what is due him.This is in line with the policy of the state
to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.
As the agency which recruited petitioner, respondent is jointly and solidarily liable
with the latter's principal employer abroad for her (petitioner's) money claims.
Respondent cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all the claims and liabilities arising
from the implementation of their POEA-approved Contract of Employment.
We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent
extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which had
a term of until April 1990). The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign
employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any
continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year term, against
the will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved
contract.
the solidary liability of respondent with petitioner's foreign employer for petitioner's
money claims continues although she was forced to sign another contract in Bahrain.
It is the terms of the original POEA-approved employment contract that shall govern
the relationship of petitioner with the respondent recruitment agency and the foreign
employer.
the precepts of justice and fairness dictate that petitioner must be compensated for all
months worked regardless of the supposed termination of the original contract
8. STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP v. SULPECIO
MEDEQUILLO, GR No. 177498, 2012-01-18
Facts:
Sulpecio Madequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the Adjudication Office of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the petitioners
for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to deploy under a second
contract.
respondent alleged that:
First Contract
, he was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc as Third Assistant Engineer on
board the vessel "Stolt Aspiration" for a period of nine (9) months; for nearly three
(3) months of rendering service and while the vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered
by the ship's master to disembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no
reason or explanation;
Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the petitioner's office where
he was transferred employment with another vessel named MV "Stolt Pride" under
the same terms and conditions of the First Contract; the Second Contract was noted
and approved by the POEA;
The POEA, without knowledge that he was not deployed with the vessel, certified the
Second Employment Contract
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of
nine (9) months' worth of salary as provided in the contract. This is but proper because
of the non-deployment of respondent without just cause.

Despite the commencement of the Second Contract

, petitioners failed to deploy him with the vessel MV "Stolt Pride";
He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the same refused to comply with the
Second Employment Contract.
He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees for his
illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners' bad faith in not complying with the
Second Contract.
Issues:
how will the seafarer be compensated by reason of the unreasonable non-deployment
of the petitioners?
Ruling:
9. PEOPLE v. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, GR No. 121777, 2001-01-
24
Facts:
accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City alleging:
That on 1994, the accused, without having previously obtained from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, a license or authority to engage in recruitment
and overseas placement of workers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, offer and promise for a fee employment abroad particularly in Singapore
thus causing Modesto and other two persons to apply, in fact said Modesto had already
advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the
promised employment which did not materialized thus causing damage and prejudice
to the latter in the said sum

The POEA Rules Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers do not Appellant questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale
provide for the award of damages to be given in favor of the employees. The claim
Issues:
provided by the same law refers to a valid contractual claim for compensation or
benefits arising from employer-employee relationship or for any personal injury, is she guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale?
illness or death at levels provided for within the terms and conditions of employment
of seafarers. However, the absence of the POEA Rules with regard to the payment of Ruling:
damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from
claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the We find that she is not.
suspension or cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost
Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the undertaking
to the worker. As earlier discussed, they do not forfend a seafarer from instituting an
of an activity constituting recruitment and placement are present, appellant, at the very
action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to deploy him.
least, is liable for "simple" illegal recruitment.
We thus decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each
Workers Act) which provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving
case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group.
Filipino workers for overseas deployment. The law provides:
In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been
Sec. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
recruited by appellant. The third person named in the complaint as having been
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to testify.
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days
after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial;
nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense
was committed against three or more persons.
Moreover, The information does not include Fermindoza or the other persons present
in the briefing as among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To convict
appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons other than those alleged to
have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
10. Estate of Nelson Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime
Facts:
Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of co
- Furthermore, Article 13.1 of the CBA provides that in case of dispute or conflict in t
petitioner Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. 25 days after the completion of his employm
ent contract, Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia. At the ti
me of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers
and Seaman’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s collective bargaining age
nt. Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the
grievance procedure of the CBA between AMOSUP and GCI. However, the grievan
ce procedure was “declared deadlocked” as petitioners refused to grant the benefits s
ought by the widow. The wife then filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-
Regional Arbitration against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages. Nelso
n’s brother, only received P20,000.00 from respondents pursuant to the CBA. Merri
dy Jane contended that she is entitled to the aggregate sum of $90,000.00 instead.
The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same b
asically involves the interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject C
BA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter
ISSUE:
Whether or not claim for death benefits of an overseas employee should be with the
Labor Arbiter considering that such granting involves interpretation and application
of the provisions in the CBA.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that it is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing
overseas Filipino workers. However, a careful reading of this special law would read
ily show that there is no specific provision thereunder which provides for jurisdictio
n over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or implementat
ion of a CBA. Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, i
n general, of “claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other for
ms of damages.” On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are v
ery specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising fr
om the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Stated
differently, the instant case involves a situation where the special statute (R.A. 8042)
refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in partic
ular.
he interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement, or enforc
ement of Company policies, the same shall be settled through negotiation, conciliati
on or voluntary arbitration. Therefore, it is clear that the parties, in the first place, re
ally intended to bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict i
n the interpretation or application of the provisions of their CBA. It is settled that wh
en the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to sub
mit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed.
11. Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management
FACTS:
Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc.
(respondent) for about 5 yrs. In February 3, 1998, petitioner signed a new contract of
employment with respondent, with the duration of 9 months. The contract was
approved by POEA. Petitioner was to be deployed on board the “MSV Seaspread”
which was scheduled to leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February 1998.
A week before the date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondent’s Vice
President, sent a facsimile message to the captain of “MSV Seaspread,”, saying that
it received a phone call from Santiago’s wife and some other callers who did not reveal
their identity and gave him some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time, if allowed to
depart, will jump ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago. The captain of
“MSV Seaspread replied that it cancel plans for Santiago to return to Seaspread.
Petitioner thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. Petitioner filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney’s fees against respondent and
its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
favored petitioner and ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not
commenced since petitioner was not deployed and that respondent violated the rules
and regulations governing overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner,
causing petitioner to suffer actual damages. On appeal by respondent, NLRC ruled
that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent
because the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the
seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved
contract. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties,
the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and attorney’s fees should be
dismissed. But the NLRC found respondent’s decision not to deploy petitioner to be
a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Petitioner filed MR but it was denied.
He went to CA. CA affirmed the decision of NLRC. Petitioner’s MR was denied.
Hence this case.
ISSUE:
When does an employer- employee relationship begin in the case at bar.
RULING:
There is some merit in the petition. The parties entered into an employment contract
whereby petitioner was contracted by respondent to render services on board “MSV
Seaspread” for the consideration of US$515.00 per month for 9 months, plus overtime
pay. However, respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to
Canada. Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport
in the point of hire, the employment contract did not commence, and no employer-
employee relationship was created between the parties. However, a distinction must
be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement
of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this
case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and
respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and
conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship would
have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus,
even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with
the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and
obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring
party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be
deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being
deployed without a valid reason. Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from
departing the port of Manila and boarding “MSV Seaspread” constitutes a breach of
contract, giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and
unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer
for the actual damages he suffered.
Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint.
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-
employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides
that:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the NLR) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within 90 calendar days after the
filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages.”
Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner
for overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.
Respondent is liable to pay petitioner only the actual damages in the form of the loss
of nine (9) months’ worth of salary as provided in the contract. He is not, however,
entitled to overtime pay. While the contract indicated a fixed overtime pay, it is not a
guarantee that he would receive said amount regardless of whether or not he rendered
overtime work. Even though petitioner was prevented without valid reason from
rendering regular much less overtime service, the fact remains that there is no
certainty that petitioner will perform overtime work had he been allowed to board the
vessel. The amount stipulated in the contract will be paid only if and when the
employee rendered overtime work. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very
nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work
schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he
might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time
would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.
The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the concept of
damages and expenses of litigation. Respondent’s basis for not deploying petitioner
is the belief that he will jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that is based
on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed.
This Court has upheld management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good
faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under
valid agreements. Respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and
unreasonable However, moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. because
respondent’s action was not tainted with bad faith, or done deliberately to defeat
petitioner’s rights, as to justify the award of moral damages.
Seafarers are considered contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular
employees under the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they
sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract
expires. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a
contractual basis.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED IN PART.
12. Sto. Tomas v. Salac
G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers
abroad, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and
TESDA, from regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked
Sections 29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which
provides that recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from
the passage of the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully
deregulated. RA 8042 was passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as
2000, the aforementioned government agencies should have stopped issuing
memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of
this case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the
POEA) was passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned
the validity of the following provisions of RA 8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term “illegal recruitment”. PASEI claims that the
definition by the law is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-
licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the
penalties for simple violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or
obstructing inspection are already punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment an a fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either
file the criminal case where he or she resides or at the place where the crime was
committed. PASEI argues that this provision is void for being contrary to the Rules
of Court which provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the place where the
crime or any of its essential elements were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found
to be in violation of RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with
the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims
that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for
being violative of due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said
provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of
the RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and
non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” without the
appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether
or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand,
recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the
appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if
they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed
the said penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom
behind the law.
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110,
itself, provides that the rule on venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to
existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided an
alternative venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To
make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding
that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or
tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99
In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her
parents received insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration). But when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the
Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and
Mila Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the
recruitment and placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter
and Promotion, Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since
Becmen was negligent in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( a violation
of RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that
pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are
themselves jointly and solidarily liable with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to
intervene. They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.
HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section 10 is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al
is not automatic. However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al
are solidarily and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record which
shows that they were personally involved in their company’s particular actions or
omissions in Jasmin’s case.
13. Sameer Overseas Placement v. Cabille
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and
placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year
employment contractfor a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to
work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan,
she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to
“prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26
to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her,
Wacoal deductedNT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed
LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of
salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary
due to illegal dismissal.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of
respondent’s salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired
term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It
“confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office;
it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”
The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic
Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office
of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The
Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the
Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent
with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that
was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so
changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in
Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any
compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No.
10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.
14. unace International Management Service v. NLRC, January 25, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), deployed to Taiwan
Divina A. Montehermozo (Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month contract
effective February 1, 1997. The deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese
broker, Edmund Wang, President of Jet Crown International Co., Ltd.
After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working
for her Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she
returned to the Philippines on February 4, 2000.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez,
the Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed
for three months and that she was underpaid
Reacting to Divina's Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an ". . . ANSWER
TO COMPLAINANT'S POSITION PAPER" alleging that Divina's 2-year extension
of her contract was without its knowledge and consent, hence, it had no liability
attaching to any claim arising therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a
Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of Responsibility and an Affidavit of Desistance, copy
of each document was annexed to said
The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace's claim that the extension of Divina's contract for
two more years was without its knowledge and consent.
ISSUE:
Whether the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina be
attributable to Sunace
HELD:
No, the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina is not
attributable to Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under
the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As
such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divina's claims
arising from the 2-year employment extension.
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its
agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina
and entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan.
15. Saudia Airlines v. Rebesencio, January 14, 2015
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not there was an illegal
dismissal of the respondents? (madaming nabuntis na flight attendant, sabay-sabay)
16. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING v. TORIBIO C. AVESTRUZ, GR
No. 207010, 2015-02-18
Facts:
petitioner hired Avestruz as Chief Cook on board the vessel for a period of six (6)
months
Captain Woodward noticed that the cover of the garbage bin in the kitchen was oily.
causing an argument to ensue between them
Captain Woodward informed Avestruz that he would be dismissed from service and
be disembarked in India.
Subsequently, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
He alleged that no investigation or hearing was conducted nor was he given the chance
to defend himself before he was dismissed
Issues:
whether or not Avestruz was legally dismissed
Ruling:
petition is devoid of merit.
Court finds that there was no just or valid cause for his dismissal, hence, he was
illegally dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that Avestruz was dismissed on the ground of insubordination,
consisting of his "repeated failure to obey his superior's order to maintain cleanliness
in the galley of the vessel" petitioners presented as evidence the e-mails sent by
Captain Woodward
The Court, however, finds these e-mails to be uncorroborated and self-serving, and
therefore, do not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence as would sufficiently
discharge the burden of proving that Avestruz was legally dismissed. On the contrary,
petitioners failed to prove that he committed acts of insubordination which would
warrant his dismissal.
17. INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL (IPAMS) v. JOSE G. DE VERA, GR
No. 205703, 2016-03-07
Facts:
Petitioner SNC Lavalin Engineers & Contractors, Inc. (SNC-Lavalin) is the principal
of IPAMS, a Canadian company with business interests in several countries. On the
other hand, respondent is a licensed general surgeon in the Philippines.
Arriola was offered by SNC-Lavalin the position of Safety Officer in Madagascar.
Arriola was then hired and his overseas employment contract was processed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)
According to Arriola, he signed the contract of employment in the Philippines.
Arriola started working in Madagascar.
After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-termination of employment due
to diminishing workload in the area of his expertise and the unavailability of
alternative assignments. Consequently, Arriola was repatriated. SNC-Lavalin
deposited in Arriola's bank account his pay amounting to Two Thousand Six Hundred
Thirty Six Dollars and Eight Centavos (CA$2,636.80), based on Canadian labor law.
Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of overtime pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay before the Labor
Arbiter (LA). He claimed that SNC-Lavalin still owed him unpaid salaries equivalent
to the three-month unexpired portion of his contract, amounting to, more or less, One
Million Sixty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,062,936.00). He
asserted that SNC-Lavalin never offered any valid reason for his early termination
and that he was not given sufficient notice regarding the same. Arriola also insisted
that the petitioners must prove the applicability of Canadian law before the same could
be applied to his employment contract.
Issues:
When can a foreign law govern an overseas employment contract?
Ruling:
the general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment contracts.
This rule is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article XIII that the
State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or overseas. Hence, even if
the OFW has his employment abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work and a living wage under our Constitution.
As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment
contract. A synthesis of the existing laws and jurisprudence reveals that this exception
is subject to the following requisites:That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas
employment contract that a specific foreign law shall govern;That the foreign law
invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the Philippine rules on
evidence;That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the
Philippines; andThat the overseas employment contract must be processed through
the POEA.The Court is of the view that these four (4) requisites must be complied
with before the employer could invoke the applicability of a foreign law to an overseas
employment contract.
With these requisites, the State would be able to abide by its constitutional obligation
to ensure that the rights and well-being of our OFWs are fully protected.
If the first requisite is absent, or that no foreign law was expressly stipulated in the
employment contract which was executed in the Philippines, then the domestic labor
laws shall apply in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus.
If the second requisite is lacking, or that the foreign law was not proven pursuant to
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, then the international
law doctrine of processual presumption operates. The said doctrine declares that
"[w]here a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the The Labor Arbiter (LA) and the NLRC gave more credence to the medical report of
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours." petitioner's independent doctor and, thus, granted petitioner's disability claim

If the third requisite is not met, or that the foreign law stipulated is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, then Philippine laws govern. This
finds legal bases in the Civil Code, specifically: (1) Article 17, which provides that
laws which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws of a foreign country; and (2) Article 1306, which
states that the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions in a contract must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Finally, if the fourth requisite is missing, or that the overseas employment contract
was not processed through the POEA, then Article 18 of the Labor Code is violated.
Article 18 provides that no employer may hire a Filipino worker for overseas
employment except through the boards and entities authorized by the Secretary of
Labor. In relation thereto, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended, declares that the
State shall only allow the deployment of overseas Filipino workers in countries where
the rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected. Thus, the POEA, through the
assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs, reviews and checks whether the
countries have existing labor and social laws protecting the rights of workers,
including migrant workers
Unless processed through the POEA, the State has no effective means of assessing the
suitability of the foreign laws to our migrant workers. Thus, an overseas employment
contract that was not scrutinized by the POEA definitely cannot be invoked as it is an
unexamined foreign law.
However, the CA disagreed
It ruled that the claim was premature
Issues:
Who’s medical findings should prevail
Ruling:
The disability suffered by the seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed by
the Company.
If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-designated
physician's assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between
the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding on them.Thus, while
petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final
determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance with an
agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence,
we have no option but to declare that the company-designated doctor's certification is
the final determination that must prevail.

In other words, lacking any one of the four requisites would invalidate the application
of the foreign law, and the Philippine law shall govern the overseas employment
contract.

18. Dohle v. Gargallo, August 17, 2016

Facts:
petitioner filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits against respondents
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

that: (a) he accidentally fell on deck while lifting heavy loads of lube oil drum he has
remained permanently unfit for further sea service despite major surgery his
permanent total unfitness to work was duly certified by his chosen physician
espondents countered that the fit-to-work findings of the company-designated
physicians must prevail over that of petitioner's independent doctor

Respondents further averred that the filing of the disability claim was premature since
petitioner was still undergoing medical treatment within the allowable 240-day period
at the time the complaint was filed.