EN BANC
G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented
by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-
GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own
behalf, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
(GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY.
LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA,
MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and
duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183752 October 14, 2008
CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by
HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor of Zamboanga,
and in his personal capacity as resident of the City of
Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1,
and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District 2, City of
Zamboanga, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as
represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH
ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN
SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity
as the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183893 October 14, 2008
THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR
LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
(GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY.
LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA,
MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly
appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or
SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary. respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183951 October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA
DEL NORTE, as represented by HON. ROLANDO E.
YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON.
FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, HON.
CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1st
Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS,
Congressman, 3rd Congressional District, and Members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga
del Norte, namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS,
HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M.
MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON.
EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON.
FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C.
AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO
S. DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON.
LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as
represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the
Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183962 October 14, 2008
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and
AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL,
represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the
MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE
NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman
MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO,
petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its
Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioners-in-
intervention,
x--------------------------------------------x
THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE,
represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-AKBAR,
petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON.
SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as
Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan
Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention.
x-------------------------------------------x
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf
of Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not Belonging to the
MILF, petitioner-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G.
AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G.
JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan, petitioners-
in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-
intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC
(MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE &
DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers
of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the
facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed
conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has
a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a
long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked
to perform a delicate balancing act. It must
uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the
President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do
so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling
unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same
Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to
pursue the peace process effectively.
I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons
of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled
to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March
1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim,
it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among
others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of
the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-
Maoist orientations.1
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF
was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the
scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation
and the concluding of several prior agreements between the
two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF
Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General
Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents,
summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same
contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to
pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights,
negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific
settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat
or force to attain undue advantage while the peace
negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.2
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to
be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process.
Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked
a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in
March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph
Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the
MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office,
the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and
the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The
MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially
responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo
asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to
the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central
Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually,
decided to meet with the GRP.4
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with
the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the
parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the
General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter
suspended all its military actions.5
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli,
Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement
2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the
following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect,
Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With
regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli
Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed
further by the Parties in their next meeting."
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya,
Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing
of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between
the parties. This was followed by the Implementing
Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which
was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.
Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between
government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed
away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad,
who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's
position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by
Mohagher Iqbal.6
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the
parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting
of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned,
was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious
"consensus" ever embodied in an instrument - the MOA-AD
which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing
docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and
183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain7 and the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-
Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the right to
information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-
AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD
and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be
declared unconstitutional.10
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as
G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed
by the City of Zamboanga,12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma.
Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise
pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein
moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from
the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared
null and void.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing
public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from
formally signing the MOA-AD.13 The Court also required the
Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the
official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she
complied.15

Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction
and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893,
praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-
AD or, if the same had already been signed, from
implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando
Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-
Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members18 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on
August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition,19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter
alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without
operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from
executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and
Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition,20
docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment
prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from
formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other
agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and
nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and
illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent
the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its
Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave
of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention.
Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A.
Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty.
Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela21 and Mayor Cherrylyn
Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat22 and Gov.
Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in
Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the
Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino
Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City;
and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat,
Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The
Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the
Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention.
By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the
consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments
on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their
respective Replies.
Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19,
2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly
review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to
address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to
dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings,
respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from
petitioners.
The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and
29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of
the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local
Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that
consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of
the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA
is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated
and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution,
Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution,
Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under
Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate
remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the
authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North
Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas
covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a
justiciable question; and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any
prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines.24
The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their
memoranda on time.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD
As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections
raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-
intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two
comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court
takes an overview of the MOA.
The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the
MILF.
Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD
includes not only four earlier agreements between the GRP
and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and
the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace
Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the
administration of President Fidel Ramos.
The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the
organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26
and several international law instruments - the ILO
Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN
Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the
UN Charter, among others.
The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of
"compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of
dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh
(or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the
nature of a treaty device."
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim
jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy:
there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-
harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands
where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted
those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where
Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective.27 This way of
viewing the world, however, became more complex through
the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the
international community of nations.
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors,
even with distant States and inter-governmental
organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-
Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New
terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving
non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-
mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty)
referred to countries which, though under a secular regime,
maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim
States, having been bound to each other by treaty or
agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand,
referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with
Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for
Muslims.28
It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment"
emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-
sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF
and the Philippine government - the Philippines being the
land of compact and peace agreement - that partake of the
nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as
"any solemn agreement in writing that sets out
understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties
which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles
declared in the [MOA-AD]."29
The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND
ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its main
body.
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands,
namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and
Governance.
A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the
birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the
time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants
whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand
of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally
understood even by Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that
the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be
respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not
been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro
homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in
the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that
ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.33
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the
right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on
ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the
suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as
states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic
endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the
modern sense.34
The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the
Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the
sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the
Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and,
specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent
principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans,
none of whom was supreme over the others.35
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as
"the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system
of government having entered into treaties of amity and
commerce with foreign nations."
The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the
indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known
as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is
equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them
are usually described collectively by the plural "First
Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the
Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its
exclusive entitlement to that designation - departs from the
Canadian usage of the term.
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37
B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the
land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and
alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-
Palawan geographic region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present
geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the
following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also
includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted
for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into
two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these
areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different
dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas
are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12)
months following the signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B
areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas," on the other
hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years
from the signing of a separate agreement - the
Comprehensive Compact.41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have
jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internal
waters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the
coastline of the BJE area;42 that the BJE shall also have
"territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE
internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland
Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE
and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with
RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the
jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly
described as "joint."
The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on
the territorial waters between the Central Government and
the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing
and economic cooperation agreement.44 The activities which
the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters
are enumerated, among which are the exploration and
utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and
fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety
measures.45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of
minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal
waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries and shall have the option to establish trade
missions in those countries. Such relationships and
understandings, however, are not to include aggression
against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental
cooperation agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and
obligation of the Central Government. The Central
Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure
the BJE's participation in international meetings and events"
like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the
UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine
official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border
agreements or protocols for environmental protection and
equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the
bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming
part of the ancestral domain.47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and
obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil
fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control
thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control
within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the
proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public
interest so requires," the Central Government may, for a
fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed
upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such
resources.48
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE
of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be
75:25 in favor of the BJE.49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the
Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of
their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land
tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged.
Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to
be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.50
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber
licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions,
Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA),
Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and
other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine
Government, including those issued by the present
ARMM.51
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational
third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the
Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the
"details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms
and modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOA-
AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation
of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the
relationship between the Central Government and the
BJE.52
The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central
Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by
shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the
structure of governance is to be based on executive,
legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive
Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring
"amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take
effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the
non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy
hangs on the legality of this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain
its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral,
financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic,
police and internal security force, judicial system and
correctional institutions, the details of which shall be
discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on
August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal,
Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and
the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph
of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the
representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF
themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels.53 In
addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is
"WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special
Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY"
Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special
Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and
SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr.
Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of
whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5,
2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the
respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities,
and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned
in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies.54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or
to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic
questions.55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to
actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government.56
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis
of existing law and jurisprudence.57 The Court can decide
the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper
case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial
determination.58
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy
is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.59 For a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture,60 and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action.61 He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of.62
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable
controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present
petitions, reasoning that
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points
subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as
well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final
peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be
a proposal that does not automatically create legally
demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative
acts required have been duly complied with. x x x
xxxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this
Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based
on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or
interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary
character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that
could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights
since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps
toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly,
petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is
merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded
and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the
MOA-AD:
TERRITORY
xxxx
2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following
stipulations:
xxxx
d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior
agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and
deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12)
months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite
covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in
the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The
Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework
agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to
complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues
on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months
from the signing of the MOA-AD.
xxxx
GOVERNANCE
xxxx
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the
actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in
the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to
enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to
non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.64
(Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render
the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65
this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.
xxxx
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility
of the courts.66
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United
States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the
constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led
prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication,
even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy,
because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional
on its face.68
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not
negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United
States,69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court
held that the action by the State of New York challenging the
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was
ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not
to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties
agreed that New York had to take immediate action to avoid
the provision's consequences.70
The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and
Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted
by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the
case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition,
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.72
Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper,
acts of legislative and executive officials.74
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by
Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28,
2001.75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he
government's policy framework for peace, including the
systematic approach and the administrative structure for
carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be
governed by this Executive Order."76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and
PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without
consulting the local government units or communities
affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be
discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself,
constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under E.O. No. 3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the
MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides
that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments
to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an
amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-
AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the
amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another
violation of its authority. Again, these points will be
discussed in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of
respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their
duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution
and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case
or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a
branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.77
B. LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."78
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which
the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a
preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in
the constitutional question raised.79
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege
that he has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about
to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.80 When the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and
has an interest in the execution of the laws.81
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an
assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or
deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains discretion
whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit.83
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of
the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes
a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be
questioned by legislators. A member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights
of its members,85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession
of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to
clothe it with standing.86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief
in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of
the other LGUs.87
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon
showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural
technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has
exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed
aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount
public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the
attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents.90 The Court's forbearing stance on
locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for
its purpose the protection of fundamental rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under
the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion
given them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure.91
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North
Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte
(G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City
of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-
intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the
direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would
suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to
be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These
petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in
the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE
territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar
Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as
citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they
would be denied some right or privilege or there would be
wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former
Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident
of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence.
Considering their invocation of the transcendental
importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants
them standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging
their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds
would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and
unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On
that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their
allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of
"undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with
added basis for their personality to intervene in these
petitions.
With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is
premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen
to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's
constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as
on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus
possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former
congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and
a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as
members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers;
Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin
Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal
interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court
exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on
locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues
at hand.
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement
for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and
the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao;
and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-
government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they
stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the
resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and
prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein
stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with
standing.
B. MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been
rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed
for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the
Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme
Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the
MOA."92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor
General points out that the President had already disbanded
the GRP Peace Panel.93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the
"moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula
that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution;95 (b) the
situation is of exceptional character and paramount public
interest is involved;96 (c) the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public;97 and (d) the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review.98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is
where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity
complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is
filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct,
it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to
hear and determine the case and does not render the case
moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for
injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the
violation.99
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to
thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The
grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the
present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in
Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and Manalo v.
Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the
merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have
rendered the same moot notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted
Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-
signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the
GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears
emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push
through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be
considered a mere "list of consensus points," especially given
its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all
the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching
Constitutional implications of these "consensus points,"
foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.
In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a
commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect
necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain
provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the
present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions
of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations
and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions
have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply
by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD,102 the
manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the
disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with
paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the
country's territory and the wide-ranging political
modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-
AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides
impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the
government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court
did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately
constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more
harm than good to the nation as a whole."
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico.
Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually
cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement
contract for a national broadband network involving a one-
time contractual relation between two parties-the
government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues
therein involved specific government procurement policies
and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in
Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual
circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and
parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part
of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli
Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the
third such component to be undertaken following the
implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and
the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect
in May 2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his
Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General,
has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court
ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-
AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another
one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any
form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic
provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive
Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an
agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because
that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured,"
it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present
petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the
government in negotiating with the MILF regarding
Ancestral Domain.
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate
opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in
Sanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he stated that the doctrine of
"capable of repetition yet evading review" can override
mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has
been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct
result of their issuance." They contend that the Court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to
be invoked.
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over
which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R.
No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction
and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for
Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises
questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the
Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the
petitions.
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the
Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as
what it had done in a number of landmark cases.106 There is
a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the
Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and
Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela,
and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to
the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are
capable of repetition, in another or any form.
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the
petitions have become moot, respondents having, by
Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and
petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-
AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or
have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.
V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention,
there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved,
one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was
negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions,
viz:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and the right to information
when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution
and the laws?
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article
III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.107
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has
recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public
records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional
status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both
the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been
recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.109
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the
Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the
right of the people to acquire information on matters of public
concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a
legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance.
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic
perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied
access to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
"Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since,
if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x
x x111
In the same way that free discussion enables members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to
information of general interest aids the people in democratic
decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the
vital issues confronting the nation112 so that they may be
able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the
government in a responsible, reasonable and effective
manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a
government remains responsive to the changes desired by the
people.113
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information sought in the present
cases is a matter of public concern114 faces no serious
challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is
indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court
found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered
in the Register of Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to
the public of the various laws,117 the civil service eligibility
of a public employee,118 the proper management of GSIS
funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials,119 the
recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth,120 and
the identity of party-list nominees,121 among others, are
matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject
of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information
include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation
of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory
nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has
categorically ruled:
x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."
Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for
the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people
can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated,
and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public
to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the
dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes
fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which
the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such
a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating
in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively
truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We
can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right,
nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."122 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to
information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public
disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution
reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.124
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-
quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of
Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes
the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands.125
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece.
It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following
such policy.126 These provisions are vital to the exercise of
the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials
at all times accountable to the people.127
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose:
MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy
will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until
after Congress shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics
immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have
to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide,
Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this.
Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as
having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It
would require a legislation by Congress to implement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing,
but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado,
so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by
the clause "as may be provided by law"
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will
immediately take effect and Congress may provide for
reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said
earlier that it should immediately influence the climate of the
conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no
longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking
this principle, which is inconsistent with this policy.129
(Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure
need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot
revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for
"reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise
of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the
same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-
hand, it is absurd to say that the broader130 right to
information on matters of public concern is already
enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose
its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable
until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point
to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in
not effecting such policy.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State
that the channels for free political discussion be maintained
to the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people's will.131 Envisioned to be corollary
to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design
for feedback mechanisms.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding
Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the
government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people
can participate and can react where the existing media
facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to
the government? I suppose this will be part of the
government implementing operational mechanisms.
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives
and that is how these courses take place. There is a message
and a feedback, both ways.
xxxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just
make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not
talking about public officials but also network of private
business o[r] community-based organizations that will be
reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or
credibility on the private network of volunteers and
voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think
we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the
making.132 (Emphasis supplied)
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the
right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to
respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose
information and to conduct public consultation regarding the
peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No.
3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that
there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil
society to the comprehensive peace process by
institutionalizing the people's participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive
peace process is that it "should be community-based,
reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to
all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government
alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all
Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of
the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and
empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing
consultations on both national and local levels to build
consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the
mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the
peace process."135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a
plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary
to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than
sufficient consultation."136
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and
responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct
regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and
other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments,
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely
reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace
process."137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the
NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with
and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners
and concerned sectors of society on both national and local
levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace
process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives."138
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be
consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure.
PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts
to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct
the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may,
however, require him to comply with the law and discharge
the functions within the authority granted by the
President.139
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table,
contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of
petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance
manifests the manner by which they treat the salient
provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such
disregard of the express mandate of the President is not
much different from superficial conduct toward token
provisos that border on classic lip service.140 It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive
privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument
defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's
explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue
on both national and local levels. The executive order even
recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the
GRP makes its official recommendations or before the
government proffers its definite propositions.141 It bear
emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice,
information, comments and recommendations from the
people through dialogue.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the
defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified
disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-
AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4,
2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's
disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was
complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam.
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in
their respective jurisdictions"142 is well-taken. The LGC
chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this
avowed policy:
Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall
be implemented by government authorities unless the
consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are
complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian
concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas
where such projects are to be implemented shall not be
evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.143 (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño,144 the Court held that the above-
stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply
only to national programs or projects which are to be
implemented in a particular local community. Among the
programs and projects covered are those that are critical to
the environment and human ecology including those that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in the locality where these will be implemented.145
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests
are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely
affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA,
the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making
in matters which may affect their rights, lives and
destinies.147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing
ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with
the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act,148 which
entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the
raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other
stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In
proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral
domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as
one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly
transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems,
even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary
changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on
Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions
requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself
invalid, as will be discussed in the following section.
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always
to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to
remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people
and all government authority emanating from them.149
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be
no question that they cannot all be accommodated under the
present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted
as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the
MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing
legal framework to render effective at least some of its
provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-
AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions
therein which are inconsistent with the present legal
framework will not be effective until the necessary changes
to that framework are made. The validity of this argument
will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon
how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the
extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners
assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those
granted to any local government under present laws, and
even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing
some of the specific powers that would have been vested in
the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general
idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions
of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of
association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to
this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY,
paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on
GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision,
however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe
the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the
Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a
structure of governance based on executive, legislative,
judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers
and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of
transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace
compact specifying the relationship between the Central
Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been
intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged
Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a
concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-
AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its
TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that
concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-
AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one
state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the
other, the principal, while maintaining its international
status as a state. Free associations represent a middle
ground between integration and independence. x x x150
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM),
formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant
to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these
countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties
with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents,
which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal
status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council
and by their admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall
Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct
foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity
extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine
resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural
relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign
affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the
Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S.
government) regards as relating to or affecting either
government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall
Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority
and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S.
territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of
establishing and using military areas and facilities within
these associated states and has the right to bar the military
personnel of any third country from having access to these
territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international
practice, free association is understood as an international
association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free
Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated
nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate
the association consistent with the right of independence. It
has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated
states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the
American model of free association is actually based on an
underlying status of independence.152
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement
has usually been used as a transitional device of former
colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states
that have passed through the status of associated states as a
transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla,
Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since
become independent states.153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are
consistent with the international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into
economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the
commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of
the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the
BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions
bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental
protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies
of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of
the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments
of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S.
government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted
by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state.
The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in
this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare
any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's
provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the
amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the
following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status
of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE
is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo Convention,154 namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government,
and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not
necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the
spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the
concept of association - runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and
the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region."
(Emphasis supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by
the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision
just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and
2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in
addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted
for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi,
Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are
automatically part of the BJE without need of another
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B
mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present
components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned
municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however,
does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for
then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not
comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous
regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject
to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the
organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
(Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an
autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an
amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision.
The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-
paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not
suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the
powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other
provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance,
to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-
making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the
strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to
enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with
foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships
and understandings do not include aggression against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under
our constitutional system, it is only the President who has
that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head
of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country's sole representative
with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy,
the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect
to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with
the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be
amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be
effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State
recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and
development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there
may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of
placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-
AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among
which are R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM,
and the IPRA.157
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar
to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used
in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles
states:
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples
of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
"Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who
are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago
at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants
whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their
descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of
choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that
found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which,
rather than lumping together the identities of the
Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in
Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people
and Tribal peoples, as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural
community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the
autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural
and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors
of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers
in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure
for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The
MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the
Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure.
By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that,
subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he
Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land
mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial
domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above
it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic
region."
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a
detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions
thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and
delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance
with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a
specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the
consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for
Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the
members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral
domain boundaries including census of all community
members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the
Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the
ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination
with the community concerned and shall at all times include
genuine involvement and participation by the members of the
communities concerned;
d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall
include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and
other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the
possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial
by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any
one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and
institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old
improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements
concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs
concerned with other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal
forests and hunting grounds;

9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks
such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and
the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native
dialect of the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation
and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains
Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete
with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural
features and landmarks embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete
copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation,
shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the
NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document,
including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at
least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be
posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the
NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow
other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15)
days from date of such publication: Provided, That in areas
where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio
station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That
mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper
and radio station are not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from
publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing
a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have
sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient,
the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of
additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains
Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or
fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided,
further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all
concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial
shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That
in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs
on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet
and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution
of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication
according to the section below.
xxxx
To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-
AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not only the
Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international
law is in order, for
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land."
Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on
account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained
alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not
been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in
Agustin v. Edu159 applied the aforesaid constitutional
provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals.
International law has long recognized the right to self-
determination of "peoples," understood not merely as the
entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In
considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had
a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian
Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC160 had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of
a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in
international conventions that the principle has acquired a
status beyond ‘convention' and is considered a general
principle of international law."
Among the conventions referred to are the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights161 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all
peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development."
The people's right to self-determination should not, however,
be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession.
A distinction should be made between the right of internal
and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE
SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish
that the right to self-determination of a people is normally
fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's
pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state. A
right to external self-determination (which in this case
potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to
unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases
and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defined as in the
following statement from the Declaration on Friendly
Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the
free association or integration with an independent State or
the emergence into any other political status freely
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the
right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added)
127. The international law principle of self-determination
has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial
integrity of existing states. The various international
documents that support the existence of a people's right to
self-determination also contain parallel statements
supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right
must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing
state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations
between sovereign states.
x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases
in which the right to external self-determination can arise,
namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to
foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context,
and - less definitely but asserted by a number of
commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its
right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately
held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession,
as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination,
nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political
choices and pursue economic, social and cultural
development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in
legislative, executive and judicial institutions within
Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further
exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF
THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION.163 There, Sweden
presented to the Council of the League of Nations the
question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands
should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the
archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be
incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before
resolving the question, appointed an International
Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on
the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based
on international law, be entirely left to the domestic
jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as
follows:
x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international
treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State.
Positive International Law does not recognize the right of
national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the
State of which they form part by the simple expression of a
wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to
claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or
refusal of the right to a portion of its population of
determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some
other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty
of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute
between two States concerning such a question, under
normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which
International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction
of one of the States concerned. Any other solution would
amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and
would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of
stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea
embodied in term "State," but would also endanger the
interests of the international community. If this right is not
possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can
it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to
be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland
Islands did not refer to a question which is left by
international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland,
thereby applying the exception rather than the rule
elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general
rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland
Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was
undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal
situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so
abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions
required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist.
In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the
legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed
by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been
chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying
out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided
into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances,
Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a
"definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee,
therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to
withhold from a portion of its population the option to
separate itself - a right which sovereign nations generally
have with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous
peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as
international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups
with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land
(spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated
into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as
"indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-
invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others.
Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or
communities are culturally distinctive groups that find
themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of
empire and conquest.164 Examples of groups who have been
regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand
and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples
situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under
international law,165 but they do have rights amounting to
what was discussed above as the right to internal self-
determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN
General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through
General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4,
the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the
four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the
right to autonomy or self-government, to wit:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to their internal and local
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their
autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and
cultural institutions, while retaining their right to
participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic,
social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse
pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as
equivalent to "internal self-determination."166 The extent of
self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more
particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which
are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to
be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their
culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention
of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them
of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural
values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing
them of their lands, territories or resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim
or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite
racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination,
to the improvement of their economic and social conditions,
including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment,
vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation,
health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where
appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing
improvement of their economic and social conditions.
Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special
needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and
persons with disabilities.
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories
and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied
or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess
by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise
acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these
lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be
conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and
land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or
territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a
relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or
requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the
indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate
procedures and in particular through their representative
institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for
military activities.
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and
develop priorities and strategies for the development or use
of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their free and
informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting
their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation
of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair
redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures
shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic,
social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition,
observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and
other constructive arrangements concluded with States or
their successors and to have States honour and respect such
treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as
diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples
contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous
peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including
legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying
customary international law - a question which the Court
need not definitively resolve here - the obligations
enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to
grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of
the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the
MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP
are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application
by the different States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that
States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police
and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes
that it is the State which will provide protection for
indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession
of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police
officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous
people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of
the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant
to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor
is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of
indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric
space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of
indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired.
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of
indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to
grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an
associated state. All the rights recognized in that document
are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying
for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in
any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of
the United Nations or construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of
the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution,
it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so
as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous
provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution
and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer,
however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not
have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion
on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the
provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take
effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of
the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but
which is reproduced below for convenience:
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for
the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out
in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps
to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing
of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to
non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial
provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the
necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While
the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision
now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD,
the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to
include the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however,
respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-
AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government,
have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From
The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the
"negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the
principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied)
Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE
and the Central Government is, for the reasons already
discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an
implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already
prevailing.
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum,
however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive
clause is invalid, as discussed below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to
negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section
5(c), which states that there shall be established Government
Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different
rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official
emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-
face discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels
are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the
conduct and progress of the negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring
lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its
negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3
only to those options available under the laws as they
presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive
peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the
"Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic, and
political reforms which may require new legislation or even
constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which
reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,167 states:
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the
comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known
as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are
interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore
be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated
fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the
following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and
projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal
armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require
administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional
amendments.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an
attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this provision
of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in
Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the
box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on
signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic,
and political reforms which cannot, however, all be
accommodated within the present legal framework, and
which thus would require new legislation and constitutional
amendments.
The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause,"
however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked whether
the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the
GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does
not possess. May the President, in the course of peace
negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new
legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the
reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the
present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a
discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct
peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace
negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue
was the authority of the President to declare a state of
rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in
the Constitution. The Court held thus:
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put
her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7
margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of
her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling
rested on the President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to
comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers
of the President are not limited to what are expressly
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and
in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr.
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of
the President, particularly those relating to the commander-
in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and,
at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-
Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace
negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the
President has the general responsibility to promote public
peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific
duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.169
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone
through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is
rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution.
Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental
reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is
required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are
enlightening, to wit:
x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and
governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict
peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and
Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without
modification of the political environment, even where state-
building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance
and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed.
On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from
conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial proportion
of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.
The design of a constitution and its constitution-making
process can play an important role in the political and
governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is
an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a
state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution
can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework
setting up the rules by which the new democracy will
operate.170
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on
the nature and legal status of peace agreements, observed
that the typical way that peace agreements establish or
confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization
is by linking them to new constitutional structures
addressing governance, elections, and legal and human
rights institutions.171
In the Philippine experience, the link between peace
agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by
no less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the
provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions172 is
the framers' intention to implement a particular peace
agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between
the GRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of
National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF
Chairman Nur Misuari.
MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have
some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if
they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two
questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy
already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well;
it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So,
my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to
go into something new?
MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman
Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain
definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of
the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region
in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question
that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli
Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional
autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state
policy.173(Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes
enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters,
been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are
still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the
Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected
to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to
achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given
the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations,
solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for
their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power
to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the
President is in a singular position to know the precise nature
of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to
hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the
solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be
prevented from submitting them as recommendations to
Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them
pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have
the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the
Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or
revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or
submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as
those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative
and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional
change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the
arrogation of constituent powers.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then
President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for
constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the
interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the
1973 Constitution with the power to propose such
amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never
convened the interim National Assembly. The majority
upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute
necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people
to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to
propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling,
Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma vigorously dissented.
The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard
to the point on which it was then divided in that controversial
case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting.
While he disagreed that the President may directly submit
proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum,
implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have
upheld the President's action along with the majority had the
President convened the interim National Assembly and
coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee
opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the
essential departments of government, defines and delimits
the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise
of such powers, and the constituent power has not been
granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime
Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees
proposing and submitting constitutional amendments
directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim
National Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested)
are devoid of constitutional and legal basis."176 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred
that the President - in the course of conducting peace
negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those
policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may
not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of
Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were
assumed as a certainty.
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have
the power to directly propose amendments through initiative
and referendum, the President may also submit her
recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to
be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos
did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of
whether these recommendations merit being formally
proposed through initiative.
These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing
more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any
further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief
Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's
initiative." The only initiative recognized by the Constitution
is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court
stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the
‘people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group unabashedly
states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of
their petition with the COMELEC, that ‘ULAP maintains its
unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their
‘people's' initiative is an ‘unqualified support to the agenda'
of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of ‘people's
voice' or ‘sovereign will' in the present initiative."
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated
in her oath of office,178 only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply
to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as
she limits herself to recommending these changes and
submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority
to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to
propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an
accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose
new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the
practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation
Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual
general appropriations bill has always been based on the
budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and
purposes - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the
President.179
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to
propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to
any third party that the required amendments will
eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however,
that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with
the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework." This stipulation
does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined
in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It
is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the
legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no
uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows,
for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated
changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained in the Comprehensive Compact."
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for
the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework
contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include
constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears
noting that,
By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD
itself would be counted among the "prior agreements" from
which there could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact
would merely be the implementing details for these
"consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the
contemplated changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is
inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to
propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual
guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all
the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must
be struck down as unconstitutional.
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-
AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace
agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most
instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated
that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered
a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of
new administrative structures through Executive Order,
such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development
(SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace
and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the
establishment of the new regional autonomous government
through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was
then the Organic Act of the ARMM.
The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements
on the structure of the expanded autonomous region
envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to
the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial
difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD
virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal
framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace
agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on
Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for
incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law."
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have
given rise to a binding international law obligation on the
part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in
conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered
either as a binding agreement under international law, or a
unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the
international community that it would grant to the
Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated.
Neither ground finds sufficient support in international law,
however.
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof,
would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In
addition, representatives of other nations were invited to
witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances
readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had
the status of a binding international agreement had it been
signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in
international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion.
The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord
Amnesty180 (the Lomé Accord case) of the Special Court of
Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lomé Accord was a peace
agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government
of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a
rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had
been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of
signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the
agreement, among which were the Government of the
Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African
States, and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between
the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone
Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN
and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra
Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court,
an international court, was to try persons who bore the
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the
territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.
Among the stipulations of the Lomé Accord was a provision
for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to
anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as
members of that organization since the conflict began.
In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord
created an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute
the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing,
among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries
and international organizations in the finalization of that
agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this
argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and
that it can only create binding obligations and rights between
the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence,
the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an
international court like it of jurisdiction.
"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an
internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with
some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the
defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in
addition to the parties to the conflict, the document
formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state
or their representatives and representatives of international
organizations, means the agreement of the parties is
internationalized so as to create obligations in international
law.
xxxx
40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to
the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement,
or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement
took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are
not contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation
from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the
settlement.
41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful
authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of
statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within
the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lomé
Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that, in
the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace
agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by
both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal
obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative
appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an
understanding of the extent of the agreement to be
implemented as not including certain international crimes.
42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must
create rights and obligations regulated by international law
so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined
under international law which will also provide principle
means of enforcement. The Lomé Agreement created neither
rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by
international law. An agreement such as the Lomé
Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict
no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of peace
that the international community acting through the
Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not
convert it to an international agreement which creates an
obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from
municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace
agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict
or creating a threat to peace in the determination of the
Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual
situation of peace to be visited with possible legal
consequences arising from the new situation of conflict
created. Such consequences such as action by the Security
Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and
not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by
it. Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach.
A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict
cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an
international armed conflict which, essentially, must be
between two or more warring States. The Lomé Agreement
cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x
x" (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by
representatives of States and international organizations not
parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it
a binding character under international law.
In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD
would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine
State, binding under international law, that it would comply
with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that
it would have to amend its Constitution accordingly
regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority
for this view is Australia v. France,181 also known as the
Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the
ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific.
France refused to appear in the case, but public statements
from its President, and similar statements from other French
officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series
of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to
dismiss the case.182 Those statements, the ICJ held,
amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the
international community, which required no acceptance from
other States for it to become effective.
Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French
government intended to be bound to the international
community in issuing its public statements, viz:
43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of
unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may
have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of
this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the
intention of the State making the declaration that it should
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers
on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the
State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of
conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of
this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound,
even though not made within the context of international
negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in
the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance
of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other
States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since
such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly
unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the
pronouncement by the State was made.
44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a
State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to
a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the
intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act.
When States make statements by which their freedom of
action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called
for.
xxxx
51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests
would be the last, the French Government conveyed to the
world at large, including the Applicant, its intention
effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume
that other States might take note of these statements and
rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements
and their legal consequences must be considered within the
general framework of the security of international
intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so
essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual
substance of these statements, and from the circumstances
attending their making, that the legal implications of the
unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these
statements are clear and they were addressed to the
international community as a whole, and the Court holds
that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect.
The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic,
in deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests,
gave an undertaking to the international community to
which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public
statements of a state representative may be construed as a
unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are
present: the statements were clearly addressed to the
international community, the state intended to be bound to
that community by its statements, and that not to give legal
effect to those statements would be detrimental to the
security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral
declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.
The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling
was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ entitled
Burkina Faso v. Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning
the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that
case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an
interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by
the decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization
of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between
Mali and Burkina Faso.
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the
statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with
legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear
Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding
the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:
40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a
unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual
circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the
Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the
applicant States were not the only ones concerned at the
possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French
Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had
‘conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its
intention effectively to terminate these tests‘ (I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular
circumstances of those cases, the French Government could
not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by
unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have
accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the
applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that
its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present case
are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the
Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the binding
character of the conclusions of the Organization of African
Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal
agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of
this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber
finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration
made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral
act with legal implications in regard to the present case.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would
not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of
the Philippine State to the international community. The
Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear
intention of being bound thereby to the international
community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF.
While there were States and international organizations
involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected
signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as
witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held
in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the
parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by
representatives of states and international organizations
does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as
to create obligations in international law.
Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed
to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments would
not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse
- to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among
States.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the
MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as
already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not
held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in
that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine
panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other
States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here,
that formal agreement would have come about by the
inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally
bound to the international community, not just the MILF,
and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the
participating states-representatives would constitute an
acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal
agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the
Philippine government before the international community,
which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French
Government from entering into a formal agreement with
other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into
such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to
be bound to the international community. On that ground,
the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration
under international law.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the
Philippines under international law notwithstanding,
respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing
amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not
in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro
Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their
brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to
their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested
only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way
that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of
giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the
sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it
wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in
international law, is known as Jus Cogens.184 Respondents,
however, may not preempt it in that decision.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of
respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents
from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents
exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter
for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance,
the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention
and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in
keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing
of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP
Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds
that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot
and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of
the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the
situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements
necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June
2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or
another one drawn up that could contain similar or
significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus
have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action
in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official
copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
The people's right to information on matters of public concern
under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid
symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28,
Article II of the Constitution. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that
its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the
same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps
and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is
the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public
consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public
rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional
imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be
consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty
of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001
before any project or program critical to the environment and is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction
of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is SO ORDERED.
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively Associate Justice
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a
great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
WE CONCUR:
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the REYNATO S. PUNO
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which Chief Justice
entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does Associate Justice
not grant the Executive Department or any government
agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. Associate Justice

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a ANTONIO T. CARPIO

defense to the general right to information or the specific Associate Justice
right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal
provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
respondents effectively waived such defense after it Associate Justice
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft
of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. Associate Justice
No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and DANTE O. TINGA
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, Associate Justice
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary
and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty Associate Justice
enjoined.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Associate Justice
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are Associate Justice
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its RUBEN T. REYES
way to independence. Associate Justice

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal Associate Justice
framework will not be effective until that framework is
amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of ARTURO D. BRION
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative Associate Justice
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government
is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From
The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded,
it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the CERTIFICATION
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, the writer of the opinion of the Court.
or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of REYNATO S. PUNO
the amendment process is through an undue influence or Chief Justice
interference with that process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international
agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the
Philippines under international law, respondents' act of
guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED.
The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE
COURSE and hereby GRANTED.
Separate Concurring Opinion - C.J. Puno, J. Ynares-
Santiago, J. Carpio
Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion - J. Leonardo-
De Castro, J. Brion
Separate Opinion - J. Azcuna, J. Tinga, J. Chico-Nazario, J.
Reyes
Dissenting Opinion - J. Velasco, Jr., J. Nachura
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED
BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO,
JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.
AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.
CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT,
KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN,
EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS,
SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR.,
NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE,
ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO
MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS,
AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU
YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL
ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA,
DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO
BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG,
ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO
MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR.,
EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS
NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN,
MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS,
CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT,
ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN,
ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE
ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF
PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT
REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN
MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,
JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO
DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA,
ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR.,
AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES,
ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL
M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL
DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA,
EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA,
MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO,
KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA
P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA
LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON
ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE
DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA,
EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON,
VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU
RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED
BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL
MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED
BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE
SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC.,
GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA
C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES,
SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO,
DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-
PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED
THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME
COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE
HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT
TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86
SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER,
HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO,
JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU
CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF
IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG,
PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY,
DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF
CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC.
[YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED
BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE
VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE
ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L.
JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU
LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],
MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO,
PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED
BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER
AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT,
respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict,
no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it
may appear to be, over the determination by the independent
branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of
their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution
itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the
often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is
confronted with one such today involving the legislature and
the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent
cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization
that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions
– whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House
of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in
the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a
political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps
even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a
political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our
Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to
extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither
necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not
departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the
controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth
that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge
by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it
by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of
republican government, intended as they are to insure that
governmental power is wielded only for the good of the
people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate
functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people.
Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to hold
any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment
to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the
Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th
Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two
Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the
following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES
12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. – Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. –
In cases where a Member of the House files a verified
complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through
a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed
initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as
the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as
the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of
the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the Secretary General.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within the period of one (1) year.
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided
in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such,
can be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary
General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.,
alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop
an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in
his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim
of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the
12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an
impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted
and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and
17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared
unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus
directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint
and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are
consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives
from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al.,
as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case
are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with
the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President
Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has
accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment
trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and
Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as
it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the
impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint,
pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging
that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to
bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v.
PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for
Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al.,
as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in
their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the
second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia
and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F.
Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging
that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have
a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition
for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment
complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null
and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al.,
claiming that they have a right to be protected against all
forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that
they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the
Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in
their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as
well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null
and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate
President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and
deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ
of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and
agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on
the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc.,
whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-
petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member
of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does
not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest
and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as
a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr.
Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives
from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays
in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and
that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined
from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores
prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu
Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of
all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in
behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that
this Court declare as unconstitutional the second
impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the
Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio
Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance
and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he
has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution,
prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving
the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a
taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed
the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without
any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as
far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse
of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores
and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they
have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the
minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate
from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr.,
without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second
impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or
not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives
does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and
audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint
Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction"
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association,
alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental
importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2)
respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the
Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al.,
as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be
declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same,
that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262
and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed
before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent
the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles
of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment
complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R.
No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the
November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292
and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought
similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number
G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260
(calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by
the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of
the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House
of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the
Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as
reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet
to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which
were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and
Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected
their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the
Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this
Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a)
consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of
Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m.
of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments
on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed
distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition,
this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain
the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for
and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance,
submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene
(Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment
proceedings and that the sole power, authority and
jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try
and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the
Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed,
this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier
consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their
comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and
(c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through
Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation
stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are
plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding
that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable
issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty
to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only
upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had
not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions
pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for
Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo
Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the
ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this
Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the
dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not
yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and
Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein
Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a
Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5,
2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator
Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's
Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the
amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors
Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor
General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in
an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what
time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this
time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-
a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and
substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well
as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and
against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has
sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold
and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review
extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2)
whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the
substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise
the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the
second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively
expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive
1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike
the present Constitution, did not contain the present
provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial
power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates
to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances,
and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere
verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and
the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power
is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section
2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.
Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial
review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of
Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was
first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in
declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the
United States generally, but those only which shall be made
in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the
United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its
express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial
review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches
of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power
of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system
of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
republican form of government and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which
it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief,
indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of
intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb
grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities
of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into
block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari
jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for
which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the
sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will
read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the
government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a
product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of
fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at
all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those
of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter
on the question whether or not a branch of government or any
of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant
petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles
of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used
in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando,
declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply
this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40
where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42
this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could
not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for
the benefit of one person without considering that it could
also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function
to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself
alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that
great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction
that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be
clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case
of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional
refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of
judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al.
and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument
that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings
from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De
Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which
cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question,
issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the
Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely
excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine
constitutional questions relative to impeachment
proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that
impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial
review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of
Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and
to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances,
under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the
judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty
in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to
deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to
isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that
the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional
questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these
are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have
only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia
vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its
origins to that of the United States, their paths of
development have long since diverged. In the colorful words
of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to
correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to
the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power
of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House
of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the
manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year
bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead
to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they
call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the
principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to
the judgment of the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they
instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v.
Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument
that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial
review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to
perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise
of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it
held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and
that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and
void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal
for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In
Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation
by the National Assembly of the election of any member,
irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties
and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention
that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both
are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the
courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.68
(Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing
since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain
direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister
and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that
petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70
and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural
matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or
not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws
and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72
Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of
Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance
and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real
party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking
the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who,
for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-
party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a
concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set
forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate
the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is
meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-
in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party
in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is
important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue.
Although all three requirements are directed towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the
merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in
some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official
action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in
standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest"
is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a
violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens,
individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers
and legislators when specific requirements have been met
have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or
is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the
mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is
a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before
he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that
he has merely a general interest common to all members of
the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether
or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court
opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their
allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of
the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the
Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of
public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity
of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House
of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial
taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85
the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true,
does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too
general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the
rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf
of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to
enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved
in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res
judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly
appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented
as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit
ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as
citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes
the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty.
Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his
standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied
that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental
importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does
not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should
have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party
must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial
notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any
interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section
2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it
may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one
additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same
standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier
stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner
Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens
to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious
scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise
the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid
and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal
interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to
intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to
intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and
arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President
Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment
court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it
from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator
Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
he being a member of Congress against which the herein
petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate
all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his
Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier
stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the
same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a
taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for
bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do
said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there
is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC,
or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed
even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being
deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him
with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice
Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts
pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter
is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the
validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts
having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment
complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives
and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated
and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed
before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied
with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the
instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former
Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be
no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time,
it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality
anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House
and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P.
College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial
notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the
second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures
and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions
themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented
on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean
maintains that even assuming that the Articles are
transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the
issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to
dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal
by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by
itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal,
by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment
complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of
Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and,
therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies
from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this
Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed,
neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the
issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment
proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested
in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body
which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and
seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated
on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved
political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the
cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise
its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however,
despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues
involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark
1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which
raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by
the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a
question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political
question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain
cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice
Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner,
to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its
application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has
made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the
weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since
the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword,
the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions
or commands except the power of reason and appeal to
conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the
most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x
And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will
read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the
government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a
product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of
fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at
all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are
familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me
to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court
in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice,
if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated
September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its
publication was that the administration had apprehended
and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that
when martial law was announced on September 22, the
media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media
could not publish any story not only because our main writers
were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of
being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971
Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by
September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had
barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I
forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some
delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of
them, were picked up. One of them was our very own
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft
of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree
calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters
of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free
discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may
use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople,
during the interregnum, however, the draft of the
Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling
effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite
and announced that he would consult the people in a
referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But
the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not
announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but
of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or
barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The
questions to be propounded were released with proposed
answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold
a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court
praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended.
When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court,
the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation
of the President declaring that the new Constitution was
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the
votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution.
Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being
heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the
presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in
force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and
that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January
10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court
were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified
of any referendum in their respective places of residence,
much less did they participate in the alleged referendum.
None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So,
a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had
been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite.
There is a big difference between a referendum and a
plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense
that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they
dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which
the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a
number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected
because the issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to
perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What
is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main
function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of
rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are
rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced
by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained
that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife.
The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as
such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital
duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by
law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section
I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are generally considered
divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere
and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those
of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter
on the question whether or not a branch of government or any
of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of
judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial
power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court
alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman
seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional
questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether
the government had authority or had abused its authority to
the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that
is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty
to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be
decided by the Supreme Court according to the new
numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away
with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse
of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is
not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to
define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice
it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that
the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact
that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those
which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin
of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number
of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly
political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political
question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to
decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through
Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that
this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover,
as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the
rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate
that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although
said provision by no means does away with the applicability
of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani
Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political
questions, however. Identification of these two species of
political questions may be problematic. There has been no
clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111
attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring
supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first
three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
(2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in
that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the
others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the
American concept of judicial review is radically different from
our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional
issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court
shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee
on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an
unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue
would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is
a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution
enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude
a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers
could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both,
without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a
standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court
to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond
the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should
be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v.
Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by
the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may rest
its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a
case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections
13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and
violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown
that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper
party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very
lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all
seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint,
collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the
outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is
guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court
should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al.
argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment
complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a
Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF,
which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to
likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the
rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s
claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of
the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting
legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the
validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the
resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require
it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate
and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which
would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these
consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by
the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely
affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct
of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this
Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122
viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill
of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's
self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and
Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument
that since the second impeachment complaint was verified
and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the
provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section
in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment"
was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to
have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of
Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the
Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of
Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what
the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles
of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not
merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the
House of Representatives. Not having complied with this
requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the
House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of
the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice
Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified
the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice
Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is
not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary
only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a
verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more
compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the
lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this
is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra,
intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a
ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding
the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No.
160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as
well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as
unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is
made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and
Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al.,
adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own.
Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's
decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues,
inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota
of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as
a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial
restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the
power of judicial review includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al.
argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not
assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the
Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this
argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a
moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses
because Members of the House of Representatives are subject
to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not
an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor
can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this
Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII,
Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with
authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance
of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a
solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it,
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under
our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule
upon the challenge because no other office has the authority
to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an
interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon
the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the
public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence
that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits
of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him]
to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid
to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped
with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of
interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v.
Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners
filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion
for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members
thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-
87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to
said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-
Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving
them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of
his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is
in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that
the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware
of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all
Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface
again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but
for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake.
Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators
designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their
trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-
Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as
his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the
light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on
the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was
held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto
depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one
designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of
his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the
deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects
the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by
the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo
Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of
judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last
resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never
was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an
inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the
habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application.
Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment
can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is
more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one
who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge
by a public official interested only in the performance of his
official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by
a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided (citations
omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review,
summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into
the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as
required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason
of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of
constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted
by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another
argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial
review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing
conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They
stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or
conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that
it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious
political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this
argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution
of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith
in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As
correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this
Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if
not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this
Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme
Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act
involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also
political consequences. Those political consequences may
follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's
prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and
validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this
Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes
either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's
claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was
disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the
martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also
presumes that the coordinate branches of the government
would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty
under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws
of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the
branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner
and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by
encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is
well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to
wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system
of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or
political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond
boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise
the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of
Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal
beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De
Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of
Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the
term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is
clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective
body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file"
because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit:
(1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member
of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least
1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act
on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation
of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is,
therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the
Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed
on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he
(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during
the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on
November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word
"initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean,
as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate
the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position,
and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral
arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in
this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act.
It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle
and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is
the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee
on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon
by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice
Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House
reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule
does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but
rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition
that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is
an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the
Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding
the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee
action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies
of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This
is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the
First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of
the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting
on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and
judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving
for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of
the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I
have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with
the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the
floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles
of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on
the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the
case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard
Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved
the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score,
probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging
these words because we have to be very technical about this.
I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are
with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are
with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee
has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this
on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a
reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is
only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the
House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to
any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines
17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on
line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE
ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third
of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment
OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as
far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the
words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in
the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third
of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance
in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure
of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was
clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start
with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason
in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings"
as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was
to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing
of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI
of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of
the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
"initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both
adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an
action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas
clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year,
(Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment
proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the
common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence
is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of
reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment
case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House,
by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to
the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive
power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body
can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case
in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate,
which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin.
On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the
Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1)
there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member
of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold
it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or
upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to
the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution
of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote
of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the
Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment
are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point
that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this
point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment
proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of
the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of
the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in
its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members
of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on
the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint
does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the
present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year," it means
that no second verified complaint may be accepted and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his
explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common
understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to
begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand
it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into
ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words
as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers
confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a
body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section
3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is
a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle
of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment
cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the
amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing
by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least
1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the
term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that
this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an
aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera
v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal
opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the
Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed
during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different
footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this
Court likened the former members of the Constitutional
Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional
roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the
real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives
and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the
present petitions. There are at present only two members of
this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these
proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not
simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members
of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the
records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under
Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it
and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate
its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate
its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution
which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution
which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within
the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules
and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly
behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of
the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief
Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151
declared that where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the
question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court,
held that while the Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only
within these limitations that all matters of method are open
to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of
Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic
as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even
more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules
of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States,
the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial
power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144
US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears
that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to
that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum
in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the
clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker
with the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not
what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to
for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters
the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceedings established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations
all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just.
It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one
has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass
upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it
was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any
fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction
to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason
for courts to categorically reject the political question defense
when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For
section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally
cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and
was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of
state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the
misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary
vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to
this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to
exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down
any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any
of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court
against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty
of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone
of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade
the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of
government. This provision was dictated by our experience
under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to
annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from
passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our
distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions,
this Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not
do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn
duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case
at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our
power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will
not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or
if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by
undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In
resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history
should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to
the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the
violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on
Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not
decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S.
Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment."
It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how
this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever
is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there
was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This
reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power
of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several
provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be
exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the
House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House
thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give
the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint,
was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of
this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that
there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of
our individual and collective consciousness as a people with
our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy.
Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us,
the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating,
mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides
have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what
they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on
the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators,
whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice,
took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and
chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of
society - from the business, retired military, to the academe
and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return
to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles
of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was
specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of
any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the
House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint
against the subject respondent public official. When the
present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps
of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made
through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction,"
"non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at
halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on
the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance
as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the
Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions
for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty
of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely
called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of
the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue
of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court
can properly and competently address and adjudicate in
accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our
system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no
other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that
problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling
itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up
a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in
fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the
Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-
year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming
jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because
it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of
their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the
rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed
ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in
ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch
or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that
principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court
which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the
high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief
Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member
of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does
not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else.
The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective
of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no
doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case
against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court
has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a
solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in
government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for
this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal
principles, it is equally important that it went through this
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can
resolve differences without the use of force and aggression
upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office
of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting
opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in
the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all

other courts has long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of
the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court
has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by
whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by
whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so
long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the
facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power
in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking
magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact
that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by
the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition
of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in
specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution
now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as
likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a
party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic

precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all
men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority
and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to
EN BANC
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner,
v.
SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE
POE-LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as
to callously exclude all foundlings from public service.
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be
discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence
is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies
the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one
or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be
sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen.
When these inferences are made by the Senate Electoral
Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive prerogative
to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate,
then there is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by
either Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I
of the Constitution.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the
citizenship of every single foundling as natural-born. The
circumstances of each case are unique, and substantial proof
may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born. The
nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the
scheme of political powers, as devised by the Constitution,
are likewise different from the other ways to raise questions
of citizenship.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for the
nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and
December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.2 The assailed
November 17, 2015 Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo
Warranto filed by David, which sought to unseat private
respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for
allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such office under
Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed
December 3, 2015 Resolution5 denied David's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a
foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an
infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on
September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He later turned her
over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar
reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the
infant was found on September 6, 1968.9 She was given the
name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.10 Local Civil
Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling
Certificate stating:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN
THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER
3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND
THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF
MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL
STREET, JARO . . .11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal
promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Adoption
of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly
known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more
popularly known as Susan Roces).12 The Decision also
ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio
certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate
of Finality.14chanrobleslaw
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received
the Decision of the San Juan Court Municipal Court and
noted on Senator Poe's foundling certificate that she was
adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.15 This
hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling
certificate:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and
Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San
Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May
13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No.
138.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila when she turned 18 years old.17 The
Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's Identification
Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila on December 13, 1986.18chanrobleslaw
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued
her a Philippine passport.19 Her passport was renewed on
April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19,
2013, and March 18, 2014.20 Having become Senator, she
was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on
December 19, 2013.21chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of
the Philippines, Manila, but eventually went to the United
States in 1988 to obtain her college degree.22 In 1991, she
earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science from Boston
College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.23chanrobleslaw
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael
Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino
national since birth.24 The marriage took place in Sanctuario
de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila.25cralawred On July
29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with her
husband.26 For some time, she lived with her husband and
children in the United States.27chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian
Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa
Anika (Anika).28 Brian was born in the United States on
April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika
on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the
Philippines.29chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American
citizenship on October 18, 2001.30 She was subsequently
given a United States passport.31chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 2004
National Elections.32 To support her father's candidacy,
Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the
Philippines on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she
returned to the United States on July 8, 2004.34 It was
during her stay in the Philippines that she gave birth to her
youngest daughter, Anika.35chanrobleslaw
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004
and eventually "slipped into a coma."36 Senator Poe returned
to the Philippines on December 13, 2004.37 On December 14,
2004, her father died.38 She stayed in the country until
February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend
to the settling of his estate.39chanrobleslaw
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United
States. She never looked for work again in the United
States.40chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.41 After
consulting her children, they all agreed to return to the
Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces.42 In early
2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools Virginia,
United States that they would be transferring to the
Philippines the following semester.43 She came back on May
24, 2005.44 Her children also arrived in the first half of
2005.45 However, her husband stayed in the United States
to "finish pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the PR358
family home there."46chanrobleslaw
April 20, 2009
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau PR104
of Internal Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on
July 22, 2005.47chanrobleslaw July 31, 2009
PR730
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines:48 October 19, 2009
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will PR102
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated November 15, 2009
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I PR103
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and December 27, 2009
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon PR112
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary March 27, 2010
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention PR102
and or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through
Republic Act No. 9225.50 She also "filed applications for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who Arrivals
were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that Flight No.
time."51chanrobleslaw
November 4, 2006
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and SQ076
Deportation on July 18, 2006 through an Order signed by
Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner July 23, 2007
Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:52 PR731
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the
instant petition indicate that David was a former citizen of November 5, 2007
the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents PR337
and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen;
thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a holder May 8, 2008
of an American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and PR103
has taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have October 5, 2008
re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the PR359
original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed May 21, 2009
Citizens of the Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of PR105
R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225."54 Until now, the Order "has not
been set aside by the Department of Justice or any other August 3, 2009
agency of Government."55chanrobleslaw PR733

On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificates in the name of Senator Poe and her
children.56 It stated that Senator Poe is a "citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative
Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed
Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18,
2006."57chanrobleslaw
November 15, 2009
PR10361
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).62 On
October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship,63 stating:

Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa
Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006.58chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of
America between 2006 and 2009 using her United States
Passport No. 170377935.59 She used her passport "after
having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07
July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her
American citizenship on 20 October 2010."60 The following
are the flight records given by the Bureau of
Immigration:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Departures
Flight No.
November 1, 2006
SQ071
July 20, 2007
PR730
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryI, MARY GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently
residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon
City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state that
with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily
renounce my United States nationality/American citizenship,
together with all rights and privileges and all duties and
allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this
renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free
will, free of any duress or undue influence.64 (Emphasis in
the original)
The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on
October 21, 2010.65 On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath
of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and assumed office on
October 26, 2010.66 Her oath of office
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN

October 31, 2007 Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga

PR300 sa katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa
October 2, 2008 na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng
aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking
kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan
nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na
aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng
Pilipinas; na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na
susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at mga
dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may
kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong
babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang
pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-
21 ng Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.67
(Emphasis in the original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States68 in the presence of Vice-
Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011.69 On this
occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire Information for
Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.70 On
December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe.71 The
certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service,
Department of State, on February 3, 2012.72chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013
Elections.73 On September 27, 2012, she executed a
Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the
Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.74 She won and
was declared as Senator-elect on May 16,
2013.75chanrobleslaw
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections,
filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo
Warranto on August 6, 2015.76 He contested the election of
Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and
residency requirements mandated by the 1987
Constitution."77chanrobleslaw
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution
No. 15-01 requiring David "to correct the formal defects of his
petition."78 David filed his amended Petition on August 17,
2015.79chanrobleslaw
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, through its Executive Committee,
ordering the Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to
summon Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended
Petition.80chanrobleslaw
Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a
Motion Subpoena the Record of Application of Citizenship Re-
acquisition and related documents from the Bureau of
Immigration on August 25, 2015.81 The documents
requested included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO
kept Birth Certificate.82 On August 26, 2015, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the
Motion.83 The same Resolution directed the Secretary of the
Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned officials of the
Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office.84
The subpoenas ordered the officials to appear on September
1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the Secretary of the
Senate bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents.85
The subpoenas were complied with by both the Bureau of
Immigration and the National Statistics Office on September
1, 2015.86chanrobleslaw
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified
Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion
for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate
Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for
Direct Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect
Contempt of Court.87chanrobleslaw
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 15-05 requiring the parties to file a
preliminary conference brief on or before September 9,
2015.88 The Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference
on September 11, 2015.89 During the Preliminary
Conference, the parties "agreed to drop the issue of residency
on the ground of prescription."90chanrobleslaw
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal
on September 21, 2015.91 The parties were then "required to
submit their respective [memoranda], without prejudice to
the submission of DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within
thirty (30) days from the said date."92chanrobleslaw
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15
days the submission of DNA test results.93 The Senate
Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27, 2015
through Resolution No. 15-08.94 On November 5, 2015,
Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of
DNA Testing,95 which stated that "none of the tests that
[Senator Poe] took provided results that would shed light to
the real identity of her biological parents."96 The
Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was to continue
to find closure regarding the issue and submit any
development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator
Poe submitted "the issue of her natural-born Filipino
citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal
arguments set forth in her submissions to the Tribunal."97
On November 6, 2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and
considered the case submitted for
resolution."98chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be
a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office
as Senator.99 The Decision
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the
1935 Constitution and continue to be a natural-born citizen
as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of
the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship.
....
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, Respondent validly reacquired
her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-
002 (the Revised Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the
foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire
natural-born Philippine citizenship.
....
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the
moment she renounced her American citizenship on 20
October 2010. She remained solely a natural-born Filipino
citizen from that time on until today.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo
warranto is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted)
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration.101
The Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11
on November 24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five (5) days to
comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration.102chanrobleslaw
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration on December 1, 2015.103 David's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal
on December 3, 2015:104
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified
Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on
17 November 2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23
November 2015.
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No.
15-11 dated 24 November 2015 issued by the Executive
Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the
Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01
December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear
and submit memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean
Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for
Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de
Castro before the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-
139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."
SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)
On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's
Resolution was received by David.106 On December 9, 2015,
David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari before this
Court.107chanrobleslaw
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and Senator Poe to comment on the
Petition "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from notice."108 The Resolution also set oral arguments on
January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its
Comment on December 30, 2015.110 Senator Poe submitted
her Comment on January 4, 2016.111chanrobleslaw
This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the
Commission on Elections case on the issue of private
respondent's citizenship.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate
Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its finding
that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
qualified to hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section
3 of the 1987 Constitution.
I the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has
Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial
review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
which state its findings and conclusions on private
respondent's citizenship.
Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a
consideration of two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this
Court's competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—a
petition for certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved
by a judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek
relief from this Court.
I. A
The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article
VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution:112
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
....
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates
from all other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly,
courts and the Commission on Elections113) the power to
rule on contests114 relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the
House of Representatives). These powers are granted to a
separate and distinct constitutional organ. There are two (2)
aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal's
power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to any
other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it
performs no other function.
The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to
introduce into our legal system an "independent, impartial
and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and
specially created for that singular purpose."115 The 1935
Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission,
independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to members of the National
Assembly.116 This was a departure from the system
introduced by prior organic acts enforced under American
colonial rule—namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power to resolve such
contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution
was amended to make room for a bicameral legislature, a
corresponding amendment was made for there to be separate
electoral tribunals for each chamber of Congress.117 The
1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals,
but they have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions—which provide for the creation of electoral
tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission),
have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral
tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character
of the jurisdiction conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by
been described as "intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature
was characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear and
complete." . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the
power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal
. . . and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the legislature and the Electoral
Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987
Constitution.119chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials
falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in
these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-
election challenges against the election, returns, and
qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of
the President and the Vice-President, in the case of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of
any review. Article VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral
tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in harmony
with Article VIII, Section 1's express statement that
"[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Judicial review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution
grants the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . .
. the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the
exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would
in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review
in exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference,
the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of
law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated
error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the
Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission
"is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power
as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not,
to paraphrase it in Co vs. [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of correcting
perceived errors of independent branches of the Government;
it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due
process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring
that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial
action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate
Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of
whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error
in judgment.
I. B
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House
Electoral Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this Court
through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a
continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which
the appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil
action.122 The viability of such a petition is premised on an
allegation of "grave abuse of discretion."123chanrobleslaw
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held
to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be
grave.124chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional
organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in
its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence,
which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party,
or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are
ignored or not accounted for.125chanrobleslaw
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of
statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or
misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also
considered grave abuse of discretion.126 The arbitrariness
consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or
frivolously departs from settled principles engenders a strong
suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent
against a party.
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the
tribunal's approach to an issue is premised on wrong
considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross
misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence;127 (b)
where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from
reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and
subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with
standards that can be used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's
action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being
grossly unreasonable";129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes
erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an
issue.130chanrobleslaw
I. C
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral
Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping
with a faithful and exhaustive reading of the Constitution,
one that proceeds from an intent to give life to all the
aspirations of all its provisions.
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by
petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was confronted
with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children
whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the
Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes
reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled to
exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional
ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
only asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law
while needfully considering the established personal
circumstances of private respondent. It could not have asked
the impossible of private respondent, sending her on a
proverbial fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the
controversy before it arose because private respondent's
parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her
life.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human
capacity. It did not insist on burdening private respondent
with conclusively proving, within the course of the few short
months, the one thing that she has never been in a position
to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously
appreciated the implications of all other facts known about
her finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner
in keeping with the degree of proof required in proceedings
before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but
"substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion."131chanrobleslaw
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all
children with the misfortune of having been abandoned by
their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior,
second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did
justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending
the well-being of children, advancing human rights, and
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and equal access to
opportunities for public service.
II
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the
requirement that "[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he
[or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-
born citizen and, therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of
the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that
as a foundling whose parents are unknown, private
respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is,
that she failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is
supposedly the essence of the Constitution's determination of
who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding
from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private
respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never
leave reverted to natural-born status despite the
performance of acts that ostensibly comply with Republic Act
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article
IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of
who are Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2),
which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose fathers or mothers
are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims
that, as private respondent's foundling status is settled, the
burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her. With
private respondent having supposedly failed to discharge this
burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is not
a natural-born Filipino.
III
At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both
of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their
parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities
where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
foundling, remains unknown.132 Resolving this controversy
hinges on constitutional interpretation.
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in
discovering the sovereign's purpose so as to identify which
among competing interpretations of the same text is the more
contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual
words—text—and how they are situated within the whole
document—context—govern. Secondarily, when discerning
meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails,
contemporaneous construction may settle what is more
viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is
already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be
resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear
textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.
III. A
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision
must necessarily begin with the text itself. The language of
the provision being interpreted is the principal source from
which this Court determines constitutional
intent.133chanrobleslaw
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary
meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba
legis.134 The Constitution is truly a public document in that
it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People
exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through
a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the
Constitution, therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is,
popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding.
Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.135 (Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its
relation with the whole of the Constitution. A constitutional
provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the
framework of the Constitution that animates each of its
components through the dynamism of these components'
interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire
document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution
should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular,
whole unit—ut magis valeat quam pereat.136 Each provision
must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to all
that the Constitution contains, from its foundational
principles to its finest fixings.137chanrobleslaw
The words and phrases that establish its framework and its
values color each provision at the heart of a controversy in an
actual case. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary:138
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction
that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.139 (Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of
jurisprudence that has previously considered that exact same
text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle
that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system."140
Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law.
Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or
written into the text itself as of the date that it was originally
passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the
contemporaneous intent that the text brings to effect.141
Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of
considering prior interpretation as immutable.
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks
into how the text has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal
provisions are the result of the re-adoption—often with
accompanying re-calibration—of previously existing rules.
Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced
as a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses of
previously existing rules.
One may trace the historical development of text by
comparing its current iteration with prior counterpart
provisions, keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along
with accounting for more conspicuous substantive changes
such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in
enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more
emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of
heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and
change galvanizes meaning.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which
enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines, may be
compared with counterpart provisions, not only in earlier
Constitutions but even in organic laws142 and in similar
mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts
nevertheless still resonate today.
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic
appreciation of legal interpretation must grapple with the
truth that meaning is not always singular and uniform. In
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,144
this Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal
interpretation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to
what they (respectively) construe to be plainly evident from
Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of COMELEC, that the use of
the words "paid for" evinces no distinction between direct
purchasers and those who purchase via subscription
schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s
desistance from actually using the word "subscriber" means
that subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The variance
in the parties' positions, considering that they are both
banking on what they claim to be the Fair Election Act's plain
meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity.
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic
rigor that foments absurdity. The dangers of inordinate
insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and
need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means
endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday
conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder
for humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less
innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can
stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that
unbridled textualism purports to bolster.
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal
plain language is erroneous. In reality, universality and
uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly
assumes that language is static.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus,
holistic rather than parochial: to consider context and the
interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the
envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of
social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be
effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock
of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the
word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution —
saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act
in isolation. Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but
a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of
which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair
elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm
that should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the
ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and demand
fealty from the Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
III. B
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to
the text may be resorted to when the text is capable of
multiple, viable meanings.146 It is only then that one can go
beyond the strict boundaries of the document. Nevertheless,
even when meaning has already been ascertained from a
reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may
serve to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such
reading.
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified
by the realization that the business of understanding the
Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The basic
democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily
means that all organs of government, and even the People,
read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When
competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable
controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in
order to arrive with finality at which interpretation shall be
sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings,
however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a
framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This
same principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to
refrain from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically as
regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are
narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained.147chanrobleslaw
When permissible then, one may consider analogous
jurisprudence (that is, judicial decisions on similar, but not
the very same, matters or concerns),148 as well as
thematically similar statutes and international norms that
form part of our legal system. This includes discerning the
purpose and aims of the text in light of the specific facts
under consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when
external aids may be consulted—that the supposedly
underlying notions of the framers, as articulated through
records of deliberations and other similar accounts, can be
illuminating.
III. C
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional
interpretation, inferring meaning from the supposed intent
of the framers or fathoming the original understanding of the
individuals who adopted the basic document is the weakest
approach.
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective
interpretation. Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors.
The alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily
encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the records of
deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and
have not actively engaged in interpellation and debate may
have voted for or against a proposition for reasons entirely
their own and not necessarily in complete agreement with
those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that
the beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely
erroneous premises. Fathoming original understanding can
also misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of
actions made within specific historical episodes through
detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the
Constitution is not always uniform with the original
understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil Liberties
Union:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave the
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's
understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis supplied)
IV
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a
Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement
in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but
the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides
its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the
deliberations of its framers and the implications of
international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from
several levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies
the specific provision, which principally governs: the
Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of
"natural-born citizens." This definition must be harmonized
with Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to
parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in
relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of
evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted
facts, and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify
the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings
are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the
contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete
consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its
provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of
defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal
protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public
service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons
for requiring natural-born status for select public offices.
Moreover, this is a reading validated by contemporaneous
construction that considers related legislative enactments,
executive and administrative actions, and international
instruments.
V were, thus, reduced to subservience in their own land.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This
status' commencement from birth means that private
respondent never had to do anything to consummate this
status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though
subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born
status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No.
9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of
the Republic.
V. A
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates
who are citizens of the
Philippines:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2)
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3)
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4)
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.150
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born
citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition
of the term "natural-born citizens." This is distinct from
Section 1's enumeration of who are citizens. As against
Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates
those who may count themselves as natural-born.
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are
better appreciated when supplemented with an
understanding of how our concepts of citizenship and
natural-born citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the
term "natural-born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily
defined, foreign concept.
V. B
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is
the "right to have rights."151 It is one's personal and . . .
permanent membership in a political community. . . The core
of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is,
the right to participate in government principally through
the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right
to petition the government for redress of
grievance.152chanrobleslaw
Citizenship also entails obligations to the political
community of which one is part.153 Citizenship, therefore, is
intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the
state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it.
This is particularly so if these benefits and protection have
been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen's birth.
Tecson v. Commission on Elections154 reckoned with the
historical development of our concept of citizenship,
beginning under Spanish colonial rule.155 Under the
Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects."156
Church records show that native inhabitants were referred
to as "indios." The alternative identification of native
inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial
master's regard for native inhabitants as inferior.157 Natives
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within
Spanish territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered
Spaniards, classification, however, did not extend to the
Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that the
archipelago was to be governed by special laws.158 It was
only on December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this
jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens,159
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a)
Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b)
Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were
born outside of Spain,
(c)
Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d)
Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.160
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine
Islands were ceded by Spain to the United States of America
under the Treaty of Paris, which was entered into on
December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not automatically
convert the native inhabitants to American citizens.161
Instead, it left the determination of the native inhabitants'
status to the Congress of the United
States:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes
or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom. . . . In case they remain in the territory
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making . . . a declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of
the territory in which they may reside.
Thus -
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determined by Congress.162chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native
inhabitants who had ceased to be Spanish subjects were
"issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States."163chanrobleslaw
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared
in legislation in the Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known
as the Philippine Bill of 1902:164
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of
children born in the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who
were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did
not account for the status of children born in the Islands to
parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed
that the common law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by
place of birth), which was operative in the United States,
applied to the Philippine Islands.165chanrobleslaw
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include
a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on
acquiring citizenship. This proviso read:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided
for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of
the United States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein.166chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as
the Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902.
It restated the citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of
1902, as amended:167
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and
except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives
of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of
the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or
who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States if residing therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born
inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was
"(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the
Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen
of some other country."168chanrobleslaw
There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a
mode of acquiring citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution
that made sole reference to parentage vis-a-vis the
determination of citizenship.169 Article III, Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution provided:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2)
Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3)
Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4)
Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5)
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this
jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's provision stipulating
the qualifications for President and Vice-President of the
Philippines. Article VII, Section 3
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of
President or Vice-President, unless he be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age
or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding the election.
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935
Constitution did not define the term.
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with
the then civil law provisions that stipulated the automatic
loss of Filipino citizens lip by women who marry alien
husbands—was discriminatory towards women.170 The
1973 Constitution rectified this problematic situation:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2)
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3)
Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
(4)
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries
an alien shall retain her Philippine citizenship, unless by her
act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have
renounced her citizenship.171chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually
define the term "natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4
of the 1973 Constitution provided:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.172chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution on citizenship, "except for subsection
(3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution."173chanrobleslaw
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2)
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3)
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4)
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.174
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's
previous definition of natural-born citizens, as follows:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
(Emphasis supplied)
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a
"foreign" concept that was transplanted into this jurisdiction
as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility requirements for
President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
In the United States Constitution, from which this concept
originated, the term "natural-born citizen" appears in only a
single instance: as an eligibility requirement for the
presidency.175 It is not defined in that Constitution or in
American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a
requirement for the presidency are not even found in the
records of constitutional deliberations.176 However, it has
been suggested that, as the United States was under British
colonial rule before its independence, the requirement of
being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against
foreign infiltration in the administration of national
government:
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was
inserted in response to a letter sent by John Jay to George
Washington, and probably to other delegates, on July 25,
1787, which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable
to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into
the administration of our national Government; and to
declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the American
army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural
born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von
Steuben, who had served valiantly in the Revolutionary
forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay.
Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting
constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the
Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a
foreign monarch.177chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli,
not jus sanguinis.
V. C
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens:
natural-born and naturalized.
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as
one who is a citizen of the Philippines "from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen
is one who is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal178 articulates this
definition by dichotomy:
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is
a natural-born Filipino.179chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed
light on the concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring
Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are
"former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens."180chanrobleslaw
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by
naturalization is generally required to file a verified
petition.181 He or she must establish. among others, that he
or she is of legal age, is of good moral character, and has the
capacity to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and
principles, or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a
significant period of time.182 Further, the applicant must
show that he or she will not be a threat to the state, to the
public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs.183chanrobleslaw
V. D
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an
enumeration. Section 2 categorically defines "natural-born
citizens." This constitutional definition is further clarified in
jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born citizenship
from naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the
Civil Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed
written into the interpreted text, thus establishing its
contemporaneous intent.
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and
the need to establish bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately
selective and myopic. It divines Section 1's mere enumeration
but blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section's
unequivocal definition.
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on,
and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on point. To determine
whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we
must look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her
citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into
whether she underwent the naturalization process to become
a Filipino.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent
went through the actual naturalization process. There is no
more straightforward and more effective way to terminate
this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack of
proof.
At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential
approach to foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic
Act No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts at
analogies are misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for
naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The
investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children,
individuals whose capacity to act is restricted.184 It is a
glaring mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the
relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a
Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he
or she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later be
discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the
immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-
born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise
from the restrictive process of naturalization.
So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-
vis natural-born status is clear. It should be with the actual
process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be
contrasted, not against other procedures relating to
citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the
unbridled diminution of the status of citizens.
V. E
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a
human thoroughbred.
Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2)
stipulates that to be a citizen, either one's father or one's
mother must be a Filipino citizen.
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics,
pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born
Filipino citizens. It does not even require them to conform to
traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically
Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically
foreign.
Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant
degree: parentage. The citizenship of everyone else in one's
ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists,
for a pure Filipino bloodline.
Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of
Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in
a proper proceeding, which substantially proves that either
or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.
V. F

Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced
in these proceedings attests to how at least one—if not both—
of her biological parents were Filipino citizens.
Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now
practically impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned as
a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century
ago. By now, there are only a handful of those who, in 1968,
were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render
testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and finding.
Even the identification of individuals against whom DNA
evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer economic
cost, prohibitive.
However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means
for private respondent to establish her parentage.
abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent
with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly
religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved.
The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo
precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a
foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and
out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring
there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical
features nonetheless attest to it.
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission
on Elections,195 the Solicitor General underscored how it is
statistically more probable that private respondent was born
a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He submitted
the following table is support of his statistical inference:196
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN
BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014

In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through YEAR

circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People:185 FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES
without the aid of any inference or presumption; while 1965
circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from 1,479
which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a 795,415
particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or 1966
probable consequence.186chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 1,437
People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial 823,342
evidence: 1967
1,440
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of 840,302
facts other than the fact in issue, which by experience have 1968
been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of 1,595
cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion.188 898,570
(Citation omitted) 1969
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for 1,728
instance, stipulates when circumstantial evidence is 946,753
sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal proceedings: 1970
1,521
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — 966,762
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1971
1,401
(a) There is more than one circumstances; 963,749
1972
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are 1,784
proven; and 968,385
1973
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to 1,212
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 1,045,290
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of 1974
circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal 1,496
proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of 1,081,873
circumstantial evidence in other proceedings.189 There is no 1975
rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence 1,493
exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering 1,223,837
circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or 2010
administrative proceedings. 1,244
1,782,877
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to 2011
sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation of life, 1,140
liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or 1,746,685
proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond 2012
reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such 1,454
a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less 1,790,367
stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi- 2013
judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral 1,315
Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.190chanrobleslaw 1,751,523
2014
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside 1,351
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In 1,748,782
1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—Philippine provinces,
had a predominantly Filipino population.192 Private Source: Philippine Statistics Authority
respondent is described as having "brown almond-shaped
eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval- Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in
shaped face."193 She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.194 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This
Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private
Iloilo. respondent was born a Filipino citizen.

These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of
inference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her identifying her parents after half a century, a range of
substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable
conclusion as to private respondent's parentage.
VI
Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born
status is sustained by a general assumption on foundlings
arising from a comprehensive reading and validated by a
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, and
considering that we have just discussed the evidence
pertaining to the circumstances of private respondent's birth,
it is opportune to consider petitioner's allegations that
private respondent bore the burden of proving—through
proof of her bloodline—her natural-born status.
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to
private respondent upon a mere showing that she is a
foundling is a serious error.
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential
presumption that all newborns who have been abandoned in
rural areas in the Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis
on private respondent's supposed burden to prove the
circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible
condition. To require proof from private respondent borders
on the absurd when there is no dispute that the crux of the
controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is simply
not known.
"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense
by the amount of evidence required by law." Burden of proof
lies on the party making the allegations;198 that is, the party
who "alleges the affirmative of the issue"199 Burden of proof
never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the
burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes
a prima facie case in his or her favor.200 The other party then
bears the "burden of going forward"201 with the evidence
considering that which has ostensibly been established
against him or her.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily
falls on the party who brings the action and who alleges that
the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the
controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such
as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of
proof is substantial evidence.202 This burden was
petitioner's to discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima
facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.
Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not
establish a prima facie case in favor of petitioner. While it
does establish that the identities of private respondent's
biological parents are not known, it does not automatically
mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint
of doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence
establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of
evidence to private respondent.
Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling,
petitioner trivializes other uncontroverted circumstances
that we have previously established as substantive evidence
of private respondent's parentage:
(1)
Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
(2)
She was only an infant when she was found, practically a
newborn;
(3)
She was-found sometime in September 1968;
(4)
Immediately after she was found, private respondent was
registered as a foundling;
(5)
There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
(6)
Private respondent's physical features are consistent with
those of typical Filipinos.
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates
an imperceptive bias. As against petitioner's suggested
conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts
is that at least one of private respondent's parents is a
Filipino.
VII
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino
citizen consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV,
Section 2's definition of natural-born citizens and Section
1(2)'s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a
presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are
born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother
and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof
otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such
countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a
foundling's biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
VII. A
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro's Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17,
2015 Decision, petitioner intimates that no inference or
presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship may be
indulged in resolving this case.203 He insists that it is
private respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of
her Filipino parentage.
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal.
Common sense dictates that actual proof is preferable.
Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based on
presumptions is firmly established in jurisprudence.
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of
presumptions. Ruling on the allegations that former
presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly
known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, this Court proceeded from the presumptions that:
first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born
sometime in 1870, while the country was still under Spanish
colonial rule;204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of
residence, as indicated in his dearth certificate, must have
also been his place of residence before death, which subjected
him to the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping investiture
of Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of
1902.205 This Court then noted that Lorenzo Pou's
citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando Poe
Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr.
would then have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born
while the 1935 Constitution, which conferred Filipino
citizenship to those born to Filipino fathers, was in effect:
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is
necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of
any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen
first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.206chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan207 and
Go v. Ramos208 (which merely cites Paa)—to the effect that
presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.
Paa, decided in 1967, stated:
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine
citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is
really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of
the claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
State.209 (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of
this Court's more recent ruling in Tecson.
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the claimant" was
preceded by a sentence specifically referencing the duty of
"the respondent." The syntax of this Court's
pronouncement—using the definitive article "the"—reveals
that its conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his
circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used
generic language. Instead of the definite article "the," it could
have used the indefinite article "a" in that same sentence: "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of a claimant of
Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used
other words that would show absolute or sweeping
application, for instance: "no presumption can be indulged in
favor of any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of all claimants of
Philippine citizenship."
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those
of this case. Its statements, therefore, are inappropriate
precedents for this case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced
showing that respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an
alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was
likewise registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence
already indubitably establish foreign citizenship and shut
the door to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this
case presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private
respondent's or of both of her parents' foreign citizenship.
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it
to make it appear that the same pronouncement was
generally applicable:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship
to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a
Filipino. No presumption can be indulged hi favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.210
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in
proverbial translation. In any case, Go was decided by this
Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn Tecson, which
was decided by this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's
factual and even procedural backdrops are different from
those of this case. Go involved the deportation of an allegedly
illegal and undesirable alien, not an election controversy. In
Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing the
Chinese citizenship of Go and of his siblings were adduced.
VII. B
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines
are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino
mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the
Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole
purpose."211chanrobleslaw
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV,
Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional
provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They
must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend
the well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of
the law and equal access to opportunities for public service,
and to respect human rights. They must also be read in
conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring
natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this
presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction
that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution require the state to enhance children's well-
being and to project them from conditions prejudicial to or
that may undermine their development. Fulfilling this
mandate includes preventing discriminatory conditions and,
especially, dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that
hide behind the veneer of the legal apparatus:
ARTICLE II. . .
State Policies. . . .
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth
in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
....
ARTICLE XV
The Family
....
SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
....
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-
born citizens of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes
the following offices exclusive to natural-born
citizens:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1)
President;212
(2)
Vice-President;213
(3)
Senator;214
(4)
Member of the House of Representatives;215
(5)
Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court;216
(6)
Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission;217
(7)
Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections;218
(8)
Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on
Audit;219
(9)
Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220
(10)
Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;221
and
(11)
Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights.222
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-
born citizens include, among others, city fiscals,223 assistant
city fiscals,224 Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of the
Sandiganbayan, and other public offices.225 Certain
professions are also limited to natural-born citizens,226 as
are other legally established benefits and
incentives.227chanrobleslaw
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino
citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating
against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of
service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is
also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such
as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the
actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot
be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the
present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective
of which is merely to exclude a singular politician from office.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens
creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer
that inferiority through no fault of their own.
If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and
equal access to opportunities for public service:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
....
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
....
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good. (Emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that
"persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or oppression of
inequality.'"228chanrobleslaw
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no
substantial distinction229 differentiates foundlings from
children with known Filipino parents. They are both entitled
to the full extent of the state's protection from the moment of
their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the
parents who abandoned them—an inability arising from no
fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule that
reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-
class citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and
protection from the state as those who know their parents.
Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is
dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very
beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of desolation
and deprivation.
This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional
organ, mandated to effect the Constitution's dictum of
defending and promoting the well-being and development of
children. It is not our business to reify discriminatory classes
based on circumstances of birth.
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines,
foundlings are human persons whose dignity we value and
rights we, as a civilized nation, respect. Thus:
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
(Emphasis supplied)
VII. C
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively
within the confines of constitutional text, the presumption
that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines
(unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both
of the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a
parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of
the Constitution with acts of Congress, international
instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of
executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil
Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that
foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted
mechanisms to effect the constitutional mandate to protect
children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put
this mandate into effect.
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides:
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State
policies shall be observed at all times:
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child
through measures that will ensure the observance of
international standards of child protection, especially those
to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any
authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child
and in a manner which allows the child to participate and to
express himself/herself freely. The participation of children
in the program and policy formulation and implementation
related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the
concerned government agency. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best
interest of the child" as the "totality of the circumstances and
conditions which are most congenial to the survival,
protection and feelings of security of the child and most
encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and
emotional development."
Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
specifically requires the states-parties' protection of: first,
children's rights to immediate registration and nationality
after birth; second, against statelessness; and third, against
discrimination on account of their birth status.231 Pertinent
portions of the Convention read:
Preamble
The State Parties to the present Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have,
in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human
rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and
have determined to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom,
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and in the International
Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that
everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status,
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that childhood is
entitled to special care and assistance,
....
Have agreed as follows:
Article 2
State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in
the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction
without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's
or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic
or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure
that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination
or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or
family members.
Article 3
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection
and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into
account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or
her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and
administrative measures.
....
Article 7
The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire
a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be
cared for by his or her parents.
States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these
rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As with the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty requires
that children be allowed immediate registration after birth
and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends them
against discrimination:
Article 24. . . .
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to
race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin,
property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as
are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
....
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between
state| in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular
designation."233 Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution, treaties require concurrence by the Senate
before they became binding:
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate.
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective
and binding by transformation. It then has the force and
effect of a statute enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical
and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
et al.:234
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation
or incorporation. The transformation method requires that
an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through
transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus,
treaties or conventional international law must go through a
process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.235 (Emphasis supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action,
legislative or otherwise, is necessary. Thereafter, the whole
of government—including the judiciary—is duty-bound to
abide by the treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt
servanda.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings
cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with
the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon
birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship,
and render them stateless is to unduly burden them,
discriminate them, and undermine their development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights effect the constitutional dictum of promoting
the well-being of children and protecting them from
discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate
the intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth.
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, is formally entitled An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on Domestic Adoption of
Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted as
a mechanism to "provide alternative protection and
assistance through foster care or adoption of every child who
is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."236chanrobleslaw
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children"
covered by Republic Act No. 8552:237
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be
the duty of the Department or the child-placing or child-
caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all
efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and
subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she
shall be declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to
as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, is formally
entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-
Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and for Other
Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly
includes foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be
adopted:
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free
child may be the subject of inter-country adoption, hi order
that such child may be considered for placement, the
following documents must be submitted: to the Board:
a) Child study;
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of
abandonment/death certificate of parents;
d) Medical evaluation/history;
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be
presented in lieu of authenticated birth certificates to satisfy
the requirement for the issuance of passports, which will
then facilitate their adoption by foreigners:
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must
present a certified true copy of the Court Order of Adoption,
certified true copy of his original and amended birth
certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a
minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case
the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A.
No. 8043, the following, shall be required:
a)
Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of
Child, the Death Certificate of the child's parents, or the
Deed of Voluntary Commitment executed after the birth of
the child.
b)
Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by
the DSWD.
c)
Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate.238 (Emphasis
supplied)
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of
foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account of their birth.
They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect
their citizenship or without having to complete the
naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-
born citizens.
Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of
executive organs have recognized her natural-born status.
This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is,
until circumstances made it appear that she was a viable
candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well
as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares,
private respondent's natural-born status has been affirmed
and reaffirmed through various official public acts.
First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate
and benefitted from the domestic adoption process. Second,
on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the
Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the
President of the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB
Chairperson—an office that requires natural-born
citizenship.239chanrobleslaw
VIII
As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is
not a bar to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition
as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225
crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino
citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when,
following her naturalization as a citizen of the United States,
she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. A
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law."240 Commonwealth Act No. 63,
which was in effect when private respondent was naturalized
an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section
1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y
naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, private
respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was
naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006,
she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three
(3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of
her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was
granted.241chanrobleslaw
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No.
63242 and Republic Act No. 8171243 specifically "to do away
with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes
away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other
countries."244chanrobleslaw
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225
is designed, in its own words, to ensure "that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."245 This
Court shed light on this in Calilung v. Commission on
Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country."247chanrobleslaw
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status
permanent and immutable despite naturalization as citizens
of other countries. To effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225 provides:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine
citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are
naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that is, keep, their
Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this
retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities
attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities
(i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific
rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other
hand, those who became citizens of another country before
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their
Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and
capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities.
Read in conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a policy of
immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration
that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this
reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though
it was never lost at all.
VIII. B
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates
the enjoyment of civil and political rights, "subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities."248 However, other
conditions must be met for the exercise of other faculties:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1)
Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing
laws;
(2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath;
(3)
Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce their oath
of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4)
Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5)
That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended
to, those who:
a.
are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
b.
are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized
elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must
comply with all of the following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This
effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a
natural-born Filipino.249 This also enables the enjoyment of
full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided
the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225
are satisfied.250chanrobleslaw
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution,251 Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing
laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage;
that is, to allow for voting in elections.252chanrobleslaw
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath."253 This, along with
satisfying the other qualification requirements under
relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on
Elections,254 this required sworn renunciation is intended to
complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that
"[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law."255 It is also in view of this that
Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public
office elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces
of other countries from being appointed or elected to public
office in the Philippines.
VIII. C
Private respondent has complied with all of these
requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.256 Second, on
August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay
Santa Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her compliance
with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she
was to vote within the country, this dispensed with the need
to comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship.258 This was
complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States259 before
Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011,260
which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's
issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December
9, 2011261 and the approval of this certificate by the
Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February
3, 2012.262chanrobleslaw
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired
natural-born citizenship; she has also complied with all of the
other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as
stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. D
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having
had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is
a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It
is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No.
9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of
permanence and immutability as articulated in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence.
It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino
citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible
termination of his or her natural-born status.
To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-
born citizenship. The prefix "re" signifies reference to the
preceding state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante that one
returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way
things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean
the investiture of an entirely new status, it should not have
used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act No. 9225,
therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose
citizenship commences only from the moment of compliance
with its requirements.
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation,
ruled that repatriation involves the restoration of former
status or the recovery of one's original nationality:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.263 (Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No.
63 was in force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No.
9225 's policy of permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship."264 In Bengson's words, the
once naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back to his
or her natural-born status. There may have been an
interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the
interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the
restoration of natural-born status expurgates this
intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine
citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward.
He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from
birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences
de facto.
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not
limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring
compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for
facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship,
not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship
itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization
as there is no singular, extended process with which the
former natural-born citizen must comply.

IX

To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is

stateless265 is not only to set a dangerous and callous
precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.

Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual,

and social justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order.
By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright
irresponsibility of those gave them life, foundlings are
compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage.
Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly
remedied by any economic relief.

If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then

we an never tolerate an interpretation that condemns
foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their
being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert
and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.

Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be

deployed against other reasonable interpretations of our
basic law. It does command us to consider legal text, but
always with justice in mind.

It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the

Constitution that we must always sustain. Not only will this
manner of interpretation edify the less fortunate; it
establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds

of its constitutional competence when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen qualified to sit as
Senator of the Republic. Contrary to petitioner's arguments,
there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision and
Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

Public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and
December 3, 2015 Resolution.

Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a

natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as
Senator of the Republic.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Perez, and

Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., no part.
Brion, J., no part.
Del Castillo, J., not natural born until proven otherwise.
Mendoza, J., with some reservation.
Reyes, J., dissenting.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Jardeleza, J., in result.
 SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR.,
FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE,
LITIGATION ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO
MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS,
EN BANC
AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL
ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR.,
vs.
EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED
NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN,
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO,
MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS,
JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE
intervention.
ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF
PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT
x---------------------------------------------------------x
REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN
MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO
DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA,
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.
ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR.,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
intervention.
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
x---------------------------------------------------------x
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES,
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
DRILON, respondents,
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
intervention.
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND
x---------------------------------------------------------x
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
intervention.
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
M. GONZALES, petitioners,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
intervention.
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
vs.
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER
DRILON, respondents,
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
intervention.
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN,
EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS,
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL
DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA,
EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA,
MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO,
KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA
P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA
LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON
ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE
DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA,
EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON,
VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU
RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED
BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL
MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED
BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE
SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC.,
GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA
C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES,
SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO,
DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-
PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED
THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME
COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE
HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT
TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86
SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER,
HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO,
JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU
CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF
IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG,
PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY,
DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF
CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC.
[YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED
BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE
VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE
ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L.
JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU
LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],
MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO,
PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED
BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER
AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT,
respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict,
no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it
may appear to be, over the determination by the independent
branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of
their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution
itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the
often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is
confronted with one such today involving the legislature and
the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent
cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization
that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions
– whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House
of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in
the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a
political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps
even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a
political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our
Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to
extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither
necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not
departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the
controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth
that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge
by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it
by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of
republican government, intended as they are to insure that
governmental power is wielded only for the good of the
people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate
functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people.
Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to hold
any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment
to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the
Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th
Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two
Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the
following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES
12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. – Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. –
In cases where a Member of the House files a verified
complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through
a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed
initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as
the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as
the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of
the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the Secretary General.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within the period of one (1) year.
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided
in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such,
can be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary
General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.,
alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop
an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in
his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim
of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the
12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an
impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted
and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and
17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared
unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus
directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint
and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are
consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives
from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al.,
as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case
are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with
the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President
Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has
accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment
trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and
Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as
it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the
impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint,
pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging
that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to
bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v.
PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for
Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al.,
as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in
their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the
second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia
and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F.
Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging
that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have
a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition
for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment
complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null
and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al.,
claiming that they have a right to be protected against all
forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that
they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the
Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in
their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as
well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null
and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate
President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and
deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ
of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and
agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on
the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc.,
whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-
petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member
of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does
not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest
and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as
a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr.
Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives
from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays
in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and
that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined
from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores
prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu
Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of
all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in
behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that
this Court declare as unconstitutional the second
impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the
Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio
Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance
and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he
has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution,
prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving
the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a
taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed
the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without
any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as
far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse
of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores
and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they
have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the
minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate
from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr.,
without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second
impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or
not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives
does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and
audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint
Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction"
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association,
alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental
importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2)
respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the
Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al.,
as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be
declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same,
that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262
and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed
before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent
the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles
of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment
complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R.
No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the
November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292
and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought
similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number
G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260
(calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by
the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of
the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House
of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the
Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as
reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet
to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which
were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and
Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected
their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the
Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this
Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a)
consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of
Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m.
of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments
on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed
distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition,
this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain
the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for
and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance,
submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene
(Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment
proceedings and that the sole power, authority and
jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try
and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the
Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed,
this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier
consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their
comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and
(c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through
Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation
stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are
plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding
that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable
issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty
to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only
upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had
not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions
pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for
Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo
Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the
ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this
Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the
dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not
yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and
Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein
Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a
Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5,
2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator
Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's
Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the
amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors
Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor
General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in
an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what
time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this
time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-
a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and
substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well
as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and
against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has
sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold
and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review
extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2)
whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the
substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise
the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the
second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively
expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive
1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike
the present Constitution, did not contain the present
provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial
power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates
to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances,
and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere
verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and
the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power
is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section
2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.
Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial
review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of
Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was
first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in
declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the
United States generally, but those only which shall be made
in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the
United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as
well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its
express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial
review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches
of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power
of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system
of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
republican form of government and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which
it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief,
indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of
intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb
grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities
of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into
block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari
jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for
which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the
sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will
read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the
government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a
product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of
fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at
all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those
of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter
on the question whether or not a branch of government or any
of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant
petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles
of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used
in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando,
declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply
this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40
where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42
this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could
not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for
the benefit of one person without considering that it could
also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function
to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself
alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that
great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction
that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be
clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case
of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional
refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of
judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al.
and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument
that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings
from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De
Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which
cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question,
issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the
Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely
excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine
constitutional questions relative to impeachment
proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that
impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial
review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of
Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and
to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances,
under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the
judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty
in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to
deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to
isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that
the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional
questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these
are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have
only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia
vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its
origins to that of the United States, their paths of
development have long since diverged. In the colorful words
of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to
correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to
the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power
of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House
of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the
manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year
bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead
to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they
call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the
principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to
the judgment of the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they
instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v.
Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument
that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial
review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to
perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise
of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it
held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and
that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and
void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal
for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In
Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation
by the National Assembly of the election of any member,
irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties
and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention
that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both
are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the
courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.68
(Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing
since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain
direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister
and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that
petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70
and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural
matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or
not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws
and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72
Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of
Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance
and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real
party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking
the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who,
for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-
party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a
concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set
forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate
the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is
meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-
in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party
in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is
important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue.
Although all three requirements are directed towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the
merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in
some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official
action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in
standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest"
is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a
violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens,
individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers
and legislators when specific requirements have been met
have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or
is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the
mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is
a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before
he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that
he has merely a general interest common to all members of
the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether
or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court
opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their
allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of
the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the
Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of
public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity
of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House
of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial
taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85
the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true,
does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too
general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the
rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf
of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to
enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved
in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res
judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly
appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented
as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit
ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as
citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes
the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty.
Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his
standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied
that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental
importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does
not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should
have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party
must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial
notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any
interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section
2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it
may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one
additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same
standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier
stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner
Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens
to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious
scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise
the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid
and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal
interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to
intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to
intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and
arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President
Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment
court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it
from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator
Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
he being a member of Congress against which the herein
petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate
all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his
Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier
stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the
same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a
taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for
bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do
said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there
is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC,
or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed
even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being
deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him
with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice
Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts
pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter
is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the
validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts
having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment
complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives
and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated
and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed
before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied
with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the
instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former
Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be
no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time,
it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality
anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House
and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P.
College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial
notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the
second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures
and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions
themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented
on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean
maintains that even assuming that the Articles are
transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the
issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to
dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal
by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by
itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal,
by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment
complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of
Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and,
therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies
from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this
Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed,
neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the
issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment
proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested
in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body
which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and
seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated
on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved
political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the
cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise
its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however,
despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues
involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark
1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which
raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by
the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a
question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political
question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain
cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice
Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner,
to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its
application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has
made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the
weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since
the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword,
the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions
or commands except the power of reason and appeal to
conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the
most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x
And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will
read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the
government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a
product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of
fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at
all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are
familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me
to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court
in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice,
if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated
September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its
publication was that the administration had apprehended
and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that
when martial law was announced on September 22, the
media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media
could not publish any story not only because our main writers
were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of
being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971
Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by
September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had
barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I
forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some
delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of
them, were picked up. One of them was our very own
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft
of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree
calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters
of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free
discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may
use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople,
during the interregnum, however, the draft of the
Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling
effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite
and announced that he would consult the people in a
referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But
the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not
announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but
of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or
barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The
questions to be propounded were released with proposed
answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold
a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court
praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended.
When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court,
the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation
of the President declaring that the new Constitution was
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the
votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution.
Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being
heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the
presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in
force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and
that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January
10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court
were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified
of any referendum in their respective places of residence,
much less did they participate in the alleged referendum.
None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So,
a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had
been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite.
There is a big difference between a referendum and a
plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense
that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they
dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which
the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a
number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected
because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to
perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What
is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main
function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of
rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are
rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced
by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained
that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife.
The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as
such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital
duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by
law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section
I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are generally considered
divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere
and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those
of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter
on the question whether or not a branch of government or any
of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of
judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial
power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court
alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman
seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional
questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether
the government had authority or had abused its authority to
the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that
is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty
to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be
decided by the Supreme Court according to the new
numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away
with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse
of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is
not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to
define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice
it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that
the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact
that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those
which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin
of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number
of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly
political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political
question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to
decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through
Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that
this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover,
as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the
rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate
that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although
said provision by no means does away with the applicability
of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani
Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political
questions, however. Identification of these two species of
political questions may be problematic. There has been no
clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111
attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring
supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first
three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
(2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in
that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the
others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the
American concept of judicial review is radically different from
our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional
issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court
shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee
on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an
unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue
would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is
a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution
enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude
a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers
could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both,
without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a
standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court
to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond
the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should
be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v.
Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by
the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may rest
its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a
case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections
13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and
violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown
that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper
party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very
lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all
seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint,
collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the
outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is
guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court
should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al.
argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment
complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a
Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF,
which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to
likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the
rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s
claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of
the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting
legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the
validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the
resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require
it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate
and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which
would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these
consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by
the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely
affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct
of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this
Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122
viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill
of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's
self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and
Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument
that since the second impeachment complaint was verified
and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the
provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section
in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment"
was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to
have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of
Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the
Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of
Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what
the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles
of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not
merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the
House of Representatives. Not having complied with this
requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the
House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of
the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice
Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified
the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice
Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is
not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary
only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a
verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more
compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the
lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this
is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra,
intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a
ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding
the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No.
160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as
well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as
unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is
made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and
Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al.,
adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own.
Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's
decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues,
inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota
of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as
a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial
restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the
power of judicial review includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al.
argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not
assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the
Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this
argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a
moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses
because Members of the House of Representatives are subject
to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not
an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor
can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this
Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII,
Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with
authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance
of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a
solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it,
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under
our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule
upon the challenge because no other office has the authority
to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an
interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon
the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the
public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence
that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits
of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him]
to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid
to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped
with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of
interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v.
Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners
filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion
for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members
thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-
87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to
said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-
Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving
them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of
his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is
in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that
the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware
of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all
Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface
again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but
for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake.
Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators
designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their
trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-
Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as
his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the
light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on
the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was
held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto
depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one
designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of
his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the
deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects
the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by
the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo
Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of
judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last
resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never
was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an
inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the
habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application.
Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment
can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is
more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one
who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge
by a public official interested only in the performance of his
official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by
a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided (citations
omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review,
summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into
the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as
required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason
of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of
constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted
by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another
argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial
review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing
conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They
stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or
conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that
it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious
political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this
argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution
of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith
in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As
correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this
Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if
not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this
Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme
Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act
involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also
political consequences. Those political consequences may
follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's
prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and
validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this
Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes
either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's
claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was
disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the
martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also
presumes that the coordinate branches of the government
would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty
under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws
of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the
branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner
and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by
encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is
well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to
wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system
of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or
political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond
boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise
the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of
Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal
beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De
Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of
Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the
term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is
clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective
body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file"
because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit:
(1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member
of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least
1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act
on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation
of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is,
therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the
Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed
on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he
(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during
the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on
November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word
"initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean,
as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate
the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position,
and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral
arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in
this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act.
It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle
and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is
the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee
on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon
by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice
Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House
reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule
does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but
rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition
that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is
an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the
Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding
the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee
action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies
of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This
is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the
First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of
the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting
on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and
judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving
for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of
the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I
have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with
the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the
floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles
of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on
the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the
case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard
Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved
the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score,
probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging
these words because we have to be very technical about this.
I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are
with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are
with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee
has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this
on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a
reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is
only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the
House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to
any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines
17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on
line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE
ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third
of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment
OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as
far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the
words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in
the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third
of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance
in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure
of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was
clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start
with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason
in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings"
as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was
to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing
of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI
of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of
the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
"initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both
adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an
action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas
clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year,
(Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment
proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the
common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence
is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of
reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment
case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House,
by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to
the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive
power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body
can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case
in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate,
which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin.
On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the
Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1)
there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member
of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold
it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or
upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to
the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution
of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote
of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the
Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment
are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point
that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this
point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment
proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of
the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of
the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in
its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members
of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on
the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint
does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the
present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year," it means
that no second verified complaint may be accepted and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his
explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common
understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to
begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand
it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into
ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words
as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers
confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a
body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section
3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is
a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle
of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment
cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the
amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing
by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least
1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the
term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that
this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an
aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera
v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal
opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the
Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed
during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different
footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this
Court likened the former members of the Constitutional
Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional
roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the
real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives
and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the
present petitions. There are at present only two members of
this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these
proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not
simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members
of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the
records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under
Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it
and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate
its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate
its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution
which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution
which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within
the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules
and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly
behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of
the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief
Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151
declared that where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the
question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court,
held that while the Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only
within these limitations that all matters of method are open
to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of
Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic
as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even
more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules
of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States,
the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial
power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144
US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears
that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to
that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum
in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the
clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker
with the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not
what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to
for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters
the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceedings established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations
all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just.
It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one
has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass
upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it
was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any
fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction
to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154

xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason
for courts to categorically reject the political question defense
when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For
section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally
cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and
was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of
state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the
misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary
vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to
this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to
exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down
any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any
of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court
against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty
of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone
of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade
the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of
government. This provision was dictated by our experience
under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to
annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from
passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our
distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions,
this Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not
do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn
duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case
at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our
power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will
not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or
if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by
undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In
resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history
should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to
the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the
violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on
Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not
decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S.
Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment."
It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how
this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever
is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there
was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This
reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power
of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several
provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be
exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the
House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House
thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give
the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint,
was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of
this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that
there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of
our individual and collective consciousness as a people with
our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy.
Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us,
the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating,
mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides
have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what
they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on
the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators,
whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice,
took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and
chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of
society - from the business, retired military, to the academe
and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return
to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles
of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was
specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of
any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the
House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint
against the subject respondent public official. When the
present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps
of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made
through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction,"
"non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at
halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on
the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance
as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the
Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions
for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty
of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely
called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of
the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue
of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court
can properly and competently address and adjudicate in
accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our
system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no
other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that
problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling
itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up
a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in
fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the
Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-
year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming
jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because
it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of
their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent
effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the
rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed
ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in
ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all
other courts has long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of
the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court
has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by
whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by
whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so
long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the
facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power
in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking
magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact
that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by
the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition
of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in
specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution
now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as
likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a
party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic
precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all
men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority
and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to
its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch
or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that
principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court
which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the
high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief
Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member
of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does
not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else.
The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective
of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no
doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case
against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court
has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a
solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in
government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for
this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal
principles, it is equally important that it went through this
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can
resolve differences without the use of force and aggression
upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office
of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting
opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in
the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.