Barredo v.

Garcia

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” thereby killing the 16
year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved
their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal
suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla).
The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of
their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that
the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.

HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to
file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment
Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is
negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic
infractions already before he hired him – something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had
Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been
subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act
(his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article
1903).

The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903
of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's
negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and
his property has not been exhausted.

Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even the
slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the
plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a
remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary
and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the
law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means
with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through
this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts
have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to
help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done
by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
Garcia v. Florido

FACTS:

 August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his
wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and
boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga
City for the purpose of attending a conference
 August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the
national highway at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and
operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala
 Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical
treatment and hospitalization
 Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers and their owners for
driving in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU
car
 RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict because there is a violation of
law or traffic rules or regulations for excessive speeding
ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a
criminal action.

HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed to
proceed with the trial of the case
 essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the
New Civil Code are present, namely:
 a) act or omission of the private respondents
 b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the
passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the
passenger car
 c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision
 d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the
fault or negligence of private respondents
 e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties
 violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe
for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury
on petitioners
 petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police
against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been
terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused
 It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the
present civil case
 petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law
itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of
the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent
court's order of dismissal
Elcano v. Hill
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case
against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then
filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case;
and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already
an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil
action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327,
Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it
is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not
really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without
the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill –
the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability
should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
Cinco v. Canonoy
FACTS:
 Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and
operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident
 At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending
the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered
 City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
 CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for

 nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
 Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant
 The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized
in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
 Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action
has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
 Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
 For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of
obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157
of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
 Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
 (1) Law;
 (2) Contracts;
 (3) Quasi-contracts;
 (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
 (5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
 Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property
 word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the
harm done
Mendoza v. Arrieta
Facts:

On October 22, 1969, at around 4pm, a 3-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway
Bulacan, involving a Mercedez Benz owned and driven by petitioner, a private jeep owned and driven by
respondent Salazar and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Timbol and driven by Montoya. As a
consequence, separate informations were filed against Salazar and Montoya.

At the trial, petitioner testified that Salazar overtook the truck, swerved to the left and hit his car. He further
testified that before impact, Salazar jumped from the jeep not knowing that Salazar was hit by the truck of
Montoya. Montoya affirmed this. On the other hand, Salazar tried to show that after overtaking the truck, he
flashed a signal showing his intention to turn left but was stopped at by a policeman directing traffic at the
intersection which he contends to be the time he was hit by the truck causing his jeep to hit petitioner’s car.

A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven by petitioner Edgardo Mendoza, a
private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar, and a gravel and sand truck owned by
respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate
Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and
Freddie Montoya with the CFI of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability,
civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar’s jeep and petitioner’s car was the
result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner
awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar. After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case against respondents
Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles.

Issue:

whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for damages based on quasi-delict
against private respondents

Held:

Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge wrongfully sustained
Timbol’s allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against him,
wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively
participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against Salazar only. For petitioner's cause of action against
Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error when he
dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that, “When the
civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.”
Timbol’s submission that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an
independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, bars the institution of such
separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relation to Articles 2176 and 2177) of the
Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of
negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation is required to be made in the criminal case. And so,
to reiterate, the civil case filed against Timbol is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the
criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal
responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously
instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended
party. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base
his cause of action against Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active
participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil
liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no
need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.

Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioner’s car for considering that the
collision between the jeep driven by him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the
hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Montoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault.
Hence, the right of petitioner to claim damages from Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as
petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c)
which provides that, “Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil right arise did not
exist…”
Dulay v. CA
FACTS:
 December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard
on duty at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay
 Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf
and in behalf of her minor children filed an action for damages against Benigno
Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp.
(Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the
injury
 Superguard:
 Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.

 civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code
 CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay
ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be
civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits
 Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute
it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused
 Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting
the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
 Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary
 extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as
 a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused
 It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay
resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on
duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer
and responsible for his acts.
Padilla v CA (Torts)

PADILLA v CA G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO
and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS:
1. The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused prevented Antonio Vergara and his
family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and
the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise

Contentions:

Vergara Family
1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest
of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.

Roy Padilla, et al
1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence
2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall
because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se
3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate
the market premise

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE
(5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount
of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly
and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this
proceedings.
(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000. The petitioners were acquitted
because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some petitioners were acquitted
because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief

Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds

1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the
criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no
civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him
2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but
must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was
acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its
attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. The
exceptions are when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.
Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a
crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant. That the same punishable act or omission can create two
kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one
of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot
recover damages under both types of liability.
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted."
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same
criminal act or omission.
The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate
civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode
of recovering damages. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review
stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
PEOPLE vs. LIGON
152 SCRA 419
July 29, 1987

Facts:
Accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat was convicted of the crime of Robbery with homicide
and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Gabat allegedly robbed Jose “Rosales” Ortiz, a 17
year old working student, who was a cigarette vendor. According to Prudencio Castillo, a
taxi driver, who allegedly saw the incident that transpired on the night Ortiz died.
According to Castillo, he was at a distance of about 3 meters travelling on the same lane and
was behind the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon together with Gabat.
Castillo, in his testimony, said that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales. That
while waiting for the traffic light to change from red to green, Castillo idly watched the
Volkswagon Kombi and saw Gabat signal to Ortiz. While Ortiz was handling the cigarettes
to Gabat, the traffic light changed to green and as the Kombi moved forward, Gabat grabbed
the box from Ortiz. Ortiz ran beside the Jombi and was able to hold on to the windowsill
with his right hand. Howeverm as the Kombi continued to speed towards the C.M. Rector
underpass, Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the said windowsill and as a
result fell face down on the ground.
On the other hand, according to Gabat, after Ortiz handed the two sticks cigarettes Gabat in
turn paid him a 5 peso bill. In order to change the said bill, Ortiz placed his box between the
arm of Gabat and the window frame. When the traffic light changed to green, Ligon moved
the vehicle forward. That in spite of Gabat’s order to stop the vehicle, Ligon said that it
could not be done due the the moving vehicular traffic. When Ortiz fell down, Gabat
shouted at Ligon but the latter replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report the
incident to the parents of Gabat and that later they would come back to the scene of the
incident. At this point, the Kombi was blocked by Castillo’s taxi and the jeep driven by the
policeman.
The trial court gave full credence to Castillo’s testimony and dismissed Gabat’s testimony
on the ground that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors do not let go of their
cigarette. Gabat was convicted by the trial court; Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.
Held:
According to the Court of Appeals, although Castillo is a disinterested witness, his
testimony even if not tainted with bias is not entirely free from doubt because his
observation of the event could have been faulty. Castillo’s taxi was driving a car lower in
height compared to the Kombi. The windshield of the Kombi (1978 model) is occupying
approximately 1/3 of the rear end of the vehicle making it visually difficult for Castillo to
observe what clearly transpired. Also, Castillo’s statement given to the police on the
evening of the incident did not mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of
Rosales from the windowsill though such appeared in the police report.
Given the circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of
Gabat was established beyond reasonable doubt. As such he is acquitted. However, such
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability as such only requires a preponderance
of evidence and such evidence is sufficient to establish Gabat’s liability. The Court finds
Gabat’s act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Ortiz. That he failed to
prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed; He failed to
help Ortiz while the latter clung to the moving vehicle; e did not enforce his order to Ligon
to stop; and that he acquiesced in the driver’s act of speeding away instead of stopping and
picking up Ortiz.
His acquittal in the criminal prosecution does not bar the heirs of Ortiz from recovering
damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Wherefore, Gabat is sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Ortiz the amount of P15,000 for
the latter’s death, P1,733 for hospital and medical expenses, 4,100 for funeral expenses,
and the alleged loss of income amounting to P20,000.
 Maniago v. CA
G.R. No. 104392, February 20, 1996
Mendoza, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in
transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to
its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his buses figured in a
vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado.
As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and multiple physical injuries against petitioner’s driver, Herminio Andaya. A
month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against
petitioner Maniago. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case
against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver and because no
reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had been made in the criminal
case. But the lower court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that pursuant to the
Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action.

Issue:

whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may

nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following provisions
of the Civil Code:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

Held:

No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved
as required by Rule 111, § 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, §1 quite
clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for
the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with
the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense
charged.” In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of
the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art.
2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the
criminal action.

On the basis of Rule 111, §§1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as
a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such
action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is
waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted
prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought
before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery
of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
Manliclic v. Calaunan
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Third Division
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:
1. The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by petitioner PRBLI and
driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza
2. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
- The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the
latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to
further extensive damage.
- Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.
3. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
4. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI
5. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
6. When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs) of the testimonies in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
7. The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

Respondent’s version:
- According to the respondent and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70
kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus
overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
rear of the jeep on the left side.
- At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other
words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit.
- Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on
another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident
took place. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped
by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Petitioner’s version:
- The petitioner explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to
overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep
in front of it.
- Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employee
8. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA found no reversible error and affirmed the RTC’s
decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the TSNs from the criminal case may be admitted in evidence for the civil case.
2. Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the CA in the criminal case that there was an absence of
negligence on his part.
3. Whether the petitioner, PRBLI, exercised due diligence and supervision of its employee.

HELD: The petitioner, Manliclic, is civilly liable for the damages for his negligence or reckless
imprudence based on quasi-delict. The PRBLI is held solidarily liable for the damages caused by the
petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

1. Admissibility of the TSNs

Petitioner’s contention:
- The TSNs should not be admitted to evidence for failure to comply with the requisites of Sec.
47, Rule 130 of the ROC
- The petitioner, PRBLI, had no opportunity to cross examine the witnesses because the criminal
case was filed exclusively against Manliclic.
- Admission of the TSNs will deprive the petitioner of due process.
Court:
- The testimonies are still admissible on the ground that the petitioner failed to object on their
admissibility.
- Failure to object to the inclusion of the evidence is a waiver on the provision of the law.
- In addition, the petitioner even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of
Ganiban.
- The court disagrees that it would deprive the petitioner of due process. For the failure of the
petitioner to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object for the non compliance with
the ROC.

2. Civil liability arising from crime v. Quasi-delict/Culpa Acquiliana

Petitioner:
- The version of the petitioner deserves more credit as the petitioner was already acquitted by
the CA of the charge of Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical
injuries.
Court:
- From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from or
based on quasi-delict: Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence
in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence
of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees
- it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground
that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.

- In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-
quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil
action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
- The extinction of civil liability referred to in the quoted provision, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused.

In sum, the court distinguished civil liability arising from a crime and that arising from quasi-
delict:

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME

(a) if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from
the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
(b) if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or
ex delicto.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT

 - A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict
or crime.
- The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil
Code. The acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
- civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of
the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist).
- An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

- The petitioners urge the court to give more credence to their version of the story however, as
they constitute a question of fact, it may not be raised as a subject for a petition for review.
Findings of the trial court and appellate court are binding on the Supreme Court.
- The testimony of the petitioner about the jeep of the respondent overtaking another vehicle in
the criminal case was not consistent with what he gave to the investigator which is evidently a
product of an after-thought
- If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor,
Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when
the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the
left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road
itself rather than having been forced off the road.

3. PRBLI’s liability
- Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection or both.
- The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of
such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.

Petitioner’s contention:
- PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees
- In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent
before he became a regular driver.
- As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence
of ready investigators is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the
supervision of its employees
Court:
- In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof.
- As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of
the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the
selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work.
- The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees
- it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver
as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in
the supervision of its personnel.
 o no evidence introduced that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding
the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the
vehicles
o no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its
driver should behave while operating their vehicles
o The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough.
Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth with regard to the supervision.
o Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown
and established.
o the lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual
containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers
- For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be
reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00.