SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 1 of 73
1. FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M.
SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership
of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its
determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties
are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are
not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as
the determination of the status of each heir and whether property
included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991,
survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and
their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado,
Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita
M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas
(Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime.
He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir
Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu
Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate
stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu
(Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir
Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-
CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no
opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were
issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate
of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and
approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time
of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal
properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of
₱32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth ₱20,000.00; pieces of
jewelry valued at ₱15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir
Realty worth ₱6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth ₱22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were
excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct
Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it.
The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of January 8,
1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of
January 8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three
certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock;4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10,
1991 involving real properties with the market value of
₱4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock
with total par value of ₱4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock
issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson
worth ₱30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be
allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or
comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita
had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need
for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined
to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the
inventory.7
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory,
and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court on the issue of what properties should be included in or
excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on
that issue.8
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC
issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the
inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should
be included, and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and
considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrix’s motion
for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said
administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are
supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado
by including therein the properties mentioned in the last five
immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the
revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of
her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado
which had come to her possession. She must render such accounting
within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.9
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio,
timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on
the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353
located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and
that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had
already come into the possession of and registered in the name of
Mervir Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for the
reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit
to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or
excluded from the inventory already estopped them from
questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as
administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to
Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson
Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on
March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS
SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO
A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO
S. MERCADO.

II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN
THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF)
PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO
S. MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED
FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE
OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari,
disposing as follows:13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is
GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and
May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the
inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian,
Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated
February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to
be submitted by the administratrix is concerned and affirmed in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for
certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of
properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the
Civil Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold "shall
be transferred to the vendee" upon its "actual and constructive
delivery," and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the
sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita
had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty
because the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989
had been notarized; that Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any
more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of
land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 "for the purpose
of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of
Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of
land were included"; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of
assignment, Mervir Realty had been "even at the losing end
considering that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed
of Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary
consideration through shares of stock"; that even if the assignment
had been based on the deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991,
the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory
"considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the
estate planning scheme"; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also
had no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title
to property registered in the name of third persons or corporation;
that a property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded
the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by
disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions
of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that
the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et
al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of their
agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should
be included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that
petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction
considering that they have already agreed to submit themselves to
its jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included in
or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 2 of 73
Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public
respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning
its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which
they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that
there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March
14, 2001 denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the
inventory of properties which were already titled and in possession
of a third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private
corporation, which under the law possessed a personality distinct
and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation
should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no
authority to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was
not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, private
respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that
would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction
because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a
corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly
established since it cannot be presumed.14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing
the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding
that such properties had been either transferred by sale or
exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that
the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders
of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy
depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or
interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court
distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is
well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more
to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case
but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain
whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial
court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application
for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a
final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason
for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends
the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the
pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will

necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to
incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as
many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as
there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower
court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but
only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment
itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal
is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for
the approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001
denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is
because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet
a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the
inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as
basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional
and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in
affirming the decision of the CA to the effect that the order of the
intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory
was interlocutory and could be changed or modified at anytime
during the course of the administration proceedings, held that the
order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order "in the
sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San
Lorenzo Village lots." The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory,
the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by
the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14,
1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 19 where the
Court declared that a "probate court, whether in a testate or
intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally," and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that
the "patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the
principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only
be settled in a separate action." Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez
v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for
Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final
judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41,
Rules of Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings,
stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a
court of law "that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may
be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that
an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals
with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical
recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally
determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1,
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 3 of 73
which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings,
viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. -
An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an
order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased
person, or the distributive share of the estate to which
such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim
against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim
against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator,
trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration
of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no
appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and
affects the substantial rights of the person appealing,
unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a
new trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not
come under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are
permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion for including properties in the inventory
notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by
Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of
the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by
applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in
reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully
warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the
surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the
person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to
the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the
estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty
and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from
the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three
months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory
and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of
the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion
of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which
has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the
decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1
allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded
from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and
appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising
the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the
administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution
(partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the
administration of the estate."23Hence, the RTC that presides over
the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the
question of what properties should be included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment
in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties
are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of
"positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the
estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary
powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or
attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that
there has been a positive abuse of discretion."25 As long as the RTC
commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an
intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot
adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but
are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the
decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in
the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator.
Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the
Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to
do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises
special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate
court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed
to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased
but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that
the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate
or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption
of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are
not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues
on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as
the determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 4 of 73
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases
for its directive for the inclusion of the properties in question in its
assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that
Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who,
upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of
properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306-R
which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The
administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the
counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory
submitted by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the
said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties
constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties required
to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio
Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not include in the
inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in
her name and which were paid by her from money derived from the
taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a
conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being
conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof should
be included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio
Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in her
name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still
alive. Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being
conjugal in character, and so, one-half thereof should be included in
the inventory of the properties constituting as estate of her
husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this
case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in Badian, Cebu
containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described in and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of
Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil Case
No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the
estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner
thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case
in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard
Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said
property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory
in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of
land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on
January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him
on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the
administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was
made two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made
in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the
transferor has not long to live and made in place of a testamentary
disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of
his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of
which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in
contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in this
case should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado
which were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides,
the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in the
name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his
death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City
Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of
Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing
the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations
indicated that the directive to include the properties in question in
the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far
from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from
Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory because

Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being
inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property
regime was the conjugal partnership of gains. 29 For purposes of the
settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to
include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party
asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime
did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the
burden of proof, and that party must prove the exclusive ownership
by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence.30 In
the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the
conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally
liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected
properties were,31 and which of the properties should form part of
the estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of
Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in
the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title
in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that had involved the
ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of
Emigdio, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in
Emigdio’s name.1âwphi1 Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of
March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had
remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No.
CEB-12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB-12692 was
susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect
that the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out their
differences with the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation
was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was
managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as
its President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family
corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in
favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not
sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties
involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of
regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se
guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and
what the contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity
could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of
Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in
its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the
function of the notary public to validate and make binding an
instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding
legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still
and always is the primary consideration in determining the true
nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of
stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio
would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed
of assignment two days prior to his death was a circumstance that
should put any interested party on his guard regarding the
exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having
been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time.34 In this regard,
whether the CA correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an
estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be
established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles
in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for
immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the
circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of
assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is
merely a system of registration of titles to lands.1âwphi1However,
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 5 of 73
justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made
to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the
State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or
of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the
Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any
question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted
in the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise
subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system
shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of
assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in
the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the
assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the
validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court might have constricted the determination of the
rights to the properties arising from that deed,36 but it does not
prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the
inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is because the
RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited
jurisdiction, was still "deemed to have all the necessary powers to
exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective."37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and
submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues
of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil
Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse,
herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he (or she) may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or
any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that
any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may
be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90
thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as
an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the
estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of
properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any
compulsory heir by the decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or
included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the
authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making
its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all
properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to
the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the
estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means
either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to
act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.39
In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and
May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special
Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late
Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the
case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

2. SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA
Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND
HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON,"
AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on
certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure
question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27,
20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case
No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their
cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent
Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso),
docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged
that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on
June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which
were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44
and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to
their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-
2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of
Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two
(2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of
his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed
that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the
complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not
prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing
that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s
lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011
Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of
action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein
had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous
special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be
considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary,
Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s
son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary
evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract
between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of
Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport. 13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was,
however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to
state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the
instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 6 of 73
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of
whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that
the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a
cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient
cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be
correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which
the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the
plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of
Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and
that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be
cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true,
would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said
complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful
heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In
the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several
other precedents, held that the determination of who are the
decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special
proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal
heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property.1âwphi1 This must take
precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in
a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking
the establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and
not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in
Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the
Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of
filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court
in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this
Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be
an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special
proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with
for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a
special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed
and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar
nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the

proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the
parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case
No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining
whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot
disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the
questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable
jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in
an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light,
it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s
heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing
pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No.
T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent
proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno
Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.
3. THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs,
except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A.
OROSCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the
CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY,Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated March 30, 2012 and
September 25, 2012, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 93035, which reversed and set aside the Decision
dated January 20, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in
Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 10407.
The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:
On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo
(Avelina) and Salvador Orosco (Salvador) filed a Complaint for
annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated
December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6,
2002 before the court a quo. In it, petitioners alleged that Avelina
was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio) and Victoria
Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by
his wife Victoria, six legitimate children, and one illegitimate child,
namely: (1) Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo, petitioner in this case;
(2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco, the mother of petitioner Salvador;
(3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5) Feliciano
Abarientos; (6) Abraham Abarientos; and (7) Carlos Abarientos. His
wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30, 1983.
On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi
City consisting of two thousand eight hundred sixty-nine(2,869)
square meters, more or less, which was covered by Tax Declaration
ARP No. (TD) 0141.
In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by
her daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-
in-law Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in this case, on the
pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of
the lot. It was only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized
that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.
As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to
them, Avelina sought the intervention of the RTC to declare null and
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 7 of 73
void the two (2) documents in order to reinstate TD0141 and so
correct the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.
In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to
facilitate the titling of the subject property. Paragraph 9 of their
Answer reads:
Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the
other heirs of Eulalio Abarientos brought out the idea to
[respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez to have the property
described in paragraph 8 of the complaint registered under the
Torrens System of Registration. To facilitate the titling of the
property, so that the same could be attractive to prospective buyers,
it was agreed that the property’s tax declaration could be
transferred to [respondents] Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez and
Domingo Gualvez who will spend all the cost of titling subject to
reimbursement by all other heirs in case the property is sold; That it
was agreed that all the heirs will be given their corresponding shares
on the property; That pursuant to said purpose Avelina Abarientos-
Rebusquillo with the knowledge and consent of the other heirs
signed and executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact, [petitioner]
Avelina Rebusquillo was given an advance sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (₱50,000.00) by [respondent] spouses and all the delinquent
taxes paid by [respondents].3
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009
annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Avelina on the grounds that (1) with regard to the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her
parents and was not therefore solely entitled to their estate; and (2)
in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina did not really
intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to
facilitate the titling of such property. The dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as
follows:
1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate
of the Deceased Spouses Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria
Villareal, dated December 4, 2001 as well as the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale, notarized on February 6, 2002,
covering the property described in par. 8 of the Amended
Complaint are hereby ordered ANNULLED;
2. That defendant City Assessor’s Officer of Legazpi City is
hereby ordered to CANCEL the Tax Declaration in the
name of private [respondents] spouses Gualvez under ARP
No. 4143 and to REINSTATE the Tax Declaration under ARP
No. 0141 in the name of Eulalio Abarientos;
3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina Abarientos
Rebusquillo is hereby ordered to return or refund to
[respondents] spouses Domingo Gualvez and Emelinda
Gualvez, the ₱50,000.00 given by the latter spouses to the
former.4
Assailing the trial court’s decision, respondents interposed an appeal
with the CA arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being
a public document that has for its object the creation and
transmission of real rights over the immovable subject property. The
fact that Avelina’s testimony was not offered in evidence, so
respondents argued, the signature on the adverted deed remains as
concrete proof of her agreement to its terms. Lastly, respondents
contended that the Complaint filed by petitioners Avelina and
Salvador before the RTC is not the proper remedy provided by law
for those compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of their inheritance.
Pending the resolution of respondents’ appeal, Avelina died
intestate on September 1, 2009 leaving behind several living
heirs5 including respondent Emelinda.
In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted
the appeal and reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The
CA held that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-

Adjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of the existence of the
heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on heirship must be made in
administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil
action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of
Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that
has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face.
Aggrieved by the CA’s Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by
her heirs except respondent Emelinda, and petitioner Salvador are
now before this Court ascribing reversible error on the part of the
appellate court.
We find merit in the instant petition.
It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be
made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action.
However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to
administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is
sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such
recourse.6 Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule
requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil
case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon
the issues it defined during the pre-trial.7 In Portugal v. Portugal-
Beltran,8 this Court held:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15,
1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said
rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies
leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will,
or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A
probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who
are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of
the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could
and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs
could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court
should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one
parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the
inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal
teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of
Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses
Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner
Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador
was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land. As
confirmed by the RTC in its Decision, respondents have stipulated
and have thereby admitted the veracity of the following facts during
the pre-trial:
IV – UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in
the Pre-Trial Order)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 8 of 73
A. x x x
B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted
the following facts:
1. Identity of the parties;
2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents]
to sue and be sued;
3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the
only surviving heir of deceased spouses Eulalio and
Victoria Abarientos;
4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a
portion of the subject property;
5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina
Abarientos;
6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a
daughter of [petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo;
7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10,
1923;
8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate
of the Deceased and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
[petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo on the subject
property.9 (emphasis supplied)
In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with
more reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an
unnecessary superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly
rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court,
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is
the sole heir of the decedent. The second sentence of Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that self-adjudication
is only warranted when there is only one heir:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. –– x
x x If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of
deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio.
In fact, as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the
co-heirs by right of representation of his mother. Without a doubt,
Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that
she is "the only daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO
ABARIENTOS AND VICTORIA VILLAREAL."10 The falsity of this claim
renders her act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her
father invalid. The RTC did not, therefore, err in granting Avelina’s
prayer to declare the affidavit null and void and so correct the wrong
she has committed.
In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in
favor of respondents was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC.
Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute
ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not
the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void,
the subject property is still subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did
not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but only an
aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to respondents
was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from
the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that
Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever
extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of
Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The
former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at

all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
(emphasis supplied)
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A
relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is
not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy binds the parties to their real
agreement.
In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta,11 this Court
explained the concept of the simulation of contracts:
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no
substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The
main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent
contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or
in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an
absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties
may recover from each other what they may have given under the
contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract
to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated
and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence,
where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the
simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the
agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the
parties and their successors in interest. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from
respondents’ very own Answer to petitioners’ Complaint. As
respondents themselves acknowledge, the purpose of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was simply to "facilitate the titling of the [subject]
property," not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them.
Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains
in possession of the property and that there is no indication that
respondents ever took possession of the subject property after its
supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of the
subject property or, in the alternative, to collect rentals from its
possessor, is contrary to the principle of ownership and is a clear
badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void.12
Contrary to the appellate court’s opinion, the fact that the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and
notarized does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility
otherwise provided by the parole evidence rule. The form of a
contract does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act valid.
The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. – x x x
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties
or their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis supplied)
The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent
and agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in
the present case. Again, respondents themselves admit in their
Answer that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of
Absolute Sale were only executed to facilitate the titling of the
property. The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply the exceptions
provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the
true intent of the parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the
document. That said, considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 9 of 73
been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated, petitioners
are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the written agreement.13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 20, 2009 in Civil Case No.
10407 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 4 in Legazpi City is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
4. SECOND DIVISION
November 23, 2016
G.R. No. 203770
MANUELA AZUCENA MAYOR, Petitioner
vs.
EDWIN TIU and DAMIANA CHARITO MARTY, Respondents
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the October 5, 20111 and September 24,
20122 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
06256, which dismissed the petition filed by Remedios
Tiu (Remedios) and Manuela Azucena Mayor (Manuela) for
procedural infirmities. The said CA petition challenged the January
20, 20113 and June 10, 20114 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 6), in Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30, a
case for Probate of Last Will and Testament and Issuance of Letters
of Testamentary.
The Antecedents:
On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan (Rosario), the
widow of the late Primo Villasin (Primo), passed away and left a
holographic Last Will and Testament,5 wherein she named her sister,
Remedios Tiu (Remedios), and her niece, Manuela Azucena
Mayor (Manuela), as executors. Immediately thereafter, Remedios
and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of Rosario's holographic
will6 with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary (probate
proceedings). The petition was raffled to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 9) and docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 2008-05-30. They averred that Rosario left properties
valued at approximately ₱2.5 million.
On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito
Marty (Marty) claiming to be the adopted daughter of Rosario, filed
a petition for letters of administration before the RTC, Branch 34,
Tacloban City (RTC- Br. 34), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-
32, but it was not given due course because of the probate
proceedings. Per records, this dismissal is subject of a separate
proceeding filed by Marty with the CA Cebu City, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 04003.7
On June 12, 2008, in its Order,8 the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition for
probate of will filed by Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in form
and substance and set the case for hearing.
Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent Manifestation and
Motion,9 dated June 23, 2008, stating that Remedios kept the
decedent Rosario a virtual hostage for the past ten (10) years and
her family was financially dependent on her which led to the
wastage and disposal of the properties owned by her and her
husband, Primo. Marty averred that until the alleged will of the
decedent could be probated and admitted, Remedios and her ten
(10) children had no standing to either possess or control the
properties comprising the estate of the Villasins. She prayed for the
probate court to: 1) order an immediate inventory of all the
properties subject of the proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the

estate, namely, Mercury Drug and Chowking, located at Primrose
Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court; 3) direct Metro bank,
P. Burgos Branch, to freeze the accounts in the name of Rosario,
Primrose Development Corporation (Primrose) or Remedios; and 4)
lock up the Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the property until
final disposition by the court.
On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their
Comment/Opposition10 to the urgent manifestation averring that
Marty was not an adopted child of the Villasins based on a
certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tacloban
City, attesting that no record of any adoption proceedings involving
Marty existed in their records. They also argued that the probate
court had no jurisdiction over the properties mistakenly claimed by
Marty as part of Rosario's estate because these properties were
actually owned by, and titled in the name of, Primrose. Anent the
prayer to direct the tenants to deposit the rentals to the probate
court, Remedios and Manuela countered that the probate court had
no jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons, particularly
by Primrose, the latter having a separate and distinct personality
from the decedent's estate.
In her Reply,11 dated July 15, 2008, Marty cited an order of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte (CF! Leyte) in SP No. 1239,12 claiming that
as early as March 3, 1981, the veil of corporate entity of Primrose
was pierced on the ground that it was a closed family corporation
controlled by Rosario after Primo's death. Thus, Marty alleged that
"piercing" was proper in the case of Rosario's estate because the
incorporation of Primrose was founded on a fraudulent
consideration, having been done in contemplation of Primo's death.
Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the Petition for the
Approval of the Will of the Late Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin
Casilan,13 Marty impugned the authenticity of her holographic will.
Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu (Edwin), a son of Remedios, also filed his
Opposition,14 dated June 13, 2008.
After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties submitted their
respective memoranda.
The January 14, 2009 Order
In its January 14, 2009 Order,15 the RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion of
Marty and appointed the OIC Clerk of Court as special administrator
of the Estate. The Probate Court also ordered Mercury Drug and
Chowking to deposit the rental income to the court and Metrobank
to freeze the bank accounts mentioned in the motion of Marty. The
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was applied in the case
considering that Rosario had no other properties that comprised her
estate other than Primrose. According to the probate court, for the
best interest of whoever would be adjudged as the legal heirs of the
Estate, it was best to preserve the properties from dissipation.
On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion for
Inhibition16 on the ground of their loss of trust and confidence in
RTC-Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio C. Sescon (Judge Sescon) to
dispense justice. Later, they also filed their Motion for
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam,17 dated February 3, 2009, arguing
that Rosario's estate consisted only of shares of stock in Primrose
and not the corporation itself. Thus, the probate court could not
order the lessees of the corporation to remit the rentals to the
Estate's administrator. With regard to the appointment of a special
administrator, Remedios and Manuela insisted that it be recalled.
They claimed that if ever there was a need to appoint one, it should
be the two of them because it was the desire of the decedent in the
will subject of the probation proceedings.
In its Order,18 dated March 27, 2009, the RTC-Br. 9 denied the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed its January
14, 2009 Order. The presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also granted the
motion for inhibition and ordered that the records of the case be
referred to the RTC Executive Judge for reraffling. The case was later
re-raffled to RTC-Br.6, Judge Alphinor C. Serrano, presiding judge.
Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration,
Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for certiorari with the CA in
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 10 of 73
Cebu City, docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04254, assailing the January
14, 2009 and March 27, 2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9.19
Ruling of the CA
In its October 16, 2009 Decision,20 the CA reversed the assailed
orders of the RTC Br. 9, except as to the appointment of a special
administrator insofar as this relates to properties specifically
belonging to the "Estate." It held that Primrose had a personality
separate and distinct from the estate of the decedent and that the
probate court had no jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil.
According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders of the probate
court was it stated that its determination of the title of the
questioned properties was only for the purpose of determining
whether such properties ought to be included in the inventory.
When the probate court applied the doctrine of "piercing," in effect,
it adjudicated with finality the ownership of the properties in favor
of the Estate. The CA stated that RTC-Br. 9 had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate ownership of a property claimed by another based on
adverse title; and that questions like this must be submitted to a
court of general jurisdiction and not to a probate court.
The CA added that assuming that the probate court's determination
on the issue of ownership was merely intended to be provisional,
Marty's contentions still had no merit. The properties, which she
claimed to be part of the estate of Rosario and over which she
claimed co-ownership, comprised of real properties registered under
the Torrens system. As such, Primrose was considered the owner
until the titles to those properties were nullified in an appropriate
ordinary action. The CA further stated that the RTC erroneously
relied on the order issued by the CFI Leyte in 1981, in the probate
proceedings involving the estate of Primo. Whatever determination
the CFI made at the time regarding the title of the properties was
merely provisional, hence, not conclusive as to the ownership.
By reason of the favorable decision by the CA, Remedios and
Manuela filed their Motion to Partially Revoke the Writ of Execution
Enforcing the January 14, 2009 Order of the Honorable Court and
Manifestation in Compliance with the October 21, 2009 Order (Ad
Cautelam),21 dated October 27, 2009.
In its Order,22 dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-Br. 6 partially
granted the motion as it revoked the power of the special
administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of Primrose. It
also revoked the order with respect to Mercury Drug and Chowking,
reasoning out that the said establishments dealt with Primrose,
which had a personality distinct and separate from the estate of the
decedent. In the said order, Atty. Blanche A. Salino nominated by
oppositors Marty and Edwin, was appointed special administrator to
oversee the day-to-day operations of the estate. The same order
also upheld the January 14, 2009 Order, as to the conduct and
inventory of all the properties comprising the estate.
This order was not questioned or appealed by the parties.
Omnibus Motion
On September 24, 2010, or almost ten (10) months after the
November 17, 2009 Order of the probate court was issued, Marty,
together with her new counsel, filed her Omnibus Motion, 23 praying
for the probate court to: 1) order Remedios and Manuela to render
an accounting of all the properties and assets comprising the estate
of the decedent; 2) deposit or consign all rental payments or other
passive income derived from the properties comprising the estate;
and 3) prohibit the disbursement of funds comprising the estate of
the decedent without formal motion and approval by the probate
court.
Ruling of the RTC-Br. 6
In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6 granted Marty's
Omnibus Motion. Although it agreed with the October 16, 2009 CA
Decision reversing the January 14, 2009 Order of the RTC-Br. 9,
nonetheless, it acknowledged the urgency and necessity of
appointing a special administrator. According to the probate court,

considering that there was clear evidence of a significant decrease of
Rosario's shares in the outstanding capital stock of
Primrose,24prudence dictated that an inquiry into the validity of the
transfers should be made. A final determination of this matter
would be outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court, but it
was likewise settled that the power to institute an action for the
recovery of a property claimed to be part of the estate was normally
lodged with the executor or administrator. Thus, the probate court
disposed:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, and so as not to render
moot any action that the special administrator, or the regular
administrator upon the latter's qualification and appointment, may
deem appropriate to take on the matter (i.e. Whether or not to
institute in the name of the estate the appropriate action for the
recovery of the shares of stock), this Court
hereby GRANTS Oppositor Marty's Omnibus Motion, dated
September 24, 2010, and thus hereby:
1. DIRECTS petitioners, either individually or jointly, to: (a) RENDER
AN ACCOUNTING of all the properties and assets comprising the
estate of the decedent that may have come into their possession;
and, (b) DEPOSIT OR CONSIGN all the rentals payments or such
other passive incomes from the properties and assets registered in
the name of Primrose Development Corporation, including all
income derived from the Primrose Hotel and the lease contracts
with Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, both within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this Order;
2. DIRECTS the Special Administrator to take possession and charge
of the properties comprising the decedent's estate, specially those
pertaining to the sharesholding of the decedent in Primrose
Development Corporation, to determine whether or not action for
the recovery of the shares of stock supposedly transferred from the
decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu, Manuela Azucena Mayor
should be instituted in the name of the estate against the said
transferees and to submit a Report on the foregoing matters to this
Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order; and,
3. ORDERS that no funds comprising the estate of the decedent shall
be disbursed without formal Motion therefor, with the conformity of
the Special Administrator, duly approved by this Court.
SO ORDERED.25 [Underscoring supplied]
The partial motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by
Remedios and Manuela was denied in the other assailed order of
the RTC-Br. 6, dated June 10, 2011.26
Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, and filed a petition before the CA.
Action by the CA
The CA, however, in its October 5, 2011 Resolution,27 dismissed the
same based on the following infirmities: 1) there was no proper
proof of service of a copy of the petition on the respondents which
was sent by registered mail; 2) petitioners failed to indicate on the
petition the material date when the motion for reconsideration was
filed; 3) the copy of the assailed order was not certified true and
correct by the officer having custody of the original copy; and 4) the
serial number of the commission of the notary public, the province-
city where he was commissioned, the office address of the notary
public and the roll of attorney's number were not properly indicated
on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of the assailed
CA resolution, but to no avail, as the appellate court denied the
motion in its September 24, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by Manuela as
Remedios had also passed away, and anchored on the following
GROUNDS
I.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 11 of 73
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED SECTION 13, RULE 13
OF THE RULES OF COURT AND DECLARED THAT THERE WAS NO
PROPER PROOF OF SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED JURISPRUDENCE AND
RULE 65 AND IT HELD THAT PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY
WITH THE MATERIAL DATE RULE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER
MAYOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION
1, RULE 65 FOR FAILING TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER
MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT ALLOWED TECHNICALITIES TO BE
USED TO DEFEAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE PARTIES.
VI.
PETITIONERS HA VE GOOD CAUSE AND A MERITORIOUS CASE
AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS AS PARAGRAPH l(B) OF THE
DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE FIRST ASSAILED ORDER SHOULD HA
VE BEEN REVERSED BECAUSE IT OVERTURNS THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS DATED 16 OCTOBER 2009 WHICH HAS LONG
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.28
Petitioner Manuela argued that:
1) There was actual compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court. The CA petition was accompanied by a
notarized affidavit of service and filing of registered mail.
At the time the petition was filed, this was the best
evidence of the service. The other registry receipts for the
other parties were also attached to the petition. Further,
the available registry return card was furnished the CA in
the motion for reconsideration.29
2) The failure of the petition to comply with the rule on a
statement of material dates could be excused because the
dates were evident from the records.30
3) The petitioner went to the RTC of Tacloban to secure
certified true copies of the assailed orders. Only the
stamped name of the Clerk of Court, however, appeared
thereon, because the particular branch had no stamp pad
which had the phrase for certification. The branch did not
even have a typewriter in order to affix the phrase on the
copies. These inadequacies could not be attributed to the
petitioners.31
4) The lack of information pertaining to the notary public
in the verification and certification against forum-shopping
should not invalidate the same because, again, it was not
attributable to the parties.32

5) Technicalities should never be used to defeat the
substantive rights of a party.33
In its January 23, 2013 Resolution34 the Court ordered the
respondents to file their respective comments. Marty, in her
Comment, insisted that the petitioner failed to comply with the
procedural requirements as stated by the CA.35
In her Reply to Comment,36 petitioner Manuela clarified that the
affidavit of service was executed on August 31, 2011, which was
after the petition was signed by the lawyers and after it was verified
by the petitioner herself. After contesting Marty's arguments on the
alleged procedural infirmities of the petitions with the CA and this
Court, Manuela asserted that the final and executory October 16,
2009 Decision of the CA already held that Primrose had a personality
separate and distinct from the estate of decedent Rosario.
Meanwhile, in his Manifestation,37 dated May 29, 2013, Edwin
affirmed that he and Manuela decided to patch up their differences
and agreed to settle amicably. Accordingly, he manifested that he
was withdrawing from the case pursuant to their agreement.
On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction38 on
the ground that a flurry of orders had been issued by the RTC-Br. 6
in the implementation of the assailed January 20, 2011 Order, such
as the Order,39 dated May 27, 2013, wherein the probate court
vaguely ordered "the inventory of the exact extent of the
'decedent's estate."' Then another order was issued appointing an
auditing firm to conduct an inventory/audit of the Estate including
the rentals and earnings derived from the lease of Mercury Drug and
Chowking Restaurant, as tenants of Primrose.40 According to
petitioner Manuela, although an inventory of the assets of the
decedent was proper, the probate court ordered an inventory of the
assets of Primrose, a separate and distinct entity. Manuela asserts
that it was clearly in error.
In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,41dated June
17, 2013, Manuela informed the Court that the inventory and
accounting of Primrose would already commence on June 19, 2013.
Marty filed her Opposition,42 dated July 3, 2013, stating that the
petition of Manuela had been rendered moot and academic as the
probate court had declared her as the sole heir of Rosario and
appointed her administrator of the estate. She argued that an
injunctive relief would work injustice to the estate because of the
total assimilation by petitioner of the shareholdings of the decedent
in Primrose and her share in the corporation's income corresponding
to her shareholdings.
Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief were
present,43 the Court issued the TRO44 in favor of Manuela on
October 14, 2013. At the outset, the Court was convinced that the
rights of Primrose sought to be protected by the grant of injunctive
relief were material and substantial and the TRO was issued in order
to prevent any irreparable damage to a corporate entity that could
arise from the conduct of an accounting by the court-appointed
inventory.
The Court's Ruling
The Court now resolves the subject case by the issuance of a
permanent injunction, as prayed for by petitioner Manuela. This
position is supported by law and jurisprudence, as follows:
First. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of
natural persons forming a corporation; and (2) a collection of
property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights
and duties. This class of artificial persons is recognized only to a
limited extent in our law. Example is the estate of a bankrupt or
deceased person.45From this pronouncement, it can be gleaned that
the estate of the deceased person is a juridical person separate and
distinct from the person of the decedent and any other corporation.
This status of an estate comes about by operation of law. This is in
consonance with the basic tenet under corporation law that a
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 12 of 73
corporation has a separate personality distinct from its stockholders
and from other corporations to which it may be connected. 46
Second. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no relevant
application in this case. Under this doctrine, the court looks at the
corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of
persons undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate
juridical personality of the corporation unifying the group. Another
formulation of this doctrine is that when two business enterprises
are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law
and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties,
disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are distinct entities
and treat them as identical or as one and the same. 47 The purpose
behind piercing a corporation's identity is to remove the barrier
between the corporation and the persons comprising it to thwart
the fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate
personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed activities.48
Here, instead of holding the decedent's interest in the corporation
separately as a stockholder, the situation was reversed. Instead, the
probate court ordered the lessees of the corporation to remit
rentals to the estate's administrator without taking note of the fact
that the decedent was not the absolute owner of Primrose but only
an owner of shares thereof. Mere ownership by a single stockholder
or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a
corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the
fiction of separate corporate personalities.49 Moreover, to disregard
the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing
cannot be presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly
established.50
Third. A probate court is not without limits in the determination of
the scope of property covered in probate proceedings. In a litany of
cases, the Court had defined the parameters by which a probate
court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the
question of title in probate proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals,51 the Court explained that, as a rule, the question of
ownership was an extraneous matter which the probate court could
not resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should, or should not, be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate but
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only
determine whether they should, or should not, be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.52
In this case, respondent Marty argues that the subject properties
and the parcel of land on which these were erected should be
included in the inventory of Rosario's estate. More so, the arrears
from the rental of these properties were later on ordered to be
remitted to the administrator of the estate grounded on the
allegation that Rosario had no other properties other than her
interests in Primrose. To the Court's mind, this holding of the
probate court was in utter disregard of the undisputed fact the
subject land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of
Primrose, a third person who may be prejudiced by the orders of the
probate court. In Valera vs. Inserto:53 the Court stated:
xxx, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and
determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of
whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction
as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality

not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a
mode of practice which may be waived.
xxxx
xxx These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here,
the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedent's names but
in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion
to rule.54 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Thus, the probate court should have recognized the incontestability
accorded to the Torrens title of Primrose over Marty's arguments of
possible dissipation of properties. In fact, in the given setting, even
evidence purporting to support a claim of ownership has to yield to
the incontestability of a Torrens title, until after the same has been
set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself. In other words,
the existence of a Torrens title may not be discounted as a mere
incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. Put clearly, if a property covered by Torrens title
is involved, "the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be
given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence
to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in
the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons
named in the title."55
Additionally, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152956 proscribes a
collateral attack on a Torrens title:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack.1âwphi1 It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
In Cuizon vs. Ramolete,57 the property subject of the controversy
was duly registered under the Torrens system. To this, Court
categorically stated:
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was
in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the
respondent administrator and excluded the property in question
from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and
ownership of the property. 58 xxx [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
A perusal of the records of this case would show that that no
compelling evidence was ever presented to substantiate the position
of Marty that Rosario and Primrose were one and the same,
justifying the inclusion of the latter's properties in the inventory of
the decedent's properties. This has remained a vacant assertion. At
most, what Rosario owned were shares of stock in Primrose. In turn,
this boldly underscores the fact that Primrose is a separate and
distinct personality from the estate of the decedent. Inasmuch as
the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of Rosario
are in the possession of, and are registered in the name of,
Primrose, Marty's claims are bereft of any logical reason and
conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.
Fourth. The probate court in this case has not acquired jurisdiction
over Primrose and its properties. Piercing the veil of corporate entity
applies to determination of liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically
applied only to determine established liability. It is not available to
confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first
place, over a party not impleaded in a case.59 This is so because the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only
during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be
even applied, based on the evidence presented, it is imperative that
the court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation.60
Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to
the court's process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 13 of 73
Resultantly, any proceedings taken against the corporation and its
properties would infringe on its right to due process.
In the case at bench, the probate court applied the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil ratiocinating that Rosario had no other
properties that comprise her estate other than her shares in
Primrose. Although the probate court's intention to protect the
decedent's shares of stock in Primrose from dissipation is laudable,
it is still an error to order the corporation's tenants to remit their
rental payments to the estate of Rosario.
Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds that a
permanent and final injunction is in order in accordance with
Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]f
after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to
have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court
shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or
person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or
acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction."
Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to suffer an irreparable injury from
the subject order of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining
Order, dated June 14, 2013, is hereby made PERMANENT, effective
immediately. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City,
is ENJOINED from enforcing and implementing its January 20, 2011
and June 10, 2011 Orders, insofar as the corporate properties of
Primrose Development Corporation are concerned, to avert
irreparable damage to a corporate entity, separate and distinct from
the Estate of Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan.
SO ORDERED.
5. THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES
MARIA FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA
ALARAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 and Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009 and April 23,
2009·, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
107347, Which affirmed the Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in
Civil Case No. 217.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving
several heirs, including his_ children with his first wife, respondents
Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties
including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No.
51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a
family home, the land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos.
40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of
Title and Recovery of Possession 5 dated September 15, 1993,
respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered
that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other
children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses
Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and
substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their
knowledge and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita
acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she
believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however,
did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtoiined by
Pedro and Benita from a bank. 6 The document actually evidenced

receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of ₱87, 352.62 releasing
her and her late husband’s indebtedness therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry,
the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has
no record of any transaction involving the subject properties, giving
them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When
respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4
out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They were
not, however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of
an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, They caused the
annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties
before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint
praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates
of title issued pursuant thereto. 8
In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint
on the groun_d of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in
acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony
during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what they
purchased was only the resort. 10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights
and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs
sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc
for Pl million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the
resort to petitioners for ₱650, 000.00. 11
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the
subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to
irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by
petitioner’s .as well as the circumstances Surrounding the execution
of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized
by a notary public that was not duly commissioned as such on the
date it was executed. 12 The Deed of Sale was Undated, the date of
the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the Typewritten
name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of the document
Was not signed. 13 The trial court also observed that both
documents were Never presented to the Office of the Register of
Deeds for registration and That the titles to the subject properties
were still in the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita. In
addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the Subject properties
were not even presented as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed
the signing and execution of the documents of conveyance. 14 On
The basis thereof, the triaI court ruled in favor of respondents, in its
Judgment, the pertinent portions of its fallo provide:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is Hereby
rendered as follows:
xxxx
4. A) Declaring as a nullity the ~'Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Ex. "l ",
Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public Antonio
G. Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No. IXII,
Series of 1991. .
b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Ex. "2",
Villafria), purportedly executed by Benita T. Rifioza in favor
of spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong,
purportedly notarized by one Alfredo de Guzman marked
Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141, and Book. No. XXX, Series of
1991.
c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements
introduced By defendants Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong in the properties Covered by TCT No. 40807,
40808, 51354 and 51355 of the Register of Deeds for
Nasugbu, Batangas. .
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose
Occupancy within the premises of the four- (4) parcels of land
described in Par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest of
defendant Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver possession
thereof, and all improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and
in behalf of the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 14 of 73
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended
Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza,
each in the capacity and degree established, as well as their direct
successors-in interest, and ordering the defendant Registrar of
Deeds to issue the co1Tesponding titles in their names in the
proportion established by law, pro in division, in TCT Nos. 40807,
40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after restoration) within ten (10)
days from finality of this Decision, 4pon payment of lawful fees,
except TCT No. 40353, which shall be exempt from all expenses for
its restoration.
With no costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial ‘court’s Judgment in its
Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006 in the following wise:
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged,
Alfredo de Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary public from
1989 to July 3, 1991, the date the certification was issued. Such
being the case, the resort deed is not a public document and the
presumption of regularity accorded to public documents will not
apply to the same. As laid down in Tigno, et al. v. Aquino, et al.:
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the
authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public docs net have
the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the
document should be treated as A. Unnotarized. The rule may strike
as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties
in good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary public
or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would
render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court
in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial commission. Without
such a rule,
The notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public
will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer
engaged in pretense. The notarization of a document carries
considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible
in court without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notarization
is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in
a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires
preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as
notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.
Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be
considered a public document. This is because the following cast
doubt on the document's authenticity, to wit: J.
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu,
Batangas for annotation; and
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or the
purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were
presented as witnesses. · Concededly, the absence of notarization in
the resort deed and/or the lacking details in the settlement/family
home deed did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced
by the said documents. However, since the said deeds are private
documents, perforce, their due execution and authenticity becomes
subject to the requirement of proof under the Rules on Evidence,
Section 20, Rule 132 of which provides: Sec. 20. Proof of private
document. - Before any private. Document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution a"Q.d. authenticity must be
proved either:
(a). By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.

The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and
the resort deed are void, as their signatures thereon are forgeries as
opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds' enforceability. After
the Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim
that their signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the
Villafrias to disprove the ~ame2 or conversely, to prove the
authenticity and due execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed
in this regard.
As forestalled, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the
notary public who purportedly notarized the questioned instrument,
(b) the witnesses who appear [Ed] in the instruments as
eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert to prove the
authenticity and genuineness of all the signatures appearing on the
said instruments. Verily, the rule that, proper foundation must be
laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity
and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as
a pre requisite to its admission, was prudently observed by the
lower court when it refused to admit the settlement/family home
and the resort deeds as their veracity are doubtful. 17
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising the
trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the
Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no settlement of
Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor was
there an identification of the number of legitimate heirs. As such,
the trial court ruled on the settlement of the intestate estate of
Pedro in its ordinary· jurisdiction when the action filed was for
Judidal Partition. Considering that the instant action is really one for
settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its
probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the
issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that. Said
ruling is void and has no effect for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied
by the appellate court on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition
for Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the petition,
a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that
failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding
competent evidence of affiant' s identities. 18 In its
Resolution 19 dated September 26, 2007, this Court also denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the absence of any
compelling reason to warrant a modification of the previous denial.
Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became final and executors on
October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry of Judgment issued by the
Court. 20 On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner' s
motion for leave to admit a second motion for reconsideration of its
September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that the same is a
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section
4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Furthennore, petitioner's letter dated December 18, 2007 pleading
the Court to take a second. Look at his petition for review on
certiorari and that a decision thereon be rendered based purely on
its merits was noted without action. 21
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008
addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that a
decision on the case be rendered based on the. Merits and not on
formal requirements "as he stands to lose everything his parents
had left him just because the verification against non-forum
shopping is formally defective." However, in view of the Entry of
Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007, the Court
likewise noted said letter without action. 22
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Part Writ
of Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the
portions disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 200
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and· Order before the CA
assailing October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27, 2008
Order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. In Decision dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA
dismissed the petition a affirmed the rulings of the trial court in the
following wise: Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 15 of 73
already become final and executory and in fact entry of judgment
was issued on 31 October 2007, supra, nevertheless, to put the
issues to rest,·We deem it apropos to tackle the same.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the
Court a quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded.
xxxx
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment
of a judgment may "be based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho Magdato, the High
Tribunal stressed that: There is extrinsic fraud when "the
unsuccessful party had been ·prevented from exhibiting fully his
case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, ... or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; ... "
Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud,
which prevents the aggrieved party ·from having a trial or presenting
his case to the court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair
submission of the controversy. This refers to acts intended to keep
the unsuccessful party away from the courts as when there is a false
promise of compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit.
The pivotal issues before us are (1) whether. There was a time
during the proceedings below that the Petitioners ever prevented
from exhibiting fully their case, by fraud or deception, practiced on
them by Respondents, and (2) whether the Petitioners were kept
away from the court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the
Respondent?
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what we deduced as We
carefully delved. Into the evidentiary facts surrounding the instant
case as well as the proceedings below as shown in the 36-page
Decision of the Court a quo, is that the Petitioners were given ample
time to rebut the allegations of the Respondents and had in fact
addressed every detail of. Respondent's cause of action against
them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation of the Court a quo ‘s lack of
jurisdiction is misplaced.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit
ruling of the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao,
thus: It is elementary that' the active participation of a party in a
case pending against him before a court is tantamount to
recognition of that court's jurisdiction and willingness to abide by
the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on
impugning the court’s jurisdiction. ' In fine, under the circumstances
obtaining in this case the Petitioners are stopped from assailing the
Court a quo 's lack of jurisdiction. Too, We do not find merit in the
Petitioners' second issue, supra. As mentioned earlier, entry of
judgment had already been made on the assailed Decision and
Order as early as 31 October 2007.
xxxx
It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain
equitable remedies such as a petition for annulment. But the I. Rules
are clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial
Courts is resorted to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner, supra.
If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate
remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court, that is their own look
out. The High Tribunal has emphatically pointed out in Mercado, et
al. v. Security Bank Corporation, thus:
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for
annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost
remedy of·appeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a
motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for
annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the party

from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Also, the action for
annulment of judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud
or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Having failed to
avail of the remedies and there being 'a Clear showing that neither
of the grounds was present, the petition must be dismissed. Only a
disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition unacceptable.
23 When the appellate court denied Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution dated April 23, 2009, petitioner
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009,
invoking the following ground:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, NASUGBU,
BATANGAS, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDCITION IN ENTERTAINING THE
SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF PEDRO
RINOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE
HEIRS AND THIRD PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING. 24
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was
captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause
of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro.
Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding
cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while judicial
partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are
ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction,
the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the latter
while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view
of the prohibition found in the Rules on the joiner of special civil
actions and ordinary civil actions. 25 Thus, petitioner argued that the
ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having been
rendered in without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate
court that since the finding of forgery relates only to the signature of
respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented to the
conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as to them.
Petitioner also denies the indings of the courts below that his
parents are builders in bad faith for they only took possession of the
subject properties after the execution of the transfer documents
and after they paid the consideration on the sale.
The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since.
Respondents’ complaint alleged the following causes of action, the
same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial
partition: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu,
Batangas at the time of his death, died intestate on
November 16, 1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto
attached as Annex "A";
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants
enumerated from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only known
heirs of the above-mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and
the Defendants Rolando, Rafael, Antonio, Angelita, Loma
all surnamed Rifioza, and Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R.
Rogador, Epifania Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are
the decedent’s legitimate children with his first wife, while
Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedent’s widow and
Bernadette Rifioza, the decedent's daughter with said
widow. As such, said parties are co-owners by virtue of an
intestate inheritance from the decedent, of the properties
enumerated in the succeeding paragraph; ‘
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all
located in Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no
known legal indebtedness;
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 16 of 73
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and
it will be to the best interest of all heirs that it be
partitioned judicially. 26.
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of
action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent
Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests
thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However,
a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based
on the nature of the suit, the llegations therein, and the relief’s
prayed for, the action, is clearly one for udicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court proyides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If
the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age5
or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir,
he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an
Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by
stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the
filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a
bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the
value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by
the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just
claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a
petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the
death of the decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. 27
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property. 28
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of
respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact,
mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly,
the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that
respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with
the exception of one who is represented by a judicial representative
duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are
the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and
description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate
has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful
heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in
accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that
based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial
partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the
heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights
thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of
estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies
intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. Fails to

furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this
rule, however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4
wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due
from is estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an
ordinary action or partition without submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator
by the court. 30The reasons that where the deceased dies without
pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the. Estate for hem and to deprive the
real owners of their possession to which they are immediately
entitled. 31
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not
isputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without
any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of
intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by ereira v. Court of
Appeals: 32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even
if the estate has no· debts or obligations, if they do not desire to
resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While
Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as
they may see fit, qr. to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the
said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good
reasons to take a different course of action. It should be noted that
recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no
debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly 4eld that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings. 33
Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial
partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate
as law expressly permits the same.1avvphi1 That the complaint
contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate
does not. Mean that there was a prohibited joined of causes of
action for questions as to the estate's properties as well as a
determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and
extent of their titles to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in
partition proceedings alone.34 In fact, a complete inventory of the
estate may likewise be done during the partition proceedings,
especially since the estate has no debts.~5 Indeed, where the more
expeditious remedy 9f partition is available to the heirs, then they
may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings,
dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being
dissipated. 36
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the
annulment of title and recovery of possession does not strip the trial
court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for
the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be
achieved in an action for partition, 37 as can be seen in cases where
1-ourts determine the parties' rights arising from complaints asking
not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of
titles and recovery of ownership and possession of property. 38 In
fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas, 39·wherein a complaint for annulment of
sale and partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the
impropriety of an action for annulment as it constituted a collateral
attack on the certificates of title of the respondents therein, this
Court found the dismissal to be improper in the following manner:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 17 of 73
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action. For partition
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a
resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens
title issued over the disputed realties 'to a collateral attack. It must
be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not
the title itself. The' certificate referred to is that -document issued
by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title
referred to by law means ownership, which is, more often than not,
represented by that document. Petitioner c.pparently confuses title
with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should
not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for
annulment of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral
attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's title to
the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate oftitle over the
same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of
the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the existence
of the same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition,
as held in Municipality of Bifzan·v. Garcia: 40
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with
the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists,
and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and
may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in
the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is
not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does
not exist, or partition is_ legally prohibited. It may end, on the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and
profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is
in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that
event [,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c] ourt with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This
second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting
itself and its approval by the [c] ourt after the. Parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard Thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in
the rents and profits of the real estate in question. xx x. 41 ·
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or
non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. 42 Unless and
until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of an estate. 43
In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial court
acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of settlement of
estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly
erroneous for the instant complaint is precisely one for judicial
partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession, filed
within the confines of applicable law and jurisprudence. Under
Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas
Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation
is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not
merely for partition and recovery of ownership but also for
annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence,
considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering
its decision, the instant petition for annulment of judgment must
necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title
alone, without the prayer for judicial partition, the requirement of
instituting a separate special proceeding for the determination of

the status and rights of the respondents as putative heirs may be
dispensed with, in light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the trial court and had already presented
evidence regarding the issue of heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-
Beltran, 47 the Court explained:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15,
1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said
rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies
leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will,
or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
xxxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of
the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the evil case - subject of the present case, could
and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject · Portugal’s estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,
the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by
the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. 48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes
of action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the trial court, in
arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more than ample opportunity
to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be permitted to allege
lack of jurisdiction just because the judgment rendered was adverse
to them. To repeat, the action filed herein is one for judicial partition
and not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that
respondents also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of
possession in the same proceeding does not strip the court off of its
jurisdiction for asking for 'the annulment of certain transfers of
property could very well be achieved in an action for partition.
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid
as to the heirs who assented to the conveyance as well as their
allegation of good faith, this Court does not find any compelling
reason to deviate from the ruling of the appellate court. As
sufficiently found by both courts below, the authenticity and due
execution of the documents on which petitioner’s claims are based
were inadequately proven. They were undated, forged, and
acknowledged before a notary public who was not commissioned as
such on the date they were executed. They were never presented to
the Register of Deeds for registration. Neither were the supposed
notaries and buyers of the subject properties presented as
witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the
estate, actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the
circumstances surrounding the same militate against the fact of its
occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by
Benita undated and unsigned by Pedro, but the document she
presented purportedly evidencing her receipt of her share in the
sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained
by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court’s
observations as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the transactions
alleged herein are concerned. First, they were seemingly uncertain
as to the number and/or identity of the properties bought by
them. 49 In their Answer, they gave the impression 'that· they bought
both the resort and the family home and yet, during trial, Francisco
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 18 of 73
Villafria claimed they only bought the resort. In fact, it was only then
that they presented the subject Extra Judicial Settlement and Deed
of Sale. 50 Second, they never presented any other document which
w0uld evidence their actual payment of consideration to the selling
heirs. 51 Third, in spite of the. Blatant legal infirmities of the subject
documents of conveyance, petitioners still took possession of the
properties, demolished several cottages, and introduced permanent
improvements thereon.
In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that petitioners
failed to adequately substantiate, with convincing, credible and
independently verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact,
purchased the subject properties. The circumstances surrounding
the purported transfers cast doubt on whether they actually took
place. In substantiating their claim, petitioners relied solely on the
Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly failed to
prove their authenticity and due execution. They cannot, therefore,
be permitted to claim. Absolute ownership of the subject lands
based on the same.
Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and
builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of title builder
that the land the latter is building on is one's own without
knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's. Title. 52 However, in view
of .the manifest defects in the instruments conveying their titles,
petitioners should have been placed on guard. Yet, they still
demolished several cottages and constructed improvement on the
properties. Thus, their claim of. Good faith cannot be given
credence.
Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect
except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between
the parties being deemed resolved and. laid to rest. 53 it is a
fundamental principle in our judicial system and essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 54 Exceptions
to the immutability of final judgment is allowed only under the most
extraordinary of circumstances. 55 Yet, when petitioner is given more
than • ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the
appellate courts, as well as unbiased judgments rendered after a
consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at
hand, the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts
below in the absence of any showing that the same were rendered
with fraud or lack of jurisdiction. ·
WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is DENIED.
The Decision and Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23,
2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals for CA-G.R. SP No. 107347,
which affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217,
insofar as it conce1ns the resort covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title No. 513 54 and No. 51355, and family home covered by TCT No.
40807 and 40808, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
6. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6622 July 31, 1957
Intestate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE BORJA. CRISANTO
DE BORJA, administrator-appellant,
vs.
JUAN DE BORJA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
E. V. Filamor for appellant.
Juan de Borja for himself and co-appellees.
FELIX, J.:
The case. — Quintin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, all surnamed
de Borja, are legitimate children of Marcelo de Borja who, upon his
demise sometime in 1924 or 1925, left a considerable amount of
property. Intestate proceedings must have followed, and the pre-
war records of the case either burned, lost or destroyed during the

last war, because the record shows that in 1930 Quintin de Borja
was already the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja.
In the early part of 1938, Quintin de Borja died and Crisanto de
Borja, son of Francisco de Borja, was appointed and took over as
administrator of the Estate. Francisco de Borja, on the other hand,
assumed his duties as executor of the will of Quintin de Borja, but
upon petition of the heirs of said deceased on the ground that his
interests were conflicting with that of his brother's estate he was
later required by the Court to resign as such executor and was
succeeded by Rogelio Limaco, a son-in-law of Quintin de Borja.
It also appears that on February 16, 1940, at the hearing set for the
approval of the statement of accounts of the late administrator of
the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja, then being opposed by
Francisco de Borja, the parties submitted an agreement, which was
approved by the Court (Exh. A). Said agreement, translated into
English, reads as follows:
1. All the accounts submitted and those that are to be
submitted corresponding to this year will be considered
approved;
2. No heir shall claim anything of the harvests from the
lands in Cainta that came from Exequiel Ampil, deceased,
nor from the land in Tabuatin, Nueva Ecija;
3. That the amounts of money taken by each heir shall be
considered as deposited in conjunction with the other
properties of the intestate and shall form part of the mass
without drawing any interest;
4. That it shall be understood as included in this mass the
sum of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000) that the sisters
Crisanta and Juliana de Borja paid of their own money as
part of the price the lands and three thousand pesos
(P3,000) the price of the machinery for irrigation;
5. The right, interests or participation that the deceased
Quintin de Borja has or may have in Civil Case No. 6190 of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, shall be likewise
included in the total mass of the inheritance of the
Intestate;
6. Not only the lands in Tabuatin but also those in Cainta
coming from the now deceased Exequiel Ampil shall also
from part of the total mass of the inheritance of the
Intestate of the late Marcelo de Borja;
7. Once the total of the inheritance of the intestate is
made up as specified before in this Agreement, partition
thereof will be made as follows:
From the total mass shall be deducted in case or in kind,
Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000) that shall be delivered
to Da. Juliana de Borja and Da. Crisanta de Borja in equal
shares, and the rest shall be divided among the four heirs,
i. e., Don Francisco de Borja, the heirs of Quintin de Borja,
Da. Juliana de Borja, and Da. Crisanta de Borja, in equal
parts. (TRANSLATION)
The Intestate remained under the administration of Crisanto de
Borja until the then outbreak of the war. From then on and until the
termination of the war, there was a lull and state of inaction in
Special proceeding No. 2414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig branch (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja), until upon petition filed by Miguel B. Dayco, as administrator
of the estate of his deceased mother, Crisanta de Borja, who is one
of heirs, for reconstitution of the records of this case, the Court on
December 11, 1945, ordered the reconstitution of the same,
requiring the administrator to submit his report and a copy of the
project of partition.
On January 3, 1946, the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, filed his
accounts for the period ranging from March 1 to December 22,
1945, which according to the heirs of Quintin de Borja were so
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 19 of 73
inadequate and general that on February 28, 1946, they filed a
motion for specification. On April 30, 1946, they also filed their
opposition to said statement of accounts alleging that the income
reported in said statement was very much less than the true and
actual income of the estate and that the expenses appearing therein
were exaggerated and/or not actually incurred, and prayed that the
statement of accounts submitted by the administrator be
disapproved.
The administrator later filed another report of his administration,
dated August 9, 1949, corresponding to the period lapsed from
December 23, 1945, to July 31, 1949, showing a cash balance of
P71.96, but with pending obligation amounting to P35,415.
On August 22, 1949, Juan de Borja and sisters, heirs of the deceased
Quintin de Borja, filed their opposition to the statement of accounts
filed by the administrator on the ground that same was not detailed
enough to enable the interested parties to verify the same; that they
cannot understand why the Intestate could suffer any loss
considering that during the administration of the same by Quintin de
Borja, the Estate accumulated gains of more than P100,000 in the
form of advances to the heirs as well as cash balance; that they
desired to examine the accounts of Dr. Crisanto de Borja to verify
the loss and therefore prayed that the administrator be ordered to
deposit with the Clerk of Court all books, receipts, accounts and
other papers pertaining to the Estate of Marcelo de Borja. This
motion was answered by the administrator contending that the
Report referred to was already clear and enough, the income as well
as the expenditures being specified therein; that he had to spend for
the repairs of the properties of the Estate damaged during the
Japanese occupation; that the allegation that during the
administration of Quintin de Boria the Estate realized a profit of
P100,000 was not true, because instead of gain there was even a
shortage in the funds although said administrator had collected all
his fees (honorarios) and commissions corresponding to the entire
period of his incumbency; that the obligations mentioned in said
report will be liquidated before the termination of the proceedings
in the same manner as it is done in any other intestate case; that he
was willing to submit all the receipts of the accounts for the
examination of the interested parties before the Clerk or before the
Court itself; that this Intestate could be terminated, the project of
partition having been allowed and confirmed by the Supreme Court
and that the Administrator was also desirous of terminating it
definitely for the benefit of all the parties.
On September 14, 1949, the administrator filed another statement
of accounts covering the period of from March 1, 1945, to July 31,
1949, which showed a cash balance of P71.95, with pending
obligations in the sum of P35,810.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja, Juan de Borja and his sisters,
registered their opposition said statement of accounts and prayed
the Court to disapprove the same and to appoint an account to go
over the books of the administrator and to submit a report thereon
as soon as possible. The heir Juliana de Borja also formally offered
her objection to the approval of the accounts submitted by the
administrator and prayed further that said administrator be required
to submit a complete accounting of his administration of the Estate
from 1937 to 1949. On the other hand, Francisco de Borja and
Miguel B. Dayco, as the only heir of the deceased Crisanta de Borja,
submitted to the Court an agreement to relieve the administrator
from accounting for the period of the Japanese occupation; that as
to the accounting from 1937 to 1941, they affirmed their conformity
with the agreement entered into by all the heirs appearing in the Bill
of Exceptions of Juliana de Borja; and they have no objection to the
approval of the statement of accounts submitted by the
administrator covering of the years 1945 to 1949.
On December 6, 1949, the administrator, answered the opposition
of the heir Juliana de Borja, alleging that the corresponding
statement of accounts for the years 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940 and
1941 were presented and approved by the Court before and during
the Japanese occupation, but the records of the same were
destroyed in the Office of the Clerk of that Court during the
liberation of the province of Rizal, and his personal records were
also lost during the Japanese occupation, when his house was
burned; that Judge Peña who was presiding over the Court in 1945
impliedly denied the petition of heirs to require him to render an
accounting for the period from 1942 to the early part of 1945, for

the reason that whatever money obtained from the Estate during
said period could not be made the subject of any adjudication it
having been declared fiat money and without value, and ordered
that the statement of accounts be presented only for the period
starting from March 1, 1945. The administrator further stated that
he was anxious to terminate this administration but some of the
heirs had not yet complied with the conditions imposed in the
project of partition which was approved by the Supreme Court; that
in accordance with said partition agreement, Juliana de Borja must
deliver to the administrator all the jewelry, objects of value, utensils
and other personal belongings of the deceased spouses Marcelo de
Borja and Tircila Quiogue, which said heir had kept and continued to
retain in her possession; that the heirs of Quintin de Borja should
deliver to the administrator all the lands and a document
transferring in favor of the Intestate the two parcels of land with a
total area of 71 hectares of cultivated land in Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija which were in the possession of said heirs, together with the
house of Feliciana Mariano Vda. de Sarangaya, which were the
objects of Civil Case No. 6190 mentioned in Paragraph 11 of the
project of partition; that as consequence of the said dispossession
the heirs of Quintin de Borja must deliver to the administrator the
products of the 71 hectares of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and
the rentals of the house of Feliciana Mariano or else render to the
Court an accounting of the products of these properties from the
time they took possession of the same in 1937 to the present; that
there was a pending obligation amounting to P36,000 as of
September 14, 1949, which the heirs should pay before the
properties adjudicated to them would be delivered. The Court,
however, ordered the administrator on December 10, 1949, to show
and prove by evidence why he should not be accounts the proceeds
of his administration from 1937.
Meantime, Juliana de Borja filed a Constancia denying possession of
any jewelry belonging to the deceased spouses Marcelo de Borja
and Tarcilla Quiogue or any other personal belonging of said
spouses, and signified her willingness to turn over to the
administrator the silver wares mentioned in Paragraph III of the
project of partition, which were the only property in her care, on the
date that she would expect the delivery to her of her share in the
inheritance from her deceased parents.
On July 6, 1950, Juan de Borja and his sisters Marcela, Saturnina,
Eufracia, Jacoba and Olimpia, all surnamed de Borja, as heirs of
Quintin de Borja, filed a motion for the delivery to them of their
inheritance in the estate, tendering to the administrator a document
ceding and transferring to the latter all the rights, interests and
participation of Quintin de Borja in Civil Case No. 7190 of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, pursuant to the provisions of the
project of Partition, and expressing their willingness to put up a
bond if required to do so by the Court, and on July 18, 1950, the
Court ordered the administrator to deliver to Marcela, Juan,
Saturniana, Eufracia, Jacoba and Olimpia, all surnamed de Borja, all
the properties adjudicated to them in the Project of Partition dated
February 8, 1944, upon the latter's filing a bond in the sum of
P10,000 conditioned upon the payment of such obligation as may be
ordered by the Court after a hearing on the controverted accounts
of the administrator. The Court considered the fact that the heirs
had complied with the requirement imposed by the Project of
Partition when they tendered the document ceding and transferring
the rights and interests of Quintin de Borja in the aforementioned
lands and expressed the necessity of terminating the proceedings as
soon as practicable, observing that the Estate had been under
administration for over twenty-five years already. The Court,
however, deferred action on the petition filed by the special
administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Juliana de Borja until after
compliance with the conditions imposed by the project of partition.
But on July 20, 1950, apparently before the properties were
delivered to the heirs, Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco filed a
motion informing the Court that the two parcels of land located in
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, produced some 21,300 cavans of palay,
amounting to P213,000 at P10 per cavan, which were enjoyed by
some heirs; that the administrator Crisanto de Borja had not taken
possession of the same for circumstances beyond his control; and
that there also existed the sum of P70,204 which the former
administrator, Quintin de Borja, received from properties that were
redeemed, but which amount did not come into the hands of the
present, administrator because according to reliable information,
same was delivered to the heir Juliana de Borja who deposited it in
her name at the Philippine National Bank. It was, therefore prayed
that the administrator be required to exert the necessary effort to
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 20 of 73
ascertain the identity of the person or persons who were in
possession of the same amount and of the value of the products of
the lands in Mayapyap, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and to recover the
same for the Intestate Estate.
On July 28, 1950, the special administratrix of the estate of Juliana
de Borja, then deceased, filed an answer to the motion of these two
heirs, denying the allegation that said heir any product of the lands
mentioned from Quintin de Borja, and informed the Court that the
Mayapyap property had always been in the possession of Francisco
de Borja himself and prayed the court that the administrator be
instructed to demand all the fruits and products of said property
from Francisco de Borja.
On July 28, 1950, the heirs of Quintin de Borja also filed their
opposition to the said motion of Francisco de Borja and Miguel B.
Dayco on the ground that the petition was superfluous because the
present proceeding was only for the approval of the statement of
accounts filed by the administrator; that said motion was improper
because it was asking the Court to order the administrator to
perform what he was duty bound to do; and that said heirs were
already barred or stopped from raising that question in view of their
absolute ratification of and assent to the statement of accounts
submitted by the administrator.
On August 16, 1950, by order of the Court, the properties
adjudicated to Juliana de Borja in the project of Partition were finally
delivered to the estate of said heir upon the filing of a bond for
P20,000. In that same order, the Court denied the administrator's
motion to reconsider the order of July 18, 1950, requiring him to
deliver to the heirs of Quintin de Borja the properties corresponding
to them, on the ground that there existed no sufficient reason to
disturb said order. It also ruled that as the petition of Francisco de
Borja and Miguel B. Dayco made mention of certain properties
allegedly belonging to the Intestate, said petition should properly be
considered to gather with the final accounts of the administrator.
The administrator raised the matter by certiorari to this Tribunal,
which was, docketed as G.R. No. L-4179, and on May 30, 1951, We
rendered decision affirming the order complained of, finding that
the Juan de Borja and sisters have complied with the requirement
imposed in the Project of Partition upon the tender of the document
of cession of rights and quit-claim executed by Marcela de Borja, the
administratrix of the Estate of Quintin de Borja, and holding that the
reasons advanced by the administrator in opposing the execution of
the order of delivery were trivial.
On August 27, 1951, the administrator filed his amended statement
of accounts covering the period from March 1, 1945, to July 31,
1949, which showed a cash balance of P36,660. An additional
statement of accounts filed on August 31, 1961 for the period of
from August 1, 1949, to August 31, 1951, showed a cash balance of
P5,851.17 and pending obligations in the amount of P6,165.03.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja again opposed the approval of the
statements of accounts charging the administrator with having failed
to include the fruits which the estate should have accrued from
1941 to 1951 amounting to P479,429.70, but as the other heirs
seemed satisfied with the accounts presented by said administrator
and as their group was only one of the 4 heirs of Intestate Estate,
they prayed that the administrator be held liable for only
P119,932.42 which was 1/4 of the amount alleged to have been
omitted. On October 4, 1951, the administrator filed a reply to said
opposition containing a counterclaim for moral damages against all
the heirs of Quintin de Borja in the sum of P30,000 which was
admitted by the Court over the objection of the heirs of Quintin de
Borja that the said pleading was filed out of time.
The oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, then filed their answer
to the counterclaim denying the charges therein, but later served
interrogatories on the administrator relative to the averments of
said counterclaim. Upon receipt of the answer to said
interrogatories specifying the acts upon which the claim for moral
damages was based, the oppositors filed an amended answer
contending that inasmuch as the acts, manifestations and pleadings
referred to therein were admittedly committed and prepared by
their lawyer, Atty. Amador E. Gomez, same cannot be made the
basis of a counterclaim, said lawyer not being a party to the action,

and furthermore, as the acts upon which the claim for moral
damages were based had been committed prior to the effectivity of
the new Civil Code, the provisions of said Code on moral damages
could not be invoked. On January 15, 1952, the administrator filed
an amended counterclaim including the counsel for the oppositors
as defendant.
There followed a momentary respite in the proceedings until
another judge was assigned to preside over said court to dispose of
the old case pending therein. On August 15, 1952, Judge
Encarnacion issued an order denying admission to administrator's
amended counterclaim directed against the lawyer, Atty. Amador E.
Gomez, holding that a lawyer, not being a party to the action,
cannot be made answerable for counterclaims. Another order was
also issued on the same date dismissing the administrator's
counterclaim for moral damages against the heirs of Quintin de
Borja and their counsel for the alleged defamatory acts,
manifestation and utterances, and stating that granting the same to
be meritorious, yet it was a strictly private controversy between said
heirs and the administrator which would not in any way affect the
interest of the Intestate, and, therefore, not proper in an intestate
proceedings. The Court stressed that to allow the ventilation of such
personal controversies would further delay the proceedings in the
case which had already lagged for almost 30 years, a situation which
the Court would not countenance.
Having disposed of these pending incidents which arose out of the
principal issue, that is, the disputed statement of accounts
submitted by the administrator, the Court rendered judgment on
September 5, 1952, ordering the administrator to distribute the
funds in his possession to the heirs as follows: P1,395.90 to the heirs
of Quintin de Borja; P314.99 to Francisco de Borja; P314.99 to the
Estate of Juliana de Borja and P314.99 to Miguel B. Dayco, but as the
latter still owed the intestate the sum of P900, said heirs was
ordered to pay instead the 3 others the sum of P146.05 each. After
considering the testimonies of the witnesses presented by both
parties and the available records on hand, the Court found the
administrator guilty of maladministration and sentenced Crisanto de
Borja to pay to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, the sum
of P83,337.31, which was 1/4 of the amount which the state lost,
with legal interest from the date of the judgment. On the same day,
the Court also issued an order requiring the administrator to deliver
to the Clerk of that Court PNB Certificate of Deposit No. 211649 for
P978.50 which was issued in the name of Quintin de Borja.
The administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, gave notice to appeal from
the lower Court's orders of August 15, 1952, the decision of
September 5, 1952, and the order of even date, but when the
Record on Appeal was finally approved, the Court ordered the
exclusion of the appeal from the order of September 5, 1952,
requiring the administrator to deposit the PNB Certificate of Deposit
No. 2114649 with the Clerk of Court, after the oppositors had shown
that during the hearing of that incident, the parties agreed to abide
by whatever resolution the Court would make on the ownership of
the funds covered by that deposit.
The issues. — Reducing the issues to bare essentials, the questions
left for our determination are: (1) whether the counsel for a party in
a case may be included as a defendant in a counterclaim; (2)
whether a claim for moral damages may be entertained in a
proceeding for the settlement of an estate; (3) what may be
considered as acts of maladministration and whether an
administrator, as the one in the case at bar, may be held
accountable for any loss or damage that the estate under his
administration may incur by reason of his negligence, bad faith or
acts of maladministration; and (4) in the case at bar has the
Intestate or any of the heirs suffered any loss or damage by reason
of the administrator's negligence, bad faith or maladministration? If
so, what is the amount of such loss or damage?
I. — Section 1, Rule 10, of the Rules of Court defines a counterclaim
as:
SECTION 1. Counterclaim Defined. — A counterclaim is any
claim, whether for money or otherwise, which a party may
have against the opposing party. A counterclaim need not
dismiss or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing
party, but may claim relief exceeding in amount or
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 21 of 73
different in kind from that sought by the opposing party's
claim.
It is an elementary rule of procedure that a counterclaim is a relief
available to a party-defendant against the adverse party which may
or may not be independent from the main issue. There is no
controversy in the case at bar, that the acts, manifestations and
actuations alleged to be defamatory and upon which the
counterclaim was based were done or prepared by counsel for
oppositors; and the administrator contends that as the very
oppositors manifested that whatever civil liability arising from acts,
actuations, pleadings and manifestations attributable to their lawyer
is enforceable against said lawyer, the amended counterclaim was
filed against the latter not in his individual or personal capacity but
as counsel for the oppositors. It is his stand, therefore, that the
lower erred in denying admission to said pleading. We differ from
the view taken by the administrator. The appearance of a lawyer as
counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel
does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents
the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold
him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may
adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The
principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who
are acting in representation of another — such as trustees — in their
individual capacities (Chambers vs. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p.
155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in
the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely
confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant,
however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer
not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin
de Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship does not make the former a party to the
action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We
have arrived at.
Granting that the lawyer really employed intemperate language in
the course of the hearings or in the preparation of the pleadings
filed in connection with this case, the remedy against said counsel
would be to have him cited for contempt of court or take other
administrative measures that may be proper in the case, but
certainly not a counterclaim for moral damages.
II. — Special Proceedings No. 6414 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Pasig branch) was instituted for the purpose of settling the
Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja. In taking cognizance of the
case, the Court was clothed with a limited jurisdiction which cannot
expand to collateral matters not arising out of or in any way related
to the settlement and adjudication of the properties of the
deceased, for it is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a probate
court is limited and special (Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 361).
Although there is a tendency now to relax this rule and extend the
jurisdiction of the probate court in respect to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers (14 Am. Jur. 251-
252), this should be understood to comprehend only cases related
to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes. For it was even
said that:
Probate proceedings are purely statutory and their
functions limited to the control of the property upon the
death of its owner, and cannot extend to the adjudication
of collateral questions (Woesmes, The American Law of
Administration, Vol. I, p. 514, 662-663).
It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the
lower court dismissed the administrator's counterclaim for moral
damages against the oppositors, particularly against Marcela de
Borja who allegedly uttered derogatory remarks intended to cast
dishonor to said administrator sometime in 1950 or 1951, his
Honor's ground being that the court exercising limited jurisdiction
cannot entertain claims of this kind which should properly belong to
a court general jurisdiction. From what ever angle it may be looked
at, a counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an
administrator against the heirs for alleged utterances, pleadings and
actuations made in the course of the proceeding, is an extraneous
matter in a testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into the
action of incidental questions entirely foreign in probate
proceedings should not be encouraged for to do otherwise would
run counter to the clear intention of the law, for it was held that:

The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons
for the benefit of the creditors and those entitled to the
residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling
spirit of our probate law (Magabanua vs. Akel, 72 Phil.,
567, 40 Off Gaz., 1871).
III. and IV. — This appeal arose from the opposition of the heirs of
Quintin de Borja to the approval of the statements of accounts
rendered by the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja, on the ground that certain fruits which should have been
accrued to the estate were unaccounted for, which charge the
administrator denied. After a protracted and extensive hearing on
the matter, the Court, finding the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de
Borja, guilty of certain acts of maladministration, held him liable for
the payment to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, of 1/4
of the unreported income which the estate should have received.
The evidence presented in the court below bear out the following
facts:
(a) The estate owns a 6-door building, Nos. 1541, 1543, 1545, 1547,
1549 and 1551 in Azcarraga Street, Manila, situated in front of the
Arranque market. Of this property, the administrator reported to
have received for the estate the following rentals:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 22 of 73
talked with said Pedro Enriquez when he leased the aforementioned
apartments and admitted paying the rentals to the latter and not to
the administrator. It is interesting to note that Pedro Enriquez is the
same person who appeared to be the administrator's collector, duly
authorized to receive the rentals from this Azcarraga property and
for which services, said Enriquez received 5 per cent of the amount
he might be able to collect as commission. If we are to believe
appellant's contention, aside from the commission that Pedro
Enriquez received he also sublet the apartments he was occupying
at a very much higher rate than that he actually paid the estate
without the knowledge of the administrator or with his approval. As
the administrator also seemed to possess that peculiar habit of
giving little importance to bookkeeping methods, for he never kept a
ledger or book of entry for amounts received for the estate, We find
no record of the rentals the lessees of the other doors were paying.
It was, however, brought about at the hearing that the 6 doors of
this building are of the same sizes and construction and the lower
Court based its computation of the amount this property should
have earned for the estate on the rental paid by Atty. Aguila for the
1 1/2 doors that he occupied. We see no excuse why the
administrator could not have taken cognizance of these rates and
received the same for the benefit of the estate he was
administering, considering the fact that he used to make trips to
Manila usually once a month and for which he charged to the estate
P8 as transportation expenses for every trip.

Annual Basing on the rentals paid by Atty. Aguila for 1 1/2 doors, the estate
Total
Period of time monthly received P112,800 from February 1, 1945, to November 15, 1949,
rentals
rental for the 6 doors, but the lower Court held him accountable not only
March to December, 1945 P3,085.00 P51.42 for the sum of P34,235 reported for the period ranging from March
January to December, 1946 4,980.00 69.17 1, 1945, to December 31, 1949, but also for a deficit of P90,525 or a
total of P124,760. The record shows, however that the upper floor
January to December, 1947 8,330.00 115.70
of Door No. 1549 was vacant in September, 1949, and as Atty. Aguila
January to December, 1948 9,000.00 125.00 used to pay P390 a month for the use of an entire apartment from
January to December, 1949 8,840.00 122.77 September to November, 1949, and he also paid P160 for the use of
January to December, 1950 6,060.00 184.16 the basement of an apartment (Door No. 1541), the use, therefore,
of said upper floor would cost P230 which should be deducted, even
Total P40,295.00 if the computation of the lower Court would have to be followed.

The oppositors, in disputing this record income, presented at the There being no proper evidence to show that the administrator
witness stand Lauro Aguila, a lawyer who occupied the basement of collected more rentals than those reported by him, except in the
Door No. 1541 and the whole of Door No. 1543 from 1945 to instance already mentioned, We are reluctant to bold him
November 15, 1949, and who testified that he paid rentals on said accountable in the amount for which he was held liable by the lower
apartments as follows: Court, and We think that under the circumstances it would be more
just to add to the sum reported by the administrator as received by
1945 him as rents for 1945-1949 only, the difference between the sum
reported as paid by Atty. Aguila and the sum actually paid by the
Door No. 1541 (basement)
latter as rents of 1 1/2 of the apartments during the said period, or
February P20.00 Door No. 1543 P25,457.09 1/4 of which is P6,364.27 which shall be paid to the
March 20.00 For 7 months at P300 oppositors.
April 60.00 a month P2,100.00
May-December 800.00 The record also shows that in July, 1950, the administrator delivered
to the other heirs Doors Nos. 1545, 1547, 1549 and 1551 although
Total P900.00
Doors Nos. 1541 and 1543 adjudicated to the oppositors remained
1946 under his administration. For the period from January to June, 1950,
January-December P1,200.00 January-December P4,080.00 that the entire property was still administered by him, the
1947 administrator reported to have received for the 2 oppositors'
apartments for said period of six months at P168.33 a month, the
January P100.00 January P380.00 sum of P1,010 which belongs to the oppositors and should be taken
February 100.00 February 380.00 from the amount reported by the administrator.
March 180.00 March 1-15 190.00
April-December 1,140.00 March 16-December 4,085.00 The lower Court computed at P40 a month the pre-war rental
admittedly received for every apartment, the income that said
P1,820.00 P5,035.00
property would have earned from 1941 to 1944, or a total of
1948 P11,520, but as We have to exclude the period covered by the
January-December P1,920.00 January-December P5,150.00 Japanese occupation, the estate should receive only P2,880 1/4 of
1949 which P720 the administrator should pay to the oppositors for the
year 1941.
January-November P1,680.00 January-December P4,315.00
15
(b) The Intestate estate also owned a parcel of land in Mayapyap,
Nueva Ecija, with an area of 71 hectares, 95 ares and 4 centares,
From the testimony of said witness, it appears that from 1945 to acquired by Quintin de Borja the spouses Cornelio Sarangaya and
November 15,1949, he paid a total of P28,200 for the lease of Door Feliciana Mariano in Civil Case NO. 6190 of the Court of First
No. 1543 and the basement of Door No. 1541. These figures were Instance of said province, In virtue of the agreement entered into by
not controverted or disputed by the administrator but claim that the heirs, this property was turned over by the estate of Quintin de
said tenant subleased the apartments occupied by Pedro Enriquez Borja to the intestate and formed part of the general mass of said
and Soledad Sodora and paid the said rentals, not to the estate. The report of the administrator failed to disclose any return
administrator, but to said Enriquez. The transcript of the testimony from this property alleging that he had not taken possession of the
of this witness really bolster this contention — that Lauro Aguila same. He does not deny however that he knew of the existence of

this land but claimed that when he demanded the delivery of the
Certificate of Title covering this property, Rogelio Limaco, then
administrator of the estate of Quintin de Borja, refused to surrender
the same and he did not take any further action to recover the
same.
To counteract the insinuation that the Estate of Quintin de Borja was
in possession of this property from 1940 to 1950, the oppositors
presented several witnesses, among them was an old man, Narciso
Punzal, who testified that he knew both Quintin and Francisco de
Borja; that before the war or sometime in 1937, the former
administrator of the Intestate, Quintin de Borja, offered him the
position of overseer (encargado) of this land but he was notable to
assume the same due to the death of said administrator; that on July
7, 1951, herein appellant invited him to go to his house in Pateros,
Rizal, and while in said house, he was instructed by appellant to
testify in court next day that he was the overseer of the Mayapyap
property for Quintin de Borja from 1937-1944, delivering the yearly
proceeds of 1,000 cavanes of Palay to Rogelio Limaco; that he did
not need to be afraid because both Quintin de Borja and Rogelio
Limaco were already dead. But as he knew that the facts on which
he was to testify were false, he went instead to the house of one of
the daughters of Quintin de Borja, who, together with her brother,
Atty. Juan de Borja, accompanied him to the house of the counsel
for said oppositors before whom his sworn declaration was taken
(Exh. 3).
Other witnesses, i.e., Isidro Benuya, Federico Cojo, Emilio de la Cruz
and Ernesto Mangulabnan, testified that they were some of the
tenants of the Mayapyap property; that they were paying their
shares to the overseers of Francisco de Borja and sometimes to his
wife, which the administrator was not able to contradict, and the
lower Court found no reason why the administrator would fail to
take possession of this property considering that this was even the
subject of the agreement of February 16, 1940, executed by the
heirs of the Intestate.
The lower Court, giving due credence to the testimonies of the
witnesses for the oppositors, computed the loss the estate suffered
in the form of unreported income from the rice lands for 10 years at
P67,000 (6,700 a year)and the amount of P4,000 from the remaining
portion of the land not devoted to rice cultivation which was being
leased at P20 per hectare. Consequently, the Court held the
administrator liable to appellees in the sum of P17,750 which is 1/4
of the total amount which should have accrued to the estate for this
item.
But if We exclude the 3 years of occupation, the income for 7 years
would be P46,900 for the ricelands and P2,800 (at P400 a year) for
the remaining portion not developed to rice cultivation or a total of
P48,700, 1/4 of which is P12,175 which We hold the administrator
liable to the oppositors.
(c) The Hacienda Jalajala located in said town of Rizal, was divided
into 3 parts: the Punta section belonged to Marcelo de Borja, the
Bagombong pertained to Bernardo de Borja and Francisco de Borja
got the Jalajala proper. For the purpose of this case, we will just deal
with that part called Junta. This property has an area of 1,345,
hectares, 29 ares and 2 centares (Exh. 36) of which, according to the
surveyor who measured the same, 200 hectares were of cultivated
rice fields and 100 hectares dedicated to the planting of upland rice.
It has also timberland and forest which produce considerable
amount of trees and firewoods. From the said property which has an
assessed value of P115,000 and for which the estates pay real estate
tax of P1,500 annually, the administrator reported the following:
Expenditure
(not including
administration's
Year Income fees
1945........... P625.00 P1,310.42
1946............. 1,800.00 3,471.00
1947............. 2,550.00 2,912.91
1948............. 1,828.00 3,311.88
1949............. 3,204.50 4,792.09
1950............. 2,082.00 2,940.91
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 23 of 73
P12,089.50 P18,739.21
This statement was assailed by the oppositors and to substantiate
their charge that the administrator did not file the true income of
the property, they presented several witnesses who testified that
there were about 200 tenants working therein; that these tenants
paid to Crisanto de Borja rentals at the rate of 6 cavanes of palay per
hectare; that in the years of 1943 and 1944, the Japanese were the
ones who collected their rentals, and that the estate could have
received no less than 1,000 cavanes of palay yearly. After the
administrator had presented witnesses to refute the facts previously
testified to by the witnesses for the oppositors, the Court held that
the report of the administrator did not contain the real income of
the property devoted to rice cultivation, which was fixed at 1,000
cavanes every year — for 1941, 1942, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949
and 1950, or a total of 8,000 cavanes valued at P73,000. But as the
administrator accounted for the sum of P11,155 collected from rice
harvests and if to this amount we add the sum of P8,739.20 for
expenses, this will make a total of P19,894.20, thus leaving a deficit
of P53,105.80, ¼ of which will be P13,276.45 which the
administrator is held liable to pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja.
It was also proved during the hearing that the forest land of this
property yields considerable amount of marketable firewoods.
Taking into consideration the testimonies of witnesses for both
parties, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the administrator
sold to Gregorio Santos firewoods worth P600 in 1941, P3,500 in
1945 and P4,200 in 1946 or a total of P8,300. As the report included
only the amount of P625, there was a balance of P7,675 in favor of
the estate. The oppositors were not able to present any proof of
sales made after these years, if there were any and the
administrator was held accountable to the oppositors for only
P1,918.75.
(d) The estate also, owned ricefields in Cainta, Rizal, with a total area
of 22 hectares, 76 ares and 66 centares. Of this particular item, the
administrator reported an income of P12,104 from 1945 to 1951.
The oppositors protested against this report and presented
witnesses to disprove the same.
Basilio Javier worked as a tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja
which is near the land belonging to the Intestate, the 2 properties
being separated only by a river. As tenant of Juliana de Borja, he
knew the tenants working on the property and also knows that both
lands are of the same class, and that an area accommodating one
cavan of seedlings yields at most 100 cavanes and 60 cavanes at the
least. The administrator failed to overcome this testimony. The
lower Court considering the facts testified to by this witness made a
finding that the property belonging to this Intestate was actually
occupied by several persons accommodating 13 ½ cavanes of
seedlings; that as for every cavan of seedlings, the land produces 60
cavanes of palay, the whole area under cultivation would have
yielded 810 cavanes a year and under the 50-50 sharing system
(which was testified by witness Javier), the estate would have
received no less than 405 cavanes every year. Now, for the period of
7 years — from 1941 to 1950, excluding the 3 years of war — the
corresponding earning of the estate should be 2,835 cavanes, out of
which the 405 cavanes from the harvest of 1941 is valued at P1,215
and the rest 2,430 cavanes at P10 is valued at P24,300, or all in all
P25,515. If from this amount the reported income of P12,104 is
deducted, there will be a balance of P13,411.10 1/4 of which
or P3,352.75 the administrator is held liable to pay to the
oppositors.
(e) The records show that the administrator paid surcharges and
penalties with a total of P988.75 for his failure to pay on time the
taxes imposed on the properties under his administration. He
advanced the reason that he lagged in the payment of those tax
obligations because of lack of cash balance for the estate. The
oppositors, however, presented evidence that on October 29, 1939,
the administrator received from Juliana de Borja the sum of
P20,475.17 together with certain papers pertaining to the intestate
(Exh. 4),aside from the checks in the name of Quintin de Borja.
Likewise, for his failure to pay the taxes on the building at Azcarraga
for 1947, 1948 and 1949, said property was sold at public auction
and the administrator had to redeem the same at P3,295.48,
although the amount that should have been paid was only
P2,917.26. The estate therefore suffered a loss of P378.22.

Attributing these surcharges and penalties to the negligence of the
administrator, the lower Court adjudged him liable to pay the
oppositors ¼ of P1,366.97, the total loss suffered by the Intestate,
or P341.74.
(f) Sometime in 1942, a big fire razed numerous houses in Pateros,
Rizal, including that of Dr. Crisanto de Borja. Thereafter, he claimed
that among the properties burned therein was his safe containing
P15,000 belonging to the estate under his administration. The
administrator contended that this loss was already proved to the
satisfaction of the Court who, approved the same by order of
January 8, 1943, purportedly issued by Judge Servillano Platon(Exh.
B). The oppositors contested the genuineness of this order and
presented on April 21, 1950, an expert witness who conducted
several tests to determine the probable age of the questioned
document, and arrived at the conclusion that the questioned ink
writing "(Fdo)" appearing at the bottom of Exhibit B cannot be more
than 4 years old (Exh. 39). However, another expert witness
presented by the administrator contradicted this finding and
testified that this conclusion arrived at by expert witness Mr. Pedro
Manzañares was not supported by authorities and was merely the
result of his own theory, as there was no method yet discovered
that would determine the age of a document, for every document
has its own reaction to different chemicals used in the tests. There
is, however, another fact that called the attention of the lower
Court: the administrator testified that the money and other papers
delivered by Juliana de Borja to him on October 29, 1939, were
saved from said fire. The administrator justified the existence of
these valuables by asserting that these properties were locked by
Juliana de Borja in her drawer in the "casa solariega" in Pateros and
hence was not in his safe when his house, together with the safe,
was burned. This line of reasoning is really subject to doubt and the
lower Court opined, that it runs counter to the ordinary course of
human behaviour for an administrator to leave in the drawer of the
"aparador" of Juliana de Borja the money and other documents
belonging to the estate under his administration, which delivery has
receipted for, rather than to keep it in his safe together with the
alleged P15,000 also belonging to the Intestate. The subsequent
orders of Judge Platon also put the defense of appellant to bad light,
for on February 6, 1943, the Court required Crisanto de Borja to
appear before the Court of examination of the other heirs in
connection with the reported loss, and on March 1, 1943, authorized
the lawyers for the other parties to inspect the safe allegedly burned
(Exh. 35). It is inconceivable that Judge Platon would still order the
inspection of the safe if there was really an order approving the loss
of those P15,000. We must not forget, in this connection, that the
records of this case were burned and that at the time of the hearing
of this incident in 1951, Judge Platon was already dead. The lower
Court also found no reason why the administrator should keep in his
such amount of money, for ordinary prudence would dictate that as
an administration funds that come into his possession in a fiduciary
capacity should not be mingled with his personal funds and should
have been deposited in the Bank in the name of the intestate. The
administrator was held responsible for this loss and ordered to pay
¼ thereof, or the sum of P3,750.
(g) Unauthorized expenditures —
1. The report of the administrator contained certain sums
amounting to P2,130 paid to and receipted by Juanita V. Jarencio the
administrator's wife, as his private secretary. In explaining this item,
the administrator alleged that he needed her services to keep
receipts and records for him, and that he did not secure first the
authorization from the court before making these disbursements
because it was merely a pure administrative function.
The keeping of receipts and retaining in his custody records
connected with the management of the properties under
administration is a duty that properly belongs to the administrator,
necessary to support the statement of accounts that he is obliged to
submit to the court for approval. If ever his wife took charge of the
safekeeping of these receipts and for which she should be
compensated, the same should be taken from his fee. This
disbursement was disallowed by the Court for being unauthorized
and the administrator required to pay the oppositors ¼, thereof
or P532.50.
2. The salaries of Pedro Enriquez, as collector of the Azcarraga
property; of Briccio Matienzo and Leoncio Perez, as encargados, and
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 24 of 73
of Vicente Panganiban and Herminigildo Macetas as forest-guards
were found justified, although un authorized, as they appear to be
reasonable and necessary for the care and preservation of the
Intestate.
3. The lower Court disallowed as unjustified and unnecessary the
expenses for salaries paid to special policemen amounting to P1,509.
Appellant contended that he sought for the services of Macario
Kamungol and others to act as special policemen during harvest
time because most of the workers tilting the Punta property were
not natives of Jalajala but of the neighboring towns and they were
likely to run away with the harvest without giving the share of the
estate if they were not policed. This kind of reasoning did not appear
to be convincing to the trial judge as the cause for such fear seemed
to exist only in the imagination. Granting that such kind of situation
existed, the proper thing for the administrator to do would have
been to secure the previous authorization from the Court if he failed
to secure the help of the local police. He should be held liable for
this unauthorized expenditure and pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja
¼ thereof or P377.25.
4. From the year 1942 when his house was burned, the
administrator and his family took shelter at the house belonging to
the Intestate known as "casa solariega" which, in the Project of
Partition was adjudicated to his father, Francisco de Borja. This
property, however, remained under his administration and for its
repairs he spent from 1945-1950, P1465,14, duly receipted.
None of these repairs appear to be extraordinary for the receipts
were for nipa, for carpenters and thatchers. Although it is true that
Rule 85, section 2 provides that:
SEC. 2. EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR TO KEEP
BUILDINGS IN REPAIR. — An executor or administrator
shall maintain in tenant able repair the houses and other
structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver
the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when
directed so to do by the court.
yet considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa
solariega" he was not paying any rental at all, it is but reasonable
that he should take care of the expenses for the ordinary repair of
said house. Appellant asserted that had he and his family not
occupied the same, they would have to pay someone to watch and
take care of said house. But this will not excuse him from this
responsibility for the disbursements he made in connection with the
aforementioned repairs because even if he stayed in another house,
he would have had to pay rentals or else take charge also of
expenses for the repairs of his residence. The administrator should
be held liable to the oppositors in the amount of P366.28.
5. Appellant reported to have incurred expenses amounting to
P6,304.75 for alleged repairs on the rice mill in Pateros, also
belonging to the Intestate. Of the disbursements made therein, the
items corresponding, to Exhibits I, I-1, I-21, L-26, L-15, L-64 and L-65,
in the total sum of P570.70 were rejected by the lower court on the
ground that they were all unsigned although some were dated. The
lower Court, however, made an oversight in including the sum of
P150 covered by Exhibit L-26 which was duly signed by Claudio
Reyes because this does not refer to the repair of the rice-mill but
for the roofing of the house and another building and shall be
allowed. Consequently, the sum of P570.70 shall be reduced to
P420.70 which added to the sum of P3,059 representing
expenditures rejected as unauthorized to wit:
Exhibit L-59 ............. P500.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-60 ............. 616.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-61 ............. 600.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-62 ............. 840.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-63 ............. 180.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit Q-2 ............. 323.00 scale "Howe"
Total ...................... P3,059.00
will give a total of P3,479 1/4 of which is P869.92 that belongs to the
oppositors.

6. On the expenses for planting in the Cainta ricefields: — In his
statement of accounts, appellant reported to have incurred a total
expense of P5,977 for the planting of the ricefields in Cainta, Rizal,
from the agricultural year 1945-46 to 1950-51. It was proved that
the prevailing sharing system in this part of the country was on 50-
50 basis. Appellant admitted that expenses for planting were
advanced by the estate and liquidated after each harvest. But the
report, except for the agricultural year 1950 contained nothing of
the payments that the tenants should have made. If the total
expenses for said planting amounted to P5,977, ½ thereof or
P2,988.50 should have been paid by the tenants as their share of
such expenditures, and as P965 was reported by the administrator
as paid back in 1950, there still remains a balance of P2,023.50
unaccounted for. For this shortage, the administrator is responsible
and should pay the oppositors ¼ thereof or P505.87.
7. On the transportation expenses of the administrator: — It appears
that from the year 1945 to 1951, the administrator charged the
estate with a total of P5,170 for transportation expenses. The un
receipted disbursements were correspondingly itemized, a typical
example of which is as follows:
1950
Gastos de viaje del administrador From Pateros
To Pasig ................ 50 x P4.00 = P200.00
To Manila ............... 50 x P10.00 = P500.00
To Cainta ................ 8 x P8.00 = P64.00
To Jalajala ............... 5 x P35.00 = P175.00
= P399.00
(Exhibit W-54).
From the report of the administrator, We are being made to believe
that the Intestate estate is a losing proposition and
assuming arguendo that this is true, that precarious financial
condition which he, as administrator, should know, did not deter
Crisanto de Borja from charging to the depleted funds of the estate
comparatively big amounts for his transportation expenses.
Appellant tried to justify these charges by contending that he used
his own car in making those trips to Manila, Pasig and Cainta and a
launch in visiting the properties in Jalajala, and they were for the
gasoline consumed. This rather unreasonable spending of the
estate's fund prompted the Court to observe that one will have to
spend only P0.40 for transportation in making a trip from Pateros to
Manila and practically the same amount in going to Pasig. From his
report for 1949 alone, appellant made a total of 97 trips to these
places or an average of one trip for every 3 1/2 days. Yet We must
not forget that it was during this period that the administrator failed
or refused to take cognizance of the prevailing rentals of commercial
places in Manila that caused certain loss to the estate and for which
he was accordingly held responsible. For the reason that the alleged
disbursements made for transportation expenses cannot be said to
be economical, the lower Court held that the administrator should
be held liable to the oppositors for ¼ thereof or the sum of
P1,292.50, though We think that this sum should still be reduced
to P500.
8. Other expenses:
The administrator also ordered 40 booklets of printed contracts of
lease in the name of the Hacienda Jalajala which cost P150. As the
said hacienda was divided into 3 parts one belonging to this
Intestate and the other two parts to Francisco de Boria and
Bernardo de Borja, ordinarily the Intestate should only shoulder
¹/3 of the said expense, but as the tenants who testified during the
hearing of the matter testified that those printed forms were not
being used, the Court adjudged the administrator personally
responsible for this amount. The records reveal, that this printed
form was not utilized because the tenants refused to sign any, and
We can presume that when the administrator ordered for the
printing of the same, he did not foresee this situation. As there is no
showing that said printed contracts were used by another and that
they are still in the possession of the administrator which could be
utilized anytime, this disbursement may be allowed.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 25 of 73
The report also contains a receipt of payment made to Mr. Severo
Abellera in the sum of P375 for his transportation expenses as one
of the two commissioners who prepared the Project of Partition. The
oppositors were able to prove that on May 24, 1941, the Court
authorized the administrator to withdraw from the funds of the
intestate the sum of P300 to defray the transportation expenses of
the commissioners. The administrator, however, alleged that he
used this amount for the payment of certain fees necessary in
connection with the approval of the proposed plan of the Azcarraga
property which was then being processed in the City Engineer's
Office. From that testimony, it would seem that appellant could
even go to the extent of disobeying the order of the Court specifying
for what purpose that amount should be appropriated and took
upon himself the task of judging for what it will serve best. Since he
was not able to show or prove that the money intended and ordered
by the Court to be paid for the transportation expenses of the
commissioners was spent for the benefit of the estate as claimed,
the administrator should be held responsible therefor and pay to the
oppositors ¼ of P375 or the sum of P93.75.
The records reveal that for the service of summons to the
defendants in Civil Case No. 84 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
P104 was paid to the Provincial Sheriff of the same province (Exhibit
H-7). However, an item for P40 appeared to have been paid to the
Chief of Police on Jalajala allegedly for the service of the same
summons. Appellant claimed that as the defendants in said civil case
lived in remote barrios, the services of the Chief of Police as
delegate or agent of the Provincial Sheriff were necessary. He forgot
probably the fact that the local chiefs of police are deputy
sheriffs ex-officio. The administrator was therefore ordered by the
lower Court to pay ¼ of said amount or P10 to the oppositors.
The administrator included in his Report the sum of P550 paid to
Atty. Filamor for his professional services rendered for the defense
of the administrator in G.R. No. L-4179, which was decided against
him, with costs. The lower Court disallowed this disbursement on
the ground that this Court provided that the costs of that litigation
should not be borne by the estate but by the administrator himself,
personally.
Costs of a litigation in the Supreme Court taxed by the Clerk of
Court, after a verified petition has been filed by the prevailing party,
shall be awarded to said party and will only include his fee and that
of his attorney for their appearance which shall not be more than
P40; expenses for the printing and the copies of the record on
appeal; all lawful charges imposed by the Clerk of Court; fees for the
taking of depositions and other expenses connected with the
appearance of witnesses or for lawful fees of a commissioner (De la
Cruz, Philippine Supreme Court Practice, p. 70-71). If the costs
provided for in that case, which this Court ordered to be chargeable
personally against the administrator are not recoverable by the
latter, with more reason this item could not be charged against the
Intestate. Consequently, the administrator should pay the
oppositors ¼ of the sum of P550 or P137.50.
(e) The lower Court in its decision required appellant to pay the
oppositors the sum of P1,395 out of the funds still in the possession
of the administrator.
In the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, there
appeared a cash balance of P5,851.17 as of August 31, 1961. From
this amount, the sum of P1,002.96 representing the Certificate of
Deposit No. 21619 and Check No. 57338, both of the Philippine
National Bank and in the name of Quintin de Borja, was deducted
leaving a balance of P4,848. As Judge Zulueta ordered the delivery to
the oppositors of the amount of P1,890 in his order of October 8,
1951; the delivery of the amount of P810 to the estate of Juliana de
Borja in his order of October 23, 1951, and the sum of P932.32 to
the same estate of Juliana de Borja by order of the Court of February
29, 1952, or a total of P3,632.32 after deducting the same from the
cash in the possession of the administrator, there will only be a
remainder of P134.98.
The Intestate is also the creditor of Miguel B. Dayco, heir and
administrator of the estate of Crisanta de Borja, in the sum of P900
(Exhibits S and S-1). Adding this credit to the actual cash on hand,
there will be a total of P1,034.98, ¼, of which or P258.74 properly
belongs to the oppositors. However, as there is only a residue of

P134.98 in the hands of the administrator and dividing it among the
3 groups of heirs who are not indebted to the Intestate, each group
will receive P44.99, and Miguel B. Dayco is under obligation to
reimburse P213.76 to each of them.
The lower Court ordered the administrator to deliver to the
oppositors the amount of P1,395.90 and P314.99 each to Francisco
de Borja and the estate of Juliana de Borja, but as We have arrived
at the computation that the three heirs not idebted to the Intestate
ought to receive P44.99 each out of the amount of P134.98, the
oppositors are entitled to the sum of P1,080.91 — the amount
deducted from them as taxes but which the Court ordered to be
returned to them — plus P44.99 or a total of P1,125.90. It appearing
however, that ina Joint Motion dated November 27, 1952, duly
approved by the Court, the parties agreed to fix the amount at
P1,125.58, as the amount due and said heirs have already received
this amount in satisfaction of this item, no other sum can be
chargeable against the administrator.
(f) The probate Court also ordered the administrator to render an
accounting of his administration during the Japanese occupation on
the ground that although appellant maintained that whatever
money he received during that period is worthless, same having
been declared without any value, yet during the early years of the
war, or during 1942-43, the Philippine peso was still in circulation,
and articles of prime necessity as rice and firewood commanded
high prices and were paid with jewels or other valuables.
But We must not forget that in his order of December 11, 1945,
Judge Peña required the administrator to render an accounting of
his administration only from March 1, 1945, to December of the
same year without ordering said administrator to include therein the
occupation period. Although the Court below mentioned the
condition then prevailing during the war-years, We cannot simply
presume, in the absence of proof to that effect, that the
administrator received such valuables or properties for the use or in
exchange of any asset or produce of the Intestate, and in view of the
aforementioned order of Judge Peña, which We find no reason to
disturb, We see no practical reason for requiring appellant to
account for those occupation years when everything was affected by
the abnormal conditions created by the war. The records of the
Philippine National Bank show that there was a current account
jointly in the names of Crisanto de Borja and Juanita V. Jarencio, his
wife, with a balance of P36,750.35 in Japanese military notes and
admittedly belonging to the Intestate and We do not believe that
the oppositors or any of the heirs would be interested in an
accounting for the purpose of dividing or distributing this deposit.
(g) On the sum of P13,294 for administrator's fees:
It is not disputed that the administrator set aside for himself and
collected from the estate the sum of P13,294 as his fees from 1945
to 1951 at the rate of P2,400 a year. There is no controversy as to
the fact that this appropriated amount was taken without the order
or previous approval by the probate Court. Neither is there any
doubt that the administration of the Intestate estate by Crisanto de
Borja is far from satisfactory.
Yet it is a fact that Crisanto de Borja exercised the functions of an
administrator and is entitled also to a certain amount as
compensation for the work and services he has rendered as such.
Now, considering the extent and size of the estate, the amount
involved and the nature of the properties under administration, the
amount collected by the administrator for his compensation at P200
a month is not unreasonable and should therefore be allowed.
It might be argued against this disbursement that the records are
replete with instances of highly irregular practices of the
administrator, such as the pretended ignorance of the necessity of a
book or ledger or at least a list of chronological and dated entries of
money or produce the Intestate acquired and the amount of
disbursements made for the same properties; that admittedly he did
not have even a list of the names of the lessees to the properties
under his administration, nor even a list of those who owed back
rentals, and although We certainly agree with the probate Court in
finding appellant guilty of acts of maladministration, specifically in
mixing the funds of the estate under his administration with his
personal funds instead of keeping a current account for the Intestate
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 26 of 73
in his capacity as administrator, We are of the opinion that despite
these irregular practices for which he was held already liable and
made in some instances to reimburse the Intestate for amounts that
were not properly accounted for, his claim for compensation as
administrator's fees shall be as they are hereby allowed.
Recapitulation. — Taking all the matters threshed herein together,
the administrator is held liable to pay to the heirs of Quintin de
Borja the following:
Under Paragraphs III and IV:
(a) P7,084.27
...............................................................................
(b) 12,175.00
...............................................................................
(c) 16,113.95
...............................................................................
(d) 3,352.75
...............................................................................
(e) 341.74
...............................................................................
(f) 3,750.00
................................................................................
(g) 1 ..................................................................... 532.50
2 ..................................................................... 377.25
3 ..................................................................... 366.28
4 ..................................................................... 869.92
5 ..................................................................... 505.87
6 ..................................................................... 500.00
7-a
b .................................................................. 93.75
c .................................................................. 10.00
d ................................................................... 137.50
P46,210.00
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified by
reducing the amount that the administrator was sentenced to pay
the oppositors to the sum of P46,210.78 (instead of P83,337.31),
plus legal interests on this amount from the date of the decision
appealed from, which is hereby affirmed in all other respects.
Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
7. SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188921 April 18, 2012
LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and VITTORIO C.
ROMERO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, praying for the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 14 April 2009 and the subsequent Resolution2 dated
21 July 2009.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed
by petitioners which alleged grave abuse of discretion in the
Resolutions dated 14 December 2007 and 29 January 2008 issued by
Judge Maria Susana T. Baua in her capacity as presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The said
Resolutions dismissed petitioners’ complaint against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death on 18 October 1974,
their mother, respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal
guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for

her children.3 Since that year until the present, she continues to be
the administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments
comprising the estate of her late husband.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that
several Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are
purportedly conjugal properties of their parents. These included the
following real and personal properties:
1. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-G of Subdivision Plan
Psd-67995 situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 16142 and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 290013 in the name
of Vittorio C. Romero. A warehouse stands on the lot,
covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16142.
2. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-D of Subdivision Plan
Psd-67995 situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 405, and
TCT No. 77223 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero
and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
3. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-E of Subdivision Plan
Psd-67995 situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of
Real Property No. 407 and TCT No. 77224 in the names of
Spouses Dante Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
4. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-H of Subdivision Plan
Psd-67995 situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 406, and
TCT No. 77225 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero
and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
5. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3815-A of Subdivision
Plan Psd-227224 situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy,
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of four
hundred ninety-four square meters under TCT No. 113514
in the name of Aurora Cruz vda. de Romero.
6. A parcel of land located in Barangay Burgos,
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of more or
less three hundred seventy-nine square meters under
Declaration of Real Property No. 16136. It is not yet
registered under Act 496 or the Old Spanish Mortgage
Law, but registrable under Act 3344 as amended. The
improvement thereon, a building classified as a
warehouse, is covered by Declaration of Real Property No.
16136 A.
7. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of more or less two
hundred four square meters under Declaration of Real
Property No. 16139. It is not yet registered under Act 496
or Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon is
covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16140.
8. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy,
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of more or
less eleven thousand six hundred forty-six square meters
under Declaration of Real Property No. 724 and TCT No.
284241 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.
9. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy,
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of more or
less one thousand two hundred fifty-six square meters
under Declaration of Real Property No. 725 and TCT No.
284242 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.4
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother
Vittorio – through fraud, misrepresentation and duress – succeeded
in registering the above-mentioned properties in his name through
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 27 of 73
of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora.5 Vittorio
allegedly employed force and threat upon her, and even
administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus,
Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their
contents.
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment
of Sale, Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title
(Amended)6 against private respondents Aurora C. Romero and
Vittorio C. Romero. Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the
properties in question were acquired long after the death of their
father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be
considered conjugal. They allege that the lots covered by TCT Nos.
290010, 290011, 113514, and Tax Declaration Nos. 16136 and 11639
were paraphernal properties of Aurora which she had mortgaged.
Vittorio purportedly had to shell out substantial amounts in order to
redeem them. The lots covered by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and
77225 were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-fact of her children
on 23 November 2006, since her authority to do so had never been
revoked or modified.
On 14 December 2007, the RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing
petitioners’ complaint, stating thus:
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains pending
in that no distribution of the assets of the estate of the late Dante Y.
Romero, nor a partition, has been effected among his compulsory
heirs. Thus, the contending claims of plaintiffs and defendants in this
case could not be adjudicated nor passed upon by this Court without
first getting a definitive pronouncement from the intestate court as
to the share of each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his
estate.
Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the
properties being claimed by plaintiffs in this case are her own, the
same being paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up and
established in the intestate proceedings.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, citing Section 3,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court which bars an heir or a devisee from
maintaining an action to recover the title or possession of lands until
such lands have actually been assigned. The court ruled that
"plaintiffs must first cause the termination of Special Proceedings
No. 5185 to its logical conclusion before this case could be
entertained by the Court."8
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
rendering the said Resolutions, petitioners filed for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the CA. On 14 April 2009, the CA rendered the assailed
judgment dismissing the Petition, ruling that the properties involved
in this case are part of the estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero,
the partition of which is already subject of an intestate proceeding
filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI).9 The
CA based its judgment on the findings of the RTC that the inventory
of the estate of Judge Romero submitted to the CFI included the
same parties, properties, rights and interests as in the case before it.
Petitioners now come to us on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the
probate court may rule on issues pertaining to title over property
only in a provisional capacity. They assert that the CA erred in
dismissing their appeal, just because the intestate proceeding has
not yet terminated. Petitioners, as heirs, are purportedly allowed to
exercise their option of filing a separate civil action in order to
protect their interests.
Thus, the singular issue in the case at bar is whether or not
petitioners in this case may file a separate civil action for annulment
of sale and reconveyance of title, despite the pendency of the
settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y.
Romero.
Ruling of the Court
The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the
present case

Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate
or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons or the appointment of
executors, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings.10 They cite Ongsingco
v. Tan,11Baybayan v. Aquino12 and several cases which state that
when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part
of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other
person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and
his estate, the intestate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate these
questions. Petitioners conclude that the issue of ownership of the
properties enumerated in their Petition and included in the
inventory submitted by respondent Aurora Romero to the intestate
court, must be determined in a separate civil action to resolve title.13
The rulings in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly inapplicable, as
they both arose out of facts different from those in the case at bar.
Baybayan involved a summary settlement for the estate of the
decedent, in which a parcel of land representing the share of
decedent’s nephews and nieces was already covered by a TCT under
the name of a third party. To defeat the writ of partition issued by
the probate court, the third party, petitioners Baybayan et al., had
to file a separate civil action for quieting of their title and for
damages. The issue before the Court then devolved upon the
propriety of the probate court’s order to amend the Complaint for
quieting of title before the regular court. More importantly,
Baybayan pertained to a civil action involving third parties who were
not heirs, and not privy to the intestate proceedings in the probate
court. The present action was instituted precisely by heirs of Judge
Romero, against their brother, who is also an heir, and their mother,
who is the administrator of the estate.
In Coca v. Borromeo,14 this Court allowed the probate court to
provisionally pass upon the issue of title, precisely because the only
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of the
proceeding, viz:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question
should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate
or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of
title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the
general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate
action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the
motion for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate
proceeding.15 (Citations omitted.)
While it is true that a probate court’s determination of ownership
over properties which may form part of the estate is not final or
ultimate in nature, this rule is applicable only as between the
representatives of the estate and strangers thereto. Indeed, as early
as Bacquial v. Amihan,16 the court stated thus:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 28 of 73
xxx The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in
the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect
their interests are allowed to do so protect the same, but not for a
decision on their action. In the case of In re Estate of the deceased
Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et al.,
67 Phil., 353, this court held:
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings
has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima
facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or
ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of interested
parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.
To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United States.
* * * That the probate court is without jurisdiction to try the title to
property as between the representatives of an estate and strangers
thereto is too well established by the authorities to require
argument.
There is also authority abroad that where the court is without
jurisdiction to determine questions of title, as for example, as
between the estate and persons claiming adversely, its orders and
judgments relating to the sale do not render the issue of title res
judicata.17 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners’ claim that the issues
raised in the case at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore
need to be ventilated in a separate civil action. The issue before the
court is not really one of title or ownership, but the determination of
which particular properties should be included in the inventory of
the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the properties
alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of their
parents and, therefore, part of the estate that was illegally sold to
the respondent. Some of these real properties identified seem to be
the same real properties that form part of the inventory of the
estate in the intestate proceedings.18
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory
heirs, they also seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said
properties. To anchor their claim, they argue that the properties are
conjugal in nature and hence form part of their inheritance. For his
defense, Vittorio contends that the lots are the paraphernal
properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio
subsequently redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,19 the Supreme Court declared that
the determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal
for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the
probate court:
xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a
deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to
belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate
courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration
proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the
residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the
debts and expenses.Thereafter, distribution is made of the
decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed
him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in
which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever
community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a
necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs
relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs
who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before
the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and
incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so
long as no interests of third parties are affected.
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question
of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively.
This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court
which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order

to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings.20 xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject
of the allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their
share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of the
estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only
the probate court can competently rule on whether the properties
are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the probate court
that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same
to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been paid.
Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action
Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has the
power to rule on their Complaint, the submission of the issues in this
case to the probate court is merely optional, and not mandatory
upon them. Hence, they argue, they still have the right to bring
these issues in a separate civil action, if they so choose. They argue
further that Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court is not
applicable to the present case.
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. – When an executor or
administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no action to
recover the title or possession of lands or for damages done to such
lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until
there is an order of the court assigning such lands to such heir or
devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain
exceptions. They invoke the doctrine that while heirs have no
standing in court to sue for the recovery of property of the estate
represented by an administrator, these heirs may maintain such
action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the suit, or has
allegedly participated in the act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners’ theory must again fail. There is
nothing on the record that would prove that Aurora defied the
orders of the probate court or entered into sale agreements in
violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really accusing a co-
heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain properties
which they allege to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the
estate, Aurora Romero’s acts as the administrator of the estate are
subject to the sole jurisdiction of the probate court. In Acebedo v.
Abesamis,21 the Court stated:
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a
pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court
to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say
that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not
specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging
to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made
with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included
in its capacity as a probate court.22
Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or
ownership. They are, in effect, questioning the validity of the sales
made by the administrator, an issue that can only be properly
threshed out by the probate court. Paragraph 13 of petitioners’
Complaint alleges as follows:
13. The purported transfers and sales executed by Defendant Aurora
C. Romero to and in favor of Defendant Vittorio C. Romero are
nullities since all were simulated, entered into without the intent
and volition of Defendant Aurora C. Romero, attended by force,
intimidation, duress and fraud and not supported with any valid or
sufficient consideration and with the sole depraved intentions of
depriving the other compulsory heirs of the late Judge Dante Y.
Romero of their rightful share in the estate.23 (Emphasis omitted.)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 29 of 73
Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of
property under administration is the recognition that the probate
court has the power to rescind or nullify the disposition of a
property under administration that was effected without its
authority.24 That petitioners have the prerogative of choosing where
to file their action for nullification – whether with the probate court
or the regular court – is erroneous. As held in Marcos, II v. Court of
Appeals:
xxx (T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with
limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over the estate of deceased
individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once
invoked, and made effective, cannot be treated with indifference
nor should it be ignored with impunity by the very parties invoking
its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction
of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased
person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; to
determine who are the heirs of the decedent; the recognition of a
natural child; the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of
the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the
testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary
rights.25(Citations omitted.)
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly
orchestrated by petitioners’ co-heir, Vittorio, can only be
determined by the probate court, because it is the probate court
which is empowered to identify the nature of the property, and that
has jurisdiction over Aurora’s actions and dispositions as
administrator. In Peñaverde v. Peñaverde,26 the Court even
adjudged the petitioners guilty of forum-shopping for filing a
separate civil action despite the pendency of the said petitioners’
own case seeking that letters of administration be granted to them.
Similar to the case at bar, the petitioners in Peñaverde also sought
the annulment of titles in the name of their co-heir:
The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471,
which seeks letters of administration for the estate of Mariano
Peñaverde; and (2) Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks the
annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano
Peñaverde and the annulment of titles in his name as well as the
reopening of the distribution of his estate.
Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to
share in the estate of Mariano, specifically the subject land
previously owned in common by Mariano and his wife,
Victorina.This is also what they hoped to obtain in filing Civil Case
No. Q-95-24711.
Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the
ultimate distribution and partition of a decedent's estate. This is also
manifestly sought in Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely calls
for the "Reopening of Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peñaverde.
In both cases, petitioners would have to prove their right to inherit
from the estate of Mariano Peñaverde, albeit indirectly, as heirs of
Mariano's wife, Victorina.1âwphi1
Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-
shopping.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc.
No. Q-94-19471 and Civil Case No. Q-95-24711 are identical. There is
also no question that the rights asserted by petitioners in both cases
are identical, i.e., the right of succession to the estate of their aunt,
Victorina, wife of Mariano. Likewise, the reliefs prayed for --- to
obtain their share in the estate of Mariano --- are the same, such
relief being founded on the same facts ---their relationship to
Mariano's deceased wife, Victorina.27
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties
herein are already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6
January 1976, the 14 April 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104025 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
8. SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 102126 March 12, 1993
ANGELICA LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF CIPRIANO PEDROSA represented by Nelson
Jimena, Honorable Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon in her
capacity as Presiding Judge-Designate, Branch 51, RTC, Bacolod
City, respondents.
Hector P. Teodosio of Defensor and Teodocio Law Office for
petitioner.
Edmundo G. Manlapao for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing an
order dated 24 January 1991 issued by herein respondent presiding
judge-designate Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 51 which considered the supplemental
action for partition (after annulment of the marriage) as terminated
due to the death of one of the spouses (husband) and the pendency
of intestate proceedings over his estate.
Petitioner Angelica Ledesma's marriage to Cipriano Pedrosa was
declared a nullity by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
Branch 51 on 8 February 1984 in Civil Case No. 1446.1 The
dispositive portion of the order annulling the marriage also provided
thus:
. . . that the properties acquired by plaintiff
Cipriano Pedrosa and defendant Angelica
Ledesma at the time they were living together as
common-law husband and wife is (sic) owned by
them as co-owners to be governed by the
provisions on co-ownership of the civil code; that
the properties acquired by plaintiff and
defendant after their marriage was solemnized
on March 25, 1965, which was annulled by this
Court in the above-entitled proceeding, forms
(sic) part of the conjugal partnership and upon
dissolution of the marriage, to be liquidated in
accordance with the provision of the civil code.2
Surprisingly it took some time before the next order implementing
the above disposition was issued on 4 May 1989, the pertinent part
of which reads:
. . . . It appearing from the records that the court
has to verify and determine the correct
inventory of the properties of Cipriano Pedrosa
and Angelica Ledesma, the parties, including the
receiver, through their respective attorneys, are
ordered to submit their respective inventory, if
one has not been submitted yet, before June 1,
1989. . . . .3
Pending receipt by the court of the ordered inventory, Cipriano
Pedrosa died. A separate petition for the probate of his last will and
testament was
filed.4 Nelson Jimena was named executor and substituted Pedrosa
in the partition proceedings (Civil Case No. 1446).
Due to disagreement of the parties on the characterization of the
properties, the court in the partition proceedings ordered (30 March
1990) the submission of comments, objections and manifestations
on the project of partition submitted by the parties. During a lull in
the proceedings, the presiding judge also passed away. On 24
January 1991 the following now-questioned order was issued by the
herein respondent presiding-judge designate who took over:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 30 of 73
It is informed by Atty. Pio Villoso that insofar as
the status of this case is concerned, the plaintiff
who has long been dead, was substituted by the
administrator, now the plaintiff Nelson Jimena,
and Atty. Vicente Sabornay, as the receiver.
Furthermore, the judgment as to the annulment
of the marriage had already been rendered
partially by then Presiding Judge Quirino Abad
Santos, Jr., on February 8, 1984. What is being
litigated here by the parties affects the property
division to dissolve the partnership. However,
the plaintiff died and an intestate proceeding is
now pending before Branch 43 whereby the said
Nelson Jimena was actually the appointed
administrator, and who was substituted as
plaintiff in this case.
With all these informations, and considering the
nature of the action, the Court finds the
substitution of the original plaintiff improper, as
the defendant herein can pursue her claim over
the properties before the intestate proceedings
being instituted. Action for intervention in order
that the judgment in this particular proceeding
can be implemented, can be raised in the
intestate Court. Likewise, the appointment of
the receiver conflicts with that of the judicial
administrator considering that with the filing of
the intestate case, the properties of the
deceased plaintiff are in custodia legis and this
Court losses jurisdiction in determining further
the distribution of the properties.
In view of the above, without prejudice to the defendant's right to
file as intervenor in the intestate proceedings with the judgment
annulling the marriage, the proceedings becomes moot and
academic with the pendency of the intestate proceeding before
Branch 43. This case is therefore deemed TERMINATED.5
With the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the
respondent court, this special civil action was initiated.
Petitioner argues that respondent judge reneged in the performance
of a lawful duty when she refrained from rendering a decision in the
partition case (Civil Case No. 1446) and considered the same closed
and terminated, due to the pendency of intestate proceedings over
the deceased husband's estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159).6 It is likewise
erroneous, petitioner contends, to rule that petitioner's remedy is a
motion for intervention in said intestate proceedings to implement
judgment in the marriage-annulment case, since petitioner has
already presented all her evidence in the annulment case to prove
which properties acquired during the marriage pertain to her.
The case of Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals,7 where a similar
issue was involved — the husband having died after the legal
separation of the spouses had been finally decreed but before the
actual liquidation of their community of properties — is on point.
The Court therein said:
WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission
that the questioned decision had not become
final and executory since the law explicitly and
clearly provides for the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains
or the absolute community of property as
among the effects of the final decree of legal
separation. Article 106 of the Civil Code thus
reads:
Art. 106. The decree of legal
separation shall have the
following effects:
1) The spouses shall be
entitled to live separately
from each other, but the
marriage bonds shall not be
severed;

2) The conjugal partnership
of gains or the absolute
conjugal community of
property shall be dissolved
and liquidated, but the
offending spouse shall have
no right to any share of the
profits earned by the
partnership or community,
without prejudice to the
provisions of Article 176;
xxx xxx xxx
The aforequoted provision mandates the
dissolution and liquidation of the property
regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree
of legal separation. Such dissolution and
liquidation are necessary consequences of the
final decree. This legal effect of the decree of
legal separation ipso facto or automatically
follows, as an inevitable incident of, the
judgment decreeing legal separation for the
purpose of determining the share of each spouse
in the conjugal assets.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the decision of the trial court dated January
4, 1973 decreeing the legal separation between
then spouses Antonio Macadangdang and
Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang had long
become final and executory and the division of
the conjugal property in a "supplemental
decision" is a mere incident of the decree of
legal separation.
Since We have ruled on the finality of the
judgment decreeing the spouses' legal
separation as of January 4, 1973, the remaining
issue for Our resolution is the final disposition of
their conjugal partnership of gains which
partnership, by reason of the final decree, had
been automatically dissolved. The law (Article
106, 107 of the Civil Code) clearly spells out the
effects of a final decree of legal separation on
the conjugal property.
The death on November 30, 1979 of herein
petitioner who was declared the guilty spouse by
the trial court, before the liquidation of the
conjugal property is effected, poses a new
problem which can be resolved simply by the
application of the rules on intestate succession
with respect to the properties of the deceased
petitioner.
Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of gains under the
aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be
applied effective January 4, 1973 when the
decree of legal separation became final. Upon
the liquidation and distribution conformably
with the law governing the effects of the final
decree of legal separation, the law on intestate
succession should take over in the disposition of
whatever remaining properties heave been
allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves
details which properly pertain to the lower
court.
The properties that may be allocated to the
deceased petitioner by virtue of the liquidation
of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in
accordance with the laws of intestate succession
in Special Proceedings No. 134.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 31 of 73
The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with
equal reason, the doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a
marriage annulment which is the situation at bar. The respondent
presiding judge is directed to decide the partition (liquidation) case
(Civil Case No. 1446) within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of
this decision to determine which of the properties of the conjugal
partnership should be adjudicated to the husband and the wife. This
is but a consequence or incident of its decision rendered in the same
case annulling the marriage. Petitioner's letters to the Court indicate
that she is seventy (70) years of age and the prolonged action for
partition (liquidation) has taken a toll on her resources. Justice and
equity demand the disposition of her case with dispatch. Any
properties that may be adjudicated to the deceased husband
Pedrosa can then be distributed in accordance with his last will and
testament in the special proceedings involving his estate (Sp. Proc.
No. 4159).
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Judge's order dated 24 January 1991
considering Civil Case No. 1446 closed and terminated for being
moot and academic is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge
or whoever may have succeeded her is ordered to decide said action
for partition (liquidation) within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
9. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE,
deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through
Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No.
4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San
Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein
showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted
in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and
maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in
the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O.
Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed
in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public
convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro
Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily
productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant
in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions
therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in
accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not
reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving
petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the
Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable
opportunity to meet the increased demand.

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an
unwarranted departure from its announced policy with
respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant.
(Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of
the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative
of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in
the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently
granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be
in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he
would have had the right to prosecute his application before the
commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him
that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had
invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the
commission said regarding his other properties and business, he
would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate
said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was
netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and
continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its
decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was
financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid
right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his
death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for
which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the
commission might have denied application, although under the facts
of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the
financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.
Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3)
that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule,
should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would
certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by
complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent
in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator
after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a
piece of land and during the life of the option he died, if the option
had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of
special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that
said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his
estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be
the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his
estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of
the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right
to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience
— the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant —
was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship
and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course,
such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience
was subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment
of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from
the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just
given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may
bring or defend actions, among other cases, for the protection of the
property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that
such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the
deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the
executor or administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come
to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other
person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages
366, 367) the present chief Justice of this Court draws the following
conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any
action affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied)
of a deceased person which may be brought by or against
him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 32 of 73
prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the
action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon,
or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because
death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of
public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an
"action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that
the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by
death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate
which, being placed under the control and management of the
executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in
representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors,
devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the
right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished
proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission,
it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and
entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that
proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and
article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider
as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The
same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that
article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is
not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the
term, property includes, among other things, "an option", and "the
certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a
bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest)
have also been declared to include every species of
title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in
contract, whether executory or executed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the
Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the
following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a
person, a forgery committed after the death of the man
whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may
be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate.
Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763,
57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before
it a case of forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the
purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the
information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the
intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of
this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is
that the law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a
person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The
estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation.
"The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal
signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as
well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs.
Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs.
Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that
'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural
person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a
collection or succession of natural persons forming a
corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The
latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a
limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a
bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict.

954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness
of the definition given by the authors from whom we have
quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a
claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the
defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming
him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this
definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in
cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the
death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a
result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with
principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a
result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the
estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial
person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling
a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and,
although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors,
have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a
distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons
have in it is not complete until there has been a due
administration; and one who forges the name of the
decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory
note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the
estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having
diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to
have known who those persons were, or what was the
nature of their respective interest. The fraudulent intent is
against the artificial person, — the estate — and not the
natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in
it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing
of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail
prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as
found by the commission, not counting the expenses and
disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have
occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the
estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to
show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as
having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most
recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs.
Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was
the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave
judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in
these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as
it holds that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are
indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . .
.
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were
considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his
personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code
that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the
decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court
in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of
the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was
abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22.
In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the
innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter
of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine
that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by
the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and
charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the
decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not
have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a
legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to
the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal
system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be
exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the
same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical
basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator,
to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 33 of 73
identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje
& L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law
figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a
bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate
of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the
Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service
Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and
categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue
certificates of public convenience or certificates of public
convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of
the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or
joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of
the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the
stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying
reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate
of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of
injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising
such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent
as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule
in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs.
State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent
should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation
of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the
assets to be properly made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite
just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while
the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to
natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must
be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise
these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against
being deprived of property without due process of law, or the
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that
it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical,
no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and
in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons
figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the
framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes
of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of
those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which
survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in
his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the
instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its
final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the
opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality
is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and
surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be
exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we
find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the
same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise
extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding
before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said
proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of
the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could
not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could
have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired
certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is
grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same
reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is
made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate,
creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the
investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the
ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant
proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of
the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship
exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for
reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of
personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can
find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the
extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived,
in view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the
commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation
has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was
that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately
and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was
the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence
of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be
assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the
simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from
inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the
prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission
to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro
O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and
intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the
majority.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to
obtain a certificate of public convenience to operate an ice plant in
San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution which provides
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or other entities organized under the laws of
the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for
a longer period than fifty years. No franchise granted to
any individual, firm or corporation, except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by Congress when the public interest
so requires.
The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante fulfills the citizenship requirement. To our mind, the
question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O.
Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on
what it represents. It is a device by which the law gives a kind of
personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs.
They inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his
death. As there are procedural requisites for their identification and
determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction
has been devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate,
a liquid condition in process of solidification.
The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law
calls estate is, a matter of fact, intended to designate the heirs of
the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to
the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of
the heirs of Fragrante. If they are Filipino citizens, the action taken
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 34 of 73
by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they are not,
it should be reversed.
Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens
to go around the citizenship constitutional provision. It is alleged
that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.
We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante
should be determined by the Commission upon evidence that the
party should be present. It should also determine the dummy
question raised by the petitioner.
We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service
Commission of May 21, 1946, be set aside and that the Commission
be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual questions and
render a new decision accordingly.
10. FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the
word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court,
referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a
special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A.
Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado
G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in
the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the
estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the
motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule
as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no
notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served
upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay
or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia,
she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of
Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G.
Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before
the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to
remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides

the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration
of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through
erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that
Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that
she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of
the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31,
1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation
in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental
Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by
Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original
petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime
of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional
Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of
Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G.
Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply
listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her
preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of
Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the
regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition
was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others,
that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning
because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the
original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration,
raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia
G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of
Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20,
1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties of the
decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to
secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia
opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by
Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to
making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up
the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an
order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying
the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2,
1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and
admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the
petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the
parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue
was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in
interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado
G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental
motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the
court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased
Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14,
1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking
possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have
not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to
remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority
and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in
behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 35 of 73
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending
omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed
by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge
Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are
those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court, 1subject only to the previous qualification made by the court
that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing
agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the
special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous
order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all
papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent
with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to
Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any
qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue
of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2,
1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental
petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original
petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of
the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar
further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by
praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the
estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December
27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge
Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of
the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa
B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the
petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of
Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders,
the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the
power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct
and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration
of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19,
1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised
by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b)
venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal
of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special
administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January
7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three
questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish
Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of
accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to
her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing
Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles
presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon
Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified
with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc.
27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the
time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973
showing that three months before his death his residence was in
Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia
was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that
he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the
first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia
commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before
Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders
of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion
for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss
the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among
others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974,
directing the delivery of certain properties to the special
administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp.
Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for
lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975,
Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by
certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of
the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on
February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G.
Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge
Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B.
Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00.
Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia
informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before
Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the
annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on
January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to
withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of
Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final,
it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the
proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the
court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of
Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on
December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance
to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated
in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling
attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been
appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their
respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the
Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded
Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the
payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a
cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670,
a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul
the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge
Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining
order was issued on February 9, 1976.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 36 of 73
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for
certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations
hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to
letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively
show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the
name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if
need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the
right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin,
creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation
facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration
of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of
the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a
matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of
Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not
have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject
matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one
thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or
authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed
before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly
exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the
court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose
jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The
appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter
of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of
numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in
settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon
this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as
"venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides"
mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule
that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes

and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa
B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the
time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration
before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G.
Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba,
Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For
her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of
Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according
to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that,
as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule
herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last
residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition,
Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last
place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death
certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at
the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself
and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence
was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside
from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained
three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and
Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the
administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of
Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in
certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna,
show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of
residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes
imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that
objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not
objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case
before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B.
Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or
venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna,
but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert
her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of
the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last
residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as
special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B.
Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse.
Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 37 of 73
appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the
appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules,
however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot
agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint
a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That,
however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make
his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his
judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason,
equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular
administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment
of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is
the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the
decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,
besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she
would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire
estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the
naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as
the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B.
Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever
with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the
latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule
that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of
special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of
such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not
determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent
but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one
to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of
the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as
to be the basis of distribution. 21The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia
is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the
deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B.
Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B.
Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to
the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on
September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B.
Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving
spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco
vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority
over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant
case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and
that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay
that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the
appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be
approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna
be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be
required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17,
1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738,
subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang
Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of
P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby
upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia
Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby
denied, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
11. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners.
Torres and Torres for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed
Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition
to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their
motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court
is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the
respondent court, dated June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this
wise:
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria,
Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez, through counsel, that
this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled
case in view of the pendency of another action for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino
Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely,
Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the
Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino
Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case".
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on
February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4,
1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered
to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria
Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the
alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court
could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that
on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging,
among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of
Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and
praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special
Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in
this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them
on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr.
Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he was Parish
priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from
the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he
was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties
in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M.
on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed
in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on
the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in
support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs.
Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand,
take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 38 of 73
acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them
of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that
the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the
case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion
to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not
entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early as
March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported will
of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they
filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed
the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to
prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied,
movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on
Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling
in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery
thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963,
even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have
taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued
the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by
section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77,
of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice
thereof to be published. — When a will is delivered to, or a
petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court
having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for
proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest
the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time
and place to be published three (3) weeks successively,
previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the
petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to
OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that
the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's
testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where
the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the
petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and
delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners
initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.1äwphï1.ñët
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77)
speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction,"
and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the
decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr.
Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy,
Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he
retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth
in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan

court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to
settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first
instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but
not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239;
Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676).
Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that
he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p.
46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is
sufficient in the case before us.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:
"... If we consider such question of residence as one
affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-
matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings
including all decisions on the different incidents which
have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same
case will have to be commenced anew before another
court of the same rank in another province. That this is of
mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice
is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy
Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942).
Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the
province where he had last resided, could not have been
intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court
over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again,
procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. (Attorney General vs. Manila Railroad
Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act No.
136, Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently
of the place of residence of the deceased.1 Since, however,
there are many Courts of First Instance in the Philippines,
the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the
venue or the place where each case shall be brought.
Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules
of Court the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75,
section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of
First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case
of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the
Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been
asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them
only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence
to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking
venue into account.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of
petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in
Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the
Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to
divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules.
Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75)
was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates
into a race between applicants, with the administration of the
properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since
intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 39 of 73
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or
one which has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose
of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case,
legal succession shall take place only with respect to the
property in which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution
of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir
dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance,
there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding,
except in cases provided in this Code.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only
after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an
intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established
action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not
thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father
Rodriguez is pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to
priority in the settlement of the estate in question, and that in
refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not
commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal
Court that should be discontinued.
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against
petitioners Rodriguez.
12. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio.
EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE
EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.
Filemon Cajator for appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres
Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to
said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda,
Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio,
objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children
of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon
the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated
March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said
petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said
order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and
brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on
November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court,
provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a

decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres
Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other
properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son,
Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino
St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a
house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2).
While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason
Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned
residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to
the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November
26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo
mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said
hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular
failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of
seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or
even slept in said house at España Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of
the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for
over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such
domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof
to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is
retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws,
p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate
of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the
case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must
have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are
essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2)
physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay
therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110;
Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624;
Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p.
220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a
domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his
demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to
stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the
decedent appears to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in
said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand,
did not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the
aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that "the
deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in
Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the
testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr.
Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at
No. 889-A España Extention was purchased, and who, therefore,
might have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying
said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the
decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest"
from the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his
belonging thereto. This conclusion is untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent
because he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the
very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is
very likely — that said advice was given and followed in order that
the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective
treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed
by presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled
with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of
illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp.
172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906;
U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to
live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that
municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 40 of 73
said property at No. 889-A España Extention, Quezon City, was
conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before
his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his
residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by
the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public,
was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage
contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married,
in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on
November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that
his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that
Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein
appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the
children of the deceased by his first marriage, including said
appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have
objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false.
Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory
that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City,
the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death,
prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the
retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong when
the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga,
evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset by
the evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being
offered in evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the order
appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its
resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the
incident at bar. The court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be
attached to the records for whatever action oppositors
may want to take later on because until now the
personality of the oppositors has not been established
whether or not they have a right to intervene in this case,
and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the
oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court
and they maintain that these proceedings should be
dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be
admitted in evidence before appellants had established their
"personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their
filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to
establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate
children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection
thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this
Court, and it seems that you are now trying to prove the
status of your client; you are leading so that. The main
point here is your contention that the deceased was never
a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to
cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of
the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you
want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not
yet the time to declare who are persons who should
inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on
the domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged lack of
"personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they
were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue
raised by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the
foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it
drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent
positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that appellants could
not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the
decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other
hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining
the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the
authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the
beginning of the hearing, in the lower court, appellants' counsel
announced that he would take part therein "only to question the

jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2,
t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said
counsel tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the
appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said,
addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question
the jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the
status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want
to submit to the jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon,
appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my
stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court
rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that appellants "refuse to
submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that these
proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially made
of record that they were not submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the
same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up their
stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to
prove, not only their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also,
that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their
alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them
to proceed him under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his
alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court
should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto
the proper effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that
on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated November
4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don
Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the
docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the
Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated
November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court
on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio,
Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the
decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for
the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the
present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since
November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in an order dated
December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of
the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the
case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or
residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first
taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same,
said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable
before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not
possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the
authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had
been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by
law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the
parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident
decedents who have properties in several provinces in the
Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may
undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said
provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent
jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case
shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because the statement to
this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court
immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence,
which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled
the court of first instance of any province in which they have
properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 41 of 73
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of
venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case
was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and
we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July
27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said
court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending
therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings
may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his
death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First
Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been
laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained
appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and
appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is
so ordered.
13. THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the
February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15,
1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo
T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister
of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death
on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On

December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico
Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children
of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed
that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined
her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two
motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on
March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted
documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which
they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had
already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of
the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying
their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family
Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge
Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of
the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then
Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on
which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting
the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134
presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit
their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and
legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 42 of 73
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence
set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position
paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.
It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and
set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31,
1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records
of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions
as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article
26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn,
Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O.
No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual
view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our
state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to
give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14,
1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as
the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition
for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and
motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that
the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our
rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any
given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo
was void and bigamous because it was performed during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in
the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the
time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez
are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules
of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which
may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and
domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 43 of 73
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.
The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue
of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized
the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the
divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties
and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still marriedto private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is
not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where
a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling
in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the
divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The
ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article
26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 44 of 73
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse
is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26
thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to
the society where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating
that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court
stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that
it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to
file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia
v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading
and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that

proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo
as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue
of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article
148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of
the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described
the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union
of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but
who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent
of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 45 of 73
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who,
as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s
defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to
file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from
her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
14. SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of
Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and
LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills
and to annul a partition, approved in an intestateproceeding
by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be
entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district
court).
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila,
died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He
was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two
children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and
by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his
two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-
Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco,
California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he
described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The
second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The
two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the
will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will
dealing with his property outside this country, the testator
said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I purposely have made no provision in this will
for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my

daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm
Roberts), because I have provided for each of
them in a separate will disposing of my
Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47,
Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine
Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720
of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita
Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C.
Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the
probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate
petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its
order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court
admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil It was issued upon
consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between
the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller
Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children
Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris
and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with
knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into
a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed
by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the
parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by
the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita
Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel
would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of
Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that
Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved
for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes
in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated
the computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that
the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children
"shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel
and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total
of the net distributable estate and marital share. A supplemental
memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties
(Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be
stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9,
1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers
Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20
of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No.
113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named special
administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law
office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding
for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be
appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy
of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in pages
58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that
Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of
Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition
and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete,
appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done
pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The
court ignored the will already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority
and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979
the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the
deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp.
120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 46 of 73
Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband,
Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita,
they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares
of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and
filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and
her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27,
1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's
Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or
12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of the
will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced
Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9,
moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court
considered the motion moot considering that it had already
approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149,
Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged
that he was no longer connected with Makiling Management Co.,
Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's
son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he
(Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him
(Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant
Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was
stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and
penalties and that he interposed no objection to the transfer of the
estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the
certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five
months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate case. On
April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a
motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be
partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be
closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara
law firm filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as
counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should
be recalled that the firm had previously appeared in the case as
Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy
of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was then superseded by
lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. — On
September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in
behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower
court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills
(already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the
intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration
revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and
Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by
them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were
defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the
1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate
proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the
partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it
for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the
testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two
proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the
matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be
heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).

Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying
Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with
two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71
SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore,
the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this
judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she
considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for
the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case,
should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in
the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining
order is dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
15. EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th
Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO
URIARTE, respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.
Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original
petition for certiorari — docketed as G.R. L-21938 — against the
respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts
of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who
will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila
Court, respectively — praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered
annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11
July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing
the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and
the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila
court denying petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene
and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No.
51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the
settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and
consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent Manila
court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending
these proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents
Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte
from proceeding with Special Proceeding No.
51396, supra, until further orders of this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 47 of 73
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare itself
'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as
prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding
proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra,
in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued
by this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a
pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS —
docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 — praying, for the
reasons therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the
orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and
February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on appeal and
the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further
commanding said court to approve his record on appeal and to give
due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution
deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original
action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their
answer traversing petitioner's contention that the respondent
courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the
matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the
Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late
Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging
therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole
heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the
Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special
administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the
date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite
notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses,
however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National
Bank never actually qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private
respondents herein, filed an opposition to the above-mentioned
petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte
y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a
duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which
shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof,"
and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to
commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private
respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the
Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last
will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he
filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to
proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner
Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said
intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of
the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged
Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that,
as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte
Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding
No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said
order having been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to
file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the
purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on questions of

law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the
Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the
approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7,
1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the
petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having been
filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the
meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved
by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte,
Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
et al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before
the Supreme Court on questions of law which is
tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from
this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the
record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby
disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental
petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave
to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the
annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This
motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same
year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the
same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No.
6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his
natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed
the action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special
proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of
Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect
appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the
Negros Court has not gone farther than the appointment of a special
administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as
stated heretofore, failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings
were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court
admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of
Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have
been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the
order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner.
Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of
Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special
proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte
were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite
and of the petition filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is
clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No.
6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the
existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its
probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are
(a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b)
whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of
Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts
of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters
of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons — whether they died testate or
intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond
question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 48 of 73
Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is
regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that
the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first
instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first
instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when
the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in
provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for
the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of
First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and
city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable
properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros
Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No.
6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the
estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and
that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat
the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the
latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage
an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however,
is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as
an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan
Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for the probate of
the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court —
particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or was entitled to
commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in
the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to
support the view that he should have submitted said will for probate
to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an
appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending
Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord
with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of
justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts
would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission
of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place, when
respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already
informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite
had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for
submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan
Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No.
6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged
will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like
Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with
the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding
pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the
same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it
seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in
Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit
said will for probate to the Negros Court.

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for
probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the
petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no
jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this
connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed
by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice
of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines
and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court
since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion
for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the
Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion
asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of
all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the
Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will
annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five
months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow
him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the
will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his
negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not
inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if
the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would
be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of
similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344,
Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he was "not inclined
to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the
herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory
acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the
institution by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be
consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his
contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in
the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No.
51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining
an independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the
estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final
decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is
entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally
determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the
Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has
already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination
the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased
testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator
and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his
acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p.
476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil.
343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47
O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-
21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in view of the
conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and
academic. If the said supplemental petition is successful, it will only
result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the
appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated
December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order
of said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second
being an order denying petitioner's motion for the reconsideration
of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has
been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the
conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would
serve no useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 49 of 73
circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of
said orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition
for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental
petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby
dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set
aside. With costs against petitioner.
16. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL
CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA,
CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA
CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964,
and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the
Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the
herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr.
and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y
Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of
the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco,
Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco,
Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal
age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late
Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No.
2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator
died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident
of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal
properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu
court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April
1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and
interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at
LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and
Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled
and a new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of
the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of
Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was
further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for
the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was
not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as
reasons the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not
having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of
hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover,
copies of the petition have not been served on all of the
heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of
letters of administration.2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the
filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco

filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City)
for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the
issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow
and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court,
petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an
Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as
an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator,
dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order
holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss
"until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have
acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be
the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither
excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set
aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same
by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition
and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the
will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to
entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as
executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive
jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No.
2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the
motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of
probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court
further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at
the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5
of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows:
"that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a
resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the
aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12
March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong
venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of
the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted
allegation, the Court is made to understand that the
oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a
resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate
proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the
probate of the will should take precedence, but that the
probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court
of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the
oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also
be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the
petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a
resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last
Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the
petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at
the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that
he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the
former as his first choice and the latter as his second
choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one
will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he
himself selects or considers to be his home or which
appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in
thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows
the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this
court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is
to the exclusion of all others.5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the
Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu
court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for
reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 50 of 73
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the
hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three
times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification
none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court
proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the
Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed
probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the
following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required
by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or
some other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud
and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not
intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at
the time he affixed his signature thereto.6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of
the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all
the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving
the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's
last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and
Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola,
Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence
(such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return,
diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the
decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also
affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its
said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's
last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily
executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and
appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond
"following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said
order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-
R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein
petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc.
2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that
court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first
attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively
pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent
left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the
decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was
instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it
follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate
was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special
Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her
rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu
CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on
March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI,
acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for
appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for
the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature
for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is

sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was
certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over
the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the
moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all
events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and
does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment
provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue,
commanding and directing the respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the
respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually
from proceeding and taking any action in Special
Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent
court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore
taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge,
therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled.
The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein
petition for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the
appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from
proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting
aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate
of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the
testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the
issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon
City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu
court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to
the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the
Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of
the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu
court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition
or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to
proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate
proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue,
to proceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to
probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and
authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court
erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling
and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission
to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations:
— ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all
Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate
and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the
Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of
the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the
different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction
from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The
cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 51 of 73
Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of the province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Rule 73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the
late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that
in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is
regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its
mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case
has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First
Instance of a province where the deceased had not
resided. All the parties, however, including all the
creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court and the case is therein completely finished
except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it
with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision
raises for the first time in this Court the question of
jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the
deceased in the province. If we consider such question of
residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different
incidents which have arisen in court will have to
be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced
anew before another court of the same rank in another
province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt
administration of justice is too obvious to require
comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No.
48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of
Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled in the province where he had last
resided, could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as
we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-
General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The
law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11Section 56, No. 5 —
confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all
probate cases independently of the place of residence of
the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of
First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act
No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where
each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of
the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly
called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the
court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first
filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity
between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates
that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first
take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition
for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another
court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and
resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that
the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the
decedent died intestatemay be actually false, may decline to take
cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in
abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it
the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's
filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued
its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and
deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition
for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was
that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City
court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to
be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to
the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise
by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City
court to resolve the question between the parties whether the
decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City
where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as
claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would
decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and
instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make
a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of
the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to
take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the
Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the
probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court
must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and
must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu
court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only
lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably
had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over
the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the
estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the
Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of
said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the
Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed
to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon
City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have
acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will
and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance
with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is
authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate
proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to
effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It
is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of
first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 52 of 73
will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate
in his possession to the executor subsequently
appointed. This however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy.
As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of
the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although
opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support
the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will
for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either
in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No.
6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for
probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the
petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no
jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the proper venuetherefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is
merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of
the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of
the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the
right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so
by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan
Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in
Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was
served with notice of the existence (presence) of the
alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August
28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed
with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the
dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had
therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not
only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but
also to admit said will to probate more than five months
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow
him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of
all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396
would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must
be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result
would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like
the present where the objection against said proceedings
is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the
basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choiceof residence of the
decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with
the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The
last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had
such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City
court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise
shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence
of the late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the
issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of
whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise
jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that
the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious
one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the
basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary
course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in
view of the fact that the deceased was better known as
the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his
also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We
reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper
court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case
of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July
27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take
cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to
the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in
effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of
the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament
upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having
thus determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with
the deference and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was
the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore
the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no
applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still
require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable
and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself
the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court
had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at
the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously
questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and
if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the
actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only
then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to
institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld
when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires
that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a)
the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate
proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are
the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in
the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran
that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by
publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a
constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is
granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even
against the State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction
thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The
Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it
were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue
notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in
admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action
should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of
jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and
should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the
Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila
court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and
distributing the estate in accordance therewith in
the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 53 of 73
Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower
court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net
result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice
Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration
of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the
jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings
only to start all over again the same proceedings before another
court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require
comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on
who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for
settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established
jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a
rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts
between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and
that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives
who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into
a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her
choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo
presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the
fact that he left a last will and testament and the right of his
surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire
consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would
they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly
administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow,
who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that
the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed
an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5
March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had
within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death
(on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and
petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled
to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would
be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way
to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate
either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate
proceedings be convertedinto a testate proceeding — when under
the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the
facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is
Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their
conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named
and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his
estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under
the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend
much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City
to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the
estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that
under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been
dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property
and conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the
estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed
decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and
the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and
the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised
exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of
the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be
nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her
residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the
decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that
the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse
of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition
and instead deferring to the testateproceedings filed just a week
later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of
the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's
opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the
allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had
died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never

challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's
order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before
the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the
Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit
the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to
have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner
as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the
light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1
lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon
City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and
appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court
concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of
probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a
special civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise
of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly
determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly
assumed by and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is
the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the
Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of
the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu
court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and
appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in
pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and
actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and
authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had
and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu
court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the
Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by
the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible
documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal
residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally
filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-
R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.
Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.
I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to
question within a reasonable time the laying of the venue in the
Quezon City Court of First Instance and the assumption of
jurisdiction by that court, after the Court of First Instance of Cebu
deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the holding therein of any
proceeding and trial, and their having filed therein a formal
opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches,
for which reason they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed
for in the present petition.
17. SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 134100 September 29, 2000
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his
Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,respondents.
DECISION
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 54 of 73
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue
the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by
the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be
filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We
reverse.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond
in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of
five years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he
subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the
spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and
Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was ₱485,600.00,
payable in two installments of ₱300,000.00 and ₱185,600.00, with
the second installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four
sublessees signed the contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment,
the sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid
balance of ₱50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to
comply with their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private
respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of
the said amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,
Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission
of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the
balance.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1,
1988.2 She based her action on Rule 3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of
Court which then provided that "when the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules." This
provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, §20 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of
such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment
obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of a deceased person.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since
petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be
independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel
spouses and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his
exclusion from the case.3 The Manuel spouses failed to file their
answer. For this reason, they were declared in default.
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial,
ordering petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private
respondent the unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in
the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. In its
decision4 rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed
her appeal. It held:
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon must be dismissed when the defendant dies before final
judgment in the regional trial court, does not apply where there are
other defendants against whom the action should be maintained.
This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the Supreme Court
held:
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a
cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It
was, however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is,

a sum of money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one
that does not survive upon the death of the defendant, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel
Co was also named defendant in the complaint. Obviously,
therefore, the order appealed from is erroneous insofar as it
dismissed the case against Co. (Underlining added)
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the
deceased, were signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The
remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming that the
death of one of the parties to the contract has totally extinguished
their obligation as held in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David:
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled
jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor
may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in
solidum. Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and
severally, in case of his death, her liability is independent of and
separate from her husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt
and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as
the claim against her husband should be made in the decedent's
estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on
June 4, 1998.6 Hence this petition based on the following assignment
of errors:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST
REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO
THE CLAIM FOR PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER
HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY
CLAIM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID,
133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE
SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
JARING.7
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the
surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the
collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal
partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in
the settlement of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten
months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial
court on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit
of Rule 3, §21 which deals with dismissals of collection suits because
of the death of the defendant during the pendency of the case and
the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the
filing of claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's
estate. As already noted, Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner especially
provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a
deceased person. The issue to be resolved is whether private
respondent can, in the first place, file this case against petitioner.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses,
signed the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount
of stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also
that of the Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the
conjugal partnership is liable for ¾
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 55 of 73
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also
for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.8
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved9 and debts chargeable against it are to be
paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule
73, §2 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. ¾ When the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Tañedo,10 after the death of either of the
spouses, no complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable
against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the
surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the
proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal
property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse,
the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is
passed to the administrator appointed by the court having
jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings.11Indeed, the
surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that
conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the
partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void.12
The ruling in Calma v. Tañedo was reaffirmed in the recent case
of Ventura v. Militante.13 In that case, the surviving wife was sued in
an amended complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation
allegedly contracted by her and her late husband. The defendant,
who had earlier moved to dismiss the case, opposed the admission
of the amended complaint on the ground that the death of her
husband terminated their conjugal partnership and that the
plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable against the partnership,
should be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
The trial court nevertheless admitted the complaint and ruled, as
the Court of Appeals did in this case, that since the defendant was
also a party to the obligation, the death of her husband did not
preclude the plaintiff from filing an ordinary collection suit against
her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that ¾
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership
terminates upon the death of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint
is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an
indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any
judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in
the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings
of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of
the spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This
does not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues.
And private respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under
Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court
for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of
the deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner
failed to apply for administration or request that administration be
granted to some other person.14
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its
ruling, namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy15 and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v.
David,16 are based on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the
defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and Manuel Co, were sued for damages
for malicious prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact the claim was
not against any conjugal partnership, it was one which does not
survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the
dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining
defendant Manuel Co.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and
severally executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis
of a collection suit filed against the wife after her husband had died.

For this reason, the Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was
solidary, the surviving spouse could be independently sued in an
ordinary action for the enforcement of the entire obligation.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of
conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the
husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership
and it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its
repayment.17 Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement
of an obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in
their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not
as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the
contrary to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this
case, as will be discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely
joint, making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot
maintain the present suit against petitioner.1âwphi1 Rather, his
remedy is to file a claim against the Alipios in the proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of petitioner's husband or, if none has been
commenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of letters
of administration18 or for the allowance of will,19 depending on
whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate. Private
respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim
against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that,
aside from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal
estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary
before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say,
such power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over
the settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any other court.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses
to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in
the amount of ₱50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is
to be paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art.
1207 of the Civil Code provides:
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors
in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the
former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound
to render, entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so estates, or when the
law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the
obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed
to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal shares as
there are debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one
another.20
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which
provides that when there are two or more lessees, or in this case,
sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be
sure, should the lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased
property after the expiration of the lease period and despite due
demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly and severally liable
to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their solidary liability
is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they have
become joint tortfeasors.21 In the case at bar, there is no allegation
that the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the
expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance
sought to be collected by private respondent in his collection suit
became due on June 30, 1989, long before the sublease expired on
September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that
when there are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is
solidary. On the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract
involved in this case reads:22
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the
entire period of three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (₱485,600.00)
PESOS, including all the improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs
and related species thereon as well all fishing equipment,
paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount shall be paid to the
Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to wit:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 56 of 73
A. Three hundred thousand (₱300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this
contract; and
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (₱185,6000.00)
Pesos to be paid on June 30, 1989.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the
obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against
their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of
₱50,600.00 should be divided into two so that each couple is liable
to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and
Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00, the
attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the
suit. The complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice
to the filing of a claim by private respondent in the proceedings for
the settlement of estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the
share of the Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance of the rent in the
amount of ₱25,300.00.
SO ORDERED.
18. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39532 July 20, 1979
Testate Estate of Jose M. Valero, FLORA VALERO VDA. DE
RODRIGUEZ and ROSIE VALERO DE GUTIERREZ, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CARMEN VALERO-RUSTIA, respondents-
appellees.
Amboriso Padilla Law Office and Iglesia & Associates for appellants.
Angel P. Purisima for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This is supposedly a case about collation. As factual background, it
should be stated that the spouses, Beatriz Bautista and Jose M.
Valero, did not beget any child during their marriage In 1951 Beatriz
adopted Carmen (Carmencita) Bautista. Jose wanted also to adopt
her but because, by his first marriage, he had two children named
Flora Valero Vda. de Rodriguez and Rosie Valero Gutierrez. he was
disqualified to adopt Carmen. Jose manifested in the adoption
proceeding that he consented to the use by Carmen of his surname
Valero. (See Civil Case No. 12475, Manila CFI; Art. 338[1], Civil Code
and art. 28, Child and Youth Welfare Code.)
On September 18, 1964, Jose M. Valero donated to Carmen B.
Valero (who was already married to Doctor Sergio Rustia) his one-
half proindiviso share (apparently his inchoate share) in two conjugal
lots, with the improvements thereon, located at San Lorenzo Village,
Makati, Rizal, with an area of 1,500 square meters. His wife, Beatriz,
consented to the donation. However, the deed of donation was not
registered.
On January 13, 1966, Jose M. Valero, who was then seventy-three
years old, executed his last will and testament wherein he
enumerated the conjugal properties of himself and his wife,
including the two San Lorenzo Village lots. In that will, he did not
mention the donation. He devised to his wife properties sufficient to
constitute her legitime and bequeathed the remainder to his two
children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez.
About a month later, or on February 15, 1966, the Valero spouses,
by means of a deed of absolute sale, conveyed the San Lorenzo
Village lots and the improvements thereon to Carmen B. Valero-
Rustia for the sum of one hundred twenty thousand pesos. The sale
was registered on the following day. Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 163270 and 163271 were issued to the vendee, Mrs. Rustia.

On December 4, 1967 she mortgaged the two lots to the Quezon
City Development Bank as security for a loan of fifty thousand pesos
(page 204, Rollo).
Beatriz B. Valero died intestate on September 12, 1972, survived by
her husband and her adopted child. Her estate is pending settlement
in Special Proceeding No. 88896 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Mrs. Rustia was named administratrix of her adopted
mother's estate.
More than a month later, or on October 18, 1972, Jose M. Valero
died testate, survived by his two children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs.
Gutierrez. His will was duly probated in Special Proceeding No.
88677, also of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Lawyer Celso F.
Unson, the executor, submitted an inventory wherein, following the
list of conjugal assets in the testator's will, the two San Lorenzo
Village lots were included as part of the testate estate.
That inclusion provoked Mrs. Rustia, the adopted child of Mrs.
Valero, and Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez, the legitimate
children of the testator, Jose M. Valero, to file (through Mrs. Rustia's
lawyer) in the testate proceeding a motion for the exclusion of the
two San Lorenzo Village lots from the testator's inventoried estate.
Adduced as reason for the exclusion is the fact that since February
16, 1966 Mrs. Rustia has been the registered owner of the lots as
shown by two Torrens titles, copies of which were attached to the
motion.
The executor opposed the motion on the ground that the two lots
were donated to Mrs. Rustia and the donation would allegedly
involve collation and the donee's title to the lots. The executor
revealed that he was informed by Mrs. Gutierrez and Mrs. Rodriguez
(supposed movants) that the two lots should be included in the
inventory. Thus, the issue of collation was prematurely raised.
The probate court in its order of August 9, 1973 excluded the two
lots from the inventory of the testator's estate but with the
understanding "that the same are subject to collation".
On December 4, 1973 or one hundred twelve days after Mrs. Rustia
was served with a copy of that order, she filed a motion for its
reconsideration. She insisted that she is the owner of the two San
Lorenzo Village lots as indicated in the Torrens titles. No one
opposed that motion. At the hearing of that motion, Mrs. Rustia's
lawyer apprised the court that the executor informed him over the
phone that he was not opposing the motion.
The probate court in its order of December 14, 1973 ruled that the
two lots were unconditionally excluded from the inventory of Jose
M. Valero's estate, meaning "that they are not subject to collation".
That order is the bone of contention in this case.
Mrs. Rodriguez (without being joined by her sister, Mrs. Gutierrez)
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of December 14,
1973. She alleged that the two San Lorenzo Village lots were really
conveyed to Mrs. Rustia by way of donation because the
consideration for the sale was allegedly only one-fifth of the true
value of the lots. Mrs. Rodriguez further contended that the order of
August 9, 1973 was final in character.
In reply, Mrs. Rustia countered that the prior order was
interlocutory and that in 1966 the true value of the two lots was
around P120,000 and that their value increased considerably in 1973
or 1974. Moreover, the relatively low price of the sale could be
attributed to the fact that Mrs. Rustia and her husband lived with
the Valeros and were taking care of them.
The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration. Mrs.
Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez, in their petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, assailed the probate court's order declaring that
the two lots were not subject to collation.
The Court of Appeals held that the order of exclusion dated August
9, 1973 was interlocutory and that it could be changed or Modified
at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 57 of 73
It further held that it was immaterial whether the two lots were
donated or sold to Mrs. Rustia as "a mere subterfuge to avoid
payment of the donor's and donee's taxes". According to the
Appellate Court, it was immaterial because under article 1061 of the
Civil Code, only compulsory heirs are required to make collation for
the determination of their legitimes and, under section 2, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court, only heirs are involved in questions as to
advancement and Mrs. Rustia is not an heir of the testator, Jose M.
Valero (Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Valero Rustia, CA-G. R. No. SP- 02944,
August 28, 1974, per G. S. Santos, Gaviola, Jr. and De Castro, JJ.).
From that decision, an appeal was made to this Court. The appeal
was not given due course. However, upon motion for
reconsideration and over Mrs. Rustia's opposition, the appeal was
later allowed.
The appellants' only assignment of error is that the Court of Appeals
should have held that the probate court's order of exclusion dated
August 9, 1973 was not interlocutory but was a final and appealable
order valid that the order of December 14, 1973 modifying the order
of August 3 is void.
We hold that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not a
final order. It was interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle
once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots. The probate
court in the exclusion incident could not determine the question of
title.
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory,
the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by
the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14,
1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).
We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the
probate court that the two disputed lots are not subject to collation
was a supererogation and was not necessary to the disposition of
the case which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of the testator's estate. The issue of collation
was not yet justifiable at that early stage of the testate proceeding.
It is not necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the
controversial matter of collation.
Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and
whether Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are
matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all. How
those issues should be resolved, if and when they are raised, need
not be touched upon in the adjudication of this appeal.
The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the
estates of the deceased Valero spouses were consolidated, as
ordered by the lower court on November 21, 1974, so that the
conjugal estate of the deceased spouses may be properly liquidated,
as contemplated in section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court and Act
No. 3176 (Pages 223 and 235-6, Rollo).
We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We found that
the proceedings have not yet reached the stage when the question
of collation or advancement to an heir may be raised and decided.
The numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net
remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet
been determined. On the other hand, up to this time, no separate
action has been brought by the appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustia's
Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to show that the sale was in
reality a donation.
In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation
and to decide whether Mrs. Rustia's titles to the disputed lots are
questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the stage of
partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory
heirs have to be determined.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the
orders of the, lower court dated August 9 and December 14, 1973,

excluding from the inventory of Jose M. Valeros estate the two San
Lorenzo Village lots now registered in the name of Carmen B.
Valero-Rustia, but we delete from that decision and the two orders
any ruling regarding collation which is a matter that may be passed
upon by the probate court at the time when it is seasonably raised
by the interested parties, if it is ever raised at all. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
Guerrero, Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Santos and De Castro, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
For even assuming that the order of exclusion had become final
insofar as the inventory is concerned, said order could not have any
final binding effect on the issue of collation.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I vote for the unqualified affirmance of respondent appellate court's
decision sustaining the exclusion from the inventory of Jose M.
Valeros estate of the two San Lorenzo Village lots registered in the
name of respondent Carmen B. Valero-Rustia by virtue of the deed
of absolute sale thereof executed by him in his lifetime on February
15, 1966 in her favor.
The question of collation of said lots is immaterial insofar as
respondent and the deceased Jose M. Valeros estate and petitioners
are concerned, since respondent is not even an heir of his estate
(which he had willed to his two legitimate children, herein
petitioners, his second wife Beatriz Bautista having predeceased him
in September, 1972). Under Article 1061 of the Civil Code, only a
compulsory heir succeeding with other compulsory heirs is required
to collate whatever property he/she may have received from the
decedent during the decedent's lifetime by way of donation or any
other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition." There can therefore be no collation here because from
the documents of record, respondent Carmen B. Valero-Rustia is not
a compulsory heir who received property by donation or gratuitous
title from the deceased that would be subject to collation.
The properties in question had been transferred by deed of absolute
sale to said respondent-vendee more than six years before the
vendor Jose M. Valero died in, October, 1972. The deceased having
long divested himself of title to the said properties, they were
properly excluded from the inventory of his estate.
The real question between petitioners (Children of the deceased
vendor) and respondent-vendee (a stranger to the deceased's
estate) is not collation, but a question of title and ownership of the
properties. The probate court has no jurisdiction over this question
and petitioners must bring a separate action if they wish to question
respondent's title and ownership. Even granting their claim that the
deed of sale should be considered a donation or gratuitous transfer,
(because of the allegedly excessively low price), their only recourse
would be not collation, but a separate action for reduction of the
donation to the extent that they may show it to be inofficious
(exceeding that which the deceased may give by will) under the
provisions of Articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code.
19. FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE
PASTOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I,
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 58 of 73
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO
QUEMADA, respondents.
Pelaez, Pelaez, & Pelaez Law Office for petitioners.
Ceniza, Rama & Associates for private respondents.
PLANA, J.:
I. FACTS:
This is a case of hereditary succession.
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City
on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also
died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro
Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an
illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito
Quemada QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been
naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a
Filipino by his mother's citizenship.
On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate
and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT),
docketed as SP No. 3128-R. The will contained only one
testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting
of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some
mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of
QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special
administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR., whether or not
covered or affected by the holographic will. He assumed office as
such on December 4, 1970 after filing a bond of P 5,000.00.
On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator,
instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the
properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the
spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor,
who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not
by inheritance. The action, docketed as Civil Case No. 274-R, was
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.
On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their
opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing
QUEMADA as special administrator.
On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing
the will to probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
52961- R, the order was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977.
On petition for review, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-46645
dismissed the petition in a minute resolution dated November 1,
1977 and remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying
reconsideration on January 11, 1978.
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT,
QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his
legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR,
JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency
of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of
First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE
COURT.
On March 5, 1980, the PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the
intrinsic validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of
PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the
PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit their respective
position papers as to how much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled
to receive under the wig. Pursuant thereto, PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA
submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10, which in
effect showed that determination of how much QUEMADA should
receive was still premature. QUEMADA submitted his Position paper
dated April 20, 1980. ATLAS, upon order of the Court, submitted a

sworn statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group of tsn from
June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to February 1980. The statement
revealed that of the mining claims being operated by ATLAS, 60%
pertained to the Pastor Group distributed as follows:
1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5%
2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0%
3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%
On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being
litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the
PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and
Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties
payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA
was not inofficious. [There was absolutely no statement or claim in
the Order that the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 had
previously resolved the issue of ownership of the mining rights of
royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic will.]
The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will
and a written acknowledgment of PASTOR, JR. dated June 17, 1962,
of the above 60% interest in the mining claims belonging to the
Pastor Group, 42% belonged to PASTOR, SR. and only 33% belonged
to PASTOR, JR. The remaining 25% belonged to E. Pelaez, also of the
Pastor Group. The PROBATE COURT thus directed ATLAS to remit
directly to QUEMADA the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of
which QUEMADA was authorized to retain 75% for himself as
legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking institution for
payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The
33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered
garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from
the time of PASTOR, SR.'s death, which amounted to over two
million pesos.
The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in
obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment on September 4,
1980, and in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day. Notified of
the Order on September 6, 1980, the oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground
that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it
resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the
payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will. In the meantime, the PROBATE COURT
ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR.
and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors' motion for
reconsideration.
Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however,
PASTOR, JR., this time joined by his wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE
PASTOR, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and
Prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R.
No. SP- 11373-R). They assailed the Order dated August 20, 1980
and the writ of execution and garnishment issued pursuant thereto.
The petition was denied on November 18, 1980 on the grounds (1)
that its filing was premature because the Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Order was still pending
determination by the PROBATE COURT; and (2) that although "the
rule that a motion for reconsideration is prerequisite for an action
for certiorari is never an absolute rule," the Order assailed is "legally
valid. "
On December 9, 1980, PASTOR, JR. and his wife moved for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's decision of November 18,
1980, calling the attention of the appellate court to another order of
the Probate Court dated November 11, 1980 (i.e., while their
petition for certiorari was pending decision in the appellate court),
by which the oppositors' motion for reconsideration of the Probate
Court's Order of August 20, 1980 was denied. [The November 11
Order declared that the questions of intrinsic validity of the will and
of ownership over the mining claims (not the royalties alone) had
been finally adjudicated by the final and executory Order of
December 5, 1972, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, thereby rendering moot and academic the suit for
reconveyance then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch IX. It clarified that only the 33% share of PASTOR, JR. in the
royalties (less than 7.5% share which he had assigned to QUEMADA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 59 of 73
before PASTOR, SR. died) was to be garnished and that as regards
PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share, what was ordered was just the transfer of
its possession to the custody of the PROBATE COURT through the
special administrator. Further, the Order granted QUEMADA 6%
interest on his unpaid legacy from August 1980 until fully paid.]
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of
pre y injunction, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 18, 1980 as well as the orders of the Probate Court dated
August 20, 1980, November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, Med
by petitioners on March 26, 1981, followed by a Supplemental
Petition with Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.
In April 1981, the Court (First Division) issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, the lifting of which was denied in the Resolution of the
same Division dated October 18, 1982, although the bond of
petitioners was increased from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00.
Between December 21, 1981 and October 12, 1982, private
respondent filed seven successive motions for early resolution. Five
of these motions expressly prayed for the resolution of the question
as to whether or not the petition should be given due course.
On October 18, 1982, the Court (First Division) adopted a resolution
stating that "the petition in fact and in effect was given due course
when this case was heard on the merits on September 7, (should be
October 21, 1981) and concise memoranda in amplification of their
oral arguments on the merits of the case were filed by the parties
pursuant to the resolution of October 21, 1981 . . . " and denied in a
resolution dated December 13, 1982, private respondent's
"Omnibus motion to set aside resolution dated October 18, 1982
and to submit the matter of due course to the present membership
of the Division; and to reassign the case to another ponente."
Upon Motion for Reconsideration of the October 18, 1982 and
December 13, 1982 Resolutions, the Court en banc resolved to
CONFIRM the questioned resolutions insofar as hey resolved that
the petition in fact and in effect had been given due course.
II. ISSUES:
Assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the
Order of execution and garnishment dated August 20, 1980 as well
as the Orders subsequently issued allegedly to implement the
Probate Order of December 5, 1972, to wit: the Order of November
11, 1980 declaring that the Probate Order of 1972 indeed resolved
the issues of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will, and
reiterating the Order of Execution dated August 20, 1980; and the
Order of December 17, 1980 reducing to P2,251,516.74 the amount
payable to QUEMADA representing the royalties he should have
received from the death of PASTOR, SR. in 1966 up to February
1980.
The Probate Order itself, insofar as it merely allowed the
holographic will in probate, is not questioned. But petitioners
denounce the Probate Court for having acted beyond its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Orders.
Their argument runs this way: Before the provisions of the
holographic win can be implemented, the questions of ownership of
the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic
will must first be resolved with finality. Now, contrary to the position
taken by the Probate Court in 1980 — i.e., almost eight years after
the probate of the will in 1972 — the Probate Order did not resolve
the two said issues. Therefore, the Probate Order could not have
resolved and actually did not decide QUEMADA's entitlement to the
legacy. This being so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy in
alleged implementation of the Probate Order of 1972 are
unwarranted for lack of basis.
Closely related to the foregoing is the issue raised by QUEMADA The
Probate Order of 1972 having become final and executory, how can
its implementation (payment of legacy) be restrained? Of course,
the question assumes that QUEMADA's entitlement to the legacy
was finally adjudged in the Probate Order.

On the merits, therefore, the basic issue is whether the Probate
Order of December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the questions of
ownership and intrinsic validity. A negative finding will necessarily
render moot and academic the other issues raised by the parties,
such as the jurisdiction of the Probate Court to conclusively resolve
title to property, and the constitutionality and repercussions of a
ruling that the mining properties in dispute, although in the name of
PASTOR, JR. and his wife, really belonged to the decedent despite
the latter's constitutional disqualification as an alien.
On the procedural aspect, placed in issue is the propriety of
certiorari as a means to assail the validity of the order of execution
and the implementing writ.
III. DISCUSSION:
1. Issue of Ownership —
(a) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and
large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75,
Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is
an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. [3 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court (1980 ed.), p. 458; Valero Vda. de
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540.]
(b) The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that
decreed in the dispositive part of the decision. (Philippine-American
Insurance Co. vs. Honorable Flores, 97 SCRA 811.) However, in case
of ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the decision may be
scanned for guidance in construing the judgment. (Heirs of Presto
vs. Galang, 78 SCRA 534; Fabular vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329;
Robles vs. Timario. 107 Phil. 809.)
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution
is the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 which allegedly resolved
the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. The
said Probate Order enumerated the issues before the Probate Court,
thus:
Unmistakably, there are three aspects in these
proceedings: (1) the probate of the holographic will (2) the
intestate estate aspect; and (3) the administration
proceedings for the purported estate of the decedent in
the Philippines.
In its broad and total perspective the whole proceedings
are being impugned by the oppositors on jurisdictional
grounds, i.e., that the fact of the decedent's residence and
existence of properties in the Philippines have not been
established.
Specifically placed in issue with respect to the probate
proceedings are: (a) whether or not the holographic will
(Exhibit "J") has lost its efficacy as the last will and
testament upon the death of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. on June 5,
1966, in Cebu City, Philippines; (b) Whether or not the said
will has been executed with all the formalities required by
law; and (c) Did the late presentation of the holographic
will affect the validity of the same?
Issues In the Administration Proceedings are as follows: (1)
Was the ex- parte appointment of the petitioner as special
administrator valid and proper? (2) Is there any
indispensable necessity for the estate of the decedent to
be placed under administration? (3) Whether or not
petition is qualified to be a special administrator of the
estate; and (4) Whether or not the properties listed in the
inventory (submitted by the special administrator but not
approved by the Probate Court) are to be excluded.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 60 of 73
Then came what purports to be the dispositive portion:
Upon the foregoing premises, this Court rules on and
resolves some of the problems and issues presented in
these proceedings, as follows:
(a) The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings as it hereby allows and approves the so-called
holographic will of testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr., executed on
July 31, 1961 with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same
having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. Let, therefore, a
certificate of its allowance be prepared by the Branch
Clerk of this Court to be signed by this Presiding Judge, and
attested by the seal of the Court, and thereafter attached
to the will, and the will and certificate filed and recorded
by the clerk. Let attested copies of the will and of the
certificate of allowance thereof be sent to Atlas
Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation,
Goodrich Bldg., Cebu City, and the Register of Deeds of
Cebu or of Toledo City, as the case may be, for recording.
(b) There was a delay in the granting of the letters
testamentary or of administration for as a matter of fact,
no regular executor and/or administrator has been
appointed up to this time and - the appointment of a
special administrator was, and still is, justified under the
circumstances to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased in the Philippines (particularly in
Cebu) until the problems causing the delay are decided
and the regular executor and/or administrator appointed.
(c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special
administrator and later on an executor and/or
administrator in these proceedings, in spite of this Court's
declaration that the oppositors are the forced heirs and
the petitioner is merely vested with the character of a
voluntary heir to the extent of the bounty given to him
(under) the will insofar as the same will not prejudice the
legitimes of the oppositorfor the following reasons:
1. To submit a complete inventory of the estate
of the decedent-testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr.
2. To administer and to continue to put to
prolific utilization of the properties of the
decedent;
3. To keep and maintain the houses and other
structures and belonging to the estate, since the
forced heirs are residing in Spain, and prepare
them for delivery to the heirs in good order after
partition and when directed by the Court, but
only after the payment of estate and inheritance
taxes;
(d) Subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of
ownership and possession of real and personal
properties in Civil Case No. 274-T before Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, the intestate estate
administration aspect must proceed, unless, however, it
is duly proven by the oppositors that debts of the
decedent have already been paid, that there had been an
extrajudicial partition or summary one between the forced
heirs, that the legacy to be given and delivered to the
petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of
the testator, that the respective shares of the forced heirs
have been fairly apportioned, distributed and delivered to
the two forced heirs of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., after deducting
the property willed to the petitioner, and the estate and
inheritance taxes have already been paid to the
Government thru the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to
remain as special administrator or administrator of the
other properties of the estate of the decedent, which
properties are not directly or indirectly affected by the
provisions of the holographic will (such as bank deposits,

land in Mactan etc.), will be resolved in another order as
separate incident, considering that this order should have
been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of
whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of
ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest
therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the
question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and
propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and
approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity,
the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate
estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome
of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and
personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of
Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the
"intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the
estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for
purposes of testate administration, but not
for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a property for
testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate
Order (while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the
legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect
must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given
and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of
the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of
impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not
resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of
allowing QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of estate
properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this
(Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a
resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the
aforestated will. "
(c) That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership
of the properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate,
considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of
controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch
IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
(d) What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the
Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed the Probable
Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order.
(e) In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of execution
dated August 20, 1980, the Probate Court in its Order of November
11, 1980 explained that the basis for its conclusion that the question
of ownership had been formally resolved by the Probate Order of
1972 are the findings in the latter Order that (1) during the lifetime
of the decedent, he was receiving royalties from ATLAS; (2) he had
resided in the Philippines since pre-war days and was engaged in the
mine prospecting business since 1937 particularly in the City of
Toledo; and (3) PASTOR, JR. was only acting as dummy for his father
because the latter was a Spaniard.
Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously far-fetched.
(f) It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to
conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question
of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that,
premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said
Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in
dispute.
2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will -
(a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife,
aside from his two legitimate children and one illegitimate son.
There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and
set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership
preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the estate of
PASTOR, SR. which will include, among others, the determination of
the extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her
death. * When the disputed Probate order was issued on December
5, 1972, there had been no liquidation of the community properties
of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 61 of 73
(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive
determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was
an inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special
administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of
a hearing or that it was judicially approved. The reconveyance or
recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of
PASTOR, SR. was still being litigated in another court.
(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of
the debts of the decedent and his estate. Indeed, it was only in the
Probate Order of December 5, 1972 where the Probate Court
ordered that-
... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, requiring all
persons having money claims against the decedent to file
them in the office of the Branch Clerk of this Court."
(d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least
provided for, as of December 5, 1972.
so
(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the
legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not be
ascertained.
(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to
determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a fixed share in a
specific property rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate
of the deceased - would produce an impairment of the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic
validity of the will in other respects. It was obviously for this reason
that as late as March 5, 1980 - more than 7 years after the Probate
Order was issued the Probate Court scheduled on March 25, 1980 a
hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will.
3. Propriety of certiorari —
Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means
to assail the validity of the disputed Order of execution. He contends
that the error, if any, is one of judgment, not jurisdiction, and
properly correctible only by appeal, not certiorari.
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be
rejected. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
is much too evident in the actuations of the probate court to be
overlooked or condoned.
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what
properties compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of
conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA
ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving properties not in the name of the
decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on the intrinsic validity
of the will here in question, there was no basis for the Probate Court
to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did not, that private
respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned legacy.
Therefore, the Order of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the
subsequent implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's
legacy, in alleged implementation of the dispositive part of the
Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of basis.
(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule
requiring prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the
determination of the assets of the estate and payment of all debts
and expenses, before apportionment and distribution of the residue
among the heirs and legatees. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7
SCRA 367.)
(c) Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR.
Payment therefore of the legacy to QUEMADA would collide with
the provision of the National Internal Revenue Code requiring
payment of estate tax before delivery to any beneficiary of his
distributive share of the estate (Section 107 [c])

(d) The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been
issued purportedly under Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees,
legatees, or heirs have been in possession. —
Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into
possession of portions of the estate before the debts and
expenses have been settled and paid and have become
liable to contribute for the payment of such debts and
expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may,
by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount
of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what
manner each person shall contribute, and may issue
execution as circumstances require.
The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce
payment of debts of estate. A legacy is not a debt of the estate;
indeed, legatees are among those against whom execution is
authorized to be issued.
... there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the
probate court generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It
is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its
orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against
the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy
without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution.
The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment
enforceable by execution.
The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly
specifies that the probate court may issue execution (a) to
satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive shares
of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the
decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment
of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to
satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in
probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under
the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, that those
are the only instances when it can issue a writ of
execution. (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59 SCRA 96, 108.)
(d) It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final
judgment; but to order the execution of a final order (which is not
even meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not
there and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be invoked to defeat
the right of a prevailing party to the execution of a valid and final
judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is issued
with grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment
sought to be enforced (PVTA vs. Honorable Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172),
certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.
(e) Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an
order of execution which varies the terms of the judgment sought to
be executed or does not find support in the dispositive part of the
latter, there are circumstances in the instant case which justify the
remedy applied for.
Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is
the holder in her own right of three mining claims which are one of
the objects of conflicting claims of ownership. She is not an heir of
PASTOR, SR. and was not a party to the probate proceedings.
Therefore, she could not appeal from the Order of execution issued
by the Probate Court. On the other hand, after the issuance of the
execution order, the urgency of the relief she and her co-petitioner
husband seek in the petition for certiorari states against requiring
her to go through the cumbersome procedure of asking for leave to
intervene in the probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is
granted, to appeal from the challenged order of execution which has
ordered the immediate transfer and/or garnishment of the royalties
derived from mineral properties of which she is the duly registered
owner and/or grantee together with her husband. She could not
have intervened before the issuance of the assailed orders because
she had no valid ground to intervene. The matter of ownership over
the properties subject of the execution was then still being litigated
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 62 of 73
in another court in a reconveyance suit filed by the special
administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR.
Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. Med the petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, appeal was not available to him
since his motion for reconsideration of the execution order was still
pending resolution by the Probate Court. But in the face of actual
garnishment of their major source of income, petitioners could no
longer wait for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration.
They needed prompt relief from the injurious effects of the
execution order. Under the circumstances, recourse to certiorari
was the feasible remedy.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-
11373-R is reversed. The Order of execution issued by the probate
Court dated August 20, 1980, as well as all the Orders issued
subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate Order
dated December 5, 1972, particularly the Orders dated November
11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside; and this case
is remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper
proceedings, subject to the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case
No. 274-R.
SO ORDERED.
20. FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA
NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent
dies intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court
appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of
the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These
are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines,
passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He
was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein
petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac,
the herein private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No.
RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the
following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving
heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are
no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several
properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security
System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona,
Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein
petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as
such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to
dismiss the petition of private respondent 2 alleging that there exists
no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and
praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of
administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as
the surviving spouse.

In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court,
appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of
the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond
posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her
to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the
deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after
receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in
its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises
the following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration;
(2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary
where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the
better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the
surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate
of the deceased for purposes of administration for the following
reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the
SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in
support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these
institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said
death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her
deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to
defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and,
finally, the only real property of the deceased has been
extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private
respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for
petitioner to decide what properties form part of the estate of the
deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that
this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate
proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do
not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare
allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as
this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and
final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the
estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before
which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is
in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant
contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate,
the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of
the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a
certain property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly
within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be
instituted by the parties.7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres
de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless
find the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent
to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein
below discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the
same should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in
Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had
left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception
to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this
exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no
debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or applying
for the appointment of an administrator.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 63 of 73
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even
if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to
resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While
Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as
they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the
said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good
reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted
that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has
no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial
administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of
legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do
not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary
estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case
the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the
hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in
sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has
indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the
deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be
ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where
such property is in the hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an
appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of
suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the
annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective
could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not
justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case,
We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the
appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his
deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him
to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his
wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being
a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter.15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There
are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both
of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to
be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in
good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent
seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession
of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes,
since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who
supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion
that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate
of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be
substantial especially since the only real property left has been
extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful
purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being
wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, 16 the
claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may
be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the
creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the
administration proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing

letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening
the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs
and expenses of an administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the
issue of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas
Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be
appointed as administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and
the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the
right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition
of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
21. SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978
Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa
Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN,
and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely, MARIA
P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P.
YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO
PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and
FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN
BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE
PANGILINAN and her Children, claimants-appellees.
Casiano U. Laput and Lorenzo D. de Guzman for appellants.
Paulino A. Conol and Felicidario M. Batoy for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a
parcel of land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or to
their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a
separate action. Also in issue in these two cases is the liability of the
decedents' estate for the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a
case regarding that same land.
Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was
allowed in this Court's resolution of August 13, 1969.
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943
and 1948, respectively. They possession a homestead, consisting of
two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon,
Calamba, Misamis Occidental.
One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791
hectares. It was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10
of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of Juan
Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 86 (T-10) of the registry of deeds of Misamis Occidental (p.
7, Appellees' brief in L-27082).
The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of
18.0291 hectares. It is covered by OCT No. P-8419 issued on
November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan ,
represented by Concepcion Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal
in L-27082).
According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot
No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares which was surveyed in the
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 64 of 73
name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and
1112, also forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan
spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on Appeal).
The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1)
Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed
Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in
1961, and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all
surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pan who died in 1948 and
who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not
clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay,
were the children of the deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a
daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. See pages 81-
82, Record on Appeal).
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental was instituted on September 5, 1963 for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa
Magtuba.
On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of
partition wherein the combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or
22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:
(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees
in Civil Case No. 560 or CA-G.R. No. 6721-R, February 27,
1952, Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in accordance
with the lower court's decision dated July 19, 1965 in Civil
Case No. 2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11, Appellees' brief
in L-27082), three hectares which should be taken from Lot
No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;
(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and
children), 5.3361 hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and
designated as Lot No. 1112-B;
(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot
No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-C, and
presumably a daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on
Appeal).
(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares,
consisting of Lot No. 1927 and the remainder of Lot No.
1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No. 1112-D.
It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of
P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate to Concepcion Pan
should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or
P1,696.16 for each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.)
opposed that project of partition. They contended that the proposed
partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963
which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-
hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her
share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition; that
the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is
12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is
6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.
The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the
administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition
until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by
the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six hectares, which were claimed
by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded
from the inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is
determined in an ordinary action.
On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a
supplemental opposition wherein they asked that Lot No. 1920, with
an area of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at should be
included in the project of partition.

On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own
volition, tackled once more the project of partition. After noting that
no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of the
twelve hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition
but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan.
That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after
excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court did not bother to
decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima
Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.
That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as
administrator, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the
lower court's order of December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen
hectares from the inventory, which order was sustained by the Court
of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R,
and 3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused to review
that decision in its resolution of July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.
The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968
which directed that the claim of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan for
reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of
P1,459.49, as the value of the produce of the twelve hectares
already mentioned, which was appropriated by the special
administrator), be referred to the clerk of court for reception of the
evidence.
In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court
reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that the administrator should
pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to
her estate. The court further directed the administrator to account
for the income of the estate, to recover any amount due from the
special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and
the amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in
its order of August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of
the special administrator.
The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of
Concepcion Pan also appealed from those two orders dated May 11,
1968 (L-29545).
The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has
no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not
decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their
exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the
title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a
separate action or in the intestate. proceeding.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which may be waived" (Cunanan vs.
Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re
jurisdiction over the issue).
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be
passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question
should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-
42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate
or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of
title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 65 of 73
of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs. Pascual
73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA
892; Cunanan vs. Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the
general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate
action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the
motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate
proceeding.
As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of
society. They should not be forced to incur additional expenses
(such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs
of Francisco Pangilinan to the in the intestate, proceeding, Special
Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein
they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in question,
stating the ultimate facts in support of their claim, such as the
partition made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share
of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their parents,
their long possession of the said portion, their claim for the produce
of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No.
560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920
forms part of the estate of the Pangilinan spouses.
Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and
upon Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan (who
are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer the
motion within fifteen days from service. In their answer the
appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the defenses (such
as the violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to support
their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate of the
spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the expenses incurred
by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.
After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable
settlement has been reached, the probate court should receive
evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs.
Catolico, supra a full-dress hearing should be held.
Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares
but only for the purpose of deciding what portion of the estate
should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for the
sum of P416 had already been adjudicated by the lower court in its
order of August 31, 1966 (pp. 26- 27, Record on Appeal in L-29545).
No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.
After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what
constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan spouses should include the
partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate
should be allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of
the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112, made by Juan C.
Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.
Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan . and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for
reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil
Case No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two orders of the trial
court dated May 11, 1968 regarding those matters (L-29545) should
not be enforced. They should be set aside.
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31,
1966, excluding twelve hectares from the partition of the estate of
the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated
May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras and her
children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-
29545) are reversed and set aside.

A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the
proper pleadings and in case no amicable settlement is reached. The
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within thirty
days from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.
The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with the guidelines already set forth. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
22. SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 75579 September 30, 1991
TOMAS TRINIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Tomas Trinidad for himself.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of 1)
the decision * dated February 14, 1986 of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. N 01483
entitled: "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Tom Trinidad," affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court Manila dated January 5,
1984, which convicted herein petitioner of violation of Section 25 in
relation to Section 39 of P 957 sentencing him to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law
and to pay the costs, and the resolution of said appellate court
dated May 9, 1986, denying the motion for reconsideration of
herein petitioner.
In an information that was filed in the then Court of First Instance of
Manila (now Regional Trial Court), herein petitioner, Atty. Tomas
Trinidad, was charged with violation of P.D. 957 for non-delivery of
title allegedly committed in this manner:
That on or about February 20, 1978 and continuously up to
the present, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being the administrator of the estate of the late NICOLAI
DREPIN, President and General Manager of the Mother
Earth Realty Development Corporation, owner-developer
of the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision, located at
Antipolo, Rizal, and having knowledge of the sale of Lot
No. 19, Block No. 51 of the said Subdivision to FRANCISCA
T. DIMABUYO for the purchase price of P14,000,00, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to
deliver the title of said subdivision lot to the said lot buyer
upon full payment thereof in violation of the
aforementioned P.D. No. 957. (Rollo, p. 25)
After the accused had been arraigned, pleading not guilty, the
prosecution presented only one witness namely Francisca T.
Dimabuyu, who is 49 years old, married, public school teacher,
residing at 311 Poblacion, Mabalacat, Pampanga. In her direct and
cross examination she testified to the following: that she filed a case
against the accused Tomas Trinidad with the Task Force of the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice for Violation of P.D. No. 957
for non-delivery of title and she executed an affidavit in support of
her complaint before the Task Force of the Ministry (now
Department) of Justice. She identified the Affidavit, Exhibit A in her
complaint. She filed this complaint against Tomas Trinidad for the
non-issuance of title wherein there was a contract executed by her
with the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, and that
the accused Tomas Trinidad was the administrator of the estate of
the late Nicolai Drepin. She identified the contract executed by her
presented and marked as Exhibit B and the total price of the lot
bought by her was FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00). She was
paying Thirty Eight Pesos and Sixty Bight Centavos (P38.68) monthly
until she made the full payment. She was given receipts and entered
in her booklet presented and marked as Exhibit C. She was able to
pay SEVEN THOUSAND (P7,000.00) PESOS including amortization,
and this lot which she bought is located at Antipolo, Rizal. She had
visited the place before she bought the same. She identified Exhibit
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 66 of 73
D, which is the certification of the secretary of the accused. She has
also receipts to prove her payments to the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation, of which the accused is the President and
General Manager and owner developer of the Munting Baguio
Village Subdivision located at Antipolo, Rizal. She identified these
receipts of payment paid by her. Exhibits E, E-1 to E-3 inclusive. She
also identified a passbook wherein the payment made by her were
posted by the employee of the said corporation, Exhibits F to F-1.
She further stated that she never me the accused in his office. She
called him by phone and he promised her to deliver the title after
she had made the full payment. She waited for several months but
no title was issue to her. She dropped in the office of the accused
and she never saw him there, only a clerk told her that he is busy.
Two month after she paid the last payment she made inquiries of
her title. She was able to talk with the accused in 1978, and the
accused told her that she should be patient for her title would
arrive. She went to the office of the accused for so many, many
times and inquired about her title and the office of the accused in
situated at Escolta, Regina Building, Manila. She was able to talk
with the accused two times using the telephone in his office and the
accused told her that she must not worry for her title would be
forthcoming. Her son was able to talk with the accused but the
accused told her son that her title was coming. She wen to the
National Housing Authority and inquired if the corporation of the
accused is fake. Atty. Lagunsag of the National Housing Authority set
a hearing between her and the accused but the accused did not
appear. She received the notification ("marked as Exhibit G) from
the National Housing Authority about the hearing. The hearing was
about the title she was claiming from the accused. A hearing. was
also held at the Ministry (now Department) of Justice on March 7,
1981 but the accused did not appear. The Ministry (now
Department) of Justice handled the case to help her and it was Fiscal
Rodrigo Cosico, state Prosecutor of the Ministry (now Department)
of Justice who handled the case. There was a resolution of the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice in her favor, marked an
presented as Exhibit H and H-1. She did not approach an lawyer for
she could not afford to pay a lawyer. Whenever she comes to Manila
to claim her title and confront Tomas Trinidad she used to spend
FIFTY PESOS (P50.00) per day. She felt frustrated and was mad with
the accused.
In the cross-examination of this witness she said she had been
teaching Grade IV at Pampanga for 20 years then. She admitted that
she is a signatory to the contract, Exhibit B. admitted that she did
not pay the real estate taxes of this land. She admitted that she did
not go to the Probate Court.
In the re-direct, she said that she has not paid the taxes because she
was not notified about the demand of payment. She paid the
installment as evidenced by receipts Exhibits E, E-I E-30 of Lots Nos.
19 and 51 of said subdivision managed by the accused. She said that
the accused was the administrator of land wherein the portion was
bought by her.
After the testimony of the complainant Francesca Dimabuyu, the
prosecution rested its case and offered Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, E-I to E-
30, inclusive, F, F-I to F-5, inclusive, and H, and H-1, which were all
admitted by the court. (Ibid., pp. 27-29).
On the other hand, herein petitioner, in his direct testimony and
cross, testified to the fact that in the Intestate Proceedings of the
estate of the late Nicolai Drepin, he became the Judicial
Administrator appointed in the year 1976, and he presented his
appointment and marked as Exhibit 3. He testified that he took hold
of the property of the deceased including the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation, and also the unregistered property
situated at Antipolo, Rizal. The whole lot is titled in the name of
testator. He admitted that he is the administrator of the Mother
Earth Realty Development Corporation, and that said corporation
has lots for sale. He continued to receive payments of lots for sale in
installment. In 1978 the National Housing Authority stopped the sale
of lots, and his corporation was told to stop operating the property
now the place being under control of the Ministry of Human
Settlements. According to him the complainant (Ms. Francesca T.
Dimabuyu) had not complied with all the requirements for the
complainant had not paid the taxes. He asked the Probate Court as
administrator to allow him to execute a Deed of Sale to his lot
buyers and he was allowed in November 1982, the authority was
presented and marked as Exhibit 5. The Mother Earth Realty

Development Corporation, according to him, is not in business now,
and he is not the administrator. He was appointed by the Court as
administrator in place of Atty. Guico, and he has letters of
administration presented and marked as Exhibit 3. His duties as
administrator are with the full authority to take possession of all
properties of the deceased.
In the cross examination of this witness he admitted that he was not
able to deliver any title to the complainant for according to him the
complainant had not actually paid all her obligations because there
is no adjustment considering the value of the peso which has
declined these days. The complainant has not even paid the taxes of
the land so that the contract has not been duly complied with.
On January 5, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATION, the guilt of the accused having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 25 in
relation to Section 39 of P.D. 957 hereby sentences him to
pay a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.) and to
suffer the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay
the costs. (Ibid., P. 62)
Not satisfied with the foregoing decision, herein petitioner elevated
the case to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in
toto with costs against accused-appellant. (Ibid., p. 34)
The motion for reconsideration having been denied (Ibid., p. 39),
herein petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following
issues:
I
IT IS AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION TO EXPAND THE TERM IN A PENAL
PROVISION OF PD 957 TO INCLUDE THAT WHICH IS NOT
SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR THEREIN. (Ibid., p. 10)
II
THE CONCLUSION OF THE I.A.C. THAT THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE MOTHER REALTY DEV. CORP.
(sic) FINDS NO SANCTION IN REASON AND LOGIC AND A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION. (Ibid., 13)
III
IT IS A SERIOUS ERROR OF THE IAC. NOT TO
COUNTENANCE THE SPECIFIC PROVISION OF LAW ON THE
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT IN
REFERENCE TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A
DECEDENT OF WHICH A DELIVERY OF TITLE TO A LOT IS
ONE SUCH. (Ibid., p. 15)
IV
ENFORCING PD 957 TO RETROACT TO A CONTRACT LONG
BEFORE ESTABLISHED VALID AND LEGAL THEN, VIOLATES
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, HENCE IT
IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. (Ibid., p. 17)
V
YOUR PETITIONER, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF NICOLAI DREPIN IS CAUGHT IN THE HORNS OF
A DILEMMA AND A NO WIN POSITION AT THAT. (Ibid., p.
18)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 67 of 73
Under the first two assigned errors, herein petitioner assails the
judgment of the respondent appellate court for having expanded
the term in a penal provision of PD 957, i.e., Section 39, to include
that which is not specifically provided for therein. Moreover, he
assails respondent appellate court's finding that he is also the
administrator of Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation
as non sequitur.
The contentions are without merit.
Sections 25 and 39 of Presidential Decree 957 provide, thus:
Sec. 25. Issuance of Title. — The owner or developer shall
deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full
payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required
for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of
Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In
the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at
the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the
owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the
corresponding portion thereof within six months from
such issuance in order that the title over fully paid lo or
unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in
accordance herewith.
Sec. 39. Penalties. — Any person who shall violate any of
th provision of this decree and/or any rule or regulation
that may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall upon
conviction, be punished by fine of not more than twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not
more than ten years: Provided, that in the case of
corporations, partnerships, cooperatives, or associations,
the President, Manager or Administrator or the person
who has charge with the administration of the business
shall be criminally responsible for any violation of this
Decree and/or the rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto.
From the foregoing, it is clear that any person who violate Section 25
thereof by non-delivery of the title upon full payment of the lot or in
case of a corporation, partnership, cooperative, or association, the
president, manager or administrator or the person who has charge
of the administration of the business shall be criminally responsible.
In the case at bar, Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation is
the developer of the property in question which belongs to the
deceased, Nicolai Drepin. As administrator of the estate of the said
decedent, herein petitioner took over the administration of all the
properties of said deceased including the property in question. Thus
undeniably he is also the administrator of the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation which is handling the development and
disposition of said property. This is demonstrated by the fact that
when said corporation was sued by Ms. Dimabuyu before the Nation
Housing Authority (NHA) for non-issuance of title, herein petitioner
appeared as the administrator of said corporation an appealed to
the Minister (now Secretary) of Justice from resolution of the Task
Force Division of said Ministry (no Department) in the same
capacity. In his appeal he did not deny that he is the administrator of
the said corporation and property in behalf of the deceased. What
he claims is that the title was not issued due to the failure of the
proper government agency to approve the technical description of
the lot preparatory to the issuance of the corresponding torrens title
and that PD 957 cannot be given retroactive effect to apply to
contracts entered into ten years before its passage. Again, in his
letter of December 7, 1982 to Ms. Dimabuyu delineating the
procedure to secure the title of ownership of the property in
question, herein petitioner signed as administrator not only of the
testate estate of Nicolai Drepin but also of the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation. (Ibid., pp. 31-32).
Under the third assigned error, herein petitioner contends that the
trial court and the respondent appellate court had exceeded their
jurisdiction by totally disregarding the law and penalizing an act
when the law shows the manner of performing the same.
The contention is without merit.
Section 41 of Presidential Decree 957 provides, thus:

Section 41. Other Remedies. — The rights and remedies
provided in this Decree shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may be available under
existing laws.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that whatever rights or remedies
accruing to a lot buyer, Ms. Dimabuyu in this case, under other laws
do not foreclose the application of PD 957.
In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that Ms. Dimabuyu has fully
paid in monthly installments the agreed purchase price for the lot.
Notwithstanding full payment, herein petitioner has failed and
refused to deliver to Ms. Dimabuyu the certificate of title
corresponding to the lot despite numerous demands.
Under the fourth assigned error, herein petitioner maintains that PD
957 impairs the obligations of the vendee (Ms. Dimabuyu) in the
contract to sell and that it is an ex post facto law as the provision
thereof provides retroactive effect.
The contention is likewise without merit.
Quoting the Solicitor General, the respondent appellate court aptly
rebutted this argument, thus:
Under P.D. 957, after the complainant had fully paid for
the lo in question, appellant (herein petitioner) as
administrator of t Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation, was legally bound cause the issuance of the
corresponding transfer certificate of title in the name of
the buyer. The failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to do
so is punishable under the penal provisions of Section 39
of said decree.
Likewise, under P.D. 957, it is not required that the buyer
should pay the taxes. The buyer is only required to pay for
the registration of the Deed of Sale with the Register of
Deeds for the issuance of the title but it does not mention
the payment of taxes. With respect to th alleged
devaluation of the peso, suffice it to state that at the time
thde contract was executed, the full price of the lot was
already agreed upon by the complainant and the
corporation.
Lastly, appellant (herein petitioner) asserts that P.D. 957 is
an ex post facto law as the penal provision thereof
provides retroactive effect.
P.D. 957 cannot be assailed as an ex post facto law. The act
made punishable thereunder is the failure of the owner-
developer or administrator to deliver the title of the lot or
unit to the buyer upon full payment, not the execution of a
deed of sale or contract to sell over such lot or unit before
the passage of the law. In the instant case although the
contract to sell was executed long before the enactment
of P.D. 957, the failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to
deliver the title over the lot upon full payment transpired
when the decree was already in effect. Such law is not ex
post facto for the simple reason that what is being
punished is the failure to deliver such title after the
enactment of the Decree on July 12, 1976. (Ibid., pp. 33-
34)
We however find that the fifth or last issue to be meritorious and
the same deserves Our careful consideration.
In said issue, herein petitioner maintains that to proceed execute
the deed of absolute sale without the go-signal of th Probate Court
is to be recreant to his sworn duty as administrator, as well as to
render void his actuations done without the permission of the
Probate Court.
This contention is correct and is impressed with merit. Inasmuch as
the owner-seller of the property was already deceased and there
were proceedings in the Probate Court, it was incumbent for the
Probate Court to first give authorization to administrator of the
estate to deliver titles of lots which had previously been sold. The
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 68 of 73
decedent after all, might be considered the alter ego of the Mother
Earth Realty Development Corporation. The private complainant had
been duly instructs by the accused herein to file the proper petition
or motion wit the Probate Court for delivery of said title but said
complainant for one reason or another, disregarded said
instructions. If at anybody should be blamed, it should be private
complainant herself for her failure to obtain the needed
authorization fro the court. Indeed, questions of title to any
property apparent still belonging to estate of the deceased may be
passed upon in the Probate Court, with consent of all the parties,
without prejudice to third persons such as the herein private
complainant. In fact, third persons may even intervene in the testate
or intestate proceedings to protect their interest [See Cunanan vs.
Amparo, 45 O.G. (No. 9), 3796]. Just as ordinary claimant against the
estate of the deceased are duty bound to present claim before the
Probate Court so was private complainant herein required to file her
claim for redress in said Probate Court. This is so because in the
ascertainment of claims against the estate of the decedent, the
Probate Court must weigh the extent of the liability of the estate
when compared vis-a-vis it solvency. We uphold petitioner's
contention therefore that if he had proceeded to immediately cause
the delivery of the title of private complainant herein, he could have
been held liable for a blatant disregard of the jurisdiction and
function of the Probate Court. Truly, he was caught between the
horns of a dilemma which was not of his own making. We therefore
see no criminal intent whatsoever on his part and accordingly the
judgment of the appellate court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
with costs de officio.
If the probate proceedings referred to in this case are still going on,
the proper remedy of the private complainant herein is to file before
said Probate Court her claim for the delivery of the title of the lot
she has purchased. If on the other hand, said probate proceedings
are already closed and terminated, the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation through its present President or General
Manager is hereby ordered to cause the delivery of said title to Ms.
Dimabuyu, within the shortest possible time, as soon as all the
requirements therefore have been complied with. We are giving this
remedy to prevent Ms. Dimabuyu from being prejudiced.
SO ORDERED.
Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It should not be the obligation of the buyer to file before Probate
Court her claim for delivery of the title against estate of the
decedent. That was petitioner's obligation as administrator not only
of the estate of the decedent but also administrator/manager of the
development corporation. Article 1495 of the Civil Code mandates
that the vendor is bound transfer the ownership of and deliver, as
well as warrant thing which is the object of the sale. The vendee has
the right receive, and the vendor the corresponding obligation to
transfer to the former, not only the possession and enjoyment of
the land but also the certificate of title (Gabila vs. Perez, G.R. No.
2954 27 January 1989, 169 SCRA 517).
Moreover, petitioner was not devoid of criminal intent in not
immediately delivering the certificate of title to the buyer held by
the majority (p. 15, Decision). He had reasons of his own for not
delivering. During his cross examination as a defendant witness, he
testified that the buyer had not actually paid all obligations when in
fact, she had already fully paid, on pretext that said buyer had not
paid taxes and that no adjustments had been made for the
devaluation of the peso (p. Ibid.). The payment of taxes by the
buyer, however, is required by Pres. Decree No. 957; nor was there
any contra provision for price escalation.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent.

The majority opinion states:
... We uphold petitioner's contention therefore that if he
had proceeded to immediately cause the delivery of the
title of private complainant herein, he could have been
held liable for a blatant disregard of the jurisdiction and
functions of the Probate Court. Truly, he was caught
between the horns of a dilemma which was not of his own
making. We therefore see no criminal intent whatsoever
on his part and accordingly the judgment of the appellate
court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs de
oficio. (p. 15)
It seems ironical that after private complainant, Francisca T.
Dimabuyu, a public school teacher who must have invested her life-
time savings in the small lot in question, by paying religiously the
installments due, in turn, received by the petitioner in his capacity as
manager or administrator of the Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation and administrator of the estate of Nicolai Drepin, owner
of the subdivision, should still get the blame from this Court for not
having asked the probate court to authorize the petitioner to
execute the deed of sale in her favor.
We seem to overlook the fact that the gravamen of the offense — a
special offense— under P.D. 957 is that the petitioner, as manager
of the subdivision developer, accepted the installment payments
until the purchase price had been fully paid without being able to
deliver the title to the private complainant-buyer.
Besides, if there was any one required or duty bound to seek and
obtain the authority of the probate court to execute the deed of sale
in favor of private complainant, it was the petitioner and none
other. And if, for any reason, he had no authority forthcoming from
the probate court to execute the deed of sale, he certainly had no
right or business to continue collecting or receiving payments from
the private complainant.
I vote, therefore, to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
rendered against the petitioner for violating P.D. 957.
23. FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of
the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and
possession and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff
and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana,
Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff
and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be
equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum
and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants
shall be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards,
donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the
entire estate property, including but not limited to,
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 69 of 73
specific items already mentioned in this decision and to
render an accounting of the property of the estate, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half
(1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as
expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana,
Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the
Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are:
(1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-
sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father,
Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months
after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four
months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and
his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial
High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various
parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had
inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first
wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during
her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her
only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City,
where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all
these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to
his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his
estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he
died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the
foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about
what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia
about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be
named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the
purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia
agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted
by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated
April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding
No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the
immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is
also the relative of the deceased within the third degree,
she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana,
father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing
of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and
movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the
estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have
closely known each other due to their filiation to the
decedent and they have been visiting each other's house
which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234,
Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in
good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8,
1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later,
she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the
deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of

inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115,
Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her
amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three
reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her
sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative
on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of
the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be
facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC)
declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold
properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the
deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE
JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No.
0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana
Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order
declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too
was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was
denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of
appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year
and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva
v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership
and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in
Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its
judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an
inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for
reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the
properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and
were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review
wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction
to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery
of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl.
Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the
same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from
intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject
to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within
the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had
inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate
after she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding
the fact that conformably with said agreement, the
Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the
petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for
partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 70 of 73
the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the
same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting,
distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of
the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the
intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus
far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring
Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did
not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last
paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the
settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are
quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration
of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7,
1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices
posted and the publication of these proceedings as
required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any
opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears
that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the
estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February
26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on
March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban
Javellana died single, without any known issue, and
without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the
herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late
mother who reared him and with whom he had always
been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is
hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late
Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26,
1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with
the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated.
(pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of
the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion
to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban,
and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her
share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in
Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion,
was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on
certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed
more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in
Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was
improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and
conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not
interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a
daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition
executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. The finality of the approval of the
project of The probate court, in the exercise of its

jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine
the proportion or parts to which each distributed is
entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or
illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the
jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal
distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate
and independent action is necessary to that effect, would
be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence
of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive,
dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil.
388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir
of the decedent is exclusively within the range of the
administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made
an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445,
April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not
been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra);
because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and
does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil.
137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has
not received his share, is to demand his share through a
proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action, which would be
tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate or intestate court already
final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil.
730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-
5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v.
Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-
461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency
of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil
action in which they claimed that they were the children by a
previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence,
entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties
acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the
civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of
the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal
properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his
only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations
(that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper,
in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of
the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in
issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of
the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had
been closed and terminated for over three years, the action for
annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue.
Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still
pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have
herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted
likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest
of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No.
13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly
Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia
Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr.,
ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix,
Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate,
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 71 of 73
were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he
within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate
proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is
noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's
original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her
amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was
alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is
any act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented
a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38
O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a
trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which
operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment
itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was
procured so much so that there was no fair submission of
the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent
machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced
to withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting
an available defense or cause of action in the case wherein
the judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party
was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his
own, the equitable relief against such judgment may be
availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971).
(cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno;
Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or
collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a
prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the
defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses,
whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting
fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is
one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
(Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29;
Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the
following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding
intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her
complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the
latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay
the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6
of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the
estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest
possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the
necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and
other obligations, and to do everything else required by
law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate
between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied
that they agreed to partition the estate, for their
agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2,
Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the
proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the
estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and
she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the
deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice
of the time and place of hearing of the petition is required
to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule
79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's

original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on
April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record).
Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of
May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by
order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New
Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305,
Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings
was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was
not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings
for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the
same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of
October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed
about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as
the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had
been duly published as required by law, despite which the
present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty
of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the
requisites of a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for
new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory
jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in rem no
subsequent errors or irregularities are available on
collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of
Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not false.
Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that
because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not
his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his
mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-
defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she
stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission
to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court,
matters which would defeat one's own claim or defense is
not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of
the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d
622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v.
Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144,
1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a
decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2,
Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not
preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the
deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as
his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side.
The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891
which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the
reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who inherits by
operation of law property from his descendants.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 72 of 73
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third
degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and
belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by
gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other
ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by
Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited
the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is
his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva
troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or
sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from
his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the
distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code
which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased
in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters,
nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being
relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the
collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject
estate 'without distinction of line or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is
entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate.
(p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of
the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an
agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to
Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she
filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other
due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been
visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic)
each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement,
she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did
agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime,
planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education
of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being
a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be
presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil.

227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18
SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018;
People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and
Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA
347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia
who, significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she
could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed
to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law,
Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband
confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he
endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to
give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323,
Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation" was established and duly registered in the Securities
and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following
principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of
scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of
Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one
scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and
the University of the Philippines in the Visayas both
located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St.
Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving
student who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS/Rule 73 73 of 73
upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular. (pp.
9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three
(3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in
1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2)
from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude
and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for
teaching for being the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso
Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by
the Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot
Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez,
who would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis
Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The
Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist
Association that gives yearly donations to help poor
students who want to become Redemptorist priests or
brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known
as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S.
Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise
contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising
drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)

3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will
promote the advancement and enrichment of the various
fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts.
Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be
named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of
gratitude for their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the
community to determine community needs and be able to
alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the
proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ
the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana
Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late
Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation
possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic
beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their
equivalents will be offered every February and October,
and Requiem masses every February 25th and October
llth, their death anniversaries, as part of this provision.
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to
the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as
Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia
J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr.
entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the
agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the
entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner
and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be
entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the
Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same
for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as
administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an
inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory
to terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.

6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions,

endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever
source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income
thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part
thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such
endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives
of the Foundation.

7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop,

lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or
otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted
by law, in real and personal property of every kind and
description or any interest herein.

8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary,

suitable or proper for the accomplishments of any of the
purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any time
appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the
corporation, including the exercise of the powers,
authorities and attributes concerned upon the corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and