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SRK Consulting: 495007: Isegen Draft BAR

Risk Assessment

MURA/JORD 495007_Isegen_BA_Appendices January 2017


PROJECT DONE ON BEHALF OF
ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF


THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT
ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-
NATAL
Author: M P Oberholzer
Date of Issue: 16th December 2016
Report No.: R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1

P O Box 2541, Cresta, 2118


Tel: +27 (0) 11 431 2198
Cell: +27 (0) 82 457 3258
Fax: +27 (0) 86 624 9423
E-mail: mike@riscom.co.za
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

DOCUMENT CHANGE HISTORY


PAGE/LINE CHANGE DATE REV
Document Initial release 9 Dec 2016 0
Document Updated with client’s comments 16 Dec 2016 1

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RISCOM (PTY) LTD

RISCOM (PTY) LTD is a consulting company that specialises in process safety. Further to
this, RISCOM* is an approved inspection authority (AIA) for conducting Major Hazard
Installation (MHI) risk assessments in accordance with the OHS Act 85 of 1993 and its Major
Hazard Installation regulations (July 2001). In order to maintain the status of approved
inspection authority, RISCOM is accredited by the South African National Accreditation
System (SANAS) in accordance with the IEC/ISO 17020:2012 standard. The accreditation
consists of a number of elements, including technical competence and third party
independence.

The independence of RISCOM is demonstrated by the following:

 RISCOM does not sell or repair equipment that can be used in the process industry;
 RISCOM does not have any shareholding in processing companies nor companies
performing risk assessment functions;
 RISCOM does not design equipment or processes.

Mike Oberholzer is a professional engineer, holds a Bachelor of Science in Chemical


Engineering and is an approved signatory for MHI risk assessments, thereby meeting the
competency requirements of SANAS for assessment of the risks of hazardous components,
including fires, explosions and toxic releases.

M P Oberholzer Pr. Eng. BSc (Chem. Eng.) MIChemE MSAIChE

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This report was prepared by RISCOM (PTY) LTD. The material in it reflects the best
judgement of RISCOM (PTY) LTD in light of the information available to it at the time of
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decisions to be based on it, are the responsibility of such third parties.
RISCOM (PTY) LTD accepts no responsibility for damages, if any, suffered by any
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* RISCOM™ and the RISCOM logo are trademarks of RISCOM (PTY) LTD

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QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF


THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT
ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-
NATAL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 INTRODUCTION

Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Isegen) owns and operate facility in
Isipingo, that produces phthalic anhydride, malic anhydride and food acids. Isegen is
proposing a project to including:
- Construction of a phthalates plant, captively using some the phthalic anhydride
produced on site:
- Including naphthalene storage as alternative raw material for the phthalic anhydride
plant;
- Increasing malic acid production with the inclusion of a centrifuge;
- Construct a bulk liquid tank farm to store raw material and products associated with
the new phthalates plant.

Isegen wishes to start the process and are now seeking Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) authorisation based on the designs of the current phthalate plants with the incorporation
of the raw material and product tank farms.

The purpose of this report is to convey the essential details, which include a short description
of hazards, the receiving environment and current relevant design as well as risks and
consequences of a major incident, with ultimate recommendations for project commencement.

1.1 Terms of Reference

The main aim of the investigation was to quantify the risks to employees, neighbours and the
public with regard to the proposed Isegen project including the phthalates plant and associated
tank farm facility and increased malic acid production in Isipingo.

This risk assessment was conducted in accordance with the Major Hazard Installation
regulations and can be used as notification for the facility. The scope of the risk assessment
included:
1 1. Development of accidental spill and fire scenarios for the facility;
2 Using generic failure rate data (for tanks, pumps, valves, flanges, pipework, gantry,
couplings and so forth), determination of the probability of each accident scenario;
3 For each incident developed in Step 2, determination of consequences (such as
thermal radiation, domino effects, toxic-cloud formation and so forth); or scenarios
with off-site consequences (greater than 1% fatality off-site),
4 Calculation of maximum individual risk (MIR), taking into account all generic failure
rates, initiating events (such as ignition), meteorological conditions and lethality

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1.2 Purpose and Main Activities

Isegen produces commodity chemicals from raw materials that are either piped to site or
delivered by road tanker. Materials produced on site are either used by the neighbouring
company or dispatched by road to customers.

1.3 Main Hazards Due to Substance and Process

The main hazards that would occur with a loss of containment of hazardous components at
the Isegen facility in Isipingo include exposure to:
 Thermal radiation from fires;
 Overpressure from explosions

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2 ENVIRONMENT

As shown in Figure 2-1, the Isegen site is situated at 284 Refinery Road in Isipingo (Durban)
and is located approximately 6 m above sea level near the shore of the Indian Ocean some
15 km south of Durban CBD. Access to the site is restricted, with all personnel and visitors
passing through the SAPREF security control point.

The land use immediately surrounding Isegen is commercial and industrial with the site of
Transnet to the east and NCS Resins and SAPREF to the north. The closest residential area
is Isipingo Beach approximately 1 km southwest of site.

Other than the SAPREF itself, no other neighbouring facility has made itself known as a
MHI facility.

Figure 2-1: Location of the Isegen site at Isipingo

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3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

3.1 Site

The Isegen site at Isipingo produces a variety of chemicals including: phthalic anhydride,
maleic anhydride, malic acid, fumaric acid and cream of tartar. In the manufacture of maleic
anhydride and phthalic anhydride flammable liquids are used as raw materials and process
chemicals. The plant layout is shown below in Figure 3-1, indicating the existing facilities as
well as the proposed phthalates facility and tank farm.

No. Description No. Description


1 n˗Butane bullet 9 New phthalates plant
2 Workshops 10 Maleic anhydride plant 2
3 Boiler 11 Food acids plant
4 Contractor area 12 Control room
5 Product warehouse and store 13 Laboratory
6 Training and conference centre 14 Medical centre
7 Offices 15 Gas reduction station
8 Phthalic anhydride plants 16 Nitrogen
17 New tank farm
Figure 3-1: Layout of the Isegen facility at Isipingo

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3.2 Manufacturing Facility

The facilities listed in the subsections below are existing installations on the establishment;

3.2.1 Maleic Anhydride

Maleic anhydride is produced by the partial oxidation of n˗butane, using a catalyst at elevated
temperatures, as shown in Figure 3-2 The gaseous reactor effluent is cooled and the
condensed product is collected as a crude, molten maleic anhydride. The saturated air from
the reactor is scrubbed with a water solution to remove the remaining maleic anhydride. During
the scrubbing process the maleic anhydride reacts with the water forming maleic acid.

The crude maleic anhydride and the maleic acid are refined in a single-batch distillation unit,
using o˗xylene as an entrainer. The pure maleic anhydride is stored in heated vessels to
prevent freezing.

Maleic anhydride is either used to produce food acids in the foods plant, sold as a molten
product or cooled into pastels and sold as a solid product.

The production of maleic anhydride is exothermic and produces steam that is used in the
distillation process or exported to other plants when required.

Due to the partial oxidation of butane in the reactor, the reactor is specifically designed to
reduce the inventory of flammable materials and the reactor is protected from potential internal
explosions with bursting disks, specifically designed by the reactor designer.

Figure 3-2: Simplified process flow diagram for maleic anhydride (MA) production

3.2.2 Phthalic Anhydride

Phthalic anhydride is produced from o˗xylene in a similar manner to maleic anhydride, as


shown in Figure 3-3. The reaction is a partial oxidation of o˗xylene over a catalyst at high
temperatures. The phthalic anhydride is removed from the reactor’s effluent gases in switch
condensers. Molten crude phthalic anhydride is drained into a storage tank and is purified in
a batch distillation column.

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The gases from the switch condensers that contain residual phthalic anhydride pass through
a catalytic converter to destroy all residual organics, prior to release into the atmosphere.

Phthalic anhydride is either sold as molten material or cooled and sold as solid flakes.

Due to the partial oxidation of xylene in the reactor, the reactor is specifically designed to
reduce the inventory of flammable materials and the reactor is protected from potential internal
explosions with bursting disks, specifically designed by the reactor designer.

Figure 3-3: Simplified flow diagram of phthalic anhydride (PA) production

3.2.3 Food Acids Plant

The food-acids plant produces food-grade malic and fumaric acids. This process consists of
reacting maleic anhydride with water at an elevated temperature and purifying the material
prior to spray granulating the material into solid particles for sale, as shown in Figure 3-4.

Figure 3-4: Simplified flow diagram for food acid production

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3.3 Raw materials and Process Chemicals

The current facility consists of the following raw materials and process chemicals.

3.3.1 n-Butane

n˗Butane is used as raw material for the manufacture of maleic anhydride. It is piped to the
Isegen site from the adjacent refinery as a liquid at 500 kPa and 15°C. The liquid n˗butane
entering the maleic anhydride plants is vaporised in butane vaporisers and fed to the maleic
anhydride reactors.

An aboveground n˗butane bullet of 975 m3 (approximately 50 m in length and 5 m in diameter)


has been installed for surge capacity when the adjacent refinery is down or cannot supply the
required n˗butane. The bullet was installed by a specialist company in bulk gas installations in
accordance to SANS 10087.

3.3.2 o-Xylene

o˗Xylene is used as a raw material for the manufacture of phthalic anhydride and as an
entrainer for the purification of maleic anhydride.

o˗Xylene is brought to site in road tankers and pumped from the tanker into the dedicated
o˗xylene tanks. From the o˗xylene tank it is then pumped to either the phthalic anhydride
plant or the maleic anhydride plant.

3.3.3 Natural Gas

Natural gas, supplied by Sasol, is transported to site via a 100 mm NB pipeline at 625 kPag
and is reduced to 100 kPag at the reducing station located at the main entrance of the site.
Natural gas is then transported to the PA plant and the standby boiler where the natural gas
is reduced further to approximately 15 kPag.

3.3.4 Nitrogen

A 14.8 t bulk nitrogen tank is located at the eastern side of the phthalic anhydride plant, as
shown in Figure 3-1, and used as an inert gas for the process. Liquid nitrogen is delivered to
site in road tankers of approximately 18 t and are offloaded adjacent to the storage tank. The
frequency of delivery is twice per week.

3.3.5 Warehouse

Solid products of maleic anhydride, phthalic anhydride, malic acid and fumaric acid are kept
in a warehouse on site from where the products are dispatched to customers

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3.4 Proposed Project

The proposed project consists of the following facilities;

3.4.1 Phthalic Anhydride Esters (Phthalates) Plant

Phthalates are a range of esters formed when alcohols are reacted with phthalic anhydride.
The reaction takes place in a batch reactor at elevated temperatures, using an acidic catalyst.
The water formed during the reaction is removed and sent to the effluent system. The wet
alcohol is sent to intermediate tanks for re-use, while the phthalate is sent to a designated
tank, from which it is dispatched into bulk tankers, isotainers and drums.

Figure 3-5: Simplified flow diagram of the phthalates plant

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3.5 Phthalic Anhydride Esters (Phthalates) Tank Farm

The bulk tanks required for the phthalate project would use the currently unused tanks with
inclusion of additional tanks within the existing bulk tank area as shown in Figure 3-6. The
tank details are given in Table 3-1.

Day tanks for the use of the phthalate manufacturing process would be located at the plant
area.

Figure 3-6: Layout of the bulk storage tanks

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3.6 Summary of Bulk Materials to be Stored on Site

A summary of bulk materials that can give hazardous effects that are to be stored on site is
given in Table 3-1.

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Table 3-1: Summary of components to be stored on site

CAS No Tank Tank Tank Bund


Tank
Product Tank Type Height Diameter Volume Volume Comment
No.
(m) (m) (m3) (m3)
01OA107-01 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 4.572 5.486 80 206.3 Existing
01OA107-02 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 4.572 5.486 80 206.3 Existing
01OA107-03 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 4.572 5.486 80 206.3 Existing
01OA107-04 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 4.572 5.486 80 206.3 Existing
F420 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 3.6 3.5 34.6 34.6 MA Plant
106-97-8 Horizontal
D360 n˗Butane pressure 50 5 975 Nil LPG Area
vessel
26761-40-0 Tank Farm
N/N DIDP Atmospheric 8 5.64 200 TBC
1
26761-40-0 Tank Farm
N/N DIDP Atmospheric 12 7.28 200 TBC
1
104-76-7 Atmospheric Tank Farm
2EH 5.32 200 618.3
TK100 1
104-76-7 Atmospheric Tank Farm
2EH 5.32 200 618.3
TK101 1
27458-94-2 Atmospheric Tank Farm
INA 9 5.32 200 618.3
ACL 1 1
27458-94-2 Atmospheric Tank Farm
9 5.32 200 618.3
ACL 2 INA 1
117-81-7 Atmospheric Tank Farm
5 4.4 76 618.3
ACL 3 DEHP HC 1
117-81-7 Atmospheric Tank Farm
6 5.2 130 618.3
ACL 4 DEHP CG 1
TK-118 Atmospheric Not in use

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CAS No Tank Tank Tank Bund


Tank
Product Tank Type Height Diameter Volume Volume Comment
No.
(m) (m) (m3) (m3)
Naphthalene Naphthalene 91-20-3 Tank Farm
Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90 TBC
2
Naphthalene Naphthalene 91-20-3 Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90 TBC Tank Farm 2
Naphthalene Naphthalene 91-20-3 Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90 TBC Tank Farm 2
Naphthalene Naphthalene 91-20-3 Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90 TBC Tank Farm 2
Butanol Butanol 71-36-3 Atmospheric 5 3.91 60 TBC Tank Farm 2
IDA IDA 25339-17-7 Atmospheric 6 5.25 130 TBC Tank Farm 2
DBP DBP 84-74-2 Atmospheric 6 4.9 113 TBC Tank Farm 2
DEHA DEHA 103-23-1 Atmospheric 9 5.32 200 TBC Tank Farm 2
Mixed Mixed Tank Farm 2
Atmospheric TBC TBC 180 TBC
Phthalates Phthalates
7 tanks at
Intermediates Phthalates Atmospheric 3 2.35 13 TBC Phthalates
Plant
7 tanks at
Wet Alcohol Alcohols Atmospheric 3 2.35 13 TBC Phthalates
Plant
Malic acid
Malic Acid Malic Acid 617-48-1 Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90
plant

Abbreviations

Component Name
DIDP Di isodecyl phthalate
2EH 2-Ethylhexanol
INA Isononanol

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DEHP HC 2 Ethylhexyl phthalate - high colour


DEHP CG 2 Ethylhexyl phthalate crystal grade
IDA Isodecanol
DBP Di butyl phthalate

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4 METHODOLOGY

The first step in any risk assessment is to identify all hazards. The merit of including a hazard
for further investigation is then determined by how significant it is, normally by using a cut-off
or threshold value.

Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to assess it in terms of the risk it presents
to the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both probability and
consequence should be considered, but there are occasions where, if either the probability or
the consequence can be shown to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can be
made based on just one factor.

During the hazard identification component of the report, the following considerations are
taken into account:

 Chemical identities;
 Location of on-site installations that use, produce, process, transport or store
hazardous components;
 Type and design of containers, vessels or pipelines;
 Quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release;
 Nature of the hazard most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or releases,
e.g. airborne toxic vapours or mists, fires or explosions, large quantities to be stored
and certain handling conditions of processed components.

The evaluation methodology assumes that the facility will perform as designed in the absence
of unintended events such as component and material failures of equipment, human errors,
external events and process unknowns.

Due to the absence of South African legislation regarding determination methodology for
quantitative risk assessment (QRA), the methodology of this assessment is based on the legal
requirements of the Netherlands, outlined in CPR 18E (Purple Book; 1999) and RIVM (2009).
The evaluation of the acceptability of the risks is done in accordance with the UK Health and
Safety Executive (HSE) ALARP criteria that clearly cover land use, based on determined risks.

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The QRA process is summarised with the following steps:

1. Identification of components that are flammable, toxic, reactive or corrosive and that
have potential to result in a major incident from fires, explosions or toxic releases;
2. Development of accidental loss of containment (LOC) scenarios for equipment
containing hazardous components (including release rate, location and orientation of
release);
3. For each incident developed in Step 2, determination of consequences (such as
thermal radiation, domino effects, toxic-cloud formation and so forth);
4. For scenarios with off-site consequences (greater than 1% fatality off-site), calculation
of maximum individual risk (MIR), taking into account all generic failure rates, initiating
events (such as ignition), meteorological conditions and lethality;

Scenarios included in this QRA have impacts external to the establishment. The 1% fatality
from acute affects (thermal radiation, blast overpressure and toxic exposure) is determined as
the endpoint (RIVM 2009). Thus, a scenario producing a fatality of less than 1% at the
establishment boundary under worst-case meteorological conditions would be excluded from
the QRA.

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5 CONCLUSIONS

Risk calculations are not precise. The accuracy of the predictions is determined by the quality
of base data and expert judgements. A number of well-known sources of incident data were
consulted and applied to obtain the likelihood of an incident to occur. The risk assessment
included the consequences and risks of fires and explosions from the manufacturing or
storage tank facility.

The risk assessment was done on the assumption that the site is maintained to an acceptable
level and that all-statuary regulations are applied. It was also assumed that the detailed
engineering designs were done by competent people and were correctly specified for the
intended duty. For example, it is assumed that the tank-wall thicknesses have been correctly
calculated, that the vents have been sized for emergency conditions, that the instrumentation
and electrical components comply with the specified electrical area classification, that the
material of construction is compatible with the products, etc.

It is the responsibility of Isegen and their contractors to ensure that all engineering designs
would have been completed by competent persons and that all pieces of equipment would
have been installed correctly. All designs should be in full compliance with (but not limited to)
the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 and its regulations, the National Buildings
Regulations and the Buildings Standards Act 107 of 1977 as well as local bylaws.

A number of incident scenarios were simulated, taking into account the prevailing
meteorological conditions, and described in the report.

5.1 Notifiable Substances

The General Machinery Regulation 8 and its Schedule A on notifiable substances requires
any employer who has a substance equal to or exceeding the quantity listed in the regulation
to notify the divisional director. A site is classified as a Major Hazard Installation if it contains
one or more notifiable substances or if the off-site risk is sufficiently high. The latter can only
be determined from a quantitative risk assessment.

As the n˗butane bullet contains more than 25 t, the stored n˗butane is classified as a
notifiable substance and qualifies the Isegen site (Isipingo) as a Major Hazard
Installation.

5.2 N-Butane Storage and Pipeline

n˗Butane is stored as a liquid at an elevated pressure in a storage bullet. A loss of containment


would produce a flammable gas as well as a flammable pool.

Under worst-case conditions, a flash fire or vapour cloud explosion could enter into Isipingo
Beach, SAPREF and the adjacent Transnet property with possible fatalities. Pool fires could
result in the ignition of vegetation adjacent to the Isegen facility and off-site fatalities are a
possibility; although, the area to the west of Isegen is currently unoccupied.

Impacts for a PSV jet fire would remain within the n˗butane storage area and no off-site
incidents would be expected. In the event of a BLEVE of the n˗butane bullet, a large fireball
would not result in injuries or fatalities beyond the site boundary.

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Due to the fact that the largest endpoint distances for the above incidents are related to the
failure of the n˗butane bullet, which has a very low failure rate, the risk of off-site fatalities are
considered trivial.

5.3 Natural Gas Pipeline

Natural gas pipeline enters the site next to the main gate and is reduced to a pressure of 1 bar
before being transported to the phthalic anhydride plant and boiler. A loss of containment of
natural gas could extend beyond the Isegen site but not past the SAPREF control gate, and
thus a loss of containment would not impact the public. The risks to the public from the natural
gas line would be considered acceptable.

5.4 Phthalic Anhydride Plant

The phthalic anhydride plant produces phthalic anhydride from o˗xylene, which is considered
flammable. However, there would be no off-site impacts from large o˗xylene pool fires, flash
fires or explosions at the phthalic anhydride plant, and therefore the risks to the public are
considered trivial

The conversion of raw materials to naphthalene for the production phthalic anhydride, would
involve minimal plant changes. As there is current overpressure protection of the reactor, the
conversion to naphthalene would not change the risk profile of the plant.

Bulk naphthalene would be stored at the proposed tank farm, with the impacts covered in that
section of the risk assessment

5.5 Maleic Anhydride Plant

Materials at the maleic anhydride plant considered flammable are n˗butane and o˗xylene.

In the case of n˗butane, fatalities from flash fires as well as vapour cloud explosions and
BLEVEs could extend beyond the site boundary but would not impact the public. Jet fires
would not extend beyond the site boundary and the consequence modelling performed
indicated that no pool fires would be formed as a result of a loss of containment from the
vaporiser.

The 1% fatality from large o˗xylene pool fires could extend beyond the site boundary but would
not impact the general public.

Consequences from fires and explosions from n˗butane and o˗xylene at the maleic anhydride
plant would pose risk to the public that is considered trivial.

5.6 Food Acids Plant

No acutely toxic, flammable or combustible material is stored, produced or manufactured at


the food-acids plant. Thus, the increase in malic acid production would not alter the risk profile
of the facility.

5.7 Phthalates Plant and Tank Farm

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The risks from the phthalates plant would be localised with fires form the small day tanks
localised in the plat area.

The risks from the tank farm are related to materials having a low flash point or materials
stored above the flash point. To this end, Tank Farm 2 produced sufficiently high risks, that
would extend beyond the southern boundary into the dunes, alone classifying the site as a
Major Hazardous Installation. The risks to the public would be considered tolerable.

5.8 Impacts onto Neighbouring Properties, Residential Areas and Major Hazard
Installations

There are potential impacts on the residential area of Isipingo Beach from flash fires and
vapour cloud explosions originating from the n˗butane bullet but the risks are considered trivial.

Impacts from flash fires and vapour cloud explosions at the n˗butane bullet could extend to
any facilities and businesses located on the SAPREF property (including Isegen’s neighbour
on its northeast boundary, NCS Resins). However, the risks would be considered trivial.

5.9 Major Hazard Installation

Previous studies concluded that the MHI facility has been classified as a Major Hazard. This
project would not alter the classification and the Major Hazard Installation risk assessment
must be updated prior to construction

This study is not intended to replace the Major Hazard Installation risk assessment
which should be completed prior to construction of the terminal.

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6 RECOMMENDATIONS

The project presented for this report are not final and would require detail designs to be
completed prior to construction. RISCOM did not find any fatal flaws that would prevent the
project proceeding to the detailed engineering phase of the project.

RISCOM would support the project with the following conditions:

1. Compliance with all statutory requirements, i.e. pressure vessel designs;


2. Compliance with applicable SANS codes, i.e. SANS 10087, SANS 10089,
SANS 10108, SANS 10400 etc.;
3. Incorporation of applicable guidelines or equivalent international recognised codes of
good design and practice into the designs;
4 Completion of a recognised process hazard analysis (such as a HAZOP study,
FMEA, etc.) on the proposed facility prior to construction to ensure design and
operational hazards have been identified and adequate mitigation put in place;
5 Preparation and issue of a safety document detailing safety and design features
reducing the impacts from fires, explosions and flammable atmospheres to the MHI
assessment body at the time of the MHI assessment:
Including compliance to statutory laws, applicable codes and standards and
a.
world’s best practice;
Including the listing of statutory and non-statutory inspections, giving
b.
frequency of inspections;
c. Including the auditing of the built facility against the safety document;
6. Demonstration by Isegen or their contractor that the final designs would reduce the
risks posed by the installation to internationally acceptable guidelines;
7. Signature of all designs by a professional engineer registered in South Africa in
accordance with the Engineering Profession Act, who takes responsibility for suitable
designs;
8. Completion of an emergency preparedness and response document for on-site and
off-site scenarios prior to initiating the MHI risk assessment (with input from local
authorities);
9 Permission not being granted for increases to the product list or product inventories
without redoing part of or the full EIA;
10 Final acceptance of the facility risks with an MHI risk assessment that must be
completed in accordance to the MHI regulations:
Basing such a risk assessment on the final design and including engineering
a.
mitigation
.

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Table of Contents

1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1-1


1.1 Legislation ........................................................................................................... 1-1
1.1.1 National Environmental Management Act (No. 107 of 1998; NEMA) and
its regulations ............................................................................................... 1-1
1.1.2 The Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993; OHS Act) ............ 1-2
1.1.3 National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act (No. 103 of
1977)............................................................................................................ 1-4
1.2 Study Objectives ................................................................................................. 1-4
1.3 Terms of Reference ............................................................................................. 1-4
1.4 Purpose and Main Activities ................................................................................ 1-5
1.5 Main Hazards Due to Substance and Process..................................................... 1-5
1.6 Approach to the Study ......................................................................................... 1-5
1.7 Software .............................................................................................................. 1-5
2 ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................................... 2-1
2.1 General Background............................................................................................ 2-1
2.2 Meteorology......................................................................................................... 2-2
2.2.1 Surface Winds .............................................................................................. 2-3
2.2.2 Precipitation and Relative Humidity .............................................................. 2-4
2.2.3 Temperature ................................................................................................ 2-5
2.2.4 Atmospheric Stability .................................................................................... 2-6
2.2.5 Default Meteorological Values ...................................................................... 2-8
3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION ......................................................................................... 3-1
3.1 Site ...................................................................................................................... 3-1
3.2 Manufacturing Facility.......................................................................................... 3-2
3.2.1 Maleic Anhydride .......................................................................................... 3-2
3.2.2 Phthalic Anhydride ....................................................................................... 3-3
3.2.3 Food-Acids Plant .......................................................................................... 3-3
3.3 Raw Materials and Process Chemicals................................................................ 3-4
3.3.1 n˗Butane ...................................................................................................... 3-4
3.3.2 o˗Xylene ....................................................................................................... 3-4
3.3.3 Natural Gas .................................................................................................. 3-4
3.3.4 Nitrogen ....................................................................................................... 3-4
3.3.5 Warehouse................................................................................................... 3-4
3.4 Proposed Project ................................................................................................. 3-5
3.4.1 Phthalic Anhydride Esters (Phthalates) Plant ............................................... 3-5
3.4.2 Phthalic Anhydride Esters (Phthalates) Tank Farm ...................................... 3-6
3.4.3 Phthalic Anhydride Conversion to Naphthalene Feedstock .......................... 3-6
3.4.4 Increased Malic Acid Production .................................................................. 3-7
3.5 Summary of Bulk Materials to be Stored on Site .................................................. 3-7
4 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 4-1
4.1 Hazard Identification ............................................................................................ 4-1
4.1.1 Notifiable Substances................................................................................... 4-1
4.1.2 Substance Hazards ...................................................................................... 4-2

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4.1.3 Physical Properties .................................................................................... 4-10


4.2 Process Hazards ............................................................................................... 4-10
4.3 Physical and Consequence Modelling ............................................................... 4-11
4.3.1 Toxic Vapour Clouds .................................................................................. 4-12
4.3.2 Fires ........................................................................................................... 4-13
4.3.3 Explosions.................................................................................................. 4-15
4.4 Risk Analysis ..................................................................................................... 4-18
4.4.1 Background ................................................................................................ 4-18
4.4.2 Predicted Risk ............................................................................................ 4-20
4.4.3 Risk Calculations........................................................................................ 4-27
4.5 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Scenarios ............................................... 4-33
4.5.1 Methodology .............................................................................................. 4-33
4.5.2 Scenario Selection ..................................................................................... 4-34
5 RISK ASSESSMENT .................................................................................................. 5-1
5.1 n˗Butane Storage and Pipeline ............................................................................ 5-1
5.1.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit .................................................................... 5-1
5.1.2 Hazardous Components............................................................................... 5-1
5.1.3 Consequence Modelling ............................................................................... 5-1
5.1.4 Maximum Individual Risks (MIR) ................................................................ 5-10
5.2 Phthalic Anhydride Plant ................................................................................... 5-11
5.2.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit .................................................................. 5-11
5.2.2 Hazardous Components............................................................................. 5-11
5.2.3 Consequence Modelling ............................................................................. 5-11
5.2.4 Maximum Individual Risks (MIR) ................................................................ 5-18
5.3 Maleic Anhydride Plant ...................................................................................... 5-19
5.3.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit .................................................................. 5-19
5.3.2 Hazardous Components............................................................................. 5-19
5.3.3 Consequence Modelling ............................................................................. 5-20
5.3.4 Maximum Individual Risks (MIR) ................................................................ 5-27
5.4 Food-Acids Plant ............................................................................................... 5-28
5.4.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit .................................................................. 5-28
5.4.2 Hazardous Components............................................................................. 5-28
5.5 Natural Gas Pipeline.......................................................................................... 5-29
5.5.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit .................................................................. 5-29
5.5.2 Hazardous Components............................................................................. 5-29
5.5.3 Consequence Modelling ............................................................................. 5-29
5.5.4 Maximum Individual Risks (MIR) ................................................................ 5-34
5.6 Phthalates Plant and Tank Farm (Proposed Project) ......................................... 5-37
5.6.1 The Purpose of the Processing Unit ........................................................... 5-37
5.6.2 Hazardous Components............................................................................. 5-37
5.6.3 Flammable Materials .................................................................................. 5-37
5.6.4 Toxic Materials ........................................................................................... 5-38
5.6.5 Consequence Modelling ............................................................................. 5-39
5.6.6 Maximum Individual Risk ............................................................................ 5-45

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5.7 Site Risk Pre-and Post the Phthalate Project ..................................................... 5-46
6 REDUCTION OF RISK ............................................................................................... 6-1
7 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................... 7-1
7.1 Notifiable Substances .......................................................................................... 7-1
7.2 n˗Butane Storage and Pipeline ............................................................................ 7-1
7.3 Natural Gas Pipeline............................................................................................ 7-2
7.4 Phthalic Anhydride Plant ..................................................................................... 7-2
7.5 Maleic Anhydride Plant ........................................................................................ 7-2
7.6 Food-Acids Plant ................................................................................................. 7-2
7.7 Proposed Phthalates Plant and Tank Farm ......................................................... 7-3
7.8 Impacts on Surrounding Facilities and Residential Areas and Major Hazard
Installations ......................................................................................................... 7-3
7.9 Major Hazard Installation ..................................................................................... 7-3
8 RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................................... 8-1
9 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 9-1
10 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ....................................................................... 10-1
11 APPENDIX A: DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR CERTIFICATE .................................... 11-1
12 APPENDIX B: SANAS CERTIFICATES.................................................................... 12-1
13 APPENDIX C: NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION .................... 13-1
14 APPENDIX D: PADHI LAND-PLANNING TABLES ................................................... 14-1
14.1 Development Type Table 1: People at Work, Parking ........................................ 14-1
14.2 Development Type Table 2: Developments for Use by the General Public ........ 14-2
14.3 Development Type Table 3: Developments for Use by Vulnerable People ........ 14-6
14.4 Development Type Table 4: Very Large and Sensitive Developments ............... 14-7
15 APPENDIX E: MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS ................................................ 15-1
15.1 Butane ............................................................................................................... 15-1
15.2 Butanol .............................................................................................................. 15-2
15.3 Di - 2 Ethylhexyl Adipate (DEHA) ...................................................................... 15-3
15.4 Di - 2 Ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP) ................................................................... 15-4
15.5 Di Butyl Phthalate (DBP) .................................................................................. 15-5
15.6 Di Isodecyl Phthalate (DIDP) ............................................................................. 15-6
15.7 Di Isononyl Phthalate (DINP) ............................................................................. 15-7
15.8 Isodecanol ......................................................................................................... 15-8
15.9 Isononanol......................................................................................................... 15-9
15.10 Maleic Anhydride ............................................................................................. 15-10
15.11 Methane Rich Gas (Sasol)............................................................................... 15-11
15.12 Naphthalene .................................................................................................... 15-12
15.13 Ortho Xylene ................................................................................................... 15-13
15.14 Phthalic Anhydride........................................................................................... 15-14

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List of Figures

Figure 2-1: Location of the Isegen site at Isipingo.......................................................... 2-1


Figure 2-2: Seasonal wind speed as a function of wind direction at Durban South for
the period from 2010 to 2015 ...................................................................... 2-3
Figure 2-3: Atmospheric stability as a function of wind direction .................................... 2-6
Figure 2-4: Representative weather classes for Durban South ...................................... 2-8
Figure 3-1: Layout of the Isegen facility at Isipingo ........................................................ 3-1
Figure 3-2: Simplified process flow diagram for maleic anhydride (MA) production ....... 3-2
Figure 3-3: Simplified flow diagram of phthalic anhydride (PA) production .................... 3-3
Figure 3-4: Simplified flow diagram for food acid production .......................................... 3-3
Figure 3-5: Simplified flow diagram of the phthalates plant ............................................ 3-5
Figure 3-6: Layout of the bulk storage tanks .................................................................. 3-6
Figure 4-1: UK HSE decision-making framework ......................................................... 4-28
Figure 4-2: Town-planning zones for pipelines ............................................................ 4-30
Figure 4-3: Town-planning zones ................................................................................ 4-31
Figure 4-4: Airborne vapours from a loss of containment of liquefied gas stored in a
pressurised vessel..................................................................................... 4-34
Figure 4-5: Event tree for an instantaneous release of a liquefied flammable gas ....... 4-35
Figure 4-6: Event tree for a continuous release of a liquefied flammable gas .............. 4-35
Figure 4-7: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable gas ............................ 4-36
Figure 4-8: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable liquid .......................... 4-36
Figure 5-1: Thermal radiation from n˗butane pool fires .................................................. 5-3
Figure 5-2: Thermal radiation from a jet fire due to a PSV failure .................................. 5-4
Figure 5-3: Flash-fire scenarios with off-site impacts at 9 m/s wind speed ..................... 5-5
Figure 5-4: Blast overpressures of the worst-case n˗butane vapour cloud explosions ... 5-7
Figure 5-5: Predicted lethality from a BLEVE of the n˗butane storage bullet .................. 5-9
Figure 5-6: Risk isopleths for fires and explosions relating to accidental releases
from the n˗butane storage vessel and associated equipment .................... 5-10
Figure 5-7: The impact on the nearest community of ground-level air concentrations
of nitrogen, following a large release, using the AEGL˗2 (832 000 ppm)
value ......................................................................................................... 5-13
Figure 5-8: The extent of a 1% fatality in the open following large releases of
nitrogen ..................................................................................................... 5-14
Figure 5-9: Thermal radiation from a pool fire, due to a loss of containment of the
o˗xylene delivery tanker ............................................................................ 5-15
Figure 5-10: Thermal radiation from a pool fire, due to a loss of containment of
o˗xylene at the western bund .................................................................... 5-16
Figure 5-11: The extent of flash fires from a loss of containment of o˗xylene................. 5-17
Figure 5-12: Thermal radiation from a pool fire, due to a loss of containment of the
o˗xylene delivery tanker ............................................................................ 5-20
Figure 5-13: Thermal radiation from a pool fire, due to a loss of containment of the
o˗xylene storage vessel ............................................................................. 5-21
Figure 5-14: Thermal radiation from an n˗butane jet fire due to a full-bore line rupture .. 5-22
Figure 5-15: Flash-fire scenarios at 9 m/s wind speed................................................... 5-23

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Figure 5-16: Blast overpressures from accidental loss of containment of n˗butane at


the maleic anhydride plant......................................................................... 5-25
Figure 5-17: Predicted lethality from a BLEVE of the n˗butane vaporiser ...................... 5-26
Figure 5-18: Maximum thermal radiation from a jet fire following a full-bore natural
gas pipeline failure .................................................................................... 5-30
Figure 5-19: 1% fatality from jet fire scenarios ............................................................... 5-31
Figure 5-20: Worst-case scenarios for flash fires........................................................... 5-32
Figure 5-21: Blast overpressures of the worst-case vapour cloud explosions for
natural gas ................................................................................................ 5-33
Figure 5-22: Risk contours from accidental jet fires from a large release from the
natural gas reducing station ...................................................................... 5-34
Figure 5-23: Risk contours from accidental flash fires and vapour cloud explosions at
the natural gas reducing station................................................................. 5-35
Figure 5-24 Combined risk for the natural gas reducing station .................................... 5-36
Figure 5-25: Thermal radiation from large fires in the storage area containing tanks
TK101 and TK102 ..................................................................................... 5-40
Figure 5-26: Thermal radiation from large fires in the storage area containing tanks
ACL1/2/3/4 and TK102/103 ....................................................................... 5-41
Figure 5-27: Thermal radiation from large fires in the Tank Farm 2 storage area .......... 5-42
Figure 5-28: Thermal radiation from large fires at the road tanker offloading area ......... 5-43
Figure 5-28: Lethal probability isolines associated with the proposed phthalates plant
and storage ............................................................................................... 5-45
Figure 5-29: Lethal probability isolines associated with the current Isegen facility ......... 5-46
Figure 5-30: Lethal probability isolines associated with the Isegen facility including
the proposed Phthalates Plant and tank farm ............................................ 5-47

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List of Tables

Table 2-1: Long-term rainfall and relative humidity at Durban South ............................ 2-4
Table 2-2: Long-term temperatures measured at Durban ............................................. 2-5
Table 2-3: Classification scheme for atmospheric stability............................................ 2-6
Table 2-4: Representative weather classes .................................................................. 2-7
Table 2-5: Allocation of observations into six weather classes ..................................... 2-7
Table 2-6: Default meteorological values used in simulations, based on local
conditions .................................................................................................... 2-8
Table 3-1: Summary of components to be stored on site.............................................. 3-1
Table 4-1: Exposure to oxygen-deficient atmosphere................................................... 4-4
Table 4-2: Flammable and combustible components to be stored on, produced at
or delivered to site ....................................................................................... 4-9
Table 4-3: Acute exposure guideline level (one hour) for asphyxiants ........................ 4-10
Table 4-4: Thermal radiation guidelines (BS 5980 of 1990) ........................................ 4-13
Table 4-5: Summary of consequences of blast overpressure (Clancey 1972) ............ 4-16
Table 4-6: Damage caused by overpressure effects of an explosion
(Stephens 1970)........................................................................................ 4-17
Table 4-7: Influence of public perception of risk on acceptance of that risk, based
on the POST report ................................................................................... 4-19
Table 4-8: Failure frequencies for atmospheric vessels .............................................. 4-21
Table 4-9: Failure frequencies for pressure vessels ................................................... 4-21
Table 4-10: Failure frequencies for process pipes ........................................................ 4-22
Table 4-11: Failure frequency for centrifugal pumps and compressors......................... 4-22
Table 4-12: Failure frequency for reciprocating pumps and compressors ..................... 4-22
Table 4-13: Failure frequencies for loading and offloading arms and hoses ................. 4-23
Table 4-14: Failure frequencies for road tankers with an atmospheric tank .................. 4-24
Table 4-15: Failure frequencies for road tankers with a pressurised tank ..................... 4-24
Table 4-16: Human failure rates of specific types of tasks ............................................ 4-25
Table 4-17: Probability of direct ignition for stationary installations (RIVM 2009) .......... 4-26
Table 4-18: Classification of flammable substances ..................................................... 4-26
Table 4-19: Land-use decision matrix........................................................................... 4-31
Table 5-1: Maximum distances to thermal-radiation endpoints ..................................... 5-3
Table 5-2: Flammable limits for flash-fire scenarios...................................................... 5-6
Table 5-3: Summary of vapour cloud explosion distances following n˗butane
releases ...................................................................................................... 5-8
Table 5-4: Endpoint distances to the AEGL values for nitrogen releases ................... 5-12
Table 5-5: Maximum distances to the flammable limits .............................................. 5-17
Table 5-6: Flammable limits for flash-fire scenarios.................................................... 5-24
Table 5-7: Flammable and combustible in this section ............................................... 5-37

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THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S
FACILITY AT ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

1 INTRODUCTION

Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Isegen) owns and operate facility in
Isipingo, that produces phthalic anhydride, malic anhydride and food acids. Isegen is
proposing a project to including:
- Construction of a phthalates plant, captively using some the phthalic anhydride
produced on site:
- Including naphthalene storage as alternative raw material for the phthalic anhydride
plant;
- Increasing malic acid production with the inclusion of a centrifuge;
- Construct a bulk liquid tank farm to store raw material and products associated with
the new phthalates plant.

Isegen wishes to start the process and are now seeking Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) authorisation based on the designs of the current phthalate plants with the incorporation
of the raw material and product tank farms.

The purpose of this report is to convey the essential details, which include a short description
of hazards, the receiving environment and current relevant design as well as risks and
consequences of a major incident, with ultimate recommendations for project commencement.

1.1 Legislation

Risk assessments are conducted when required by law or by companies wishing to determine
the risks of the facility for other reasons, such as insurance. In South Africa, risk assessments
are carried out under the legislation of two separate acts, each with different requirements.
These are discussed in the subsections that follow.

1.1.1 National Environmental Management Act (No. 107 of 1998; NEMA) and its
regulations

The National Environmental Management Act (No. 107 of 1998; NEMA) contains the principal
South African environmental legislation. Its primary objective is to make provision for
cooperative governance by establishing principles for decision making on matters related to
the environment, on the formation of institutions that will promote cooperative governance and
on establishing procedures for coordinating environmental functions exercised by organs of
state as well as to provide for matters connected therewith.

Section 30 of the NEMA deals with the control of emergency incidents where an “incident” is
defined as an “unexpected sudden occurrence, including a major emission, fire or explosion
leading to serious danger to the public or potentially serious pollution of or detriment to the
environment, whether immediate or delayed”.

The act defines “pollution” as “any change in the environment caused by:

(i) Substances;

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(ii) Radioactive or other waves; or


(iii) Noise, odours, dust or heat…

Emitted from any activity, including the storage or treatment of waste or substances,
construction and the provision of services, whether engaged in by any person or an
organ of state, where that change has an adverse effect on human health or wellbeing
or on the composition, resilience and productivity of natural or managed ecosystems,
or on materials useful to people, or will have such an effect in the future... ”

“Serious” is not fully defined but would be accepted as having long lasting effects that could
pose a risk to the environment or to the health of the public that is not immediately reversible.

This is similar to the definition of a Major Hazard Installation (MHI) as defined in the
Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHS Act) 85 of 1993 and its MHI regulations.

Section 28 of the NEMA makes provision for anyone who causes pollution or degradation of
the environment to be made responsible for the prevention of the occurrence, continuation or
reoccurrence of related impacts and for the costs of repair to the environment. In terms of the
provisions under Section 28 that are stated as:

“ Every person who causes, has caused or may cause significant pollution or
degradation of the environment must take reasonable measures to prevent such
pollution or degradation from occurring, continuing or recurring, or, in so far as such
harm to the environment is authorised by law or cannot reasonably be avoided or
stopped… ”

1.1.2 The Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993; OHS Act)

The Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993; OHS Act) is primarily intended for
the health and safety of the workers, whereas its MHI regulations are intended for the health
and safety of the public.

The OHS Act shall not apply in respect of:

“ a) A mine, a mining area or any works as defined in the Minerals Act, 1991 (Act
No. 50 of 1991), except in so far as that Act provides otherwise;
b) Any load line ship (including a ship holding a load line exemption certificate),
fishing boat, sealing boat and whaling boat as defined in Section 2 (1) of the
Merchant Shipping Act, 1951 (Act No. 57 of 1951), or any floating crane,
whether or not such ship, boat or crane is in or out of the water within any
harbour in the Republic or within the territorial waters thereof, (date of
commencement of paragraph (b) to be proclaimed.), or in respect of any
person present on or in any such mine, mining area, works, ship, boat or
crane. ”

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1.1.2.1 Major Hazard Installation (MHI) regulations

The Major Hazard Installation (MHI) regulations (2001) published under Section 43 of the
Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHS Act) require employers, self-employed persons and
users who have on their premises, either permanently or temporarily, a major hazard
installation or a quantity of a substance which may pose a risk (our emphasis) that could affect
the health and safety of workers and the public to conduct a risk assessment in accordance
with the legislation. In accordance with legislation, the risk assessment must be done by an
approved inspection authority (AIA), which is registered with the Department of Labour and
accredited by the South African Accreditation System (SANAS), prior to construction of the
facility.

Similar to Section 30 of NEMA as it relates to the health and safety of the public, the MHI
regulations are applicable to the health and safety of workers and the public in relation to the
operation of a facility and specifically in relation to sudden or accidental major incidents
involving substances that could pose a risk to the health and safety of workers and the public.

It is important to note that the MHI regulations are applicable to the risks posed and not merely
the consequences. This implies that both the consequence and likelihood of an event need to
be evaluated, with the classification of an installation being determined on the risk posed to
workers and the public.

Notification of the MHI classification is described in the regulations as an advertisement


placement and specifies the timing of responses from the advertisement. It should be noted
that the regulation does not require public participation.

The regulations, essentially consists of six parts, namely:

1. The duties for notification of a Major Hazard Installation (existing or proposed),


including:
a. Fixed;
b. Temporary installations;
2. The minimum requirements for a quantitative risk assessment (QRA);
3. The requirements for an on-site emergency plan;
4. The reporting steps for risk and emergency occurrences;
5. The general duties required of suppliers;
6. The general duties required of local government.

1.1.2.2 Pressure Equipment Regulations

These regulations apply to the design, manufacture, operation, repair, modification,


maintenance, inspection and testing of pressure equipment, with a design pressure equal to
or greater than 50 kPa, with a view to health and safety.

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1.1.3 National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act (No. 103 of 1977)

National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act (No. 103 of 1977) governs how
buildings should be constructed. The legislation became enforceable as law in September
1985 and two years later was published by the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) as
part of the original Code of Practice for the Application of the National Building Regulations
(SABS 0400-1987).

1.2 Study Objectives

The risk assessment was completed for the purposes of an environmental impact assessment
(EIA), conducted by SRK Consulting (SA). For the purposes of the EIA, this risk assessment
has the main objective to determine any fatal flaws that would prevent the project from
proceeding. This differs from a Major Hazard Installation (MHI) risk assessment, which will
determine if the project could be constructed and operate with risks to employees and the
public at an acceptable level.

The risk assessment should have a statement from a professional person covering the
following questions:

1. Whether the proposed project would likely be considered an MHI;


2. If it is likely to be considered an MHI, whether it would meet the requirements of the
MHI regulations and whether the risks could be engineered or managed to meet
acceptable risks;
4. Whether there are any factors that will prevent the project from proceeding to the next
phase of construction or whether the project could continue under certain conditions
or mitigations;
5. Whether there are any special requirements that local authorities need to know when
evaluating the proposal

1.3 Terms of Reference

The main aim of the investigation was to quantify the risks to employees, neighbours and the
public with regard to the proposed Isegen project including the phthalates plant and associated
tank farm facility and increased malic acid production in Isipingo.

This risk assessment was conducted in accordance with the Major Hazard Installation
regulations and can be used as notification for the facility. The scope of the risk assessment
included:
1 Development of accidental spill and fire scenarios for the facility;
2 Using generic failure rate data (for tanks, pumps, valves, flanges, pipework, gantry,
couplings and so forth), determination of the probability of each accident scenario;
3 For each incident developed in Step 2, determination of consequences (such as
thermal radiation, domino effects, toxic-cloud formation and so forth); or scenarios
with off-site consequences (greater than 1% fatality off-site),
4 Calculation of maximum individual risk (MIR), taking into account all generic failure
rates, initiating events (such as ignition), meteorological conditions and lethality

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1.4 Purpose and Main Activities

Isegen produces commodity chemicals from raw materials that are either piped to site or
delivered by road tanker. Materials produced on site are either used by the neighbouring
company or dispatched by road to customers.

1.5 Main Hazards Due to Substance and Process

The main hazards that would occur with a loss of containment of hazardous components at
the Isegen facility in Isipingo include exposure to:
 Thermal radiation from fires;
 Overpressure from explosions

1.6 Approach to the Study

As mentioned in the previous subsection, the MHI regulations give instructions to the owner
regarding the requirements of the risk assessment but stops short on giving the methodologies
and criteria that must be used for such studies.

As an AIA, RISCOM uses the methodologies and criteria described in the internationally
recognised CPR 18E (1999) (Purple Book) and RIVM (2009). This is a requirement of
accreditation and implies that similar results should be obtained by independent risk assessors
compliant to the aforementioned documents. Furthermore, CPR 18E (1999) (Purple Book)
and RIVM (2009) are legal requirements for conducting quantitative risk assessments (QRAs)
in the Netherlands and form the basis of the commercially available software.

The evaluation and acceptability of the risks is extended to the Health and Safety
Executive (HSE) of the (UK) ALARP criteria, which explains clearly and covers land use based
on the determined risks in the Section 6.

1.7 Software

Physical consequences were calculated with TNO’s EFFECTS v.9.0.23 and DNV’s PHAST
v. 6.7 and the data derived was entered into TNO’s RISKCURVES v. 9.0.26 All calculations
were performed by Mr M P Oberholzer.

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2 ENVIRONMENT

2.1 General Background

As shown in Figure 2-1, the Isegen site is situated at 284 Refinery Road in Isipingo (Durban)
and is located approximately 6 m above sea level near the shore of the Indian Ocean some
15 km south of Durban CBD. Access to the site is restricted, with all personnel and visitors
passing through the SAPREF security control point.

The land use immediately surrounding Isegen is commercial and industrial with the site of
Transnet to the east and NCS Resins and SAPREF to the north. The closest residential area
is Isipingo Beach approximately 1 km southwest of site.

Other than the SAPREF itself, no other neighbouring facility has made itself known as a
MHI facility.

Figure 2-1: Location of the Isegen site at Isipingo

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2.2 Meteorology

Meteorological mechanisms govern dispersion, transformation and eventual removal of


hazardous vapours from the atmosphere. The extent to which hazardous vapours will
accumulate or disperse in the atmosphere is dependent on the degree of thermal and
mechanical turbulence within the earth's boundary layer.

Dispersion comprises of vertical and horizontal components of motion. The stability and the
depth of the atmosphere from the surface (known as the mixing layer) define the vertical
component. The horizontal dispersion of hazardous vapours in the atmospheric boundary
layer is primarily a function of wind field. Wind speed determines both the distance of
downwind transport and the rate of dilution as a result of stretching of the plume, and
generation of mechanical turbulence is a function of the wind speed in combination with
surface roughness. Wind direction and variability in wind direction both determine the general
path hazardous vapours will follow and the extent of crosswind spreading.

Concentration levels of hazardous vapours therefore fluctuate in response to changes in


atmospheric stability, to concurrent variations in the mixing layer depth and to shifts in the
wind field.

There are no South African Weather Services meteorology stations in the vicinity of Hillcrest.
For this report, the meteorological conditions at Durban South, as measured by the South
African Weather Service, were used as the basis of wind speed and direction, temperature,
precipitation and atmospheric humidity and stability.

It should be noted that in August 2014 the weather station at the old Durban International
Airport was moved to Merebank (about 5 km away). Wind speed and direction presented in
this study was based on the old Durban International Airport up to August 2014 and the
Merebank weather station for the remainder of 2014.

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2.2.1 Surface Winds

Hourly averages of wind speed and direction recorded at Durban South were obtained from
the South African Weather Service for the period from the 1st of January 2010 to the 31st of
December 2014.

The wind roses in Figure 2-2 depict seasonal variances of measured wind speeds. In summer
months, wind blows predominantly from the north-northeast and southwest due to sea and
land breezes. Calm conditions were recorded at 5.1% with medium wind speeds.

During the winter months, slow winds predominate from the northwest with sea and land
breezes from the north-northeast and southwest and calm conditions at 15.1%.

Figure 2-2: Seasonal wind speed as a function of wind direction at Durban South
for the period from 2010 to 2015

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2.2.2 Precipitation and Relative Humidity

The long-term rainfall and relative humidity, recorded at Durban South, was obtained from the
South African Weather Service for the period from 1974 to 2004, as given in Table 2-1.

In Durban South there is an average annual rainfall of 1026 mm with the maximum rainfall
ranging from December to March.

The relative humidity typically ranges from 60% (comfortable) to 83% (very humid) over the
course of the year, very rarely dropping below 60% (dry) and reaching as high as 100% (very
humid).

Table 2-1: Long-term rainfall and relative humidity at Durban South


Maximum Minimum
Average Daily Average Daily Average Monthly
Month Relative Relative Rainfall
Humidity Humidity (mm)
(%) (%)
January 83 70 142
February 83 69 124
March 83 68 117
April 82 66 78
May 81 59 38
June 78 53 23
July 76 53 53
August 78 60 51
September 81 66 77
October 82 69 102
November 83 70 108
December 83 70 113
Year 75 59 1026

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2.2.3 Temperature

The long-term temperatures obtained from the South African Weather Service for the period
from 1974 to 2004 are given in Table 2-2.

The surrounding region has a temperate climate with the average daily maximum between
22°C and 28°C. Temperatures rarely extend below 10°C, with the mean average of the daily
temperature recorded at 21°C.

Table 2-2: Long-term temperatures measured at Durban


Temperature (°C)
Month Highest Average Daily Average Daily Average Daily
Recorded Mean Maximum Minimum
January 36.2 24.5 27.8 21.2
February 36.6 25.0 28.3 21.6
March 36.1 24.1 27.7 20.4
April 38.1 22.2 26.4 17.9
May 34.4 19.5 24.8 14.2
June 36.0 17.2 23.4 11.0
July 33.8 16.9 22.8 10.9
August 37.1 18.0 23.0 12.9
September 35.5 19.5 23.4 15.5
October 40.0 20.6 24.1 17.0
November 33.3 22.0 25.5 18.5
December 35.9 23.7 27.0 20.3
Year 40.0 21.1 25.4 16.8

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2.2.4 Atmospheric Stability

Atmospheric stability is frequently categorised into one of six stability classes. These are
briefly described in Table 2-3. Atmospheric stability, in combination with wind speed, is
important in determining the extent of a particular hazardous vapour release.

A very stable atmospheric condition, typically at night, would have low wind speeds and
produce the greatest endpoint for a dense gas. Conversely, a buoyant gas would have the
greatest endpoint distance at high wind speeds.

Table 2-3: Classification scheme for atmospheric stability


Stability Stability
Description
Class Classification
A Very unstable Calm wind, clear skies, hot conditions during the day
B Moderately unstable Clear skies during the day
Moderate wind, slightly overcast conditions during the
C Unstable
day
D Neutral Strong winds or cloudy days and nights
E Stable Moderate wind, slightly overcast conditions at night
F Very stable Low winds, clear skies, cold conditions at night

The atmospheric stability for Durban South, as a function of the wind class, was calculated
from hourly weather values supplied by the South African Weather Service from the 1st of
January 2010 to the 31st of December 2014, as given in Figure 2-3.

Atmospheric Stability at Durban

F
Frequency %

E
D
C
B
A

Wind Direction

Figure 2-3: Atmospheric stability as a function of wind direction

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Calculations for this risk assessment are based on six representative weather classes
covering stability conditions of stable, neutral and unstable as well as low and high wind
speeds. In terms of Pasquill classes, representative conditions are given in Table 2-4.

Table 2-4: Representative weather classes


Stability Class Wind (m/s)
B 3
D 1.5
D 5
D 9
E 5
F 1.5

As wind velocities are vector quantities (having speed and direction) and blow preferentially
in certain directions, it is mathematically incorrect to give an average wind speed over 360° of
wind direction; the result would be incorrect risk calculations.

It would also be incorrect to base risk calculations on one wind category, such as 1.5/F for
example. In order to obtain representative risk calculations, hourly weather data for wind
speed and direction was analysed over a five-year period and categorised into the six wind
classes for day and night conditions and 16 wind directions. The risk was then determined
using contributions from each wind class in various wind directions.

The allocation of observations into the six weather classes is summarised in Table 2-5 with
the representative weather classes given in Figure 2-4.

Table 2-5: Allocation of observations into six weather classes


Wind Speed A B B/C C C/D D E F
< 2.5 m/s D 1.5 m/s F 1.5 m/s
2.5 - 6 m/s B 3 m/s D 5 m/s
E 5 m/s
> 6 m/s D 9 m/s

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Representative Weather Classes as a Function


of Wind Direction for
Durban

F1.5
E5
Frequency (%)

D9
D5
D1.5
B3

Wind Direction

Figure 2-4: Representative weather classes for Durban South

2.2.5 Default Meteorological Values

Default meteorological values used in simulations, based on local conditions, are given in
Table 2-6.

Table 2-6: Default meteorological values used in simulations, based on local


conditions
Parameter Default Value (Day) Default Value (Night)
Ambient temperature (°C) 25.3 16.7
Substrate or bund temperature (°C) 21 21
Water temperature (°C) 21 21
Air pressure (bar) 1.013 1.013
Humidity (%) 64 81
Fraction of a 24-hour period 0.5 0.5
1 1
Mixing height

1 The default values for the mixing height, which are included in the model, are:
1500 m for Weather Category B3; 300 m for Weather Category D1.5; 500 m for Weather Category D5
and Weather Category D9; 230 m for Weather Category E5; and, 50 m for Weather Category F1.5.

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3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

3.1 Site

The Isegen site at Isipingo produces a variety of chemicals including: phthalic anhydride,
maleic anhydride, malic acid, fumaric acid and cream of tartar. In the manufacture of maleic
anhydride and phthalic anhydride flammable liquids are used as raw materials and process
chemicals. The plant layout is shown below in Figure 3-1, indicating the existing facilities as
well as the proposed phthalates facility and tank farm.

No. Description No. Description


1 n˗Butane bullet 9 New phthalates plant
2 Workshops 10 Maleic anhydride plant 2
3 Boiler 11 Food acids plant
4 Contractor area 12 Control room
5 Product warehouse and store 13 Laboratory
6 Training and conference centre 14 Medical centre
7 Offices 15 Gas reduction station
8 Phthalic anhydride plants 16 Nitrogen
17 New tank farm
Figure 3-1: Layout of the Isegen facility at Isipingo

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3.2 Manufacturing Facility

The facilities listed in the subsections below are existing installations on the establishment;

3.2.1 Maleic Anhydride

Maleic anhydride is produced by the partial oxidation of n˗butane, using a catalyst at elevated
temperatures, as shown in Figure 3-2 The gaseous reactor effluent is cooled and the
condensed product is collected as a crude, molten maleic anhydride. The saturated air from
the reactor is scrubbed with a water solution to remove the remaining maleic anhydride. During
the scrubbing process the maleic anhydride reacts with the water forming maleic acid.

The crude maleic anhydride and the maleic acid are refined in a single-batch distillation unit,
using o˗xylene as an entrainer. The pure maleic anhydride is stored in heated vessels to
prevent freezing.

Maleic anhydride is either used to produce food acids in the foods plant, sold as a molten
product or cooled into pastels and sold as a solid product.

The production of maleic anhydride is exothermic and produces steam that is used in the
distillation process or exported to other plants when required.

Due to the partial oxidation of butane in the reactor, the reactor is specifically designed to
reduce the inventory of flammable materials and the reactor is protected from potential internal
explosions with bursting disks, specifically designed by the reactor designer.

Figure 3-2: Simplified process flow diagram for maleic anhydride (MA) production

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3.2.2 Phthalic Anhydride

Phthalic anhydride is produced from o˗xylene in a similar manner to maleic anhydride, as


shown in Figure 3-3. The reaction is a partial oxidation of o˗xylene over a catalyst at high
temperatures. The phthalic anhydride is removed from the reactor’s effluent gases in switch
condensers. Molten crude phthalic anhydride is drained into a storage tank and is purified in
a batch distillation column.

The gases from the switch condensers that contain residual phthalic anhydride pass through
a catalytic converter to destroy all residual organics, prior to release into the atmosphere.

Phthalic anhydride is either sold as molten material or cooled and sold as solid flakes.

Due to the partial oxidation of xylene in the reactor, the reactor is specifically designed to
reduce the inventory of flammable materials and the reactor is protected from potential internal
explosions with bursting disks, specifically designed by the reactor designer.

Figure 3-3: Simplified flow diagram of phthalic anhydride (PA) production

3.2.3 Food-Acids Plant

The food-acids plant produces food-grade malic and fumaric acids. This process consists of
reacting maleic anhydride with water at an elevated temperature and purifying the material
prior to spray granulating the material into solid particles for sale, as shown in Figure 3-4.

Figure 3-4: Simplified flow diagram for food acid production

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3.3 Raw Materials and Process Chemicals

The current facility consists of the following raw materials and process chemicals.

3.3.1 n˗Butane

n˗Butane is used as raw material for the manufacture of maleic anhydride. It is piped to the
Isegen site from the adjacent refinery as a liquid at 500 kPa and 15°C. The liquid n˗butane
entering the maleic anhydride plants is vaporised in butane vaporisers and fed to the maleic
anhydride reactors.

An aboveground n˗butane bullet of 975 m3 (approximately 50 m in length and 5 m in diameter)


has been installed for surge capacity when the adjacent refinery is down or cannot supply the
required n˗butane. The bullet was installed by a specialist company in bulk gas installations in
accordance to SANS 10087.

3.3.2 o˗Xylene

o˗Xylene is used as a raw material for the manufacture of phthalic anhydride and as an
entrainer for the purification of maleic anhydride.

o˗Xylene is brought to site in road tankers and pumped from the tanker into the dedicated
o˗xylene tanks. From the o˗xylene tank it is then pumped to either the phthalic anhydride
plant or the maleic anhydride plant.

3.3.3 Natural Gas

Natural gas, supplied by Sasol, is transported to site via a 100 mm NB pipeline at 625 kPag
and is reduced to 100 kPag at the reducing station located at the main entrance of the site.
Natural gas is then transported to the PA plant and the standby boiler where the natural gas
is reduced further to approximately 15 kPag.

3.3.4 Nitrogen

A 14.8 t bulk nitrogen tank is located at the eastern side of the phthalic anhydride plant, as
shown in Figure 3-1, and used as an inert gas for the process. Liquid nitrogen is delivered to
site in road tankers of approximately 18 t and are offloaded adjacent to the storage tank. The
frequency of delivery is twice per week.

3.3.5 Warehouse

Solid products of maleic anhydride, phthalic anhydride, malic acid and fumaric acid are kept
in a warehouse on site from where the products are dispatched to customers.

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3.4 Proposed Project

The proposed project consists of the following facilities;

3.4.1 Phthalic Anhydride Esters (Phthalates) Plant

Phthalates are a range of esters formed when alcohols are reacted with phthalic anhydride.
The reaction takes place in a batch reactor at elevated temperatures, using an acidic catalyst.
The water formed during the reaction is removed and sent to the effluent system. The wet
alcohol is sent to intermediate tanks for re-use, while the phthalate is sent to a designated
tank, from which it is dispatched into bulk tankers, isotainers and drums.

Figure 3-5: Simplified flow diagram of the phthalates plant

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3.4.2 Phthalic Anhydride Esters (Phthalates) Tank Farm

The bulk tanks required for the phthalate project would use the currently unused tanks with
inclusion of additional tanks within the existing bulk tank area as shown in Figure 3-6. The
tank details are given in Table 3-1.

Day tanks for the use of the phthalate manufacturing process would be located at the plant
area.

Figure 3-6: Layout of the bulk storage tanks

3.4.3 Phthalic Anhydride Conversion to Naphthalene Feedstock

Currently the phthalic anhydride plant uses o-xylene as raw material. Naphthalene can also
be used a raw material, with minimal plant changes.

The naphthalene would be delivered to site and offloaded into storage tanks located in the
new tank farm.

Steam would be provided to the storage tanks to keep the naphthalene in the molten state.

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3.4.4 Increased Malic Acid Production

The production of malic acid would be increased with the addition of centrifuges to
debottleneck the facility.

3.5 Summary of Bulk Materials to be Stored on Site

A summary of bulk materials that can give hazardous effects that are to be stored on site is
given in Table 3-1.

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Table 3-1: Summary of components to be stored on site

CAS No Tank Tank Tank Bund


Tank
Product Tank Type Height Diameter Volume Volume Comment
No.
(m) (m) (m3) (m3)
01OA107-01 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 4.572 5.486 80 206.3 Existing
01OA107-02 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 4.572 5.486 80 206.3 Existing
01OA107-03 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 4.572 5.486 80 206.3 Existing
01OA107-04 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 4.572 5.486 80 206.3 Existing
F420 o˗Xylene 95-47-6 Atmospheric 3.6 3.5 34.6 34.6 MA Plant
106-97-8 Horizontal
D360 n˗Butane pressure 50 5 975 Nil LPG Area
vessel
26761-40-0 Tank Farm
N/N DIDP Atmospheric 8 5.64 200 TBC
1
26761-40-0 Tank Farm
N/N DIDP Atmospheric 12 7.28 200 TBC
1
104-76-7 Atmospheric Tank Farm
2EH 5.32 200 618.3
TK100 1
104-76-7 Atmospheric Tank Farm
2EH 5.32 200 618.3
TK101 1
27458-94-2 Atmospheric Tank Farm
INA 9 5.32 200 618.3
ACL 1 1
27458-94-2 Atmospheric Tank Farm
9 5.32 200 618.3
ACL 2 INA 1
117-81-7 Atmospheric Tank Farm
5 4.4 76 618.3
ACL 3 DEHP HC 1
117-81-7 Atmospheric Tank Farm
6 5.2 130 618.3
ACL 4 DEHP CG 1
TK-118 Atmospheric Not in use

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CAS No Tank Tank Tank Bund


Tank
Product Tank Type Height Diameter Volume Volume Comment
No.
(m) (m) (m3) (m3)
Naphthalene Naphthalene 91-20-3 Tank Farm
Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90 TBC
2
Naphthalene Naphthalene 91-20-3 Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90 TBC Tank Farm 2
Naphthalene Naphthalene 91-20-3 Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90 TBC Tank Farm 2
Naphthalene Naphthalene 91-20-3 Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90 TBC Tank Farm 2
Butanol Butanol 71-36-3 Atmospheric 5 3.91 60 TBC Tank Farm 2
IDA IDA 25339-17-7 Atmospheric 6 5.25 130 TBC Tank Farm 2
DBP DBP 84-74-2 Atmospheric 6 4.9 113 TBC Tank Farm 2
DEHA DEHA 103-23-1 Atmospheric 9 5.32 200 TBC Tank Farm 2
Mixed Mixed Tank Farm 2
Atmospheric TBC TBC 180 TBC
Phthalates Phthalates
7 tanks at
Intermediates Phthalates Atmospheric 3 2.35 13 TBC Phthalates
Plant
7 tanks at
Wet Alcohol Alcohols Atmospheric 3 2.35 13 TBC Phthalates
Plant
Malic acid
Malic Acid Malic Acid 617-48-1 Atmospheric 4.5 5.05 90
plant

Abbreviations

Component Name
DIDP Di isodecyl phthalate
2EH 2-Ethylhexanol
INA Isononanol

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DEHP HC 2 Ethylhexyl phthalate - high colour


DEHP CG 2 Ethylhexyl phthalate crystal grade
IDA Isodecanol
DBP Di butyl phthalate

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4 METHODOLOGY

4.1 Hazard Identification

The first step in any risk assessment is to identify all hazards. The merit of including a hazard
for further investigation is then determined by how significant it is, normally by using a cut-off
or threshold value.

Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to assess it in terms of the risk it presents
to the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle, both probability and
consequence should be considered but there are occasions where, if either the probability or
the consequence can be shown to be sufficiently low or sufficiently high, decisions can be
made based on just one factor.

During the hazard identification component of the report, the following considerations are
taken into account:

 Chemical identities;
 Location of on-site installations that use, produce, process, transport or store
hazardous components;
 Type and design of containers, vessels or pipelines;
 Quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release;
 Nature of the hazard most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or releases,
e.g. airborne toxic vapours or mists, fires or explosions, large quantities to be stored
and certain handling conditions of processed components.

The evaluation methodology assumes that the facility will perform as designed in absence of
unintended events, such as component and material failures of equipment, human errors,
external events and process unknowns.

4.1.1 Notifiable Substances

The General Machinery Regulation 8 and its Schedule A on notifiable substances requires
any employer who has a substance equal to or exceeding the quantity listed in the regulation
to notify the divisional director. A site is classified as a Major Hazard Installation if it contains
one or more notifiable substances or if the off-site risk is sufficiently high. The latter can only
be determined from a quantitative risk assessment.

As the n˗butane bullet contains more than 25 t, the stored n˗butane is classified as a
notifiable substance and qualifies the Isegen site (Isipingo) as a Major Hazard
Installation.

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4.1.2 Substance Hazards

All components on site were assessed for potential hazards according to the criteria discussed
in this section.

4.1.2.1 Chemical Properties

A short description of bulk hazardous components stored on, produced at or delivered to site
is given below. The material safety data sheets (MSDSs) of the respective materials are
attached in Appendix E.

 n˗Butane

n˗Butane is a colourless, flammable gas at atmospheric pressure and normal temperature. It


is a colourless flammable gas at atmospheric pressure and normal temperature, with a
characteristic natural gas odour. At higher pressures, it will condense to a liquid state at
ambient temperatures. It is commonly shipped as a liquid, stored in low pressure tanks under
its own vapour pressure at 21°C.

Due to its extreme flammability, n˗butane is a dangerous and explosive hazard.

n˗Butane is a simple asphyxiant, has an anaesthetic effect but is not considered to be a toxic
gas. There are apparently no ill effects from remaining for several minutes in an atmosphere
containing as high as 5% n˗butane, in the lower flammable range, or from repeated exposures.

 o-Xylene

o˗Xylene is a clear, colourless liquid at normal temperatures and has an aromatic odour. It is
flammable and explosive in the range of 1-7% by volume in air. It has a relative vapour density
of 3.66 (air = 1) and may travel along the ground and low points for some distance to an
ignition source.

o˗Xylene will react violently with nitric acid, sulphuric acid and other strong oxidisers and could
result in fires and explosions.

From available evidence, o˗xylene is not carcinogenic, mutagenic and does not have a tendency
to cause damage to genetic material.

Exposure to o˗xylene results primarily in the depression of the central nervous system. The
principal effects from inhalation are narcotic. Acute exposure to more than 200 ppm or chronic
exposure to 100-200 ppm may lead to headaches and mental irritation as well as confusion,
drowsiness, nausea, vomiting, coughing and catarrh and irritation of the skin and eyes. No
chronic organ toxicity has been observed; any kidney and liver damage is reversible. Exposure
to very high concentrations (greater than 10 000 ppm) can cause unconsciousness. Vapours
can also cause slight irritation to the nose, eyes and respiratory system. If taken into the lungs,
it may cause severe coughing, distress and rapidly developing pulmonary oedema.

Exposure to liquid o˗xylene may cause irritation to eyes and skin. If ingested, it may cause
nausea or vomiting, swelling of the abdomen, headache, depression and coma that could
result in death. The liquid may cause damage to the linings of the stomach and intestine,
kidney and liver damage may occur. The oral LD50 (rat) is 4300 mg/kg.

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 Maleic Anhydride

Pure maleic anhydride is a white solid at ambient temperatures and a clear liquid above 53°C.
It is combustible with a flash point of 102°C.

As a liquid, maleic anhydride decomposes in the presence of small quantities of alkali metals
or amines; at temperatures above 150°C a rapid exothermic reaction can take place producing
a gas which could cause equipment to rupture.

Maleic anhydride is an intense local irritant to body tissues. On moist tissues, whether skin or
mucous membrane, the irritant is manifest sooner, due to hydrolysis to maleic acid. The dust
and vapour are irritating to the skin, eyes, throat and upper respiratory tract.

Maleic anhydride possesses few systemic toxic properties. Oral feedings of maleic anhydride
show a low order of toxicity. No systemic effects have been reported for acute short-term or
repeated exposure.

Solid maleic anhydride may not cause an immediate burning sensation upon contact with the
skin, especially if the skin is dry. However, it may cause reddening and occasional blistering, if
the exposure is prolonged and severe.

Upon inhalation of dust or vapours, coughing and sneezing together with burning and irritation
of the throat may occur.

The eyes are particularly sensitive to the dust and vapours. Marked irritation and conjunctive
and corneal swelling may occur. Photophobia together with double vision may be present.
These effects are usually temporary.

 Phthalic Anhydride

Phthalic anhydride is a solid at room temperature with a mild odour. It is commercially sold in
the solid form of crystalline needles or flakes. It has a melting point of 131.2°C and is often
stored and sold as a molten liquid.

Phthalic anhydride has a flammable range of 1.7-10.4% and can form explosive mixtures in air.
It is listed in SABS 0108 as a Class I dust that can ignite and propagate flame readily. It is stable
under normal conditions but is incompatible with copper (II) oxide or sodium nitrite and will
explode violently if heated with these components.

Phthalic anhydride is listed under SANS 10228:2003 as corrosive. The dust, fumes or vapours
are severely irritating to the eyes, respiratory tract, skin and, especially, to moist tissues. It is
less irritating than other industrial acid anhydrides such as maleic anhydride but impurities such
as naphthoquinone and maleic anhydride contribute further to its irritancy.

It is a direct but delayed skin irritant and may cause burns if held in contact with the skin.
Prolonged or repeated exposure causes dermatitis and sensitisation, erythema and,
occasionally, urticaria and eczematous response have also been reported.

Inhalation of dust or vapours causes coughing, sneezing and bloody nasal discharge. Workers
exposed to undetermined concentrations of the acid and anhydride suffered atrophy of the nasal
mucosa, hoarseness, bloody spit, bronchitis, emphysema and several cases of bronchial

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asthma. Phthalic anhydride is a possible pulmonary sensitiser; a case of an exposed worker,


with rhinorrhoea, wheezing and lacrimation, who was shown to have a positive patch test to
phthalic anhydride, has been reported. Repeated exposure to phthalic anhydride may cause
irritation of the mucous membranes, asthma and diseases of the respiratory and digestive
systems. Numerous symptoms of respiratory tract injury have been noted in phthalic anhydride
production workers.

Conjunctivitis has been reported in workers exposed to 30 mg/m3 and mucous membrane
irritation occurring at 25 mg/m3. Fumes from molten phthalic anhydride are especially irritating
to the eyes.

 Nitrogen

Nitrogen is a colourless, odourless gas that is non-flammable and can be considered inert
since it does not readily react with other components.

It has a molecular weight of 28 and has a similar density to air. It could accumulate in confined
areas and low points displacing oxygen, which may result in asphyxiation. Typical oxygen
deficiencies effects are given in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1: Exposure to oxygen-deficient atmosphere


Oxygen
Signs and Symptoms of Persons at Rest
Content of Air
Decreased ability to work strenuously
15%–19.5% May impair coordination and may induce symptoms in persons with
coronary, pulmonary or circulatory problems
Respiration deepens, increased pulse rate and impaired coordination,
12%–15%
perception and judgment
Further increase in rate and depth of respiration, further increase in
10%–12%
pulse rate, performance failure, giddiness, poor judgment and blue lips
Mental failure, nausea, vomiting, fainting, unconsciousness, ashen face
8%–10%
and blue lips
Eight minutes may be fatal in 50-100% of exposures; six minutes may
6%–8% be fatal in 25-50% of exposures; and, after four to five minutes there
may be recovery with treatment
4%–6% Coma in 40 seconds; convulsions, respiration ceases and death

Nitrogen is normally stored as a liquid at low temperatures and elevated pressures. Exposure
to liquid nitrogen can cause frostbite.

It can only be absorbed into the body by inhalation with resultant asphyxiation risks.

 Fuel/Sasol/Natural Gas

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The composition of natural gas is primarily methane (±95% v/v), with other components
including ethane, propane and nitrogen.

Given the flammable and potentially explosive nature of natural gas, fires and vapour cloud
explosions represent the primary hazards associated with the transfer of the gas. The gas is
a fire and explosion hazard when it is exposed to heat and flame. The lower explosive
limit (LEL) of natural gas is 5% v/v (meaning 5% gas to 95% air, measured by volume) and
the upper explosive limit (UEL) is 15% v/v. In unconfined atmospheric conditions, the
likelihood of an explosion is expected to be small.

Natural gas is not compatible with strong oxidants and could result in fires and explosions in
the presence of such materials.

Natural gas is nontoxic and is to be considered as an asphyxiant only. Chronic and long-term
effects are low and are not listed.

 Isononanol

Isononanol appears as a clear, colourless liquid without visible impurities and may be
recognized by its specific odour. It dissolves slightly in the water but easily in organic solvents.
It is combustible with a flash point of 59 C and its vapours can form explosive mixtures with
air. It reacts with strong oxidants.

Its vapours may cause drowsiness and dizziness. Contact causes skin irritation and serious
eye damage. However, is not toxic after single exposure (oral, inhalation, skin) and has no
sensitizing effects.

 Naphthalene

Molten naphthalene is a whitish coloured semi-liquid with a strong coal-tar odour. In the molten
form, it is very hot and could result in thermal burns when exposed to the skin. Exposure to
skin must be avoided. With a melting and flash point of 80°C, naphthalene is not considered
flammable, but it may sustain combustion when ignited. The vapours given off by the material
may be toxic.

Naphthalene can react violently with strong oxidizing agents with fire and explosion hazards.

Naphthalene can be absorbed by mouth, through inhalation and through the skin and can
cross the placenta in amounts sufficient to cause foetal toxicity. The most commonly observed
effect of naphthalene toxicity following acute oral exposure or inhalation in humans is
haemolytic anemia associated with decreased haemoglobin and haematocrit values,
increased reticulocyte counts, presence of Heinz bodies and increased serum bilirubin levels.

Long-term or repeated exposure may have effects on the blood, resulting in chronic haemolytic
anaemia. The substance may have effects on the eyes, resulting in the development of
cataract. Naphthalene is possibly carcinogenic to humans.

 2-Ethylhexanol (2-EH)

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2-Ethylhexanol is a clear, colourless liquid with a mild odour that is nearly insoluble in water
but soluble in most organic solvents.

2-Ethylhexanol is combustible with a flash point of 82°C. It reacts with strong acids or strong
oxidizers

It may cause severe irritation or injury to eyes and may cause moderate to severe irritation to
skin and local redness with continued contact. Sustained inhalation may cause respiratory
irritation and central nervous system depression; however, it has low toxicity if swallowed.

It is slightly harmful to fish and other aquatic organisms on an acute basis. It is unlikely to
persist in the environment as it is readily biodegradable.

 Phthalic Anhydride

Phthalic anhydride is a solid at room temperature with a mild odour. It is commercially sold in
the solid form of crystalline needles or flakes. Phthalic anhydride has a melting point of
131.2°C and is often stored and sold as a molten liquid.

Phthalic anhydride has a flammable range of 1.7-10.4% and can form explosive mixtures in air.
It is listed in SABS 0108 as a Class I dust that can ignite and propagate flame readily. It is stable
under normal conditions but is incompatible with copper (II) oxide or sodium nitrite and will
explode violently if heated with these components.

Phthalic anhydride is listed under SANS 10228:2003 as corrosive. Phthalic anhydride dust,
fume or vapours are severely irritating to the eyes, respiratory tract, skin and, especially, to moist
tissues. It is less irritating than other industrial acid anhydrides such as maleic anhydride but
impurities such as naphthoquinone and maleic anhydride contribute further to its irritancy.

Phthalic anhydride is a direct but delayed skin irritant and may cause burns if held in contact
with the skin. Prolonged or repeated exposure causes dermatitis and sensitisation, erythema
and, occasionally, urticaria and eczematous response have also been reported.

Inhalation of dust or vapours causes coughing, sneezing and bloody nasal discharge. Workers
exposed to undetermined concentrations of the acid and anhydride suffered atrophy of the nasal
mucosa, hoarseness, bloody spit, bronchitis, emphysema and several cases of bronchial
asthma. Phthalic anhydride is a possible pulmonary sensitiser; a case of an exposed worker,
with rhinorrhoea, wheezing and lacrimation, who was shown to have a positive patch test to
phthalic anhydride, has been reported. Repeated exposure to phthalic anhydride may cause
irritation of the mucous membranes, asthma and diseases of the respiratory and digestive
systems. Numerous symptoms of respiratory tract injury have been noted in phthalic anhydride
production workers.

Conjunctivitis has been reported in workers exposed to 30 mg/m3 phthalic anhydride and
mucous membrane irritation occurring at 25 mg/m3. Fumes from molten phthalic anhydride are
especially irritating to the eyes.

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 Dibutyl Phthalate (DBP)

Dibutyl phthalate (DBP) is a colourless to faint yellow liquid with a slight aromatic odour. It is
combustible and has a slight fire hazard when exposed to heat or flame, with a flash point of
146°C. Above the flash point, vapour-air mixtures are explosive within the flammable limits.

DBP causes skin irritation and severe eye irritation and it may cause an allergic skin reaction
(including rare instances of contact burns) and respiratory tract irritation. It is harmful if
swallowed and may be harmful if inhaled. Inhalation of vapours or mists is not expected unless
this material is heated or misted. Symptoms of ingestion include nausea and vomiting,
dizziness, light sensitivity, swelling of the eyelids, watering of the eyes and kidney effects (red
and white blood cells and oxalate crystals in the urine). In addition to all of the above, it may
cause harm to an unborn child and has a possible risk of impaired fertility associated with it.
Women working where phthalates are used had higher incidence of miscarriages, menstrual
disorders and reduced gestation periods.

Moreover, it is very toxic to aquatic organisms.

 Dioctyl Phthalate (DOP)

Dioctyl phthalate (DOP) is a clear liquid with a mild odour. With a flash point of 221°C, DOP is
not considered flammable. It is not acutely toxic, and the primary hazard is the threat to the
environment. Immediate steps should be taken to limit its spread into the environment. As a
liquid, it can easily penetrate the soil and contaminate groundwater as well as nearby streams.
Eye contact may produce severe irritation and direct skin contact may produce mild irritation.

Dioctyl phthalate reacts with acids to liberate heat along with alcohols and acids. Mixing with
strong oxidizing acids may cause a vigorous reaction that is sufficiently exothermic to ignite
the reaction products. Heat can also be generated by the interaction with caustic solutions.
Flammable hydrogen may be generated by mixing with alkali metals and hydrides. DOP can
generate electrostatic charges by swirling or pouring.

 Diisononyl Phthalate (DINP)

Diisononyl phthalate (DINP) is a colourless to faint yellow, non-volatile, stable liquid, with a
mild odour. It is combustible at high temperatures, with a flash point of 216°C. Combustion
may produce carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and reactive hydrocarbons. Irritating or toxic
substances may be emitted upon thermal decomposition.

Repeated or prolonged exposure may cause dermatitis. DINP contains a component that can
cause allergic skin reactions in some individuals. It is absorbed through the skin, and it may
be irritating to the respiratory tract, with a sore throat, coughing and shortness of breath.
Aspiration into lungs may cause pneumonitis. Also, it can be harmful to the central nervous
system. If swallowed, it may cause gastrointestinal disturbances, with irritation, nausea,
vomiting and diarrhoea.

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 Diisodecyl Phthalate (DIDP)

Diisononyl phthalate (DINP) is a colourless to faint yellow, non-volatile, stable liquid and is
almost odourless. It is combustible with a flash point of 232°C.

Liquid or mist may cause slight transient irritation to the eyes and prolonged or repeated
contact may cause slight irritation to the skin. Swallowing may irritate the gastrointestinal tract
and a large dose may have the following effects: nausea; vomiting; and, central nervous
system depression. Exposure to vapour at high concentrations may cause irritation of the
nose, throat and respiratory tract.

Long-term studies have shown that in rats and mice the lifetime consumption of large amounts
will produce liver cancer

4.1.2.2 Corrosive Liquids

Corrosive liquids considered under this subsection are those components that have a low or
high pH and that may cause burns if they come into contact with people or may attack and
cause failure of equipment.

Maleic and phthalic anhydride and food acids are considered corrosive but are stored
sufficiently far from the site boundary that a release would not affect the public.

4.1.2.3 Reactive Components

Reactive components are components that when mixed or exposed to one another react in a
way that may cause a fire, explosion or release a toxic component.

All components to be stored on, produced at or delivered to site are considered thermally
stable in atmospheric conditions. The reaction with air is covered under the subsection dealing
with ignition probabilities.

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4.1.2.4 Flammable and Combustible Components

Flammable and combustible components are those that can ignite and give a number of
hazardous effects, depending on the nature of the component and conditions. These effects
may include pool fires, jet fires and flash fires as well as explosions and fireballs.

The flammable and combustible components to be stored on, produced at or delivered to site
are listed in Table 4-2. These components have been analysed for fire and explosion risks.

Table 4-2: Flammable and combustible components to be stored on, produced at


or delivered to site
Flash Point Boiling Point
Compound Comment
(°C) (°C)
n˗Butane -60 -0.5
Maleic anhydride 102 202
Phthalic anhydride 152 285
Natural gas Gas Gas
o-Xylene 17 145
n-Butanol 29 118
Isononanol >80 212-219
Naphthalene 79 218 Sublimes at 79°C
2-EH 82 217
DBP 157 340
DOP 216 384
DINP 216 409
DIDP 229 250-267
DEHP 195 385
Isodecanol 104 212-216
DEHA 200 418

Abbreviations
Component Name
DIDP Di isodecyl phthalate
2EH 2-Ethylhexanol
INA Isononanol
DEHP HC 2 Ethylhexyl phthalate - high colour
DEHP CG 2 Ethylhexyl phthalate crystal grade
IDA Isodecanol
DBP Di butyl phthalate
DEHA Di 2 ethylhexyl adipate

4.1.2.5 Toxic and Asphyxiant Components

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Toxic or asphyxiant components of interest to this study are those that could produce
dispersing vapour clouds upon release into the atmosphere. These could subsequently cause
harm through inhalation or absorption through the skin. Typically, the hazard posed by toxic
or asphyxiant components will depend on both concentration of the material in the air and the
exposure duration.

Nitrogen is not considered toxic but will act as asphyxiant by replacing oxygen. The one hour
AEGL values are given in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3: Acute exposure guideline level1 (one hour) for asphyxiants
ERPG-1 ERPG-2 ERPG-3
Compound 3 3
mg/m ppm mg/m ppm mg/m3 ppm
Nitrogen2 750 000 796 000 957 000 832 000 1 000 000 869 000

4.1.3 Physical Properties

For this study, components were modelled as a pure component, based on the DIPPR3 data
base.

4.2 Process Hazards

Maleic anhydride and phthalic anhydride are produced in reactors at high temperatures
producing steam at high pressures. Due to the partial oxidation process, there is always a
chance for explosions in the reactor, which are mechanically protected with bursting disks, as
specified by the technology supplier.

The phthalate manufacture can operate at elevated temperatures, but pressures that would
not be considered harmful.

1 Acute Exposure Guideline Level values published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
AEGLs represent threshold exposure limits for the general public:
AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general
population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain
asymptomatic nonsensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible
upon cessation of exposure
AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general
population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting
adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape.
AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general
population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or death.
Although the AEGL values represent threshold levels for the general public, including susceptible
subpopulations, such as infants, children, the elderly, persons with asthma, and those with other illnesses,
it is recognised that individuals, subject to unique or idiosyncratic responses, could experience the effects
described at concentrations below the corresponding AEGL.
2 Total values
3 Design Institute for Physical PRoperties

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4.3 Physical and Consequence Modelling

In order to establish which impacts, follow an accident, it is first necessary to estimate the
physical process of the spill (i.e. rate and size), spreading of the spill, evaporation from the
spill, subsequent atmospheric dispersion of the airborne cloud and, in the case of ignition, the
burning rate and resulting thermal radiation from a fire and the overpressures from an
explosion.

The second step is then to estimate the consequences of a release on humans, fauna, flora
and structures in terms of the significance and extent of the impact in the event of a release.
The consequences could be due to toxic or asphyxiant vapours, thermal radiation or explosion
overpressures. They may be described in various formats.

The simplest methodology would show a comparison of predicted concentrations, thermal


radiation or overpressures to short-term guideline values.

In a different but more realistic fashion, the consequences may be determined by using a
dose-response analysis. Dose-response analysis aims to relate the intensity of the
phenomenon that constitutes a hazard to the degree of injury or damage that it can cause.
Probit analysis is possibly the method mostly used to estimate probability of death,
hospitalisation or structural damage. The probit is a lognormal distribution and represents a
measure of the percentage of the vulnerable resource that sustains injury or damage. The
probability of injury or death (i.e. the risk level) is in turn estimated from this probit (risk
characterisation).

Consequence modelling gives an indication of the extent of the impact for selected events and
is used primarily for emergency planning. A consequence that would not cause irreversible
injuries would be considered insignificant, and no further analysis would be required. The
effects from major incidents are summarised in the following subsections.

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4.3.1 Toxic Vapour Clouds

The purpose of considering vapour clouds emanating from toxic components is to identify
sections of the surrounding community that may be affected by exposure or individuals in the
community who may be subject to injury or death from an accidental release.

A toxic vapour cloud can occur when:

 Toxic gas is released under pressure;


 Toxic liquid spills and evaporates;
 Components combust forming toxic gases;
 Components react forming toxic gases.

In the case of a toxic liquefied gas, the rate of the component becoming airborne must be
estimated as input for dispersion modelling. The pressure of contained liquefied gas is
dependent on its temperature, and it remains liquefied due to the pressure inside the tank.

Quantification of the adverse impacts associated with a substance is made possible through
dose-response analysis and exposure assessment. A large release of a toxic, flammable or
explosive substance may result in death, nonlethal injury or irritation to humans and in damage
to property. The characterisation of such impacts would be based on the calculation of
downwind distances to various acute exposure guidelines.

Limits for brief exposure to potentially lethal levels are given in terms of lethal concentration
and lethal dose. Lethal concentration and lethal dose are determined by tests on animals.
Lethal concentration LC50 refers to the concentration of airborne material inhalation of which
results in death of 50% of the test group. The period of inhalation exposure could be from
30 min to a few hours (normally up to 4 hrs.). Lethal dose LD50 refers to the quantity of material
administered, either orally or by skin adsorption, which results in death of 50% of the test
group.

An approach that may be adopted involves comparison of predicted concentrations to


exposure guidelines. These guidelines may include the following occupational exposure limits:
the threshold limit values (TLVs); the immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) values;
or, the acute exposure guideline level (AEGL) values.

AEGL values were developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and are
defined as the maximum concentrations that individuals could be exposed to for a period of
one hour before certain health effects would occur in sensitive populations. In the event that
AEGL values are not yet available for a particular component, emergency response planning
guideline (ERPG) values or temporary emergency exposure limits (TEELs) could be used.

This study refers to the AEGL values for the assessing of emergency response plans and LC1
(1% fatality based on inhaled dosages derived from probit values) for determining the
significance and extent off-site impacts. In this report, all AEGL values are based on one hour.

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4.3.2 Fires

Combustible and flammable components within their flammable limits may ignite and burn if
exposed to an ignition source of sufficient energy. On process plants releases with ignition
normally occur as a result of a leakage or spillage. Depending on the physical properties of
the component and the operating parameters, combustion may take on a number of forms,
such as pool fires, jet fires, flash fires and so forth.

4.3.2.1 Thermal Radiation

The effect of thermal radiation is very dependent on the type of fire and duration of exposure.
Certain codes, such as the American Petroleum Institute API 520 and API 2000 codes,
suggest values for the maximum heat absorbed by vessels to facilitate adequate relief designs
in order to prevent failure of the vessel. Other codes, such as API 510 and the British
Standards BS 5980 code, give guidelines for the maximum thermal radiation intensity and act
as a guide to equipment layout, as shown in Table 4-4.

The effect of thermal radiation on human health has been widely studied, relating injuries to
the time and intensity of exposure.

Table 4-4: Thermal radiation guidelines (BS 5980 of 1990)


Thermal Radiation
Intensity Limit
(kW/m2)
1.5 Will cause no discomfort for long exposure
Sufficient to cause pain if unable to reach cover within
2.1
40 seconds
Sufficient to cause pain if unable to reach cover within
4.5
20 seconds
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood and
12.5
melting of plastic tubing
Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long
25
exposures
37.5 Sufficient to cause serious damage to process equipment

For pool fires, jet fires and flash fires CPR 18E (Purple Book; 1999) suggests the following
thermal radiation levels be reported:

 4 kW/m2, the level that glass can withstand, preventing the fire entering a building, and
that should be used for emergency planning;
 10 kW/m2, the level that represents the 1% fatality for 20 seconds of unprotected
exposure and at which plastic and wood may start to burn, transferring the fire to other
areas;
 35 kW/m2, the level at which spontaneous ignition of hair and clothing occurs, with an
assumed 100% fatality, and at which initial damage to steel may occur.

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4.3.2.2 Bund and Pool Fires

Pool fires, either tank or bund fires, consist of large volumes of a flammable liquid component
burning in an open space at atmospheric pressure.

The flammable component will be consumed at the burning rate, depending on factors
including prevailing winds. During combustion, heat will be released in the form of thermal
radiation. Temperatures close to the flame centre will be high but will reduce rapidly to
tolerable temperatures over a relatively short distance. Any building or persons close to the
fire or within the intolerable zone will experience burn damage with severity depending on the
distance from the fire and time exposed to the heat of the fire.

In the event of a pool fire, the flames will tilt according to the wind speed and direction. The
flame length and tilt angle affect the distance of thermal radiation generated.

4.3.2.3 Tank-top fires

A tank-top fire occurs within a tank, and thus the pool fire is limited to the area of the tank. A
tank-top fire could escalate to a bund fire should the tank fail, releasing a flammable or
combustible component into the bund.

4.3.2.4 Jet Fires

Jet fires occur when a flammable component is released with a high exit velocity ignites.

In process industries, this may be due to design (such as flares) or due to accidental releases.
Ejection of a flammable component from a vessel, pipe or pipe flange may give rise to a jet
fire and in some instances the jet flame could have substantial ‘reach’.

Depending on wind speed, the flame may tilt and impinge on other pipelines, equipment or
structures. The thermal radiation from these fires may cause injury to people or damage
equipment some distance away from the source of the flame.

4.3.2.5 Flash Fires

A loss of containment of a flammable component may mix with air, forming a flammable
mixture. The flammable cloud would be defined by the lower flammable limit (LFL) and the
upper flammable limit (UFL). The extent of the flammable cloud would depend on the quantity
of the released and mixed component, physical properties of the released component, wind
speed and weather stability. An ignition within a flammable cloud can result in an explosion if
the front is propagated by pressure. If the front is propagated by heat, then the fire moves
across the flammable cloud at the flame velocity and is called a flash fire. Flash fires are
characterised by low overpressure, and injuries are caused by thermal radiation. The effects
of overpressure due to an exploding cloud are covered in the subsection dealing with vapour
cloud explosions (VCEs).

A flash fire would extend to the lower flammable limit; however, due to the formation of
pockets, it could extend beyond this limit to the point defined as the ½ LFL. It is assumed that
people within the flash fire would experience lethal injuries while people outside of the flash
fire would remain unharmed. The ½ LFL is used for emergency planning to evacuate people
to a safe distance in the event of a release.

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4.3.3 Explosions

The concentration of a flammable component would decrease from the point of release to
below the lower explosive limits (LEL), at which concentration the component can no longer
ignite. The sudden detonation of an explosive mass would cause overpressures that could
result in injury or damage to property.

Such an explosion may give rise to any of the following effects:

 Blast damage;
 Thermal damage;
 Missile damage;
 Ground tremors;
 Crater formation;
 Personal injury.

Obviously, the nature of these effects depends on the pressure waves and the proximity to
the actual explosion. Of concern in this investigation are the ‘far distance effects’, such as
limited structural damage and the breakage of windows, rather than crater formations.

Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 give a more detailed summary of the damage produced by an
explosion due to various overpressures.

CPR 18E (Purple Book; 1999) suggests the following overpressures be determined:

 0.03 bar overpressure, corresponding to the critical overpressure causing windows to


break;
 0.1 bar overpressure, corresponding to 10% of the houses being severely damaged
and a probability of death indoors equal to 0.025:
o No lethal effects are expected below 0.1 bar overpressure on unprotected people
in the open;
 0.3 bar overpressure, corresponding to structures being severely damaged and a
probability of death equal to 1.0 for unprotected people in the open;
 0.7 bar overpressure, corresponding to an almost entire destruction of buildings and
100% fatality for people in the open.

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Table 4-5: Summary of consequences of blast overpressure (Clancey 1972)


Pressure (Gauge)
Damage
Psi kPa
0.02 0.138 Annoying noise (137 dB), if of low frequency (10 – 15 Hz)
0.03 0.207 Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain
0.04 0.276 Loud noise (143 dB); sonic boom glass failure
0.1 0.69 Breakage of small under strain windows
0.15 1.035 Typical pressure for glass failure
‘Safe distance’ (probability 0.95; no serious damage beyond this
0.3 2.07 value); missile limit; some damage to house ceilings;
10% window glass broken
0.4 2.76 Limited minor structural damage
Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damage
0.5–1.0 3.45–6.9
to window frames
0.7 4.83 Minor damage to house structures
1.0 6.9 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable
Corrugated asbestos shattered; corrugated steel or aluminium
1.0–2.0 6.9–13.8 panels, fastenings fail, followed by buckling; wood
panels (standard housing) fastenings fail, panels blown in
1.3 8.97 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted
2.0 13.8 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
2.0–3.0 13.8–20.7 Concrete or cinderblock walls (not reinforced) shattered
2.3 15.87 Lower limit of serious structural damage
2.5 17.25 50% destruction of brickwork of house
Heavy machines (1.4 t) in industrial building suffered little
3.0 20.7 damage; steel frame building distorted and pulled away from
foundations
3.0–4.0 20.7–27.6 Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished
4.0 27.6 Cladding of light industrial buildings demolished
Wooden utilities poles (telegraph, etc.) snapped; tall hydraulic
5.0 34.5
press (18 t) in building slightly damaged
5.0–7.0 34.5–48.3 Nearly complete destruction of houses
7.0 48.3 Loaded train wagons overturned
Brick panels (20 – 30 cm) not reinforced fail by shearing or
7.0–8.0 48.3–55.2
flexure
9.0 62.1 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
Probable total destruction buildings; heavy (3 t) machine tools
10.0 69.0 moved and badly damaged; very heavy (12 000 lb. / 5443 kg)
machine tools survived
300 2070 Limit of crater lip

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Table 4-6: Damage caused by overpressure effects of an explosion (Stephens 1970)


Overpressure (psi)
Equipment
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 12 14 16 18 20
Control house steel roof A C V N A Windows and gauges break
Control house concrete roof A E P D N B Louvers fall at 0.3–0.5 psi
Cooling tower B F O C Switchgear is damaged from roof collapse
Tank: cone roof D K U D Roof collapses
Instrument cubicle A LM T E Instruments are damaged
Fire heater G I T F Inner parts are damaged
Reactor: chemical A I P T G Bracket cracks
Filter H F V T H Debris-missile damage occurs
Regenerator I IP T I Unit moves and pipes break
Tank: floating roof K U D J Bracing fails
Reactor: cracking I I T K Unit uplifts (half filled)
Pine supports P SO L Power lines are severed
Utilities: gas meter Q M Controls are damaged
Utilities: electric transformer H I T N Block wall fails
Electric motor H I V O Frame collapses
Blower Q T P Frame deforms
Fractionation column R T Q Case is damaged
Pressure vessel horizontal PI T R Frame cracks
Utilities: gas regulator I MQ S Piping breaks
Extraction column I V T T Unit overturns or is destroyed
Steam turbine I M S V U Unit uplifts (0.9 filled)
Heat exchanger I T V Unit moves on foundations
Tank sphere I I T
Pressure vessel vertical I T
Pump I Y

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4.3.3.1 Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCEs)

The release of a flammable component into the atmosphere could result in formation of a flash
fire, as described in the subsection on flash fires, or a vapour cloud explosion (VCE). In the
case of a VCE, an ignited vapour cloud between the higher explosive limits (HEL) and the
lower explosive limit (LEL) could form a fireball with overpressures that could result in injury
or damage to property.

4.3.3.2 Fixed-Roof Tank Explosions

A confined gas explosion occurs when the exploding flammable mixture is restricted from
expanding by physical barriers, such as walls, equipment or other obstacles.

A fixed-roof tank explosion is a confined gas explosion within a tank. The explosive mass is
calculated as the volume of the tank at its lower flammable limit (LFL). It should be noted that
an explosion can only occur if a flammable atmosphere can be formed. For this study, only
flammable components with flashpoints lower than 38°C were considered.

4.3.3.3 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions (BLEVEs)

A boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) can occur when a flame impinges on a
pressure cylinder, particularly in the vapour space region where cooling by evaporation of the
contained material does not occur; the cylinder shell would weaken and rupture with a total
loss of the contents, and the issuing mass of material would burn as a massive fireball.

The major consequences of a BLEVE are \ intense thermal radiation from the fireball, a blast
wave and propelled fragments from the shattered vessel. These fragments may be projected
to considerable distances. Analyses of the travel range of fragment missiles from a number of
BLEVEs suggest that the majority land within 700 m from the incident. A blast wave from a
BLEVE is fairly localised but can cause significant damage to immediate equipment.

A BLEVE occurs sometime after the vessel has been engulfed in flames. Should an incident
occur that could result in a BLEVE, people should be evacuated to beyond the 1% fatality line.

4.4 Risk Analysis

4.4.1 Background

It is important to understand the difference between hazard and risk.

A hazard is anything that has the potential to cause damage to life, property and the
environment. Furthermore, it has constant parameters (like those of petrol, chlorine, ammonia,
etc.) that pose the same hazard wherever present.

On the other hand, risk is the probability that a hazard will actually cause damage and goes
along with how severe that damage will be (consequence). Risk is therefore the probability
that a hazard will manifest itself. For instance, the risks of a chemical accident or spill depends
upon the amount present, the process the chemical is used in, the design and safety features
of its container, the exposure, the prevailing environmental and weather conditions and so on.

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Risk analysis consists of a judgement of probability based on local atmospheric conditions,


generic failure rates and severity of consequences, based on the best available technological
information.

Risks form an inherent part of modern life. Some risks are readily accepted on a day-to-day
basis, while certain hazards attract headlines even when the risk is much smaller, particularly
in the field of environmental protection and health. For instance, the risk of one-in-ten-
thousand chance of death per year associated with driving a car is acceptable to most people,
whereas the much lower risks associated with nuclear facilities (one-in-ten-million chance of
death per year) are deemed unacceptable.

A report by the British Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST), entitled
‘Safety in Numbers? Risk Assessment and Environmental Protection’, explains how public
perception of risk is influenced by a number of factors in addition to the actual size of the risk.
These factors were summarised as follows in Table 4-7.

Table 4-7: Influence of public perception of risk on acceptance of that risk, based
on the POST report
People are more willing to accept risks they impose upon themselves
Control
or they consider to be ‘natural’ than to have risks imposed upon them
Dread and Scale Fear is greatest where the consequences of a risk are likely to be
of Impact catastrophic rather than spread over time
People appear more willing to accept risks that are familiar rather
Familiarity
than new risks
Risks seem to be more acceptable if the consequences are
Timing immediate or short term, rather than if they are delayed (especially if
they might affect future generations)
Social
Concern can be increased because of media coverage, graphic
Amplification
depiction of events or reduced by economic hardship
and Attenuation
A key factor is how far the public trusts regulators, policy makers or
industry; if these bodies are open and accountable (being honest as
Trust well as admitting mistakes and limitations and taking account of
differing views without disregarding them as emotive or irrational),
then the public is more likely consider them credible

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A risk assessment should be seen as an important component of ongoing preventative action,


aimed at minimising or hopefully avoiding accidents. Reassessments of risks should therefore
follow at regular intervals and after any changes that could alter the nature of the hazard, so
contributing to an overall prevention programme and emergency response plan of the facility.
Risks should be ranked with decreasing severity and the top risks reduced to acceptable
levels.

Procedures for predictive hazard evaluation have been developed for the analysis of
processes when evaluating very low probability accidents with very high consequences (for
which there is little or no experience) as well as more likely releases with fewer consequences
(for which there may be more information available). These address both the probability of an
accident as well as the magnitude and nature of undesirable consequences of that accident.
Risk is usually defined as some simple function of both the probability and consequence.

4.4.2 Predicted Risk

Physical and consequence modelling addresses the impact of a release of a hazardous


component without taking into account probability of occurrence. This merely illustrates the
significance and the extent of the impact in the event of a release. Modelling should also
analyse cascading or knock-on effects due to incidents in the facility and the surrounding
industries and suburbs.

During a risk analysis, the likelihood of various incidents is assessed, the consequences
calculated and finally the risk for the facility is determined.

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4.4.2.1 Generic Equipment Failure Scenarios

In order to characterise various failure events and assign a failure frequency, fault trees were
constructed starting with a final event and working from the top down to define all initiating
events and frequencies. Analysis was completed using published failure rate data. Equipment
failures can occur in tanks, pipelines and other items handling hazardous chemical
components. These failures may result in:

 Release of combustible, flammable and explosive components with fires or explosions


upon ignition;
 Release of toxic or asphyxiant components.

 Storage Vessels

Scenarios involving storage vessels can include catastrophic failures that would lead to
leakage into the bund with a possible bund fire. A tank-roof failure could result in a possible
tank-top fire. The fracture of a nozzle or transfer pipeline could also result in leakage into the
bund.

Typical failure frequencies for atmospheric and pressure vessels are listed, respectively, in
Table 4-8 and Table 4-9.

Table 4-8: Failure frequencies for atmospheric vessels


Leak Frequency
Event
(per item per year)
Small leaks 1x10˗4
Severe leaks 3x10˗5
Catastrophic failure 5x10˗6

Table 4-9: Failure frequencies for pressure vessels


Failure Frequency
Event
(per item per year)
Small leaks 1x10˗5
Severe leaks 5x10˗7
Catastrophic failure 5x10˗7

 Process Piping

Piping may fail as a result of corrosion, erosion, mechanical impact damage, pressure surge
(water hammer) or operation outside the design limitations for pressure and temperature.
Failures caused by corrosion and erosion usually result in small leaks, which are easily
detected and corrected quickly. For significant failures, the leak duration may be from 10–
30 minutes before detection.

Generic data for leak frequency for process piping is generally expressed in terms of the
cumulative total failure rate per year for a 10 m section of pipe for each pipe diameter.
Furthermore, failure frequency normally decreases with increasing pipe diameter. Scenarios
and failure frequencies for a pipeline apply to pipelines with connections, such as flanges,
welds and valves.

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The failure data given in Table 4-10 represents the total failure rate, incorporating all failures
of whatever size and due to all probable causes. These frequencies are based on an assumed
environment where no excessive vibration, corrosion, erosion or thermal cyclic stresses are
expected. For incidents causing significant leaks (such as corrosion), the failure rate will be
increased by a factor of 10.

Table 4-10: Failure frequencies for process pipes


Frequencies of Loss of Containment for Process
Pipes
Description (per meter per year)
Full Bore Rupture Leak
˗6
Nominal diameter < 75 mm 1x10 5x10˗6
75 mm < nominal
3x10˗7 2x10˗6
diameter < 150 mm
Nominal diameter > 150 mm 1x10˗7 5x10˗7

 Pumps and Compressors

Pumps can be subdivided roughly into two different types, reciprocating pumps and centrifugal
pumps. This latter category can be further subdivided into canned pumps (sealless pumps)
and gasket (pumps with seals). A canned pump can be defined as an encapsulated pump
where the process liquid is located in the space around the rotor (impeller), in which case
gaskets are not used.

Compressors can also be subdivided roughly into reciprocating compressors and centrifugal
compressors.

Failure rates for pumps and compressors are given in Table 4-11 and Table 4-12.

Table 4-11: Failure frequency for centrifugal pumps and compressors


Canned (No Gasket) Gasket
Event Frequency Frequency
(per annum) (per annum)
Catastrophic failure 1.0x10˗5 1.0x10˗4
Leak (10% diameter) 5.0x10˗5 4.4x10˗3

Table 4-12: Failure frequency for reciprocating pumps and compressors


Frequency
Event
(per annum)
Catastrophic failure 1.0x10˗4
Leak (10% diameter) 4.4x10˗3

 Loading and Offloading

Loading can take place from a storage vessel to a transport unit (road tanker, tanker wagon
or ship) or from a transport unit to a storage vessel. The failure frequencies for loading and
offloading arms are given in Table 4-13.

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Table 4-13: Failure frequencies for loading and offloading arms and hoses
Frequency (per hour)
Event Loading and Loading and
Offloading Arms Offloading Hoses
˗8
Rupture 3x10 4x10˗6
Leak with effective diameter at 10% of
3x10˗7 4x10˗5
nominal diameter to max. 50 mm

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 Road or Rail Tankers within the Establishment

Road or rail tankers are transport vehicles with fixed and removable tanks. In addition, they
include battery wagons and, insofar as these are fitted on a transport vehicle, tank containers,
swap-body tanks and MEGCs (multiple element gas containers).

The failure rate of tankers on an establishment is dependent on the pressure rating of the tank
and is given in Table 4-14 and Table 4-15.

Table 4-14: Failure frequencies for road tankers with an atmospheric tank
Frequency
Event
(per annum)
Instantaneous release of the entire contents 1x10˗5
Release of contents from the largest connection 5x10˗7

Table 4-15: Failure frequencies for road tankers with a pressurised tank
Frequency
Event
(per annum)
Instantaneous release of the entire contents 1x10˗7
Release of contents from the largest connection 5x10˗7

It should be noted that no scenarios are included for loss of containment as a result of external
damage to tanker or fire in the surrounding areas. It is assumed that sufficient measures are
taken to prevent external damage to the tanker.

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 Human Failure

Human error and failure can occur during any life cycle or mode of operation of a facility.
Human failure can be divided into the following categories:

 Human failure during design, construction and modification of the facility;


 Human failure during operation and maintenance;
 Human failure due to errors of management and administration.

Human failure during design, construction and modification is part of the generic failure given
in this subsection. Human failure due to errors of organisation and management are
influencing factors. Some of the types of tasks that have been evaluated for their rates of
human failure are given in Table 4-16.

Table 4-16: Human failure rates of specific types of tasks


Human Failure
Tasks
(events per year)
Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likely
0.55
consequences
Failure to carry out rapid and complex actions to avoid serious
0.5
incident such as an explosion
Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and skill 0.16
Failure to respond to audible alarm in control room within 10 minutes 1.0x10˗1
Failure to respond to audible alarm in quiet control room by some
more complex action such as going outside and selecting one correct 1.0x10˗2
value among many
Failure to respond to audible alarm in quiet control room by pressing
1.0x10˗3
a single button
Omission or incorrect execution of step in a familiar start-up routine 1.0x10˗3
Completing a familiar, well-designed, highly-practiced, routine task
occurring several times per hour, performed to highest possible
standards by a highly-motivated, highly-trained and experienced 4.0x10˗4
person totally aware of implications of failures, with time to correct
potential error but without the benefit of significant job aids

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 Ignition Probability of Flammable Gases and Liquids

Estimation of probability of an ignition is a key step in assessment of risk for installations where
flammable liquids or gases are stored. There is a reasonable amount of data available relating
to characteristics of ignition sources and effects of release type and location.

Probability of ignition for stationary installations is given in Table 4-17 (along with classification
of flammable substances in Table 4-18). These can be replaced with ignition probabilities
related to surrounding activities. For example, probability of a fire from a flammable release at
an open flame would increase to a value of 1.

Table 4-17: Probability of direct ignition for stationary installations (RIVM 2009)
Source-Term Source-Term Probability of
Substance Category
Continuous Instantaneous Direct Ignition
Category 0 < 10 kg/s < 1000 kg 0.2
Average to high 10 – 100 kg/s 1000 – 10 000 kg 0.5
reactivity > 100 kg/s > 10 000 kg 0.7
< 10 kg/s < 1000 kg 0.02
Category 0
10 – 100 kg/s 1000 – 10 000 kg 0.04
Low reactivity
> 100 kg/s > 10 000 kg 0.09
Category 1 All flow rates All quantities 0.065
Category 2 All flow rates All quantities 0.00431
Category 3
All flow rates All quantities 0
Category 4

Table 4-18: Classification of flammable substances


Substance
Description Limits
Category
Liquids, substances and preparations that have a
flashpoint lower than 0°C and a boiling point (or the
Extremely start of the boiling range) less than or equal to 35°C
Category 0
flammable Gaseous substances and preparations that may
ignite at normal temperature and pressure when
exposed to air
Highly Liquids, substances and preparations that have a
Category 1
flammable flashpoint of below 21°C
Liquids, substances and preparations that have a
Category 2 Flammable
flashpoint equal to 21°C and less than 55°C
Liquids, substances and preparations that have a
Category 3 flashpoint greater than 55°C and less than or equal
to 100°C
Liquids, substances and preparations that have a
Category 4
flashpoint greater than 100°C

1 This value is taken from the CPR 18E (Purple Book; 1999). RIVM (2009) gives the value of delayed
ignition as zero. RISCOM (PTY) LTD believes the CPR 18E is more appropriate for warmer climates and
is a conservative value.

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4.4.3 Risk Calculations

4.4.3.1 Maximum Individual Risk Parameter

Standard individual risk parameters include: average individual risk; weighted individual risk;
maximum individual risk; and, the fatal accident rate. The lattermost parameter is more
applicable to occupational exposures.

Only the maximum individual risk (MIR) parameter will be used in this assessment. For this
parameter frequency of fatality is calculated for an individual who is presumed to be present
at a specified location. This parameter (defined as the consequence of an event multiplied by
the likelihood of the event) is not dependent on knowledge of populations at risk. So, it is an
easier parameter to use in the predictive mode than average individual risk or weighted
individual risk. The unit of measure is the risk of fatality per person per year.

4.4.3.2 Acceptable Risks

The next step, after having characterised a risk and obtained a risk level, is to recommend
whether the outcome is acceptable.

In contrast to the employees at a facility, who may be assumed to be healthy, the adopted
exposure assessment applies to an average population group that also includes sensitive
subpopulations. Sensitive subpopulation groups are those people that for reasons of age or
medical condition have a greater than normal response to contaminants. Health guidelines
and standards used to establish risk normally incorporate safety factors that address this
group.

Among the most difficult tasks of risk characterisation is the definition of acceptable risk. In an
attempt to account for risks in a manner similar to those used in everyday life, the UK Health
and Safety Executive (HSE) developed the risk ALARP triangle. Applying the triangle involves
deciding:

 Whether a risk is so high that something must be done about it;


 Whether the risk is or has been made so small that no further precautions are
necessary;
 If a risk falls between these two states so that it has been reduced to levels as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP).

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This is illustrated in Figure 4-1.

ALARP stands for ‘as low as reasonably practicable’. As used in the UK, it is the region
between that which is intolerable, at 1x10˗4 per year, and that which is broadly acceptable, at
1x10˗6 per year. A further lower level of risk, at 3x10˗7 per year, is applied to either vulnerable
or very large populations for land-use planning.

Figure 4-1: UK HSE decision-making framework

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It should be emphasised that the risks considered acceptable to workers are different to those
considered acceptable to the public. This is due to the fact that workers have personal
protection equipment (PPE), are aware of the hazards, are sufficiently mobile to evade or
escape the hazards and receive training in preventing injuries.

The HSE (UK) gives more detail on the word practicable in the following statement:

“ In essence, making sure a risk has been reduced to ALARP is about weighing
the risk against the sacrifice needed to further reduce it. The decision is
weighted in favour of health and safety because the presumption is that the
duty-holder should implement the risk reduction measure. To avoid having to
make this sacrifice, the duty-holder must be able to show that it would be
grossly disproportionate to the benefits of risk reduction that would be
achieved. Thus, the process is not one of balancing the costs and benefits of
measures but, rather, of adopting measures except where they are ruled out
because they involve grossly disproportionate sacrifices. Extreme examples
might be:

 To spend £1m to prevent five staff members suffering bruised knees is obviously
grossly disproportionate; but,
 To spend £1m to prevent a major explosion capable of killing 150 people is
obviously proportionate.

Proving ALARP means that if the risks are lower than 1x10˗4 fatalities per
person per year, it can be demonstrated that there would be no more benefit
from further mitigation, sometimes using cost benefit analysis. “

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4.4.3.3 Land Planning

There are no legislative land-planning guidelines in South Africa and in many parts of the
world. Further to this, land-planning guidelines vary from one country to another, and thus it is
not easy to benchmark the results of this study to international criteria. In this instance,
RISCOM would only advise on applicable land planning and would require governmental
authorities to make final decisions.

Land zoning applied in this study follows the HSE (UK) approach of defining the area affected
into three zones, consistent to the ALARP approach (HSE 2011).

The three zones are defined as follows:

 The inner zone is enclosed by the risk of 1x10˗5 fatalities per person per year isopleth;
 The middle zone is enclosed by the risk of 1x10˗5 fatalities per person per year and the
risk of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleths;
 The outer zone is enclosed by the risk 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year and the risk
of 3x10˗7 fatalities per person per year isopleths.

The risks decrease from the inner zone to the outer zone as shown in Figure 4-2 and
Figure 4-3.

Figure 4-2: Town-planning zones for pipelines

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Figure 4-3: Town-planning zones

Once the zones are calculated, the HSE (UK) methodology then determines whether a
development in a zone should be categorised as ‘advised against’ (AA) or as ‘don’t advise
against’ (DAA), depending on the sensitivity of the development, as indicated in Table 4-19.
There are no land-planning restrictions beyond the outer zone.

Table 4-19: Land-use decision matrix


Development in Development in Development in
Level of Sensitivity
Inner Zone Middle Zone Outer Zone
1 DAA DAA DAA
2 AA DAA DAA
3 AA AA DAA
4 AA AA AA

The sensitivity levels are based on a clear rationale: progressively more severe restrictions
are to be imposed as the sensitivity of the proposed development increases.

There are four sensitivity levels, with the sensitivity for housing defined as follows:

 Level 1 is based on workers who have been advised of the hazards and are trained
accordingly;
 Level 2 is based on the general public at home and involved in normal activities;
 Level 3 is based on the vulnerability of certain members of the public (e.g. children,
those with mobility difficulties or those unable to recognise physical danger);
 Level 4 is based on large examples of Level 2 and of Level 3.

Refer to Appendix D for detailed planning advice for developments near hazardous
installations (PADHI) tables. These tables illustrate how the HSE land-use decision matrix,
generated using the three zones and the four sensitivity levels, is applied to a variety of
development types.

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4.4.3.4 Societal Risk Parameter

Risk criteria discussed so far have been for individual risks. There is also a need to consider
incidents in the light of their effect on many people at the same time. Public response to an
incident that may harm many people is thought to be worse than the response to many
incidents causing the same number of individual deaths. Compliance with an individual risk
criterion is necessary but not always sufficient. Even if it were sufficient, societal risk would
also have to be examined in some circumstances.

Societal risk is risk of widespread or large-scale harm from a potential hazard. The implication
is that consequence would be on such a scale as to provoke a major social or political
response and may lead to public discussion about regulation in general. Societal risk therefore
takes into account the density of the population around a Major Hazard Installation site and is
the probability in any one year (F) of an event affecting at least a certain number (N) of people
(also known as an FN curve).

Societal risk used in this study is based on legal requirements in the Netherlands and may
differ from risk criteria and requirements in other parts of the world.

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4.5 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Scenarios

4.5.1 Methodology

Due to the absence of South African legislation regarding determination methodology for
quantitative risk assessment (QRA), the methodology of this assessment is based on the legal
requirements of the Netherlands, outlined in CPR 18E (Purple Book; 1999) and RIVM (2009).

The evaluation of the acceptability of the risks is done in accordance with the Health and
Safety Executive (HSE; UK) ALARP criteria, which clearly covers land use, based on the
determined risks.

The QRA process is summarised with the following steps:

1. Identification of components that are flammable, toxic, reactive or corrosive and that
have potential to result in a major incident from fires, explosions or toxic releases;
2. Development of accidental loss of containment (LOC) scenarios for equipment
containing hazardous components (including release rate, location and orientation of
release);
3. For each incident developed in Step 2, determination of consequences (such as
thermal radiation, domino effects, toxic-cloud formation and so forth);
4. For scenarios with off-site consequences (greater than 1% fatality off-site), calculation
of maximum individual risk (MIR), taking into account all generic failure rates, initiating
events (such as ignition), meteorological conditions and lethality;

Scenarios included in this QRA have impacts external to the establishment. The 1% fatality
from acute affects (thermal radiation, blast overpressure and toxic exposure) is determined as
the endpoint (RIVM 2009). Thus, a scenario producing a fatality of less than 1% at the
establishment boundary under worst-case meteorological conditions would be excluded from
the QRA.

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4.5.2 Scenario Selection

Guidelines for selection of scenarios is given in RIVM (2009) and CPR 18E (Purple Book;
1999). A particular scenario may produce more than one major consequence. In such cases,
consequences are evaluated separately and assigned failure frequencies in the risk analysis.
Some of these phenomena are described in the subsections that follow.

4.5.2.1 Scenarios for Release of a Pressurised Liquefied Gas

The nature of the release of a liquefied gas from a pressurised vessel is dependent on the
position of the hole.

A hole above the liquid level will result in a vapour release only, and the release rate would be
related to the size of the hole and internal pressure of the tank. Over a period of time, bulk
temperature reduces, with an associated decrease in the vapour release rate.

A hole below the liquid level will result in a release of a liquid stream. In the reduced pressure
of the atmosphere, a portion of the liquid will vaporise at the normal boiling point. This
phenomenon is called flashing and is shown in Figure 4-4. The pool, formed after flashing,
then evaporates at a rate proportional to the pool area, surrounding temperature and wind
velocity.

Figure 4-4: Airborne vapours from a loss of containment of liquefied gas stored in
a pressurised vessel

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 Instantaneous Release of a Pressured Liquefied Flammable Gas

An instantaneous loss of containment of a liquefied flammable gas could result in the


consequences given in the event tree of Figure 4-5. Probability of the events occurring is
dependent on a number of factors and is determined accordingly. All the scenarios shown in
the figure are determined separately and reported in relevant subsections of the report.

Figure 4-5: Event tree for an instantaneous release of a liquefied flammable gas

 Continuous Release of a Pressurised Liquefied Flammable Gas

The continuous loss of containment of a liquefied flammable gas could result in the
consequences given in the event tree of Figure 4-6. Probability of the events occurring is
dependent on a number of factors and is determined accordingly. All the scenarios shown in
the figure are determined separately and reported in relevant subsections of the report.

Figure 4-6: Event tree for a continuous release of a liquefied flammable gas

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4.5.2.2 Continuous Release of a Flammable Gas

The continuous loss of containment of a flammable gas could result in the consequences
given in the event tree of Figure 4-7. Probability of the events occurring is dependent on a
number of factors and is determined accordingly. All the scenarios shown in the figure are
determined separately and reported in relevant subsections of the report.

Figure 4-7: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable gas

4.5.2.3 Continuous Release of a Flammable Liquid

The continuous loss of containment of a flammable liquid could result in the consequences
given in the event tree of Figure 4-8. Probability of the events occurring is dependent on a
number of factors and is determined accordingly. All the scenarios shown in the figure are
determined separately and reported in relevant subsections of the report.

Figure 4-8: Event tree for a continuous release of a flammable liquid

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5 RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk assessment was done of each processing unit by firstly selecting a scenario and then
completing consequence and outflow modelling. Consequences with possible impacts beyond
the site boundary were retained for risk analysis of the unit.

Finally, the risk of the entire facility is determined as a combination of the risk calculated for
each unit.

5.1 n˗Butane Storage and Pipeline

5.1.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit

n˗Butane is a raw material used to manufacture maleic anhydride. It is transported to site via
a pipeline and is either sent directly to the maleic anhydride plant or is stored.

5.1.2 Hazardous Components

Hazardous components used in this section include:

5.1.2.1 n˗Butane

n˗Butane is a colourless, flammable gas at atmospheric pressure and normal temperature. It


is a colourless flammable gas at atmospheric pressure and normal temperature, with a
characteristic natural gas odour. At higher pressures, it will condense to a liquid state at
ambient temperatures. It is commonly shipped as a liquid, stored in low pressure tanks under
its own vapour pressure at 21°C.

Due to its extreme flammability, n˗butane is a dangerous and explosive hazard.

n˗Butane is a simple asphyxiant, has an anaesthetic effect but is not considered to be a toxic
gas. There are apparently no ill effects from remaining for several minutes in an atmosphere
containing as high as 5% n˗butane, in the lower flammable range, or from repeated exposures.

1.1.1.1 Acute Toxic Substances Stored or Processed

The n˗butane installation does not contain acutely toxic materials.

1.1.1.2 Flammable or Combustible Materials

n˗Butane is stored as a liquid at an elevated pressure in a storage bullet. A loss of containment


would produce a flammable gas as well as a flammable pool.

5.1.3 Consequence Modelling

5.1.3.1 Pool Fires

n˗Butane is a gas under atmospheric temperatures and pressures. The n˗butane on site is
maintained as a liquid at high pressure. A loss of containment of liquid butane would result in
a portion of the material vaporising, with the liquid material forming a pool at the boiling point.

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As with all uncontained liquids, the pool would spread until it could spread no more or until it
was contained by a natural barrier. The maximum extent of the flammable pool is set at
1500 m2 (CPR 18E 1999). On ignition, the flammable pool burns rapidly resulting in the
shrinkage of the pool, until all the fuel has been consumed.

The 4 kW/m2 is radiation sufficient to break glass, with a possibility of the fire propagating
indoors. This value should also be used as the outer extent for emergency escape. The
10 kW/m2 is the value that would result in a 1% fatality for unprotected people exposed to the
fire for duration of 20 seconds. 35 kW/m2 would indicate the spontaneous combustion of hair
and clothing with a 100% fatality. This is also the lower limit of damage to steel equipment,
with potential knock-on effects.

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The thermal radiation from large pool fires from an accidental release of n˗butane is shown in
Figure 5-1, with the maximum distance to the respective thermal-radiation value given in
Table 5-1. The thin lines indicated indicate a northerly wind, while the thicker lines indicate
wind from all directions. The northerly wind direction used does not indicate the predominant
wind but is used for illustrative purposes only.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-1: Thermal radiation from n˗butane pool fires

n˗Butane pool fires could result in the ignition of vegetation adjacent to the Isegen facility. Off-
site fatalities are a possibility, although the area to the west of Isegen is currently unoccupied.

Table 5-1: Maximum distances to thermal-radiation endpoints


Scenari Thermal Max. Distanc
Equipmen
o Incident Radiation e
t
No. (kW/m2) (m)
4 188
Release contents in 10
BUT-05 D-360 10 137
minutes
35 87
4 76
BUT-18 P-3601A Pump failure 10 61
35 46

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5.1.3.2 Jet Fires

Jet fires for gaseous releases are included in the risk assessment (RIVM 2009) and are
described in the subsections below.

 Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) Failure

A pressure safety valve (PSV) is located on the n˗butane bullet and is a statutory requirement
to protect the vessel in the event of overpressure. A failure of the PSV would result in a vertical
release. A strong wind could tilt the flame, giving the largest ground-distance thermal radiation.

A PSV release from a 100 mm opening would be in the vertical plane, producing a flame length
of 31 m in still air. The edge of the flame would have thermal radiation over 147 kW/m2 and
could cause damage to surrounding equipment at the same elevation as the release. The
thermal radiation drops relatively fast as you move away from the flame, as shown in
Figure 5-2. The thin lines indicate the flame, while the thicker lines indicate the effect zone with
a flame from all orientations.

The 4 kW/m2 is radiation is sufficient to break glass, with a possibility of the fire propagating
indoors The 10 kW/m2 represents a 1% fatality for people exposed to the fire for 20 seconds.
This value is used for emergency planning for fires. The 35 kW/m2 thermal radiation at ground
level was never reached.

Impacts for a PSV jet fire would remain within the n˗butane storage area and no off-site
incidents would be expected.

LEGEND Thermal Radiation


(kW/m2)
4
10
Figure 5-2: Thermal radiation from a jet fire due to a PSV failure

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5.1.3.3 Flash Fires

A loss of containment of n˗butane could form a flammable cloud that could drift to a point of
ignition. On ignition, the flammable cloud could form either a flash fire or a vapour cloud
explosion (see Subsection 5.1.3.4). The extent of the flammable cloud would depend on the
released quantity, physical properties of the released gas, wind speed and weather stability.

A flash fire would extend to the lower flammable limit (LFL) but, due to the formation of pockets,
could extend beyond this limit to the point defined as the ½ LFL. It is assumed that people
within the flash fire would experience lethal injuries while people outside of the flash fire would
remain unharmed. The ½ LFL is used for emergency planning to evacuate people to a safe
distance in the event of a release. The flammable limits for flash fires are given in Table 5-2.

Flash-fire scenarios are shown in Figure 5-3, indicated by the LFL at 9 m/s wind speed, which
corresponds to the worst case of the largest releases, i.e. catastrophic failure of n˗butane
storage vessel. The thin lines indicate a northerly wind, while the thicker lines indicate wind
from all directions.

Under worst-case conditions, the flash fire could enter into Isipingo Beach, SAPREF and the
adjacent Transnet properties.

LEGEND FLASH-FIRE SCENARIO


BUT-3 (Butane vessel – catastrophic failure)
BUT-7 (Butane vessel – empty in 10 minutes)
BUT-19 (Pump failure)
Figure 5-3: Flash-fire scenarios with off-site impacts at 9 m/s wind speed

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Table 5-2: Flammable limits for flash-fire scenarios


Scenari Distance (m)
Flammabilit
o Equipment Incident Category Category Category Category Category Category
y
No. 3/B 1.5/D 5/D 9/D 5/E 1.5/F
Catastrophic LFL 951 1093 1087 1226 1102 1103
BUT-3 D-360
failure ½ LFL 1269 1553 1413 1536 1413 1563
LFL 493 472 462 363 447 511
BU-07 D-360 Empty in 10 min
½ LFL 501 478 466 365 450 516
No No No No No No
LFL
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
BUT-13 D-360 vessel PSV failure - open
No No No No No No
½ LFL
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
LFL 105 129 96 77 94 168
BUT-17 P-3601A Failure
½ LFL 115 158 103 83 98 187
No No No No No No
LFL
Pipeline to MA hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
BUT-19 Rupture
plants No No No No No No
½ LFL
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard

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5.1.3.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)

A loss of containment of n˗butane with an ignition source could form a flash fire as described
in Subsection 5.1.3.3 or a vapour cloud explosion (VCE).

A release of flammable vapours could drift to an ignition point before detonating. This is
referred to as a late explosion. A summary of overpressures from late explosions for various
scenarios is given in Table 5-3.

The 0.1 bar overpressure corresponds to 10% of the houses being severely damaged and a
probability of death indoors equal to 0.025. No lethal effects are expected below the 0.1 bar
for people in the open. The 0.7 bar overpressure corresponds to total destruction of equipment,
while the 0.3 bar would correspond to severe damage to brick buildings.

While the effect area appears large the actual explosion damage at high overpressures would
be limited to a relatively small area.

The eThekwini Municipality requires a graphical representation of the worst-case blast


overpressures, with the worst case being a catastrophic failure of the n˗butane bullet, shown
in Figure 5-4. The thin lines indicate the overpressure from vapours drifting from a northerly
wind, while the thicker lines show the effect zone of drifting clouds from all wind directions

The 0.69 bar (10 psi) overpressure would indicate total destruction of equipment. The
0.344 bar (5 psi) would indicate severely damaged brick building and the 0.069 bar (1 psi)
would indicate partial building damage.

LEGEND BLAST OVERPRESSURE


(Bar)
0.069 (1 psi)
0.344 (5 psi)
0.69 (10 psi)
Drift line
Figure 5-4: Blast overpressures of the worst-case n˗butane vapour cloud
explosions

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Table 5-3: Summary of vapour cloud explosion distances following n˗butane releases
Distance (m)
Scenario Overpressure
Equipment Incident Category Category Category Category Category Category
No. (bar)
3/B 1.5/D 5/D 9/D 5/E 1.5/F
0.03 2386 2542 2533 2604 2568 2584
0.1 1525 1715 1652 1724 1681 1745
BUT-4 D-360 Catastrophic failure
0.3 1232 1423 1351 1435 1375 1451
0.7 1119 1313 1237 1342 1259 1338
0.03 1101 1058 1000 797 1009 1189
0.1 756 721 690 546 689 800
BUT-8 D-360 Empty in 10 min
0.3 628 595 575 453 569 655
0.7 578 546 530 417 523 598
0.03 No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard
0.1 No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard
BUT-11 D-360 Overfill
0.3 No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard
0.7 No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard
0.03 No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard
0.1 No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard
BUT-14 D-360 PSV PSV failure - open
0.3 No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard
0.7 No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard No hazard
0.03 247.3 317.8 226.0 184.3 216.3 434.0
0.1 168.6 221.6 153.8 124.5 143.9 288.3
BUT-18 P-3601A Failure
0.3 139.2 185.7 126.8 102.2 116.9 234.1
0.7 127.8 171.8 116.4 93.5 106.4 213.0

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5.1.3.5 BLEVE

A boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) can occur when a flame impinges on an
n˗butane pressure vessel, particularly in the vapour space region where cooling by
evaporation does not occur. The vessel shell weakens and ruptures with a total loss of
contents, and the issuing mass of propane burns as a massive fireball.

The major consequences of a BLEVE are intense thermal radiation from the fireball, a blast
wave and fragments from the shattered vessel. These fragments may be projected to
considerable distances. Analyses of the travel range of fragment missiles from a number of
BLEVEs suggest that the majority land within 700 m from the incident. A blast wave from a
BLEVE is fairly localised but can cause significant damage to immediate equipment.

A BLEVE formed from the 975 m3 n˗butane storage bullet assumed a flammable and explosive
mass of 563 532 kg. On explosion, the radius of the fireball was estimated to be 240 m, with
duration of 26.7 seconds. The lift-off height was calculated to be 480 m. The thermal radiation
from the resulting fireball is shown below in Figure 5-5. The 1% fatality for the exposed
duration equates to 9.85 kW/m2 (935 m from the fireball), while the 10% fatality would equate
to 13.37 kW/m2. In the event of a BLEVE of the 975 m3 n˗butane vessel, a large fireball would
not result in injuries or fatalities beyond the site boundary.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
9.85 (1% fatality)
13.37 (10% fatality)
Figure 5-5: Predicted lethality from a BLEVE of the n˗butane storage bullet

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5.1.4 Maximum Individual Risks (MIR)

The combined risks from fires and explosions due to a loss of containment of the n˗butane
bullet (D˗360) are shown in Figure 5-6. The risks of 1x10-6 fatalities per person per year are in
the lower bounds of the ALARP range and remains within the Isegen property. The risks of
3x10˗7 fatalities per person per year are considered trivial.

The reason for the relatively short distance to the 1x10-6 fatalities per person per year is due
to the fact that the largest endpoint distances are related to the failure of the n˗butane vessel,
which has a very low failure rate.

LEGEND RISK
(FATALITIES PER PERSON PER YEAR)
1x10-5
1x10-6
3x10-7
Figure 5-6: Risk isopleths for fires and explosions relating to accidental releases
from the n˗butane storage vessel and associated equipment

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5.2 Phthalic Anhydride Plant

5.2.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit

The phthalic anhydride plant produces phthalic anhydride from o˗xylene, with nitrogen used
as an inert gas for the process.

5.2.2 Hazardous Components

1.1.1.3 Acute Toxic Substances Stored or Processed

Phthalic anhydride and o˗xylene are not considered toxic. Nitrogen, although nontoxic, can
displace air as an asphyxiant.

1.1.1.4 Flammable or Combustible Materials

Phthalic anhydride has a flash point of 152°C and has a probability of ignition of zero
(RIVM 2009), while o˗xylene is considered flammable with a flashpoint of 17°C.

5.2.3 Consequence Modelling

5.2.3.1 Toxic Vapour Clouds

Nitrogen is not a toxic gas but may displace oxygen, resulting in asphyxiation, and is analysed
in a similar manner to toxic gases. The effects from delivery tankers were not considered as
they spend less than 2% of the time on site.

The downwind distances to the emergency response concentrations AEGL-1, AEGL-2 and
AEGL-3, respectively, are given in Table 5-4 for release scenarios in various weather
conditions. The AEGL-2 concentration is the maximum air concentration below which it is
believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing
irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair an individual’s ability
to take protective action. AEGL-3 is the maximum air concentration below which it is believed
that nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing life-threatening
health effects.

Figure 5-7 illustrates the AEGL-2 endpoint distances for various release scenarios in worst-
case meteorological conditions.

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Table 5-4: Endpoint distances to the AEGL values for nitrogen releases
Distance to Endpoints (m)
Scenario
Equip. Scenario AEGL Category Category Category Category Category Category
No.
3/B 1.5/D 5/D 9/D 5/E 1.5/F
AEGL˗1 209 184 281 376 284 209
N2-01 Vessel Catastrophic failure AEGL˗2 43 33 65 110 68 43
AEGL˗3 28 24 39 62 40 28
AEGL˗1 189 141 144 133 116 134
N2-02 Vessel Fixed duration release AEGL˗2 34 35 37 35 33 35
AEGL˗3 25 18 19 17 15 17
AEGL˗1 36 40 37 28 40 46
N2-03 Vessel 10 mm hole AEGL˗2 9 11 8 7 8 11
AEGL˗3 6 7 6 5 6 7
AEGL˗1 223 198 303 402 306 205
N2-04 Tanker Catastrophic failure AEGL˗2 46 35 70 118 73 37
AEGL˗3 31 26 42 67 43 27
AEGL˗1 159 162 149 129 148 179
N2-05 Tanker Fixed duration release AEGL˗2 40 41 40 38 41 43
AEGL˗3 20 22 20 18 20 22

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0.00 0.12 0.24


km

LEGEND SCENARIO
N2-01 Nitrogen storage tank – catastrophic failure
N2-02 Nitrogen storage tank – contents released in 10 minutes
N2-03 Nitrogen storage tank – 10 mm hole
N2-04 Nitrogen road tanker – catastrophic failure
N2-05 Nitrogen road tanker – contents released in 10 minutes
Figure 5-7: The impact on the nearest community of ground-level air concentrations
of nitrogen, following a large release, using the AEGL˗2 (832 000 ppm)
value

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A 1% fatality represents the endpoint for risk assessment calculations, with various scenarios
shown in Figure 5-8. As no fatalities would be expected from a nitrogen release, no further
analysis would be required.

0.00 0.12 0.24


km

LEGEND SCENARIO
N2-02 Nitrogen storage tank – contents released in 10 minutes
N2-03 Nitrogen storage tank – 10 mm hole
N2-05 Nitrogen road tanker – contents released in 10 minutes
Figure 5-8: The extent of a 1% fatality in the open following large releases of
nitrogen

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5.2.3.2 Pool Fires

o˗Xylene for the manufacture of phthalic anhydride is offloaded from road tankers and pumped
into the o˗xylene tanks. Prior to offloading, the tankers are positioned in the offloading area
that has secondary containment and a water deluge tunnel and are earthed to limit ignition
sources. Operators are present during the offloading and can take the first line of defence in
the event of a fire.

Figure 5-9 shows the maximum thermal-radiation curves for a large pool fire, due to the loss
of containment of the delivery tanker, while Figure 5-10 shows the thermal-radiation curves
from a single bund fire.

The 4 kW/m2 is radiation sufficient to break glass, with a possibility of the fire propagating
indoors. This value should also be used as the outer extent for emergency escape. The
10 kW/m2 is the value that would result in a 1% fatality for unprotected people exposed to the
fire for duration of 20 seconds.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-9: Thermal radiation from a pool fire, due to a loss of containment of the
o˗xylene delivery tanker

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LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-10: Thermal radiation from a pool fire, due to a loss of containment of
o˗xylene at the western bund

There would be no off-site impacts from large o˗xylene pool fires, and therefore no further
analysis would be required.

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5.2.3.3 Flash Fires

A loss of containment of o˗xylene could form a flammable cloud that could drift to a point of
ignition. On ignition, the flammable cloud could form either a flash fire or a vapour cloud
explosion (see Subsection 5.2.3.4). The extent of the flammable cloud would depend on the
released quantity, physical properties of the released gas, wind speed and weather stability.

A flash fire would extend to the lower flammable limit (LFL) but, due to the formation of pockets,
could extend beyond this limit to the point defined as the ½ LFL. It is assumed that people
within the flash fire would experience lethal injuries while people outside of the flash fire would
remain unharmed. The ½ LFL is used for emergency planning to evacuate people to a safe
distance in the event of a release, as given in Table 5-5.

Table 5-5: Maximum distances to the flammable limits


Maximum Distance (m)
Scenario
LFL ½ LFL
Tank failure 7.7 7.7
Tanker failure 5.5 5.5

Flash-fire scenarios indicated by the LFL at a low wind speed, which correspond to the worst
case of the largest releases, would not extend beyond the site boundary, as shown in
Figure 5-11.

LEGEND FLASH-FIRE SCENARIO


o˗Xylene Tank failure (bund)
o˗Xylene Tank failure (bund)
o˗Xylene Tanker failure
Figure 5-11: The extent of flash fires from a loss of containment of o˗xylene

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5.2.3.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion

A loss of containment of o˗xylene with an ignition source could form a flash fire as described
in Subsection 5.2.3.3 or a vapour cloud explosion.

No hazards were determined for vapour cloud explosions from o˗xylene.

5.2.3.5 BLEVE

A boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) can occur when a flame impinges on an
o˗xylene vessel, particularly in the vapour space region where cooling by evaporation does not
occur. The vessel shell weakens and ruptures with a total loss of contents, and the issuing
mass of o˗xylene burns as a massive fireball.

The major consequences of a BLEVE are intense thermal radiation from the fireball, a blast
wave and fragments from the shattered vessel. These fragments may be projected to
considerable distances. Analyses of the travel range of fragment missiles from a number of
BLEVEs suggest that the majority land within 700 m from the incident. A blast wave from a
BLEVE is fairly localised but can cause significant damage to immediate equipment.

No BLEVE would be expected from o˗xylene tankers.

5.2.4 Maximum Individual Risks (MIR)

As the consequence from fires and explosions from the o˗xylene road tanker would not pose
a risk to both workers and the public and no fatalities would be expected from a nitrogen
release, no further analysis would be required.

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5.3 Maleic Anhydride Plant

5.3.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit

Maleic anhydride is produced from n˗butane, which is transported to site via a pipeline and is
stored in D˗360. o˗Xylene is used as entrainer.

5.3.2 Hazardous Components

1.1.1.5 Acute Toxic Substances Stored or Processed

No acute toxic materials are produced or stored at the maleic anhydride plant.

1.1.1.6 Flammable or Combustible Materials

Materials at the maleic anhydride plant considered flammable are n˗butane and o˗xylene. See
Chapter 4.1.2 for description of hazardous materials.

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5.3.3 Consequence Modelling

5.3.3.1 Pool Fires

 n˗Butane

The consequence modelling indicated that no n˗butane pool fires would be formed as a result
of a loss of containment from the vaporiser.

 o˗Xylene

o˗Xylene for the manufacture of maleic anhydride is offloaded from road tankers and pumped
into the o˗xylene tanks. Prior to offloading, the tankers are positioned in the offloading area
that has secondary containment and a water deluge tunnel and are earthed to limit ignition
sources. Operators are present during the offloading and can take the first line of defence in
the event of a fire.

Figure 5-12 shows the maximum thermal-radiation curves for a large pool fire, due to the loss
of containment of the delivery tanker, while Figure 5-13 shows the thermal-radiation curves
from a single bund fire.

The 4 kW/m2 is radiation sufficient to break glass, with a possibility of the fire propagating
indoors. This value should also be used as the outer extent for emergency escape. The
10 kW/m2 is the value that would result in a 1% fatality for unprotected people exposed to the
fire for duration of 20 seconds. The 35 kW/m2, representing the 100% fatality, was not reached.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
Figure 5-12: Thermal radiation from a pool fire, due to a loss of containment of the
o˗xylene delivery tanker

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LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-13: Thermal radiation from a pool fire, due to a loss of containment of the
o˗xylene storage vessel

The 10 kW/m2 thermal radiation (the1% fatality) could extend beyond the site boundary but
would not impact the general public. Thus, no further analysis would be required.

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5.3.3.2 Jet Fires

Jet fires for gaseous releases are included in the risk assessment (RIVM 2009) and are
described in the subsections below.

 Vapour Line Rupture

The thermal radiation from a full-bore vapour line rupture of the n˗butane line is shown in
Figure 5-14. The thin lines indicate the flame shape from a single orientation, while the thicker
lines indicate the shape from all directions.

The 4 kW/m2 is radiation sufficient to break glass, with a possibility of the fire propagating
indoors. This value should also be used as the outer extent for emergency escape. The
10 kW/m2 is the value that would result in a 1% fatality for unprotected people exposed to the
fire for duration of 20 seconds. The 35 kW/m2 represents the 100% fatality and the lower limits
of steel damage.

As n˗butane jet fires would not extend beyond the site boundary, no further analysis would be
required.

LEGEND Thermal Radiation


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-14: Thermal radiation from an n˗butane jet fire due to a full-bore line rupture

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5.3.3.3 Flash Fires

A loss of containment of flammable gas could form a flammable cloud that could drift to a point
of ignition. On ignition, the flammable cloud could form either a flash fire or a vapour cloud
explosion (see Subsection 5.3.3.4). The extent of the flammable cloud would depend on the
released quantity, physical properties of the released gas, wind speed and weather stability.

A flash fire would extend to the lower flammable limit (LFL) but, due to the formation of pockets,
could extend beyond this limit to the point defined as the ½ LFL. It is assumed that people
within the flash fire would experience lethal injuries while people outside of the flash fire would
remain unharmed. The ½ LFL is used for emergency planning to evacuate people to a safe
distance in the event of a release. The flammable limits for flash fires are given in Table 5-6.

 Butane

Flash-fire scenarios are shown in Figure 5-15 indicated by the LFL at 9 m/s wind speed, which
corresponds to the worst case of the largest releases, i.e. catastrophic failure of n˗butane
vaporiser. The thin lines indicate a northerly wind, while the thicker lines indicate wind from all
directions.

Impacts from flash fires could extend beyond the site boundary but would not impact the public.
Thus, no further analysis would be required.

LEGEND FLASH-FIRE SCENARIO


n˗Butane Vaporiser failure
n˗Butane Line
Figure 5-15: Flash-fire scenarios at 9 m/s wind speed

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Table 5-6: Flammable limits for flash-fire scenarios


Distance (m)
Scenario
Equipment Incident Flammability Category Category Category Category Category Category
No.
3/B 1.5/D 5/D 9/D 5/E 1.5/F
LFL 78 61 103 138 99 57
BUT-23 D-110 Catastrophic failure
½ LFL 134 119 166 212 157 106
LFL 12 12 12 9 12 17
BUT-26 Butane pipeline Full-bore rupture
½ LFL 22 26 22 19 24 37

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5.3.3.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion

A loss of containment of n˗butane with an ignition source could form a flash fire as described
in Subsection 5.3.3.3 or a vapour cloud explosion.

A release of flammable vapours could drift to an ignition point before detonating. This is
referred to as a late explosion. The distance to the 0.1 bar overpressure is shown in
Figure 5-16.

The 0.1 bar overpressure corresponds to 10% of the houses being severely damaged and a
probability of death indoors equal to 0.025. No lethal effects are expected below the 0.1 bar
for people in the open

As with the previous figures, the thin lines indicate the overpressure from vapours drifting from
a northerly wind, while the thicker lines show the effect zone from drifting clouds from all wind
directions.

LEGEND OVERPRESSURE
n˗Butane Vaporiser failure
n˗Butane Line
Figure 5-16: Blast overpressures from accidental loss of containment of n˗butane at
the maleic anhydride plant

Fatalities from n˗butane explosions at the maleic anhydride plant could extend beyond the
Isegen site boundary but would not extend into areas occupied by the public. Thus, no further
analysis would be required.

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5.3.3.5 BLEVE

A boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) can occur when a flame impinges on an
n˗butane pressure vessel, particularly in the vapour space region where cooling by
evaporation does not occur. The vessel shell weakens and ruptures with a total loss of
contents, and the issuing mass of propane burns as a massive fireball.

The major consequences of a BLEVE are intense thermal radiation from the fireball, a blast
wave and fragments from the shattered vessel. These fragments may be projected to
considerable distances. Analyses of the travel range of fragment missiles from a number of
BLEVEs suggest that the majority land within 700 m from the incident. A blast wave from a
BLEVE is fairly localised but can cause significant damage to immediate equipment.

A BLEVE formed from the n˗butane vaporiser assumed a flammable and explosive mass of
1708 kg. On explosion, the radius of the fireball was estimated to be 36.4 m, with duration of
5.9 seconds. The lift-off height was calculated to be 72.8 m. The thermal radiation from the
resulting fireball is shown below in Figure 5-17. The 1% fatality for the exposed duration
equates to 24.6 kW/m2 (49.5 m from the fireball), while the 10% fatality would equate to
33.4 kW/m2.

In the event of a BLEVE of the n˗butane vaporiser, a large fire ball could result in injuries or
fatalities just beyond the site boundary. However, impacts would not reach neighbouring
properties or the public.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
9.85 (1% fatality)
13.37 (10% fatality)
Figure 5-17: Predicted lethality from a BLEVE of the n˗butane vaporiser

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5.3.4 Maximum Individual Risks (MIR)

As the consequence from fires and explosions from n˗butane and o˗xylene at the maleic
anhydride plant would not pose a risk to both workers and the public, no further analysis would
be required.

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5.4 Food-Acids Plant

5.4.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit

The food-acids plant produces malic and fumaric acids from maleic anhydride.

5.4.2 Hazardous Components

5.4.2.1 Acute Toxic Substances Stored or Processed

No acutely toxic material is stored, produced or manufactured at the food-acids plant.

5.4.2.2 Flammable or Combustible Materials

No flammable or combustible material is stored, produced or manufactured at the food-acids


plant.

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5.5 Natural Gas Pipeline

5.5.1 Purpose of the Processing Unit

Natural gas is used as fuel for the catalytic converter and standby boiler. Once the plant is
operational, it is self-sufficient regarding steam production and the boiler is shut down.

5.5.2 Hazardous Components

5.5.2.1 Acute Toxic Substances Stored or Processed

Natural gas is primarily methane with small quantities of inert gases and heavier hydrocarbon
gases. As a result, natural gas is not considered toxic.

5.5.2.2 Flammable or Combustible Materials

Natural gas is extremely flammable.

5.5.3 Consequence Modelling

A number of scenarios were simulated for fires and explosions due to a loss of containment
of natural gas.

5.5.3.1 Jet Fires

A release of natural gas with a direct ignition would form a jet fire from the point of release. In
many instances, the release could be in any orientation depending on the point of release.
Unless the release orientation is specific, such as a PSV release, the release orientation
assumes the worst case, with a horizontal release from aboveground piping.

The 4 kW/m2 is the value that will break windows, thereby propagating a fire in the building.
The 10 kW/m2 represents a 1% fatality and the 35 kW/m2 is the thermal radiation for
spontaneous combustion of clothing with 100% probability of fatality.

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The worst-case jet fire would be from a catastrophic failure of the pipeline with subsequent
ignition. The jet fire would produce a maximum flame length of 71 m in still air, with the
produced thermal radiation shown in Figure 5-18. The thin lines indicate the radiation from a
single orientation, while the thicker lines indicate the thermal radiation from all directions.

The worst case may impact onto traffic in the road but should stop short of neighbouring tanks.
The fire may cause some on-site structural damage with potential knock-on effects. The gas
line is next to the main entrance, which could be unusable in the event of an emergency. An
alternative escape route should be provided in the event of such an emergency.

0.00 0.10 0.20


km

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-18: Maximum thermal radiation from a jet fire following a full-bore natural
gas pipeline failure

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Figure 5-19 illustrates the jet-fire scenarios that could produce a 1% fatality, represented by
the 10 kW/m2 thermal-radiation isopleths. Under worst-case conditions, the 1% fatality could
cross the site boundary and fatalities beyond the SAPREF boundary could occur. Further to
this, a large jet fire could interfere with the main entrance and alternative escape routes should
be considered.

0.00 0.08 0.16


km

LEGEND SCENARIOS
SG-01 Full-bore rupture at 6.5 bar
SG-04 10 mm hole at 6.5 bar
SG-07 Full-bore rupture at 1 bar
SG-10 10 mm hole at 1 bar
Figure 5-19: 1% fatality from jet fire scenarios

5.5.3.2 Flash Fires

A loss of containment of natural gas could form a flammable cloud that could drift to a point of
ignition. On ignition, the flammable cloud could form either a flash fire or a vapour cloud
explosion (see Subsection 5.5.3.3). The extent of the flammable cloud would depend on the
release quantity, physical properties of the released gas, wind speed and weather stability.

A flash fire would extend to the lower flammable limit (LFL) but due to the formation of pockets,
could extend beyond this limit to the point defined as the ½ LFL. It is assumed that people
within the flash fire would experience lethal injuries, while people outside of the flash fire would
remain unharmed. The ½ LFL is used for emergency planning to evacuate people to a safe
distance in the event of a release.

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The worst-case scenario consisting of a full-bore rupture at 6.25 barg is shown in Figure 5-20.
The worst case may impact onto traffic in the road but should stop short of neighbouring tanks.
The gas line is next to the main entrance, which could be unusable in the event of an
emergency. An alternative escape route should be provided in the event of such an
emergency. It is recommended that in emergency conditions, people should be evacuated to
the ½ LFL distance.

0.00 0.10 0.20


km

LEGEND SCENARIOS
½ LFL Full-bore rupture at 6.5 bar
LFL Full-bore rupture at 6.5 bar
Figure 5-20: Worst-case scenarios for flash fires

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5.5.3.3 Vapour Cloud Explosions

A loss of containment of natural gas from the gas line with an ignition source could form a
flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion (see Subsection 5.5.3.2).

The worst-case blast overpressures are given in Figure 5-21. In this case, the worst case is
the catastrophic failure of the natural gas pipeline. As with the previous diagrams, the thin
lines indicate the overpressure from vapours drifting from an easterly wind, while the thicker
lines show the effect zone from drifting clouds from all wind directions. The easterly wind
direction used in the diagrams does not indicate the predominant wind but is used as
illustrative purposes only.

The 0.3 bar represents major destruction of buildings and fatalities for people in the open. The
0.1 bar overpressure corresponds to 10% of the houses being severely damaged and a
probability of death indoors equal to 0.025. No lethal effects are expected below 0.1 bar
overpressure for people in the open. The 0.03 bar corresponds to the critical overpressure
causing windows to break, thus it is the limit of building damage.

While the effect area appears large, the actual explosion damage at high overpressures would
be limited to a relatively small area but could extend beyond the property boundary.

0.00 0.12 0.24


km

LEGEND OVERPRESSURE
(bar)
0.03
0.1
0.3
0.7
Drift line
Figure 5-21: Blast overpressures of the worst-case vapour cloud explosions for
natural gas

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5.5.4 Maximum Individual Risks (MIR)

5.5.4.1 Jet Fires

The risk from jet fires is shown in Figure 5-22. The 3x10˗7 fatalities per person per year are
considered trivial and extend a short distance beyond the site boundary.

LEGEND RISK
(fatalities per person per year)
1x10-5
1x10-6
3x10-7
Figure 5-22: Risk contours from accidental jet fires from a large release from the
natural gas reducing station

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5.5.4.2 Flash Fires and Vapour Cloud Explosions

A loss of containment of flammable material could drift to a point of ignition. On ignition, the
flammable cloud could form either a flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion. The risks from flash
fires and explosions are shown in Figure 5-23.

The risk of1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year extends beyond the site boundary. However,
the risks would not extend into any residential area and would be considered tolerable.

LEGEND RISK
(fatalities per person per year)
1x10-5
1x10-6
3x10-7
Figure 5-23: Risk contours from accidental flash fires and vapour cloud explosions
at the natural gas reducing station

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5.5.4.3 Combined Risks from the Natural Gas Pipeline

Figure 5-24 shows the combined risks from the natural gas pipeline. The risk of 1x10˗6 fatalities
per person per year extends a short distance beyond the site boundary resulting in risks being
in the ALARP range and considered tolerable.

LEGEND RISK
(fatalities per person per year)
1x10-5
1x10-6
3x10-7
Figure 5-24 Combined risk for the natural gas reducing station

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5.6 Phthalates Plant and Tank Farm (Proposed Project)

5.6.1 The Purpose of the Processing Unit

The phthalates plant produces phthalic esters from the reaction of acids with alcohols and
removing the water formed during the reaction. The unused acid component is recovered and
sent to the wet alcohol tanks for reuse, while the produced phthalate is kept for quality checks
before being transferred to the bulk tanks for transfer

The tank farm receives raw materials and stores products for the phthalates production, with
the exception of naphthalene, which is used for the production of phthalic anhydride.

5.6.2 Hazardous Components

5.6.3 Flammable Materials

Flammable materials are those that can ignite to give a number of possible hazardous effects,
depending on the actual material and conditions. These effects include flash fires, explosions,
fireballs, jet fires and pool fires.

The flammable and combustible materials i are listed below in Table 5-7. The description of
these products can be found in Chapter 4.1.2.1.

Table 5-7: Flammable and combustible in this section


Flash Point Boiling Point
Compound Comment
(°C) (°C)
Maleic anhydride 102 202
o-Xylene 17 145
n-Butanol 29 118
Isononanol 58 199
Naphthalene 79 218 Sublimes at 79°C
2-EH 82 217
Phthalic anhydride 152 286 Sublimes at 152°C
DBP 157 340.
DOP 216 384.
DINP 216 409
DIDP 229 250-267
DEHP 195 385
Isodecanol 104 212-216
DEHA 200 418

Abbreviations
Component Name
DIDP Di isodecyl phthalate
2EH 2-Ethylhexanol
INA Isononanol
DEHP HC 2 Ethylhexyl phthalate - high colour
DEHP CG 2 Ethylhexyl phthalate crystal grade

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Component Name
IDA Isodecanol
DBP Di butyl phthalate
DEHA Di 2 ethylhexyl adipate

In accordance to Table 4-17, Class 3 and Class 4 products, having flash points above 55°C
will sustain combustion when lit, but have a zero probability of direct and delayed ignition.
Naphthalene, which is stored above its flammable point has a direct ignition probability as a
Class 1 material, but a delayed ignition probability of a Class 3 material.

5.6.4 Toxic Materials

Toxic materials of interest to this study are those that could give dispersing vapour clouds
upon release into the atmosphere. These could then cause harm through inhalation or
absorption through the skin. Typically, the hazard posed by toxic materials will depend on both
concentration of the material in the air and the exposure duration.

No acutely toxic materials are stored or manufactured on site.

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5.6.5 Consequence Modelling

5.6.5.1 Fires

 Bund and Pool Fires

 Bunded Area containing TK101/102

TK101 and TK102 would contain 2EH in a separate bunded area that would receive product
from road tankers offloaded adjacent to the storage tanks.

A loss of containment could occur at the offloading tanker or at the pump and its lines. On loss
of containment, a pool will form and the material will evaporate at a rate determined by the
surface area of the pool, the temperature of the pool and the wind conditions. In the event of
an ignition, the evaporation rate would be replaced with the burning rate.

Instantaneous failure of a storage tank can result if a proportion of the component overflows
the top of the bund, referred to as ‘overtopping’. For the scenario of an instantaneous release,
the amount of overtopping is taken to be an average of 33%. This is translated to the risk
assessment by increasing the surface area of the bund by 50% (RIVM 2009)

A tank release such as an overfilling or piping failure would not result in overtopping, and even
in the worst case would be contained within the bunded area.

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The maximum effect of a pool fire from a loss of containment in the storage area is shown in
Figure 5-25. The thin lines indicate a westerly wind while the thicker lines indicate wind from
all directions.

The 4 kW/m2 is radiation is sufficient to break glass, with a possibility of the fire propagating
indoors. The 10 kW/m2 represents a 1% fatality for people exposed to the fire for 20 seconds.
This value is used for emergency planning for fires. The 35 kW/m2.thermal radiation
represents a 100% fatality and the lower bounds for steal damage.

Impacts from a fire within the bunded area would be local and would not extend beyond the
site boundary.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-25: Thermal radiation from large fires in the storage area containing tanks
TK101 and TK102

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 Bunded Area containing Tanks ACL1/2/3/4 and TK102/103

This bunded area would contain 2EH, DEHP and isononanol. Isononanol having the lowest
flashpoint of over 80°C was used in the simulations

Instantaneous failure of a storage tank can result if a proportion of the component overflows
the top of the bund, referred to as ‘overtopping’. For the scenario of an instantaneous release,
the amount of overtopping is taken to be an average of 33%. This is translated to the risk
assessment by increasing the surface area of the bund by 50% (RIVM 2009)

A tank release such as an overfilling or piping failure would not result in overtopping, and even
in the worst case would be contained within the bunded area.

The maximum effect of a pool fire from a loss of containment in the storage area is shown in
Figure 5-26. The thin lines indicate a westerly wind while the thicker lines indicate wind from
all directions.

The 4 kW/m2 is radiation is sufficient to break glass, with a possibility of the fire propagating
indoors. The 10 kW/m2 represents a 1% fatality for people exposed to the fire for 20 seconds.
This value is used for emergency planning for fires. The 35 kW/m2.thermal radiation
represents a 100% fatality and the lower bounds for steal damage.

Impacts from a fire within the bunded area would be local and would not extend beyond the
site boundary.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-26: Thermal radiation from large fires in the storage area containing tanks
ACL1/2/3/4 and TK102/103

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 Tank Farm 2

This bunded area would contain a variety of materials. Butanol having the lowest flashpoint of
over 80°C was used in the simulations.

Instantaneous failure of a storage tank can result if a proportion of the component overflows
the top of the bund, referred to as ‘overtopping’. For the scenario of an instantaneous release,
the amount of overtopping is taken to be an average of 33%. This is translated to the risk
assessment by increasing the surface area of the bund by 50% (RIVM 2009).

A tank release such as an overfilling or piping failure would not result in overtopping, and even
in the worst case would be contained within the bunded area.

The maximum effect of a pool fire from a loss of containment in the storage area is shown in
Figure 5-27. The thin lines indicate a westerly wind while the thicker lines indicate wind from
all directions.

The 4 kW/m2 is radiation is sufficient to break glass, with a possibility of the fire propagating
indoors. The 10 kW/m2 represents a 1% fatality for people exposed to the fire for 20 seconds.
This value is used for emergency planning for fires. The 35 kW/m2.thermal radiation
represents a 100% fatality and the lower bounds for steal damage.

Fatalities, represented by the 10kW/m2 isopleth, from a fire within the bunded area would be
local could extend beyond the site boundary and must be carried over to the risk assessment.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-27: Thermal radiation from large fires in the Tank Farm 2 storage area

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 Road Tanker Offloading Area

The road tanker offloading area would be located north of the Tank Farm 2 storage area. The
designs for the offloading has not been completed, but legally must comply to legislation
including the National Building Regulations and the National Environmental Management Act.
Based on these acts, no material may enter the ground and the spilt material must be
contained. Assuming the material is contained in the offloading area and not a remote sump
and the pool size limited to 300 m2, due to natural barriers, the thermal radiation isopleths are
shown in Figure 5-28.

The thin lines indicate a westerly wind while the thicker lines indicate wind from all directions.

The 4 kW/m2 is radiation is sufficient to break glass, with a possibility of the fire propagating
indoors. The 10 kW/m2 represents a 1% fatality for people exposed to the fire for 20 seconds.
This value is used for emergency planning for fires. The 35 kW/m2.thermal radiation
represents a 100% fatality and the lower bounds for steal damage.

Impacts from a fire at the road tanker area, with the above assumptions, would be local and
would not extend beyond the site boundary and thus nor further analysis would be required.

LEGEND THERMAL RADIATION


(kW/m2)
4
10
35
Figure 5-28: Thermal radiation from large fires at the road tanker offloading area

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 Jet Fires

No jet fires would be expected, as material is not stored under pressure. In this section.

 Flash Fires

Flash fires would not be expected in this section, due to the high flashpoints of the materials
stored.

5.6.5.2 Vapour Cloud Explosions

Vapour cloud explosions would not be expected in this section, due to the high flashpoints of
the materials stored.

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5.6.6 Maximum Individual Risk

Based only on the catastrophic and severe failures of the storage tanks to be installed, the
risks of 1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year isopleth extends beyond the site boundary to the
south onto the unoccupied dunes, as shown in Figure 5-29. As a result, the proposed
phthalates facility and tank farm alone would classify the Isegen facility as a Major Hazard
Installation. The risk from fires and explosions on site would be considered tolerable.

LEGEND RISK
(fatalities per person per year)
1x10˗6
3x10˗7
Figure 5-29: Lethal probability isolines associated with the proposed phthalates
plant and storage

Risks greater than 1x10˗4 fatalities per person per year, considered tolerable for industrial
areas but excessive for residential areas, extends beyond the Isegen site to the south.

The risk of 3x10˗7 fatalities per person per year isopleth indicates the extent for land-use that
would be suitable for vulnerable populations, such as hospitals, retirement homes, nursery
schools, prisons, large gatherings in the open, and so forth.

No new land planning should be approved without consultation of the PADHI land-planning
tables attached in Appendix D.

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5.7 Site Risk Pre-and Post the Phthalate Project

The isopleths of the current Isegen site risks are shown in Figure 5-30, which has limited
impacts beyond the SAPREF site boundary and is general considered acceptable to the
public, beyond the SAPREF boundaries.

LEGEND RISK
(fatalities per person per year)
1x10˗4
1x10˗5
1x10˗6
3x10˗7
Figure 5-30: Lethal probability isolines associated with the current Isegen facility

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The isopleths of the Isegen facility including the Phthalates Plant and tank farm are given in
Figure 5-31. The 1x10-6 fatalities per person per year isopleth, representing the lower bounds
of the ALARP criteria, area increases slightly to the southern side where the isopleth extends
beyond the site boundary onto the unoccupied dune area. The increases 1x10-6 fatalities per
person per year isopleth would not encroach onto any residential area and thus would be
considered acceptable.

LEGEND RISK
(fatalities per person per year)
1x10˗4
1x10˗5
1x10˗6
3x10˗7
Figure 5-31: Lethal probability isolines associated with the Isegen facility including
the proposed Phthalates Plant and tank farm

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6 REDUCTION OF RISK

The project presented for this report are not final and would require detail designs to be
completed prior to construction. RISCOM did not find the site risks unacceptable to proceed
to the detail designs. Isegen and their contractor must continue to investigate ways to reduce
risks via either engineering or organisational measures.

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7 CONCLUSIONS

Risk calculations are not precise. The accuracy of the predictions is determined by the quality
of base data and expert judgements. A number of well-known sources of incident data were
consulted and applied to obtain the likelihood of an incident to occur. The risk assessment
included the consequences and risks of fires and explosions from the manufacturing or
storage tank facility.

The risk assessment was done on the assumption that the site is maintained to an acceptable
level and that all-statuary regulations are applied. It was also assumed that the detailed
engineering designs were done by competent people and were correctly specified for the
intended duty. For example, it is assumed that the tank-wall thicknesses have been correctly
calculated, that the vents have been sized for emergency conditions, that the instrumentation
and electrical components comply with the specified electrical area classification, that the
material of construction is compatible with the products, etc.

It is the responsibility of Isegen and their contractors to ensure that all engineering designs
would have been completed by competent persons and that all pieces of equipment would
have been installed correctly. All designs should be in full compliance with (but not limited to)
the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 and its regulations, the National Buildings
Regulations and the Buildings Standards Act 107 of 1977 as well as local bylaws.

A number of incident scenarios were simulated, taking into account the prevailing
meteorological conditions, and described in the report.

7.1 Notifiable Substances

The General Machinery Regulation 8 and its Schedule A on notifiable substances requires
any employer who has a substance equal to or exceeding the quantity listed in the regulation
to notify the divisional director. A site is classified as a Major Hazard Installation if it contains
one or more notifiable substances or if the off-site risk is sufficiently high. The latter can only
be determined from a quantitative risk assessment.

As the n˗butane bullet contains more than 25 t, the stored n˗butane is classified as a
notifiable substance and qualifies the Isegen site (Isipingo) as a Major Hazard
Installation.

7.2 n˗Butane Storage and Pipeline

n˗Butane is stored as a liquid at an elevated pressure in a storage bullet. A loss of containment


would produce a flammable gas as well as a flammable pool.

Under worst-case conditions, a flash fire or vapour cloud explosion could enter into Isipingo
Beach, SAPREF and the adjacent Transnet property with possible fatalities. Pool fires could
result in the ignition of vegetation adjacent to the Isegen facility and off-site fatalities are a
possibility; although, the area to the west of Isegen is currently unoccupied.

Impacts for a PSV jet fire would remain within the n˗butane storage area and no off-site
incidents would be expected. In the event of a BLEVE of the n˗butane bullet, a large fireball
would not result in injuries or fatalities beyond the site boundary.

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Due to the fact that the largest endpoint distances for the above incidents are related to the
failure of the n˗butane bullet, which has a very low failure rate, the risk of off-site fatalities are
considered trivial.

7.3 Natural Gas Pipeline

Natural gas pipeline enters the site next to the main gate and is reduced to a pressure of 1 bar
before being transported to the phthalic anhydride plant and boiler. A loss of containment of
natural gas could extend beyond the Isegen site but not past the SAPREF control gate, and
thus a loss of containment would not impact the public. The risks to the public from the natural
gas line would be considered acceptable.

7.4 Phthalic Anhydride Plant

The phthalic anhydride plant produces phthalic anhydride from o˗xylene, which is considered
flammable. However, there would be no off-site impacts from large o˗xylene pool fires, flash
fires or explosions at the phthalic anhydride plant, and therefore the risks to the public are
considered trivial

The conversion of raw materials to naphthalene for the production phthalic anhydride, would
involve minimal plant changes. As there is current overpressure protection of the reactor, the
conversion to naphthalene would not change the risk profile of the plant.

Bulk naphthalene would be stored at the proposed tank farm, with the impacts covered in that
section of the risk assessment

7.5 Maleic Anhydride Plant

Materials at the maleic anhydride plant considered flammable are n˗butane and o˗xylene.

In the case of n˗butane, fatalities from flash fires as well as vapour cloud explosions and
BLEVEs could extend beyond the site boundary but would not impact the public. Jet fires
would not extend beyond the site boundary and the consequence modelling performed
indicated that no pool fires would be formed as a result of a loss of containment from the
vaporiser.

The 1% fatality from large o˗xylene pool fires could extend beyond the site boundary but would
not impact the general public.

Consequences from fires and explosions from n˗butane and o˗xylene at the maleic anhydride
plant would pose risk to the public that is considered trivial.

7.6 Food-Acids Plant

No acutely toxic, flammable or combustible material is stored, produced or manufactured at


the food-acids plant. Thus, the increase in malic acid production would not alter the risk profile
of the facility.

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7.7 Proposed Phthalates Plant and Tank Farm

The risks from the phthalates plant would be localised with fires form the small day tanks
localised in the plat area.

The risks from the tank farm are related to materials having a low flash point or materials
stored above the flash point. To this end, Tank Farm 2 produced sufficiently high risks, that
would extend beyond the southern boundary into the dunes, alone classifying the site as a
Major Hazardous Installation. The risks to the public would be considered tolerable.
7.8 Impacts on Surrounding Facilities and Residential Areas and Major Hazard
Installations

There are potential impacts on the residential area of Isipingo Beach from flash fires and
vapour cloud explosions originating from the n˗butane bullet but the risks are considered trivial.

Impacts from flash fires and vapour cloud explosions at the n˗butane bullet could extend to
any facilities and businesses located on the SAPREF property (including Isegen’s neighbour
on its northeast boundary, NCS Resins). However, the risks would be considered trivial.

7.9 Major Hazard Installation

Previous studies concluded that the MHI facility has been classified as a Major Hazard. This
project would not alter the classification and the Major Hazard Installation risk assessment
must be updated prior to construction

This study is not intended to replace the Major Hazard Installation risk assessment
which should be completed prior to construction of the terminal.

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8 RECOMMENDATIONS

The project presented for this report are not final and would require detail designs to be
completed prior to construction. RISCOM did not find any fatal flaws that would prevent the
project proceeding to the detailed engineering phase of the project.

RISCOM would support the project with the following conditions:

1. Compliance with all statutory requirements, i.e. pressure vessel designs;


2. Compliance with applicable SANS codes, i.e. SANS 10087, SANS 10089,
SANS 10108, SANS 10400 etc.;
3. Incorporation of applicable guidelines or equivalent international recognised codes of
good design and practice into the designs;
4 Completion of a recognised process hazard analysis (such as a HAZOP study,
FMEA, etc.) on the proposed facility prior to construction to ensure design and
operational hazards have been identified and adequate mitigation put in place;
5 Preparation and issue of a safety document detailing safety and design features
reducing the impacts from fires, explosions and flammable atmospheres to the MHI
assessment body at the time of the MHI assessment:
Including compliance to statutory laws, applicable codes and standards and
a.
world’s best practice;
Including the listing of statutory and non-statutory inspections, giving
b.
frequency of inspections;
c. Including the auditing of the built facility against the safety document;
6. Demonstration by Isegen or their contractor that the final designs would reduce the
risks posed by the installation to internationally acceptable guidelines;
7. Signature of all designs by a professional engineer registered in South Africa in
accordance with the Engineering Profession Act, who takes responsibility for suitable
designs;
8. Completion of an emergency preparedness and response document for on-site and
off-site scenarios prior to initiating the MHI risk assessment (with input from local
authorities);
9 Permission not being granted for increases to the product list or product inventories
without redoing part of or the full EIA;
10 Final acceptance of the facility risks with an MHI risk assessment that must be
completed in accordance to the MHI regulations:
Basing such a risk assessment on the final design and including engineering
a.
mitigation
.

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9 REFERENCES

AICHE (1985). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures. New York: American Institute of
Chemical Engineers.
BUNCEFIELD MAJOR INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS BOARD (2007). Recommendations on
the Design and Operation of Fuel Storage Sites. [report]. Available at: Buncefield Investigation
Website. <http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/index.htm> (Accessed 5
February 2012).
CLANCEY, V. J. (1972). Diagnostic Features of Explosion Damage. Edinburgh: Sixth
International Meeting of Forensic Sciences.
CPR 14E (1997). Methods for the Calculation of Physical Effects (“Yellow Book”). Third
Edition. Apeldoorn: TNO.
CPR 16E (1992). Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage (“Green Book”). First
Edition. Apeldoorn: TNO.
CPR 18E (1999). Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment (“Purple Book”). First Edition,
Apeldoorn: TNO.
COX, A. W, LEES, F. P. and ANG, M.L. (1990). Classification of Hazardous Locations. British
Institution of Chemical Engineers.
EPA (1989) Health Issue Assessment: Summary Review of Health Effects Associated with
Hydrogen Fluoride and Related Compounds. EPA/600/8-89/002F. Cincinnati, Ohio:
Environmental Criteria and Assessment Office, Office of Health and Environmental
Assessment, Office of Research and Development.
DOL (2001). Occupation Health and Safety Act, 1993: Major Hazard Installation Regulations
(No. R692). Regulation Gazette. No. 7122, Pretoria, Republic of South Africa: Government
Gazette.
HSE (2011). PADHI: HSE’s Land Use Planning Methodology. Available at: Health and Safety
Executive Website. <http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/ methodology.htm>
LEES, F. P. (2001). Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard Identification,
Assessment, and Control. Second Edition. London: Butterworths.
OGP (2010). Process Release Frequencies. OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory. 434 (1).
London: International Association of Oil & Gas Producers.
RIVM (2009). Reference Manual BEVI Risk Assessments. Edition 3.2. Bilthoven, the
Netherlands: National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM).
STEPHENS, M. (1970). Minimizing Damage to Refineries. US Dept. of the Interior, Offices of
Oil and Gas.

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10 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AEGL Acute exposure guideline levels are values published by the US


Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
AEGL values represent threshold exposure limits for the general public
applicable to five emergency exposure periods (10 minutes, 30 minutes,
1 hour, 4 hours and 8 hours) and are distinguished by varying degrees
of severity of toxic effects.
AEGL˗1 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is
predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals,
could experience notable discomfort, irritation or certain asymptomatic
nonsensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are
transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure.
AEGL˗2 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is
predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals,
could experience irreversible or other serious, long lasting adverse
health effects or an impaired ability to escape.
AEGL˗3 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is
predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals,
could experience life-threatening health effects or death.
Although the AEGL values represent threshold levels for the general
public, including susceptible subpopulations, such as infants, children,
the elderly, persons with asthma and those with other illnesses, it is
recognized that individuals, subject to unique or idiosyncratic responses,
could experience the effects described at concentrations below the
corresponding AEGL value.
AIA See Approved Inspection Authority
ALARP The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) developed the risk ALARP
triangle, in an attempt to account for risks in a manner similar to those
used in everyday life. This involved deciding:
 Whether a risk is so high that something must be done about it;
 Whether the risk is or has been made so small that no further
precautions are necessary;
 Whether a risk falls between these two states and has been
reduced to levels ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP).
Reasonable practicability involves weighing a risk against the trouble,
time and money needed to control it.
Approved An approved inspection authority (AIA) is defined in the Major Hazard
Inspection Installation regulations (July 2001)
Authority
Asphyxiant An asphyxiant is a gas that is nontoxic but may be fatal if it accumulates
in a confined space and is breathed at high concentrations since it
replaces oxygen containing air.
Blast Blast overpressure is a measure used in the multi-energy method to
Overpressure indicate the strength of the blast, indicated by a number ranging from 1
(for very low strengths) up to 10 (for detonative strength).
BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions result from the sudden
failure of a vessel containing liquid at a temperature above its boiling
point. A BLEVE of flammables results in a large fireball.
Deflagration Deflagration is a chemical reaction of a substance, in which the reaction
front advances into the unreacted substance at less than sonic velocity.

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Detonation Detonation is a release of energy caused by extremely rapid chemical


reaction of a substance, in which the reaction front of a substance is
determined by compression beyond the auto-ignition temperature.
Emergency An emergency plan is a plan in writing that describes how potential
Plan incidents identified at the installation together with their consequences
should be dealt with, both on site and off site.
Explosion An explosion is a release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity
or blast wave.
Flammable Flammable limits are a range of gas or vapour concentrations in the air
Limits that will burn or explode if a flame or other ignition source is present. The
lower point of the range is called the lower flammable limit (LFL).
Likewise, the upper point of the range is called the upper flammable
limit (UFL).
Flammable The Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 defines a flammable
Liquid liquid as any liquid which produces a vapour that forms an explosive
mixture with air and includes any liquid with a closed cup flashpoint of
less than 55°C.
Flammable products have been classified according to their flashpoints
and boiling points, which ultimately determine the propensity to ignite.
Separation distances described in the various codes are dependent on
the flammability classification.
Class Description
0 Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
IA Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of below 23°C and a
boiling point below 35°C
IB Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of below 23°C and a
boiling point of 35°C or above
IC Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of 23°C and above but
below 38°C
II Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of 38°C and above but
below 60.5°C
IIA Liquids that have a closed cup flashpoint of 60.5°C and above
but below 93°C
Flash Fire A flash fire is defined as combustion of a flammable vapour and air
mixture in which the flame passes through the mixture at a rate less than
sonic velocity so that negligible damaging overpressure is generated.
Frequency Frequency is the number of times an outcome is expected to occur in a
given period of time.
IDLH Immediately dangerous to life or health values were developed by the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
IDLH value refers to a maximum concentration to which a healthy person
may be exposed for 30 minutes and escape without suffering irreversible
health effects or symptoms that impair escape (ranging from runny eyes
that temporarily impair eyesight to a coma). IDLH values are intended to
ensure that workers can escape from a given contaminated environment
in the event of failure of the respiratory protection equipment.
Ignition An ignition source is a source of temperature and energy sufficient to
Source initiate combustion.
Individual Risk Individual risk is the probability that in one year a person will become a
victim of an accident if the person remains permanently and unprotected

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in a certain location. Often the probability of occurrence in one year is


replaced by the frequency of occurrence per year.
Isopleth See Risk Isopleth
Jet A jet is the outflow of material emerging from an orifice with significant
momentum.
Jet Fire or A jet fire or flame is combusting material emerging from an orifice with
Flame a significant momentum.
LC Lethal concentration is the concentration by which a given percentage
of the exposed population will be fatally injured. The LC50 refers to the
concentration of airborne material the inhalation of which results in death
of 50% of the test group. The period of inhalation exposure could be from
30 min to a few hours (up to 4 hours).
LFL Lower Flammable Limit see Flammable Limits
LOC See Loss of Containment
Local Local government is defined in Section 1 of the Local Government
Government Transition Act, 1993 (Act No. 209 of 1993).
Loss of Loss of containment (LOC) is the event resulting in a release of
Containment material into the atmosphere.
Major Hazard Major Hazard Installation (MHI) means an installation:
Installation  Where more than the prescribed quantity of any substance is or
may be kept, whether permanently or temporarily;
 Where any substance is produced, used, handled or stored in
such a form and quantity that it has the potential to cause a major
incident (the potential of which will be determined by the risk
assessment).
Major Incident A major incident is an occurrence of catastrophic proportions, resulting
from the use of plant or machinery or from activities at a workplace.
When the outcome of a risk assessment indicates that there is a
possibility that the public will be involved in an incident, then the incident
is catastrophic.
Material Safety According to ISO˗11014, a material safety data sheet (MSDS) is a
Data Sheet document that contains information on the potential health effects of
exposure to chemicals or other potentially dangerous substances and on
safe working procedures when handling chemical products. It is an
essential starting point for the development of a complete health and
safety program. It contains hazard evaluations on the use, storage,
handling and emergency procedures related to that material. An MSDS
contains much more information about the material than the label and it
is prepared by the supplier. It is intended to tell what the hazards of the
product are, how to use the product safely, what to expect if the
recommendations are not followed, what to do if accidents occur, how to
recognize symptoms of overexposure and what to do if such incidents
occur.
MHI See Major Hazard Installation
MIR Maximum Individual Risk (see Individual Risk)
MSDS See Material Safety Data Sheet
OHS Act Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993 (Act No. 85 of 1993)
PAC See Protective Action Criteria
PADHI PADHI (planning advice for developments near hazardous
installations) is the name given to a methodology and software decision

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support tool developed and used in the HSE. It is used to give land-use
planning (LUP) advice on proposed developments near hazardous
installations.
PADHI uses two inputs into a decision matrix to generate either an
‘advise against’ or ‘don’t advise against’ response:
 The zone in which the development is located of the three zones
that HSE sets around the major hazard:
o The inner zone (> 1x10˗5 fatalities per person per year);
o The middle zone (1x10˗5 fatalities per person per year to
1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year);
o The outer zone (1x10˗6 fatalities per person per year to
3x10˗7 fatalities per person per year);
 The ‘sensitivity level’ of the proposed development which is
derived from an HSE categorisation system of ‘development
types’ (see the ‘development type tables’ in Appendix D).
Protective Protective action criteria (PAC) for emergency planning of chemical
Action Criteria release events are based on the following chemical exposure limit
values:
 Acute exposure guideline level (AEGL) values published by the
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA);
 Emergency response planning guideline (ERPG) values
produced by the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA);
 Temporary emergency exposure limit (TEEL) values developed
by the Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and
Protective Actions (SCAPA).
QRA See Quantitative Risk Assessment
Quantitative A quantitative risk assessment is the process of hazard identification,
Risk followed by a numerical evaluation of effects of incidents, both
Assessment consequences and probabilities and their combination into the overall
measure of risk.
Risk Risk is the measure of the consequence of a hazard and the frequency
at which it is likely to occur. Risk is expressed mathematically as:
Risk = Consequence x Frequency of Occurrence
Risk Risk assessment is the process of collecting, organising, analysing,
Assessment interpreting, communicating and implementing information in order to
identify the probable frequency, magnitude and nature of any major
incident which could occur at a major hazard installation and the
measures required to remove, reduce or control potential causes of such
an incident.
Risk Contour See Risk Isopleth
Societal Risk Societal risk is risk posed on a societal group who are exposed to a
hazardous activity.
Temporary A temporary installation is an installation that can travel independently
Installation between planned points of departure and arrival for the purpose of
transporting any substance and which is only deemed to be an
installation at the points of departure and arrival, respectively.
TLV-STEL Short-term exposure threshold limit values are the concentrations to
which workers can be exposed continuously for a short period
(15 minutes) of time without suffering from: irritation; chronic or
irreversible tissue damage; or, narcosis to a sufficient degree to increase

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the likelihood of accidental injury, impair self-rescue or materially reduce


work efficiency, provided that the daily TLV-TWA is not exceeded.
TLV-TWA Time weighted average threshold limit values are the concentrations
for a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek, to which nearly
all workers may be repeatedly exposed day after day, without adverse
effects.
UFL Upper Flammable Limit (see Flammable Limits)
Vapour Cloud A vapour cloud explosion (VCE) results from ignition of a premixed
Explosion cloud of a flammable vapour, gas or spray with air, in which flames
accelerate to sufficiently high velocities to produce significant
overpressure.
VCE See Vapour Cloud Explosion

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11 APPENDIX A: DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR CERTIFICATE

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12 APPENDIX B: SANAS CERTIFICATES

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13 APPENDIX C: NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION

Prior to assessment of potential impacts of various accidental spills, reference needs to be


made to the legislation, regulations and guidelines governing the operation of the
development.

Section 1 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHS Act; Act No. 85 of 1993) defines a
"major hazard installation" to mean an installation:

“ (a) Where more than the prescribed quantity of any substance is or may be kept,
whether permanently or temporarily;
(b) Where any substance is produced, processed, used, handled or stored in
such a form and quantity that it has the potential to cause a major incident
(our emphasis). “

It should be noted that if either (a) or (b) is satisfied, the Major Hazard Installation (MHI)
regulations will apply. The prescribed quantity of a chemical can be found in Section 8(1) of
the General Machinery Regulation 8 (our emphasis).

A major incident is defined as: "an occurrence of catastrophic proportions, resulting from the
use of plant and machinery or from activities at a workplace”. Catastrophic in this context
means loss of life and limbs or severe injury to employees or members of the public,
particularly those who are in the immediate vicinity (our emphasis).

It is important to note that the definition refers to an occurrence, whereas Section 1b) refers to
potential to cause a major incident. If potential to cause a major incident exists, then the
OHS Act and the Major Hazard Installation regulations will apply (our emphasis).

On the 16th of January 1998, the MHI regulations were promulgated under the OHS Act (Act
No. 85 of 1993), with a further amendment on the 30th of July 2001. The provisions of the
regulations apply to installations that have on their premises a certain quantity of a substance
that can pose a significant risk to the health and safety of employees and the public.

The scope of application given in Section 2 of the MHI regulations is as follows:

“ (1) Subject to the provisions of Subregulation (3) these regulations shall apply to
employers, self-employed persons and users, who have on their premises,
either permanently or temporarily, a major hazard installation or a quantity of
a substance which may pose a risk that could affect the health and safety of
employees and the public (our emphasis);
(2) These regulations shall apply to local governments, with specific reference
to Regulation 9. “

It is important to note that the regulations refer to a substance, and furthermore the regulations
are applicable to risks posed by the substance and NOT merely the potential consequences
(our emphasis).

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The regulations essentially consist of six parts, namely:

1. Duties for notification of a Major Hazard Installation (existing or proposed), including:


a. Fixed (see List 1);
b. Temporary installations;
2. Minimum requirements for a quantitative risk assessment (see List 2);
3. Requirements of an on-site emergency plan (see List 3);
4. Reporting steps of risk and emergency occurrences (see List 4);
5. General duties required of suppliers;
6. General duties required of local government.

Notification of installation (List 1) indicates that:

 Applications need to be made in writing to the relevant local authority and the provincial
director for permission:
o To erect any Major Hazard Installation;
o Prior to the modification of any existing installation that may significantly increase
risk related to it (e.g. an increase in storage or production capacity or alteration of
a process);
 Applications need to include the following information:
o The physical address of installation;
o Complete material safety data sheets of all hazardous substances;
o The maximum quantity of each substance envisaged to be on premises at any one
time;
o The risk assessment of the installation (see List 2);
o Any further information that may be deemed necessary by an inspector in interests
of health and safety to the public;
 Applications need to be advertised in at least one newspaper serving the surrounding
communities and by way of notices posted within these communities.

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The risk assessment (List 2):

 Is the process of collecting, organising, analysing, interpreting, communicating and


implementing information in order to identify the probable frequency, magnitude and
nature of any major incident which could occur at a Major Hazard Installation and
measures required to remove, reduce or control the potential causes of such an
incident;
 Needs to be undertaken at intervals not exceeding 5 years and needs to be submitted
to the relevant local emergency services;
 Must be made available in copies to the relevant health and safety committee, with
60 days given to comment thereon and the results of the assessment made available
to any relevant representative or committee to comment thereon;
 Should be undertaken by competent person(s) and include the following:
o A general process description;
o A description of major incidents associated with this type of installation and
consequences of such incidents (including potential incidents);
o An estimation of the probability of a major incident;
o The on-site emergency plan;
o An estimation of the total result in the case of an explosion;
o An estimation of the effects of thermal radiation in the case of fire;
o An estimation of concentration effects in the case of a toxic release;
o Potential effects of a major incident on an adjacent major hazard installation or part
thereof;
o Potential effects of a major incident on any other installation, members of the public
(including all persons outside the premises) and on residential areas;
o Meteorological tendencies;
o Suitability of existing emergency procedures for risks identified;
o Any requirements laid down in terms of the Environmental Conservation Act of 1989
(Act No. 73 of 1989);
o Any organisational measures that may be required;
 The employer shall ensure that the risk assessment is of an acceptable standard and
shall be reviewed should:
o It be suspected that the preceding assessment is no longer valid;
o Changes in the process that affect hazardous substances;
o Changes in the process that involve a substance that resulted in the installation
being classified a Major Hazard Installation or in the methods, equipment or
procedures for the use, handling or processing of that substance;
o Incidents that have brought the emergency plan into operation and may affect the
existing risk assessment;
 Must be made available at a time and place and in a manner agreed upon between
parties for scrutiny by any interested person that may be affected by the activities.

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Requirements related to the on-site emergency plan (List 3) are:

 After submission of the notification, the following shall be established:


o An on-site emergency plan must be made available and must be followed inside
the premises of the installation or the part of the installation classified as a Major
Hazard Installation, in consultation with the relevant health and safety
representative or committee;
o The on-site emergency plan must be discussed with the relevant local government,
taking into consideration any comment on the risk related to the health and safety
of the public;
o The on-site emergency plan must be reviewed and where necessary updated, in
consultation with the relevant local government, at least once every three years;
o A copy of the on-site emergency plan must be signed in the presence of two
witnesses, who shall attest the signature;
o The on-site emergency plan must be readily available at all times for
implementation and use;
o All employees must be conversant with the on-site emergency plan;
o The on-site emergency plan must be tested in practice at least once a year, and a
record must be kept of such testing;
 Any employer, self-employed person and user owning or in control of a pipeline that
could pose a threat to the general public shall inform the relevant local government and
shall be jointly responsible with the relevant local government for establishment and
implementation of an on-site emergency plan.

In reporting of risk and emergency occurrences (List 4):

 Following an emergency occurrence, the user of the installation shall:


o Subject to the provisions of Regulation 6 of the General Administrative Regulations,
within 48 hours by means of telephone, facsimile or similar means of
communication, inform the chief inspector, the provincial director and relevant local
government of the occurrence of a major incident or an incident that brought the
emergency plan into operation or any near miss;
o Submit a report in writing to the chief inspector, provincial director and local
government within seven days;
o Investigate and record all near misses in a register kept on the premises, which
shall at all times be available for inspection by an inspector and local government
representatives.

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The duties of the supplier refer specifically to:

 Supplying of material safety data sheets for hazardous substances employed or


contemplated at the installation;
 Assessment of the circumstances and substance involved in an incident or potential
incident and the informing all persons being supplied with that substance of the
potential dangers surrounding it;
 Provision of a service that shall be readily available on a 24-hour basis to all employers,
self-employed persons, users, relevant local government and any other body
concerned to provide information and advice in the case of a major incident with regard
to the substance supplied.

The duties of local government are summarised as follows:

“ 9. (1) Without derogating from the provisions of the National Building Regulations
and Building Standards Act of 1977 (Act No. 103 of 1977), no local
government shall permit the erection of a new major hazard installation at a
separation distance less than that which poses a risk to:
(a) Airports;
(b) Neighbouring independent major hazard installations;
(c) Housing and other centres of population; or,
(d) Any other similar facility…

Provided that the local government shall permit new property development
only where there is a separation distance which will not pose a risk (our
emphasis) in terms of the risk assessment: Provided further that the local
government shall prevent any development adjacent to an installation that will
result in that installation being declared a major hazard installation.

(2) Where a local government does not have facilities available to control a major
incident or to comply with the requirements of this regulation that local
government shall make prior arrangements with a neighbouring local
government, relevant provincial government or the employer, self-employed
person and user for assistance…

(3) All off-site emergency plans to be followed outside the premises of the
installation or part of the installation classified as a major hazard installation
shall be the responsibility of the local government… ”

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14 APPENDIX D: PADHI LAND-PLANNING TABLES

14.1 Development Type Table 1: People at Work, Parking

Development Development Detail


Examples Justification
Type and Size
Places where the
Workplaces occupants will be fit
(predominantly and healthy and could
Offices, factories,
nonretail), providing for be organised easily for
warehouses, haulage
less than 100 emergency action
depots, farm buildings,
occupants in each Members of the public
nonretail markets,
building and less than will not be present or
builder’s yards
3 occupied storeys will be present in very
(Level 1) small numbers and for
a short time
Exclusions
DT1.1 x1
Workplaces
(predominantly
DT1.1 nonretail) providing for
Workplaces 100 or more occupants
Substantial increase in
in any building or 3 or
numbers at risk with
more occupied storeys
no direct benefit from
in height (Level 2
exposure to the risk
except where the
development is at the
major hazard site itself,
where it remains
Level 1)
Those at risk may be
DT1.1 x2
especially vulnerable
Workplaces
to injury from
Sheltered workshops, (predominantly
hazardous events or
Remploy nonretail) specifically
they may not be able
for people with
to be organised easily
disabilities (Level 3)
for emergency action
Parking areas with no
Car parks, truck parks, other associated
lockup garages facilities (other than
toilets; Level 1)
Exclusions
DT1.2 DT1.2 x1
Parking Where parking areas
Areas Car parks with picnic are associated with
areas or at a retail or other facilities and
leisure development or developments the
serving a park and ride sensitivity level and the
interchange decision will be based
on the facility or
development

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14.2 Development Type Table 2: Developments for Use by the General Public

Development Development Detail


Examples Justification
Type and Size
Development
where people
Developments up to live or are
Houses, flats, retirement and including 30 temporarily
flats or bungalows, dwelling units and at a resident
residential caravans, density of no more It may be difficult
mobile homes than 40 per hectare to organise
(Level 2) people in the
event of an
emergency
Exclusions
DT2.1 x1
DT2.1 Minimal increase
Infill, back-land Developments of 1 or
in numbers at
Housing development 2 dwelling units
risk
(Level 1)
DT2.1 x2
Substantial
Larger housing Larger developments
increase in
developments for more than 30
numbers at risk
dwelling units (Level 3)
DT2.1 x3
Any developments (for
more than 2 dwelling
High-density
units) at a density of
developments
more than 40 dwelling
units per hectare
(Level 3)
Development
Hotels, motels, guest
where people are
houses, hostels, youth
temporarily
hostels, holiday camps, Accommodation up to
resident
holiday homes, halls of 100 beds or 33
It may be difficult
residence, dormitories, caravan or tent pitches
to organise
accommodation centres, (Level 2)
people in the
holiday caravan sites,
event of an
camping sites
emergency
DT2.2 Exclusions
Hotel or Hostel
or Holiday Smaller: guest houses,
DT2.2 x1
Accommodation hostels, youth hostels,
Accommodation of Minimal increase
holiday homes, halls of
less than 10 beds or 3 in numbers at
residence, dormitories,
caravan or tent pitches risk
holiday caravan sites,
(Level 1)
camping sites
Larger: hotels, motels, DT2.2 x2
hostels, youth hostels, Accommodation of Substantial
holiday camps, holiday more than 100 beds or increase in
homes, halls of residence, 33 caravan or tent numbers at risk
dormitories, holiday pitches (Level 3)

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Development Development Detail


Examples Justification
Type and Size
caravan sites, camping
sites
Prime purpose is
as a transport
link
Major transport links in
Potentially large
their own right i.e. not
Motorway, dual numbers
as an integral part of
carriageway exposed to risk
other developments
but exposure of
(Level 2)
an individual is
only for a short
period
Exclusions
Minimal numbers
DT2.3 present and
Transport Links mostly a small
DT2.3 x1
Estate roads, access period of time
Single carriageway
roads exposed to risk
roads (Level 1)
Associated with
other
development
Transient
population, small
period of time
DT2.3 x2 exposed to risk
Any railway or tram track
Railways (Level 1) Periods of time
with no
population
present

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Development Development Detail


Examples Justification
Type and Size
Food and drink:
restaurants, cafes, drive-
through fast food, pubs
Retail: shops, petrol filling
station (total floor space
based on shop area not
forecourt), vehicle dealers
(total floor space based
on showroom or sales
building not outside
display areas), retail
warehouses, super-
stores, small shopping
centres, markets, financial
and professional services
Developments
to the public
where members
Community and adult
Developments for use of the public will
education: libraries, art
by the general public be present (but
galleries, museums,
where total floor space not resident)
exhibition halls, day
is from 250 m2 up to Emergency
surgeries, health centres,
5000 m2 (Level 2) action may be
religious buildings,
difficult to
community centres. adult
coordinate
DT2.4 education, 6th form
Indoor Use by college, college of FE
Public Assembly and leisure:
Coach or bus or railway
stations, ferry terminals,
airports, cinemas, concert
or bingo or dance halls,
conference centres,
sports or leisure centres,
sports halls, facilities
associated with golf
courses, flying clubs (e.g.
changing rooms, club
house), indoor go kart
tracks
Exclusions
DT2.4 x1
Minimal increase
Development with less
in numbers at
than 250 m2 total floor
risk
space (Level 1)
DT2.4 x2
Development with Substantial
more than 5000 m2 increase in
total floor space numbers at risk
(Level 3)
DT2.5 Principally an outdoor Developments
Food and drink: food
Outdoor Use by development for use where members
festivals, picnic areas
Public by the general public of the public will

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Development Development Detail


Examples Justification
Type and Size
Retail: outdoor markets, i.e. developments be present (but
car boot sales, funfairs where people will not resident)
Community and adult predominantly be either indoors or
education: open-air outdoors and not more outdoors
theatres and exhibitions than 100 people will Emergency
Assembly and leisure: gather at the facility at action may be
coach or bus or railway any one time (Level 2) difficult to
stations, park and ride coordinate
interchange, ferry
terminals, sports stadia,
sports fields or pitches,
funfairs, theme parks,
viewing stands, marinas,
playing fields, children’s
play areas, BMX or go
kart tracks, country parks,
nature reserves, picnic
sites, marquees
Exclusions
DT2.5 x1
Predominantly open-
Substantial
air developments likely
Outdoor markets, car boot increase in
to attract the general
sales, funfairs picnic area, numbers at risk
public in numbers
park and ride interchange, and more
greater than 100
viewing stands, marquees vulnerable due to
people but up to 1000
being outside
at any one time
(Level 3)
Very substantial
DT2.5 x2 increase in
Predominantly open- numbers at risk,
Theme parks, funfairs,
air developments likely more vulnerable
large sports stadia and
to attract the general due to being
events, open air markets,
public in numbers outside
outdoor concerts, pop
greater than 1000 Emergency
festivals
people at any one time action may be
(Level 4) difficult to
coordinate

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14.3 Development Type Table 3: Developments for Use by Vulnerable People

Development Development Detail


Examples Justification
Type and Size
Places providing an
Hospitals, element of care or
convalescent homes, protection
Institutional,
nursing homes, old Because of age,
educational and
people’s homes with infirmity or state of
special
warden on site or ‘on health the occupants
accommodation for
call’, sheltered may be especially
vulnerable people or
housing, nurseries, vulnerable to injury
that provides a
crèches, schools and from hazardous
protective
academies for events
environment (Level 3)
children up to school Emergency action
leaving age and evacuation may
DT3.1 be very difficult
Institutional Exclusions
Accommodation DT3.1 x1
and Education Hospitals, 24-hour care where
Substantial increase
convalescent homes, the site on the
in numbers of
nursing homes, old planning application
vulnerable people at
people’s homes, being developed is
risk
sheltered housing larger than
0.25 hectare (Level 4)
DT3.1 x2
Day care where the
Substantial increase
site on the planning
Schools, nurseries, in numbers of
application being
crèches vulnerable people at
developed is larger
risk
than 1.4 hectare
(Level 4)
Secure Places providing
accommodation for detention
DT3.2 Prisons, remand
those sentenced by Emergency action
Prisons centres
court, or awaiting and evacuation may
trial, etc. (Level 3) be very difficult

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14.4 Development Type Table 4: Very Large and Sensitive Developments

Development Development Detail


Examples Justification
Type and Size
Note: all Level 4 developments are by exception from Level 2 or 3 and are reproduced in
this table for convenient reference
Places providing an
Large developments element of care or
of institutional and protection
special Because of age or
accommodation for state of health the
vulnerable people (or occupants may be
Hospitals, that provide a especially vulnerable
convalescent homes, protective to injury from
nursing homes, old environment) where hazardous events
people’s homes, 24-hour care is Emergency action
sheltered housing provided and where and evacuation may
the site on the be very difficult
planning application The risk to an
being developed is individual may be
larger than small but there is a
DT4.1 0.25 hectare (Level 4) larger societal
Institutional concern
Accommodation Places providing an
Large developments
element of care or
of institutional and
protection
special
Because the
accommodation for
occupants may be
vulnerable people (or
especially vulnerable
that provide a
Nurseries, crèches, to injury from
protective
schools for children hazardous events
environment) where
up to school leaving Emergency action
day care (not 24-hour
age and evacuation may
care) is provided and
be very difficult
where the site on the
The risk to an
planning application
individual may be
being developed is
small but there is a
larger than 1.4 hectare
larger societal
(Level 4)
concern
People in the open
air may be more
exposed to toxic
fumes and thermal
radiation than if they
Theme parks, large Predominantly open
were in buildings
DT4.2 sports stadia and air developments
Large numbers make
Very Large events, open air where there could be
emergency action
Outdoor Use by markets, outdoor more than
and evacuation
Public concerts, pop 1000 people present
difficult
festivals (Level 4)
The risk to an
individual may be
small but there is a
larger societal
concern

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15 APPENDIX E: MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS

15.1 Butane

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15.2 Butanol

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Material Safety Data Sheet

10420 Revision Date 24-Sep-2010


n-Butanol Revision Number 1.00
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1. PRODUCT AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION

Identification of the
substance/preparation n-Butanol
CAS-No 71-36-3
EINECS-No 200-751-6
Use of the Substance Intermediate, solvent.
/Preparation

Company/Undertaking OXEA GmbH


Identification Otto-Roelen-Str. 3
D-46147 Oberhausen
Germany

Product Information Product Stewardship


FAX: +49 (0)208 693 2053
email: psq@oxea-chemicals.com

Emergency telephone number +44 (0) 1235 239 671 (UK)

2. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

GHS / CLP
Basis for Classification This substance is classified based on Directive 1272/2008/EC and its
amendments (CLP Regulation, GHS)
Classification

Flammable liquid Category 3


Acute oral toxicity Category 4
Skin corrosion/irritation Category 2
Serious eye damage/eye irritation Category 1
Target Organ Systemic Toxicant - Single exposure Category 3

Hazard symbols

Signal word Danger

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Hazard statements H226: Flammable liquid and vapour
H302: Harmful if swallowed
H315: Causes skin irritation
H318: Causes serious eye damage
H335: May cause respiratory irritation
H336: May cause drowsiness and dizziness

Precautionary statements P210: Keep away from sources of ignition - No smoking


P233: Keep container tightly closed
P235: Keep cool
P261: Avoid breathing gas/mist/vapours
P271: Use only outdoors or in a well-ventilated area
P280: Wear protective gloves and eye/face protection
P301+P330: IF SWALLOWED: Rinse mouth
P302+P352: IF ON SKIN: Wash with plenty of soap and water
P304+P340: IF INHALED: Remove victim to fresh air and keep at rest in a position
comfortable for breathing
P305+P351+P338: IF IN EYES: Rinse cautiously with water for several minutes.
Remove contact lenses, if present and easy to do. Continue rinsing
P310: Immediately call a POISON CENTRE or doctor
P403: Store in well-ventilated place

Other Hazards Vapour is heavier than air and can travel considerable distance to a source of
ignition and flashback
Vapours may form explosive mixture with air
Components of the product may be absorbed into the body by inhalation, ingestion
and through the skin

Classification and labelling according to Directive 67/548/EEC or 1999/45/EC


Basis for Classification This substance is classified and labelled according to Annex I of Directive
67/548/EEC, as amended.

EC Label

contains Butan-1-ol (CAS 71-36-3)

Symbol(s) Xn - Harmful

R-phrase(s) R10 - Flammable


R22 - Harmful if swallowed
R37/38 - Irritating to respiratory system and skin
R41 - Risk of serious damage to eyes
R67 - Vapours may cause drowsiness and dizziness

S-phrase(s) S 7/9 - Keep container tightly closed and in a well-ventilated place


S13 - Keep away from food, drink and animal feedingstuffs
S26 - In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of water and seek
medical advice
S37/39 - Wear suitable gloves and eye/face protection
S46 - If swallowed, seek medical advice immediately and show this container or
label

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Other hazards Vapour is heavier than air and can travel considerable distance to a source of
ignition and flashback
Vapours may form explosive mixture with air
Components of the product may be absorbed into the body by inhalation, ingestion
and through the skin

3. COMPOSITION/INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS

Component CAS-No REACh-No 67/548/EEC 1272/2008/EC Concentration


(%)
Butan-1-ol 71-36-3 R10 Flam. Liq. 3; H226 > 99,80
Xn;R22 Acute Tox. 4; H302
Xi;R37/38-41 STOT SE 3; H335
R67 Skin Corr. 2; H315
Eye Dam. 1; H318
STOT SE 3; H336

4. FIRST AID MEASURES

General advice
Remove contaminated, soaked clothing immediately and dispose of safely. If unconscious place in recovery position
and seek medical advice. First aider needs to protect himself.

Inhalation
Keep at rest. Aerate with fresh air. When symptoms persist or in all cases of doubt seek medical advice.

Eyes
Rinse immediately with plenty of water, also under the eyelids, for at least 15 minutes. Remove contact lenses.
Immediate medical attention is required.

Skin
Wash off immediately with soap and plenty of water. When symptoms persist or in all cases of doubt seek medical
advice.

Ingestion
Rinse mouth. Call a physician immediately. If conscious, drink plenty of water. Do not induce vomiting without medical
advice.

Main symptoms
cough, headache, dizziness, drowsiness, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, unconsciousness, diarrhea.

Special hazard
Lung irritation, Pneumonia.

Notes to physician
Treat symptomatically. If ingested, irrigate the stomach using activated charcoal. Chemical pneumonitis could follow
respiratory exposure.

5. FIRE-FIGHTING MEASURES

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5. FIRE-FIGHTING MEASURES
Suitable extinguishing media
dry chemical, carbon dioxide (CO2), water spray, alcohol-resistant foam

Extinguishing media which must not be used for safety reasons


Do not use a solid water stream as it may scatter and spread fire.

Special exposure hazards arising from the substance or preparation itself, its combustion products, or
released gases
Under conditions giving incomplete combustion, hazardous gases produced may consist of:
carbon monoxide (CO)
carbon dioxide (CO2)
Combustion gases of organic materials must in principle be graded as inhalation poisons
Vapour is heavier than air and can travel considerable distance to a source of ignition and flashback
Vapours may form explosive mixtures with air

Special protective equipment for fire-fighters


Fire fighter protection should include a self-contained breathing apparatus (NIOSH-approved or EN 133) and full fire-
fighting turn out gear.

Precautions for fire-fighting


Cool containers / tanks with water spray. Dike and collect water used to fight fire. Keep people away from and upwind
of fire. Do not allow run-off from fire fighting to enter drains or water courses. Foam should be applied in large
quantities as it is broken down to some extent by the product.

6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

Personal precautions
Avoid contact with skin and eyes. Avoid breathing vapors or mists. Keep people away from and upwind of spill/leak.
Ensure adequate ventilation, especially in confined areas. Keep away from heat and sources of ignition.
For emergency responders: Personal protection see section 8.

Environmental precautions
Prevent further leakage or spillage. Do not discharge product into the aquatic environment without pretreatment
(biological treatment plant).

Methods for containment


Stop the flow of material, if possible without risk. Dike spilled material, where this is possible.

Methods for cleaning up


Soak up with inert absorbent material (e.g. universal binder). Keep in suitable, closed containers for disposal. If liquid
has been spilt in large quantities clean up promptly by scoop or vacuum. Dispose of in accordance with local
regulations. Take necessary action to avoid static electricity discharge (which might cause ignition of organic
vapours).

7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

Handling
Advice on safe handling
Avoid contact with skin, eyes and clothing. Wash hands before breaks and immediately after handling the product.
Provide sufficient air exchange and/or exhaust in work rooms.

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Advice on protection against fire and explosion
Keep away from sources of ignition - No smoking. Take necessary action to avoid static electricity discharge (which
might cause ignition of organic vapours). In case of fire, emergency cooling with water spray should be available.
Ground and bond containers when transferring material. Vapour is heavier than air and can travel considerable
distance to a source of ignition and flashback. Vapours may form explosive mixture with air.

Advice on the protection of the environment


See Section 8: Environmental exposure controls.

Storage
Technical measures/Storage conditions
Keep containers tightly closed in a cool, well-ventilated place. Handle and open container with care.

Suitable material
stainless steel, mild steel

Unsuitable material
Attacks some forms of plastic and rubber, Natural Rubber

Advice on common storage


Incompatible products:
strong oxidizing agents
acids
acid chlorides
reducing agents

Temperature class
T2

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS / PERSONAL PROTECTION


Exposure limits Egypt
Egypt OELs; Threshold limits of air pollutants in the workplace (Decree No. 338, Annex 8)

Component TWA TWA STEL STEL CLV CLV


(mg/m³) (ppm) (mg/m³) (ppm) (mg/m³) (ppm)
Butan-1-ol 152 50
71-36-3

Egypt OELs; Threshold limits of air pollutants in the workplace (Decree No. 338, Annex 8)

Component Skin Absorption Carc. Cat.


Butan-1-ol Yes
71-36-3

Exposure limits Israel


Israel OELs

Component TWA TWA STEL STEL


(mg/m³) (ppm) (mg/m³) (ppm)
Butan-1-ol 20
71-36-3
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Exposure limits South Africa


South Africa OELs; Recommended exposure limits

Component TWA TWA STEL STEL


(mg/m³) (ppm) (mg/m³) (ppm)
Butan-1-ol 150 150
71-36-3

South Africa OELs; Recommended exposure limits

Component Skin Absorption Sensitizer


Butan-1-ol Yes
71-36-3

Exposure limits United Arab Emirates


United Arab Emirates OELs

Component CLV CLV Skin Absorption Carc. Cat.


(mg/m³) (ppm)
Butan-1-ol 152 50 Yes
71-36-3

Exposure limits Kuweit


No exposure limits established

Note For details and further information please refer to the original regulation.

Occupational Exposure Controls

Engineering measures
General or dilution ventilation is frequently insufficient as the sole means of controlling employee exposure. Local
ventilation is usually preferred. Explosion-proof equipment (for example fans, switches, and grounded ducts) should
be used in mechanical ventilation systems.

Personal protective equipment

General industrial hygiene practice


Avoid contact with skin, eyes and clothing. Do not breathe vapours or spray mist. Ensure that eyewash stations and
safety showers are close to the workstation location.

Hygiene measures
When using, do not eat, drink or smoke. Take off all contaminated clothing immediately. Wash hands before breaks
and immediately after handling the product.

Respiratory protection
Respirator with filter for organic vapour. Use the indicated respiratory protection if the occupational exposure limit is
exceeded and/or in case of product release (dust). Equipment should conform to NIOSH, EN or other applicable
national standards.
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Hand protection
Wear protective gloves. Recommendations are listed below. Other protective material may be used, depending on the
situation, if adequate degradation and permeation data is available. If other chemicals are used in conjunction with
this chemical, material selection should be based on protection for all chemicals present.
Suitable material butyl-rubber

Suitable material nitrile rubber

Eye protection
Tightly fitting safety goggles. In addition to goggles, wear a face shield if there is a reasonable chance for splash to
the face.

Skin and body protection


Impervious clothing. Wear face-shield and protective suit for abnormal processing problems.

Environmental exposure controls


If possible use in closed systems. If leakage can not be prevented, the substance needs to be suck off at the
emersion point, if possible without danger. Observe the exposure limits, clean exhaust air if needed. If recycling is not
practicable, dispose of in compliance with local regulations. Inform the responsible authorities in case of leakage into
the atmosphere, or of entry into waterways, soil or drains.

9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

Physical state liquid


Colour colourless
Odour alcoholic
Molecular weight 74,12
Molecular formula C4 H10 O

Flash point 35 °C
Method ISO 2719
Autoignition temperature 355 °C
Method DIN 51794
Lower explosion limit 1,4 Vol %
Upper explosion limit 11,3 Vol %
Melting point/range < -90 °C (Pour point)
Boiling point/range 119 °C @ 1013 hPa

Vapour pressure
Values [hPa] @ °C @ °F
10 20 68
53 50 122
Density
Values [g/cm³] @ °C @ °F Method
0,81 20 68 DIN 51757

Refractive index 1,399 @ 20 °C


Viscosity 2,947 mPa*s @ 20 °C
Method dynamic, DIN 51562
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n-Butanol Revision Number 1.00
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pH neutral
Water solubility 66 g/l @ 20 °C, OECD 105
log Pow 1 (measured), OECD 117
Vapour density 2,6 (Air = 1) @ 20 °C (68 °F)
Surface tension 69,9 mN/m (1 g/l @ 20°C), OECD 115

10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

Stability
Stable under recommended storage conditions.

Hazardous reactions
Vapours may form explosive mixture with air.

Conditions to avoid
Avoid contact with heat, sparks, open flame, and static discharge. Avoid any source of ignition.

Materials to avoid
strong oxidizing agents, acids, acid chlorides, reducing agents.

Hazardous decomposition products


No decomposition if stored and applied as directed.

11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Principle Routes of Exposure Inhalation, Eye contact, Skin contact, Ingestion

Acute toxicity
Routes of Exposure Endpoint Values Species Method
Butan-1-ol (71-36-3)
Oral LD50 2292 mg/kg rat, female OECD 401
Inhalative LC0 > 17,76 mg/l (4h) rat, male/female OECD 403
Dermal LD50 3430 mg/kg rabbit OECD 402

Irritation and corrosion


Target Organ Effects Species Result Method
Butan-1-ol (71-36-3)
Skin rabbit irritating Draize Test
Eyes rabbit severe irritation OECD 405

Sensitization
Target Organ Effects Species Evaluation Method
Butan-1-ol (71-36-3)
Skin guinea pig not sensitizing OECD 406 read across

Subacute, subchronic and prolonged toxicity


Type Dose Species Method
Butan-1-ol (71-36-3)
Subchronic toxicity NOAEL: 125 mg/kg/d rat, male/female Oral
Subchronic toxicity LOAEL: 500 mg/kg/d rat, male/female Oral

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Subchronic toxicity NOAEL: ~ 2,35 mg/l/d rat, male/female EPA OTS 798.2450 Inhalation
(90d)

Carcinogenicity, Mutagenicity, Reproductive toxicity


Type Dose Species Evaluation Method
Butan-1-ol (71-36-3)
Mutagenicity V79 cells, Chinese negative OECD 476
hamster (Mammalian Gene
Mutation)
Mutagenicity V79 cells, Chinese negative Chromosomal
hamster Aberration
Mutagenicity Salmonella negative Ames test
typhimurium
Mutagenicity mouse negative OECD 474 Oral
Reproductive NOAEL 18,5 mg/l rat, parental Inhalation
toxicity
Reproductive NOAEL 18,5 mg/l Rat, 1. Inhalation
toxicity Generation,
male/female
Mutagenicity NOAEL 5000 rat, female Oral
mg/kg/d
Developmental NOAEL 1454 rat Oral Maternal toxicity,
Toxicity mg/kg/d Fetal toxicity
Developmental NOAEL 5654 rat Oral Teratogenicity
Toxicity mg/kg/d
Developmental NOAEL 10,8 mg/l rat Inhalation Maternal toxicity,
Toxicity Fetal toxicity
Developmental NOAEL 24,7 mg/l rat Inhalation Teratogenicity
Toxicity

Butan-1-ol, CAS 71-36-3


Main symptoms
cough, headache, dizziness, drowsiness, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, unconsciousness, diarrhoea.
Aspiration toxicity
Based on the viscosity a potential aspiration hazard cannot be excluded
Other adverse effects
Components of the product may be absorbed into the body by inhalation, ingestion and through the skin.
Note
Handle in accordance with good industrial hygiene and safety practice.

12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Acute aquatic toxicity


Species Exposure time Dose Method
Butan-1-ol (71-36-3)
Pimephales promelas 96h LC50: 1376 mg/l OECD 203
(fathead minnow)
Daphnia magna (Water flea) 48h EC50: 1328 mg/l OECD 202
Pseudomonas putida 17 h EC50: 4390 mg/l (Growth DIN 38412, part 8
inhibition)

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12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Pseudokirchneriella 96h EC50: 225 mg/l (Growth OECD 201
subcapitata rate)

Long term toxicity


Type Species Dose Method
Butan-1-ol (71-36-3)
Reproductive toxicity Daphnia magna NOEC: 4,1 mg/l/21d OECD 211
(Water flea)
Reproductive toxicity Daphnia magna EC50: 18 mg/l/21d OECD 211
(Water flea)

Butan-1-ol, CAS 71-36-3


Biodegradation
92 % (15 d), Sewage, aerobic, domestic, non-adapted, BOD.
Note
Avoid release to the environment.

13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

Product Information
Disposal required in compliance with all waste management related state and local regulations. The choice of the
appropriate method of disposal depends on the product composition by the time of disposal as well as the local
statutes and possibilities for disposal. Hazardous waste according to European Waste Catalogue (EWC).

Uncleaned empty packaging


Contaminated packaging should be emptied as far as possible and after appropriate cleansing may be taken for
reuse.

14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION


ADR/RID
UN/ID No UN 1120
Proper shipping name Butanols
Class 3
Packing group III
ADR Tunnel restriction code (D/E)
Classification Code F1
Hazard Number 30

ADNR ADNR: Container and Tanker


UN/ID No UN 1120
Proper shipping name Butanols
Class 3
Packing group III
Classification Code F1
Hazard Number 30

ICAO/IATA
UN/ID No UN 1120
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14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION
Proper shipping name Butanols
Class 3
Packing group III

IMDG
UN/ID No UN 1120
Proper shipping name Butanols
Class 3
Packing group III
EmS F-E, S-D

IBC-Code
Product name n-Butyl alcohol
Pollution category Z

15. REGULATORY INFORMATION

GHS / CLP
Basis for Classification This substance is classified based on Directive 1272/2008/EC and its
amendments (CLP Regulation, GHS). (See chapter 2)

Regulation 1272/2008, Annex VI

Butan-1-ol (CAS #: 71-36-3)


Classification Flam. Liq. 3; H226
Acute Tox. 4*; H302
STOT SE 3; H335
Skin Irrit. 2; H315
Eye Dam. 1; H318
STOT SE 3; H336
Hazard symbols Flame
Corrosion
Exclamation mark
Signal word Danger
Hazard statements H226, H302, H335, H315, H318, H336

International Inventories

Butan-1-ol, CAS 71-36-3


AICS (AU)
DSL (CA)
G-1321 (CH)
IECSC (CN)
EC-No. 2007516 (EU)
ENCS (2)-3049 (JP)

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Butan-1-ol, CAS 71-36-3


ISHL (2)-3049 (JP)
ISHL 2-(8)-299 (JP)
KECI KE-03867 (KR)
PICCS (PH)
TSCA (US)
NZIoC (NZ)

National regulatory information Egypt


Banned Chemicals (Unified List of Hazardous Substances, List A)
not listed

Substances Requiring Permits (Unified List of Hazardous Substances, List B)


not listed

Non-Restricted Substances (Unified List of Hazardous Substances, List C)

Component Listed
Butan-1-ol Yes
71-36-3

National regulatory information Israel


Harmful Chemicals (Hazardous Substances Law, 5753-1993, Annex 1
not listed

Toxic Chemicals (Hazardous Substances Law, 5753-1993, Annex 2


not listed

Hazardous materials requiring annual testing (Labor Inspection Regs., Appendix 1)


not listed

Hazardous Substances Regulations (Classification & Exemptions)


not listed

National regulatory information South Africa


Group 1 Hazardous Substances (G.N.R 452)
not listed

National regulatory information United Arab Emirates


Prohibited and restricted imports (Ministry of Environment and Water)
not listed
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For details and further information please refer to the original regulation.

16. OTHER INFORMATION

Full text of H-Statements referred to under section 3


H226: Flammable liquid and vapour
H302: Harmful if swallowed
H335: May cause respiratory irritation
H315: Causes skin irritation
H318: Causes serious eye damage
H336: May cause drowsiness and dizziness

Full text of R-phrases referred to under sections 2 and 3


R10 - Flammable
R20 - Harmful by inhalation
R37/38 - Irritating to respiratory system and skin
R41 - Risk of serious damage to eyes
R67 - Vapours may cause drowsiness and dizziness

Revision Date 24-Sep-2010


Issuing date 24-Sep-2010

Training advice
For effective first-aid, special training / education is needed.

Sources of key data used to compile the datasheet


Information contained in this safety data sheet is based on Oxea owned data and public sources deemed valid or
acceptable. The absence of data elements required by ANSI or 2001/58/EC indicates, that no data meeting these
requirements is available.

Further information for the safety data sheet


Changes against the previous version are marked by ***. Observe national and local legal requirements. For more
information, other material safety data sheets or technical data sheets please consult the Oxea homepage
(www.oxea-chemicals.com).

Disclaimer
For industrial use only. The information contained herein is accurate to the best of our knowledge. We do not
suggest or guarantee that any hazards listed herein are the only ones which exist. Oxea makes no warranty of any
kind, express or implied, concerning the safe use of this material in your process or in combination with other
substances. User has the sole responsibility to determine the suitability of the materials for any use and the manner of
use contemplated. User must meet all applicable safety and health standards.

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ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.3 Di - 2 Ethylhexyl Adipate (DEHA)

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-3


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 1 of 7
Revision : 4
Reviewed :August 2015
Di 2- Ethylhexyl Adipate (DEHA)
Company Details
Name ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Emergency Telephone +27 31 9133320 / +27 31 560 1260
Address 284 REFINERY ROAD
ISIPINGO
4110
KWAZULU NATAL
SOUTH AFRICA
Telephone +27 31 9133200 / +27 31 9133362

Fax +27 31 9024839

1. Product Information

Trade Name Di 2 ethylhexyl adipate


Chemical Abstract No. 103-23-1
Chemical Family Aliphatic ester
Chemical formula C22H42O4
Molecular Weight 371
NIOSH No. Not available
Chemical Name Di 2 ethylhexyl adipate
Hexanedioc acid, bis(2-ethylhexyl) ester
Hazchem Code Not available
Synonyms Adipol 2EH
Hexanedioic acid dioctyl ester

UN No. Not available

2. Composition

Components Di 2 ethylhexyl adipate: Ester content > 99.0 %m/m

3. Hazard Identification

Main Hazard Skin and eye irritant.

Flammability Not stated

Chemical Hazard See section 10

Reproductive Hazard May cause reproductive defects


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


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Revision : 4
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Di 2- Ethylhexyl Adipate (DEHA)
Health Effects: Eyes Liquid may cause transient irritation.

Health Effects: Skin Repeated or prolonged contact may produce defatting of the skin
leading to irritation and dermatitis.

Health Effects: Ingestion A large dose may have the following effects:-
gastrointestinal irritation, central nervous system depression.

Health Effects: Inhalation Exposure to vapor at high concentrations may have the following
effects: -Irritation of nose, throat and respiratory tract.

Carcinogenicity Long-term studies have shown that in rats and mice the life-time
consumption of large amounts will produce liver cancer.

Mutagenicity Not available

Neurotoxicity Not available

4. First Aid Measures

Product in Eye Immediately flush eyes thoroughly for at least 15 minutes with running
water. Hold eyelids open during flushing. If irritation persists, repeat
flushing and obtain medical attention immediately.

Product on Skin Remove contaminated clothing. Wash affected areas with soap and
water. If irritation persists, obtain medical advice immediately. Wash
contaminated clothing before reuse.

Product Ingested If victim is alert and not convulsing, give 1 glass of water to dilute
material. DO NOT induce vomiting. If spontaneous vomiting occurs,
have victim lean forward with head down to avoid breathing in of vomits,
rinse mouth and administer more water. Obtain medical attention
immediately.

Product Inhaled Move victim to fresh air. Give artificial respiration ONLY if breathing has
stopped. Give cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) if there is no
breathing and no pulse. Obtain medical advice immediately.

5. Fire Fighting Measures

Extinguishing Media Carbon dioxide, dry chemical, alcohol foam, water fog, water spray
and other class B extinguishing agents. Keep containers cool with
water spray.

Special Hazards This product may give rise to hazardous fumes in a fire.

Protective Clothing Fire fighters should wear protective clothing and self-contained breathing
equipment.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 3 of 7
Revision : 4
Reviewed :August 2015
Di 2- Ethylhexyl Adipate (DEHA)
6. Accidental Release Measures

Personal Precautions Restrict access to the area until completion of the cleanup. Ensure
trained personnel conduct cleanup only. Wear safety goggles or face
shield, protective clothing, gloves and boots preferably made of butyl
nitrile. Material can create slippery conditions underfoot.

Environmental Precautions Try to prevent the material from entering drains or water courses.
Advise authorities if spillage has entered water course or sewer or has
contaminated soil or vegetation.

Small Spills Contain the spill. Mop up or soak with inert absorbent such as sand or
clay for disposal. Wash spill area with large volumes of water.
Dispose of residue in accordance with Local or State Regulations.

Large Spills Contain by diking with soil or other non-combustible sorbent material and
pump into approved waste containers or absorb with non-combustible
absorbent material. Collect product and contaminated soil for recovery or
disposal.
Wash spills area with large volumes of water and allows draining into a
waste treatment system.
Comply with all local regulations on spill reporting, handling and disposal
of waste.

7. Handling and Storage

Suitable Material Suitable storage materials are: - Aluminum and its alloys, mild steel,
high-density polyethylene.
Do not store in: - certain plastics and rubbers, glass-reinforced
polyester. Do not store in copper and its alloys For gaskets and seals
use: - butyl rubber.

Handling/Storage Precautions Handling Precautions: Adequate ventilation should be provided if


product is handled hot. Avoid breathing mist or vapor from heated
material. Avoid contact with eyes, skin and clothing.

Storage Precautions:
A reaction can occur between this product and concrete leading to
surface crumbling and a progressive loss of mechanical strength.
Concrete is therefore not recommended for duties such as tank
supports. For other areas where product spillage is likely to occur,
ridged acid resistant tiles will provide better resistance to attack than
concrete. Storage and transfer equipment should be adequately
earthed and bonded to prevent the accumulation of static charges.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 4 of 7
Revision : 4
Reviewed :August 2015
Di 2- Ethylhexyl Adipate (DEHA)

8. Exposure Controls/Personal Protection


Occupational Exposure Limits Not established

Engineering Control Measures Provide sufficient ventilation to minimize exposure. Dilution is


acceptable, but local mechanical exhaust ventilation is preferred at
sources of air contamination such as open process equipment.

Personal Protection: Respiratory A NIOSH/MSHA approved-respirator, if required.

Personal Protection: Hand Use gloves made from impervious material such as butyl nitrile.

Personal Protection: Eye Chemical goggles or glasses with side shields are recommended to
prevent eye contact.

Personal Protection: Skin Use protective clothing made of impervious material such as butyl nitrile.
Impervious boots are also recommended.

Other Protection Safety shower and eye bath should be located close to chemical
exposure area.
9. Physical and Chemical Properties
Appearance Colorless liquid.

Odor Slight characteristic odor

pH Not applicable

Boiling Point 417°C.

Melting Point Not available

Flash Point 200°C

Refractive Index n25


D 1.446

Flammability Not available

Autoflammability Not available

Explosive Properties Not available


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


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Di 2- Ethylhexyl Adipate (DEHA)
Oxidising Properties Not available

Vapour Pressure 3.3 kPa at 200 °C. (measured as millibars)

3
Density @ 25°C 920 – 926 kg/m

Solubility: Water Practically insoluble in water.

Solubility: Solvent Not available

Solubility: Coefficient Not available

Neurotoxicity Not available

10. Stability and Reactivity

Conditions to Avoid High temperatures

Incompatible Materials Oxidizing agents, water, nitrates, strong acids and strong bases.

Hazardous Decomposition Products Combustion will generate: oxides of carbon.


Heating may produce: acrid smoke and irritating fumes.

11. Toxicological Information

Acute Toxicity Acute oral LD50: (Oral, rat) = 9110 mg/kg.


(Skin, rabbit) = 15000mg/kg.

Skin and Eye Contact Prolonged and repeated contact may cause irritation.

Chronic Toxicity Studies have not revealed any evidence of skin sensitization effects.

Carcinogenicity Long-term studies have shown that in rats and mice the life-time
consumption of large amounts will produce liver cancer.

Mutagenicity No data available

Reproductive Hazards No relevant studies identified.

12. Ecological Information

Aquatic Toxicity: Fish The product is expected to be non-hazardous to aquatic species.

Aquatic Toxicity: Daphnia The product is expected to be non-hazardous to aquatic species.


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


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Revision : 4
Reviewed :August 2015
Di 2- Ethylhexyl Adipate (DEHA)
Aquatic Toxicity: Algae The product is expected to be non-hazardous to aquatic species.

Bio-degradability he product is expected to be readily biodegradable.

Bio-accumulation Product is not expected to bio-accumulate.

Mobility The product is non volatile and insoluble and will accumulate in the
ground. The product is insoluble in water.

13. Disposal Considerations


Disposal Methods Care should be taken not to mix waste with incompatible material.
Dispose of waste material by incineration or at an approved landfill site in
accordance with Local, Provincial or State regulations. Do not dispose of
waste with normal garbage or in local sewage system.

Disposal of Packaging Labels should not be removed from containers until they have been
cleaned. Do not cut, puncture or weld on or near to the container.
Contaminated containers must not be treated as household waste.
Containers should be cleaned by appropriate methods and then re-
used or disposed of by landfill or incineration as appropriate. Always
obey hazard warnings.

14. Transport Information


Not regulated

15. Regulatory Information


EEC Hazard Classification Not classified

Risk Phrases None

Safety Phrases S 25 Avoid contact with eyes


S 36 / 37 Wear suitable PPE
S 45 In case of accident or if you feel unwell, seek medical advice
immediately (show the label where possible).

National Legislation Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, Hazardous Chemical
Substances Regulations (1995)
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 7 of 7
Revision : 4
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Di 2- Ethylhexyl Adipate (DEHA)
16. Other Information
Bibliography 1. Material Safety Data Sheets as sourced from various suppliers and
manufacturers
2. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety

EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd believes that this information is correct at date of publication, but does not warrant the accuracy
thereof. The use of the product designated herein will be at the Sole Risk of the user and Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd will not
accept liability for any loss or damage, including Consequential Damage, howsoever caused by or arising from the use of this
information or the use, application, adoption or processing of the product described herein or its use in combination with any
other product, material or in any process.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.4 Di - 2 Ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP)

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-4


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 1 of 6
Revision : 4
Reviewed : August 2015
Di – 2 Ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP)
Company Details
Name ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Emergency Telephone +27 31 9133320 / +27 11 825 3357 / +27 31 5601260
Address 284 REFINERY ROAD
ISIPINGO
4110
KWAZULU NATAL
SOUTH AFRICA
Telephone +27 31 9133200 / +27 11 418 1900

Fax +27 31 9024839

1. Product Information

Trade Name Di – 2 ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP)


Chemical Abstract No. 117-81-7
Chemical Family Phthalates
Molecular formula C24H38O4
Molecular Weight 391
NIOSH No. Not stated
Chemical Name Di – 2 ethylhexyl phthalate ( DEHP )
Hazchem Code
Synonyms Diisooctyl phthalate, Phthalic acid bis(2-ethylhexyl) ester, DOP
UN No. Not regulated for transport

2. Composition

Hazardous Components Di – 2 ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP) : Ester content : > 99.0 %m/m

3. Hazard Identification

Main Hazard Harmful if swallowed

Flammability Combustible – vapours heavier than air

Chemical Hazard See section 10


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


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Revision : 4
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Di – 2 Ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP)
Reproductive Hazard May impair fertility, May cause harm to the unborn child

Based on clear evidence from animal experiments there is a high risk


of teratogenic effects. Pregnant women must not be exposed to the
product. There is sufficient evidence to assume that reproductive
performance in man is impaired. These properties have been clearly
demonstrated in animal experiments

Health Effects: Eyes May irritate eyes

Health Effects: Skin May irritate skin. May cause eczema

Health Effects: Ingestion Irritation of mucous membranes in the mouth, pharynx, oesophagus
and gastrointestinal tract, nausea, diarrhea. After uptake of large
quantities: unconsciousness and coma

Health Effects: Inhalation Inhalation may cause irritation of the respiratory tract.

Carcinogenicity Classified 2B (Possible for human.)

Mutagenicity No information available

Neurotoxicity No information available

4. First Aid Measures

Product in Eye Flush immediately with water for at least 15 minutes. Consult a
physician immediately.

Product on Skin Wash thoroughly with soap and water. Consult a physician if irritation
develops.

Product Ingested Give 2 glasses of water and induce vomiting. Consult a physician
immediately.
NOTE: If victim is unconscious, never induce vomiting nor give liquids.
Place victim in a stable side position and keep warm.

Product Inhaled Move victim to fresh air. Give artificial respiration ONLY if breathing has
stopped. Give cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) if there is no
breathing and no pulse. Obtain medical advice immediately.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 3 of 6
Revision : 4
Reviewed : August 2015
Di – 2 Ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP)

5. Fire Fighting Measures

Extinguishing Media CO2, foam, powder

Special Hazards Forms explosive mixtures with air on intense heating


Development of hazardous combustion gases or vapours possible in
the event of a fire

Protective Clothing Fire fighters should wear protective clothing and self-contained breathing
equipment.

6. Accidental Release Measures

Personal Precautions Restrict access to the area until completion of the cleanup. Ensure
trained personnel conduct cleanup only. Wear safety goggles or face
shield, protective clothing, gloves and boots preferably made of butyl
nitrile. Ensure supply of fresh air in enclosed rooms

Environmental Precautions Do not allow to enter water, waste water or soil

Small Spills Take up with liquid absorbent material. Forward for disposal. Clean up
affected area

Large Spills Take up with liquid absorbent material. Forward for disposal. Clean up
affected area

7. Handling and Storage

Suitable Material Original container

Handling/Storage Precautions Wear suitable PPE. See section 8. Store tightly closed in a well
ventilated place, accessible only for authorized persons. Store at
approx 15°C

8. Exposure Controls/Personal Protection

Occupational Exposure Limits OSHA: 5 mg/m3.


TLV: 5 mg/m3

Engineering Control Measures Ensure adequate ventilation

Personal Protection: Respiratory Required when vapours are generated. Work under fume hood, if
possible. Do not inhale substance.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 4 of 6
Revision : 4
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Di – 2 Ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP)
Personal Protection: Hand Apply skin protective barrier cream. Protective gloves – nitrile rubber
recommended

Personal Protection: Eye Chemical goggles or glasses with side shields are recommended to
prevent eye contact.

Personal Protection: Skin Overalls, boots. Immediately change contaminated clothing.

Other Protection Safety shower and eye bath should be located close to chemical
exposure area. Wash hands and face after working with the substance.
Under no circumstances eat or drink at the workplace.

9. Physical and Chemical Properties


Appearance Colourless to faint yellow liquid

Odour Odourless

pH Neutral

Boiling Point 385°C

Melting Point -50°C

Flash Point 195°C

Flammability Combustible – vapours heavier than air

Autoflammability Approx 400°C

Explosive Properties Forms explosive mixtures with air on intense heating


Explosion limits: Lower 0.1 Vol%
Upper 0.2 Vol%

Refractive Index n25


D 1.485

Vapour Pressure <0.01 hPa at 20°C

3
Specific Gravity 0.978 – 0.983 g/cm 25°C

Solubility: Water <0.1 g/l at 20°C

Solubility: Solvent Soluble in most organic solvents

Solubility: Coefficient Log Pow 7.60


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


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Revision : 4
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Di – 2 Ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP)
10. Stability and Reactivity

Conditions to Avoid Strong heating

Incompatible Materials Violent reactions are possible with oxidizing agents

Hazardous Decomposition Products Development of hazardous combustion gases or vapours possible in


the event of a fire

11. Toxicological Information


Acute Toxicity Acute oral LD50: (Rat) 30 600mg/kg.

Skin and Eye Contact See section 3

Chronic Toxicity Not stated

Carcinogenicity Classified 2B (Possible for human.)

Mutagenicity No information available

Reproductive Hazards Based on clear evidence from animal experiments there is a high risk
of teratogenic effects. Pregnant women must not be exposed to the
product. There is sufficient evidence to assume that reproductive
performance in man is impaired. These properties have been clearly
demonstrated in animal experiments

12. Ecological Information

Aquatic Toxicity: Fish L.idus LC50 >1000mg/l/48h

Aquatic Toxicity: Daphnia Not stated

Aquatic Toxicity: Algae Not stated

Bio-degradability Bio degradable, biodegradation: 62%/28d (OECD 301 C)

Bio-accumulation An appreciable bioaccumulation potential is to be expected log Pow >3

Mobility
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


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Revision : 4
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Di – 2 Ethylhexyl Phthalate (DEHP)
13. Disposal Considerations
Disposal Methods Whatever cannot be saved for recovery or recycling should be handled
as hazardous waste and sent to an approved incinerator or disposed in
an approved waste facility. Processing, use or contamination of this
product may change the waste management options.

Disposal of Packaging Dispose of container and unused contents in accordance with local
requirements.

14. Transport Information


Not subject to transport regulations

15. Regulatory Information

EEC Hazard Classification T Toxic

Risk Phrases R22: Harmful if swallowed


R60/61 May impair fertility, May cause harm to the unborn child

Safety Phrases S24/25 Avoid contact with skin and eyes


S36: Wear suitable protective clothing
S 53-45Avoid exposure - obtain special instructions before use.
In case of accident or if you feel unwell, seek medical advice
immediately

National Legislation Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, Hazardous Chemical
Substances Regulations (1995)

16. Other Information

Bibliography 1. Material Safety Data Sheets as sourced from various suppliers and
manufacturers
2. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety

EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd believes that this information is correct at date of publication, but does not warrant the accuracy
thereof. The use of the product designated herein will be at the Sole Risk of the user and Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd will not
accept liability for any loss or damage, including Consequential Damage, howsoever caused by or arising from the use of this
information or the use, application, adoption or processing of the product described herein or its use in combination with any
other product, material or in any process.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.5 Di Butyl Phthalate (DBP)

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-5


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

SAFETY DATA SHEET


Di Butyl Phthalate ( DBP )
Page 1 of 6
Revision 4
Reviewed : February 2015

1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE AND OF THE COMPANY


Identification of the substance
Product name Dibutyl Phthalate

Use of the substance DBP is used as a plasticizer in nitro-cellulose lacquers, in polyvinyl chloride
and acetate, vinyl co polymers and other resins, giving good low temperature
flexibility. It is a solvent for perfumes, oils, and a textile lubricating agent. It is
also used in manufacture of safety glasses, leather dopes, insecticides,
printing inks, adhesives, dyes, etc.

Company identification
Name ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Emergency Telephone +27 31 9133200 / +27 11 418 1900
Address 284 REFINERY ROAD
ISIPINGO , 4110
KWAZULU NATAL , SOUTH AFRICA
Telephone +27 31 9133320 / +27 11 825 3357 / +27 31 5601156

Fax +27 31 9024839


Informing department Sales
E Mail info@isegen.co.za

2. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
Main Hazard Harmful if swallowed. Causes severe eye irritation. Causes skin irritation.
May cause allergic skin reaction. May cause respiratory tract irritation. May
be harmful if inhaled. May cause harm to the unborn child. Very toxic to
aquatic organisms. Possible risk of impaired fertility.

Health Effects: Eyes Vapor or mist causes eye irritation. Splashes cause severe irritation
with stinging pain and tears.

Health Effects: Skin Irritation and contact burns are possible, but do not occur frequently.
Allergic dermatitis has been reported after using antiperspirants and
contact with plastics containing dibutyl phthalate (such as a watchband).

Health Effects: Ingestion Causes irritation to the gastrointestinal tract. Symptoms may include
nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Accidental ingestion of 10 g (ca. 40
mg/kg) in one person produced nausea and vomiting, dizziness, light
sensitivity, swelling of the eyelids, watering of the eyes, and kidney
effects (red and white blood cells and oxalate crystals in the urine).

Health Effects: Inhalation Inhalation of vapors or mists is not expected unless this material is
heated or misted. If inhaled, material may cause irritation to
respiratory tract.

Reproductive Hazard Women working were phthalates are used had higher incidence of
miscarriages, menstrual disorders, and reduced gestation periods.

Carcinogenicity Not anticipated to be carcinogenic


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

SAFETY DATA SHEET


Di Butyl Phthalate ( DBP )
Page 2 of 6
Revision 4
Reviewed : February 2015
Symbols:

Risk Phrases R61-50-62


May cause harm to the unborn child
Very toxic to aquatic organisms.
Possible risk of impaired fertility.
Safety Phrases S 53-45-61
Avoid exposure - obtain special instructions before use.
In case of accident or if you feel unwell, seek medical advice immediately

3- COMPOSITION / INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS


Trade name Dibutyl Phthalate

Chemical name Dibutyl Phthalate

Chemical formula C6H4(COOC4H9)2

Molecular Weight 278

Chemical Family Phthalic acid, dibutyl ester

Composition Dibutyl Phthalate : Ester content : 99.0 - 100.5 %m/m

Synonyms 1,2-Benzenedicarboxylic acid dibutyl ester; n-Butyl


phthalate; Phthalic acid, dibutyl ester

Chemical Abstract No. 84-74-2

UN No. 3082

4 – FIRST AID MEASURES


Product in Eye Immediately flush eyes with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes,
lifting lower and upper eyelids occasionally. Get medical attention
immediately.

Product on Skin Immediately flush skin with plenty of soap and water. Remove
contaminated clothing and shoes. Get medical attention. Wash clothing
before reuse. Thoroughly clean shoes before reuse.

Product Ingested Induce vomiting immediately as directed by medical personnel. Never give
anything by mouth to an unconscious person. Get medical attention.

Product Inhaled Remove to fresh air. Get medical attention for any breathing difficulty.
5 – FIRE - FIGHTING MEASURES
Extinguishing Media Dry chemical or carbon dioxide. Water or foam may cause frothing.

Special Hazards Above flash point, vapor-air mixtures are explosive within flammable
limits noted above.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

SAFETY DATA SHEET


Di Butyl Phthalate ( DBP )
Page 3 of 6
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Reviewed : February 2015

Protective Clothing In the event of a fire, wear full protective clothing and NIOSH-approved
self-contained breathing apparatus with full face piece operated in the
pressure demand or other positive pressure mode.

6 – ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES


Personal Precautions Remove all sources of ignition. Ventilate area of leak or spill. Wear
appropriate personal protective equipment as specified in Section 8.

Environmental Precautions Do not flush to sewer!


Small Spills Contain and recover liquid when possible. Collect liquid in an appropriate
container or absorb with an inert material (e. g.,
vermiculite, dry sand, earth), and place in a chemical waste container. Do
not use combustible materials, such as saw dust.

Large Spills Contain and recover liquid when possible. Collect liquid in an appropriate
container or absorb with an inert material (e. g.,
vermiculite, dry sand, earth), and place in a chemical waste container. Do
not use combustible materials, such as saw dust.

7 – HANDLING AND STORAGE


Suitable Packaging Material Original container
Handling/Storage Precautions Keep in a tightly closed container. Store in a cool, dry, ventilated area
away from sources of heat or ignition. Protect against physical damage.
Store separately from reactive or combustible materials, and out of
direct sunlight. Isolate from incompatible substances. Containers of this
material may be hazardous when empty since they retain product residues
(vapors, liquid); observe all warnings and precautions listed for the product.

8 – EXPOSURE CONTROLS / PERSONAL PROTECTION


Occupational Exposure Limits -OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL): 5 mg/m3 (TWA)
-ACGIH Threshold Limit Value (TLV): 5 mg/m3 (TWA)

Engineering Control Measures A system of local and/or general exhaust is recommended to keep
employee exposures below the Airborne Exposure Limits. Local exhaust
ventilation is generally preferred because it can control the emissions of the
contaminant at its source, preventing dispersion of it into the general work
area.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

SAFETY DATA SHEET


Di Butyl Phthalate ( DBP )
Page 4 of 6
Revision 4
Reviewed : February 2015
Personal Protection: Respiratory If the exposure limit is exceeded, a half-face respirator with an organic
vapor cartridge and particulate filter (NIOSH type P95 or R95 filter) may
be worn for up to ten times the exposure limit or the maximum use
concentration specified by the appropriate regulatory agency or respirator
supplier, whichever is lowest. A full-face piece respirator with an organic
vapor cartridge and particulate filter (NIOSH P100 or R100 filter) may be
worn up to 50 times the exposure limit, or the maximum use
concentration specified by the appropriate regulatory agency or respirator
supplier, whichever is lowest. Please note that N series filters are not
recommended for this material. For emergencies or instances where the
exposure levels are not known, use a full-face piece positive-pressure, air-
supplied respirator. WARNING: Air-purifying respirators do not protect
workers in oxygen-deficient atmospheres. This compound possibly exists in
both particulate and vapor phase. A gas/vapor cartridge should be used in
addition to the particulate filter (NIOSH type P95 or better filter). If the vapor
concentration alone exceeds the exposure limits, use a supplied air
respirator, because warning properties are unknown for these compounds.
Breathing air qualitymust meet the requirements of the OSHA respiratory
protection standard (29CFR1910.134).

Personal Protection: Hand Wear impervious gloves. Polyvinyl alcohol, butyl rubber and nitrile rubber
are suitable materials to use for personal protective equipment.

Personal Protection: Eye Use chemical safety goggles and/or a full face shield where splashing is
possible. Maintain eye wash fountain and quick-drench facilities in work
area.

Personal Protection: Skin Wear impervious protective clothing, including boots, gloves, lab coat,
apron or coveralls, as appropriate, to prevent skin contact. Polyvinyl
alcohol, butyl rubber and nitrile rubber are suitable materials to use
for personal protective equipment.

Other Protection Safety shower and eye bath should be located close to chemical exposure
area. Wash hands and face after working with the substance. Under no
circumstances eat or drink at the workplace.

9 – PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES


Appearance Colorless to faint yellow liquid
Odour Slight aromatic odor.
Boiling Point 340ºC
Melting Point -35ºC
Flash Point 157ºC
Flammability Flammable limits in air % by volume: lel: 0.5; uel: 2.5
Slight fire hazard when exposed to heat or flame. Lower explosive limit
was measured at 235ºC

Autoflammability 402ºC
Explosive Properties Above flash point, vapor-air mixtures are explosive within flammable
limits noted above.

Vapour Pressure ( mm Hg ) < 0.01 @ 20ºC


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SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
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SAFETY DATA SHEET


Di Butyl Phthalate ( DBP )
Page 5 of 6
Revision 4
Reviewed : February 2015
3
Density 1.040 – 1.044 g/cm @ 25ºC
Solubility: Water Insoluble in water.
Solubility: Solvent Soluble in many organic solvents
Solubility: Coefficient Log Pow 4.57
Refractive Index n25
D 1.492

10 – STABILITY AND REACTIVITY


Conditions to Avoid Stable under ordinary conditions of use and storage.
Avoid: Heat, flames, ignition sources and incompatible materials

Incompatible Materials Oxidizing agents, acids, chlorine, nitrates, bases and alkalis.
Hazardous Decomposition May also produce 1-butene, butanol and phthalic anhydride. Carbon dioxide
and carbon monoxide may form when heated to decomposition. Hazardous
Products Polymerization: Will not occur.

11 – TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Acute Toxicity - Oral Toxicological Data:
3
Oral rat LD50: 8000 mg/kg; inhalation rat LC50: 4250 mg/m ; skin rabbit
LD50: > 20 ml/kg.

Chronic Toxicity Workers in the artificial leather industry were studied and it was found
3
that exposure to 1.7 to 66 mg/m over a period of 19 years showed central
nervous system toxicity after 6 to 7 years. Symptoms included pain,
numbness, weakness and spasms in the extremities. Because there was
concurrent exposure to other phthalates and a few adipates and sebacates,
dibutyl phthalate cannot be singled out as the direct cause.

Carcinogenicity Not anticipated to be carcinogenic


Mutagenicity No information found
Reproductive Hazards Based on clear evidence from animal experiments there is a high risk of
teratogenic effects. Pregnant women must not be exposed to the product.
Animal experiments also suggest that the substance may also lead to the
impairment of reproductive performance in men.

12 – ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Aquatic Toxicity: Fish Highly toxic to aquatic organisms
Aquatic Toxicity: Daphnia Highly toxic to aquatic organisms
Aquatic Toxicity: Algae Highly toxic to aquatic organisms
Bio-degradability Readily bio-degradable
Bio-accumulation An appreciable bioaccumulation potential is to be expected (log P(o/w)> 3
Further ecological data Do not allow to enter waters, waste water or soil!
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SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
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SAFETY DATA SHEET


Di Butyl Phthalate ( DBP )
Page 6 of 6
Revision 4
Reviewed : February 2015
13 – DISPOSAL CONSIDERATION
Disposal Methods Whatever cannot be saved for recovery or recycling should be handled as
hazardous waste and sent to an approved incinerator or disposed in an
approved waste facility. Processing, use or contamination of this
product may change the waste management options.

Disposal of Packaging Dispose of container and unused contents in accordance with local
requirements.

14 – TRANSPORT INFORMATION
UN No. 3082
Substance Identity No. ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE, LIQUID, N.O.S.
(DIBUTYLPHTHALATE), 9, III, Marine Pollutant: P
ADR/RID Class 9
IMDG: Shipping Name ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE, LIQUID, N.O.S.
(DIBUTYLPHTHALATE),
IMDG: Class 9
IMDG: Packaging Group III
IMDG: Marine Pollutant YES
IATA: Shipping Name ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE, LIQUID, N.O.S.
(DIBUTYLPHTHALATE),

IATA: Class 9
ADNR: Class 9
15 – REGULATORY INFORMATION
EEC Hazard Classification Toxic, Dangerous to the environment
National Legislation Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, Hazardous Chemical
Substances Regulations (1995)

16 – OTHER INFORMATION
Bibliography 1. Material Safety Data Sheets as sourced from various suppliers and
manufacturers
2. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety

EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd believes that this information is correct at date of publication, but does not warrant the accuracy
thereof. The use of the product designated herein will be at the Sole Risk of the user and Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd will not
accept liability for any loss or damage, including Consequential Damage, howsoever caused by or arising from the use of this
information or the use, application, adoption or processing of the product described herein or its use in combination with any
other product, material or in any process.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.6 Di Isodecyl Phthalate (DIDP)

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-6


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SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 1 of 6
Revision : 3
Reviewed : August 2015
Di Isodecyl Phthalate
Company Details
Name ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Emergency Telephone +27 31 9133320 / +27 11 825 3357 / +27 31 5601260

Address 284 REFINERY ROAD


ISIPINGO
4110
KWAZULU NATAL
SOUTH AFRICA
Telephone +27 31 9133200 / +27 31 9133362

Fax +27 31 9024839

1. Product Information

Trade Name DIDP


Chemical Abstract No. 26761-40-0
Chemical Family Ester
Chemical Formula C28H46O4
Molecular Weight 447
NIOSH No. Not available
Chemical Name Di Isodecyl Phthalate
Hazchem Code Not regulated
Synonyms 1,2 Benzene dicarboxilic acid diisodecyl ester
UN No. Not regulated

2. Composition

Components Di Isodecyl Phthalate : Ester content : > 99.0 %m/m

3. Hazard Identification

Main Hazard Acute toxicity studies shown Di-isodecyl phthalate (D.I.D.P.) to be


practically nontoxic following acute oral and dermal administration.
D.I.D.P. was also practically nonirritating to rabbit eyes and skin.
D.I.D.P. had no effect on a group of rats exposed to D.I.D.P at ambient
temperatures for 8 hours. However 6 of 6 rats died when exposed to
D.I.D.P. vapor heated to 170(C) for one hour. A patch test using
human subjects conducted on D.I.D.P has shown that this material is
neither a primary irritant nor a sensitzer. Kidney and liver effects such
as increased organ weights, and necrosis were reported in subacute
feeding studies in which groups of rats were given D.I.D.P. in their
diets for 21 – 30 days.
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Di Isodecyl Phthalate
Flammability Combustible; inflammable (heat)

Chemical Hazard See section 10

Reproductive Hazard Not available

Health Effects: Eyes Liquid or mist may cause slight transient irritation.

Health Effects: Skin Material may cause slight irritation on prolonged or repeated contact.

Health Effects: Ingestion Swallowing may have the following effects: -Gastrointestinal irritation.
A large dose may have the following effects: -
Nausea, vomiting, central nervous system depression.

Health Effects: Inhalation Exposure to vapor at high concentrations may have the following
effects: -
Irritation of nose, throat and respiratory tract.

Carcinogenicity Long-term studies have shown that in rats and mice the lifetime
consumption of large amounts will produce liver cancer

Mutagenicity The product did not exhibit mutagenic activity in the following systems
(with and without metabolic activation): Salmonella typhimurium.

Neurotoxicity Not available

4. First Aid Measures

Product in Eye Immediately flood the eyes with plenty of water for at least 10 minutes,
holding the eye open. Get medical attention if soreness or redness
persists.

Product on Skin Wash skin with soap and water.

Product Ingested Wash mouth out with water. Do not induce vomiting. Get medical
attention.

Product Inhaled Remove from exposure. Keep warm and at rest. If there is difficulty
breathing, give oxygen. Get medical attention.

5. Fire Fighting Measures


Extinguishing Media Carbon dioxide, dry chemical, alcohol foam, water fog, water spray
and other class B extinguishing agents.
Do not use water jet. Keep containers cool with water spray.
Prevent fire-fighting water from entering surface water or ground water

Special Hazards Formation of explosive mixtures possible with air


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Page 3 of 6
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Di Isodecyl Phthalate
Protective Clothing Firefighters should wear the usual protective gear. Self contained
breathing apparatus.

6. Accidental Release Measures

Personal Precautions Do not inhale vapours/aerosols. Ensure supply of fresh air in closed
rooms

Environmental Precautions This material should not be spilled, dumped, rinsed, or washed into
sewers or public waterways.

Small Spills Spills should be confined and absorbed on a suitable medium such as
sawdust, clay, or filtercel and disposed of. This material should not be
spilled, dumped, rinsed, or washed into sewers or public waterways.

Large Spills Spills should be confined and absorbed on a suitable medium such as
sawdust, clay, or filtercel and disposed of. This material should not be
spilled, dumped, rinsed, or washed into sewers or public waterways.

7. Handling and Storage

Suitable Material Suitable storage materials are: - Aluminum and its alloys, mild steel,
high-density polyethylene.
Do not store in: - certain plastics and rubbers, glass-reinforced
polyester. For gaskets and seals use: - butyl rubber.
A reaction can occur between this product and concrete leading the
surface to crumble and progressive loss of mechanical strength.
Concrete is therefore not recommended for duties such as tank
supports. For other areas where product spillage is likely to occur, acid
resistant tiles will provide better resistance to attack than concrete.

Handling/Storage Precautions Adequate ventilation should be provided if product is handled hot.


Avoid breathing mist or vapor from heated material. Avoid contact with
eyes, skin and clothing.
Store in a dry, well ventilated place at between 15°C and 25°C

8. Exposure Controls/Personal Protection

Occupational Exposure Limits Not available

Engineering Control Measures Provide sufficient ventilation to minimize exposure. Dilution is


acceptable, but local mechanical exhaust ventilation is preferred at
sources of air contamination such as open process equipment.

Personal Protection: Respiratory Respiratory protection if there is risk of breathing mists or vapor from
heated material.

Personal Protection: Hand Butyl rubber gloves. Nitrile rubber gloves.

Personal Protection: Eye Chemical goggles if there is a risk of splashing.


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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 4 of 6
Revision : 3
Reviewed : August 2015
Di Isodecyl Phthalate
Personal Protection: Skin No special requirements.

Other Protection Change contaminated clothing. Wash hands after working with
substance

9. Physical and Chemical Properties

Appearance Colourless to faint yellow, non-volatile, stable, liquid.

Odour Almost odourless

pH neutral

Boiling Point 250-267°C at 7hPa

Melting Point -50°C

Flash Point(cc) 229°C

Flammability Combustible; inflammable (heat)

Autoflammability 380°C

Vapour Pressure 0.1 hPa at 20°C

3
Density 0.960 - 0.966 g/cm at 25°C

Solubility: Water 0.00028 g/l at 24°C

Solubility: Solvent Soluble in most organic solvents

Refractive Index n25


D 1.484

10. Stability and Reactivity

Stability Stable under normal conditions. Hydrolyzed by acids and alkalis.

Conditions to Avoid Acids and alkalis.

Incompatible Materials Acids and alkalis, strong oxidising agents


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Page 5 of 6
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Di Isodecyl Phthalate
Hazardous Decomposition Products Combustion will generate oxides of carbon, acrid smoke and irritating
fumes.

11. Toxicological Information

Acute Toxicity On the basis of available information, exposure to this plasticizer is not
expected to produce any significant adverse human health effects
when recommended occupational control procedures are followed.

LD50 (dermal, rabbit): >3160mg/kg


LD50 (oral, rat): >5000 mg/kg

Skin and Eye Contact See section 3

Chronic Toxicity Animal studies have shown that repeated administration or ingestion of
large amounts produce liver enlargement.

Carcinogenicity Long-term studies have shown that in rats and mice the lifetime
consumption of large amounts will produce liver cancer

Mutagenicity The product did not exhibit mutagenic activity in the following systems
(with and without metabolic activation): Salmonella typhimurium.

Reproductive Hazards Studies in laboratory animals have shown no tetratogenic effects in the
following species: mice.

12. Ecological Information

Aquatic Toxicity: Fish Not toxic – Due to low solubility in water.

Aquatic Toxicity: Daphnia Not available

Aquatic Toxicity: Algae Not available

Bio-degradability Readily degradable in water

Biological effects When introduced properly, no impairments in the function of adapted


biological waste-water-treatment plants are to be expected

Mobility The product is not volatile and insoluble and will accumulate in the
ground. The product will leach into soil. The product may absorb onto
soils and sediments.

13. Disposal Considerations

Disposal Methods Incineration or landfill. Dispose of in accordance with all applicable


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 6 of 6
Revision : 3
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Di Isodecyl Phthalate
local and national regulations. If correctly incinerated this material will
decompose to carbon dioxide and water only.

Disposal of Packaging Labels should not be removed until they have been cleaned. Do not
cut, puncture or weld on or near to container. Containers should be
cleaned by appropriate methods and then re-used or disposed of by
landfill or incineration as appropriate. Do not incinerate closed
containers.

14. Transport Information

Not regulated

15. Regulatory Information

EEC Hazard Classification Not classified

Risk Phrases None

Safety Phrases S 25 Avoid contact with eyes


S 36 Wear suitable PPE
S 45 In case of accident or if you feel unwell, seek medical advice
immediately (show the label where possible).

National Legislation Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, Hazardous Chemical
Substances Regulations (1995)

16. Other Information

Bibliography 1. Material Safety Data Sheets as sourced from various suppliers and
manufacturers
2. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety

EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd believes that this information is correct at date of publication, but does not warrant the accuracy
thereof. The use of the product designated herein will be at the Sole Risk of the user and Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd will not
accept liability for any loss or damage, including Consequential Damage, howsoever caused by or arising from the use of this
information or the use, application, adoption or processing of the product described herein or its use in combination with any
other product, material or in any process.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.7 Di Isononyl Phthalate (DINP)

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-7


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 1 of 7
Revision : 3
Reviewed : August 2015
Di Isononyl Phthalate
Company Details
Name ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Emergency Telephone +27 31 9133320 / +27 11 825 3357 / +27 31 5601260
Address 284 REFINERY ROAD
ISIPINGO
4110
KWAZULU NATAL
SOUTH AFRICA
Telephone +27 31 9133200 / +27 31 9133362 / +27 11 418 1900

Fax +27 31 9024839

1. Product Information

Trade Name Di isononyl phthalate


Chemical Abstract No. 68515-48-0
Chemical Family Aromatic ester

Chemical Formula C26H42O4


Molecular Weight 418
NIOSH No. Not available.
Chemical Name Di isononyl phthalate
Hazchem Code Not available.
Synonyms DINP, 1,2-Benzenedicarboxylic acid,di-isononyl ester

UN No. Not available.

2. Composition

Components Di isononyl phthalate : Ester Content: > 99.0 %m/m

3. Hazard Identification

Main Hazard Possible aspiration hazard if swallowed – can enter the lungs and
cause damage. May be irritating to the skin, eyes and respiratory tract.

Flammability Combustible at high temperatures.

Chemical Hazard See section 10

Reproductive Hazard Not available.


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SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
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Page 2 of 7
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Di Isononyl Phthalate
Health Effects: Eyes Exposure to liquid, vapors, fumes or mists may cause irritation.

Health Effects: Skin Repeated or prolonged exposure may cause dermatitis. Contains a
component that may cause allergic skin reactions in some individuals.
May be absorbed through the skin.

Health Effects: Ingestion Aspiration into lungs may cause pneumonitis. May cause gastrointestinal
disturbances. Symptoms may include irritation, nausea, vomiting and
diarrhea.

Health Effects: Inhalation May cause respiratory tract irritation. May also cause sore throat,
coughing and shortness of breath. May cause harmful central nervous
system effects.

Carcinogenicity No convincing evidence of such effects.

Mutagenicity No convincing evidence of such effects.

Neurotoxicity Not available.

4. First Aid Measures

Product in Eye Flush immediately with large amounts of room temperature water for
at least 15 minutes. Eyelids should be held away from the eyeball to
ensure thorough rinsing. Get medical attention if irritation results.

Product on Skin Wash all clothing and exposed areas of the body twice with soap and
water. Get medical attention if irritation results. Launder clothing before
reuse.

Product Ingested Do not induce vomiting because of danger of aspirating liquid into
lungs. If spontaneous vomiting occurs, monitor for breathing difficulty.
Get immediate medical attention.

Product Inhaled Remove affected person from source of exposure. If not breathing,
ensure clear airway and institute cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).
If breathing is difficult, administer oxygen if available. After
administration of oxygen, continue to monitor closely. Get immediate
medical attention.

5. Fire Fighting Measures

Extinguishing Media Use water spray, dry chemical, foam or carbon dioxide to extinguish
fire. Water or foam may cause frothing, with further application leading
to boil over.
Do not use water jet
Use water spray to cool fire-exposed containers, structures and to
protect personnel. Use water to flush spills away from sources of
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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


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Di Isononyl Phthalate
ignition. Do not flush down public sewers or other drainage systems.

Special Hazards Combustion may produce CO, CO2 and reactive hydrocarbons.
Combustible at high temperatures. Irritating and/or toxic substances
may be emitted upon thermal decomposition.

Protective Clothing Exposed firefighters must wear MSHA/NIOSH approved positive


pressure self-contained breathing apparatus with full-face mask and
full protective clothing.

6. Accidental Release Measures

Personal Precautions Wear appropriate protective clothing. See section 8 Material can
create slippery conditions underfoot

Environmental Precautions Try to prevent the material from entering drains or water courses.
Advise authorities if spillage has entered water course or sewer or has
contaminated soil or vegetation. Prevent spread of material by use of
temporary bund or impervious barrier.

Small Spills Take up with sand or other noncombustible absorbent material and
place into containers for later disposal. Take precautionary measures
against static discharges. See section 13 for information on disposal.

Large Spills Dike far ahead of liquid spill for later disposal. Take precautionary
measures against static discharges. See section 13 for information on
disposal.

7. Handling and Storage

Suitable Material Suitable storage materials are:- aluminium and its alloys . mild steel.
stainless steel. polypropylene. high density polyethylene.

Do not store in:- certain plastics and rubbers. butyl rubber. natural
rubber. Glass reinforced polyester.

For gaskets and seals use:- viton.


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SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 4 of 7
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Di Isononyl Phthalate
Handling/Storage Precautions Adequate ventilation should be provided if product is handled hot.
Avoid breathing mist or vapour from heated material. Avoid contact
with eyes, skin and clothing. Keep container tightly closed when not in
use. Take precautionary measures against static discharges. A
sensitized employee should not be exposed to the material, which
causes the sensitization. BP Oil recommends following limits
established for breathing equipment applications: Compressed Gas
Association Grade F (No detectable amounts of non gaseous
hydrocarbons). Use good personal hygiene practices. Wash hands
before eating, drinking, smoking, or using toilet facilities. Remove
contaminated clothing and clean before reuse. Wash thoroughly after
work, using soap and water. This product like any other mineral or
synthetic oil may produce carbon monoxide at elevated temperatures.
Therefore, it should not be used in compressors, which supply
breathing air unless the outlet air is monitored continuously for carbon
monoxide. However, monitoring for carbon monoxide is not needed in
diaphragm systems where the oil is in a separate unit.
Empty containers may contain toxic, flammable/combustible or
explosive residue or vapors. Do not cut, grind, drill, weld, reuse or
dispose containers unless adequate precautions are taken against
these hazards.

Avoid extremes of temperature in storage. Store in tightly closed


containers in cool, dry, isolated, well-ventilated area away from heat,
sources of ignition and incompatibles. Do not store in unlabeled
containers.
A reaction can occur between this product and concrete leading to
surface crumbling and a progressive loss of mechanical strength.
Concrete is therefore not recommended for duties such as tank
supports. For other areas where product spillage is likely to occur,
ridged acid resistant tiles will provide better resistance to attack than
concrete.

8. Exposure Controls/Personal Protection

3
Occupational Exposure Limits 5 mg/m - condensed hydrocarbon (oil mist).

Engineering Control Measures Exposure to this material may be controlled in a number of ways. The
measures appropriate for a particular worksite depend on how the
material is used and on the potential for exposure. Engineering
methods to prevent or control exposure are preferred. Methods include
process or personnel enclosure, mechanical ventilation (dilution and
local exhaust), and control of process conditions. If engineering
controls and work practices are not effective in preventing or
controlling exposure, then suitable personal protective equipment,
which is known to perform satisfactorily, should be used.

Personal Protection: Respiratory If exposure limits are exceeded or if irritation is experienced, NIOSH
approved respiratory protection should be worn. Respiratory protection
may be needed for non-routine or emergency situations.

Personal Protection: Hand Neoprene gloves


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Page 5 of 7
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Di Isononyl Phthalate
Personal Protection: Eye Avoid eye contact with this material. Wear safety glasses or chemical
goggles. Provide an eyewash station immediately accessible to the
work area. Do not wear contact lenses when working with this
substance.

Personal Protection: Skin Additional protection may be necessary to prevent skin contact
including use of apron, arm covers, face shield, boots, or full body
protection.

Other Protection A safety deluge shower should be located in the work area.

9. Physical and Chemical Properties


Appearance Colourless to faint yellow, non-volatile, stable, liquid.

Odour Mild odour.

pH Not applicable

Boiling Point 250 -252 °C

Melting Point -48°C

Flash Point 221°C (cc)

Flammability Combustible at high temperatures.

Autoflammability 380 °C

Explosive Properties None

Oxidising Properties None

Vapour Pressure <0,001 kPa at 20°C

3
Density 966 - 972 kg/m at 25°C

Solubility: Water <0,01% at 25°C

Solubility: Solvent Soluble in most organic solvents

Refractive Index n25


D 1.484

Neurotoxicity Not available


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Page 6 of 7
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Di Isononyl Phthalate

10. Stability and Reactivity

Conditions to Avoid Stable under conditions of normal use. Avoid contact with strong
oxidizers.

Incompatible Materials Concentrated nitric acid. Sulphuric acid. Strong oxidisers.

Hazardous Decomposition Products Combustion will generate: oxides of carbon. acrid smoke and irritating
fumes.
Small quantities of phthalic anhydride may also be formed.

11. Toxicological Information

Acute Toxicity Low order of acute toxicity. Oral LD50 (rat) >10000mg/kg.

Skin and Eye Contact Acute Skin Irritation: Prolonged and repeated contact may cause mild
irritation.
Acute Eye Irritation: Prolonged and repeated contact may cause mild
irritation.

Chronic Toxicity No data available

Carcinogenicity No convincing evidence of such effects.

Mutagenicity No convincing evidence of such effects.

Reproductive Hazards No convincing evidence of such effects.

12. Ecological Information

Aquatic Toxicity: Fish The product is not expected to be acutely toxic to aquatic species due
to its poor solubility

Aquatic Toxicity: Daphnia The product is not expected to be acutely toxic to aquatic species due
to its poor solubility

Aquatic Toxicity: Algae The product is not expected to be acutely toxic to aquatic species due
to its poor solubility

Bio-degradability The product is expected to be readily biodegradable.

Bio-accumulation Though aquatic organisms may bioaccumulate some phthalates, they


are capable of metabolising them without apparent harm. Product is
not expected to bioaccumulate.
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Page 7 of 7
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Di Isononyl Phthalate
Mobility The product is involatile and insoluble and will accumulate in the
ground. The product may absorb onto soils and sediments.

13. Disposal Considerations

Disposal Methods Incineration or landfill. Dispose of in accordance with all applicable


local and national regulations. If correctly incinerated this material will
decompose to carbon dioxide and water only.

Disposal of Packaging Labels should not be removed until they have been cleaned. Do not
cut, puncture or weld on or near to container. Containers should be
cleaned by appropriate methods and then re-used or disposed of by
landfill or incineration as appropriate. Do not incinerate closed
containers.
14. Transport Information
Not regulated

15. Regulatory Information

EEC Hazard Classification Not classified

Risk Phrases None stated

Safety Phrases S23/24/25: Do not breathe fumes/vapour. Avoid contact with skin and
eyes.
S26:In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of
water and seek medical advice.
S37/39: Wear suitable gloves and eye/face protection.
S46: If swallowed seek medical advice immediately and show this
container or label.

National Legislation Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, Hazardous Chemical
Substances Regulations (1995)

16. Other Information

Bibliography 1. Material Safety Data Sheets as supplied by various suppliers and


manufacturers
2. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety
EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd believes that this information is correct at date of publication, but does not warrant the accuracy
thereof. The use of the product designated herein will be at the Sole Risk of the user and Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd will not
accept liability for any loss or damage, including Consequential Damage, howsoever caused by or arising from the use of this
information or the use, application, adoption or processing of the product described herein or its use in combination with any
other product, material or in any process.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.8 Isodecanol

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-8


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


ISODECANOL PAGE 1 OF 8
(ISODECANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C10H21OH

ISEGEN GERMISTON EMERGENCY TELEPHONE No.: (011) 825 3357


1 POWER STREET TELEPHONE No.: (011) 871 8111
GERMISTON (011) 871 8000

ISEGEN UMGENI EMERGENCY TELEPHONE No.: (031) 913 3320


132 SEA COW LAKE ROAD TELEPHONE No.: (031) 913 3200
DURBAN

1. PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION

TRADE NAME Isodecanol


CHEMICAL FAMILY Aliphatic Alcohol
CHEMICAL NAME Isodecanol (mixed isomers)
SYNONYMS None
CHEMICAL ABSTRACTS No. 25339-17-7
NIOSH No. Not available
HAZCHEM CODE 3Z
UN No. Not available

2. COMPOSITION

HAZARDOUS COMPONENTS Isodecanol

EEC CLASSIFICATION Not available

R PHRASES Not available

3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

MAIN HAZARDS

Vapours are irritating to the eyes, nose, throat and respiratory tract. May cause central nervous system (CNS)
depression and kidney and liver damage.
Harmful if swallowed.

Recommended Exposure Limit: None established for this mixture.

No toxicological Data is available for this product.

HEALTH EFFECTS - EYES

May cause irritation, redness and pain.


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISODECANOL Page 2 of 9
(ISODECANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C10H21OH

HEALTH EFFECTS - SKIN

Prolonged and repeated contact may cause mild skin irritation. May be absorbed through intact skin causing
central nervous system (CNS) depression and kidney and liver damage. (See "Other Health Effects")

HEALTH EFFECTS - INGESTION

May cause irritation and burning of the mouth, throat and respiratory tract and abdominal pain. Can cause
central nervous system (CNS) depression and kidney and liver damage. (See "Other Health Effects")

HEALTH EFFECTS - INHALATION

Vapours are irritating to the eyes, nose, throat and respiratory tract. May cause central nervous system (CNS)
depression and kidney and liver damage. (See "Other Health Effects")

ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION

Other Health Effects: CNS depression is characterized by headache, dizziness, drowsiness, nausea, vomiting,
abdominal pain and incoordination. Severe overexposure may lead to coma and possible death due to
respiratory failure.

CARCINOGENICITY

The components of this product are not listed as carcinogens by NTP, (National Toxicology Program), not
regulated as carcinogens by OSHA, (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), and have not been
evaluated by IARC, (International Agency for Research on Cancer) or ACGIH (American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists).

MUTAGENICITY

No information is available and no adverse mutagenic effects are anticipated.

TERATOGENICITY AND EMBRYOTOXICITY

No information is available and no adverse teratogenic effects are anticipated.

REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS

No information is available and no adverse reproductive effects are anticipated.

4. FIRST AID MEASURES

PRODUCT IN EYE

Immediately flush eyes with running water for a minimum of 20 minutes. Hold eyelids open during flushing. If
irritation persists, repeat flushing. Obtain medical attention IMMEDIATELY.

PRODUCT ON SKIN
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISODECANOL Page 3 of 9
(ISODECANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C10H21OH

Flush skin with running water then continue flushing with running water for a minimum of 20 minutes. Start
flushing while removing contaminated clothing. If irritation persists, repeat flushing. Obtain medical attention
IMMEDIATELY.

PRODUCT INGESTED

If victim is alert and not convulsing, give 100 to 200 ml glass of water to dilute material. DO NOT induce
vomiting. If spontaneous vomiting occurs, have victim lean forward with head down to avoid breathing in of
vomitus, rinse mouth and administer more water. Obtain medical attention IMMEDIATELY.

PRODUCT INHALED

Move victim to fresh air. Give artificial respiration ONLY if breathing has stopped. Give cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) if there is no breathing AND no pulse. Obtain medical attention IMMEDIATELY.

5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES

Flash Point 104°C (PMCC)


Autoignition Temperature: (ASTM) 275°C
Flammability Limits in Air (%): Upper limit- Not available
Lower limit- 0.8% v/v

EXTINGUISHING MEDIA

Apply aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) according to manufacturer's recommended techniques for large fires.
Use carbon dioxide or dry chemical media for small fires. Use water only in the form of a fog.
Use water spray to cool fire-exposed containers or structures. Use water spray to disperse vapours; re-ignition is
possible.

SPECIAL HAZARDS

Vapours from this product are heavier than air, and may "travel" to a source of ignition (eg. pilot lights, heaters,
electric motors) some distance away, and then "flash back" to the point of product discharge causing an
explosion and fire.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Use self-contained breathing apparatus and protective clothing.

6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

PERSONAL PRECAUTIONS

Restrict access to area until completion of the cleanup. Ensure that the cleanup is conducted by trained
personnel only.
Protective clothing should be worn to prevent excessive skin contact. Isodecanol should be handled wearing an
approved respirator, Neoprene, butyl or natural rubber gauntlets or gloves (NOT PVA or polyethylene), safety
goggles and other protective clothing. An apron or rubber boots should be worn if there is a risk of splashing.

ENVIRONMENTAL PRECAUTIONS
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISODECANOL Page 4 of 9
(ISODECANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C10H21OH

Keep material out of sewers, storm drains, surface waters,and soil.


Toxic to aquatic life at low concentrations.

CLEAN-UP METHODS

Small spills

Eliminate all sources of ignition, ventilate the area and wear a laboratory coat overalls, gloves, approved self-
contained breathing apparatus and safety boots. Soak up spill with absorbent material which does not react with
spilled chemical. Put material in suitable, covered, labelled containers. Flush area with water. Contaminated
absorbent material may pose the same hazards as the spilled product.

Large spills

Contact Fire and emergency services and supplier for advice.

Do not touch spilled material. Prevent material from entering sewers or confined spaces. Stop or reduce leak if
safe to do so. Contain spill with earth, sand, or absorbent material which does not react with spilled material.
Remove liquid by pumps or vacuum equipment. Place in suitable, covered, labelled containers for removal and
disposal at a controlled site.
Dispose of waste materials in an approved incinerator or waste treatment/disposal facility in accordance with
applicable regulations. Do not dispose of wastes in local sewer or with normal refuse.
Consult appropriate state and regulatory agencies to ascertain proper disposal procedures.

Flush spill area with a large volume of water and allow to drain to a waste treatment system.

7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

SUITABLE MATERIALS

Isodecanol is not corrosive and can be stored in mild or stainless steel.

HANDLING/STORAGE PRECAUTIONS

The storage area should be cool and well ventilated. The material should be protected from sources of ignition,
heat or powerful oxidising agents. Keep containers tightly closed when not in use. Isolate from incompatible
materials.
The material should be handled in a well ventilated area, protective clothing, including safety glasses and rubber
gloves should be worn.
Flame proof and spark proof equipment should be used for atmospheres containing Isodecanol vapours.
Do not use pressure to empty containers.
Do not cut, grind, weld, or drill on or near containers.
Wash thoroughly after handling. Wash contaminated clothing before reuse.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISODECANOL Page 5 of 9
(ISODECANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C10H21OH

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS/PERSONAL PROTECTION

OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE STANDARDS

HSE Not available


MAK Not available
ACGIH Not available

ENGINEERING CONTROL MEASURES

Engineering control methods to reduce hazardous exposures are preferred. General methods include
mechanical ventilation (dilution and local exhaust), process or personnel enclosure, control of process conditions
and process modification (eg. substitution of a less hazardous material). Administrative controls and personal
protective equipment may also be required. Use a non-sparking, grounded ventilation system separate from
other exhaust ventilation systems. Exhaust directly to the outside. Supply sufficient replacement air to make up
for air removed by exhaust systems.

PERSONAL PROTECTION - RESPIRATORY

A NIOSH/MSHA approved air-purifying respirator equipped with organic vapour cartridges for concentrations up
to 1000 ppm Isodecyl alcohol. An air-supplied respirator if concentrations are higher or unknown.

PERSONAL PROTECTION - HAND

Use gloves and protective clothing made of material which has been found by user to be impervious under
conditions of use. Nitrile rubber is generally recommended.

PERSONAL PROTECTION - EYE

Safety glasses with side shields are recommended to prevent eye contact.

PERSONAL PROTECTION - SKIN

Overalls, impervious apron and safety shoes.

OTHER EQUIPMENT

Safety shower and eye bath located close to chemical exposure area.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISODECANOL Page 6 of 9
(ISODECANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C10H21OH

9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

APPEARANCE Colourless liquid


ODOUR Characteristic
pH Not applicable
BOILING POINT/RANGE 216°-226°C
MELTING POINT/RANGE 7°C
FLASH POINT 104°C (PMCC)
FLAMMABILITY UEL: Not available LEL: 0.8 % v/v
AUTOFLAMMABILITY 275°C (ASTM)
EXPLOSIVE PROPERTIES None
OXIDISING PROPERTIES None
VAPOUR PRESSURE 1,3 mm Hg at 70°C
3
DENSITY 833-839 kg/m
SOLUBILITY - WATER Insoluble in water
SOLUBILITY - SOLVENT Soluble in many organic solvents
PARTITION COEFF.
VAPOUR DENSITY 5.5

10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

STABILITY

Stable.

HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION

Will not occur.

CONDITIONS TO AVOID

Heat, flames and other sources of ignition.

INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS

Reacts with strong oxidants.

HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS

Incomplete combustion will liberate carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide .


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISODECANOL Page 7 of 9
(ISODECANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C10H21OH

11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION

ACUTE TOXICITY

No information available.

SKIN AND EYE CONTACT

See section 3.

SUB-CHRONIC TOXICITY

No information available.

CARCINOGENICITY

See section 3.

MUTAGENICITY

See section 3.

REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY

See section 3.

12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION

AQUATIC TOXICITY - FISH Not available


AQUATIC TOXICITY - DAPHNIA Not available
AQUATIC TOXICITY - ALGAE Not available
BIODEGRADABILITY Not available
BIO-ACCUMULATION Not available
MOBILITY Not available
GERMAN WGK Not available
OTHER DATA Not available

13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

DISPOSAL METHODS

Only under conditions approved by local authorities. See also section 6.

DISPOSAL OF PACKAGING

Empty containers may contain flammable and hazardous residues and are subject to controlled disposal. Always
obey hazard warnings.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISODECANOL Page 8 of 9
(ISODECANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C10H21OH

14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION

UN No. Not available


SUBSTANCE IDENTITY No.
ADR/RID CLASS Not available
ADR/RID ITEM No. Not available
ADR/RID HAZARD IDENTITY No. Not available
IMDG - SHIPPING NAME Not regulated
IMDG - CLASS Not regulated
IMDG - PACKAGING GROUP Not regulated
IMDG - MARINE POLLUTANT No
IMDG - EMS No. Not available
IMDG - MFAG TABLE No. Not available
IATA - SHIPPING NAME Not available
IATA _ CLASS Not available
IATA - SUBSIDIARY RISK(S) Not available
ADNR - CLASS Not available
UK - DESCRIPTION Not available
UK - EMERGENCY ACTION CODE Not available
UK - CLASSIFICATION Not available
TREMCARD No.

15. REGULATORY INFORMATION

EEC HAZARD CLASSIFICATION Not available

RISK PHRASES Not available

SAFETY PHRASES Not available

NATIONAL LEGISLATION Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973 and Regulations,


Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993,

16. OTHER INFORMATION

CAS No. 25339-17-7


EINECS No. Not available
EEC ANNEX 1 No. Not available
MITI No. Not available
FDA LIST No. Not available
LISTING - TOSCA Not available
LISTING - ACOIN Not available
LISTING - CANADIAN DSL/NDSL Not available
NOTIFICATION - EEC Not available
NOTIFICATION - USA Not available

APPENDIX
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISODECANOL Page 9 of 9
(ISODECANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C10H21OH

MSDS PREPARATION DATE 1994-06-29


COMPILED BY D D LIEBENBERG
REVIEWED BY J C HEYDENRICH – MAY 2003

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

1. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Record No. 348760.

EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY

Isegen believes that this information is correct at date of publication but does not warrant the accuracy thereof. The use of the product
designated herein will be at the sole risk of the user and Isegen will not accept any liability for any loss or damage, including consequential
loss, howsoever caused by or arising from the use of this information of the use, application, adaption or processing of the product described
herein or its use in combination with any other product, material or in any process.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.9 Isononanol

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-9


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


ISONONANOL PAGE 1 OF 8
(ISONONANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C9H19OH

ISEGEN GERMISTON EMERGENCY TELEPHONE No.: (011) 825 3357


1 POWER STREET TELEPHONE No.: (011) 871 8111
GERMISTON (011) 871 8000

ISEGEN UMGENI EMERGENCY TELEPHONE No.: (031) 913 3320


132 SEA COW LAKE ROAD TELEPHONE No.: (031) 913 3200
DURBAN

1. PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION

TRADE NAME Isononanol


CHEMICAL FAMILY Aliphatic Alcohol
CHEMICAL NAME Isononanol (mixed isomers)
SYNONYMS None
CHEMICAL ABSTRACTS No. Not available
NIOSH No. Not available
HAZCHEM CODE 3Y
UN No. Not available

2. COMPOSITION

HAZARDOUS COMPONENTS Isononanol

EEC CLASSIFICATION Not available

R PHRASES Not available

3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

MAIN HAZARDS

Vapours are irritating to the eyes, nose, throat and respiratory tract. May cause central nervous system (CNS)
depression and kidney and liver damage.
Harmful if swallowed.

Recommended Exposure Limit: None established for this mixture.

No toxicological Data is available for this product.

HEALTH EFFECTS - EYES

May cause irritation, redness and pain.


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISONONANOL Page 2 of 9
(ISONONANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C9H19OH

HEALTH EFFECTS - SKIN

Prolonged and repeated contact may cause mild skin irritation. May be absorbed through intact skin causing
central nervous system (CNS) depression and kidney and liver damage. (See "Other Health Effects")

HEALTH EFFECTS - INGESTION

May cause irritation and burning of the mouth, throat and respiratory tract and abdominal pain. Can cause
central nervous system (CNS) depression and kidney and liver damage. (See "Other Health Effects")

HEALTH EFFECTS - INHALATION

Vapours are irritating to the eyes, nose, throat and respiratory tract. May cause central nervous system (CNS)
depression and kidney and liver damage. (See "Other Health Effects")

ADDITIONAL MEDICAL INFORMATION

Other Health Effects: CNS depression is characterized by headache, dizziness, drowsiness, nausea, vomiting,
abdominal pain and incoordination. Severe overexposure may lead to coma and possible death due to
respiratory failure.

CARCINOGENICITY

No information is available for this product.

MUTAGENICITY

No information is available and no adverse mutagenic effects are anticipated.

TERATOGENICITY AND EMBRYOTOXICITY

No information is available and no adverse teratogenic effects are anticipated.

REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS

No information is available and no adverse reproductive effects are anticipated.

4. FIRST AID MEASURES

PRODUCT IN EYE

Immediately flush eyes with running water for a minimum of 20 minutes. Hold eyelids open during flushing. If
irritation persists, repeat flushing. Obtain medical attention IMMEDIATELY.

PRODUCT ON SKIN

Flush skin with running water then continue flushing with running water for a minimum of 20 minutes. Start
flushing while removing contaminated clothing. If irritation persists, repeat flushing. Obtain medical attention
IMMEDIATELY.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISONONANOL Page 3 of 9
(ISONONANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C9H19OH

PRODUCT INGESTED

If victim is alert and not convulsing, give 100 to 200 ml glass of water to dilute material. DO NOT induce
vomiting. If spontaneous vomiting occurs, have victim lean forward with head down to avoid breathing in of
vomitus, rinse mouth and administer more water. Obtain medical attention IMMEDIATELY.

PRODUCT INHALED

Move victim to fresh air. Give artificial respiration ONLY if breathing has stopped. Give cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) if there is no breathing and no pulse. Obtain medical attention IMMEDIATELY.

5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES

Flash Point Not available but expected to above 80°C


Autoignition Temperature: (ASTM) Not available
Flammability Limits in Air (%): Upper limit- Not available
Lower limit- 0.8% v/v

EXTINGUISHING MEDIA

Apply aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) according to manufacturer's recommended techniques for large fires.
Use carbon dioxide or dry chemical media for small fires. Use water only in the form of a fog.
Use water spray to cool fire-exposed containers or structures. Use water spray to disperse vapours; re-ignition is
possible.

SPECIAL HAZARDS

Vapours from this product are heavier than air, and may "travel" to a source of ignition (eg. pilot lights, heaters,
electric motors) some distance away, and then "flash back" to the point of product discharge causing an
explosion and fire.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Use self-contained breathing apparatus and protective clothing.

6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

PERSONAL PRECAUTIONS

Restrict access to area until completion of the cleanup. Ensure that the cleanup is conducted by trained
personnel only.
Protective clothing should be worn to prevent excessive skin contact. Isononanol should be handled wearing an
approved respirator, Neoprene, butyl or natural rubber gauntlets or gloves (NOT PVA or polyethylene), safety
goggles and other protective clothing. An apron or rubber boots should be worn if there is a risk of splashing.

ENVIRONMENTAL PRECAUTIONS
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISONONANOL Page 4 of 9
(ISONONANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C9H19OH

Keep material out of sewers, storm drains, surface waters,and soil.


Toxic to aquatic life at low concentrations.

CLEAN-UP METHODS

Small spills

Eliminate all sources of ignition, ventilate the area and wear a laboratory coat overalls, gloves, approved self-
contained breathing apparatus and safety boots. Soak up spill with absorbent material which does not react with
spilled chemical. Put material in suitable, covered, labelled containers. Flush area with water. Contaminated
absorbent material may pose the same hazards as the spilled product.

Large spills

Contact Fire and emergency services and supplier for advice.

Do not touch spilled material. Prevent material from entering sewers or confined spaces. Stop or reduce leak if
safe to do so. Contain spill with earth, sand, or absorbent material which does not react with spilled material.
Remove liquid by pumps or vacuum equipment. Place in suitable, covered, labelled containers for removal and
disposal at a controlled site.
Dispose of waste materials in an approved incinerator or waste treatment/disposal facility in accordance with
applicable regulations. Do not dispose of wastes in local sewer or with normal refuse.
Consult appropriate state and regulatory agencies to ascertain proper disposal procedures.

Flush spill area with a large volume of water and allow to drain to a waste treatment system.

7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

SUITABLE MATERIALS

Isononanol is not corrosive and can be stored in mild or stainless steel.

HANDLING/STORAGE PRECAUTIONS

The storage area should be cool and well ventilated. The material should be protected from sources of ignition,
heat or powerful oxidising agents. Keep containers tightly closed when not in use. Isolate from incompatible
materials.
The material should be handled in a well ventilated area, protective clothing, including safety glasses and rubber
gloves should be worn.
Flame proof and spark proof equipment should be used for atmospheres containing Isononanol vapours.
Do not use pressure to empty containers.
Do not cut, grind, weld, or drill on or near containers.
Wash thoroughly after handling. Wash contaminated clothing before reuse.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISONONANOL Page 5 of 9
(ISONONANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C9H19OH

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS/PERSONAL PROTECTION

OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE STANDARDS

HSE Not available


MAK Not available
ACGIH Not available

ENGINEERING CONTROL MEASURES

Engineering control methods to reduce hazardous exposures are preferred. General methods include
mechanical ventilation (dilution and local exhaust), process or personnel enclosure, control of process conditions
and process modification (eg. substitution of a less hazardous material). Administrative controls and personal
protective equipment may also be required. Use a non-sparking, grounded ventilation system separate from
other exhaust ventilation systems. Exhaust directly to the outside. Supply sufficient replacement air to make up
for air removed by exhaust systems.

PERSONAL PROTECTION - RESPIRATORY

A NIOSH/MSHA approved air-purifying respirator equipped with organic vapour cartridges for concentrations up
to 1000 ppm Isononanol. An air-supplied respirator if concentrations are higher or unknown.

PERSONAL PROTECTION - HAND

Use gloves and protective clothing made of material which has been found by user to be impervious under
conditions of use. Nitrile rubber is generally recommended.

PERSONAL PROTECTION - EYE

Safety glasses with side shields are recommended to prevent eye contact.

PERSONAL PROTECTION - SKIN

Overalls, impervious apron and safety shoes.

OTHER EQUIPMENT

Safety shower and eye bath located close to chemical exposure area.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISONONANOL Page 6 of 9
(ISONONANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C9H19OH

9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

APPEARANCE Colourless liquid


ODOUR Characteristic
pH Not applicable
BOILING POINT/RANGE 202°-219°C
MELTING POINT/RANGE Not available
FLASH POINT Above 80°C
FLAMMABILITY UEL: Not available LEL: 0.8 % v/v
AUTOFLAMMABILITY Not available
EXPLOSIVE PROPERTIES None
OXIDISING PROPERTIES None
VAPOUR PRESSURE 2 mm Hg at 70°C
DENSITY 830-834 kg/m3 at 25°C
SOLUBILITY - WATER Insoluble in water
SOLUBILITY - SOLVENT Soluble in many organic solvents
PARTITION COEFF.
VAPOUR DENSITY 5.0

10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

STABILITY

Stable.

HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION

Will not occur.

CONDITIONS TO AVOID

Heat, flames and other sources of ignition.

INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS

Reacts with strong oxidants.

HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS

Incomplete combustion will liberate carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide .

11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISONONANOL Page 7 of 9
(ISONONANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C9H19OH

ACUTE TOXICITY

No information available.

SKIN AND EYE CONTACT

See section 3.

SUB-CHRONIC TOXICITY

No information available.

CARCINOGENICITY

See section 3.

MUTAGENICITY

See section 3.

REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY

See section 3.

12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION

AQUATIC TOXICITY - FISH Not available


AQUATIC TOXICITY - DAPHNIA Not available
AQUATIC TOXICITY - ALGAE Not available
BIODEGRADABILITY Not available
BIO-ACCUMULATION Not available
MOBILITY Not available
GERMAN WGK Not available
OTHER DATA Not available

13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

DISPOSAL METHODS

Only under conditions approved by local authorities. See also section 6.

DISPOSAL OF PACKAGING

Empty containers may contain flammable and hazardous residues and are subject to controlled disposal. Always
obey hazard warnings.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISONONANOL Page 8 of 9
(ISONONANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C9H19OH

14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION

UN No. Not available


SUBSTANCE IDENTITY No
ADR/RID CLASS Not available
ADR/RID ITEM No. Not available
ADR/RID HAZARD IDENTITY No. Not available
IMDG - SHIPPING NAME Not regulated
IMDG - CLASS Not regulated
IMDG - PACKAGING GROUP Not regulated
IMDG - MARINE POLLUTANT No
IMDG - EMS No. Not available
IMDG - MFAG TABLE No. Not available
IATA - SHIPPING NAME Not available
IATA _ CLASS Not available
IATA - SUBSIDIARY RISK(S) Not available
ADNR - CLASS Not available
UK - DESCRIPTION Not available
UK - EMERGENCY ACTION CODE Not available
UK - CLASSIFICATION Not available
TREMCARD No.

15. REGULATORY INFORMATION

EEC HAZARD CLASSIFICATION Not available

RISK PHRASES Not available

SAFETY PHRASES Not available

NATIONAL LEGISLATION Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973 and Regulations,


Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993,

16. OTHER INFORMATION

CAS No. Not available


EINECS No. Not available
EEC ANNEX 1 No. Not available
MITI No. Not available
FDA LIST No. Not available
LISTING - TOSCA Not available
LISTING - ACOIN Not available
LISTING - CANADIAN DSL/NDSL Not available
NOTIFICATION - EEC Not available
NOTIFICATION - USA Not available

APPENDIX
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ISONONANOL Page 9 of 9
(ISONONANOL, MIXED ISOMERS)
C9H19OH

MSDS PREPARATION DATE 1994-07-01


COMPILED BY D D LIEBENBERG
REVIEWED BY J C HEYDENRICH – MAY 2003

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

1. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety. Based on data for Isodecanol Record No. 348760.

EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY

Isegen believes that this information is correct at date of publication but does not warrant the accuracy thereof. The use of the product
designated herein will be at the sole risk of the user and Isegen will not accept any liability for any loss or damage, including consequential
loss, howsoever caused by or arising from the use of this information of the use, application, adaption or processing of the product described
herein or its use in combination with any other product, material or in any process.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.10 Maleic Anhydride

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-10


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 1 of 12
Revision : 2
Reviewed : June 2009
Maleic Anhydride
Company Details
Name ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Emergency Telephone +27 31 9133320 / +27 31 9133362
Address 284 REFINERY ROAD
ISIPINGO
4110
KWAZULU NATAL
SOUTH AFRICA
Telex +27 31 9133200 / +27 31 9133362

Telephone +27 31 9024839


Fax ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD

1. Product Information

Trade Name Maleic anhydride


Chemical Abstract No. 108-31-6

Chemical Family Aliphatic carboxylic acid anhydride


NIOSH No. ON 3675000
Chemical Name (Z)-Butenedioic Anhydride, Dihydro-2,5-Dioxofuran, 2,5-Furandione
Chemical Formula C4H2O3
Molecular Weight 98.06
Hazchem Code 2X
Synonyms cis-Butenedioic anhydride
Dihydro-2,5-dioxofuran
2,5-Furandione
Maleic acid anhydride
MAA
MALA
Toxilic anhydride
Anhydride mal‚ique
UN No. 2215

2. Composition

Hazardous Components Maleic anhydride : > 99.5 %m/m


Maleic Acid : < 0.5% m/m
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

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3. Hazard Identification

Main Hazard COMBUSTIBLE DUST. May form explosive dust-air mixtures. TOXIC.
Harmful if swallowed. Irritating to the respiratory tract. May cause lung
injury--effects may be delayed. RESPIRATORY SENSITIZER. May
cause severe allergic respiratory reaction. CORROSIVE to the eyes
and skin. Risk of blindness. Can cause permanent eye damage,
including blindness, or permanent scarring of the skin. SKIN
SENSITIZER. May cause allergic skin reaction.

Flammability COMBUSTIBLE DUST. May form explosive dust-air mixtures.

Chemical Hazard See section 10

Reproductive Hazard No harmful effects on male or female fertility were observed in an


animal study. There is no human information available.

Health Effects: Eyes Risk of blindness. The dust or concentrated solutions can produce
severe irritation or corrosive injury, based on human and animal
information. The severity of the effect would depend on the
concentration of the solution and duration of contact. Corrosive
materials can cause permanent eye damage, including blindness.
Vapours can produce redness, irritation, blurred vision and burning
sensation based on animal and human information. Cases of eye
irritation (with pain, tearing, blurring of vision) and burns have been
reported in occupational settings following contact with solutions or
exposure to airborne vapours.

Health Effects: Skin The dust is probably not irritating to dry skin. However, on moist skin,
Maleic anhydride forms Maleic acid and can cause severe irritation or
burns (corrosive injury), based on animal information. Contact with
concentrated solutions can also cause corrosive injury, based on
animal information. Depending on the concentration of the solution
and the degree of exposure, corrosive materials can cause permanent
scarring. Maleic anhydride may produce an allergic skin reaction in
some individuals. Maleic anhydride may be absorbed through the
skin, but is not likely to cause toxic effects by this route of exposure,
based on animal information.

Health Effects: Ingestion Animal information indicates that Maleic anhydride is toxic by
ingestion. There is no human information available. Severe irritation
of the mouth, throat and digestive tract would be expected, based on
its corrosivity. Ingestion is not a typical route of occupational
exposure.
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Health Effects: Inhalation Solid Maleic anhydride sublimes readily, producing irritating fumes. It
also reacts with moisture in the air or in the respiratory tract to form
Maleic acid. The vapour, fumes or dust can cause severe irritation of
the nose, throat, and upper airways, based on human and animal
information. Coughing, sneezing, shortness of breath, nosebleeds and
vomiting may occur, depending on severity of exposure. High
concentrations may cause a life-threatening accumulation of fluid in
the lungs (pulmonary edema). Symptoms of pulmonary edema such
as shortness of breath can be delayed for several hours. Irritation of
the nose, throat and upper airways, with symptoms, such as cough,
irritation and a burning sensation in the airways, shortness of breath
and vomiting, have been reported following occupational exposure to
dust and vapours from heated Maleic acid.

Carcinogenicity One animal study did not show any effects which could be related to
Maleic anhydride exposure. There is no human information available.
The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has not
evaluated the carcinogenicity of Maleic anhydride.

Mutagenicity A positive result was obtained in a test using cultured mammalian


cells. Negative results were obtained in bacterial tests. There is no
human information available.

Neurotoxicity No data available

4. First Aid Measures

Product in Eye Immediately flush the contaminated eye(s) with lukewarm, gently
flowing water for at least 20-30 minutes, by the clock, while holding
the eyelid(s) open. Neutral saline solution may be used as soon as it
is available. DO NOT INTERRUPT FLUSHING. If necessary, keep
emergency vehicle waiting. Take care not to rinse contaminated water
into the non-affected eye or onto the face. If irritation persists, repeat
flushing. Quickly transport victim to an emergency care facility.
NOTE: Thermal burns may result when Maleic anhydride dust is
mixed with water.

Product on Skin Avoid direct contact with this chemical. Wear chemical protective
gloves, if necessary. As quickly as possible, flush contaminated area
with lukewarm, gently flowing water for at least 20-30 minutes, by the
clock. DO NOT INTERRUPT FLUSHING. If necessary, keep
emergency vehicle waiting. Under running water, remove
contaminated clothing, shoes, and leather goods (e.g. watchbands,
belts). If irritation persists, repeat flushing. Transport victim to an
emergency care facility immediately. Discard contaminated clothing,
shoes and leather goods.
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Product Ingested NEVER give anything by mouth if victim is rapidly losing
consciousness, or is unconscious or convulsing. Have victim rinse
mouth thoroughly with water. DO NOT INDUCE VOMITING. Have
victim drink 240 to 300 ml of water to dilute material in the stomach. If
milk is available, it may be administered AFTER the water has been
given. If vomiting occurs naturally, rinse mouth and repeat
administration of water. Quickly transport victim to an emergency care
facility.

Product Inhaled Take proper precautions to ensure your own safety before attempting
rescue; e.g. wear appropriate protective equipment, use the "buddy"
system. Remove source of contamination or move victim to fresh air.
If breathing is difficult, oxygen may be beneficial if administered by a
trained personnel, preferably on a doctor's advice. DO NOT allow
victim to move about unnecessarily. Symptoms of pulmonary edema
can be delayed up to 48 hours after exposure. Immediately transport
victim to an emergency care facility.

5. Fire Fighting Measures

Extinguishing Media Carbon dioxide, alcohol foam, water spray or fog. DO NOT use dry
chemical powder extinguishers on burning Maleic anhydride. These
extinguishers contain sodium or potassium carbonates which react
violently with Maleic anhydride.

Special Hazards COMBUSTION AND THERMAL DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS:


Acetylene. Incomplete combustion may also produce acrid smoke
and irritating fumes.
FIRE HAZARD SUMMARY:
Maleic anhydride can burn if strongly heated. During a fire,
irritating/toxic gases and fumes may be generated. The presence of
certain contaminants may cause containers to rupture violently when
exposed to fire or excessive heat. Refer to "Incompatibility - Materials
to Avoid" in section 10 below for additional information.

Protective Clothing Chemical resistant clothing (e.g. chemical splash suit) and positive
pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (MSHA/NIOSH approved
or equivalent)

6. Accidental Release Measures

Personal Precautions Restrict access to area until completion of clean-up. Ensure clean-up
is conducted by trained personnel only. Wear adequate personal
protective equipment. Ventilate area. Extinguish or remove all ignition
sources. Remove or isolate flammable and combustible materials.

Environmental Precautions Notify government occupational health and safety and environmental
authorities. Do not allow to enter waters, waste water or soil! Vapour
may create explosive and toxic atmosphere. Sewers must be covered
and basements/workpits evacuated.
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Small Spills Do not touch spilled material. Prevent material from entering sewers,
waterways or confined spaces. Stop or reduce leak if safe to do so.
Contain spill and solutions with earth, sand, or absorbent material
which does not react with spilled material.
SMALL SPILLS OF SOLUTIONS: Soak up spill with absorbent
material which does not react with spilled chemical. Put material in
suitable, covered, labeled containers. Flush area with water.
Contaminated absorbent material may pose the same hazards as the
spilled product. Avoid generating dust. Use vacuum equipped with
HEPA filter(s) for fine powders. Alternatively, shovel into clean, dry,
labeled containers and cover.

Large Spills Contact fire and emergency services and supplier for advice.

7. Handling and Storage

Suitable Material Stainless steel storage tanks and containers.

Handling/Storage Precautions This material is an INHALATION HAZARD, RESPIRATORY AND


SKIN SENSITIZER, CORROSIVE solid. It is also a COMBUSTIBLE
DUST and so is a DUST EXPLOSION HAZARD. Before handling, it is
extremely important that engineering controls are operating and that
protective equipment requirements and personal hygiene measures
are being followed. People working with this chemical should be
properly trained regarding its hazards and its safe use. Only
authorized personnel should have access to this material. They
should be properly trained regarding its hazards and its safe use.
Maintenance and emergency personnel should be advised of potential
hazards. If Maleic anhydride is released, immediately put on a suitable
respirator and leave the area until the severity of the release is
determined. In case of leaks or spills, escape-type respiratory
protective equipment should be available in the work area.
Immediately report leaks, spills or failures of the engineering controls.
Unprotected persons should avoid all contact with this chemical
including contaminated equipment. Be aware of typical signs and
symptoms of poisoning and first aid procedures. Any signs of illness
should be reported immediately to supervisory personnel. Seek
medical attention for all exposures, even if an exposure does not
seem significant. Symptoms can be delayed. Use in clearly posted,
designated area(s). Control access to designated area. Access doors
must remain closed while this material is present. Closed handling
systems for processes involving this material should be used. If this is
not possible, use this material in the smallest possible amounts in
appropriate labeled, containment devices (e.g. fume hood).
Containment devices should be made of smooth, unbreakable,
compatible material. Maintain containment devices at appropriate air
flow and negative pressure. Check regularly.
Avoid generating dusts. Prevent the release of dusts into the
workplace air. Inspect containers for damage or leaks before handling.
Use the proper tools to open containers. Ripping open a container
can cause an uneven tear, thus making spills more likely. Transfer
solids using tools or equipment which are corrosion-resistant.
Cautiously, transfer into sturdy containers made of compatible
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materials. Stand upwind of all opening, dispensing and mixing
operations. Cover work surfaces with compatible, impervious and/or
disposable material for easier containment and clean-up of spills.
Good housekeeping is very important. Keeping work areas clean is
essential. Use work surfaces that can be easily decontaminated. Use
the type of containers recommended by the manufacturer. Never
return contaminated material to its original container. Use dust-tight,
labeled containers. Avoid damaging containers. Keep containers
closed when not in use. Assume that empty containers contain
residues which are hazardous.
Use only conductive equipment for handling this material (e.g. metal
conveyors and piping) and keep all components grounded. Ground
clips must contact bare metal. Do not transfer in storage area unless
it is segregated by fire- resistant construction. Protect from accidental
contact with water. Do not use with other incompatible materials such
as oxidizing agents and alkalis. See Incompatibilities - Materials to
Avoid section for more information. Do not perform any welding,
cutting, soldering, drilling or other hot work on empty containers or
transfer equipment until all combustible solids have been removed.
Have suitable emergency equipment for fires, spills and leaks readily
available. Maintain handling equipment. Comply with applicable
regulations.
STORAGE :
Store in a cool, dry area, at 15°C–25°C, out of direct sunlight and
away from heat and ignition sources. Keep quantities stored as small
as possible. Storage area should be clearly identified, clear of
obstruction and accessible only to trained and authorized personnel.
Storage facilities should be made of fire-resistant materials. Keep
storage area separate from work areas, eating areas and protective
equipment storage. Post warning signs. Keep storage area clear of
burnable materials (e.g. old rags, cardboard). Store this material
away from elevators, building and room exits or main aisles leading to
exits. Inspect periodically for damage or leaks. Protect from accidental
contact with water. Store away from oxidizers and other incompatible
materials such as alkalis. See Incompatibilities - Materials to Avoid
section 10 for more information. Never return contaminated material
to its original container. Inspect all incoming containers to make sure
they are properly labeled and not damaged. Store in suitable, labeled
containers (usually the shipping container). Store containers at a
convenient height for handling, below eye level if possible. Keep
containers closed. Protect from damage. Keep empty containers in a
separate storage area. Empty containers may contain hazardous
residues. Keep closed. Avoid any dust build-up by frequent cleaning
and suitable construction of storage area.
Storage facilities should be made of fire resistant materials. Walls,
floors, shelving and lighting systems in the storage area should be
made from materials that resist attack from Maleic anhydride. Use a
grounded, non-sparking, corrosion-resistant ventilation system. Have
appropriate fire extinguishers and spill clean-up equipment in or near
storage area. Store materials according to occupational health and
safety regulations and fire and building codes.
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8. Exposure Controls/Personal Protection

Occupational Exposure Limits TIME-WEIGHTED AVERAGE (TLV-TWA) : 0.1 ppm - A4, Sensitizer –
Not classified as a human carcinogen

TIME-WEIGHTED AVERAGE (PEL-TWA) : 0.25 ppm (1 mg/m3)

Engineering Control Measures Engineering methods to control hazardous exposures and to reduce
the risk of fire and explosion are preferred. Methods include
mechanical ventilation (dilution and local exhaust), process or
personnel enclosure, control of process conditions, and process
modification (e.g. substitution of a less hazardous material).
Administrative controls and personal protective equipment may also
be required. Because of the high potential hazard associated with this
material, stringent control measures such as enclosure (closed
system) or isolation may be necessary. Use approved explosion-proof
equipment in hazardous areas. Use local exhaust ventilation, and
process enclosure if necessary, to control airborne dust, mist or
vapour. Use a corrosion-resistant ventilation system separate from
other exhaust ventilation systems. Exhaust directly to the outside. A
dust collecting system attached to the ventilation system, outside the
building, may be necessary. An explosion venting system may be
required during large-scale handling operations. Supply sufficient
replacement air to make up for air removed by exhaust system.

Personal Protection: Respiratory If engineering controls and work practices are not effective in
controlling exposure to this material, then wear suitable personal
protective equipment including approved respiratory protection. Have
appropriate equipment available for use in emergencies such as spills
or fire.
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION GUIDELINES :
NIOSH/OSHA RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MALEIC ANHYDRIDE
CONCENTRATIONS IN AIR
UP TO 10 mg/m3: SAR operated in a continuous-flow mode*; or
full-facepiece SCBA; or full-facepiece SAR.
THE IDLH (immediately dangerous to life or health.) for Maleic
Anhydride is 10 mg/m3.
The purpose of establishing an IDLH value is to ensure that the
worker can escape from a given contaminated environment in the
event of failure of the most protective respiratory protection
equipment. In the event of failure of respiratory protective equipment
every effort should be made to exit immediately.

Personal Protection: Hand Chemical protective gloves


RESISTANCE OF MATERIALS FOR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING :
Guidelines for maleic anhydride:
RECOMMENDED Nitrile rubber
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Personal Protection: Eye Chemical safety goggles. A face shield may also be necessary.

Personal Protection: Skin Chemical protective gloves, coveralls, boots, and/or other chemical
protective clothing. Have a safety shower/eye-wash fountain readily
available in the immediate work area.

Other Protection Remove contaminated clothing promptly. Keep contaminated clothing


in closed containers. Discard or launder before re-wearing. Inform
laundry personnel of contaminant's hazards. When handling on a
large scale, do not wear work clothing home. A double locker-shower
set up is usually required. Do not smoke, eat or drink in work areas.
Wash hands thoroughly after handling this material. Maintain good
housekeeping.

9. Physical and Chemical Properties

Appearance Colourless or white crystalline pastilles

Odor Irritating, acrid, choking

pH 2.42 (0.01 M solution)

Boiling Point 202°C (396 °F)

Melting Point 52.3°C (127 °F )

Flash Point 102°C (closed cup)


110 °C (open cup )

Flammability Lower flammable (explosive) limit (LFL/LEL) : 1.4%


Upper flammable (explosive) limit (UFL/UEL) : 7.1%

Autoignition Temperature 477°C ( 890 °F )

Explosive Properties Under certain conditions, a dust cloud of this material can explode
when ignited by a spark or flame. When evaluating the explosion
hazard of a specific process or sample of material, the important
factors to consider include: particle size and shape, dust
concentration, the nature of any impurities, oxygen concentration,
humidity, and extent of containment.

Vapour Pressure 0.021 kPa (0.16 mm Hg) at 20°C

Density 1314 kg/m3 @ 60 °C

Solubility: Water Soluble (16.3 g/100 g at 30°C (reacts slowly to form maleic acid)
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Solubility: Solvent Very soluble in acetone and ethyl acetate; soluble in benzene,
chloroform, diethyl ether, toluene, o-xylene and dioxane; slightly
soluble in carbon tetrachloride and kerosene. Soluble in alcohols with
ester formation

Solubility: Coefficient Not available


10. Stability and Reactivity

Stability Normally stable. Reacts slowly with water, including moisture in the
air, to form maleic acid.
HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION:
Does not polymerize on its own. Hazardous co-polymerization
reactions can occur, for example, when mixed with olefins
(unsaturated aliphatic hydrocarbons) and a catalyst.

Conditions to Avoid • Static charge, sparks, heat, other ignition sources, generation
of dust and moisture.
• Due to the effect of atmospheric moisture and the hygroscopic
characteristic of Maleic Anhydride the solidification point may
be decreased, the Maleic Acid content may increase and the
product may become hard if the material is stored for lengthy
period under humid conditions.

Incompatible Materials STRONG OXIDIZING AGENTS (e.g. perchlorates, peroxides,


chromates, sodium hypochlorite) - may react violently or explosively.
Increased risk of fire and explosion.
WATER - reacts slowly with cold water, rapidly with hot water,
producing heat. Forms maleic acid. Hot water may cause frothing.
ALKALI METALS (e.g. sodium or potassium), ALKALIS (e.g. sodium
hydroxide or potassium hydroxide), ALKALINE EARTH METALS (e.g.
calcium. magnesium or barium), ALKALINE EARTH HYDROXIDES
(e.g. calcium hydroxide), AMINES (e.g. dimethylamine, triethylamine),
PYRIDINE, QUINOLINE, SODIUM OR POTASSIUM CARBONATES,
AQUEOUS AMMONIA, AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE or AMMONIUM
SALTS - at temperatures above 150°C, mixtures can react producing
carbon dioxide, heat and pressure. Under these conditions, a mixture
may be explosive. Small amounts as low as 200 ppm of the above
chemicals are sufficient to start the decomposition.
OLEFINS (e.g. ethylene, propylene or diethylene) and CATALYSTS -
mixtures can undergo uncontrolled co-polymerization.
STRONG REDUCING AGENTS (e.g. phosphorus, tin (II) chloride,
metal hydrides) - may react vigorously or violently. Increased risk of
fire.
ALCOHOLS - react to form esters.

CORROSIVITY TO METALS:
Dry maleic anhydride is not corrosive. In contact with water, it is
corrosive to metals such as cast iron, mild steel and zinc. It is not
corrosive to types 304 and 316 stainless steels.
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Hazardous Decomposition Products Toxic levels of Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, irritating aldehydes
and ketones may be formed on burning.

11. Toxicological Information

Acute Toxicity LD50 (oral, rat): 400 mg/kg (unconfirmed); 625 mg/kg; 850 mg/kg; 900
mg/kg (in water) ; 1050 mg/kg (in corn oil)
LD50 (oral, mouse): 465 mg/kg
LD50 (oral, guinea pig): 390 mg/kg
LD50 (oral, rabbit): 875 mg/kg
LD50 (dermal, rabbit): Greater than 631 mg/kg (40% suspension in
corn oil); greater than 398 mg/kg (40% solution in water)

Skin and Eye Contact See section 10

Chronic Toxicity RESPIRATORY SENSITIZATION :


Exposure to vapours or dusts may cause allergic respiratory
sensitization. Sensitized people can experience symptoms of
bronchial asthma (wheezing, sneezing, runny nose or difficult
breathing) at low airborne concentrations which have no effect on
non-sensitized people. Evidence that maleic anhydride can cause
work-related asthma is provided by six cases in which bronchial
challenge testing demonstrated that it was likely to have been the
inducing agent. Supporting evidence is provided by its close
relationship to phthalic anhydride and trimellitic anhydride, both for
which there is a substantial body of information indicating a causal
association with asthma.

SKIN: Repeated exposure to powder or vapour may cause symptoms


such as drying, redness or itching of the skin (dermatitis).
SKIN SENSITIZATION :
Repeated or prolonged skin contact with maleic anhydride may cause
an allergic skin sensitization based on animal and limited human
information. Once a person is sensitized to a material, contact with
even a small amount causes outbreaks of dermatitis with symptoms
such as skin redness, itching, rash and swelling. This can spread
from the hands or arms to other parts of the body.
EYE CONTACT: Symptoms of chronic eye irritation with swelling and
pain in the cornea (keratitis) may develop after years of exposure to
this anhydride.

Carcinogenicity One animal study did not show any effects which could be related to
maleic anhydride exposure. There is no human information available.
The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has not
evaluated the carcinogenicity of maleic anhydride.

Mutagenicity A positive result was obtained in a test using cultured mammalian


cells. Negative results were obtained in bacterial tests. There is no
human information available.

Reproductive Hazards No harmful effects on male or female fertility were observed in an


animal study. There is no human information available.
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12. Ecological Information


Aquatic Toxicity: Fish L macrochirus LC50: 138 mg/l /48h

Aquatic Toxicity: Daphnia Daphnia magna EC50: 88mg/l /24h

Aquatic Toxicity: Algae Desmodesmus subspicatus IC50: 29mg/l /72h

Bio-degradability Readily biodegradable.


Biodegradation: 98%/7d (OECD 301 E)

Bio-accumulation No bioaccumulation is to be expected ( log Pow <1)

Further ecological data Do not allow to enter waters, waste water or soil!

13. Disposal Considerations


Disposal Methods Dispose of according to local regulations. Maleic Anhydride is
hazardous and must be disposed of at an appropriate hazardous
waste disposal site

Disposal of Packaging Dispose of according to local regulations. Empty packaging material


may contain residues of Maleic Anhydride and must also be disposed
of at an appropriate hazardous waste disposal site.

14. Transport Information

HAZARDOUS MATERIAL DESCRIPTION AND PROPER SHIPPING


NAME: MALEIC ANHYDRIDE
HAZARD CLASS OR DIVISION: 8
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: UN2215
PACKING GROUP: III

15. Regulatory Information

EEC Hazard Classification Harmful; Corrosive; Sensitising. [Xn;C;]

Risk Phrases R22: Harmful if swallowed


R34: Causes burns
R41: Risk of serious damage to eyes
R42/43: May cause sensitization by inhalation and skin contact

Safety Phrases S22: Do not breathe dust


S26: In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of
water and seek medical advice
S36/37/39: Wear suitable protective clothing, gloves and eye/face
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Maleic Anhydride
protection.
S45: In case of accident or if you feel unwell, seek medical advice
immediately (show label where possible).

National Legislation Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, Hazardous Chemical
Substances Regulations (1995)

16. Other Information

Bibliography 1. Material Safety Data Sheets as supplied by various suppliers and


manufacturers
2. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety

Document History
Date Change Reason for New revision Effective date
change No. Reviewed by
Feb 2007 Verification and updating Third party 0 JM Dold Feb 2007
review S J van der
Merwe
Associated
Risk
Management
Feb 2009 Exclusion of liability – Reviewed by 1 JC Feb 2009
Change from Associated Isegen. Heydenrich
Risk management to Isegen.
June 2009 Section 10 – conditions to Characteristic 2 JC June 2009
avoid – effect of moisture - of Maleic Heydenrich
Anhydride

EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd believes that this information is correct at date of publication, but does not warrant the accuracy
thereof. The use of the product designated herein will be at the Sole Risk of the user and Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd will not
accept liability for any loss or damage, including Consequential Damage, howsoever caused by or arising from the use of this
information or the use, application, adoption or processing of the product described herein or its use in combination with any
other product, material or in any process.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.11 Methane Rich Gas (Sasol)

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-11


Safety Data Sheet
Methane Rich Gas
Version 1.00 Revision Date 02.09.2011

1. Identification of the substance/mixture and of the company/undertaking


Trade name Methane Rich Gas

Synonyms Methane Rich Gas, Synthisized Natural Gas

Company Sasol Gas


272 Kent Avenue
Ferndale, Randburg
1451

Information (Product safety) Telephone: +27 (0) 11 889 9000 Fax: +27 (0) 11 889 9210
E-mail address msds.info@sasol.com
Emergency telephone Europe, Israel, Africa, Americas +44 (0)1235 239 670
number Middle East, Arabic African +44 (0)1235 239 671
countries
Asia Pacific +65 3158 1074
China +86 10 5100 3039
South Africa +27 (0)17 610 4444
Australia +61 2 9032 0460

2. Hazards identification

Identification of the risks


R61 May cause harm to the unborn child.
R20 Also harmful by inhalation.
R48/20 Also harmful: danger of serious damage to health by prolonged
exposure through inhalation.
R12 Extremely flammable.

3. Composition/information on ingredients
Preparation on the base:

methane
Contents: 82.10 %W/W
CAS-No. 74-82-8 Index-No. 601-001-00-4 EC-No. 200-812-7
Symbol(s) F+ R-phrase(s) -R12

carbon monoxide

Print Date 02.09.2011 100000006459 1/7


Safety Data Sheet
Methane Rich Gas
Version 1.00 Revision Date 02.09.2011

Contents: 3.40 %W/W


CAS-No. 630-08-0 Index-No. 006-001-00-2 EC-No. 211-128-3
Symbol(s) F+, T R-phrase(s) -R61 -R12 -R23 -R48/23

For the full text of the R-phrases mentioned in this Section, see Section 16.

4. First aid measures


General advice Extremely flammable liquefied gas
Inhalation Remove to fresh air. If breathing is irregular or stopped,
administer artificial respiration. Obtain medical attention.
Skin contact Wash frost-bitten areas with plenty of water. Do not remove
clothing.
Eye contact Rinse immediately with plenty of water, also under the eyelids,
for at least 5 minutes.

Notes to physician
Treatment In case of shortness of breath, give oxygen.

5. Firefighting measures
Suitable extinguishing Foam, Water spray, Dry powder
media
Specific hazards during Flash back possible over considerable distance. Extremely
firefighting flammable gas.
Special protective Wear self-contained breathing apparatus and protective suit.
equipment for firefighters
Further information Exposure to open flame or excessive heat can cause fire or
explosion. LARGE FIRE: Do not extinguish a leaking gas flame
unless leak can be stopped. Move containing vessels from fire if
without risk. Use water spray, fog or foam. Cool containing
vessels with water jet in order to prevent pressure build-up,
autoignition or explosion.

6. Accidental release measures


Personal precautions Keep people away from and upwind of spill/leak. Remove all
sources of ignition. Wear self-contained breathing apparatus
and protective suit.

Print Date 02.09.2011 100000006459 2/7


Safety Data Sheet
Methane Rich Gas
Version 1.00 Revision Date 02.09.2011

Environmental Prevent further leakage or spillage if safe to do so.


precautions

7. Handling and storage


Handling
Safe handling advice Observe special instructions applicable to compressed gases.
Wear self-contained breathing apparatus and protective suit.
Advice on protection Keep away from heat and sources of ignition. Use only
against fire and explosion explosion-proof equipment.

Storage
Requirements for storage Keep containers tightly closed in a dry, cool and well-ventilated
areas and containers place.

8. Exposure controls/personal protection


Components with workplace control parameters
NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS
Contains no substances with occupational exposure limit values.

EUROPEAN OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS


Contains no substances with occupational exposure limit values.

Engineering measures
In use, may form flammable/explosive vapour-air mixture.

Personal protective equipment


Respiratory protection In case of insufficient ventilation, wear suitable respiratory
equipment.
Hand protection Gloves suitable for permanent contact:
Material: Leather gloves

Eye protection Safety glasses with side-shields


Skin and body protection Protective suit, Safety shoes
Protective measures Wear suitable protective equipment.

9. Physical and chemical properties


Print Date 02.09.2011 100000006459 3/7
Safety Data Sheet
Methane Rich Gas
Version 1.00 Revision Date 02.09.2011

State of matter gaseous


Colour Colourless
Odour odourless
Boiling point/boiling -160 °C
range
Flash point -185.2 °C
Autoignition temperature 537 °C
Lower explosion limit 5 %(V); lower flammability limit
Upper explosion limit 17 %(V); upper flammability limit
Water solubility Insoluble

10. Stability and reactivity


Materials to avoid Oxidizing agents
Hazardous Carbon oxides
decomposition products
Hazardous reactions Hazardous polymerisation does not occur.

11. Toxicological information


Further information No data available

12. Ecological information


Ecotoxicity effects
Further information No data available

13. Disposal considerations


Product Dispose of in accordance with local regulations.

14. Transport information


ADR UN number: 1954; Class: 2; 1F; Description of the goods:
COMPRESSED GAS, FLAMMABLE, N.O.S.
(Methane, Carbon Monoxide)

Print Date 02.09.2011 100000006459 4/7


Safety Data Sheet
Methane Rich Gas
Version 1.00 Revision Date 02.09.2011

RID UN number: 1954; Class: 2; 1F; Description of the goods:


COMPRESSED GAS, FLAMMABLE, N.O.S.
(Methane, Carbon Monoxide)

ADNR UN number: 1954; Class: 2; 1F; Description of the goods:


COMPRESSED GAS, FLAMMABLE, N.O.S.
(Methane, Carbon Monoxide)

IMDG UN number: 1954; Class: 2.1; EmS: F-D, S-U; Description of the
goods: COMPRESSED GAS, FLAMMABLE, N.O.S.
(Methane, Carbon Monoxide)

ICAO/IATA UN number : 1954; Class: 2.1; Description of the goods:


Compressed gas, flammable, n.o.s.
(Methane, Carbon Monoxide)

15. Regulatory information


Labelling

Regulatory base 1999/45/EC


Symbol(s) F+: Extremely flammable
T: Toxic

R-phrase(s) R61: May cause harm to the unborn child.


R20: Also harmful by inhalation.
R48/20: Also harmful: danger of serious damage to health by
prolonged exposure through inhalation.
R12: Extremely flammable.

S-phrase(s) S53: Avoid exposure - obtain special instructions before use.


Print Date 02.09.2011 100000006459 5/7
Safety Data Sheet
Methane Rich Gas
Version 1.00 Revision Date 02.09.2011

S 9: Keep container in a well-ventilated place.


S16: Keep away from sources of ignition - No smoking.
S33: Take precautionary measures against static discharges.
S35: This material and its container must be disposed of in a
safe way.
S36/37: Wear suitable protective clothing and gloves.

Special labelling of Restricted to professional users.


certain mixtures
Hazardous components carbon monoxide
which must be listed on
the label

16. Other information


Full text of R-phrases referred to under sections 2 and 3
R12 Extremely flammable.
R23 Toxic by inhalation.
R48/23 Toxic: danger of serious damage to health by prolonged exposure
through inhalation.
R61 May cause harm to the unborn child.

All reasonable efforts were exercised to compile this SDS in accordance with ISO 11014 and ANSIZ400.1.1993.
The SDS provides information regarding the health, safety and environmental hazards, at the date of issue, to
facilitate the safe receipt, use and handling of the product in the workplace. Since Sasol and its subsidiaries
cannot anticipate or control all conditions under which the product may be handled, used and received in the
workplace, it remains the obligation of each user, receiver or handler to, prior to usage, review this SDS in the
context within which the product will be received, handled or used in the workplace. The user, handler or
receiver must ensure that the necessary mitigating measures are in place as regards health and safety. This
does not substitute the need or requirement for any relevant risk assessments to be conducted. It further
remains the responsibility of the receiver, handler or user to communicate such information to all relevant parties
that may be involved in the receipt, use or handling of the product.
Although all reasonable efforts were exercised in the compilation of this SDS, Sasol does not expressly warrant
the accuracy or assume any liability for the incompleteness of the information contained herein or any advice
given. The product is sold and risk passes in accordance with the specific terms and conditions of sale.

The MSDS was created by: B.SHAMASE


The MSDS was approved by: P.Gravett

Print Date 02.09.2011 100000006459 6/7


Safety Data Sheet
Methane Rich Gas
Version 1.00 Revision Date 02.09.2011

Print Date 02.09.2011 100000006459 7/7


QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.12 Naphthalene

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-12


Material Safety Data Sheet

Naphthalene Page 1 of 9

1. COMPANY AND PRODUCT DETAILS

Trade Name: Naphthalene


Synonyms: Naphthalene
Company: Arcelormittal Coke and Chemicals
Arcelormittal Site, Delfos Boulevard
Vanderbijlpark
 10202, Staal 1906
Contact information:  (016) 889-6401 / +27 16 889-6401
Telefax: (016) 889-9752 / +27 16 889-9752
Emergency number: (016) 889-9742

2. HAZARDOUS IDENTIFICATION
Identification of the risks:

Human health hazards: Skin exposure to vapour may result in dermatitis. Eye exposure to
vapour may result in conjunctivitis or blurred vision. Long-term exposure
to high concentration may result in fever, blood in urine, liver damage,
convulsions or collapse.

Environmental hazards: Flammable.

Safety hazards: Due to low electric conductivity the substance can generate electrostatic
charges as a result of flow, agitation etc. at temperatures above 80°C.

3. COMPOSITION/INFORMATION RELATING TO THE INGREDIENTS

Substance description: Naphthalene is a bicyclical aromatic substance derived from the


distillation or crude coal tar. Used mainly as a chemical feedstock for
phthalic anhydride and surfactants.

Approval date Prepared by (designation) Approved by:

December 2010 M+L LABORATORY SERVICES (PTY)LTD Designation: Environmental Co-ordinator

Next review date Revision Signature:


December 2012
Material Safety Data Sheet

Naphthalene Page 2 of 9

CAS Number: Compound Name: Purity % m/m

91-20-3 Naphthalene 93.5 min

105-67-9 2,4 Di Methyl phenol ±5


7704-34-9 Sulphur 0.6-0.7
7727-37-9 Nitrogen 0.04-0.06

4. FIRST AID MEASURES


General Advice: If you feel unwell, seek medical advice.

Inhalation: Remove to fresh air. If breathing is difficult, administer oxygen. If patient


is not breathing, perform mouth to mouth resuscitation. WARNING;it may
be hazardous to the person providing aid to give mouth to mouth when
the inhaled material is toxic, infectious or corrosive. Seek immediate
medical attention.

Skin contact: Remove contaminated clothes and rinse skin well with water for at least
15 minutes.

Eye contact: Gently lift the eyelids and flush immediately and continuously with
copious amounts of water. Consult a doctor immediately. Do not let the
patient rub their eyes or keep them tightly closed.

Ingestion: Do not induce vomiting. Rinse mouth with water, keep patient warm and
transfer to hospital.

Approval date Prepared by (designation) Approved by:

December 2010 M+L LABORATORY SERVICES (PTY)LTD Designation: Environmental Co-ordinator

Next review date Revision Signature:


December 2012
Material Safety Data Sheet

Naphthalene Page 3 of 9

5. FIRE-FIGHTING MEASURES

Suitable Extinguishing media: Use water spray or dry chemical powder.

Specific Hazards or precautions: Evacuate all non-essential personnel. Shut off all sources of
ignition. Have approved breathing apparatus available

Protective equipment for Fire fighters: Proper protective equipment, including breathing
apparatus and gloves.

6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

Personal precautions: Evacuate all non-essential personnel. Wear protective clothing and
breathing apparatus. Thoroughly ventilate the area before allowing
personnel to return.

Environmental Prevent the product from spreading or entering into drains, ditches or
Precautions: rivers by using sand, earth, sawdust or inert absorbent. Prevent further
leakage or spillage, if safe to do so. When handling solid, take care to
prevent the formation of dust.

Methods for Cleaning up: Sweep up spilt substance, and transfer to clearly marked containers for
disposal.

7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

Safe handling advice: Avoid contact of material with skin, eyes and clothing. Avoid breathing
vapours or fumes. When handling the product, do not eat, drink or
smoke. Keep away from open flames or sparks.

Approval date Prepared by (designation) Approved by:

December 2010 M+L LABORATORY SERVICES (PTY)LTD Designation: Environmental Co-ordinator

Next review date Revision Signature:


December 2012
Material Safety Data Sheet

Naphthalene Page 4 of 9

Advice on protection
Against fire and explosion: Electrical equipment must be flame-proof and earthed. Keep away from
sources of ignition and incompatible chemicals.

Storage: Keep away from sources of ignition. To be stored in securely closed,


and properly labelled containers. Store the product in a cool, dry, well
ventilated area, away from heat and ignition sources.

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS/PERSONAL PROTECTION

Engineering control Use engineering controls to keep airborne concentrations


Measures: below the exposure limits. Locate emergency equipment at well-marked
and clearly identified stations in case emergency escape is necessary.

Occupational exposure TWA OEL-RL (Time-Weighted Average, Occupational


Standards: Exposure Limit – Recommended): 50 mg/m3 (long-term exposure limit, 8
hours); 75 mg/m3 (short-term exposure limit, 15 min. period).

Personal protective equipment:

Respiratory protection: Handle inside a well ventilated area, or else wear approved
breathing apparatus

Approval date Prepared by (designation) Approved by:

December 2010 M+L LABORATORY SERVICES (PTY)LTD Designation: Environmental Co-ordinator

Next review date Revision Signature:


December 2012
Material Safety Data Sheet

Naphthalene Page 5 of 9

Hand protection: Solvent-resistant rubber or plastic gloves.

Eye protection: Face shield or eye protection.

Skin and body protection: Protective clothing and gloves.

Hygiene measures: Wash overalls and undergarments separately from household clothing..
Dispose of soiled gloves. Wash exposed body areas well before eating,
drinking or smoking. Shower after work.

9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

Physical state: Solid at ambient temperature


Colour: Brown Crystalline solid lumps
Odour: Characteristic odour (Aromatic)
Boiling point: 218°C
Crystallising point: 77°C min
Melting point: 80°C
Auto ignition temperature: 526°C

Approval date Prepared by (designation) Approved by:

December 2010 M+L LABORATORY SERVICES (PTY)LTD Designation: Environmental Co-ordinator

Next review date Revision Signature:


December 2012
Material Safety Data Sheet

Naphthalene Page 6 of 9

Relative vapour density: 4.4 (Air = 1)


Explosive limits: 0.9 -5.9 volume % in air
Solubility: Water: Slightly soluble
Solvents: Miscible, soluble in Benzene, Nitro benzene and a variety of
aromatic solvents.

10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

Stability: Stable
Conditions to avoid: Sources of ignition

11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Summary of hazards: The range of toxicity depends on the exposure concentration.

Acute toxicity:

Oral: LD50 (rat, oral) 3.8g/kg: 95 confidence limit 2.9-5.1g/kg (IRI Project no
412846, May 1979)

Inhalation: Inhalation of the vapour causes headaches, nausea or sweating

Eye irritation: Exposure to the vapour may result in conjunctivitis or blurred vision.

Approval date Prepared by (designation) Approved by:

December 2010 M+L LABORATORY SERVICES (PTY)LTD Designation: Environmental Co-ordinator

Next review date Revision Signature:


December 2012
Material Safety Data Sheet

Naphthalene Page 7 of 9

Skin irritation: Could result in dermatitis.

Chronic toxicity: Low toxicity on ingestion, but serious risk of aspiration into lungs if
vomiting occurs.

Other effects: Photosensitization (worsening of rash with exposure to sunlight) may


occur.

12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Basis for assessment: Little is documented about the ecological effects, but great care should
be taken protect the environment.

Mobility: It may leach into groundwater

Biodegradability: Biodegradable.

Bioaccumulation: Bioaccumulation may occur to some extent

13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

Waste and product disposal: Waste arising from a spillage or tank cleaning operation should be
disposed of in accordance with prevailing regulations, preferably by
a registered collector or contractor. The competence of the collector
or Contractor should be established beforehand. Waste product
should not be allowed to contaminate soil or water.

Approval date Prepared by (designation) Approved by:

December 2010 M+L LABORATORY SERVICES (PTY)LTD Designation: Environmental Co-ordinator

Next review date Revision Signature:


December 2012
Material Safety Data Sheet

Naphthalene Page 8 of 9

14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION

UN number: 1334

Class: 4,1
Packing group: III
Hazard Label: Flammable Solid

Special Precautions: Marine Pollutant

15. REGULATORY INFORMATION

Prevailing national legislation must be adhered to.

16. OTHER INFORMATION

MSDS Distribution: This document contains important information to ensure the safe storage,
handling and use of this product. The information in this document
Approval date Prepared by (designation) Approved by:

December 2010 M+L LABORATORY SERVICES (PTY)LTD Designation: Environmental Co-ordinator

Next review date Revision Signature:


December 2012
Material Safety Data Sheet

Naphthalene Page 9 of 9

should be brought to the attention of the person in your organisation


responsible for advising on safety matters.

Bibliography :

1. Henry, S.A. (1947) Occupational coetaneous cancer attributable to certain chemicals in industry. Brit. Med. Bull 4, 389 - 401.

2. H Henning. Solvent Safety Sheets.

3. Louw, C.W. (1965). The quantitive determination of benzo[a]pyrene in the air of South African cities. American Institute of Hygiene
Association Journal 26, 520 - 526.

4. International Agency for Research on Cancer (1991) IARC. Monograph on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risk of Chemicals to
Humans, vol. 35, Polynuclear Aromatic Compounds Pt IV Bitumen, Coal Tar and Derived Products, Lyon, France.

5. Dangerous Goods Regulations, 33rd Edition, Effective 1 January 1992.

6. Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette, 25 August 1995

This information is based on current knowledge and is intended to describe the product for
the purposes of health, safety and environmental requirements only. It should not be
construed as guaranteeing any specific property of the product.
*Published data relates to analysis conducted on a sample submitted, on an “as received basis”
Tests performed are limited to the listed test items. Test items not listed in the MSDS are either
undetermined, or below our detection limits.

All Inspectorate services are rendered in accordance with the applicable Inspectorate
General Terms and Conditions of Business available on request and accessible at:
http://www.inspml.co.za/terms_and_conditions/

Approval date Prepared by (designation) Approved by:

December 2010 M+L LABORATORY SERVICES (PTY)LTD Designation: Environmental Co-ordinator

Next review date Revision Signature:


December 2012
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.13 Ortho Xylene

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-13


Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 1 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


SECTION 1 PRODUCT AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION

PRODUCT
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Product Description: Aromatic Hydrocarbon

Intended Use: Chemical feedstock

COMPANY IDENTIFICATION
Supplier: EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL COMPANY
P.O. BOX 3272
HOUSTON, TX. 77253-3272 USA
24 Hour Health Emergency (800) 726-2015
Transportation Emergency Phone (800) 424-9300 or (703) 527-3887 CHEMTREC
Product Technical Information (281) 870-6000/Health & Medical (281) 870-6884
Supplier General Contact (281) 870-6000

SECTION 2 COMPOSITION / INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS

Reportable Hazardous Substance(s) or Complex Substance(s)


Name CAS# Concentration*
O-XYLENE 95-47-6 > 99 %

* All concentrations are percent by weight unless material is a gas. Gas concentrations are in percent by volume.

SECTION 3 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

This material is considered to be hazardous according to regulatory guidelines (see (M)SDS Section 15).

POTENTIAL PHYSICAL / CHEMICAL EFFECTS


Flammable. Material can release vapors that readily form flammable mixtures. Vapor accumulation could
flash and/or explode if ignited. Material can accumulate static charges which may cause an ignition.

POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECTS


Irritating to eyes. Irritating to respiratory system. Irritating to skin. If swallowed, may be aspirated and cause
lung damage.

Target Organs: Lung | Skin | Eye |

NFPA Hazard ID: Health: 2 Flammability: 3 Reactivity: 0


HMIS Hazard ID: Health: 2 Flammability: 3 Reactivity: 0

NOTE: This material should not be used for any other purpose than the intended use in Section 1 without expert
advice. Health studies have shown that chemical exposure may cause potential human health risks which may vary
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 2 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
from person to person.

SECTION 4 FIRST AID MEASURES

INHALATION
Remove from further exposure. For those providing assistance, avoid exposure to yourself or others. Use
adequate respiratory protection. If respiratory irritation, dizziness, nausea, or unconsciousness occurs, seek
immediate medical assistance. If breathing has stopped, assist ventilation with a mechanical device or use
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.

SKIN CONTACT
Wash contact areas with soap and water. Remove contaminated clothing. Launder contaminated clothing
before reuse.

EYE CONTACT
Flush thoroughly with water for at least 15 minutes. Get medical assistance.

INGESTION
Seek immediate medical attention. Do not induce vomiting.

NOTE TO PHYSICIAN
If ingested, material may be aspirated into the lungs and cause chemical pneumonitis. Treat appropriately.
This light hydrocarbon material, or a component, may be associated with cardiac sensitization following very
high exposures (well above occupational exposure limits) or with concurrent exposure to high stress levels or
heart-stimulating substances like epinephrine. Administration of such substances should be avoided.

SECTION 5 FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES

EXTINGUISHING MEDIA
Appropriate Extinguishing Media: Use water fog, foam, dry chemical or carbon dioxide (CO2) to extinguish
flames.

Inappropriate Extinguishing Media: Straight Streams of Water

FIRE FIGHTING
Fire Fighting Instructions: Flammable. Evacuate area. If a leak or spill has not ignited, use water spray to
disperse the vapors and to protect personnel attempting to stop a leak. Prevent runoff from fire control or
dilution from entering streams, sewers, or drinking water supply. Firefighters should use standard protective
equipment and in enclosed spaces, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Use water spray to cool fire
exposed surfaces and to protect personnel.

Unusual Fire Hazards: Vapors are flammable and heavier than air. Vapors may travel across the ground and
reach remote ignition sources causing a flashback fire danger. Hazardous material. Firefighters should
consider protective equipment indicated in Section 8.

Hazardous Combustion Products: Smoke, Fume, Incomplete combustion products, Oxides of carbon

FLAMMABILITY PROPERTIES
Flash Point [Method]: 32°C (90°F) [ASTM D-56]
Flammable Limits (Approximate volume % in air): LEL: 0.9 UEL: 6.7
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 3 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Autoignition Temperature: 463°C (865°F) [Technical literature]

SECTION 6 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES
In the event of a spill or accidental release, notify relevant authorities in accordance with all applicable
regulations. US regulations require reporting releases of this material to the environment which exceed the
applicable reportable quantity or oil spills which could reach any waterway including intermittent dry creeks. The
National Response Center can be reached at (800)424-8802.

PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Avoid contact with spilled material. Warn or evacuate occupants in surrounding and downwind areas if required
due to toxicity or flammability of the material. See Section 5 for fire fighting information. See the Hazard
Identification Section for Significant Hazards. See Section 4 for First Aid Advice. See Section 8 for advice on
the minimum requirements for personal protective equipment. Additional protective measures may be
necessary, depending on the specific circumstances and/or the expert judgment of the emergency responders.

SPILL MANAGEMENT
Land Spill: Eliminate all ignition sources (no smoking, flares, sparks or flames in immediate area). Stop leak if
you can do it without risk. All equipment used when handling the product must be grounded. Do not touch or
walk through spilled material. Prevent entry into waterways, sewer, basements or confined areas. A vapor
suppressing foam may be used to reduce vapors. Use clean non-sparking tools to collect absorbed material.
Absorb or cover with dry earth, sand or other non-combustible material and transfer to containers. Large Spills:
Water spray may reduce vapor; but may not prevent ignition in closed spaces. Recover by pumping or with
suitable absorbent.

Water Spill: Stop leak if you can do it without risk. Eliminate sources of ignition. Warn other shipping. If the
Flash Point exceeds the Ambient Temperature by 10 degrees C or more, use containment booms and remove
from the surface by skimming or with suitable absorbents when conditions permit. If the Flash Point does not
exceed the Ambient Air Temperature by at least 10C, use booms as a barrier to protect shorelines and allow
material to evaporate. Seek the advice of a specialist before using dispersants.

Water spill and land spill recommendations are based on the most likely spill scenario for this material;
however, geographic conditions, wind, temperature, (and in the case of a water spill) wave and current direction
and speed may greatly influence the appropriate action to be taken. For this reason, local experts should be
consulted. Note: Local regulations may prescribe or limit action to be taken.

ENVIRONMENTAL PRECAUTIONS
Large Spills: Dike far ahead of liquid spill for later recovery and disposal. Prevent entry into waterways,
sewers, basements or confined areas.

SECTION 7 HANDLING AND STORAGE

HANDLING
Avoid breathing mists or vapors. Avoid contact with skin. Prevent exposure to ignition sources, for example
use non-sparking tools and explosion-proof equipment. Do not enter storage areas or confined spaces unless
adequately ventilated. Prevent small spills and leakage to avoid slip hazard. Material can accumulate static
charges which may cause an electrical spark (ignition source). Use proper bonding and/or ground procedures.
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 4 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
However, bonding and grounds may not eliminate the hazard from static accumulation. Consult local applicable
standards for guidance. Additional references include American Petroleum Institute 2003 (Protection Against
Ignitions Arising out of Static, Lightning and Stray Currents) or National Fire Protection Agency 77
(Recommended Practice on Static Electricity) or CENELEC CLC/TR 50404 (Electrostatics - Code of practice for
the avoidance of hazards due to static electricity).

Loading/Unloading Temperature: [Ambient]

Transport Temperature: [Ambient]


Transport Pressure: [Ambient]

Static Accumulator: This material is a static accumulator. A liquid is typically considered a nonconductive,
static accumulator if its conductivity is below 100 pS/m (100x10E-12 Siemens per meter) and is considered a
semiconductive, static accumulator if its conductivity is below 10,000 pS/m. Whether a liquid is nonconductive
or semiconductive, the precautions are the same. A number of factors, for example liquid temperature,
presence of contaminants, anti-static additives and filtration can greatly influence the conductivity of a liquid.

STORAGE
Ample fire water supply should be available. A fixed sprinkler/deluge system is recommended. The container
choice, for example storage vessel, may effect static accumulation and dissipation. Keep container closed.
Handle containers with care. Open slowly in order to control possible pressure release. Store in a cool, well-
ventilated area. Outside or detached storage preferred. Storage containers should be grounded and bonded.
Fixed storage containers, transfer containers and associated equipment should be grounded and bonded to
prevent accumulation of static charge.
Storage Temperature: [Ambient]
Storage Pressure: [Ambient]

Suitable Containers/Packing: Tankers; Barges; Tank Cars


Suitable Materials and Coatings (Chemical Compatibility): Carbon Steel; Polyester; Stainless Steel; Teflon
Unsuitable Materials and Coatings: Natural Rubber; Synthetic Rubber; Polymers

SECTION 8 EXPOSURE CONTROLS / PERSONAL PROTECTION

EXPOSURE LIMIT VALUES

Exposure limits/standards (Note: Exposure limits are not additive)

Source Form Limit / Standard NOTE Source


O-XYLENE TWA 435 mg/m3 100 ppm N/A OSHA Z1
O-XYLENE STEL 150 ppm N/A ACGIH
O-XYLENE TWA 100 ppm N/A ACGIH

NOTE: Limits/standards shown for guidance only. Follow applicable regulations.

ENGINEERING CONTROLS

The level of protection and types of controls necessary will vary depending upon potential exposure conditions.
Control measures to consider:
Adequate ventilation should be provided so that exposure limits are not exceeded. Use explosion-
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 5 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
proof ventilation equipment.

PERSONAL PROTECTION

Personal protective equipment selections vary based on potential exposure conditions such as applications,
handling practices, concentration and ventilation. Information on the selection of protective equipment for use
with this material, as provided below, is based upon intended, normal usage.

Respiratory Protection: If engineering controls do not maintain airborne contaminant concentrations at a


level which is adequate to protect worker health, an approved respirator may be appropriate. Respirator
selection, use, and maintenance must be in accordance with regulatory requirements, if applicable. Types of
respirators to be considered for this material include:
Half-face filter respirator

For high airborne concentrations, use an approved supplied-air respirator, operated in positive pressure mode.
Supplied air respirators with an escape bottle may be appropriate when oxygen levels are inadequate,
gas/vapor warning properties are poor, or if air purifying filter capacity/rating may be exceeded.

Hand Protection: Any specific glove information provided is based on published literature and glove
manufacturer data. Glove suitability and breakthrough time will differ depending on the specific use conditions.
Contact the glove manufacturer for specific advice on glove selection and breakthrough times for your use
conditions. Inspect and replace worn or damaged gloves. The types of gloves to be considered for this material
include:
Chemical resistant gloves are recommended.

Eye Protection: Chemical goggles are recommended.

Skin and Body Protection: Any specific clothing information provided is based on published literature or
manufacturer data. The types of clothing to be considered for this material include:
Chemical/oil resistant clothing is recommended.

Specific Hygiene Measures: Always observe good personal hygiene measures, such as washing after
handling the material and before eating, drinking, and/or smoking. Routinely wash work clothing and protective
equipment to remove contaminants. Discard contaminated clothing and footwear that cannot be cleaned.
Practice good housekeeping.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS
Comply with applicable environmental regulations limiting discharge to air, water and
soil. Protect the environment by applying appropriate control measures to prevent or limit
emissions.

SECTION 9 PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

Note: Physical and chemical properties are provided for safety, health and environmental considerations only
and may not fully represent product specifications. Contact the Supplier for additional information.

GENERAL INFORMATION
Physical State: Liquid
Form: Clear
Color: Colorless
Odor: Aromatic
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 6 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Odor Threshold: N/D

IMPORTANT HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION


Relative Density (at 25 °C): 0.87 [Technical literature]
Density (at 25 ºC): 878 kg/m³ (7.32 lbs/gal, 0.88 kg/dm³) [Technical literature]
Flash Point [Method]: 32°C (90°F) [ASTM D-56]
Flammable Limits (Approximate volume % in air): LEL: 0.9 UEL: 6.7
Autoignition Temperature: 463°C (865°F) [Technical literature]
Boiling Point / Range: 145°C (292°F) [Technical literature]
Vapor Density (Air = 1): > 1 at 101 kPa [Calculated]
Vapor Pressure: [N/D at 20 °C]
| 0.882 kPa (6.62 mm Hg) at 25°C [Technical literature]
Evaporation Rate (n-butyl acetate = 1): 0.78 [In-house method]
pH: N/A
Log Pow (n-Octanol/Water Partition Coefficient): 3.12 [Technical literature]
Solubility in Water: Negligible
Viscosity: [N/D at 40 °C] | 0.87 cSt (0.87 mm2/sec) at 25°C [Technical literature]
Oxidizing Properties: See Hazards Identification Section.

OTHER INFORMATION
Freezing Point: -26°C (-15°F) [Technical literature]
Melting Point: -26°C (-15°F) [Technical literature]
Pour Point: -26°C (-15°F) [Technical literature]
Molecular Weight: 106
Hygroscopic: No
Coefficient of Thermal Expansion: 0.001 [Calculated] [In-house method]
Decomposition Temperature: N/D

SECTION 10 STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

STABILITY: Material is stable under normal conditions.

CONDITIONS TO AVOID: Avoid heat, sparks, open flames and other ignition sources.

MATERIALS TO AVOID: Strong oxidizers, Nitric acid, Sulfuric acid, Halogens, Molten Sulfur

HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS: Material does not decompose at ambient temperatures.

HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION: Will not occur.

SECTION 11 TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION

ACUTE TOXICITY
Route of Exposure Conclusion / Remarks
Inhalation
Toxicity (Rat): LC50 > 20 mg/l Slightly toxic. Based on test data for structurally similar materials.
Irritation: No end point data for material. May be irritating to the respiratory tract. The effects are reversible.

Ingestion
Toxicity (Rat): LC50 3523 mg/kg Minimally Toxic. Based on test data for structurally similar
materials.
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 7 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Skin
Toxicity (Rabbit): LD50 > 5000 mg/kg Slightly toxic. Based on test data for structurally similar materials.
Irritation: Data available. Moderately irritating to skin with prolonged exposure. Based on
test data for structurally similar materials.

Eye
Irritation: Data available. Moderately irritating to the eyes. Based on test data for structurally
similar materials.

CHRONIC/OTHER EFFECTS
For the product itself:
Vapor concentrations above recommended exposure levels are irritating to the eyes and the respiratory tract,
may cause headaches and dizziness, are anesthetic and may have other central nervous system effects.
Small amounts of liquid aspirated into the lungs during ingestion or from vomiting may cause chemical
pneumonitis or pulmonary edema. Very high exposure (confined spaces / abuse) to light hydrocarbons may
result in abnormal heart rhythm (arrhythmias). Concurrent high stress levels and/or co-exposure to high levels
of hydrocarbons (above occupational exposure limits), and to heart-stimulating substances like epinephrine,
nasal decongestants, asthma drugs, or cardiovascular drugs may initiate arrhythmias.

Additional information is available by request.

The following ingredients are cited on the lists below: None.

--REGULATORY LISTS SEARCHED--


1 = NTP CARC 3 = IARC 1 5 = IARC 2B
2 = NTP SUS 4 = IARC 2A 6 = OSHA CARC

SECTION 12 ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The information given is based on data available for the material, the components of the material, and similar materials.

ECOTOXICITY
Material -- Expected to be toxic to aquatic organisms.
Material -- Not expected to demonstrate chronic toxicity to aquatic organisms.

MOBILITY
Material -- Highly volatile, will partition rapidly to air. Not expected to partition to sediment and wastewater
solids.

PERSISTENCE AND DEGRADABILITY


Biodegradation:
Material -- Expected to be readily biodegradable.
Hydrolysis:
Material -- Transformation due to hydrolysis not expected to be significant.
Photolysis:
Material -- Transformation due to photolysis not expected to be significant.
Atmospheric Oxidation:
Material -- Expected to degrade rapidly in air
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 8 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
BIOACCUMULATION POTENTIAL
Material -- Potential to bioaccumulate is low.

SECTION 13 DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

Disposal recommendations based on material as supplied. Disposal must be in accordance with current applicable
laws and regulations, and material characteristics at time of disposal.

DISPOSAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Product is suitable for burning in an enclosed controlled burner for fuel value or disposal by supervised
incineration at very high temperatures to prevent formation of undesirable combustion products.

REGULATORY DISPOSAL INFORMATION


RCRA Information: Disposal of unused product may be subject to RCRA regulations (40 CFR 261). Disposal
of the used product may also be regulated due to ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity or toxicity as determined by
the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). Potential RCRA characteristics: IGNITABILITY.

Empty Container Warning Empty Container Warning (where applicable): Empty containers may contain residue and
can be dangerous. Do not attempt to refill or clean containers without proper instructions. Empty drums should be
completely drained and safely stored until appropriately reconditioned or disposed. Empty containers should be taken
for recycling, recovery, or disposal through suitably qualified or licensed contractor and in accordance with
governmental regulations. DO NOT PRESSURISE, CUT, WELD, BRAZE, SOLDER, DRILL, GRIND, OR EXPOSE
SUCH CONTAINERS TO HEAT, FLAME, SPARKS, STATIC ELECTRICITY, OR OTHER SOURCES OF IGNITION.
THEY MAY EXPLODE AND CAUSE INJURY OR DEATH.

SECTION 14 TRANSPORT INFORMATION

LAND (DOT)
Proper Shipping Name: XYLENES
Hazard Class & Division: 3
ID Number: 1307
Packing Group: III
Product RQ: 1000 LBS - O-XYLENE
ERG Number: 130
Label(s): 3
Transport Document Name: UN1307, XYLENES, 3, PG III, RQ

SEA (IMDG)
Proper Shipping Name: XYLENES
Hazard Class & Division: 3
EMS Number: F-E, S-D
UN Number: 1307
Packing Group: III
Label(s): 3
Transport Document Name: UN1307, XYLENES, 3, PG III, (32°C c.c.)
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 9 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

AIR (IATA)
Proper Shipping Name: XYLENES
Hazard Class & Division: 3
UN Number: 1307
Packing Group: III
Label(s) / Mark(s): 3
Transport Document Name: UN1307, XYLENES, 3, PG III

SECTION 15 REGULATORY INFORMATION

OSHA HAZARD COMMUNICATION STANDARD: When used for its intended purpose, this material is classified as
hazardous in accordance with OSHA 29CFR 1910.1200.

Complies with the following national/regional chemical inventory requirements:: AICS, DSL, ENCS, IECSC,
KECI, TSCA

EPCRA SECTION 302: This material contains no extremely hazardous substances.

CERCLA:

Chemical Name CAS Number Typical Value Component RQ Product RQ


O-XYLENE 95-47-6 > 99 % 1000 LBS 1000 LBS

SARA (311/312) REPORTABLE HAZARD CATEGORIES: Fire. Immediate Health.

SARA (313) TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY:

Chemical Name CAS Number Typical Value


O-XYLENE 95-47-6 > 99 %

The following ingredients are cited on the lists below:

Chemical Name CAS Number List Citations


O-XYLENE 95-47-6 1, 4, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19

--REGULATORY LISTS SEARCHED--


1 = ACGIH ALL 6 = TSCA 5a2 11 = CA P65 REPRO 16 = MN RTK
2 = ACGIH A1 7 = TSCA 5e 12 = CA RTK 17 = NJ RTK
3 = ACGIH A2 8 = TSCA 6 13 = IL RTK 18 = PA RTK
4 = OSHA Z 9 = TSCA 12b 14 = LA RTK 19 = RI RTK
5 = TSCA 4 10 = CA P65 CARC 15 = MI 293

Code key: CARC=Carcinogen; REPRO=Reproductive

SECTION 16 OTHER INFORMATION


N/D = Not determined, N/A = Not applicable
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 10 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

THIS SAFETY DATA SHEET CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING REVISIONS:


Revision Changes:
Section 04: First Aid Eye was modified.
Section 06: Protective Measures was modified.
Section 11: Eye Irritation Conclusion was modified.
Section 11: Skin Irritation Conclusion was modified.
Section 09: Phys/Chem Properties Note was modified.
Section 09: Boiling Point C(F) was modified.
Section 09: Evaporation Rate was modified.
Section 09: Flash Point C(F) was modified.
Section 09: n-Octanol/Water Partition Coefficient was modified.
Section 09: Coefficient of Thermal Expansion was modified.
Section 08: Comply with applicable regulations phrase was modified.
Section 09: VAPOR PRESSURE was modified.
Section 09: Vapor Pressure was modified.
Section 11: Dermal Lethality Test Data was modified.
Section 11: Oral Lethality Test Data was modified.
Section 11: Inhalation Lethality Test Data was modified.
Section 11: Oral Lethality Test Comment was modified.
Section 11: Inhalation Irritation Test Data was modified.
Section 09: Relative Density - Header was modified.
Section 09: Flammable Limits - LEL was modified.
Section 09: Flash Point C(F) was modified.
Section 09: Autoignition Temperature was modified.
Section 09: Viscosity was modified.
Section 09: Viscosity was modified.
Section 08: Eye Protection was modified.
Section 14: Transport Document Name was modified.
Section 14: Product RQ was modified.
Section 14: Transport Document Name was modified.
Hazard Identification: Health Hazards was modified.
Composition: Component table was modified.
Section 15: List Citations Table was modified.
Section 15: CERCLA Table was modified.
Section 11: Skin Irritation Conclusion was modified.
Section 11: Inhalation Lethality Test Comment was modified.
Section 15: National Chemical Inventory Listing - Header was modified.
Section 15: SARA (313) TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY - Table was modified.
Section 15: National Chemical Inventory Listing was modified.
Section 16: Code to MHCs was modified.
Section 09: Relative Density was modified.
Section 15: Community RTK - Header was modified.
Hazard Identification: Emergency Overview Target Organs was modified.
Section 16: Health Hazards was modified.
Section 16: First Aid Eye was modified.
Section 16: Target Organs was modified.
Section 09: Freezing Point C(F) was modified.
Section 09: Melting Point C(F) was modified.
Section 09: Flammable Limits - UEL was modified.
Section 08: Exposure Limits Table was modified.
Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 11 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Section 01: Company Contact Methods Sorted by Priority was modified.
Section 12: Hydrolysis - Header was added.
Section 12: Photolysis - Header was added.
Section 09: Pour Point - Header was added.
Section 09: Pour Point C(F) was added.
Section 09: Density - Header was added.
Section 09: Density kg/m3(lbs/gal) was added.
Section 16: NA Contains was added.
Section 16: NA Contains - Header was added.
Section 12: Ecological Information - Hydrolysis was added.
Section 12: Ecological Information - Photolysis was added.
Section 12: Ecological Information - Hydrolysis was added.
Section 12: Ecological Information - Photolysis was added.
Section 09: Decomposition Temperature was added.
Section 09: Decomposition Temp - Header was added.
Section 12: Ecological Information - Acute Aquatic Toxicity was added.
Section 12: Ecological Information - Acute Aquatic Toxicity was added.
Section 09: Vapor Pressure was added.
Section 09: Vapor Pressure was added.
Hazard Identification: Health Hazards was deleted.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
PRECAUTIONARY LABEL TEXT:
Contains: O-XYLENE
WARNING!
HEALTH HAZARDS
Irritating to eyes. Irritating to respiratory system. Irritating to skin. If swallowed, may be aspirated and cause lung
damage.
Target Organs: Lung | Skin | Eye |

PHYSICAL HAZARDS
Flammable. Material can accumulate static charges which may cause an ignition. Flammable.

PRECAUTIONS
Avoid breathing material. Avoid breathing mists or vapors. Avoid contact with skin. Prevent exposure to ignition
sources, for example use non-sparking tools and explosion-proof equipment. Do not enter storage areas or confined
spaces unless adequately ventilated. Use proper bonding and/or ground procedures. However, bonding and grounds
may not eliminate the hazard from static accumulation.

FIRST AID
Inhalation: Remove from further exposure. For those providing assistance, avoid exposure to yourself or others. Use
adequate respiratory protection. If respiratory irritation, dizziness, nausea, or unconsciousness occurs, seek immediate
medical assistance. If breathing has stopped, assist ventilation with a mechanical device or use mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation.

Eye: Flush thoroughly with water for at least 15 minutes. Get medical assistance.

Oral: Seek immediate medical attention. Do not induce vomiting.

Skin: Wash contact areas with soap and water. Remove contaminated clothing. Launder contaminated clothing
before reuse.

FIRE FIGHTING MEDIA


Product Name: ORTHOXYLENE
Revision Date: 15 Jan 2013
Page 12 of 12

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Use water fog, foam, dry chemical or carbon dioxide (CO2) to extinguish flames.

SPILL/LEAK
Land Spill: Eliminate all ignition sources (no smoking, flares, sparks or flames in immediate area). Stop leak if you
can do it without risk. Prevent entry into waterways, sewer, basements or confined areas. A vapor suppressing foam
may be used to reduce vapors. Absorb or cover with dry earth, sand or other non-combustible material and transfer to
containers.

Water Spill: Stop leak if you can do it without risk. Eliminate sources of ignition. Warn other shipping. Report spills
as required to appropriate authorities. If the Flash Point exceeds the Ambient Temperature by 10 degrees C or more,
use containment booms and remove from the surface by skimming or with suitable absorbents when conditions permit.
If the Flash Point does not exceed the Ambient Air Temperature by at least 10C, use booms as a barrier to protect
shorelines and allow material to evaporate. Seek the advice of a specialist before using dispersants.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
The information and recommendations contained herein are, to the best of ExxonMobil's knowledge and belief, accurate
and reliable as of the date issued. You can contact ExxonMobil to insure that this document is the most current
available from ExxonMobil. The information and recommendations are offered for the user's consideration and
examination. It is the user's responsibility to satisfy itself that the product is suitable for the intended use. If buyer
repackages this product, it is the user's responsibility to insure proper health, safety and other necessary information is
included with and/or on the container. Appropriate warnings and safe-handling procedures should be provided to
handlers and users. Alteration of this document is strictly prohibited. Except to the extent required by law, re-
publication or retransmission of this document, in whole or in part, is not permitted. The term, "ExxonMobil" is used for
convenience, and may include any one or more of ExxonMobil Chemical Company, Exxon Mobil Corporation, or any
affiliates in which they directly or indirectly hold any interest.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------

Internal Use Only


MHC: 1A, 0A, 2, 2B, 3, 2

DGN: 4401087AUS (1004498)


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
Copyright 2002 Exxon Mobil Corporation, All rights reserved
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE OF THE PROPOSED PHTHALATES PLANT AT ISEGEN’S FACILITY AT
ISIPINGO, KWAZULU-NATAL

15.14 Phthalic Anhydride

© RISCOM (PTY) LTD R/16/ISE˗01 Rev 1 Page 15-14


ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 1 of 10
Revision : 1
Reviewed : Feb 2009
Phthalic Anhydride
Company Details
Name ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Emergency Telephone +27 31 9133320 / +27 31 9133362
Address 284 REFINERY ROAD
ISIPINGO
4110
KWAZULU NATAL
SOUTH AFRICA
Telex +27 31 9133200 / +27 31 9133362

Telephone +27 31 9024839


Fax ISEGEN SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD

1. Product Information

Trade Name Phthalic Anhydride


Chemical Abstract No. 85-44-9
Chemical Family Aromatic Carboxylic Acid Anhydride / Aromatic Dicarboxylic Acid
Anhydride / Benzenedicarboxylic Acid Anhydride / Phthalic Acid
Isomer

NIOSH No.
Chemical Name 1.3 Isobenezofurandione
Chemical Formula C8H4O3
Molecular Weight 148.12
Hazchem Code Not available.
Synonyms 1,2-Benzenedicarboxylic Acid Anhydride
1,2-Benzenedicarboxylic Anhydride
1,3-Dihydro-1, 3-Dioxoisobenzofuran
1,3-Dioxophthalan
1,3-Isobenzofurandione
PAN
1,3-Phthalandion
1,3-Phthalandione

UN No. 2214.

2. Composition

Hazardous Components Phthalic Anhydride : > 99.5 %m/m


Maleic Anhydride : < 0.2 %m/m
Naphthoquinone : trace amounts : < 0.0005 %m/m
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 2 of 10
Revision : 1
Reviewed : Feb 2009
Phthalic Anhydride
3. Hazard Identification
Main Hazard Combustible dust. May form explosive dust-air mixtures. Irritating to
the respiratory tract. Risk of serious damage to eyes. Respiratory
sensitizer. May cause severe allergic respiratory reaction. Skin
sensitizer. May cause severe allergic skin reaction.

Flammability Combustible. Danger of dust explosion

Chemical Hazard See section 10

Reproductive Hazard No data available

Health Effects: Eyes Risk of serious damage to eyes.

Health Effects: Skin Pure Phthalic Anhydride is expected to produce only mild irritation, based on
animal information. It reacts with moisture to form Phthalic Acid, which is not
considered irritating. Commercial Phthalic Anhydride may contain small
amounts of Maleic Anhydride as an impurity (up to 1%). Maleic Anhydride
absorbs moisture forming corrosive maleic acid. Therefore, depending upon
the concentration of maleic anhydride and the amount of moisture present,
Phthalic Anhydride may produce moderate to severe irritation or perhaps even
corrosive skin injury.

Health Effects: Ingestion Depending on the concentration of Maleic anhydride present, Phthalic Anhydride
can cause mild to severe irritation to the mouth, throat and stomach. There is no
human information available.

Health Effects: Inhalation Exposure to airborne dust can cause irritation of the nose, throat and upper
respiratory tract, based on animal and human information. The severity of
symptoms depends on the airborne concentration and the duration of
exposure. Runny nose, coughing, and nosebleeds, may occur based on
human information. Phthalic Anhydride does not readily form a vapour at room
temperature.

Carcinogenicity There is no human information available. Carcinogenic effects were not


observed in rats or mice in one ingestion study.

Mutagenicity There is no information on effects in humans or from studies conducted with


live animals.

Neurotoxicity No data available

4. First Aid Measures


Product in Eye Avoid direct contact. Wear chemical resistant gloves, if necessary.
Quickly and gently brush away excess chemical. Immediately flush the
contaminated eye(s) with lukewarm, gently flowing water for 20
minutes, or until the chemical is removed, while holding the eyelid(s)
open. Take care not to rinse contaminated water into the non-affected
eye or onto the face. Obtain medical attention immediately.

Product on Skin Avoid direct contact with this chemical. Wear chemical resistant
protective gloves, if necessary. Quickly and gently brush away excess
chemical. Flush contaminated area with lukewarm, gently flowing
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 3 of 10
Revision : 1
Reviewed : Feb 2009
Phthalic Anhydride
water for at least 5 minutes, or until the chemical is removed. Under
running water, remove contaminated clothing, shoes, and leather
goods (e.g. watchbands, belts). If irritation persists, repeat flushing.
Obtain medical attention immediately. Completely decontaminate
clothing, shoes and leather goods before re-use, or discard

Product Ingested NEVER give anything by mouth if victim is rapidly losing


consciousness, or is unconscious or convulsing. DO NOT INDUCE
VOMITING. Have victim drink 240 to 300 ml (8 to 10 oz) of water to
dilute material in the stomach. If vomiting occurs naturally, rinse
mouth and repeat administration of water. Obtain medical attention
immediately.

Product Inhaled Take proper precautions to ensure your own safety before attempting
rescue; e.g. wear appropriate protective equipment. Remove source
of contamination or have victim move to fresh air. Obtain medical
attention immediately
5. Fire Fighting Measures
Extinguishing Media Carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder, alcohol foam, polymer foam,
water spray or fog.

Special Hazards Phthalic anhydride can burn if strongly heated. During a fire,
irritating/toxic gases and fumes may be generated. Flammable and
potentially explosive hydrogen gas may be generated if Phthalic acid,
formed by the reaction of water and Phthalic anhydride, contacts and
corrodes iron or mild steel. Under certain conditions, a dust cloud of
Phthalic anhydride may explode when ignited by a spark or flame.

EXPLOSIBILITY INDEX (hazard rating system) which is calculated by


multiplying the ignition sensitivity (ignition temperature, concentration,
etc.) with the explosion severity (explosion pressure, rate of pressure
rise) is 16.9. This value indicates that a "severe" explosion could
occur
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 4 of 10
Revision : 1
Reviewed : Feb 2009
Phthalic Anhydride
Fire Fighting Instructions Evacuate area and fight fire from a safe distance or a protected
location. Approach fire from upwind to avoid toxic decomposition
products. Water or foam may cause frothing. The frothing may be
violent and could endanger personnel close to the fire. However, a
water spray or fog that is carefully applied to the surface of the burning
material, preferably with a fine spray or fog nozzle, will cause frothing
that will blanket and extinguish the fire. In addition, water spray or fog
can be used to prevent dust formation and protect exposed material.
Closed containers may rupture violently when exposed to heat of fire.
If possible, isolate materials not yet involved in the fire, and move
containers from fire area if this can be done without risk, and protect
personnel. Otherwise, fire-exposed containers or tanks should be
cooled by application of hose streams. Application should begin as
soon as possible and should concentrate on any unwetted portions of
the container. Apply water from the side and from a safe distance until
well after the fire is out. DO NOT get water into Phthalic Anhydride
containers. If it is not possible to cool the containers, use unmanned
monitor nozzles and immediately evacuate the area.
Water spray may be used to flush spills away from ignition sources.
Solid streams of water may be ineffective and spread material. For a
massive fire in a large area, use unmanned hose holder or monitor
nozzles. If this is not possible, withdraw from fire area and allow fire to
burn. Stay away from ends of tanks, but be aware that flying material
from ruptured tanks may travel in any direction. Withdraw immediately
in case of rising sound from venting safety device or any
discolouration of tank due to fire. Phthalic anhydride and its
decomposition products may be hazardous to health. Do not enter
without wearing specialized protective equipment suitable for the
situation. Firefighter's normal protective equipment
(Bunker Gear) will not provide adequate protection. Chemical
resistant clothing (e.g. chemical splash suit) and positive pressure
self-contained breathing apparatus (MSHA/NIOSH approved or
equivalent) may be necessary.
Protective Clothing Fire fighters should wear protective clothing and self-contained
breathing equipment.
6. Accidental Release Measures
Personal Precautions Restrict access to area until completion of clean up. Ensure clean up
is conducted by trained personnel only. If Phthalic Anhydride is
released, immediately put on a suitable respirator and leave the area
until the severity of the release is determined. In case of leaks or spills,
escape-type respiratory protective equipment should be available in the
work area. Wear adequate personal protective equipment. Avoid
substance contact. Do not inhale substance. Ensure supply of fresh
air in enclosed rooms
Environmental Precautions May be harmful to aquatic life, do not allow to enter surface waters or
sewers.
Small Spills Shovel into clean, dry, labeled containers and cover. Avoid generation
of dusts (danger of spontaneous combustion!)
Large Spills Notify government OHS and environmental authorities. Contact fire
and emergency services and supplier for advice. Avoid generation of
dusts (danger of spontaneous combustion!)
7. Handling and Storage
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 5 of 10
Revision : 1
Reviewed : Feb 2009
Phthalic Anhydride
Handling/Storage Precautions This material is a VERY TOXIC (RESPIRATORY SENSITIZER, EYE
IRRITANT, SKIN SENSITIZER) solid. It is a COMBUSTIBLE DUST and
so is a DUST EXPLOSION HAZARD. If there is greater than 0.05%
maleic anhydride contamination then this material is also CORROSIVE.
Before handling, it is extremely important that engineering controls are
operating and that protective equipment requirements and personal
hygiene measures are being followed. People working with this
chemical should be properly trained regarding its hazards and its safe
use. Only authorized personnel should have access to this material.
They should be properly trained regarding its hazards and its safe use.
Immediately report leaks, spills or failures of the engineering controls.
Unprotected persons should avoid all contact with this chemical
including contaminated equipment. Be aware of typical signs and
symptoms of poisoning and first aid procedures. Any signs of illness
should be reported immediately to supervisory personnel.
Use only conductive equipment for handling this material (e.g. metal
conveyors and piping) and keep all components grounded. Ground clips
must contact bare metal. Do not transfer in storage area unless it is
segregated by fire- resistant construction. Protect from accidental
contact with water. Do not use with other incompatible materials such as
oxidizing agents and bases. See section 10 for more information. Do not
perform any welding, cutting, soldering, drilling or other hot work on
empty containers or transfer equipment until all combustible solids have
been removed. Have suitable emergency equipment for fires, spills and
leaks readily available.
Storage Precautions: Store in a cool, dry area, out of direct sunlight
and away from heat and ignition sources. Keep quantities stored as
small as possible. Avoid bulk storage indoors.
Store in isolated fireproof building, if possible. Avoid bulk storage
indoors. Store in isolated fireproof building, if possible.
Storage area should be clearly identified, clear of obstruction and
accessible only to trained and authorized personnel. Storage facilities
should be made of fire-resistant materials. Keep storage area
separate from work areas, eating areas and protective equipment
storage. Post warning signs. Keep storage area clear of burnable
materials (e.g. old rags, cardboard). Protect from accidental contact
with water. Store away from oxidizers and other incompatible
materials such as bases. Never return contaminated material to its
original container. Inspect all incoming containers to make sure they
are properly labeled and not damaged. Store in suitable, labeled
containers (usually the shipping container). Store containers at a
convenient height for handling, below eye level if possible. Keep
containers closed. Protect from damage. Keep empty containers in a
separate storage area. Empty containers may contain hazardous
residues. Keep closed. Avoid any dust build-up by frequent cleaning
and suitable construction of storage area.
Storage facilities should be made of fire resistant materials. Walls,
floors, shelving and lighting systems in the storage area should be
made from materials that resist attack from Maleic Anhydride. Use a
grounded, non-sparking, corrosion-resistant ventilation system. Have
appropriate fire extinguishers and spill clean-up equipment in or near
storage area.
ISEGEN
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 6 of 10
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Phthalic Anhydride
8. Exposure Controls/Personal Protection
Occupational Exposure Limits TIME-WEIGHTED AVERAGE (TLV-TWA) : 1 ppm
OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) : 2ppm (12mg/m3 ) TWA

Engineering Control Measures Engineering methods to control hazardous conditions are preferred.
Methods include mechanical (local exhaust) ventilation, process or
personnel enclosure and control of process conditions. Because of the
high potential hazard associated with this substance, stringent control
measures such as enclosure or isolation may be necessary. A closed
handling system is recommended. Administrative controls and
personal protective equipment may also be required. Use a corrosion-
resistant ventilation system separate from other exhaust ventilation
systems. Exhaust directly to the outside. Locate dust collectors
outside or where permitted by regulation. Supply sufficient
replacement air to make up for air removed by exhaust systems.
Use in clearly posted, designated area(s). Control access to designated
area. Access doors must remain closed while this material is present.
Closed handling systems for processes involving this material should be
used. If this is not possible, use this material in the smallest possible
amounts in appropriate labeled, containment devices (e.g. fume hood).
Containment devices should be made of smooth, unbreakable,
compatible material. Maintain containment devices at appropriate
airflow and negative pressure. Check regularly. Avoid generating dusts.
Prevent the release of dusts into the workplace air.
Inspect containers for damage or leaks before handling. Use the proper
tools to open containers. Ripping open a container can cause an
uneven tear, thus making spills more likely. Transfer solids using tools
or equipment, which are corrosion-resistant. Cautiously, transfer into
sturdy containers made of compatible materials. Stand upwind of all
opening, dispensing and mixing operations. Good housekeeping is very
important. Keeping work areas clean is essential. Use the type of
containers recommended by the manufacturer. Never return
contaminated material to its original container. Use dust-tight, labeled
containers. Avoid damaging containers. Keep containers closed when
not in use.

Personal Protection: Respiratory NIOSH recommendations for Phthalic Anhydride concentrations in air.
UP TO 30 mg/m3: Dust and mist respirator
UP TO 60 mg/m3: Dust and mist respirator except single-use and
quarter-mask respirator*; or full-facepiece respirator with high-
efficiency particulate filter(s); or powered air-purifying respirator with
dust and mist filter(s)*; or SAR*; or full-facepiece SCBA.

Personal Protection: Hand Chemical protective gloves

Personal Protection: Eye Chemical safety goggles. A face shield may also be necessary.

Personal Protection: Skin Chemical protective gloves, coveralls, boots, and/or other protective
clothing to prevent skin contact.
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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


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Phthalic Anhydride
Other Protection Remove contaminated clothing promptly. Keep contaminated clothing
in closed containers. Discard or launder before re-wearing. Inform
laundry personnel of contaminant's hazards.
When handling on a large scale, do not wear work clothing home. A
double locker-shower setup is usually required. Wash hands
thoroughly before eating, smoking or using the washroom. Do not
eat, drink, or smoke in work areas.

9. Physical and Chemical Properties


Appearance Colourless, white or pale yellow solid flakes, crystals or powder

Odor Choking, acrid odor

pH 2 at 6g/l H2O at 20°C

Boiling Point 284.5°C ( 544 °F) @ 760 mmHg


295°C - ( 563 °F) (sublimes).

Melting Point 130.5 °C

Flash Point 152°C - ( 305 °F) (closed cup).

Flammability Combustible. Danger of dust explosion

Autoflammability 580°C

Explosive Properties LOWER FLAMMABLE (EXPLOSIVE) LIMIT (LFL/LEL) :


1.7% (14,17,19)
UPPER FLAMMABLE (EXPLOSIVE) LIMIT (UFL/UEL) :
10.5% (14,17,19)

Oxidising Properties Oxidizing material: Does not meet criteria.

Vapour Pressure 2.66 x 10(-5) kPa (2.0 x 10(-4) mm Hg) at 20°C.

Vapour Density 5.10 (air=1)

Density 1.527 g/cm3 at 20°C

Solubility: Water Slightly soluble (620-640 mg/100 g) at 20°C (slowly hydrolyses).

Solubility: Solvent Very soluble in acetone, tetrahydrofuran and pyridine; moderately


soluble in ethyl acetate, methyl ethyl ketone and formic acid; slightly
soluble in ethanol (reacts slowly), diethyl ether, benzene, carbon
disulfide, carbon tetrachloride, cyclohexane and xylene.

Solubility: Coefficient Not applicable


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Phthalic Anhydride
10. Stability and Reactivity

Conditions to Avoid Static charge, sparks, heat, other ignition sources, generation of dust
and moisture.

Incompatible Materials Strong oxidizing agents (e.g. perchlorates, peroxi permanganates,


sodium hypochlorite) - can react rapidly and violently with the risk of
fire and/or explosion.
Strong mineral or organic acids (e.g. Hydrochloric Acid, Hydrofluoric
Acid, Sulfuric Acid, Chlorosulfonic acid) - reaction can be sufficiently
rapid and violent to cause an explosion. Strong alkalis or caustics
(e.g. sodium or potassium hydroxide) or bases (e.g. ethylene diamine)
- may react violently with spattering, accompanied by a temperature
and pressure rise.
Water - reacts slowly with cold water, rapidly with hot water, producing
Phthalic Acid and heat. Hot water may cause frothing.
Water and Metals (e.g. iron) - may form pyrophoric Phthalic acid salts.
Reaction of these iron salts with Naphthoquinone (impurities in
Phthalic Anhydride) form unstable materials, which can explode.
Strong reducing agents (e.g. phosphorus, tin (II) chloride, metal
hydrides) - may react vigorously or violently. Increased risk of fire.
Copper (II) Oxide or Sodium Nitrite - may explode violently on heating.
Nitric Acid and Sulfuric Acid - addition of fuming nitric acid to Phthalic
anhydride dissolved in sulfuric acid at 80-100 deg C may result in the
formation of potentially explosive substances.
Incompatible with rubber and various plastics

Hazardous Decomposition Products Phthalic acid.

11. Toxicological Information


Acute Toxicity LC50 (male rat): >52.5 mg/m3 (4- hour exposure); cited as
greater than 0.21 mg/L (1-hour exposure) (dust) (0/6 died)
LD50 (oral, rat): approximately 2000 mg/kg (unconfirmed)
LD50 (oral, male rat): 4020 mg/kg
LD50 (oral, mouse): 1500 mg/kg (unconfirmed)
LD50 (dermal, rabbit): greater than 10000 mg/kg (0/6 died)

Skin and Eye Contact See section 3

Chronic Toxicity Skin sensitisation: Repeated or prolonged skin contact may cause an
allergic skin reaction in some individuals

Respiratory sensitisation: Exposure to Phthalic Anhydride can cause


allergic respiratory sensitisation, based on human and animal evidence.
Sensitized people can experience symptoms of bronchial asthma such
as wheezing, difficult breathing, sneezing and runny or blocked nose at
low airborne concentrations that have no effect on unsensitized people.
Symptoms can develop immediately following exposure or hours later.

Carcinogenicity There is no human information available. Carcinogenic effects were not


observed in rats or mice in one ingestion study.
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Phthalic Anhydride
Mutagenicity There is no information on effects in humans or from studies conducted with
live animals.

Reproductive Hazards No data available

12. Ecological Information

Aquatic Toxicity: Fish Harmful effects due to pH shift


L.idus LC50: 313mg/l/48h

Aquatic Toxicity: Daphnia Harmful effects due to pH shift

Aquatic Toxicity: Algae Harmful effects due to pH shift

Bio-degradability Readily biodegradable


Biodegradation: 99%/14d (OECE 301 E )

Bio-accumulation Not stated

Mobility Not Stated

13. Disposal Considerations

Disposal Methods Care should be taken not to mix waste with incompatible material.
Dispose of waste material at an approved landfill site in accordance with
Local regulations. Do not dispose of waste with normal garbage or in
local sewage system.

Disposal of Packaging Care should be taken not to mix waste with incompatible material.
Dispose of waste material at an approved landfill site in accordance with
Local regulations. Do not dispose of waste with normal garbage or in
local sewage system.

14. Transport Information


ADR/RID:
Hazard Class: 8
UN No.: UN 2214.
ERG : 156

IMDG/IMO:
Shipping Name: Phthalic Anhydride.
Hazard Class: 8.
Packaging Group: III.
UN No. : UN 2214
MFAG Table No : 8210
ERG : 156

IATA/ICAO:
Shipping Name: Phthalic Anhydride.
Hazard Class: 8.
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Registration No. 2007/006549/07

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET


Page 10 of 10
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Phthalic Anhydride
UN No.: UN 2214.
Packaging Group: III.
ERG : 156

15. Regulatory Information

EEC Hazard Classification Irritant

Risk Phrases R22 Harmful if swallowed


R37/38. Irritating to skin and respiratory system
R41 Risk or serious damage to eyes
R42/43 May cause sensitization by inhalation and skin contact

Safety Phrases S24/25 Avoid contact with skin and eyes


S26 In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of water
and seek medical advice
S37/39 Wear suitable gloves and eye/face protection
S 45 In case of accident or if you feel unwell, seek medical advice
immediately (show the label where possible).

National Legislation Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993, Hazardous Chemical
Substances Regulations (1995)

16. Other Information

Bibliography 1. Material Safety Data Sheets as sourced from various suppliers and
manufacturers
2. Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety

Document History
Date Change Reason for New revision Effective date
change No. Reviewed by
Feb 2007 Verification and updating Third party 0 JM Dold Feb 2007
review S J van der
Merwe
Associated
Risk
Management
Feb 2009 Exclusion of liability – Reviewed by 1 JC Feb 2009
Change from Associated Isegen. Heydenrich
Risk management to Isegen.

EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY
Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd believes that this information is correct at date of publication, but does not warrant the accuracy
thereof. The use of the product designated herein will be at the Sole Risk of the user and Isegen South Africa (Pty) Ltd will not
accept liability for any loss or damage, including Consequential Damage, howsoever caused by or arising from the use of this
information or the use, application, adoption or processing of the product described herein or its use in combination with any
other product, material or in any process.