Agra October 16 Assignment Case Digests

TECSON, ELOISA R. ATTY. DARWIN P.
ANGELES
AGRARIAN REFORM LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION SATURDAYS 12:30-2:30 P.M.
REVOLUTIONARY EXPROPRIATION
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HONORABLE

SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 78742, G.R. No. 79310, G.R. No. 79744, G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
FACTS
Petitioners are landowners whose landholdings are subjected to agrarian reform

laws covered by PD No. 27. They argue the validity of various Constitutional provisions and
agrarian reform laws invoking separation of powers, violation of equal protection and just
compensation.
ISSUE
W/N the appropriation of the agricultural lands is valid? YES.
RULING
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. But
for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as
indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that
"private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation". Basically,
the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.
Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be
covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural
lands." The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in
the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public
agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land
Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority,
which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal.
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us
by the Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is
the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the
prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131
and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State
adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the
lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be
binding on us.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more
than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with
an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their
property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the
just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit
upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public
Page 1 of 91
TECSON, ELOISA R. ATTY. DARWIN P. ANGELES
charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of
taxation may be employed in raising the amount." Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP
Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR
shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds
to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified
beneficiaries.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the

courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts
of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and
con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from
the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable.
Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested
parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the
property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is
not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party,
for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all
parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with
finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not
as easily resolved.
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation
been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the
traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State
from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and
of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all
levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose
does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the
foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the
present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as
we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we
will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not
be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution
in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have
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heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their
deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we
estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount
of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present
standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when
they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this
assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also
intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a
less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of
the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough
money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the
farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of
payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance
(if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just
compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind
was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in
force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably
agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any
categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of
just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being
contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands
of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine
how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the
farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized
compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just
compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the
assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the
content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the
magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the aforequoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative
of the Constitution.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of
the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the
smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner
will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds
and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments
making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which
are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and
other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are
entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. The Court disregarded the August
27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on
landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after
August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41,
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45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No.27.
Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657.
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EXCLUSIONS (NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS)
BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. E. M.

RAMOS AND SONS, INC., RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 131481, March 16, 2011
FACTS
Subject of this case are several parcels of land situated in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Originally
owned by the Manila Golf and Country Club, a portion thereof was acquired by EMRASON
in 1965 for the purpose of developing the same into a subdivision as Traveller’s Life Homes.
Pursuant to the Local Autonomy Act, EMRASON applied for and was granted approval for
the conversion of its property into a subdivision. The actual implementation of the project
was delayed until the passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law ushering in a
new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution. Then came the Aquino
government's plan to convert the tenanted neighboring property of the National
Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate to be managed through a joint
venture scheme by NDC and the Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall conversion
package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to remain at the NDC property, with
three (3) hectares each. However, the size of the NDC property turned out to be insufficient
for both the demands of the proposed industrial project as well as the government's
commitment to the tenant-farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) was thus tasked with acquiring additional lands from the nearby
areas. The DAR earmarked for this purpose the subject property of [EMRASON].
EMRASON opposed the compulsory acquisition of DAR. After the investigation, DAR
declared as null and void all the notices of acquisition ruling that the property covered is
exempt from CARP based on DOJ Opinion. The DOJ Opinion clarified that lands already
converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property
was already converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to
the effectivity of the CARL.
ISSUE
W/N the land owned by EMRASON is subject to CARL? NO.
RULING
CARP coverage limited to agricultural land
Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended, particularly defines the coverage of

the CARP, to wit:
SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a
total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution
to qualified beneficiaries.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:
Page 5 of 91
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits
of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress
in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.
A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national land use plan
shall be instituted by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), in accordance with the
Local Government Code, for the purpose of properly identifying and classifying farmlands
within one (1) year from effectivity of this /Vet. without prejudice to the implementation of
the land acquisition and distribution." (Emphases supplied.)
Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the definition of
agricultural land that is subject to CARP to "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined
in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."
The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARP, the subject
property should have already been reclassified as residential prior to said date.
CARP exemption
The Court reiterates that since July 9, 1972, upon approval of Resolution No. 29-A
by the Municipality of Dasmarinas, the subject property had been reclassified from
agricultural to residential. The tax declarations covering the subject property, classifying
the same as agricultural, cannot prevail over Resolution No. 29-A. The following
pronouncements of the Court in the Patalinghug case are of particular relevance herein:
The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's decision was based on Tepoot's
building being declared for taxation purposes as residential. It is our considered view,
however, that a tax declaration is not conclusive of (he nature of the property for zoning
purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate
taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus
exist in the determination of the nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-
vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes.
xxxx
The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial and,
therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial or C-2. Consequently, even if
Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government
has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must
prevail. While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru
the ordinance, private respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to
substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed,
was still a residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a
"commercial purpose," as gleaned from Ordinance No. 363. [52] (Emphases supplied.)
Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential land by virtue of
Resolution No. 29-A dated July 9, 1972, it is no longer agricultural land by the time the
CARL took effect on June 15, 1988 and is, therefore, exempt from the CARP.
Page 6 of 91
This is not the first time that the Court made such a ruling.
In the Natalia Realty case, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1979
set aside land in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of
Rizal, as townsite areas. The properties owned by Natalia Realty, Inc. (Natalia properties)
were situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. The developer of the
Natalia properties was granted the necessary clearances and permits by the PJSRC for the
development of a subdivision in the area. Thus, the Natalia properties later became the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Following the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the DAR
placed the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision under the CARP. For
having done so, the Court found that the DAR committed grave abuse of discretion, thus:
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to
what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity
as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural lands" arc only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands"
and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were
intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their
inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continue
to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace, x x x The
enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its
completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands
and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL.
These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the eifectivity of
CARL by government agencies other than respondent OAR. In its Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses,
DAR itself defined ''agricultural land" thus - "x x x Agricultural land refers to those devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies,
and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (BLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15
June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use."
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is
bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
Page 7 of 91
EXCLUSIONS (POULTRY AND LIVESTOCK FARMS)
LUZ FARMS vs. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990
FACTS
On June 10, 1988, RA 6657 was approved, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine in its coverage. Pursuant to RA 6657, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as
well as its Rules and Regulations.
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely
affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17
and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under
R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989
ISSUE
W/N the raising of livestock, poultry and swine is covered by the CARL? NO.
RULING
Luz Farms contended that livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming.
Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five
percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. The use of
land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this
industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and
poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate
farms.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the

meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
Page 8 of 91
LANDOWNER’S RIGHT OF RETENTION
DAEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 133507, February 17, 2000
FACTS
Daez was the owner of a 4.1685 hectare Riceland in Bulacan which was cultivated
by his tenants under a share-tenancy. The land was subjected to the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) Program under PD 27 and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform acquired the
subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer to the tenant beneficiaries.
Daez applied for exemption of said rice land from the coverage of PD 27 due to non-
tenancy showing as proof documents allegedly signed by the beneficiaries stating that they
are not share tenants but hired laborers.
In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope,
declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan,
Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10)
hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands1[11] in Penaranda, Nueva
Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-
hectare riceland in Meycauayan.
DAR denied Daez’s application for exemption upon finding that she owns other
agricultural lands exceeding 7 hectares.
Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally
denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this
time under R.A. No. 6657.
DAR allowed Daez to retain the subject Riceland but he denied the application of her
8 children to retain 3 hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or
direct management thereof as required by the law.
ISSUE
W/N DAEZ IS MAY HAVE A RIGHT OF RETENTION ON THE SUBJECT LAND? YES.
RULING
Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers
tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the
following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system
of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner
may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered
under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the
entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.
P.D. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot, or in case the
land is irrigated, a three (3)-hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said law
Page 9 of 91
allows a covered landowner to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his land if his
aggregate landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares. Otherwise, his entire
landholding is covered without him being entitled to any retention right.
Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate
size does not exceed the retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will not be
covered at all by the OLT program although all requisites for coverage are present. LOI No.
474 clarified the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or corn lands of seven (7)
hectares or less, if the landowner owns other agricultural lands of more than seven (7)
hectares. The term "other agricultural lands" refers to lands other than tenanted rice or
corn lands from which the landowner derives adequate income to support his family.
Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to
rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is
devoted to rice or corn crops.
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of
retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must
be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the
landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-
four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and
more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands".
Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from
coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowners
right of retention, are different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application

for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in
one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no
procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the
subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was
denied in a decision that became final and executory.
Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject
4.1685 riceland.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to

qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing
the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the
landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore
leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of
taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless
process.
For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and it does not
exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowners choice of the area to be
retained, must prevail.
Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite
even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. What must
be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to
be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features.
Page 10 of 91
LAND ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS (OLT)
JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO VS. ABUNDIO ORCIGA

G.R. No. 153850, August 31, 2006
FACTS
Jovendo del Castillo owned a 1.330 hectare Riceland located at Camarines Sur. The
farmland was formerly cultivated by Eugenio Orciga.
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, Eugenio Orciga became the beneficiary of the Land
Transfer Program and was consequently awarded a Certificate of Land Transfer.
In 1988, Orciga died. His 8 children decided to rotate among themselves the cultivation of
the riceland covered by said CLT, as follows:
a. Ronald Orciga May 1989 - May 1991

b. Emelina Volante May 1991 - May 1992
c. Alberto Orciga May 1992 - May 1993
d. Adelaida Genio May 1993 - May 1994
e. Pilar Clemena May 1994 - May 1995
f. Nenita Eleda May 1995 - May 1996
g. Abundio Orciga May 1996 - May 1997
h. Yolanda Takasan May 1997 - May 1998
After cultivating and harvesting the riceland from 1989 to 1991, Ronald Orciga abandoned
the said farm on May 3, 1991, and eventually left the barrio without turning over the
landowners share of the agricultural harvest.
On May 28, 1991, fully armed with guns, petitioner del Castillo forcibly entered the riceland
of the late Eugenio Orciga. He started to cultivate the said land over the objection of the
heirs, effectively ejecting them from their possession and cultivation of the land hence, filing
of complaint with the DARAB.
Del Castillo contends that Ronald Orciga failed and refused to give the lessors share of the
harvest despite repeated demands. According to him, a DAR paralegal officer advised him
that in the absence and until the return of Ronald Orciga, he could take over the cultivation
of the land. Provincial Adjudicator ruled in favour of Del Castillo and ordered Orciga to to
personally cultivate said farmholding, subject to payment of arrearages on rentals. DARAB
set aside the ruling of provincial adjudicator. While CA concluded that petitioner del
Castillo had no right to take possession of the farmland being disputed even if the heirs had
failed to deliver the agricultural lessors share. It held that when the beneficiary abandons
the tillage or refuses to gain rights accruing to the farmer-beneficiary under the law, it will
be reverted to the government and not to the farm lot owner
ISSUE
W/N del Castillo is entitled to reposses the land holding under OLT upon death of the
farmer beneficiary? NO.
RULING
Undeniably, Eugenio Orciga, the original beneficiary and predecessor-in-interest of

respondents, was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0070176 over the contested land
pursuant to PD No. 27. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, he is the acknowledged
owner of the contested land.
A Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) is a document issued to a tenant-farmer, which

proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn
Page 11 of 91
production. It is issued in order for the tenant- farmer to acquire the land. This certificate
prescribes the terms and conditions of ownership over said land and likewise describes the
landholdingits area and its location. A CLT is the provisional title of ownership over the
landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of the lands value or for as long as
the beneficiary is an amortizing owner.
Land transfer under PD No. 27 is effected in two (2) stages: (1) issuance of a CLT to
a farmer-beneficiary as soon as DAR transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in
recognition that said person is a deemed owner; and (2) issuance of an Emancipation
Patent as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual
amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer or beneficiary.
As of May 28, 1991, when petitioner grabbed possession of the said land,
respondents, as successors-in-interest of Eugenio Orciga, had not yet been issued an
Emancipation Patent because they were still paying lease-rentals or the agreed share to the
lot owner. Since the respondents were not able to continue cultivating the land and pay the
share of petitioners father, Jovendo del Castillo insists that he should be allowed to take
over and possess the land.
Petitioners asseveration that he is still entitled to possess and cultivate said farmland does
not hold water under PD No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO No. 228).
PD No. 27 is clear that in case of non-payment, the amortizations due shall be paid by the
farmers cooperative in which the defaulting tenant-farmer is a member, with the
cooperative having a right of recourse against the farmer. The government shall guarantee
such amortizations with shares of stocks in government-owned and government-controlled
corporations.
Clearly, therefore, the landowner is assured of payment even if the tenant-farmer defaults
in paying amortizations since the farmers cooperative will assume paying the amortizations.
With regard to the reversion of the landholding to the owner, this is proscribed under PD
No. 27 since it is explicitly provided that:
Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the
Government shall not be transferable except by the hereditary succession or to the
Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reform
and other existing laws and regulations (par. 13).
The landowner has no reason to complain since full payment of the value is even
guaranteed by the shares of stocks of government corporations.
Unmistakably, that in case the farmer-beneficiary under PD No. 27 is unable to pay

the agreed lease rentals, the LBP will process the compensation claim for payment; and the
proceeds shall be held in trust by its Trust Department until the landowner finally accepts
the payment or the court orders him to accept it. Under Section 7 of EO No. 228, a lien by
way of mortgage shall exist in favor of LBP on the land it has financed in favor of a farmer-
beneficiary under PD No. 27. In short, the payment of the full value of the land to the
landowner is assured under EO No. 228, which explains the rule that even if the lease-
rentals or amortizations have not been paid to the landowner, the possession is retained by
the farmer-beneficiary.
In the case at bar, the petitioner has two options; first, to bring the dispute on the non-
payment of the land to the DAR and the Barangay Committee on Land Production that will
subsequently resolve said dispute pursuant to Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR)
Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and other issuances; and, second, to
negotiate with the DAR and LBP for payment of the compensation claim pursuant to
Section 2 of EO No. 228. Eventually, the scheme under EO No. 228 will result to the full
Page 12 of 91
payment of the compensation of the value of the land to Menardo del Castillo, petitioners
father and former landowner.
On the other issue of deceased Eugenio Orcigas successor, the Court rules that the
July 1, 1991 Agreement among the heirs of Eugenio Orciga (that stipulated a provision for a
rotation system in the cultivation of the riceland among themselves) directly contravenes
Ministry Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1978. The said ministry memorandum
circular states that:
Where there are several heirs, and in the absence of extra judicial settlement or waiver of
rights in favor of one heir who shall be the sole owner and cultivator, the heirs shall[,]
within one month from the death of the tenant-beneficiary[,] be free to choose from among
themselves one who shall have sole ownership and cultivation of the land, x x x Provided,
however, That [sic] the surviving spouse shall be given first preference; otherwise, in the
absence or due to the permanent incapacity of the surviving spouse, priority shall be
determined among the heirs according to age (emphases supplied).
The records show that Emelina Orciga Volante is desirous to avail herself of the right to
cultivate the land according to the rotation system of the heirs. This is contrary to MAR
Memorandum Circular No. 19, which requires that the ownership and cultivation shall be
consolidated in one heir. The said agreement is therefore illegal and ineffective. The heirs
must agree on one of them to be the owner-cultivator of the land in accordance with the
law, but priority is granted to the surviving spouse, and in the latters absence or permanent
incapacity, the age of the heirs will be used to decide who should succeed as farmer-
beneficiary.
Page 13 of 91
LAND ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS (COMPULSORY ACQUISITION)
HOLY TRINITY & DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014
FACTS
Freddie Santiago is the owner of a 212, 500 sqm land (Dakila Property) located in Bulacan.
The tenants of this property freely and voluntarily relinquished their tenancy rights in
favour of Santiago in exchange for some financial assistance and individual homelots titled
and distributed in their names. The total area distributed is 4,500 sqm.
On September 17, 1992, Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation purchased the
remaining 208,050 square meters of the Dakila property from Santiago, and later caused
the transfer of the title to its name as well as subdivided the Dakila property into six lots. It
then developed the property by dumping filling materials on the topsoil, and by erecting a
perimeter fence and steel gate. It established its field office on the property.
Sangguniang Bayan ng Malolos passed a resolution in favour of Holy Trinity reclassifying

four of the six subdivided lots belonging to the petitioner. A Certificate of Eligibility for
Conversion (Certificate of Zoning Conformance), as well as a Preliminary Approval and
Locational Clearance was likewise issued in favor of the petitioner for its residential
subdivision project on the Dakila property. On August 23, 1999, Holy Trinity purchased the
Sumapang Property from Santiago with an area of 25,611 sqm.
In April 2006, a certain Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of Felix Surio wrote to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bulacan to request an investigation of the sale
of the Dakila property. This was followed by the letter request of Sumapang Matanda
Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) Chairman Numeriano L. Enriquez to place the
Dakila property within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27. Several days later, the DAR Provincial Office of Bulacan filed a
petition to annul the sale of the Dakila property with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD).
DAR placed within the ambit of PD 27/RA 6657 the Dakila Property for distribution to
qualified farmer beneficiaries. Regional director opined that the sale of the Dakila property
was a prohibited transaction under Presidential Decree No. 27, Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1989; and that the petitioner was
disqualified from acquiring land under Republic Act No. 6657 because it was a corporation.
Pending resolution of the Motion to Withdraw/Quash/Set Aside, the Register of Deeds

issued emancipation patents (EPs) pursuant to the order of the OIC-Regional Director.
The petitioner appealed to the DAR Secretary. DAR Secretary said that the Dakila property
was not exempt from the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27 and Republic Act No. 6657
because Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 did not change or reclassify but merely re-zoned
the Dakila property.
On March 1, 2010, the Office of the President (OP) reversed the ruling of DAR Secretary
Pangandaman upon its finding that the Dakila property had ceased to be suitable for
agriculture, and had been reclassified as residential land pursuant to Municipal Resolution
No. 16-98, thus:
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision issued by the Office of the President (OP) on
March 1, 2010, and reinstated the order of the OIC-Regional Director of the Department of
Agrarian Reform in Regional Office III rendered on August 18, 2006.
ISSUE
Page 14 of 91
W/N the Dakila property was covered by the OLT? NO.
RULING
An ordinance is required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be
passed after the conduct of public hearings.
The petitioner claims the reclassification on the basis of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98.
Given the foregoing clarifications, however, the resolution was ineffectual for that purpose.
A resolution was a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body on a
specific matter that was temporary in nature, and differed from an ordinance in that the
latter was a law by itself and possessed a general and permanent character. Petitioner did
not show if the requisite public hearings were conducted at all. In the absence of any valid
and complete reclassification, therefore, the Dakila property remained under the category of
an agricultural land. Nonetheless, the Dakila property was not an agricultural land subject
to the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27.
Verily, the basic condition for land to be placed under the coverage of Republic Act No.
6657 is that it must either be primarily devoted to or be suitable for agriculture. Perforce,
land that is not devoted to agricultural activity is outside the coverage of Republic Act No.
6657. An agricultural land, according to Republic Act No. 6657, is one that is devoted to
agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. Agricultural activity includes the “cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such
farm products; and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction
with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.”
Consequently, before land may be placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, two
requisites must be met, namely: (1) that the land must be devoted to agricultural activity;
and (2) that the land must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. Considering that the Dakila property has not been classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial, the second requisite is satisfied. For the first
requisite to be met, however, there must be a showing that agricultural activity is
undertaken on the property.
It is not difficult to see why Republic Act No. 6657 requires agricultural activity in order to
classify land as agricultural. The spirit of agrarian reform laws is not to distribute lands per
se, but to enable the landless to own land for cultivation. This is why the basic qualification
laid down for the intended beneficiary is to show the willingness, aptitude and ability to
cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. This requirement conforms with the
policy direction set in the 1987 Constitution to the effect that agrarian reform laws shall be
founded on the right of the landless farmers and farmworkers to own, directly or
collectively, the lands they till. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, we even said that the framers of the Constitution limited agricultural lands to the
“arable and suitable agricultural lands.”
Here, no evidence was submitted to show that any agricultural activity – like cultivation of
the land, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, or poultry or fish,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices –
were being performed on the Dakila property in order to subject it to the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657. It should be noted that the previous tenants had themselves
declared that they were voluntarily surrendering their tenancy rights because the land was
not conducive to farming by reason of its elevation, among others.
Likewise, for land to be covered under Presidential Decree No. 27, it must be devoted to rice
or corn crops, and there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein.
If either requisite is absent, the land must be excluded. Hence, exemption from coverage
Page 15 of 91
followed when the land was not devoted to rice or corn even if it was tenanted; or the land
was untenanted even though it was devoted to rice or corn. Based on these conditions, the
DAR Regional Office erred in subjecting the Dakila property under the OLT.
Page 16 of 91
LAND ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS

(AGRIBUSINESS VENTURE AGREEMENT)
ISLANDERS CARP-FARMERS BENEFICIARIES MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC.

vs. LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 159089, May 3, 2006
FACTS
Ramon Cajegas entered into Joint Production Agreement for Islanders Carp-Farmer
Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. with Lapanday Agricultural and Development
Corporation. In 1996, Islander, represented by its chairman Manuel Asta filed a complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of the agreement, and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
alleging that the persons, who executed the contract were not authorized by it.
Lapanday then filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (hereinafter DARAB) has primary, exclusive, and original jurisdiction;
that Islander failed to comply with the compulsory mediation and conciliation proceedings
at the barangay level; and for the unauthorized institution of the complaint in behalf of
Islander.
Lapanday then filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance,
Injunction with Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney’s Fees. DARAB decided the case
in favor of Lapanday declaring the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding and
ordering Islanders to account for the proceeds of the produce and to comply with the terms
of the contract.
CA held that the issue fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Hence, the
appellate court ruled that the RTC had correctly dismissed the Complaint filed by
petitioner. Moreover, being in the nature of an agricultural leasehold and not a shared
tenancy, the Joint Production Agreement entered into by the parties was deemed valid by
the CA. The agreement could not be considered contrary to public policy, simply because
one of the parties was a corporation
ISSUE
W/N the joint production agreement is valid? YES.
RULING
Section 50 of Republic Act 66577 and Section 17 of Executive Order 229 vests in the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform.
The subject matter of the present controversy falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB. In question are the rights and obligations of two juridical persons engaged in the
management, cultivation and use of agricultural land acquired through the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
Petitioner contends that, there being no tenancy or leasehold relationship between the
parties, this case does not constitute an agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB’s
jurisdiction.
To prove tenancy or an agricultural leasehold agreement, it is normally necessary to

establish the following elements: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is a piece of agricultural land;
3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the
Page 17 of 91
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent. Petitioner is
thus correct in claiming that the relationship between the parties is not one of tenancy or
agricultural leasehold. Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within
the sphere of agrarian disputes.
An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements -- whether

leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise -- over lands devoted to agriculture. Such
disputes include those concerning farm workers’ associations or representations of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements. Also included is any controversy relating to the terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries -- whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
It is clear that the above definition is broad enough to include disputes arising from any
tenurial arrangement beyond that in the traditional landowner-tenant or lessor-lessee
relationship.
The assailed Joint Production Agreement is a type of joint economic enterprise. Joint
economic enterprises are partnerships or arrangements entered into by Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land beneficiaries and investors to implement
agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over
which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
Since the DARAB had already ruled in a separate case on the validity of the Joint Venture
Agreement, the proper remedy for petitioner was to question the Board’s judgment through
a timely appeal with the CA. Because of the manifest lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC, we must defer any opinion on the other issues raised by petitioner until an
appropriate review of a similar case reaches this Court.
Page 18 of 91
AWARD OF LAND (CERTIFICATE OF LAND OWNERSHIP AWARD)
DIAMOND FARMS, INC.

vs. DIAMOND FARM WORKERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
G.R. NO. 192999, July 18, 2012
FACTS
Diamond Farms, Inc. is a corporation engaged in commercial farming of bananas. It owned

1,023.8574 hectares of land in Carmen, Davao. 958 hectares was deferred for acquisition
and distribution under the CARP. Likewise, the Production and Profit Sharing Scheme
proposed by the Philippine Banana Growers and Exports Association was approved by DAR
as the mode of compliance with the required production sharing under CARL. Thereafter,
the Deferment Order was lifted and the land was placed under CARP Coverage. It was
awarded to the members of the Diamond Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (DARBMUPCO). Diamond Farms, however, maintained management and
control of 277.44 hectares of land, including a portion measuring 109.625 hectares (109-
hectare land).
Diamond Farm’s certificates of title over the 109-hectare land were cancelled. In lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) were issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. In 2000, the DAR identified 278 CARP beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land,
majority of whom are members of respondent Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (DFWMPC).
On October 26, 2000, the DAR issued six Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)
collectively in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries.
Diamond Farms filed a complaint for unlawful occupation, damages and attorney s fees
against respondents.
It alleged being holders of TCTs and had been in possession for a long time of the lands.
That while the order was not yet final, the CARP beneficiaries have not been finally
designated and installed, respondents its farm workers refused to do their work from June
10, 2002, forcibly entered and occupied the 74-hectare land, and prevented petitioner from
harvesting and introducing agricultural inputs.
In his Decision, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ruled that petitioner lost its
ownership of the subject land when the government acquired it and CLOAs were issued in
favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries.
The DARAB ruled that petitioner is unlawfully occupying the subject land; it also ruled that
petitioner is no longer entitled to possess the subject land; that petitioner lost its ownership
thereof; that ownership was transferred to the 278 CARP beneficiaries; that the appeals
from the Distribution Order concern distribution and will not restore petitioner s
ownership; that the 278 CARP beneficiaries can now exercise their rights of ownership and
possession; and that petitioner should have delivered possession of the 109-hectare land to
the CARP beneficiaries on August 5, 2000 instead of remaining in possession and in control
of farm operations.
The CA agreed with the DARAB in rejecting petitioner s bare and belated allegation that it
has not received just compensation. The alleged nonpayment of just compensation is also a
collateral attack against the TCTs issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE
W/N the issuance of CLOA divests Diamond Farms of its ownership over the land?
Page 19 of 91
RULING
In 2000, CLOAs had been issued collectively in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries of the
109-hectare land. These CLOAs constitute evidence of ownership by the beneficiaries under
the then provisions of Section 24 of the CARL, to wit:
SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary
shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land to him, which
award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the time the DAR
takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced
by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award, x x x.
To reiterate, petitioner had lost its ownership of the 109-hectare land and ownership thereof
had been transferred to the CARP beneficiaries. Respondents themselves have requested
petitioner to resume its farm operations and this fact has given petitioner a temporary right
to enjoy possession of the land as farm operator and manager.
Petitioner must now turn over possession of the 109-hectare land. The matter has already
been settled in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,
et al., when we ruled that the Constitution and the CARL intended the farmers, individually
or collectively, to have control over agricultural lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian
reform will be for naught. We stressed that under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian reform program is founded on the
right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or collectively
the lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land
must always be in the hands of the farmers.
Under Section 16 (e) of the CARL, the DAR is mandated to proceed with the redistribution of
the land to the qualified beneficiaries after taking possession of the land and requesting the
proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 24 of the CARL is yet another mandate to complete the award of the land to the
beneficiary within 180 days from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. And
under Section 20 of DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998, also known as the
Rules and Regulations on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of
Deferred Commercial Farms, CLOAs shall be registered immediately upon generation, and
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) shall install or cause the installation of the
beneficiaries in the commercial farm within seven days from registration of the CLOA.
Hence, it is imperative that the DAR and PARO assist the DARAB so that the 109-hectare
land may be properly turned over to qualified CARP beneficiaries, whether individuals or
cooperatives. Needless to stress, the DAR and PARO have been given the mandate to
distribute the land to qualified beneficiaries and to install them thereon.
Page 20 of 91
AWARD OF LAND (INDEFEASIBILITY OF AGRARIAN REFORM TITLES)
ESTRIBILLO VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006
FACTS
Estribillo, et.al. are owners of parcels of land with corresponding emancipation patents.
Said lands were formerly part of a forested area which have been denuded as a result of the
logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with
other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands.
HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation
thereof.
HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent
No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. Upon issuance of
PD 27, HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of
its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving
compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the
landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.
In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the
entire landholdings. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map Sketching
(PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings. HMI, through its
representatives, actively participated in all proceedings, and was a signatory of an undated
Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The
LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977. Also, HMI executed
a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of Estribillo, which was annotated at the back of
the OCT. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From
1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were
issued to petitioners, among other persons.
In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) 17
petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under PD 27 of its landholdings.
HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was
untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor.
ISSUE
W/N issuance of emancipation patents divests HMI of ownership? YES.
RULING
Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs

issued in registration proceedings.
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding

pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of
title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said
certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.
There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the
Land Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which
the public land patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent
certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the
aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32
of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of
Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the
Page 21 of 91
President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent,
therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration
cases because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party
entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants,
awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant.
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired

lands to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be
subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative
proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued
pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas
commented: Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding
the titles granted thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of
the homesteader who come into the possession of his homestead after complying with the
requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to
apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the
Minister of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in
accordance with law.
After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to
issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have
complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), the TCTs issued to Estrebillo pursuant to their
EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may
no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another
person."
Where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent
therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land
is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued
to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act.
In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall
become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act
No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens
system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX on the
subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as
indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.
Page 22 of 91
PROHIBITED ACTS (ILLEGAL LAND TRANSFERS)
STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

VS. DAR & BASILIO DE GUZMAN
G.R. NO. 164846, June 18, 2008
FACTS
Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation is a juridical person whose 98% of its
shares is owned by Trinidad and her family. Trinidad is the owner of a parcel of land
located in Bulacan and also the treasurer of Sta. Monica. Basilio de Guzman is a leasehold
tenant of Trinidad.
A leasehold contract was executed between Trinidad and De Guzman in April 1976. He was
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer on July 1981. Desiring to own the land he till, Basilio
filed a petition for patent in his name with the Regional Director – DAR.
DAR placed under OLT pursuant to PD 27 the landholdings of Trinidad. Sta. Monica filed a
petition for prohibition stating that out of the 83, 689 sqm owned by Trinidad, they
acquired 39, 547 sqm through sale with TCT in its favor and that it was not furnished
notice of the coverage under CARP Law.
Basilio contends that the alleged sale of the landholding is illegal due to lack of requisite
clearance from DAR pursuant to PD 27 which prohibits transfer of covered lands except to
tenant-beneficiaries.
ISSUE
W/N the sale of land of Trinidad to Sta. Monica is valid? NO.
RULING
The sale between Trinidad and Sta. Monica was a mere front to frustrate the
implementation of the agrarian law which is prohibited by PD 27. Transfer of ownership
over tenanted rice and corn land after October 21, 1972 is allowed only in favour of the
actual tenan-tillers thereon. It is recalled that in 1981, a certificate of land transfer was
issued to Basilio. In 1986, sale to Sta. Monica occurred.
As lesee, Basilio has the right to be informed about matters affecting the land he tills,
without need for him to inquire about it.
Trinidad and family owned 98% of Sta. Monica and yet failed to notify DAR of the prior sale
during agrarian reform proceedings. She feigned ignorance of Basilio’s claim that he was
her tenant. That she and Sta. Monica has the same cousel; that instead of replying to the
petition of Basilio, she filed for a motion for a bill of particular knowing fully that she is a
party to the transaction; and Basilio still pays Trinidad lease long after she sold the land to
Sta. Monica.
Since, Trinidad is still deemed the owner of the lands sold to Sta. Monica, there is no need
for a separate notice under CARP Law.
Corporate vehicle cannot be used as a shield to protect fraud or justify wrong. The veil of
corporate fiction will be pierced when it is used to defeat public convenience and subvert
public policy.
Page 23 of 91
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004]
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and
LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422
hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares
(5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily
acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657,2[1] as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of
1992,3[2] as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,4[3] the Land
Bank of the Philippines5[4] (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the
property:
Acquired property Area in hectares Value
Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
==========
P173,918.55
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as
amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually,
the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbanks valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a
petition for determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded
as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a
compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an
aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following
admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as
amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited
the provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR.6[5]
Page 24 of 91
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing
and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.7[6]
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for
the coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of
P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents valuation of P623,000.00. The court further
awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente
Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS
(P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of
riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in
the proportion provided by law; and
3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded
interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8[7]
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts
established in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR,
et al.), using the following formula:
For the coconut land
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net Income
(NI)
2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula under
Republic Act No. 38449[8])
For the riceland
1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the
formula under Executive Order No. 22810[9])
2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR AO
No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision11[10] affirming in toto the
judgment of the trial court. The Landbanks motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.12[11]
Page 25 of 91
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the trial courts valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on
the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged
primarily with the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private
lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition
arrangement For its part, the DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and
compensation by the Landbank.13[12]
Based on the Landbanks valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the
landowner.14[13] If the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the
purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders
the certificate of title in favor of the government.15[14] In case the landowner rejects the
offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator16[15] conducts summary administrative
proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the
Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for
the land.17[16] These functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-judicial powers
under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
x x x.
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the
RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court18[17] for final determination of just
compensation.19[18]
Page 26 of 91
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court20[19] and, on
its own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, appoint one or more
commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including
the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x.21[20] In determining
just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section
17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made
by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued
pursuant to the DARs rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657,
as amended.22[21]
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall
be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall
be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = MV x 2
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental
requirements in determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with
the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such
action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the
examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties;
Page 27 of 91
3. its nature, actual use and income;

4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the government to the property; and
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any.
Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a
hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to
underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the
same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such
purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property is
P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez
case pending before it and applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and
worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties, thus:
x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants
determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very
recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No.
6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud,
Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case are situated, the value
fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per
kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we
consider 506.95 kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be very low
considering that farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot
also comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in
average production per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in
the same place of Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the
1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average gross production. In the Rodriguez case, the
defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year.
The court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the Rodriguez case to
the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land taken
under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross production a year
of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez case
which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both cases are in the same town of Basud,
Camarines Norte, compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross
production a year of the coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70
per kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this case.
The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net income
of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the
capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal
rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore, the just compensation for the
5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an area of
.7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross production of
3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46
cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals
P46,000.00.23[22]
PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted interest
on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest on the 46
Page 28 of 91
cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the compounded
interest is P79,732.00.24[23] (emphasis added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court or before the same judge.25[24] They may only do so in the absence of objection
and with the knowledge of the opposing party,26[25] which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a
certain matter, thus:
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No.
22827[26] and R.A. No. 3844,28[27] as amended, in determining the valuation of the
property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No.
13, Series of 1994.29[28] It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold
relation between the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same.30[29]
Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold
relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
Page 29 of 91
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative
Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken
under Presidential Decree No. 2731[30] and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have
not been compensated. In this case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and
respondents have been paid the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the
pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion,
however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC
wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations.
(DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of
the subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the
merits wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In determining the
valuation of the subject property, the trial court shall consider the factors provided under
Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the
DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative
Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon
its own initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or
more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is
REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with
dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in
determining the proper valuation of the subject property.
SO ORDERED.
Page 30 of 91
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO G.R. No. 164195

PLANTATION, INC.,
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, MENDOZA, and
Respondent. SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 12, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petitioners motion for reconsideration addressing our Resolution of

December 4, 2009 whose dispositive portion directs:
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners second motion for reconsideration
(with respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and attorneys fees), and reiterates
the decision dated February 6, 2007 and the resolution dated December 19, 2007 of the
Third Division.
Page 31 of 91
For a fuller and clearer presentation and appreciation of this Resolution, we hark back to
the roots of this case.
Factual Antecedents
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI), together also referred to as
petitioners, were registered owners of vast tracks of land; AFC owned 640.3483 hectares,
while HPI owned 805.5308 hectares. On October 12, 1995, they voluntarily offered to sell
these landholdings to the government via Voluntary Offer to Sell applications filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
On October 16, 1996, AFC and HPI received separate notices of land acquisition and
valuation of their properties from the DARs Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). At
the assessed valuation of P165,484.47 per hectare, AFCs land was valued at
P86,900,925.88, while HPIs property was valued at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC rejected
these valuations for being very low.
In its follow through action, the DAR requested the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to
deposit P26,409,549.86 in AFCs bank account and P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account,
which amounts the petitioners then withdrew. The titles over AFC and HPIs properties were
thereafter cancelled, and new ones were issued on December 9, 1996 in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
On February 14, 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). When the DARAB failed to act on
these petitions for more than three years, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for
determination and payment of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagum City, acting as a Special Agrarian Court. These complaints were subsequently
consolidated.
On September 25, 2001, the RTC resolved the consolidated cases, fixing the just
compensation for the petitioners 1,338.6027 hectares of land32[1] at P1,383,179,000.00,
with interest on this amount at the prevailing market interest rates, computed from the
taking of the properties on December 9, 1996 until fully paid, minus the amounts the
petitioners already received under the initial valuation. The RTC also awarded attorneys
fees.
LBP moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The RTC, in its order of December
5, 2001, modified its ruling and fixed the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the
time the complaint was filed until finality of the decision. The Third Division of this Court,
in its Decision of February 6, 2007, affirmed this RTC decision.
On motion for reconsideration, the Third Division issued its Resolution of December
19, 2007, modifying its February 6, 2007 Decision by deleting the 12% interest due on the
balance of the awarded just compensation. The Third Division justified the deletion by the
finding that the LBP did not delay the payment of just compensation as it had deposited the
pertinent amounts due to AFC and HPI within fourteen months after they filed their
complaints for just compensation with the RTC. The Court also considered that AFC had
already collected approximately P149.6 million, while HPI had already collected
approximately P262 million from the LBP. The Third Division also deleted the award of
attorneys fees.
Page 32 of 91
All parties moved for the reconsideration of the modified ruling. The Court uniformly
denied all the motions in its April 30, 2008 Resolution. Entry of Judgment followed on May
16, 2008.
Notwithstanding the Entry of Judgment, AFC and HPI filed the following motions on
May 28, 2008: (1) Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration; (2)
Second Motion for Reconsideration, with respect to the denial of the award of legal interest
and attorneys fees; and (3) Motion to Refer the Second Motion for Reconsideration to the
Honorable Court En Banc.
The Third Division found the motion to admit the Second Motion for Reconsideration and
the motion to refer this second motion to the Court En Banc meritorious, and accordingly
referred the case to the Court En Banc. On September 8, 2009, the Court En Banc accepted
the referral.
The Court En Banc Resolution
On December 4, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a majority vote, denied the petitioners
second motion for reconsideration based on two considerations.
First, the grant of the second motion for reconsideration runs counter to the
immutability of final decisions. Moreover, the Court saw no reason to recognize the case as
an exception to the immutability principle as the petitioners private claim for the payment
of interest does not qualify as either a substantial or transcendental matter or an issue of
paramount public interest.
Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not entitled to recover interest on the just
compensation and attorneys fees because they caused the delay in the payment of the just
compensation due them; they erroneously filed their complaints with the DARAB when they
should have directly filed these with the RTC acting as an agrarian court. Furthermore, the
Court found it significant that the LBP deposited the pertinent amounts in the petitioners
favor within fourteen months after the petitions were filed with the RTC. Under these
circumstances, the Court found no unreasonable delay on the part of LBP to warrant the
award of 12% interest.
The Chico-Nazario Dissent
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,33[2] the ponente of the original December 19, 2007
Resolution (deleting the 12% interest), dissented from the Court En Bancs December 4,
2009 Resolution.
On the issue of immutability of judgment, Justice Chico-Nazario pointed out that under
extraordinary circumstances, this Court has recalled entries of judgment on the ground of
substantial justice. Given the special circumstances involved in the present case, the Court
En Banc should have taken a second hard look at the petitioners positions in their second
motion for reconsideration, and acted to correct the clearly erroneous December 19, 2007
Resolution.
Specifically, Justice Chico-Nazario emphasized the obligation of the State, in the exercise of
its inherent power of eminent domain, to pay just compensation to the owner of the
expropriated property. To be just, the compensation must not only be the correct amount to
be paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time from the time the land is taken from
the owner. If not, the State must pay the landowner interest, by way of damages, from the
time the property was taken until just compensation is fully paid. This interest, deemed a
Page 33 of 91
part of just compensation due, has been established by prevailing jurisprudence to be 12%
per annum.
On these premises, Justice Nazario pointed out that the government deprived the
petitioners of their property on December 9, 1996, and paid the balance of the just
compensation due them only on May 9, 2008. The delay of almost twelve years earned the
petitioners interest in the total amount of P1,331,124,223.05.
Despite this finding, Justice Chico-Nazario did not see it fit to declare the computed interest
to be totally due; she found it unconscionable to apply the full force of the law on the LBP
because of the magnitude of the amount due. She thus reduced the awarded interest to
P400,000,000.00, or approximately 30% of the computed interest.
The Present Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion to reconsider the Court En Bancs December 4, 2009 Resolution (the
present Motion for Reconsideration), the petitioners principally argue that: (a) the principle
of immutability of judgment does not apply since the Entry of Judgment was issued even
before the lapse of fifteen days from the parties receipt of the April 30, 2008 Resolution and
the petitioners timely filed their second motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from
their receipt of this resolution; (b) the April 30, 2008 Resolution cannot be considered
immutable considering the special and compelling circumstances attendant to the present
case which fall within the exceptions to the principle of immutability of judgments; (c) the
legal interest due is at 12% per annum, reckoned from the time of the taking of the subject
properties and this rate is not subject to reduction. The power of the courts to equitably
reduce interest rates applies solely to liquidated damages under a contract and not to
interest set by the Honorable Court itself as due and owing in just compensation cases; and
(d) the Honorable Courts fears that the interest payments due to the petitioners will
produce more harm than good to the system of agrarian reform are misplaced and are
based merely on conjectures.
The Comment of the Land Bank of the Philippines
The LBP commented on the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 28, 2010.
It maintained that: (a) the doctrine of immutability of the decisions of the Supreme Court
clearly applies to the present case; (b) the LBP is not guilty of undue delay in the payment
of just compensation as the petitioners were promptly paid once the Court had determined
the final value of the properties expropriated; (c) the Supreme Court rulings invoked by the
petitioners are inapplicable to the present case; (d) since the obligation to pay just
compensation is not a forbearance of money, interest should commence only after the
amount due becomes ascertainable or liquidated, and the 12% interest per annum applies
only to the liquidated amount, from the date of finality of judgment; (e) the imposition of
12% interest on the balance of P971,409,831.68 is unwarranted because there was no
unjustified refusal by LBP to pay just compensation, and no contractual breach is involved;
(f) the deletion of the attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the amount finally awarded as just
compensation is proper; (g) this case does not involve a violation of substantial justice to
justify the alteration of the immutable resolution dated December 19, 2007 that deleted the
award of interest and attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petitioners arguments meritorious and accordingly GRANT the present motion
for reconsideration.
Just compensation a Basic Limitation on the States

Power of Eminent Domain
Page 34 of 91
At the heart of the present controversy is the Third Divisions December 19, 2007 Resolution
which held that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest on the balance of the just
compensation belatedly paid by the LBP. In the presently assailed December 4, 2009
Resolution, we affirmed the December 19, 2007 Resolutions findings that: (a) the LBP
deposited pertinent amounts in favor of the petitioners within fourteen months after they
filed their complaint for determination of just compensation; and (b) the LBP had already
paid the petitioners P411,769,168.32. We concluded then that these circumstances refuted
the petitioners assertion of unreasonable delay on the part of the LBP.
A re-evaluation of the circumstances of this case and the parties arguments, viewed in light
of the just compensation requirement in the exercise of the States inherent power of
eminent domain, compels us to re-examine our findings and conclusions.
Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public use.34[3] It is
an inherent power of State as it is a power necessary for the States existence; it is a power
the State cannot do without.35[4] As an inherent power, it does not need at all to be
embodied in the Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it is solely for purposes of limiting
what is otherwise an unlimited power. The limitation is found in the Bill of Rights36[5] that
part of the Constitution whose provisions all aim at the protection of individuals against the
excessive exercise of governmental powers.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads No private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.) provides two essential limitations to the
power of eminent domain, namely, that (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use and
(2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private property.
It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that compensation should be just as the
safeguard is there to ensure a balance property is not to be taken for public use at the
expense of private interests; the public, through the State, must balance the injury that the
taking of property causes through compensation for what is taken, value for value.
Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted liberally in favor of the individual
and strictly against the government. The protection of the individual is the reason for the
Bill of Rights being; to keep the exercise of the powers of government within reasonable
bounds is what it seeks.37[6]
Page 35 of 91
The concept of just compensation is not new to Philippine constitutional law,38[7] but is
not original to the Philippines; it is a transplant from the American Constitution.39[8] It
found fertile application in this country particularly in the area of agrarian reform where
the taking of private property for distribution to landless farmers has been equated to the
public use that the Constitution requires. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,40[9] a
valuation case under our agrarian reform law, this Court had occasion to state:
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of

the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual
and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as
between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of
the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly
stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.
The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial,
full and ample.41[10] [Emphasis supplied.]
In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the petitioners landholdings at a total of
P251,379,104.02,42[11] the RTC, acting as a special agrarian court, determined the actual
value of the petitioners landholdings to be P1,383,179,000.00. This valuation, a finding of
fact, has subsequently been affirmed by this Court, and is now beyond question. In eminent
domain terms, this amount is the real, substantial, full and ample compensation the
government must pay to be just to the landowners.
Significantly, this final judicial valuation is far removed from the initial valuation made by
the DAR; their values differ by P1,131,799,897.00 in itself a very substantial sum that is
roughly four times the original DAR valuation. We mention these valuations as they indicate
to us how undervalued the petitioners lands had been at the start, particularly at the time
the petitioners landholdings were taken. This reason apparently compelled the petitioners
to relentlessly pursue their valuation claims all they way up to the level of this Court.
While the LBP deposited the total amount of P71,891,256.62 into the petitioners accounts
(P26,409,549.86 for AFC and P45,481,706.76 for HPI) at the time the landholdings were
taken, these amounts were mere partial payments that only amounted to 5% of the
P1,383,179,000.00 actual value of the expropriated properties. We point this aspect out to
Page 36 of 91
show that the initial payments made by the LBP when the petitioners landholdings were
taken, although promptly withdrawn by the petitioners, could not by any means be
considered a fair exchange of values at the time of taking; in fact, the LBPs actual deposit
could not be said to be substantial even from the original LBP valuation of
P251,379,103.90.
Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the immediate taking of the
landholdings but cannot be claimed as amounts that would excuse the LBP from the
payment of interest on the unpaid balance of the compensation due. As discussed at length
below, they were not enough to compensate the petitioners for the potential income the
landholdings could have earned for them if no immediate taking had taken place. Under the
circumstances, the State acted oppressively and was far from just in their position to deny
the petitioners of the potential income that the immediate taking of their properties
entailed.
Just Compensation from the

Prism of the Element of Taking.
Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be fair and
reasonable, compensation, to be just, must also be made without delay.43[12] Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if the property is immediately
taken as the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its
fruits or income.
This is the principle at the core of the present case where the petitioners were made to wait
for more than a decade after the taking of their property before they actually received the
full amount of the principal of the just compensation due them.44[13] What they have not
received to date is the income of their landholdings corresponding to what they would have
received had no uncompensated taking of these lands been immediately made. This income,
in terms of the interest on the unpaid principal, is the subject of the current litigation.
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals45[14] the need for prompt payment and the
necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for any delay in the payment of
compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this case that:
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to

the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in
open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair
value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use
before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s]
Page 37 of 91
accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position
he was in before the taking occurred.46[15] [Emphasis supplied.]
Aside from this ruling, Republic notably overturned the Courts previous ruling in
National Power Corporation v. Angas47[16] which held that just compensation due for
expropriated properties is not a loan or forbearance of money but indemnity for damages for
the delay in payment; since the interest involved is in the nature of damages rather than
earnings from loans, then Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, which fixes legal interest at 6%, shall
apply.
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the landowners
for their expropriated property amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the
State. Applying the Eastern Shipping Lines ruling,48[17] the Court fixed the applicable
interest rate at 12% per annum, computed from the time the property was taken until the
full amount of just compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. In the Courts own words:
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest[s] on
the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted
condemnation proceedings and took the property in September 1969. This allowance of
interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the
issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.49[18]
[Emphasis supplied.]
We subsequently upheld Republics 12% per annum interest rate on the unpaid
expropriation compensation in the following cases: Reyes v. National Housing
Authority,50[19] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,51[20] Republic v. Court of
Appeals,52[21] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,53[22] Philippine Ports Authority v.
Rosales-Bondoc,54[23] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.55[24]
Page 38 of 91
These were the established rulings that stood before this Court issued the currently
assailed Resolution of December 4, 2009. These would be the rulings this Court shall
reverse and de-establish if we maintain and affirm our ruling deleting the 12% interest on
the unpaid balance of compensation due for properties already taken.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we see no compelling reason to depart from
the rule that Republic firmly established. Let it be remembered that shorn of its eminent
domain and social justice aspects, what the agrarian land reform program involves is the
purchase by the government, through the LBP, of agricultural lands for sale and
distribution to farmers. As a purchase, it involves an exchange of values the landholdings in
exchange for the LBPs payment. In determining the just compensation for this exchange,
however, the measure to be borne in mind is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss56[25]
since what is involved is the takeover of private property under the States coercive power.
As mentioned above, in the value-for-value exchange in an eminent domain situation, the
State must ensure that the individual whose property is taken is not shortchanged and
must hence carry the burden of showing that the just compensation requirement of the Bill
of Rights is satisfied.
The owners loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-generating potential.
Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must immediately be paid to
achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost. The just
compensation is made available to the property owner so that he may derive income from
this compensation, in the same manner that he would have derived income from his
expropriated property. If full compensation is not paid for property taken, then the State
must make up for the shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking,
and the absence of replacement property from which income can be derived; interest on the
unpaid compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate on
eminent domain and as a basic measure of fairness.
In the context of this case, when the LBP took the petitioners landholdings without the
corresponding full payment, it became liable to the petitioners for the income the
landholdings would have earned had they not immediately been taken from the petitioners.
What is interesting in this interplay, under the developments of this case, is that the LBP,
by taking landholdings without full payment while holding on at the same time to the
interest that it should have paid, effectively used or retained funds that should go to the
landowners and thereby took advantage of these funds for its own account.
Page 39 of 91
From this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution deleting the award of 12%
interest is not only patently and legally wrong, but is also morally unconscionable for being
grossly unfair and unjust. If the interest on the just compensation due in reality the
equivalent of the fruits or income of the landholdings would have yielded had these lands
not been taken would be denied, the result is effectively a confiscatory action by this Court
in favor of the LBP. We would be allowing the LBP, for twelve long years, to have free use of
the interest that should have gone to the landowners. Otherwise stated, if we continue to
deny the petitioners present motion for reconsideration, we would illogically and without
much thought to the fairness that the situation demands uphold the interests of the LBP,
not only at the expense of the landowners but also that of substantial justice as well.
Lest this Court be a party to this monumental unfairness in a social program aimed at
fostering balance in our society, we now have to ring the bell that we have muted in the
past, and formally declare that the LBPs position is legally and morally wrong. To do less
than this is to leave the demands of the constitutional just compensation standard (in
terms of law) and of our own conscience (in terms of morality) wanting and unsatisfied.
The Delay in Payment Issue
Separately from the demandability of interest because of the failure to fully pay for property
already taken, a recurring issue in the case is the attribution of the delay.
That delay in payment occurred is not and cannot at all be disputed. While the LBP claimed
that it made initial payments of P411,769,168.32 (out of the principal sum due of
P1,383,179,000.00), the undisputed fact is that the petitioners were deprived of their lands
on December 9, 1996 (when titles to their landholdings were cancelled and transferred to
the Republic of the Philippines), and received full payment of the principal amount due
them only on May 9, 2008.
In the interim, they received no income from their landholdings because these landholdings
had been taken. Nor did they receive adequate income from what should replace the income
potential of their landholdings because the LBP refused to pay interest while withholding
the full amount of the principal of the just compensation due by claiming a grossly low
valuation. This sad state continued for more than a decade. In any language and by any
measure, a lengthy delay in payment occurred.
An important starting point in considering attribution for the delay is that the petitioners
voluntarily offered to sell their landholdings to the governments land reform program; they
themselves submitted their Voluntary Offer to Sell applications to the DAR, and they fully
cooperated with the governments program. The present case therefore is not one where
substantial conflict arose on the issue of whether expropriation is proper; the petitioners
voluntarily submitted to expropriation and surrendered their landholdings, although they
contested the valuation that the government made.
Presumably, had the landholdings been properly valued, the petitioners would have
accepted the payment of just compensation and there would have been no need for them to
go to the extent of filing a valuation case. But, as borne by the records, the petitioners lands
were grossly undervalued by the DAR, leaving the petitioners with no choice but to file
actions to secure what is justly due them.
The DARs initial gross undervaluation started the cycle of court actions that followed,
where the LBP eventually claimed that it could not be faulted for seeking judicial recourse
to defend the governments and its own interests in light of the petitioners valuation claims.
This LBP claim, of course, conveniently forgets that at the root of all these valuation claims
and counterclaims was the initial gross undervaluation by DAR that the LBP stoutly
defended. At the end, this undervaluation was proven incorrect by no less than this Court;
the petitioners were proven correct in their claim, and the correct valuation more than five-
fold the initial DAR valuation was decreed and became final.
Page 40 of 91
All these developments cannot now be disregarded and reduced to insignificance. In blunter
terms, the government and the LBP cannot now be heard to claim that they were simply
protecting their interests when they stubbornly defended their undervalued positions before
the courts. The more apt and accurate statement is that they adopted a grossly
unreasonable position and the adverse developments that followed, particularly the
concomitant delay, should be directly chargeable to them.
To be sure, the petitioners were not completely correct in the legal steps they took in their
valuation claims. They initially filed their valuation claim before the DARAB instead of
immediately seeking judicial intervention. The DARAB, however, contributed its share to the
petitioners error when it failed or refused to act on the valuation petitions for more than
three (3) years. Thus, on top of the DAR undervaluation was the DARAB inaction after the
petitioners landholdings had been taken. This Courts Decision of February 6, 2007 duly
noted this and observed:
It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12 October 1995, when AFC and
HPI voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. In view of the failure of the parties
to agree on the valuation of the properties, the Complaint for Determination of Just
Compensation was filed before the DARAB on 14 February 1997. Despite the lapse of more
than three years from the filing of the complaint, the DARAB failed to render a decision on
the valuation of the land. Meantime, the titles over the properties of AFC and HPI had
already been cancelled and in their place a new certificate of title was issued in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9 December 1996. A period of almost
10 years has lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that this case has truly
languished for a long period of time, the delay being mainly attributable to both official
inaction and indecision, particularly on the determination of the amount of just
compensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date, have yet to be fully
compensated for the properties which are already in the hands of farmer-beneficiaries, who,
due to the lapse of time, may have already converted or sold the land awarded to them.
Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch were it not for LBPs
counsel causing unnecessary delay. At the inception of this case, DARAB, an agency of the
DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for
three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. We
underscore the pronouncement of the RTC that the delay by DARAB in the determination of
just compensation could only mean the reluctance of the Department of Agrarian Reform
and the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the claim of just compensation by corporate
landowners.
To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-handed

while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive. [Emphasis
supplied.]
These statements cannot but be true today as they were when we originally decided the
case and awarded 12% interest on the balance of the just compensation due. While the
petitioners were undisputedly mistaken in initially seeking recourse through the DAR, this
agency itself hence, the government committed a graver transgression when it failed to act
at all on the petitioners complaints for determination of just compensation.
In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances of this case, delay

should be laid at the doorsteps of the government, not at the petitioners. We conclude, too,
that the government should not be allowed to exculpate itself from this delay and should
suffer all the consequences the delay caused.
The LBPs arguments on the applicability of cases imposing

12% interest
Page 41 of 91
The LBP claims in its Comment that our rulings in Republic v. Court of Appeals,57[26]
Reyes v. National Housing Authority,58[27] and Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Imperial,59[28] cannot be applied to the present case.
According to the LBP, Republic is inapplicable because, first, the landowners in Republic
remained unpaid, notwithstanding the fact that the award for just compensation had
already been fixed by final judgment; in the present case, the Court already acknowledged
that pertinent amounts were deposited in favor of the landowners within 14 months from
the filing of their complaint. Second, while Republic involved an ordinary expropriation
case, the present case involves expropriation for agrarian reform. Finally, the just
compensation in Republic remained unpaid notwithstanding the finality of judgment, while
the just compensation in the present case was immediately paid in full after LBP received a
copy of the Courts resolution
We find no merit in these assertions.
As we discussed above, the pertinent amounts allegedly deposited by LBP were mere partial
payments that amounted to a measly 5% of the actual value of the properties expropriated.
They could be the basis for the immediate taking of the expropriated property but by no
stretch of the imagination can these nominal amounts be considered pertinent enough to
satisfy the full requirement of just compensation i.e., the full and fair equivalent of the
expropriated property, taking into account its income potential and the foregone income lost
because of the immediate taking.
We likewise find no basis to support the LBPs theory that Republic and the present case
have to be treated differently because the first involves a regular expropriation case, while
the present case involves expropriation pursuant to the countrys agrarian reform program.
In both cases, the power of eminent domain was used and private property was taken for
public use. Why one should be different from the other, so that the just compensation
ruling in one should not apply to the other, truly escapes us. If there is to be a difference,
the treatment of agrarian reform expropriations should be stricter and on a higher plane
because of the governments societal concerns and objectives. To be sure, the government
cannot attempt to remedy the ills of one sector of society by sacrificing the interests of
others within the same society.
Finally, we note that the finality of the decision (that fixed the value of just compensation)
in Republic was not a material consideration for the Court in awarding the landowners 12%
interest. The Court, in Republic, simply affirmed the RTC ruling imposing legal interest on
the amount of just compensation due. In the process, the Court determined that the legal
interest should be 12% after recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a
forbearance on the part of the government. Had the finality of the judgment been the critical
factor, then the 12% interest should have been imposed from the time the RTC decision
fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was imposed from the time
that the Republic commenced condemnation proceedings and took the property.
Page 42 of 91
The LBP additionally asserts that the petitioners erroneously relied on the ruling in Reyes v.
National Housing Authority. The LBP claims that we cannot apply Reyes because it involved
just compensation that remained unpaid despite the finality of the expropriation decision.
LBPs point of distinction is that just compensation was immediately paid in the present
case upon the Courts determination of the actual value of the expropriated properties. LBP
claims, too, that in Reyes, the Court established that the refusal of the NHA to pay just
compensation was unfounded and unjustified, whereas the LBP in the present case clearly
demonstrated its willingness to pay just compensation. Lastly, in Reyes, the records showed
that there was an outstanding balance that ought to be paid, while the element of an
outstanding balance is absent in the present case.
Contrary to the LBPs opinion, the imposition of the 12% interest in Reyes did not
depend on either the finality of the decision of the expropriation court, or on the finding
that the NHAs refusal to pay just compensation was unfounded and unjustified. Quite
clearly, the Court imposed 12% interest based on the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
that x x x if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just
value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the
actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as
(but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.60[29] This is the
same legal principle applicable to the present case, as discussed above.
While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on the just compensation
due to the petitioners after this Court had fixed the value of the expropriated properties, it
overlooks one essential fact from the time that the State took the petitioners properties until
the time that the petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years passed. This is the
rationale for imposing the 12% interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the
income they would have made had they been properly compensated for their properties at
the time of the taking.
Finally, the LBP insists that the petitioners quoted our ruling in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Imperial out of context. According to the LBP, the Court imposed legal
interest of 12% per annum only after December 31, 2006, the date when the decision on
just compensation became final.
The LBP is again mistaken. The Imperial case involved land that was expropriated
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27,61[30] and fell under the coverage of DAR
Administrative Order (AO) No. 13.62[31] This AO provided for the payment of a 6% annual
interest if there is any delay in payment of just compensation. However, Imperial was
decided in 2007 and AO No. 13 was only effective up to December 2006. Thus, the Court,
relying on our ruling in the Republic case, applied the prevailing 12% interest ruling to the
period when the just compensation remained unpaid after December 2006. It is for this
reason that December 31, 2006 was important, not because it was the date of finality of the
decision on just compensation.
Page 43 of 91
The 12% Interest Rate and

the Chico-Nazario Dissent
To fully reflect the concerns raised in this Courts deliberations on the present case, we feel
it appropriate to discuss the Justice Minita Chico-Nazarios dissent from the Courts
December 4, 2009 Resolution.
While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the petitioners were entitled to the 12% interest,
she saw it appropriate to equitably reduce the interest charges from P1,331,124,223.05 to
P400,000,000.00. In support of this proposal, she enumerated various cases where the
Court, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil Code,63[32] equitably reduced interest charges.
We differ with our esteemed colleagues views on the application of equity.
While we have equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in numerous cases in the
past, those cases involved interest that was essentially consensual in nature, i.e., interest
stipulated in signed agreements between the contracting parties. In contrast, the interest
involved in the present case runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from
the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as
of the date of taking.64[33]
Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments made by the LBP to the petitioners
cannot be a proper premise in denying the landowners the interest due them under the law
and established jurisprudence. If the just compensation for the landholdings is
considerable, this compensation is not undue because the landholdings the owners gave up
in exchange are also similarly considerable AFC gave up an aggregate landholding of
640.3483 hectares, while HPIs gave up 805.5308 hectares. When the petitioners
surrendered these sizeable landholdings to the government, the incomes they gave up were
likewise sizeable and cannot in any way be considered miniscule. The incomes due from
these properties, expressed as interest, are what the government should return to the
petitioners after the government took over their lands without full payment of just
compensation. In other words, the value of the landholdings themselves should be
equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due; interest is due and should be
paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been
completed. This is the compensation arrangement that should prevail if such compensation
is to satisfy the constitutional standard of being just.
Neither can LBPs payment of the full compensation due before the finality of the judgment
of this Court justify the reduction of the interest due them. To rule otherwise would be to
forget that the petitioners had to wait twelve years from the time they gave up their lands
before the government fully paid the principal of the just compensation due them. These
were twelve years when they had no income from their landholdings because these
landholdings have immediately been taken; no income, or inadequate income, accrued to
them from the proceeds of compensation payment due them because full payment has been
withheld by government.
If the full payment of the principal sum of the just compensation is legally significant at all
under the circumstances of this case, the significance is only in putting a stop to the
Page 44 of 91
running of the interest due because the principal of the just compensation due has been
paid. To close our eyes to these realities is to condone what is effectively a confiscatory
action in favor of the LBP.
That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the principal to be paid is not per se
an inequitable or unconscionable situation, considering the length of time the interest has
remained unpaid almost twelve long years. From the perspective of interest income, twelve
years would have been sufficient for the petitioners to double the principal, even if invested
conservatively, had they been promptly paid the principal of the just compensation due
them. Moreover, the interest, however enormous it may be, cannot be inequitable and
unconscionable because it resulted directly from the application of law and jurisprudence
standards that have taken into account fairness and equity in setting the interest rates due
for the use or forebearance of money.
If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it only has itself to blame, as this
interest piled up because it unreasonably acted in its valuation of the landholdings and
consequently failed to promptly pay the petitioners. To be sure, the consequences of this
failure i.e., the enormity of the total interest due and the alleged financial hemorrhage the
LBP may suffer should not be the very reason that would excuse it from full compliance. To
so rule is to use extremely flawed logic. To so rule is to disregard the question of how the
LBP, a government financial institution that now professes difficulty in paying interest at
12% per annum, managed the funds that it failed to pay the petitioners for twelve long
years.
It would be utterly fallacious, too, to argue that this Court should tread lightly in imposing
liabilities on the LBP because this bank represents the government and, ultimately, the
public interest. Suffice it to say that public interest refers to what will benefit the public,
not necessarily the government and its agencies whose task is to contribute to the benefit of
the public. Greater public benefit will result if government agencies like the LBP are
conscientious in undertaking its tasks in order to avoid the situation facing it in this case.
Greater public interest would be served if it can contribute to the credibility of the
governments land reform program through the conscientious handling of its part of this
program.
As our last point, equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists
in the law and jurisprudence.65[34] As we have shown above, established rulings of this
Court are in place for full application to the present case. There is thus no occasion for the
equitable consideration that Justice Chico-Nazario suggested.
The Amount Due the Petitioners as Just Compensation
As borne by the records, the 12% interest claimed is only on the difference between the
price of the expropriated lands (determined with finality to be P1,383,179,000.00) and the
amount of P411,769,168.32 already paid to the petitioners. The difference between these
figures amounts to the remaining balance of P971,409,831.68 that was only paid on May 9,
2008.
As above discussed, this amount should bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
the time the petitioners properties were taken on December 9, 1996 up to the time of
payment. At this rate, the LBP now owes the petitioners the total amount of One Billion
Three Hundred Thirty-One Million One Hundred Twenty-Four Thousand Two Hundred
Twenty-Three and 05/100 Pesos (P1,331,124,223.05), computed as follows:
Page 45 of 91
Just Compensation P971,409,831.68
Legal Interest from 12/09/1996

To 05/09/2008 @ 12%/annum
12/09/1996 to 12/31/1996 23 days 7,345,455.17

01/01/1997 to 12/31/2007 11 years 1,282,260,977.82
01/01/2008 to 05/09/2008 130 days 41,517,790.07
P1,331,124,223.0566[35]
The Immutability of Judgment Issue
As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the
alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of
the land, rendered it.67[36] In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to this rule
by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justice and
where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.
Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,68[37] Galman

v. Sandiganbayan,69[38] Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National
Telecommunications Commission,70[39] and Republic v. de los Angeles,71[40] we reversed
our judgment on the second motion for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping and
Marine Services v. National Labor Relations Commission,72[41] we did so on a third motion
Page 46 of 91
for reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific v. Romillo73[42] and Cosio v. de Rama,74[43] we

modified or amended our ruling on the second motion for reconsideration. More recently, in
the cases of Munoz v. Court of Appeals,75[44] Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico,76[45]
Manotok IV v. Barque,77[46] and Barnes v. Padilla,78[47] we recalled entries of judgment
after finding that doing so was in the interest of substantial justice. In Barnes, we said:
x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of
the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had
already declared to be final.79[48] [Emphasis supplied.]
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern
from these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-
important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation in an eminent
domain be just when the payment for the compensation for property already taken has
Page 47 of 91
been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private
interest is involved in this case is to forget that an expropriation involves the government as
a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or
standards apply to government who carries the burden of showing that these standards
have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss this case as a private interest matter is an
extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not leave uncorrected.
As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first impression in our
jurisdiction; the consequences of delay in the payment of just compensation have been
settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled jurisprudence on the issue alone accords
this case primary importance as a contrary ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of
grounds, all the rulings we have established in the past.
More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental
importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved agrarian reform, a societal
objective that the government has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half century.
This reform program and its objectives would suffer a major setback if the government
falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly or unwittingly, through lack of good faith in
implementing the needed reforms. Truly, agrarian reform is so important to the national
agenda that the Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural lands, its ownership
and abuse, to the idea of revolution.80[49] This linkage, to our mind, remains valid even if
the landowner, not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the distortion of the
agrarian reform program.
As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial
justice.81[50] As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:82[51]
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
xxxx
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.83[52] [Emphasis supplied.]
Page 48 of 91
Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,84[53] we had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise,
courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is
precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then,
technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the
realities of the situation.85[54] [Emphasis supplied.]
We made the same recognition in Barnes,86[55] on the underlying premise that a courts
primordial and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render
substantial justice, it is permitted to re-examine even a final and executory judgment.
Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and erroneous conclusion
that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest, we find that we are duty-bound to re-
examine and overturn the assailed Resolution. We shall completely and inexcusably be
remiss in our duty as defenders of justice if, given the chance to make the rectification, we
shall let the opportunity pass.
Attorneys Fees
We are fully aware that the RTC has awarded the petitioners attorneys fees when it fixed the
just compensation due and decreed that interest of 12% should be paid on the balance
outstanding after the taking of the petitioners landholdings took place. The petitioners,
however, have not raised the award of attorneys fees as an issue in the present motion for
reconsideration. For this reason, we shall not touch on this issue at all in this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Court En Bancs Resolution dated December 4, 2009, as well as the Third Divisions
Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 and December 19, 2007, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioners Apo
Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the
unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from the date the Government took the
properties on December 9, 1996, until the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines paid on
May 9, 2008 the balance on the principal amount.
Unless the parties agree to a shorter payment period, payment shall be in monthly
installments at the rate of P60,000,000.00 per month until the whole amount owing,
including interest on the outstanding balance, is fully paid.
Costs against the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines.
Page 49 of 91
SO ORDERED.
Page 50 of 91

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No.
05-07,1 and DAR Memorandum No. 88,2 for having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some
provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella organization of some
3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or
indirectly involved in land and housing development, building and infrastructure
construction, materials production and supply, and services in the various related fields of
engineering, architecture, community planning and development financing. The Secretary of
Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR whose
administrative issuances are the subject of this petition.
The Antecedent Facts
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,3 entitled
"Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land
use conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and
agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses
after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-
99,4 entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to
Non-agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion.
Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2)
those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and
fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other
than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
66575 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 206 of Republic Act No. 71607 and other
pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses.
On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative
Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use
Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and
repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use.
Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain
provisions8 of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly addressing
land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008,
which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion
applications.
Page 51 of 91
By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects,
which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting
problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more
so of the whole nation.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN
RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-
AGRICULTURAL USES.
II.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-02,
AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK TO REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.
III.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
IV.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE[S] OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V.
WHETHER MEMORANDUM NO. 88 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. 9
The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his discretion is AO
No. 01-02, as amended, which states:
Section 3. Applicability of Rules. – These guidelines shall apply to all applications for
conversion, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use, such
as:
xxxx
3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGU or by
way of a Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988, x x x. [Emphasis
supplied].
Petitioner holds that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 8435, 10 the term
agricultural lands refers to "lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by a person whether natural or
juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." When the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, however, issued DAR AO No. 01-
02, as amended, he included in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988." In
effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other
non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for
purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. In so doing, petitioner avows that the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction as he has no authority to expand or
enlarge the legal signification of the term agricultural lands through DAR AO No. 01-02.
Being a mere administrative issuance, it must conform to the statute it seeks to implement,
i.e., Republic Act No. 6657, or to the Constitution, otherwise, its validity or constitutionality
may be questioned.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in
violation of Section 6511 of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all applications for
conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as
the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGUs or by
way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988. According to petitioner, there is nothing in
Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR
the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be
submitted to its conversion authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as
Page 52 of 91
amended, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner further asseverates that Section 2.19,12 Article I of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it
was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion
procedures or requirements, or that the DAR’s approval or clearance must be secured to
effect reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also
contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25,13 Article II
and Section 2,14 Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Petitioner similarly avers that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law. There is
deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because under DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DAR’s jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily
and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative and
criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in
favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.
As its final argument, petitioner avows that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not a valid
exercise of police power for it is the prerogative of the legislature and that it is
unconstitutional because it suspended the land use conversion without any basis.
The Court’s Ruling
This petition must be dismissed.
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.15 In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,16 citing People v.
Cuaresma,17 this Court made the following pronouncements:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court’s docket.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time
of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. 19
This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 20
Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a)
Chavez v. Romulo,21 on citizens’ right to bear arms; (b) Government of [the] United States of
America v. Hon. Purganan,22 on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on
Elections v. Judge Quijano-Padilla,23 on government contract involving modernization and
computerization of voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec.
Zamora,24 on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona, 25
Page 53 of 91
on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the
approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area.26
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and
important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give
due course to this petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set
forth in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.27 The present petition should have been initially
filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition.
Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it
seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the nature
of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.28 Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question. (Emphasis supplied.)
With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law are involved.
Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, this Petition
is still dismissible.
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent
it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.29
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 30
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act,
though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and invalid
with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the
exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. 31 Without jurisdiction means lack
or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power
to exercise authority.32 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 33
In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-mentioned requisites for
the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The Secretary of Agrarian
Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, as well as Memorandum
No. 88 did so in accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion
provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any performance of judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogative. A Petition for Certiorari is a special civil action that may be invoked
only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
Page 54 of 91
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment must be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer.1avvphi1
A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power
to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."34
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. 35
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid
administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of
rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he
never exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and
administrative functions.
Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in essence seeks
the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. Thus, the adequate and proper
remedy for the petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which this Court
has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It is beyond the province of certiorari to
declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal because
certiorari is confined only to the determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare
the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be
given to the fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued
except in the exercise of judicial discretion."36
At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition
should still be dismissed.
Executive Order No. 129-A37 vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing the
CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the successful implementation of the
CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorized the DAR to establish and
promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform
implementation. Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses.
Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has given the DAR the exclusive authority
to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid
executive order clearly provides that "the authority and responsibility for the exercise of the
mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x."
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have been included in the
definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted
within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No.
129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation
Page 55 of 91
and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use
conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for
conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in
the context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has been
recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve
land conversion.38 Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in
the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use
conversion.
In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include "lands not
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands finds basis in jurisprudence. In Ros v.
Department of Agrarian Reform,39 this Court has enunciated that after the passage of
Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the
process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural
lands, which are already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is
15 June 1988, are exempted from conversion. 40 It bears stressing that the said date of
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-off period for automatic
reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion
clearance or authority.41 It necessarily follows that any reclassification made thereafter can
be the subject of DAR’s conversion authority. Having recognized the DAR’s conversion
authority over lands reclassified after 15 June 1988, it can no longer be argued that the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform was wrongfully given the authority and power to include
"lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses
before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands. Such inclusion does not unduly
expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands; instead, it made clear what are the
lands that can be the subject of DAR’s conversion authority, thus, serving the very purpose
of the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation
of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded lands and
reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations on or after 15 June
1988 is specious. As explained in Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, it
is true that the DAR’s express power over land use conversion provided for under Section
65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded
have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that these are
the only instances that the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in
Republic Act No. 6657 which every landowner may use to evade compliance with the
agrarian reform program. It should logically follow, therefore, from the said department’s
express duty and function to execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification
of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial property, on or after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared by the DAR.42
This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals 43 that reclassification of lands does not
suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by
the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use
conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes. 44
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that
agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for
the purpose to which they are intended.
Page 56 of 91
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion authority can only
be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. 45 The said date
served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands
that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. 46 Thereafter,
reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion authority.
Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes.
Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands.
It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the LGUs or by way of
Presidential Proclamations because either way they must still undergo conversion process.
It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses
simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does
not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes.
As explained in DAR Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 1994, cited in the 2009 case of
Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW and the Department of Agrarian Reform,47
reclassification of lands denotes their allocation into some specific use and providing for the
manner of their utilization and disposition or the act of specifying how agricultural lands
shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan. For reclassified agricultural lands, therefore, to be used for
the purpose to which they are intended there is still a need to change the current use
thereof through the process of conversion. The authority to do so is vested in the DAR,
which is mandated to preserve and maintain agricultural lands with increased productivity.
Thus, notwithstanding the reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses,
they must still undergo conversion before they can be used for other purposes.
Even reclassification of agricultural lands by way of Presidential Proclamations to non-
agricultural uses, such as school sites, needs conversion clearance from the DAR. We
reiterate that reclassification is different from conversion. Reclassification alone will not
suffice and does not automatically allow the landowner to change its use. It must still
undergo conversion process before the landowner can use such agricultural lands for such
purpose.48 Reclassification of agricultural lands is one thing, conversion is another.
Agricultural lands that are reclassified to non-agricultural uses do not ipso facto allow the
landowner thereof to use the same for such purpose. Stated differently, despite having
reclassified into school sites, the landowner of such reclassified agricultural lands must
apply for conversion before the DAR in order to use the same for the said purpose.
Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations
enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the process of conversion, despite having
undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.
It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural lands
have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school, etc.,
because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. As held in Republic v. Estonilo, 49
only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the
public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of public agricultural lands for
public use or purpose in effect converted the same to such use without undergoing any
conversion process and that they must be actually, directly and exclusively used for such
public purpose for which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from
the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under
the CARP.50 More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for public use or purpose
no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.51 Hence, they are outside the coverage of the CARP and it logically follows that
they are also beyond the conversion authority of the DAR.
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in (1) including lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02,
as amended, subjecting to DAR’s jurisdiction for conversion lands which had already been
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or
after 15 June 1988.
Page 57 of 91
Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of agricultural
lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion procedure or
that DAR’s approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification, did not violate
the autonomy of the LGUs.
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 states that:
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. – (a) A city or municipality may, through an
ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of
Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian
concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage
of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
xxxx
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law," shall not be affected by the said reclassification and
the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said
Act.
xxxx
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any
manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
The aforequoted provisions of law show that the power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural
lands is not absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands
covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by
said Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 by explicitly providing therein that, "nothing in
this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6657."
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not also violate the due process clause, as well as the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. In providing administrative and criminal
penalties in the said administrative order, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply
implements the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No. 6657, thus:
Sec. 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. – The following are prohibited:
xxxx
(c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-agricultural use
with intent to avoid the application of this Act to his landholdings and to disposes his
tenant farmers of the land tilled by them;
xxxx
(f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other
usufructuary right over the land he acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to
circumvent the provisions of this Act.
xxxx
Sec. 74. Penalties. ─ Any person who knowingly or willfully violates the provisions of this
Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month to not more than
three (3) years or a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (₱1,000.00) and not more than
fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.
If the offender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible therefor shall be
criminally liable.
And Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which specifically provides:
Sec. 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. – x x x.
Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with
imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%)
of the government's investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the court, and an
accessory penalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement thereon.
In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an
administrative proceedings, that violation of this law has been committed:
a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and
Page 58 of 91
b. Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion

applications that they may file with the DAR.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the administrative and criminal penalties provided for
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are imposed upon the illegal or premature
conversion of lands within DAR’s jurisdiction, i.e., "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1998."
The petitioner’s argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional, as it
suspends the land use conversion without any basis, stands on hollow ground.
It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the
President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real
estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that time.
Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in
which rice cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said
Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the public, thus, it
cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 59 of 91
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154112. September 23, 2004]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO J. CUENCA and Hon.
ALFONSO B. COMBONG JR., in His Capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though
they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts should be
resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special and original authority to
hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review87[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
March 15, 2002 Decision88[2] and the June 18, 2002 Resolution89[3] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 58536. In the challenged Decision, the CA disposed as follows:
As previously stated, the principal issue raised in the court below involves a pure question
of law. Thus, it being clear that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of the case below, it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the
assailed order denying petitioners motion to dismiss and granting private respondents
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied due course and is accordingly
DISMISSED.90[4]
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land designated
as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area of 81.6117 hectares,
situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of sugar
cane.
On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La
Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca
placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The NOTICE OF
COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value
of the subject land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990.
On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 63, La Carlota City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the
Philippines for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of
Page 60 of 91
E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 713.
In his complaint, Cuenca alleged, inter alia, that the implementation of CARP in his
landholding is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation
should have commenced and should have been completed between June 1988 to June
1992, as provided in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); that the placing of
the subject landholding under CARP is without the imprimatur of the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCOM) as required by R.A. 7905; that Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990
amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering
that on 14 June 1990, then President Corazon Aquino no longer had law-making powers;
that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399 dated 28 February 1974.
Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab
initio and Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 be declared unconstitutional.
On 05 October 1999, MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the
action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.
On 12 January 2000, the respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order
directing MARO and LBP to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage. In
the same order, the respondent Judge set the hearing on the application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction on January 17 and 18, 2000.
On 14 January 2000, MARO Fortunado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order
granting the TRO contending inter alia that the DAR, through the MARO, in the course of
implementing the Notice of Coverage under CARP cannot be enjoined through a Temporary
Restraining Order in the light of Sections 55 and 68 of R.A. 6657.
In an order dated 16 February 2000, the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados
motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all
persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage,
and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) [thereafter filed before the CA] a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It is the submission of the petitioner that the assailed order is in direct defiance of Republic
Act 6657, particularly Section 55 and 68 thereof, which read:
SECTION 55. NO RESTRAINING ORDERS OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS No court in the
Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction against the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated agencies in any
case, dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to, or in connection with the
application, implementation, or enforcement or interpretation of this Act and other
pertinent laws on agrarian reform.
SECTION 68 IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM COURTS INTERFERENCE
No injunction, Restraining Order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower
court against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture
(DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) in the implementation of their program.
Petitioner contends that by virtue of the above provisions, all lower courts, such as the
court presided over by respondent Judge, are barred if not prohibited by law to issue orders
of injunctions against the Department of Agrarian Reform in the full implementation of the
Notice of Coverage which is the initial step of acquiring lands under R.A. 6657.
Petitioner also contends that the nature and subject matter of the case below is purely
agrarian in character over which the court a quo has no jurisdiction and that therefore, it
had no authority to issue the assailed injunction order.91[5]
Page 61 of 91
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage,
but was mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority,
the court a quo also had the power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the
rights of the parties.
The appellate court likewise held that petitioners reliance on Sections 55 and 68 of RA 6657
had been misplaced, because the case was not about a purely agrarian matter. It opined
that the prohibition in certain statutes against such writs pertained only to injunctions
against administrative acts, to controversies involving facts, or to the exercise of discretion
in technical cases. But on issues involving pure questions of law, courts were not prevented
from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
Hence, this Petition.92[6]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into cognizance
that the issues raised in the complaint filed by the private respondent, which seeks to
exclude his land from the coverage of the CARP, is an agrarian reform matter and within
the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely abused its discretion by
sustaining the writ of injunction issued by the trial court, which is a violation of Sections 55
and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657.93[7]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has merit.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction
In its bare essentials, petitioners argument is that private respondent, in his Complaint for
Annulment of the Notice of Coverage, is asking for the exclusion of his landholding from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). According to the DAR, the
issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform, a matter over which the DAR has
original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (RA 6657).
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his Complaint assails mainly the
constitutionality of EO 405. He contends that since the Complaint raises a purely legal
issue, it thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. We do not agree.
Conflicts involving jurisdiction over agrarian disputes are as tortuous as the history of
Philippine agrarian reform laws. The changing jurisdictional landscape is matched only by
the tumultuous struggle for, and resistance to, the breaking up and distribution of large
landholdings.
Two Basic Rules
Two basic rules have guided this Court in determining jurisdiction in these cases. First,
jurisdiction is conferred by law.94[8] And second, the nature of the action and the issue of
jurisdiction are shaped by the material averments of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought.95[9] The defenses resorted to in the answer or motion to dismiss are
Page 62 of 91
disregarded; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend entirely upon the whim of
the defendant.96[10]
Grant of Jurisdiction
Ever since agrarian reform legislations began, litigants have invariably sought the aid of the
courts. Courts of Agrarian Relations (CARs) were organized under RA 126797[11] [f]or the
enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all
agricultural lands under any system of cultivation. The jurisdiction of these courts was
spelled out in Section 7 of the said law as follows:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. - The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions,
matters, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which
determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where
one of the parties works the land, and shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
First Instance over employer and farm employee or labor under Republic Act Numbered six
hundred two and over landlord and tenant involving violations of the Usury Law (Act No.
2655, as amended) and of inflicting the penalties provided therefor.
All the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the then Courts of First
Instance98[12] (now the RTCs) were granted to the CARs. The latter were further vested by
the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) with original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the following matters:
(1) All cases or actions involving matters, controversies, disputes, or money claims
arising from agrarian relations: x x x
(2) All cases or actions involving violations of Chapters I and II of this Code and
Republic Act Number eight hundred and nine; and
(3) Expropriations to be instituted by the Land Authority: x x x.99[13]
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 946 thereafter reorganized the CARs, streamlined their
operations, and expanded their jurisdiction as follows:
Sec. 12. Jurisdiction over Subject Matter. - The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land except those cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission; x x x
;
b) Questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by laws, Presidential
Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to
the agrarian reform program; Provided, however, That matters involving the administrative
implementation of the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree
No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations,
shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, namely:
Page 63 of 91
(1) classification and identification of landholdings;

(2) x x x;
(3) parcellary mapping;
(4) x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
m) Cases involving expropriation of all kinds of land in furtherance of the agrarian
reform program;
xxx xxx xxx
p) Ejectment proceedings instituted by the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Land Bank involving lands under their administration and disposition, except urban
properties belonging to the Land Bank;
q) Cases involving violations of the penal provisions of Republic Act Numbered eleven
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, Republic Act Numbered thirty eight hundred and
forty-four, as amended, Presidential Decrees and laws relating to agrarian reform; Provided,
however, That violations of the said penal provisions committed by any Judge shall be tried
by the courts of general jurisdiction; and
r) Violations of Presidential Decrees Nos. 815 and 816.
The CARs were abolished, however, pursuant to Section 44100[14] of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129101[15] (approved August 14, 1981), which had fully been implemented on February 14,
1983. Jurisdiction over cases theretofore given to the CARs was vested in the RTCs.102[16]
Then came Executive Order No. 229.103[17] Under Section 17 thereof, the DAR shall
exercise quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the
Department of Agriculture [DA]. The DAR shall also have the powers to punish for contempt
and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions.
In Quismundo v. CA,104[18] this provision was deemed to have repealed Section 12 (a) and
(b) of Presidential Decree No. 946, which vested the then Courts of Agrarian Relations with
original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian
reform program.
Under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR was also made responsible for
implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. In accordance with Section 5
of the same EO, it possessed the following powers and functions:
(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and issue
subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writs of execution of its decisions, and other legal
Page 64 of 91
processes to ensure successful and expeditious program implementation; the decisions of

the Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be
immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal;
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian
conflicts and land-tenure related problems as may be provided for by law;
xxx xxx xxx
(l) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands
for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided x x x."
The above grant of jurisdiction to the DAR covers these areas:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.
The foregoing provision was as broad as those theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court
by Presidential Decree No. 946, as the Court ruled in Vda. de Tangub v. CA,105[19] which
we quote:
x x x. The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of
Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the
Department for the implementation of the executive orders just quoted. The rules included
the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the
adjudicatory functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of
x x x [O]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by law, and
all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order No. 229, Executive
Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6289,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.
The implementing rules also declare that (s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over
but not be limited to x x x (that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases
involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other
agrarian laws x x x.106[20]
In the same case, the Court also held that the jurisdictional competence of the DAR had
further been clarified by RA 6657 thus:
x x x. The Act [RA 6657] makes references to and explicitly recognizes the effectivity and
applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions
of Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian
Reform with original jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws, although,
as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction
over two groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture [DA] and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].
xxx xxx xxx
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require
submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to
Page 65 of 91
interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs
through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish
direct and indirect contempt in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as
provided in the Rules of Court.107[21]
Nonetheless, we have held that the RTCs have not been completely divested of jurisdiction
over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657 confers special jurisdiction on Special
Agrarian Courts, which are actually RTCs designated as such by the Supreme
Court.108[22] Under Section 57 of the same law, these Special Agrarian Courts have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following matters:
1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners, and
2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under x x x [the] Act.
The above delineation of jurisdiction remains in place to this date. Administrative Circular
No. 29-2002109[23] of this Court stresses the distinction between the quasi-judicial powers
of the DAR under Sections 50 and 55 of RA 6657 and the jurisdiction of the Special
Agrarian Courts referred to by Sections 56 and 57 of the same law.
Allegations of the Complaint
A careful perusal of respondents Complaint110[24] shows that the principal averments and
reliefs prayed for refer -- not to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged
unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage.
Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may
be gleaned from the following averments, among others:
6. This implementation of CARP in the landholding of the [respondent] is contrary to law
and, therefore, violates [respondents] constitutional right not to be deprived of his property
without due process of law. The coverage of [respondents] landholding under CARP is NO
longer with authority of law. If at all, the implementation of CARP in the landholding of
[respondent] should have commenced and [been] completed between June 1988 to June
1992 as provided for in CARL, to wit: x x x;
7. Moreover, the placing of [respondents] landholding under CARP as of 21 September 1999
is without the imprimatur of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCOM) as mandated and required
by law pursuant to R.A. 7905 x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
9. Under the provisions of CARL, it is the PARC and/or the DAR, and not x x x Land Bank,
which is authorized to preliminarily determine the value of the lands as compensation
therefor, thus x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
12. That the aforementioned NOTICE OF COVERAGE with intendment and purpose of
acquiring [respondents] aforementioned land is a gross violation of law (PD 399 dated 28
February 1974 which is still effective up to now) inasmuch as [respondents] land is
Page 66 of 91
traversed by and a road frontage as admitted by the DARs technician and defendant
FORTUNADO (MARO) x x x;
13. That as reflected in said Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, copy of which is hereto attached
as annex D forming part hereof, [respondents] land is above eighteen percent (18%) slope
and therefore, automatically exempted and excluded from the operation of Rep. Act 6657, x
x x.111[25] (Italics supplied)
In contrast, the 14-page Complaint touches on the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 by
merely making these two allegations:
10. Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 (issued by the then President Corazon
Aquino) is unconstitutional for it plainly amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL. On 14
June 1990, then President Corazon Aquino had no longer law-making powers as the
Philippine Congress was by then already organized, existing and operational pursuant to
the 1987 Constitution. A copy of the said Executive Order is hereto attached as Annex B
forming part hereof.
11. Our constitutional system of separation of powers renders the said Executive Order No.
405 unconstitutional and all valuations made, and to be made, by the defendant Land
Bank pursuant thereto are null and void and without force and effect. Indispensably and
ineludibly, all related rules, regulations, orders and other issuances issued or promulgated
pursuant to said Executive Order No. 405 are also null and void ab initio and without force
and effect.112[26]
We stress that the main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial court
was not the issue of compensation (the subject matter of EO 405113[27]). Note that no
amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion
to invoke the courts function of determining just compensation.114[28]
To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage115[29] constitutes the first necessary
step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of
the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial
jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple
expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is
clearly agrarian.
In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by respondent
in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that in case of doubt, the
jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters
that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, even if the question[s]
involved [are] also judicial in character,116[30] as in this case.
Page 67 of 91
Second Issue:
Preliminary Injunction
Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the
RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity
is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this
Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial
judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:
Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No injunction,
restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in
their implementation of the program.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Decision and
Resolution REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the February 16, 2000 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of La Carlota City (Branch 63) is ANNULLED and a new one entered,
DISMISSING the Complaint in Civil Case 713. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued
therein is also expressly VOIDED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 68 of 91

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE, namely: G.R. No. 169913

JOSEFA DELESTE, JOSE RAY DELESTE,
RAUL HECTOR DELESTE, and RUBEN ALEX
DELESTE,
Petitioners,
Present:
- versus -
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), as VELASCO, JR.,
represented by its Manager, LAND VALUATION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
OFFICE OF LBP COTABATO CITY; THE DEL CASTILLO, and
REGIONAL DIRECTOR REGION 12 OF PEREZ, JJ.
COTABATO CITY, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION X
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, represented by
MCMILLAN LUCMAN, in his capacity as
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of
DAR Lanao del Norte; LIZA BALBERONA, in her
capacity as DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO); REYNALDO BAGUIO, in his
capacity as the Register of Deeds of Iligan City
as nominal party; the emancipation patent
holders: FELIPE D. MANREAL, CUSTUDIO M.
RICO, HEIRS OF DOMINGO V. RICO, HEIRS
OF ABDON T. MANREAL, MACARIO M.
VELORIA, ALICIA B. MANREAL, PABLO RICO,
SALVACION MANREAL, HEIRS OF
TRANQUILIANA MANREAL, HEIRS OF ANGELA
VELORIA, HEIRS OF NECIFURO CABALUNA,
HEIRS OF CLEMENTE RICO, HEIRS OF
MANTILLANO OBISO, HEIRS OF HERCULANO
BALORIO, and TITO BALER,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
June 8, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Page 69 of 91
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set
aside the October 28, 2004 Resolution117[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September
13, 2005 Resolution118[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of
a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7 hectares
(subject property). Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio
Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. Virgilio had been raised by the couple since he was
two years old. Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad, by still another
woman.119[3]
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property.120[4]
On February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste
(Deleste) for PhP 16,000.121[5] The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and
registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled
and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste. The arrears in the payment of
taxes from 1952 had been updated by Deleste and from then on, he paid the taxes on the
property.122[6]
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died.123[7] Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as
special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel
(Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate.124[8]
Page 70 of 91
On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased
spouses, filed before the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del Norte an action
against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property, docketed as Civil Case
No. 698.125[9] Said case went up to this Court in Noel v. CA, where We rendered a
Decision126[10] on January 11, 1995, affirming the ruling of the CA that the subject
property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the
latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result,
Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-
owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.127[11]
Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI, particularly on October
21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice
and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded
to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the said
program.128[12] However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Concomitantly, the notices and processes
relative to the coverage were sent to these heirs.129[13]
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the Zoning Regulation
of Iligan City, reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential.130[14]
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor
of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject
property.131[15] The CLTs were registered on July 15, 1986.132[16]
Page 71 of 91
In 1991, the subject property was surveyed.133[17] The survey of a portion of the land
consisting of 20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on January 8,
1999.134[18] The claim folder for Lot No. 1407 was submitted to the LBP which issued a
Memorandum of Valuation and a Certificate of Cash Deposit on May 21, 2001 and
September 12, 2001, respectively. Thereafter, Emancipation Patents (EPs) and Original
Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001,
respectively, in favor of private respondents over their respective portions of Lot No.
1407.135[19]
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Iligan City for the expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare portion
of Lot No. 1407, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4979. On December 11, 2000, the RTC
issued a Decision granting the expropriation. Considering that the real owner of the
expropriated portion could not be determined, as the subject property had not yet been
partitioned and distributed to any of the heirs of Gregorio and Deleste, the just
compensation for the expropriated portion of the subject property in the amount of PhP
27,343,000 was deposited with the Development Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, in
trust for the RTC in Iligan City.136[20]
On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private
respondents EPs.137[21] This was docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-2002.
On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a
Decision138[22] declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of
Page 72 of 91
ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a

residential/commercial land, and the violation of petitioners constitutional right to due
process of law.
Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of Appeal on July 22, 2003.
Notwithstanding it, on July 24, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution
pursuant to Section 2, Rule XII of the Revised Rules of Procedure, which was granted in an
Order dated August 4, 2003 despite strong opposition from private respondents.139[23] On
January 28, 2004, the DARAB nullified the Order dated August 4, 2003 granting the writ of
execution.140[24]
Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling of the PARAD in
its Decision141[25] dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that the EPs were valid as
it was the heirs of Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case
No. 698 at the time the subject property was placed under the coverage of the OLT Program
considering that DAR was not a party to the said case. Further, it stated that the record is
bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of
1990, and held that whether the subject property is indeed exempt from the OLT Program is
an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR
Secretary or the latters authorized representative. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by the DARAB in its Resolution142[26] dated July 8, 2004.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
85471, challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486. This was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 28, 2004 for petitioners failure to attach the
writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of
the record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers, as required under Sec. 6
of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied by
the appellate court in a Resolution dated September 13, 2005 for being pro forma.
On November 18, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court. In Our
Resolution143[27] dated February 4, 2008, We resolved to deny the said petition for failure
to show sufficiently any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by
the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.
Page 73 of 91
On March 19, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.144[28] On April 11,
2008, they also filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.145[29]
In Our Resolution146[30] dated August 20, 2008, this Court resolved to grant petitioners
motion for reconsideration and give due course to the petition, requiring the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
The Issues
I. [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT THE

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONERS X X X.
II. [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION BASED ON A MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IS JUSTIFIED; AND
[WHETHER THE] OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION IS JUST CONSIDERING THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN.
XXXX
III. [WHETHER PETITIONERS LAND IS] COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM GIVEN

THAT THE CITY OF ILIGAN PASSED [CITY] ORDINANCE NO. 1313 RECLASSIFYING THE
AREA INTO A STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN 1975.
IV. [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND PARTIALLY
EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY] STILL BE SUBJECT[ED] TO AGRARIAN
REFORM.
V. [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO PROCEDURAL

DUE PROCESS.
VI. [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY DAR AND LBP IS

CORRECT GIVEN THAT THE FORMULA USED HAD BEEN REPEALED.
VII. [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS] LEGAL GIVEN

THAT THEY WERE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL PROCEEDING.
VIII. [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN THAT THEY
WERE DIRECTLY ISSUED TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES IN GROSS VIOLATION OF
SECTION 16(E) OF R.A. 6657 X X X.147[31]
Page 74 of 91
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Effect of non-compliance with the requirements

under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
In filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, final orders, or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, it is
required under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court that it be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order, or
resolution appealed from, with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to in the petition and other supporting papers. As stated:
Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the
grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original
or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from,
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein
and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping
as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific
material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
Non-compliance with any of the above-mentioned requirements concerning the contents of

the petition, as well as the documents that should accompany the petition, shall be
sufficient ground for its dismissal as stated in Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the Rules:
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 for petitioners
failure to attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such
material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other supporting
papers.148[32]
A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show that the foregoing
documents required by the appellate court are not necessary for the proper disposition of
the case. Specifically:
Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program]?
Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to the landowner?
Can the OLT be validly completed without a certification of deposit by Land Bank?
Page 75 of 91
[I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention x x x [considering that EPs
were already issued on the basis of CLTs]?
Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?149[33]
Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
when they appended to the petition filed before the CA certified true copies of the following
documents: (1) the challenged resolution dated July 8, 2004 issued by the DARAB denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration; (2) the duplicate original copy of petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration dated April 6, 2005; (3) the assailed decision dated March 15, 2004
issued by the DARAB reversing on appeal the decision of the PARAD and nullifying with
finality the order of execution pending appeal; (4) the Order dated December 8, 2003 issued
by the PARAD reinstating the writ of execution earlier issued; and (5) the Decision dated
July 21, 2003 issued by the PARAD in the original proceedings for the cancellation of the
EPs.150[34] The CA, therefore, erred when it dismissed the petition based on such
technical ground.
Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the appellate
court, instead of dismissing outright the petition, could have just required petitioners to
submit the necessary documents. In Spouses Espejo v. Ito,151[35] the Court held that
under Section 3 (d), Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals,152[36] the
Court of Appeals is with authority to require the parties to submit additional documents as
may be necessary to promote the interests of substantial justice.
Moreover, petitioners subsequent submission of the documents required by the CA with the
motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 6(c), Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.153[37] In Jaro v. CA, this Court held that subsequent and substantial
compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. Particularly:
The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original petition had but
the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that non-compliance in the original petition is admittedly attributable to the
petitioner and that no highly justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced to the
court for it to depart from the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
Page 76 of 91
The hard stance taken by the Court of Appeals in this case is unjustified under the
circumstances.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an
appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz
and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the subsequent
submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these two cases
to comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found
noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied
with the formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the
Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately dismissing the petitions the
appellate court clearly put a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of
the case.154[38] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must
be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.155[39] As held in
Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo:156[40]
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law
and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural
rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to
put an end to litigation speedily and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard.
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit
liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside
technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the
technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by
law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial
system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by the CA on mere technicality is unwarranted in the
instant case.
On the coverage of the subject property
Page 77 of 91
by the agrarian reform program
Petitioners contend that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the
coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No.
1313 by the City of Iligan reclassifying the area into a residential/commercial land.157[41]
Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of any evidence
that the city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt
on the validity of the reclassification over the subject property.158[42] It further noted that
whether the subject property is exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative
determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary, not with
the DARAB.
Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program.159[43] However, this will not prevent the Court from assuming jurisdiction over
the petition considering that the issues raised in it may already be resolved on the basis of
the records before Us. Besides, to allow the matter to remain with the Office of the DAR
Secretary would only cause unnecessary delay and undue hardship on the parties.
Applicable, by analogy, is Our ruling in the recent Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng
Triumph International v. Department of Labor and Employment Secretary,160[44] where
We held:
But as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue hardship, to the point of injustice,
would result if a remand would be ordered under a situation where we are in the position to
resolve the case based on the records before us. As we said in Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila v. Court of Appeals:
[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute
based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for
the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of
justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case.
Thus, we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue. And while we rule that the CA could not
validly rule on the merits of this issue, we shall not hesitate to refer back to its dismissal
ruling, where appropriate. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Page 78 of 91
Pertinently, after an assiduous study of the records of the case, We agree with petitioners
that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian
reform program in view of the enactment by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance,
City Ordinance No. 1313.
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-
agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA,161[45] this Court
held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local
Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission. It was also emphasized therein that [t]he power of the local government to
convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage
of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR].162[46]
Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the
City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area.
DARAB, however, believes that the approval of HLURB is necessary in order for the
reclassification to be valid.
We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the City of
Iligan in 1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was
the Task Force on Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was
already in existence at that time, having been created on September 19, 1973 pursuant to
Executive Order No. 419. It should be noted, however, that the Task Force was not
empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it
was only on August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local
governments were required to submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances,
enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for review and
ratification. The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) was the regulatory
arm of the Ministry of Human Settlements.163[47]
Significantly, accompanying the Certification164[48] dated October 8, 1999 issued by Gil R.

Balondo, Deputy Zoning Administrator of the City Planning and Development Office, Iligan
City, and the letter165[49] dated October 8, 1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah, Regional
Officer of the HLURB, is the Certificate of Approval issued by Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
then Minister of Human Settlements and Chairperson of the HSRC, showing that the local
Page 79 of 91
zoning ordinance was, indeed, approved on September 21, 1978. This leads to no other
conclusion than that City Ordinance No. 1313 enacted by the City of Iligan was approved by
the HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB. The validity of said local zoning ordinance is,
therefore, beyond question.
Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the
enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an
agricultural land within the ambit of RA 6657. As this Court held in Buklod nang
Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.,166[50] To be exempt
from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to
non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the
CARL took effect.
Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the subsequent reclassification by the
local zoning ordinance cannot free the land from the legal effects of PD 27 which deems the
land to be already taken as of October 21, 1972, when said law took effect. Concomitantly,
they assert that the rights which accrued from said date must be respected. They also
maintain that the reclassification of the subject property did not alter its agricultural
nature, much less its actual use.167[51]
Verily, vested rights which have already accrued cannot just be taken away by the
expedience of issuing a local zoning ordinance reclassifying an agricultural land into a
residential/commercial area. As this Court extensively discussed in Remman Enterprises,
Inc. v. CA:168[52]
In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for exemption on the ground that the subject
lands had ceased to be agricultural lands by virtue of the zoning classification by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmarias, Cavite, and approved by the HSRC, specifying them as
residential.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, this Court resolved the issue of whether
lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its precursor agencies, i.e., National
Housing Authority and Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, prior to 15 June 1988,
are covered by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988. We answered in the negative, thus:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657
provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land,
it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those
lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial,
industrial and residential land.
Page 80 of 91
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These
include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL
by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself
defined agricultural land thus
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657
and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its
preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or
industrial use.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound
by such conversion. . . . .
However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light of Administrative Order 04, Series of
2003, which outlines the rules on the Exemption on Lands from CARP Coverage under
Section (3) of Republic Act No. 6657, and Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44,
Series of 1990. It reads:
I. Prefatory Statement
Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), Section 3,
Paragraph (c) defines agricultural land as referring to land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, (or DOJ Opinion 44-1990 for brevity)
and the case of Natalia Realty versus Department of Agrarian Reform (12 August 2993, 225
SCRA 278) opines that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land covered by RA
6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to
approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on 15 June 1988.
Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before 15
June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to divest
tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, which
have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.
As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied to defeat

vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, where
the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the contentious property therein is
agricultural in nature on the ground that the same had been classified as park since 1979
under the Zoning Ordinance of Cabuyao, as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands
through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB. Municipal
Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by the Municipality of Cabuyao,
divided the municipality into residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and
institutional districts, and districts and parks for open spaces. It did not convert, however,
existing agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional. While it
classified Barangay Casile into a municipal park, as shown in its permitted uses of land
map, the ordinance did not provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that an ordinance converting agricultural lands
Page 81 of 91
into residential or light industrial should be given prospective application only, and should
not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships
existing over such land. . . . .
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does not disclose
any provision converting existing agricultural lands in the covered area into residential or
light industrial. While it declared that after the passage of the measure, the subject area
shall be used only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not provided therein that
it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands
located within the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature. This
simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we must, the ordinance should be given
prospective operation only. The further implication is that it should not change the nature
of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such lands.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued in the instant
case. In this respect, We reckon that under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands
were deemed owners of the land they till as of October 21, 1972. This policy, intended to
emancipate the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil, is given effect by the following
provision of the law:
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed
owner of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and
three (3) hectares if irrigated. (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners as of
October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon these tenant-
farmers absolute ownership over the land they were tilling. Certain requirements must also
be complied with, such as payment of just compensation, before full ownership is vested
upon the tenant-farmers. This was elucidated by the Court in Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform:169[53]
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October
21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of
a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued
to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers
cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also
had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the
land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof
of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section
2 that the lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21,
1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be
considered as advance payment for the land.
Page 82 of 91
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land
to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then,
title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have, at most, an

inchoate right over the land they were tilling. In recognition of this, a CLT is issued to a
tenant-farmer to serve as a provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot
owner is awaiting full payment of [just compensation] or for as long as the [tenant-farmer] is
an amortizing owner.170[54] This certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural
land primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-
farmer to acquire the land171[55] he was tilling.
Concomitantly, with respect to the LBP and the government, tenant-farmers cannot be
considered as full owners of the land they are tilling unless they have fully paid the
amortizations due them. This is because it is only upon such full payment of the
amortizations that EPs may be issued in their favor.
In Del Castillo v. Orciga, We explained that land transfer under PD 27 is effected in two (2)
stages. The first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR
transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is its
deemed owner. And the second stage is the issuance of an EP as proof of full ownership of
the landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations or lease rentals by the
farmer-beneficiary.172[56]
In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it
was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were recognized to have
an inchoate right over the subject property prior to compliance with the prescribed
requirements. Considering that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and
subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no vested rights
to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents were issued
the CLTs and were deemed owners.
The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since reclassification had
taken place twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights
accrued prior to reclassification and its approval. Consequently, the subject property,
particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
On the violation of petitioners right to due process of law
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property
under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law
Page 83 of 91
was violated.173[57] Citing De Chavez v. Zobel,174[58] both the DAR and the private
respondents claim that the enactment of PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of
agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production,175[59] implying that there was
no need for an actual notice.
We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property

under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods
roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due process of law.176[60]
Our ruling in Heirs of Jugalbot v. CA177[61] is particularly instructive:
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process.
The Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due
process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the
proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the
name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant
case. The ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to
Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.
xxxx
In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR certification
signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject
property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn
despite the fact that there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation
and report to verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of
the property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and
report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of due
process.
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the case at bar since there was
likewise a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation
to be conducted by the DAR before acquisition of the property was to be undertaken.
Neither was there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and
identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired. Both in the Comprehensive
Page 84 of 91
Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this
right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the
law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those
which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be
observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR.
Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence, any act
committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the
proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and
should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Markedly, a reading of De Chavez invoked by both the DAR and private respondents does
not show that this Court ever made mention that actual notice may be dispensed with
under PD 27, its enactment being a purported statutory notice to all owners of agricultural
lands devoted to rice and/or corn production that their lands are subjected to the OLT
program.
Quite contrarily, in Sta. Monica Industrial & Devt. Corp. v. DAR,178[62] this Court
underscored the significance of notice in implementing the agrarian reform program when it
stated that notice is part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the
landowner of the States intention to acquire a private land upon payment of just
compensation and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that his landholding is not
covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian law.
The Court, therefore, finds interest in the holding of the DARAB that petitioners were not
denied the right to due process despite the fact that only the Nanamans were identified as
the owners. Particularly:
Fourthly, the PARAD also ruled that the petitioners were denied the right to be given the
notice since only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. The fault lies with petitioners
who did not present the tax declaration in the name of Dr. Deleste as of October 21, 1972.
It was only in 1995 that Civil Case No. 698 was finally decided by the Supreme Court
dividing the 34.7 hectares between the Delestes and the Nanamans. Note that Dr. Deleste
died in 1992 after PD 27 was promulgated, hence, the subject land or his share was
considered in his name only (see Art. 777, New Civil Code). Even then, it must be borne in
mind that on September 26, 1972, PD No. 2 was issued by President Marcos proclaiming
the whole country as a land reform area, this was followed by PD 27. This should have
alarmed them more so when private respondents are in actual possession and cultivation of
the subject property.
But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the subject
property. It should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was
registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the
whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said
deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an instrument
involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds
Page 85 of 91
third person who may subsequently deal with the same property.179[63] x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is to notify other persons not
parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into.180[64]
There was, therefore, no reason for DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over
the subject property.
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, is
bolstered by the fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled
and a new one issued in the name of Deleste.181[65] Although tax declarations or realty tax
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive
possession.182[66]
Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify
them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform
program.
On this note, We take exception to our ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA,183[67] where,
despite a finding that there was a violation of due process in the implementation of the
comprehensive agrarian reform program when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular
inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquiring the property,
thereby effectively depriving petitioner the opportunity to at least choose and identify its
retention area in those portions to be acquired,184[68] this Court nonetheless ruled that
such violation does not give the Court the power to nullify the certificates of land ownership
award (CLOAs) already issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, since the DAR must be given the
chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
Page 86 of 91
Manifesting her disagreement that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued CLOAs and
should first ask the DAR to reverse and correct itself, Justice Ynares-Santiago, in her
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,185[69] stated that [i]f the acts of DAR are patently
illegal and the rights of Roxas & Co. violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should be
reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the wrongful acts, in this case the
illegally issued CLOAs, must be declared null and void. She also noted that [i]f CLOAs can
under the DARs own order be cancelled administratively, with more reason can the courts,
especially the Supreme Court, do so when the matter is clearly in issue.
In the same vein, if the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must
immediately take action and declare the issuance as null and void. There being no question
that the CLTs in the instant case were improperly issued, for which reason, their
cancellation is warranted.186[70] The same holds true with respect to the EPs and
certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of title
should the CLTs on which they were grounded are void.187[71] Cancellation of the EPs and
OCTs are clearly warranted in the instant case since, aside from the violation of petitioners
right to due process of law, the subject property is outside the coverage of the agrarian
reform program.
Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata
The LBP maintains that the issue of the EPs validity has already been settled by this Court
in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,188[72] where We held
that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had already become indefeasible and
incontrovertible by the time the petitioners therein instituted the case in 2005; hence, their
issuance may no longer be reviewed.189[73]
In effect, the LBP raises the defense of res judicata in order to preclude a relitigation of the
issue concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents.
Notably, the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (1) bar by prior
judgment,190[74] wherein the judgment in a prior case bars the prosecution of a second
Page 87 of 91
action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action;191[75] and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment,192[76] which precludes relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action
between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.193[77]
Citing Agustin v. Delos Santos,194[78] this Court, in Spouses Antonio v. Sayman,195[79]

expounded on the difference between the two aspects of res judicata:
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior judgment and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. This Court had occasion to explain the difference between
these two aspects of res judicata as follows:
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of
the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes
of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the
concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any right,
fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of
an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
To be sure, conclusiveness of judgment merits application when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction.196[80] Elucidating further on this second aspect of res judicata, the
Court, in Spouses Antonio, stated:
Page 88 of 91
x x x The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action
(and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind
them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on
a timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be
litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and
successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either
for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues
are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.197[81]
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Applying the above statement of the Court to the case at bar, We find that LBPs contention
that this Courts ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy that the EPs and OCTs issued in
2001 had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible precludes a relitigation of the
issue concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents does not hold water.
In the first place, there is no identity of parties in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy and the
instant case. Arguably, the respondents in these two cases are similar. However, the
petitioners are totally different. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petitioners are the
more than 120 individuals who claim to be descendants of Fulgencio Nanaman, Gregorios
brother, and who collectively assert their right to a share in Gregorios estate, arguing that
they were deprived of their inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of the EPs to
private respondents without notice to them. On the other hand, in the instant case,
petitioners are the heirs of Deleste who seek nullification of the EPs issued to private
respondents on grounds of violation of due process of law, disregard of landowners right of
retention, improvident issuance of EPs and OCTs, and non-coverage of the agrarian reform
program, among others. Evidently, there is even no privity among the petitioners in these
two cases.
And in the second place, the issues are also dissimilar. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy,
the issue was whether the filing of a petition for prohibition was the proper remedy for the
petitioners therein, considering that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001,
four (4) years prior to the filing of said petition in 2005. In the instant case, however, the
issue is whether the EPs and OCTs issued in favor of private respondents are void, thus
warranting their cancellation.
In addition, the factual circumstances in these two cases are different such that the
necessity of applying the rule on indefeasibility of title in one is wanting in the other. In
Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petition for prohibition was filed by the petitioners
therein in 2005, notwithstanding the fact that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued
in 2001. For that reason, apart from making a ruling that [p]rohibition, as a rule, does not
lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli, it becomes incumbent upon this Court
to hold that:
x x x Considering that such EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, they had become
indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 in
2005, and may no longer be judicially reviewed.198[82] (Emphasis supplied.)
Page 89 of 91
On the contrary, in the instant case, the petition for nullification of private respondents EPs
and OCTs was filed on February 28, 2002. Taking into account that the EPs and OCTs were
issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, the filing of the petition was
well within the prescribed one year period, thus, barring the defense of indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility. Even if the petition was filed before the DARAB, and not the Regional
Trial Court as mandated by Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree,199[83] this should
necessarily have the same effect, considering that DARABs jurisdiction extends to cases
involving the cancellation of CLOAs, EPs, and even of certificates of title issued by virtue of
a void EP. As this Court held in Gabriel v. Jamias:200[84]
It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its
regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and
jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the
implementation of agrarian reform laws. Pertinently, it is provided in the DARAB Revised
Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and related
agrarian reform laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to cases involving the issuance,
correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and
Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an emancipation patent
does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny.
Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. Section 12 (g) of P.D. No. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court
of Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation
patents issued under P.D. No. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged
with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to disappear the moment a
certificate of title is issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but
merely evidence of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title should the
CLOA, on which it was grounded, be void. The same holds true in the case of a certificate of
title issued by virtue of a void emancipation patent.
From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and not the regular
courts which has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance of Torrens titles in
the names of the petitioners. For, it is a fact that the petitioners Torrens titles emanated
from the emancipation patents previously issued to them by virtue of being the farmer-
beneficiaries identified by the DAR under the OLT of the government. The DAR ruling that
the said emancipation patents were erroneously issued for failing to consider the valid
retention rights of respondents had already attained finality. Considering that the action
filed by respondents with the DARAB was precisely to annul the emancipation patents
issued to the petitioners, the case squarely, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Page 90 of 91
Inevitably, this leads to no other conclusion than that Our ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman
Lonoy concerning the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the EPs and OCTs issued in
2001 does not bar Us from making a finding in the instant case that the EPs and OCTs
issued to private respondents are, indeed, void.
With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised
by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CAs
October 28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The
Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title covering the subject property,
particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in favor of private respondents are hereby declared NULL
and VOID.
The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and Original
Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 91 of 91

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TECSON, ELOISA R. ATTY. DARWIN P.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HONORABLE

Petitioners are landowners whose landholdings are subjected to agrarian reform

W/N the appropriation of the agricultural lands is valid? YES.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the

EXCLUSIONS (NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS)

BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. E. M.

W/N the land owned by EMRASON is subject to CARL? NO.

CARP coverage limited to agricultural land

Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended, particularly defines the coverage of

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:

EXCLUSIONS (POULTRY AND LIVESTOCK FARMS)

LUZ FARMS vs. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

The petition is impressed with merit.

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the

LANDOWNER’S RIGHT OF RETENTION

DAEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to

LAND ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS (OLT)

JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO VS. ABUNDIO ORCIGA

a. Ronald Orciga May 1989 - May 1991

Undeniably, Eugenio Orciga, the original beneficiary and predecessor-in-interest of

A Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) is a document issued to a tenant-farmer, which

Unmistakably, that in case the farmer-beneficiary under PD No. 27 is unable to pay

LAND ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS (COMPULSORY ACQUISITION)

HOLY TRINITY & DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. DELA CRUZ

Sangguniang Bayan ng Malolos passed a resolution in favour of Holy Trinity reclassifying

Pending resolution of the Motion to Withdraw/Quash/Set Aside, the Register of Deeds

W/N the Dakila property was covered by the OLT? NO.

LAND ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS

ISLANDERS CARP-FARMERS BENEFICIARIES MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC.

W/N the joint production agreement is valid? YES.

To prove tenancy or an agricultural leasehold agreement, it is normally necessary to

An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements -- whether

AWARD OF LAND (CERTIFICATE OF LAND OWNERSHIP AWARD)

DIAMOND FARMS, INC.

Diamond Farms, Inc. is a corporation engaged in commercial farming of bananas. It owned

AWARD OF LAND (INDEFEASIBILITY OF AGRARIAN REFORM TITLES)

ESTRIBILLO VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

W/N issuance of emancipation patents divests HMI of ownership? YES.

Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired

PROHIBITED ACTS (ILLEGAL LAND TRANSFERS)

STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

W/N the sale of land of Trinidad to Sta. Monica is valid? NO.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

3. its nature, actual use and income;

Republic of the Philippines

APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO G.R. No. 164195

October 12, 2010

We resolve the petitioners motion for reconsideration addressing our Resolution of

The Court En Banc Resolution

The Chico-Nazario Dissent

The Present Motion for Reconsideration

The Comment of the Land Bank of the Philippines

The Courts Ruling

Just compensation a Basic Limitation on the States

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of

Just Compensation from the

The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to

To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-handed

In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances of this case, delay